(11 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsMy hon. Friend the Minister for Criminal Information, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
The Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 requires Ministers across Government to undertake a review of powers of entry over a two-year period due to conclude in early 2014. The Act requires Ministers with responsibility for powers of entry to examine their powers and to consider whether they are still necessary, proportionate and contain sufficient safeguards.
Ministers are required to report on outcomes of the review to Parliament by May 2014.
During the passage of the Act, Ministers agreed to provide an update of progress of the review and I am pleased to place copies of the first six-month progress report in the Library of the House.
We are also commencing consultation on the code of practice for powers on entry required by the 2012 Act. Copies of the draft code have today been placed in the Library of the House and are available on the Home Office website.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberT3. This morning, on their way back into work, all MPs will have walked past the continued encampment on Parliament square. The banners, the flags and the tents were supposed to be removed by the time of the jubilee, yet they are still there today—over halfway through the lifetime of this Parliament. When does the Home Secretary intend to use the powers given to her by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to remove these final eyesores, so that the square can once again be fully used by the public?
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act introduced new powers prohibiting the use of tents and related items in Parliament square, while safeguarding the right to peaceful protest. The use of the powers is an operational matter for the police and Westminster city council, but they were used in January last year to clear the square of tents.
T5. I think that ordinary decent people out there will be absolutely staggered by the Home Secretary’s complacency about Ibrahim Magag. The difference between the first two years and the last four years of control orders is that no one absconded during the last four years because the power to relocate was used, and that is the power that the Home Secretary got rid of. Ibrahim Magag was in London, where his friends were, and was able to abscond, because the Home Secretary had given him a travel pass. We all hope that he does not do any harm, but if he does, I think that people out there will hold her responsible.
T4. Will the Minister join me in congratulating Sussex police on the work that they have been doing in tackling laser pen attacks on aircraft operating from Gatwick airport, which have the potential to endanger hundreds of lives in the air and on the ground? What additional work is the Home Office doing to address the problem nationwide, and, possibly, to reclassify laser pens?
I am, of course, happy to join my hon. Friend in congratulating his local force on its work in dealing with this very serious matter. Although we currently have no plans to classify lasers as offensive weapons, we are determined to ensure that best practice is shared between forces. I hope that my hon. Friend will be pleased to learn that one of the five objectives of the newly established College of Policing will be to identify what works in policing, share best practice, and ensure that that best practice is adopted.
Can the Home Secretary shed any light on the Prime Minister’s thinking, as expressed yesterday, about the removal of Abu Qatada?
(12 years ago)
Written StatementsMy hon. Friend the Minister of State with responsibility for criminal information, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
Part 1, chapter 1 of the Protection of Freedoms Act implements the commitment in the Government’s coalition agreement to reform DNA and fingerprint retention.
This Government want to protect the privacy and human rights of its citizens, while maintaining effective databases that protect the public and reduce crime.
The Protection of Freedoms Act fundamentally changes the principles behind the operation of biometric databases. From being databases that collected DNA profiles and fingerprints from every person arrested and retained them indefinitely, they will now operate proportionately, considering guilt and innocence, the seriousness of the offence and the age of the individual. In this way, they can continue to operate effectively while providing far greater protection of civil liberties.
Implementation of the Act is not a simple matter. A large amount of work is needed to prepare police forces, forensic laboratories and national databases. Complex reprogramming of databases is required to ensure that each person’s DNA and fingerprints are removed or retained correctly and at the right time. This work will be carried out thoroughly so that biometric material is not held unlawfully, and material needed to solve crime is not unnecessarily deleted.
Before the Act commences, it is necessary to destroy a significant amount of existing biometric material that the Act would not allow to be retained.
The first priority is the destruction of DNA samples. A DNA sample is an individual’s biological material, containing all of their genetic information. The Government do not want to retain the complete genetic makeup of any of its citizens. Every DNA sample taken will be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile for use on the database has been obtained from it. Destruction of existing DNA samples will begin in December 2012 and be completed by May 2013.
DNA profiles, consisting of a string of 20 numbers and two letters to indicate gender, are stored on the national DNA database (NDNAD). They allow a person to be identified if they leave their DNA at a crime scene but contain none of the person’s genetic characteristics. The NDNAD and the police national computer (PNC) must both be reprogrammed to allow DNA profiles which may not be retained under the Act to be correctly identified and deleted. Deletion from the NDNAD of existing DNA profiles which do not meet requirements for retention will begin in January 2013 and be completed by September 2013.
Fingerprints are stored electronically on the national fingerprint database, IDENTl. IDENTl and the PNC must both be reprogrammed to allow fingerprints which may not be retained under the Act to be correctly identified and deleted. Deletion from IDENTl of fingerprints which do not meet requirements for retention will begin in March 2013 and be completed by September 2013. Following deletion of each IDENTl fingerprint set, police forces will destroy any corresponding hard copies they hold.
