(10 years, 10 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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I welcome you, Mr Sheridan, to the Chair. I congratulate the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) on securing this debate, and I respect the passion with which she made her points this afternoon. I hope that my comments will reassure her and clarify some of the misapprehensions she has raised in the context of the measures that have been introduced into the Immigration Bill, which is starting its consideration in another place.
I welcome the opportunity to correct some of the issues surrounding the powers to deprive a person of citizenship and the Government’s proposed legislative changes in the Bill. As the Home Secretary outlined in her speech to the House last month, depriving people of their citizenship is a very serious matter, and the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington rightly emphasised that in her contribution this afternoon. It is one of the most serious sanctions a state can take against a person. The decision requires considerable research, evidence gathering and consultation by officials throughout the Government, and the Home Secretary herself reviews and signs it off to ensure that it is proportionate and necessary. The issue also concerns national security and our attempts to remove dangerous individuals from the UK.
It may be helpful if I start by outlining the Government’s existing provisions and powers, and the safeguards that already exist, before going on to explain the purpose of the proposals in the Immigration Bill and addressing some of the hon. Lady’s specific questions.
The Minister will be aware that in response to a freedom of information request, we now know that between 2010 and 2013, the Home Secretary revoked the passports of 16 British nationals under the current section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 on public good grounds. At least five of those people were born in the UK and one had been resident for almost 50 years. When the Home Secretary was asked during Report stage of the Immigration Bill what happened to those 16 people, she did not provide specific information. Can the Minister provide information now, or at least write to me with an explanation?
I will certainly address some of the hon. Lady’s points, but I am unable to provide further details about specific cases. She is right about existing powers being utilised. Since 2006, there have been 27 examples of that. The powers have their origin in legislation dating back to the first world war—the hon. Lady looked at some of the history—when provision was made for the revocation of citizenship if a naturalised person was suspected of treasonable activities.
The current position under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, as amended by the previous Labour Government in 2002 and 2006, is that the Home Secretary can deprive a British citizen of their citizenship in two scenarios. The first is when the person acquired it using fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. That essentially means that they used deception to obtain citizenship for which they were not eligible or, had we known the full and true facts, we would not have granted the application. In such cases, the person involved may be left stateless. The second scenario is when the Home Secretary is satisfied that deprivation is
“conducive to the public good”
and the person would not be left stateless as a result. We want to amend the second of those two conditions to ensure that individuals who are a serious threat to this country cannot retain citizenship simply because deprivation would leave them stateless.
As I said, a Labour Government amended the British Nationality Act 1981 in 2002 and 2006. That provided for deprivation when it was
“conducive to the public good”.
That is a broad power which gives the Home Secretary discretion to respond to changing threats, and covers cases involving national security, including espionage, war crimes, serious and organised crime and unacceptable behaviours such as the glorification of terrorism. Conducive deprivation can be pursued against any British citizen, including British-born citizens, as a result of the changes introduced in 2002. In practice, because a person cannot be left stateless, it applies only to those who would have another nationality when they are deprived. That provision would remain and is unchanged by our proposals.
A number of safeguards are in place for deprivation cases and those will remain, which is important to understand. First, any decision to deprive will arise only after extensive research and understanding of an individual’s previous behaviour, any potential human rights issues and the threats that they pose to the UK. Officials from the Home Office and other Departments are consulted before the information is reviewed and a final decision made by the Home Secretary.
Secondly, any person deprived of their citizenship has a full right of appeal. Grounds for appeal can include both the legality of the action and the merits of the Secretary of State’s decision. Such appeals are heard at either the first-tier tribunal—the immigration and asylum chamber—or, where issues of national security are relevant, at the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or SIAC. In both cases, any onward challenge can be to the Court of Appeal or other higher courts. That is not being changed by the wider, necessary changes to the appeals system contained in the Immigration Bill.
Thirdly, deprivation action is taken only against those individuals who meet the thresholds that I have outlined. We do not and cannot take deprivation action against family members—husbands, wives or children—on the basis of their relationship to the person being deprived.
Finally, let me be clear: this Government do not take deprivation action lightly. There is a high threshold and only a small number of individuals are deprived of their citizenship. As I said, since 2006, 27 people have been deprived under these conducive powers.
The hon. Lady highlighted the new provisions in the Immigration Bill. Clause 60 is the relevant clause that she touched on: it seeks to address the most serious deprivation cases where we have previously been prevented from taking action because it may leave the individual stateless. At present, we cannot deprive someone of citizenship even in circumstances where an individual could acquire another nationality or reacquire their previous one.
We recognise the need to avoid statelessness and are committed to maintaining our international obligations. However, we do not believe that that should be at a cost to the national security of the UK. It is a fact that article 8(3) of 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness specifies that a state may retain the right to deprive any person of their nationality, regardless of whether it would leave them stateless, if the person has
“conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State”,
if, at the time of ratification, those grounds exist in domestic law.
Therefore, when the UK ratified that UN convention, it made such a declaration that allowed for the prospect of leaving a person stateless in certain circumstances. Those circumstances, as they existed in the domestic law of the time, include the ability to deprive a naturalised person of their citizenship—regardless of whether it would leave them stateless—when an individual has conducted themselves in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of Her Britannic Majesty. That is a high threshold for cases involving national security and those who take up arms against British or allied forces. Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill seeks to recreate that very set of circumstances.
Many of us are puzzled about why the Minister calls in aid national security in making people stateless, if making people stateless would in effect make it almost impossible to move them to another country. Some people cite the case of Bilal al-Berjawi, who was a British-Lebanese citizen whom we did make stateless when he was overseas. His solicitor has argued that
“the process of deprivation of citizenship made it easier for the US to then designate Sakr”—
who accompanied Bilal al-Berjawi—
“as an enemy combatant, to whom the UK owes no responsibility whatsoever.”
This man was killed in a drone attack. Are we really talking about making people stateless when they are overseas in order to make them vulnerable targets of drone attacks by the United States?
May I directly address the suggestion that any action on deprivation of citizenship is linked, in any way, to the sort of activity that the hon. Lady highlighted? I strenuously deny that. They are two clearly separate issues and there is nothing to indicate, in any respect, that they are linked.
