National Security Bill (First sitting)
Holly Lynch ExcerptsThursday 7th July 2022
(1 year, 10 months ago)
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Scott Mann
Q
Jonathan Hall: First, it is being able to go to the room where it happens—the meetings where these decisions are taken. When I review TPIMs, I have a completely free hand. I am able to interrogate officials and able to see whatever I want. That is really important. I am not just looking at judgments in courts, or just reading documents; I am actually there able to interrogate, test and challenge. That is what I do. Also, I think it is important that Parliament and the public have a sense of what is going on. Regrettably, because legal aid has not been made available in all cases for TPIMs, there are now fewer court cases, so general information about how this important but serious power is being exercised is relatively cut off. The independent reviewer can provide a lot of transparency about how it is operating.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Q
Jonathan Hall: It has been tentatively mentioned. Obviously, because the legislation has not been passed, I have not been formally asked whether I would do it, but it has been tentatively asked. My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation. The reason is that this new legislation is really modelled on terrorism legislation. In crude terms, the concept of the foreign power condition sits in place of the purposes or acts of terrorism, and then there is the same framework in terms of very strong arrest power, detention up to 14 days, strong powers of cordons and search and investigations, and, of course, the PIMs. There are so many learning points between the two regimes that it does make sense.
Holly Lynch
Q
Jonathan Hall: Having thought about this, I do. I do not think that decisions on prosecution are going to be made other than in really strong and good cases. Where I think one needs particular care is with all the strong powers that come before prosecution, for example with arrest and detention, as well as the PIMs, which are based not on beyond reasonable doubt but on the balance of probabilities.
We have to acknowledge that we live in quite a polarised world at the moment and that citizens of individual countries, such as Russia and China, and those who associate with them, are bound to fall under suspicion. There is a parallel here, in the sense that people used to argue—I think wrongly, but they did argue —that counter-terrorism laws in England and Wales were anti-Muslim, and I think having a reviewer is one way of offering reassurance that that is not the case.
Holly Lynch
Q
Jonathan Hall: I expect that they will be effective because the agencies and the Home Secretary will only think about imposing one when they think it is going to work. There are many more subjects of interest who have terrorist intents than are currently on TPIMs, and I expect that the same will be true in relation to people who are foreign threats. There will be many more people who are identified as foreign threats who will actually go under PIMs. At the moment I think only two people are under TPIMs, so it is very few. I would have thought that the agencies and the Home Secretary will think very carefully before imposing them.
Holly Lynch
Q
Jonathan Hall: What I have been told is that polygraphs have not been used for TPIMs, as far as I am aware, but they have been used for released terrorist offenders and some disclosures have been made. Everyone always thought that the real utility of polygraphs and the clear reason for their use is the disclosures that people make when undergoing the process. I gather that some admissions have been made that have been valuable and have led to a recall. I do not have a huge amount of data, but they seem to have had some success in the context of terrorism offences.
Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)
Q
Jonathan Hall: I cannot remember the total number of TPIMs. I think it is around 30, but I may be misremembering and that may also include—
Stewart Hosie
Q
Jonathan Hall: My view is that it is the same thing.
Holly Lynch
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am slightly uncertain and concerned about the scope of clause 3(2), the foreign intelligence services offence. On the face of it, an offence could be committed inadvertently, and it does appear to cover quite a lot of lawful conduct. The example that I have been debating with officials is the example of someone who sells miniature cameras, which is undoubtedly conduct of a kind that could assist a foreign intelligence service. My concern with clause 3(2) is that it does not seem to have a sufficient mental element, either that the individual who commits the offence is deliberately acting prejudicially to the UK interest, or knows or ought to suspect that there is some foreign intelligence service involvement, so I have a concern about that particular clause.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
Q
Jonathan Hall: Not all terrorists are cold, calculating, ruthless killers who will go and commit terrorist acts whatever their circumstances. They may exist, but there are also quite chaotic terrorist-risk offenders. I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.