The biometrics commissioner will be appointed in early 2013. The role of the commissioner will be to keep under review the retention and use of biometric material retained subject to the Act’s provisions, and, in particular, to adjudicate on those cases where the police apply to retain material of someone arrested for, but not charged with a serious offence for a limited period or where a national security determination is made.
Once destruction of existing biometric material is complete and the necessary processes have been set up, legislative commencement will take place, no later than October 2013.
Developing the technology for a fully automated speculative search will take a few more months. A transitional measure will be provided to allow speculative searching and quality checks to be undertaken using existing technology. This will ensure commencement is not delayed and matches to crimes are not missed while the final piece of work is completed.
The publication of this timetable demonstrates both the complexity of the work involved in implementing the Act and removing innocent people’s DNA and fingerprints from our databases, and the Government’s commitment to completing this work as soon as safely possible.
(12 years ago)
Written StatementsMy hon. Friend the Minister of State for criminal information, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
I am pleased to announce the publication of the fifth annual report of the national DNA database ethics group on 27 November 2012. The group was established on 25 July 2007 to provide Ministers with independent ethical advice on the operation and practice of the national DNA database (NDNAD).
I welcome the points raised in the report about information on the effectiveness of the retention regime for DNA profiles, and the consideration given in the report to a number of important issues around the ethical operation of the NDNAD.
The ethics group’s annual report can be viewed on the website of the independent forensic science regulator and I am arranging for a copy to be placed in the House Library.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons Chamber14. What discussions she has had with the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on the effectiveness of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority in tackling trafficked labour.
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority plays a key role in protecting workers who may be exploited in the agriculture, shellfish, and food processing and packaging industries. A recent Government review streamlined its remit to focus on suspected serious and organised crime, working more closely with the Serious Organised Crime Agency and other specialist law enforcement agencies.
I thank the Minister for that endorsement of the work of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, particularly given the recent evidence of the Noble/Freedom Food eggs scandal, which was described as the worst case of human trafficking the Gangmasters Licensing Authority had ever seen. However, would it not be better if the Government took on the principles contained in my Transparency in UK Company Supply Chains (Eradication of Slavery) Bill so that companies ordering those goods have a responsibility to trace right back to the source what is happening in the supply chain and we stop that kind of abuse of workers who come here to pick and work in our farms?
I certainly recognise the serious nature of the crimes the hon. Gentleman highlights and am sure that he will welcome a number of the joint operations with the Serious Organised Crime Agency—in a recent case, 30 Lithuanians were freed as a consequence. I hope that he will also welcome the work of colleagues in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills who have recently put out for public consultation legislation on the human rights reporting requirements of quoted companies, which we believe will go a long way towards addressing the concerns highlighted in his Bill.
In human trafficking, far more people are exploited for labour than for sex, and the Minister is right to concentrate on organised gangs. Will he expand a little on how the Government will target organised gangs?
I know that my hon. Friend has a long-standing commitment to and interest in this important issue. I highlight the creation of the new National Crime Agency with an attached border command, which will harness greater intelligence. The national human trafficking centre will form part of that and will, we believe, really strengthen the approach in combating that appalling crime.
T1. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have decided not to exercise their right, under protocol 19 to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union (the Schengen protocol) and the treaty on European Union, to opt out of the regulation on migration from the Schengen information system (SIS 1+) to the second generation Schengen information system (SIS II).
The Government have taken this decision in accordance with the commitment in the coalition agreement, which states that we will approach legislation in the area of security and criminal justice on a case-by-case basis, with a view to maximising our country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have decided not to exercise their right, under protocol 19 to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union (the Schengen protocol) and the treaty on European Union, to opt out of the regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis.
The Government have taken this decision in accordance with the commitment in the coalition agreement which states that we will approach legislation in the area of security and criminal justice on a case-by-case basis, with a view to maximising our country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system.
The Government believe that our national interests are best served by participating in this regulation. Through this mechanism we can ensure that member states implement and continue to apply the correct standards, as required by the Schengen acquis, in order to maintain an area of lowered border controls which is secure for its citizens. Our participation will ensure our existing active role in the scrutiny of those policing and judicial co-operation elements of the Schengen acquis in which we participate.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Written StatementsMy hon. and noble Friend the Minister of State for Criminal Information (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) has today made the following written ministerial statement:
I am pleased to announce the reappointment of Mr Christopher Hughes, OBE, as chair of the National DNA Database Ethics Group. Mr Hughes was originally appointed in July 2009 for a three-year term. The ethics group provides Ministers with independent ethical advice on the operation and practice of the national DNA database (NDNAD).
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), as other Members have done, on securing the debate. As it is a Back-Bench debate, I am conscious of the need to allow him some time to respond at the end, so I will try to keep my comments to the point and respond as succinctly as I am able to a number of points that have been raised.