It is true that people have been deprived while outside the UK, but I do not accept that it is a particular tactic. It is simply an operational reality that in some cases the information comes to light when the person is outside the UK or that it is the final piece of the picture, confirming what has been suspected. In other cases, we may determine that the most appropriate response to the actions of an individual is to deprive that person while they are outside the UK. Equally, there are cases where it can be determined that it is appropriate to take action to deprive individuals while they are inside the UK.
It is not true that all those deprived under the clause will be stateless. Some may be able to acquire or reacquire another nationality. In those cases, where the individual has been deprived while in the UK, we would seek to remove that individual from the UK once they had acquired another nationality. However, the clause is not limited to those cases and can be applicable to those who cannot acquire another nationality. In that event, it is open to them to make an application to stay in the UK as a stateless person.
The UK would continue to comply with the provisions of the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, regarding the rights of stateless persons. Where appropriate, we could regularise a person’s position in the UK by granting limited leave—possibly with conditions relating to access to public funds and their right to work and study.
I come back to the hon. Lady’s point about the concept, as she described it, of two-tier citizenship. We do not accept that there is, or will be, a two-tier citizenship system. The proposal merely reflects the fact that there are differing routes to citizenship, and therefore, different actions permissible depending on the actions of the person concerned. The power to deprive a person of citizenship, as I have explained, already exists and certain aspects can only be applied depending on a person’s route to citizenship. Naturalised or registered citizens can be deprived if they obtained it by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. Any citizen can be deprived if the Secretary of State considers it conducive to the public good and the person would not be left stateless as a result, so I do not accept the hon. Lady’s suggestion.
I understand that Members are concerned about instances where deprivation action takes places when a person is outside the UK, and I hear the hon. Lady’s point. I restate that the Home Secretary takes deprivation action only when she considers it is appropriate and that may mean doing so when an individual is abroad, which prevents their return and reduces the risk to the UK. That individual would still have a full right of appeal and the ability to resolve their nationality issues accordingly. It is often the travel abroad to terrorist training camps or to countries with internal fighting that is the tipping point—the crucial piece of the jigsaw—that instigates the need to act.
The Minister refers to the right of appeal, and he outlined earlier the courts available for that process. Will he confirm that it would therefore, in some cases, be an appeal that is conducted under closed material proceedings?
As I indicated, a route is open to SIAC to consider that, and closed material proceedings could be applicable in certain circumstances—not automatically; it would depend on the nature of the individual case. It is appropriate, however, that there is that right of appeal and right of challenge, and SIAC effectively provides that ability to do so.
I reassure Members that the new power would apply only to those who are naturalised citizens—crucially, not children, who are not able to naturalise as British citizens, nor anyone who is British by birth or registration. That is because our original declaration reasonably limits action only to those who have sought the privilege of British citizenship but then betray the values and laws that they swore to maintain.
Ultimately, the new power will be used sparingly. It will be relevant only in a small subset of the most serious deprivation cases, where we are currently precluded from taking action because those people would be left stateless. Our proposed clause is a targeted and proportionate measure that protects the security of the UK without jeopardising our international obligations. It provides for effective rights of appeal and for upholding the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington for bringing the matter to the Chamber this afternoon and for enabling me to set out more details on the proposals. As she has rightly identified, this matter is before the other place, and I am sure that it will give the issues careful scrutiny and consideration.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons Chamber8. How many terrorism prevention and investigation measures orders will expire during January 2014.
As of 30 November, eight TPIM notices were in force. The previous Government did not provide a running commentary on control orders, and for sound operational reasons we will not comment on individual TPIM cases. The next quarterly statistics are due to be published in March.
It is worth highlighting for the House that TPIMs provide some of the most stringent restrictions in any democratic country. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, described them as a “harsh” measure. I highlight that the two-year limit for TPIMs is supported by David Anderson and his predecessor in that role, Lord Carlile, who was appointed by the previous Labour Government. There are measures in place to manage TPIM suspects when they come off their orders, and we have confidence in the ability of the police and the Security Service to manage risk, which they do every day.
Does my hon. Friend accept that this matter is a very strong reason for looking at the radical measures hinted at by our right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in relation to the European convention on human rights? Until 10 years ago, all Governments of all complexions accepted that some foreign suspects were too dangerous to be allowed to roam about.
As my hon. Friend will know, the Government have pursued deportation with assurances in seeking to deport individuals from this country who would do us harm—we did so successfully in removing Abu Qatada from this country—but there will always be a cadre of individuals whom we cannot deport. We maintain TPIMs to be able to guard against risks from those individuals, and that is why we consider that TPIMs continue to be effective.
Does the Minister share my concern about the number of British citizens who are travelling to and from Syria to participate in extremist activity? The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation estimates that 366 British citizens have made the trip to Syria and back again, and some may well have reached the criteria that make a TPIM order appropriate. Now that the orders are expiring, is he satisfied that there are practical measures to monitor individuals of this kind?
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the risk from Syria—that individuals may travel out there and then come back and pose a risk to us in this country. That is why the Government have taken a number of steps. For example, the Home Secretary has highlighted the change and strengthening of approach in relation to the royal prerogative. We will not hesitate to take measures to disrupt travel and to prosecute those involved in terrorism whether here or in other countries, such as Syria.
Will the Minister assure me that he will not follow the example of Labour Front Benchers who, in a debate last week, trampled on centuries of long-established principles of justice purely to look tough on this issue? Instead, will he continue to balance the principles of British justice with the rights of suspects?
My hon. Friend makes a very important point about the whole issue of the challenges that can be made in the courts. As control orders were being steadily eroded, we reviewed them very carefully as part of the counter-terrorism review at the start of this Parliament. The courts have upheld every TPIM notice that they have reviewed, and TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts, counter-terrorism reviewers, the police and the Security Service.
Last year, after Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed absconded from his TPIM, the Home Secretary told this House that he no longer posed a threat to the UK.