My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made and a sense of injustice or grievance on behalf of the terrorist offender, who will perhaps say to themselves, “Why can’t I get legal aid when everyone else in my situation can?” My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.
Scott Mann
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Yes.
Holly Lynch
Q
Sir Alex Younger: First of all, I think it is a good idea, fundamentally, to require people to say if they are acting on behalf of a foreign power. I am supportive of that because I know how difficult it makes it for people intent on conducting operations against us to operate, and makes it much easier to prove. I am therefore instinctively supportive of that, and of a register, and I think that we should get on with that. I have talked to the Government about that; they are understandably cautious, given all the unintended consequences attached to it, and the fact that our adversaries use those techniques in a way that lacks good faith and is malicious. However, fundamentally, I am supportive of it.
I have to be honest; I am more ambivalent about the idea of distinguishing between nations. My view of legislation generally, but particularly when it comes to technology, is that it is a mistake to write things to the current circumstances. It is much better to write things to the principles that you are seeking to employ. I am not a lawyer or a member of the Government, but my recommendation would be that we go for a principles-based approach in so far as we can.
Holly Lynch
Q
Sir Alex Younger: You are referring to the amendment to the Serious Crime Act?
Holly Lynch
That is right, yes.
Sir Alex Younger: I strongly believe that that is necessary. I am conscious of the concerns that you will have, and even the contentious nature of the assertion, so if you will forgive me, I briefly have to tell you why.
First, alongside our ability to uphold our values and not be terrorists, the other reason why we have been successful in stopping bombs going off has been international partnership. That is because no one state or intelligence service really ever has the full facts. They have to work together and combine their information to get the intelligence that is required, proactively, to disrupt terrorist events. That was true in the analogue world; it is really true in the digital world. It is the thing that works and keeps us safe.
That involves an unavoidable risk. That risk, through all the safeguards that you will be familiar with—but which I am happy to talk about—is managed down to the very lowest level possible. However, ultimately, we are dealing with sovereign actors—other states who we do not control—and ultimately, when we are exchanging large bulk datasets, notwithstanding all the scrutiny and risk management, there is a possibility that there will be data in that dataset whose significance we do not understand until it is compared with another dataset that we do not have. That is an unavoidable risk.
An issue that I think you have to consider is, who should be carrying that risk? My view is that there must be accountability, but where an SIS officer or any other UK intelligence community officer is acting in good faith, within their instructions, as authorised by Ministers, on behalf of you and the public, it should not be them carrying the risk. It is more appropriately carried by the Government more broadly. I feel that, as you can tell from my body language, very strongly, as a leader.
It was unavoidable that we sent our young men and women into harm’s way when it came to physical risk. For instance, I served in Afghanistan. Our people were asked to go out on to the streets day in, day out. It involved physical risk that we mitigated down to the lowest level we could possibly manage, but it was part of the deal.
These risks are avoidable. Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.
Professor Sir David Omand: I very strongly agree with what Alex Younger has just said. I know from my own experience of GCHQ that information-sharing with our close allies and indeed more broadly is essential, and I think it is morally wrong to place that burden on the individual member of staff, who may be quite junior, who is simply following the policies and the instructions that they have had. In the end, the Government Ministers must account if something unexpectedly does go awry.
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: My counter-argument would be that this is actually a question of principle—how Government works, particularly in relation to people whom we as a nation are asking to take some significant risks on our behalf. This is an additional risk. You may say that it is theoretical; they may not feel it that way, and I think that we owe it to them to protect them.
Sir Alex Younger: It does not feel theoretical. You know, you have to examine the motives of the staff of the UK IC, who are ordinary members of the public, just like you and me. They are not doing this for personal gain.
There is a very practical point that I think the Committee must consider, which is the incentive. Over time, what is going to motivate admittedly a very mission-orientated community if they see personal legal jeopardy in an area where there is an unavoidable level of ambiguity? I think that will inhibit people from the exercise of sharing. I hope I have been really clear that it is the exercise of sharing that allows us, as a team, to deal with the threats that we face. The risk may be theoretical, but it does not feel like that when you are stood in front of the person or the computer.