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman also on the manner and tone that he has brought to this afternoon’s discourse. I certainly recognise his desire to represent his constituents and obtain answers on behalf of his community. I know from discussions that we had around the time of the riots that he has stood up for his community in doing so, and that has been reflected in the manner in which the debate has been conducted.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands that because of ongoing legal and other issues, I cannot really comment on the specifics of individual cases. I am aware that the pre-inquest hearing in the case that he mentioned is due to be held next Tuesday, and there is an ongoing IPCC investigation. I certainly recognise the sensitivity of the issues that he has brought before the House this afternoon.
I pay tribute also to my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), whom I had the privilege to work alongside in opposition. I know how keenly he feels about these issues and the amount of work that he continues to put into answering the challenging question of how we can use intercept evidence.
We had an important contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). I certainly do not see the justice system as an impediment to fighting crime, and justice and security need to go hand in hand. I do not see them as somehow mutually inconsistent. The right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), with his experience as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and in his role with the Intelligence and Security Committee, highlighted some of the genuine challenges that exist, which I shall discuss. We also heard contributions from the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), and a balanced and helpful contribution from the Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson).
I underline that the Government are committed to maximising the amount of sensitive material, including intercept evidence, that can be handled in legal proceedings. That is why we set out in the coalition agreement our intention to
“seek to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.”
We have also proposed measures in the Justice and Security Bill to permit intercepted material to be adduced in closed material procedures and certain civil proceedings. In doing that, we remain acutely aware that lawful interception already plays a critical role in tackling serious crime and protecting the British public. It is used in almost all the highest priority counter-terrorist operations and many other serious crime investigations. It is no exaggeration to say that interception constitutes one of the most important and effective capabilities in tackling serious crime and threats to our national security, so it is crucial that we get it right.
We have heard about the Privy Council review and the differing legal and operational circumstances that apply in that regard and it is worth highlighting the considerable burdens on some of the intercepting agencies. Inter-agency co-operation, such as the sharing of sensitive techniques, is less well developed in other countries than it is in the UK, but the comparable examples in other jurisdictions suggest that fewer investigations could be supported and the value of intercept evidence as an intelligence tool might be reduced. It is right, however, that we should continue to examine the examples highlighted in a number of speeches and find our way through this important question.
I should make it clear that when there is relevant and sensitive material, the Government wish to find a mechanism that will enable it to be used in evidence. Finding a means of using intercept as evidence is challenging, however. There can be no clearer demonstration of that than the seven previous attempts that have been made to find a way forward. Any proposal to remove the prohibition on intercept evidence for inquests, for example, runs into a number of difficulties, and we and previous Governments have grappled with them as they relate to the general question of intercept evidence.
One option proposed by the right hon. Member for Tottenham is the disclosure of intercept product to a jury and properly interested persons, such as a family member. This Government considered that, as did our predecessor, and we do not believe that there is a practical way of preserving national security and the basic tenets of the make-up of juries. Crucially, intercept products shared with either a jury or properly interested party takes us back to the more general challenges presented by intercept as evidence, including preventing sensitive capabilities, techniques and approaches from becoming widely known. As things stand, we do not see that there is a viable way forward on that specific point.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether it would be possible for a coroner with the status of a judge to view sensitive material, including intercept evidence. We already have a mechanism through which a coroner may request the appointment of a serving judge as an assistant deputy. That enables the judge coroner to order the disclosure of intercept evidence to him or herself alone when a case’s exceptional circumstances make that disclosure essential in the interests of justice.
The judge coroner would have access to all sensitive material and could consequently be satisfied that the material provided in open court was all that was necessary to hold a proper thorough investigation. That independent assessment would give assurance to the jury and comfort to the family that all the relevant material had been placed before them. Of course, in a small number of cases that sensitive material would be centrally relevant and the article 2 investigative obligation would be engaged. In those circumstances, a statutory inquiry would be needed so that the inquiry panel, as the finders of facts, could see all relevant material. The independent examination of the material, however, together with the appointment of counsel to the inquiry, should ensure that proper account is taken of all the available material and that the interests of the family are properly protected, even if the material cannot be shared publicly.
I apologise that I was not in the Chamber to hear some of the earlier speeches. I have listened carefully to the Minister. Given what he has just said, will the Government think again about their decision not to provide for a closed material procedure for inquests—something they are prepared to provide in a small number of civil cases?
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, that matter was considered during discussions on the Justice and Security Bill currently in the other place, but the Government have determined that at this time it is not appropriate to bring those procedures forward. I hope, however, that the right hon. Gentleman heard me say that there is an existing mechanism to assess sensitive material, either through the appointment of a judge coroner to assess the relevancy and centrality of the evidence, or through the inquiry process I have highlighted.