Turning to AM, another terrorist subject, Lord Justice Mitting concluded that AM was involved in
“a viable plot to commit mass murder by bringing down transatlantic passenger airlines by suicide bombings, which was disrupted by the arrest and prosecution of a number of individuals in the United Kingdom”,
and that
“there is every reason to believe that AM would have killed himself and a large number of other people”.
With AM’s TPIM order arbitrarily ending this month, will the Minister now confirm to the House that AM no longer presents a threat to the United Kingdom?
It would be wrong to comment on the detailed operational issues surrounding TPIM subjects, as that could undermine the very work of the police and security services. The police and security services have been clear that TPIMs have been effective in reducing the risk from such individuals, and they have tailored plans in place to manage them. If any individual engages in any further terrorist-related activity after the expiry of their TPIM, the police will not hesitate to prosecute.
Does this matter not underline the problems caused by European human rights and make stronger the case for human rights modernisation and reform to ensure that the UK Supreme Court has the final say?
As my hon. Friend will know, we are actively considering how to strike the right balance on human rights. The Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims and the Secretary of State for Justice are looking at that issue closely to ensure that the rights and freedoms of individuals are upheld properly in this country.
9. What the cost has been of providing surveillance for suspects subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures to date.
Additional funding of tens of millions of pounds has been made available to the police and the Security Service each year for surveillance, technical capabilities and other measures to mitigate the overall risk as part of the TPIMs package.
What can the Minister say to reassure my constituents in Sunderland about the increased risk that they are at after the release in the past week of six very dangerous people on TPIMs, bearing it in mind that two people have previously disappeared without trace?
It is worth highlighting that under the previous Government’s control order regime, seven individuals disappeared in six years. We have increased spending on the security and intelligence agencies and protected counter-terrorism policing budgets in the 2015-16 spending round to ensure that the capabilities are maintained. That includes resources for surveillance and the management of TPIMs subjects. Upholding national security remains the priority of this Government.
10. What steps she is taking to reduce violent crime.
15. What steps she is taking to ensure all directly employed and contract staff who work in her Department are paid the living wage.
Directly employed Home Office staff are already paid above the living wage, and we are working with our suppliers to ensure that agency workers are paid in line with Home Office pay levels. Contract staff working in the Home Office are paid above the minimum wage, but decisions on pay rates are for their employers.
The Home Office lags behind some other Departments, including the Treasury, the Department for Work and Pensions and No. 10, which are already living wage Departments. Does the Minister agree that Whitehall should lead from the front in tackling low pay and in-work poverty, and will he agree to meet representatives of the Living Wage Foundation to discuss how the Home Office can be accredited as a living wage employer?
We do encourage the living wage, as the hon. Lady will know from the statements she refers to. I am pleased to say that the Home Office pay settlement for the past year focused on enhancing the pay of its lowest-paid staff who, as a result, received significant increases—19.6% above the living wage in central London, and 6.6% higher outside London. I will reflect carefully on what she said and consider the appropriateness of such a meeting, given the issues at stake.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the best way to achieve the living wage is by cutting tax for low earners, as the Government have already done? Will he lobby the Treasury to cut tax for low earners still further by raising the threshold at which low earners pay national insurance?
My hon. Friend has made his own representation through the point he has raised, but I absolutely support his recognition of the work the Government have done for those on low pay, and in taking people out of the tax system altogether.
17. What recent assessment she has made of the level of crime on public transport in London.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberLet me say at the outset that this Government regard protecting the British public from terrorism as absolutely one of the most important functions of the state. I stress the seriousness and weight that the Home Secretary, other Ministers and I attach to the exercise of these powers, and therefore the careful consideration that we give to them.
We have been consistently clear that violence and extremism of all kinds have no place in today’s society. We believe that individuals who engage in terrorist activity should be prosecuted wherever and whenever possible. The right place for terrorists is behind bars. In that context—I am sure that this will be supported by Members in all parts of the House—I recognise and pay tribute to the work of the police and the security services in protecting the security of our country and pursuing those who would seek to do us harm.
However, where individuals who pose a threat to this country and its people cannot be prosecuted or deported, we need powerful measures that can help manage the risk. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) made that point clearly. That was exactly why we took stock and reviewed the control orders that the previous Government had used. Despite what a number of Members have said today, it was clear to us that control orders were not working as they were intended to.
During the six years for which control orders existed, seven people absconded. Moreover, they were being steadily eroded by the courts. A total of eight were either quashed or revoked because they were thought wrong in principle, because they were believed no longer to be necessary or because the previous Government were unable to make a disclosure ordered by the court. Furthermore, in four cases the relocation of individuals subject to control orders was quashed. That was why we judged that the state of affairs was untenable. The British public rightly expect protection from dangerous individuals, and we needed a robust system that would provide effective and workable restrictions. We therefore ordered a lengthy and considered review of our counter-terrorism powers against the risk that then existed.
We judge that TPIMs have proved effective and workable. They have consistently been upheld by the courts, they have been endorsed by two separate independent reviewers of counter-terrorism legislation and they have the confidence of the police and the Security Service. To quote David Anderson, they are a “harsh measure” that provide some of the toughest controls possible in the democratic world. They provide for a comprehensive range of restrictions that can be placed on terror suspects, including daily reporting; overnight residence at a specified address; a ban on overseas travel; the wearing of a global positioning system tracking tag; limits on the use of telephones, computers and financial services and on association; and exclusion from specific places such as ports and airports. They give the police certainty about how individuals will be managed. In his first annual report on TPIMs, David Anderson stated:
“In terms of security, the TPIM regime continues to provide a high degree of protection against untriable and undeportable persons who are judged on substantial grounds to be dangerous terrorists”.
The right hon. Gentleman needs to understand—I am sure he will recognise this, as a former Home Secretary—that we need to focus on the management of dangerous offenders’ exit strategies and how they are released. As the Home Secretary made clear, the courts struck down relocation on a number of occasions. Our concern has been, and always will be, about having a continuing arrangement to provide assurance about the management of such offenders. Most importantly, the police and the Security Service, whose opinions are after all the ones we should listen to on the subject, say that TPIMs have been effective in disrupting individuals and networks that pose a threat to this country’s security. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made clear, however, they are only one weapon in the fight against extremism and terrorism.
The right hon. Gentleman and other Labour Members have implied that, in essence, the measure was a silver bullet and the solution, but that absolutely was not the case. The courts have challenged relocation in individual cases, and it is therefore important for us to reflect on that in the management of those individuals.
As my colleague the Home Secretary has made clear, TPIMs are only one weapon in our fight against extremism and terrorism. They are used only in exceptional circumstances as part of measures designed to disrupt a person’s activities—in other words, part of the bigger picture that my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) mentioned. Alongside TPIMs, the Government provided additional funding of tens of millions of pounds a year to the Security Service and the police, substantially increasing their surveillance and counter-terrorism capabilities. In addition to TPIMs, a range of tough measures are in place to disrupt the activities of people engaged in terrorist activities, and prevent people from becoming radicalised.
We are using the royal prerogative to remove passports from British nationals whom we believe want to travel abroad to take part in terrorist and extremist activity, and who on their return would pose a threat to this country. We have strong controls in place at British ports, and the National Border Targeting Centre is able to check advance passenger information provided by carriers, and identify any known persons of interest who intend to travel. We have the power to exclude extremists and preachers of hate from coming to this country, and where necessary we may consider the use of other disruptive powers, including deprivation of British citizenship where an individual is a dual national and the Home Secretary determines that such action is conducive to the public good.
I am grateful; the hon. Gentleman has a couple of minutes to tell Parliament what it needs to know. In the judgment of the Home Secretary, which of the six people who will be released from their TPIMs, and who were considered so dangerous that they needed to have those restrictive measures, still pose a security threat?
As the Home Secretary made clear, and as I said in my contribution this afternoon, the police and the Security Service have stated that TPIMs have been effective in reducing the risk associated with those individuals. The right hon. Gentleman, and others, have sought to make a point about the risk assessments. Those have been made but they are an operational matter for the police and the Security Service. It would seem that right hon. and hon. Members are seeking to have information disclosed on the Floor of the House that could make it that much harder for the police and the Security Service to do their job of protecting this country.
The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides for the appointment of an independent reviewer of the operation of that Act, and for that reviewer to report annually on the outcome of that review. David Anderson has been appointed to perform that function and reviews all TPIM cases. No doubt he will cover those coming off their TPIMs in his annual report.
We are returning dangerous foreign nationals who have no right to be here back to their home countries through deportation with assurances, just as we did with Abu Qatada last July—something the previous Labour Government failed to do. We are working to do more than ever to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. I am clear that the best place for a terrorist is in a cell, and those who endanger lives and threaten our national security deserve to receive long sentences. Unlike under the Labour party, which was content for convicted terrorists to be released halfway through their sentences, under new proposals, criminals convicted of serious terrorism offences and who receive a determinate sentence will no longer be automatically released at the halfway point of their prison sentences without any assessment.
claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).
Question put forthwith, That the question be now put.
Question agreed to.
Main Question accordingly put.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsThe National Fraud Authority (NFA) annual report and accounts 2012-13 has been laid before the House today and copies will be available in the Vote Office. They will be published shortly on the NFA’s pages of the gov.uk website.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2013, which was laid before this House on 2 December, be approved.
The Government are determined to do all they can to minimise the threat from terrorism to the UK and our interests abroad. Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to tackle terrorist activities. In that regard, we propose to add Imarat Kavkaz, also known as the Caucasus Emirate, to the list of international terrorist organisations, amending schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This is the 13th proscription order under that Act.
Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if she believes it is currently concerned in terrorism. The Act specifies that an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism, including the unlawful glorification of terrorism; or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
If the test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise this discretion the Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors, namely the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat it poses to the UK; the specific threat it poses to British nationals overseas; the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.
Given the wide-ranging impact of proscription, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after a thorough review of the available relevant information and evidence on the organisation. This includes open-source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across Government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Home Secretary is supported in her decision-making process by the cross-Whitehall proscription review group. Decisions to proscribe are taken with great care by the Home Secretary, and it is right that the case for proscribing organisations must be approved by both Houses.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, we firmly believe that Imarat Kavkaz is currently concerned in terrorism. Right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate that I cannot comment on specific intelligence, but I hope to provide the House with a brief summary of its activities. Imarat Kavkaz or the Caucasus Emirate is a terrorist organisation that seeks a sharia-based caliphate across the north Caucasus. It regularly uses terrorist tactics, and has carried out attacks against both Russian state and civilian targets.
The organisation claimed responsibility for the January 2011 suicide attack on Domedodevo airport in Moscow that killed 35 people, including one British national, and a suicide attack on the Moscow metro in March 2010 that killed 39 people. Since, then, Imarat Kavkaz has continued its activities, including renewed threats of activity in Russia this summer. The organisation is designated by the US, and is listed by the UN under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime.
Subject to the agreement of this House and the other place, the order will come into force on Friday 13 December. It is, of course, not appropriate for us to discuss specific intelligence that leads to any decision to proscribe, but I hope that the House will agree that it is right to add Imarat Kavkaz to the list of proscribed organisations under schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000.
I thank the Minister for his statement and explanation, and for taking the time to talk to me about the order earlier today. There is a long tradition of cross-party co-operation on issues of national security, and the Opposition will support the Government’s motion.
Under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, a group can be proscribed if the Home Secretary is persuaded that it
“(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”
In addition to the Minister’s speech, a wealth of publicly available evidence links Imarat Kavkaz to acts of terror.
Indeed, the United Kingdom is two years behind the United States in proscribing the organisation. The United States acted in 2011, after Imarat Kavkaz was linked to two deadly attacks in Moscow. In January 2011, the group was linked to an attack at Moscow international airport, in which 35 people were killed and scores were wounded. The group was also linked to an attack carried out by two female bombers in March 2010, which killed 39 people in the Moscow metro.
The State Department helpfully gave us background information on Imarat Kavkaz or the Caucasus Emirate, as it is otherwise known. The group was founded in late 2007 by the Chechen extremist Doku Umarov. It is an Islamic militant organisation based in Russia’s north Caucasus. Its stated goal is the liberation of what it considers Muslim lands from the control of Moscow. It regularly conducts attacks against Russian security forces in the north Caucasus. As the Minister said, Imarat Kavkaz is linked to al-Qaeda through its leader, Doku Umarov, who I understand is one of the world’s most wanted terrorists.