The intercept as evidence review is obviously key to this discussion. It is an extensive and detailed review to assess the benefits, costs, and risks of introducing intercept as evidence in criminal proceedings, compared with the present intelligence-only approach under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. It has a broader remit than previous reviews, thereby avoiding wasted effort on approaches that prove to be non-viable, or being artificially constrained by existing intercept practice. Instead, it will ensure a fair and comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of intercept as evidence.
The issues are complex and difficult, and as we have heard, there have been seven previous attempts since 1993 to find a way forward. The work is being overseen by the independent cross-party Privy Council group, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, which was reappointed by the Government. As the review is still ongoing, I am not in a position to provide the House with an update on its likely findings, but we will consider issues raised in this debate carefully and return to the House on the matter in due course. We do not want some form of open-ended process, and we recognise the desire to find solutions and a way forward. This is a current review, and work is ongoing to consider whether there is a way to proceed in the face of the challenges we have heard about.
The current intercept as evidence review seeks to build on the findings of previous reviews and the potential impact of a need for terrorist prevention and investigation measures. One clear conclusion of that previous work is that intercept evidence is not a silver bullet that will negate the need for alternative ways to manage risk. We have heard some examples of that this afternoon, and I highlight recent evidence from David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who reiterated that intercept as evidence would not be
“a silver bullet that makes terrorism prevention and investigation measures unnecessary”.
A number of issues have been highlighted this afternoon, but I fear that time will not allow me to go through them all in the detail I would have wished. Many overseas countries, both EU and Commonwealth, operate effective intercept as evidence regimes within their legal context. Their experience indicates, however, that the burdens on the intercepting agencies are considerable. The issues of disclosure and how to secure a fair trial are obviously central, and that has been highlighted this afternoon in relation to article 6 provisions. Disclosure, and the practical impact of that on agencies and their overall capabilities, is relevant and something that is being examined closely in the cost-benefit, overarching analysis on capabilities.
I will conclude by reassuring you, Mr Deputy Speaker, that the Government are committed to finding ways for intercept evidence of sensitive material to be heard in legal proceedings. I am grateful to the House and all right hon. and hon. Members for helping to inform the debate this afternoon, and for assisting in this important work.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons Chamber3. What assessment she has made of the effectiveness of the security operation at the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games; and if she will make a statement.
I am delighted by the success of the London 2012 games security operation. We delivered what we promised: reassuringly visible and proportionate security which protected games visitors, competitors and the wider public. I am particularly grateful to the many thousands of police and armed forces personnel who did such a great job, and in such a great spirit.
Will my hon. Friend join me in praising the hard work and dedication of those in the UK Border Force and all the other agencies whose professionalism made the security and immigration operation at the Olympics not only a great success, but a great advertisement for the UK?
My hon. Friend is right to highlight the work of the UK Border Force in ensuring that the border was run efficiently and effectively during the games. I think that it is also worth highlighting the work of the Security Service, and that of the volunteers who contributed so much to the games.
The Home Affairs Committee report makes it clear that had it not been for the actions of the Home Office, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games and the Army, Olympic security would have been a fiasco because of the failure of G4S. Has the Minister seen the Committee’s final recommendation that a register should be established listing the private sector companies that failed to deliver, and will he look into the COMPASS contract which has just been awarded and about which concern has already been expressed?
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for recognising the work that was put in, both many years in advance of the Olympics and during the games themselves. He will doubtless be aware of the work that the Cabinet Office is doing in assessing each major contractor to government. Performance will form part of that analysis.
Further to the earlier question from my hon. Friend the Member for Reading East (Mr Wilson), one of the biggest concerns before the games was the prospect of long queues at ports of entry such as Heathrow. May I therefore congratulate the Minister and the UK Border Force on a job well done in extending a warm and trouble-free welcome, without compromising border security, as the rest of the world arrived on our shores? Will he confirm that he does not view security and welcome as alternative choices to be traded off against each other, and that we can and should expect to deliver both?
My hon. Friend has rightly, again, praised the sterling work of the UK Border Force in ensuring that Heathrow and all other ports operated efficiently and effectively, and that not only were people able to pass through the border speedily, but national security was maintained.
I welcome the fact that the Minister has paid tribute to the Metropolitan police’s contribution to the success of the Olympic games—a point that was surprisingly omitted from the Prime Minister’s speech in Birmingham, presumably reflecting the poor relationship between Government Members and the Metropolitan police following the altercation with the Chief Whip. Will the Minister spell out more fully his tribute to the very important contribution that the police made to the great success of the games?
The Prime Minister has said that we have the greatest police force in the world, and I wholeheartedly endorse that. We saw some tremendous efforts by the police—the mutual aid from police forces up and down the country—to ensure that security was maintained during the Olympics and that we had a games of which we were all proud.
4. What steps her Department is taking to tackle metal theft.