Terrorist organisations originating in that part of the world have been in the spotlight because of last year’s attacks in Boston in the United States. In the light of those attacks, it is appropriate for the Government to review the activity of related groups in the United Kingdom.
The Opposition are always limited in what they can say in such cases, because we do not of course have access to the same intelligence as the Home Secretary. It would therefore be helpful if the Minister commented generally on why the United Kingdom has decided to act now.
I also want to ask the Minister about the effects of proscription on social media. Imarat Kavkaz has a number of Facebook pages and a range of fan pages are directed towards Doku Umarov. I hope that the Minister will clarify whether Facebook will be prohibited from hosting such fan pages and allowing people in the United Kingdom to access them once the group is proscribed.
The Government take the misuse of social media and the internet extremely seriously. The group’s Facebook page has been referred to the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which has responsibility for assessing such issues. If the site is assessed to be illegal, the CTIRU will flag that up with Facebook directly and have it taken down.
I am grateful to the Minister for responding on that point.
As I said earlier, the Opposition are always limited in what they can say about proscription because it is up to the Home Secretary to analyse the evidence and make a decision. However, that did not stop the previous Opposition calling for proscription. The former Leader of the Opposition, who is now the Prime Minister, said to the House that he wanted Hizb ut-Tahrir to be banned. I hope that the Minister will say what progress has been made in banning Hizb ut-Tahrir and that he will assure the House that he continues to keep the activities of that group under review.
Earlier this year, I raised in the House my concerns about the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir on university campuses. It was singled out by the Prevent strategy review as a group that was active in radicalising students on university campuses. That concern is particularly pertinent given the current trial of Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, who were radicalised at the university of Greenwich.
Finally, I want to raise the issue of de-proscription and time limits. The Minister is well aware that the Home Affairs Committee has long asked the Government how a group can be de-proscribed. The only group ever to be de-proscribed sought de-proscription through judicial review proceedings. The Select Committee has been pushing the Government for some time to put a proper structure in place for making such decisions. Time-limiting proscription was recommended by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC. He felt that a proscription order should be subject to a review after a fixed period, following which it could be renewed or it would lapse. The Minister has been pressed on that issue on previous occasions. I hope that he will update the House tonight on the Government’s position or at least give an indication of the steps the Government are taking towards reaching a conclusion on how to de-proscribe.
I will respond briefly to the short points that have been made. I welcome the support that has been offered for the motion this afternoon.
The proscription of Imarat Kavkaz will demonstrate our condemnation of that group’s activities. Proscribing Imarat Kavkaz will also enable the police to carry out disruptive action against its supporters in the UK and ensure that it cannot operate here. I strongly endorse the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) about the strength of communities. The work of the Prevent strategy has been enhanced and taken forward through the extremism taskforce, and he will know that further steps have been identified through that work. One issue that we are examining further is whether there should be a requirement for banning orders that sit underneath proscription—in other words, proscription is focused on those who are actively engaged in terrorism, but we are considering carefully whether there should be a further order aimed at any group that undertakes extremist behaviour that is counter to our fundamental values. Following that reflection, we will bring further proposals before the House.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) asked me about de-proscribing. There is a high bar for a decision to proscribe a group in the first place, so it is right to take a precautionary approach when considering any removal of groups from the list. As allowed by legislation, de-proscription should be considered on receipt of an application, which should set out the grounds on which it is contended that the group is no longer concerned in terrorism. The Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days, and if she agrees to de-proscribe the organisation, she will lay an order before Parliament removing the organisation from the list of proscribed organisations. The order is subject to the affirmative procedure, as is the order being debated this afternoon. We believe, therefore, that there is an effective process for the Home Secretary to consider de-proscription on application from groups, and there is a right of appeal and challenge.
The hon. Lady highlighted Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is not currently proscribed. Proscription can be considered only when the Home Secretary believes an organisation to be concerned in terrorism, as defined by the Terrorism Act. However, that group is an organisation about which the Government have significant concerns, and we will continue to monitor its activities very closely. Individual members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are, of course, subject to the general criminal law.
We are taking action now in response to continued activity by Imarat Kavkaz and renewed threats in Russia during the summer. We believe that it is appropriate to bring the order before the House this afternoon, and I hope the House will support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Humber Bridge Bill
Consideration of Lords amendments
Lords amendments 1 to 22 agreed to.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberIt is clear from all that we have heard in this debate that modern slavery is a brutal crime that knows no boundaries and does not discriminate on grounds of creed, culture or race. Traffickers and slave masters exploit whatever means they have at their disposal to coerce, deceive and force individuals into a life of abuse, servitude and inhumane treatment.
That is why I congratulate the Backbench Business Committee and, in particular, the hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) on securing this timely debate, when the Government are finalising their draft Bill on modern slavery. The hon. Lady made a passionate speech. I recognise that for many years she has felt strongly about and campaigned on this important policy matter, which affects so many of our communities. We will reflect on many of the comments made this afternoon, even if the limited time available does not allow me to comment in detail now. I recognise the important contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) and his role supporting the work of the all-party group on human trafficking and modern day slavery when he chaired it, and the many other people who have sought to ensure that this House properly considers this important issue and is better informed about it.
I was struck by several of the comments made and descriptions given by right hon. and hon. Members this afternoon as they sought to describe modern slavery and trafficking. The right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field) described it as “evil”, my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Sir John Randall) as an “abomination”. In describing the impact of child slavery, the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) talked about children being “commodities for profit”. What an appalling description, but a sad reality.
We also got a sense of the lack of visibility. I have spoken about the need to shine a light on this appalling issue, and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham) talked about the comment: “It doesn’t happen here, does it?” Well, we know that it does. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), who has seen that starkly in his constituency, summed up how in many ways this crime can be in plain view and yet somehow not seen. That underlines the need for further training, which is one practical element towards ensuring that front-line professionals, as well as the public, have greater knowledge and awareness. The contribution of the hon. Member for Hyndburn (Graham Jones) underlined the appalling and sick nature of this problem when he highlighted the age of some of the children involved, which brings the issue home.
Yesterday I had the privilege to visit ECPAT to speak to some child victims of trafficking. I heard their testimony directly and found out about the impact of this problem on them. I discussed what more we could do to support victims by identifying them and ensuring that the practical services are in place to provide support.
This afternoon’s contributions were encouraging in that they have shown a clear and strong desire across the House to work closely together to rid the UK of this evil.
Will the Minister have time in the course of his remarks to respond on the issue of the awareness cards and whether the Home Office could look at distributing them across the UK?
Awareness is a key issue. It will be a question of seeing what will work in different areas. Before attending this debate, I was at a conference on how social media can be a very good way to help promote debate about child trafficking. I also went to the launch of something called the cube network, which involved passing around wooden cubes to identify problems and raise awareness. There are a number of ways of achieving this, but it is quite clear that we need to ensure greater awareness at each level.
We do not know the full extent and nature of the criminality involved, hence the work of the hon. Member for Slough and the all-party group to seek to identify information more clearly. That was clear, too, from the contribution of the hon. Member for Stockport. We have seen figures coming through the national referral mechanism relating to the provision of support to victims, and information from the UK Human Trafficking Centre is also relevant. I am clear, however, that that understates the position, and I expect the numbers to rise over the coming years. I see it as a good thing, not a bad thing, if we are better able to identify those in need of support. We will be strengthening our enforcement response by bringing to justice those responsible for these heinous crimes.
The Government are absolutely committed to combating human trafficking and to supporting and protecting the victims of these appalling crimes. We have announced plans to introduce a modern slavery Bill, which will strengthen our response to human trafficking and underpin the work of law enforcement agencies in prosecuting the perpetrators. In so doing, we shall be able to identify more victims and ensure that these crimes are prevented.
The Bill will consolidate existing trafficking offences to make it simpler to prosecute human traffickers. It is important to assist law enforcement to achieve that. It is intended to increase the maximum sentence for trafficking offences to life imprisonment, so that modern-day slave-drivers will face the full force of the law. The Bill will introduce an anti-slavery commissioner to oversee efforts to tackle modern slavery and help to facilitate more prosecutions and convictions of human traffickers.
The Bill is also about the here and now. I want the draft Bill to make a difference. It is that crucial first building block. I think it was the right hon. Member for Birkenhead who said that we were on a journey, and I see this as part of a continuing journey because this important Bill will lead to further action that could be taken by successive Governments over the years ahead as well.
How to support activity without legislation—the practical issues—is another key point, and it is important that the Home Secretary has made tackling human trafficking a priority for the new National Crime Agency, which will provide strong national leadership to drive forward prosecutions and bring traffickers to justice. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay), along with my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and others, highlighted the need for greater enforcement. Victim care is also fundamental to our comprehensive approach to combating trafficking, and we have guaranteed up to £4 million a year to fund specialist support for adult victims of human trafficking.
The hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) spoke about the national referral mechanism. I can tell her that the Home Secretary has committed herself to a review of the national referral mechanism to establish how it is working and what further improvements can be made. I am conscious that this is about the here and now, and about what useful steps can be taken.
I have referred to the flagship Bill that we intend to introduce. In order to ensure that it will have the right impact, the Home Secretary has asked the right hon. Member for Birkenhead, in his role as vice-chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and as a member of the Centre for Social Justice advisory council, to lead an urgent public debate about practical and effective ways of ending modern slavery in the United Kingdom. It will take the form of a series of evidence sessions hosted by the Centre for Social Justice. The Human Trafficking Foundation has facilitated the participation of key witnesses from abroad to help us to draw on best practice.
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Birkenhead, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip, and to Baroness Butler-Sloss for taking evidence for the Centre for Social Justice. I also want to recognise the contribution of Anthony Steen, who has been appointed special envoy to the Home Secretary. He will consider what needs to be done to improve our response, focusing particularly on what happens overseas and on how we can ensure that an end-to-end approach is taken.
I should make it absolutely clear to the hon. Member for Slough that the Salvation Army and its subcontractors have not been prevented from speaking to the evidence sessions. I understand that each of them has been contacted personally by Ministry of Justice officials who have encouraged them to make their important contributions to the process. I want to ensure that, as we proceed with the draft Bill, the pre-legislative scrutiny and, subsequently, the Bill in its final form, we have an opportunity to consider all the input—and that will include careful reflection on much of what has been said today about issues such as non-prosecution and domestic abuse.
I believe that the debate has sent a clear and ringing message about our commitment to ensuring that this appalling crime is dealt with firmly, effectively and finally for the benefit of all the victims of this trade, and to achieving together what I think we all want to achieve: the consigning of modern slavery to the history books, which is where it ought to be.
(11 years ago)
Commons Chamber5. What steps she is taking to tackle online crime.
The Government are taking a range of steps to combat online crime. They include significantly strengthening law enforcement’s capabilities through the creation of the national cybercrime unit, the establishment of specialist regional policing teams and training 5,000 police officers in digital investigation skills.
Investigating and preventing online crime often requires specialist technical skills. Will the National Crime Agency be able to bring in non-police specialists, to ensure that it has access to the widest range of technical skills to tackle cybercrime?
My hon. Friend makes an important point on the need for specialist capabilities in the new national cybercrime unit, and indeed in the National Crime Agency. The NCA has established a specials programme to encourage people to volunteer to provide specialist knowledge. I do not know whether my hon. Friend, who has a strong background in IT, is making his case for being a special in the National Crime Agency, but that is certainly something that we are seeking to encourage.
20. The Olympics were overseen by police Operation Podium to stop online criminal ticket touting. Will the Minister look into working with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to make the rugby world cup an event of national significance, and to stop real fans being ripped off?
I think the hon. Gentleman will be aware that ticketing fraud has been looked at by colleagues in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and Operation Podium was a great success for the Metropolitan police. The economic crime unit in the National Crime Agency is very focused on combating all forms of fraud. Certainly, we will continue to reflect on the need to take firm action on all fraud, wherever it occurs.
6. What assessment she has made of the expected level of immigration from Romania and Bulgaria between 2014 and 2018.
14. What steps she is taking to ensure that all appropriate powers are available to seize the UK and overseas assets of people engaged in human trafficking.
The Government are committed to tackling human trafficking and are determined to build on the UK’s strong record in supporting victims. The proposed modern slavery Bill, the first of its kind in Europe, will strengthen our response by increasing the number of successful prosecutions and convictions. The new serious and organised crime strategy makes it clear that attacking criminal finances is at the heart of our efforts to pursue all organised criminals. We are committed to strengthening legislation and ensuring that existing powers are effectively deployed both here and overseas.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that answer. Given the challenges of seizing traffickers’ assets, will he ensure that greater urgency is given to getting hold of them and making sure they go to compensate the victims of these horrendous crimes?
I think that it is important to underline to my hon. and learned Friend the steps that are being taken. Last year, about £1 million was taken off human trafficking offenders by way of enforcement of confiscation orders. Equally, I am absolutely clear on the need for more action. That is why the new National Crime Agency has been tasked with making the tackling of modern slavery one of its priorities, and why we are introducing the modern slavery Bill to up prosecutions and up such enforcement action. Indeed, the Bill will include provision for a new commissioner to get a stronger operational response on the recovery of assets and on other prosecutions.
One of the poisonous sidelines in the deplorable trade of human trafficking is of course the existence of rogue and criminal gangmasters. Are the Government minded to support Labour’s call to extend the gangmasters licensing regime to cover sectors to which this devastating trade has now spread, because it has gone beyond its traditional areas into construction, social care and other sectors where these rogues and criminals reside?
I can say to the hon. Gentleman that the National Crime Agency is working closely with the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and, indeed, has been involved in an important operation in Cambridgeshire in the past few weeks. Evidence is being taken by the Centre for Social Justice as part of our preparations for the modern slavery Bill. We are focusing on provisions that relate to enforcement by policing and law enforcement agencies, but we will clearly keep operational matters under review.
On the basis of figures about UK citizens receiving consular advice for alleged trafficking and the fact that very few seem to be brought to justice overseas, is the Minister giving proper attention and resources to ensuring that UK citizens who ply this evil trade abroad are properly brought to justice?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend on the need to look at this complex issue both domestically in the UK and overseas. That is why we are working with other Governments and our embassies to strengthen support services for victims and to prevent these appalling crimes from occurring. The National Crime Agency has a focus on looking internationally and co-ordinating its work with overseas law enforcement agencies, so ensuring that where there is evidence, those involved in these pernicious crimes will be brought to justice.
15. What steps she is taking to reduce net immigration.
Ultimately, child trafficking is a form of child abuse. When such crimes take place, not only should those responsible be brought to justice, but victims should receive all the support that they need. Local authorities have a strategy duty under the Children Act 2004 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, and the Department for Education, recognising the specific needs of child victims of trafficking, is considering ways of strengthening support arrangements for them.
The Home Secretary will, I hope, be aware of the tragic murder of my constituent Bijan Ebrahimi, whose killer was sentenced last Thursday. He was attacked because his neighbours thought, quite unjustifiably, that he was a paedophile. I have written to the Home Secretary, but may I urge her to do all that she can to ensure that the Independent Police Complaints Commission has the resources that will enable it to report as quickly as possible? Resolving this matter is very important for community cohesion in the area.
(11 years ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have decided not to opt in to the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Co-operation (Eurojust) at this time. The Government will, however, conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting into the Eurojust regulation post adoption.
The Government value UK membership of Eurojust as currently established where Eurojust’s role is about providing support and co-ordination to investigations and prosecutions in cases of cross-border crime. That is why the Government are seeking to rejoin those arrangements as part of the 2014 opt out decision. However, the Commission’s new proposal creates substantial concerns; most notably by extending the mandatory powers of Eurojust national members and through the proposed interaction between Eurojust and the parallel proposal for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).
As confirmed in the coalition agreement, the Government will not participate in the establishment of any EPPO.
We will remain a full and active participant in both the Eurojust and EPPO negotiations to defend our national interests.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have decided to opt in to the Council decisions to sign and conclude the transfer and processing of passenger name records data agreement with Canada (European Union Document Nos. 12645/13 and 12637/13).
These decisions relate to a draft agreement between Canada and the European Union to allow the use and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data to the Canadian competent authority. PNR is a record of each passenger’s travel requirements which contains all information necessary to enable reservations to be processed and controlled by air carriers.
The UK has recognised first hand the benefits of PNR through its own border systems programme (formally e-Borders), which has already been used to arrest suspects wanted for serious offences such as murder, rape and kidnap. For this reason, the Government remain committed to the use of PNR as a way of tackling serious crime and terrorism but not at the expense of data protection and civil liberties.
The agreement provides that Canada shall ensure that its competent authority processes PNR “strictly” for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorism and other serious crime that is transnational in nature. Such processing constitutes a legitimate objective for the purposes of article 52 of the charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. PNR data have a clear value in combating these types of crime, which goes to the necessity of the measure to protect the public.
The agreement is strictly limited to the transfer of PNR for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism and other serious transnational crime. It is therefore not directly applicable to the control of immigration but could be used to help fight people trafficking.
We are in regular contact with the airline carriers, on whom the burden for provision of PNR data rests. They are required by Canada to provide such data already; this agreement will provide the legal coverage they need to do so. The arrangements envisaged are already in operation in practice and the proposed agreement will not have undue impact on the carriers’ existing systems.
We expect the agreement to be adopted at the December Justice and Home Affairs Council under the “A points” list.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I congratulate the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) on securing this debate and on the passionate and eloquent way in which he has advanced his argument. I also pay tribute to his supporters, the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) and my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab).
Although there have been notes of discord and disagreement this afternoon, I am sure we all agree on how essential is the work that our intelligence agencies do for us day in, day out to keep this country safe by confronting the diverse terrorist threat that this country continues to face. Generally, they are unable to make those points directly themselves, and I recognise the contributions that many right hon. and hon. Members have made in underlining the importance of our intelligence agencies’ work. It is vital that we do so.
It is also important to underline very clearly the role of scrutiny and the powerful impact that it can have. In many ways, that was brought home in a very real sense by my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who highlighted the work of the ISC following the Bali bombing. In doing so, he also highlighted the value and importance that scrutiny can directly offer.
However, we should also be clear about the importance of intelligence gathering to our agencies’ ability to maintain an edge in tackling terrorism and stopping criminals. While maintaining that edge is vital to our ability to ensure national security, I absolutely agree that that does not mean that the activities of the intelligence agencies can or should go unchecked. It is absolutely right that intelligence work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework that ensures that activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate. I hope to explain why we believe that is absolutely the case.
The work of the security and intelligence agencies is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that their activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from Secretaries of State, from the interception of communications commissioner and the intelligence services commissioner, as well as from the ISC itself. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) rightly highlighted the work of the relevant commissioners in that regard, which I will return to later in my contribution.
Oversight is absolutely essential, but much of it must necessarily take place behind closed doors to ensure that secret intelligence remains secret. That has to be a key theme in the work undertaken, because although I recognise the desire for transparency—I have heard the points about that very clearly—at the same time there has to be a role for secrets in order for our agencies to conduct the work that they do. That information should not be kept unnecessarily out of the public domain, but secrecy is essential to safeguard sensitive methods and sources, and to protect the lives of those who agree to work for us on the basis of confidentiality and anonymity.
I hope that the Minister does not think that this is a semantic point, but there is a difference between transparency and scrutiny, and this debate is about scrutiny. We are talking about new technological abilities to process huge amounts of data that may not have been empowered by very old legislation, or at least are tenuously empowered by old legislation. What I hope he can explain today is why Tempora, which is a whole new raft of intelligence gathering, was not given scrutiny in Parliament, as RIPA and other pieces of legislation were?
I say to the hon. Gentleman that publicly discussing sensitive techniques and sensitive tactics of our intelligence agencies is simply not appropriate in terms of safeguarding their work. However, I can also say to him very clearly that arrangements are in place to ensure that GCHQ neither obtains nor discloses any material except so far as necessary in pursuit of its statutory functions, as defined in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which he will be very well aware of.
As far as interception activity by GCHQ is concerned, GCHQ operates at all times in accordance with RIPA. That is not just a statement; GCHQ’s activity is overseen by the commissioners, who analyse its work in detail. They also analyse some of the codes of practice that the agencies have in place to ensure their adherence to RIPA.
Such levels of assurance are in place within our oversight regime, which I believe is very effective because our intelligence agencies’ activity is overseen by a greater variety of bodies than many other areas of Government business. At the parliamentary level, the ISC examines the policy, administration, past operations and expenditure of the intelligence agencies and parts of the wider Government intelligence community. Indeed, the ISC’s position has been strengthened by the Justice and Security Act 2013, which has only been passed into law through this House very recently.
The Minister makes the extremely good point that it is “past operations” that can be looked at, and there are constraints on what the ISC can look at; it does not have a completely free rein on operational matters. What happens if an operation lasts for many, many years? At what stage is there any sort of scrutiny of that?
To be fair to the hon. Gentleman, he took part in the consideration of the Justice and Security Act 2013, although he did not make then a number of the points that he has made this afternoon. However, we need to be very careful to ensure that scrutiny does not seek to cut across into direct, ongoing operational activity. I am quite sure that, given the robustness of the new powers that the ISC itself will hold, that consideration is very much in the forefront of the minds of the Committee members.
In response to the perfectly reasonable issue raised by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), I must say that this point was seized on by the ISC itself. We have completed discussions with the Government, the results of which will appear in a memorandum of understanding that will be published and include details of how these matters will be dealt with. That will ensure that that consideration cannot be used as an improper way of preventing the ISC from obtaining access to operations that—by any normal, common-sense approach—could be considered as completed.
It is also important to highlight that, at a political level, the intelligence agencies are ultimately accountable to the Prime Minister, but on a day-to-day basis it is Secretaries of State—primarily my right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary—who are responsible for balancing the need to protect national security and the need to fulfil their duty to protect the British public against the potential intrusion on individuals’ rights to privacy that could be caused by intelligence activity. I know from working alongside my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary how much attention she gives to that role.
The interception of communications commissioner also has such oversight in relation to that intelligence activity, and in taking decisions about whether to authorise the use of intrusive powers—for example, to intercept communications—he must be satisfied that such measures are legal, necessary, proportionate and carefully targeted.
On the question of legality, is it not the case that the Home Secretary was extremely keen to get the Communications Bill through the House of Commons in order to legalise activities that GCHQ had been carrying out for years, notably—as we now believe—the Tempora programme?
I say clearly to the right hon. Gentleman, as the Foreign Secretary said when he responded originally on this issue, that GCHQ and our intelligence agencies act within the law, a point rightly made earlier by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood).
The points about the proposals on communications data are about the changing nature of what we see, which includes ensuring that our law enforcement agencies are able to continue to do the job that they do today in bringing criminals to justice and using communications data as evidence in court. That is very different from the intelligence agencies’ roles and from GCHQ’s mission, which is external—looking outside rather than within the UK.
It is also important to note the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) about the role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, who has done some very important work and continues to do so.
It is this multi-faceted oversight that complements rigorous internal controls within the agencies themselves. The agencies’ recruitment and training procedures are all designed to ensure that those operating within the ring of secrecy can be trusted to do so lawfully and ethically. A culture of compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the law pervades everything that they do.
In the short time I have left, I should quickly address some of the points that have been raised. I can obviously assure hon. Members, for example, about the resourcing of the ISC. It has raised around a 30% uplift in its resources, and when it has a full staffing complement it will have more staffing than virtually any Select Committee. It is right to highlight the important work undertaken through the ISC and the changes that have been made to it by the Justice and Security Act 2013, which have been commented on by right hon. and hon. Members. An ongoing investigation is taking place into the events in Woolwich in May, work that the ISC is conducting very carefully and with great diligence.
This has been an important debate, highlighting the strength of the scrutiny that we have and the different layers of scrutiny that operate in this country. I believe that we have every reason to be proud of those oversight arrangements and of the work of our agencies.
Question put and agreed to.