Ben Everitt
I think everybody here would agree that a team has to play by the same rules.
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: I was pleased to see the power in the Bill because, particularly in the digital age, you can take the offensive and you can prepare, but you may not have got to the stage of actually pressing the button. If you can demonstrate that a foreign state was engaged with help from inside the country in some serious espionage or sabotage activity, it seems to me that the very preparation is something that the prosecutors ought to be able to bring forward. In the terrorism example, the cases would be slightly different, but the offence of acts preparatory to terrorism has been extremely helpful to the prosecution authorities for good reason.
Sir Alex Younger: The bottom line is that we have to get in front of this stuff. Just speaking as a counter-terrorist practitioner, that is the additional discipline. It is not like solving the crime. We need to solve it before it has happened, and that raises a set of ethical and legal dilemmas where it is important to be striking the right balance, so I really welcome the proper treatment that we see of that in the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Probably not, but on the other hand you have to balance that against the risk that legislation would inadvertently catch, for example, academic activity in think-tanks. Alex Younger has referred to transparency and covertness. Where a foreign power is taking covert acts and dirty tricks in order to access our institutions, think-tanks and universities, that would be criminalised by the Bill.
Where a member of the embassy of any foreign state represented here attends, quite openly, think-tank meetings and so on—everybody knows who they are and they know they are on the guest list—that does not pose a direct harm. It would be a mistake to start to try to confuse those categories too much. However, what it comes down to is that this is a probabilistic business; this is doing things that increase the chances that we all protect the citizens and the interests of the state. This Bill alone is not going to prevent states from attempting harm against us, and it probably will not catch all those harms either, but it is a good start.
Scott Mann
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Well, there is a lot in the Bill. The move away from having to identify states as enemies, for example. States have interests of their own and they will promote those interests. If they are doing so openly through diplomatic and academic means, that is one thing, but if they are doing it, as some are, covertly, then although you might not categorise them as enemies, they are none the less conducting themselves in a way that causes harm. That is one of the examples where I think the Bill takes a more up-to-date view. It is not just nations with which we are at war or potentially could be at war.
The Chair
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: My reading of the Bill is that trade secrets and theft of intellectual property are well covered. You probably also have to have in mind the Online Safety Bill, which has a whole different set of considerations but which is, again, intended to reduce the amount of harmful content that citizens are exposed to. It is quite easy to envisage cases where a foreign state is putting material online covertly and pretending to be someone else.
In the 2016 US presidential election, there were a number of egregious examples of that—for example, in order to stir up conflict within society by exaggerating an existing split in society, be it over race, inequality or any other issue. That is the nature of the threat that we currently face in all democracies. You cannot solve it all by creating criminal offences where a link cannot be established back to the foreign powers condition, but you may be able—by working with the companies, which will exercise their own terms and conditions—to get more of this stuff removed. You need that as well as the powers in the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Yes, and another important consideration is public education. I have argued before that we should start teaching critical thinking in schools and teaching kids how to be safe online when they come across deliberate and malicious misrepresentation.
Holly Lynch
Q
Paddy McGuinness: It was quite extraordinary that we had a range of different possible offences that relate to the kinds of things that a hostile state would commit in order to sabotage, for instance, critical national infrastructure—a target entity in the UK—and that it was not coherent. What I would put in front of the Committee when you are thinking about this is: the most common thing that I find now in corporate life, but also in Government or in policy space—and in Parliament where I do a bit of advisory work—is stovepiping.
You say “cyber” or “cyber-security” and people immediately think of cyber-security issues, or you say “insider issues” and they say they will deal with that, or they think of physical attacks or physical disruption and they deal with that. They do not understand that this is a playbook, which, if you are a Russian commander, you put together, and you have a choice of what you do.
So you go in an escalation route from, “Can we access this remotely through the internet? Is there another way of accessing it electronically? Do we have a spy within it? Can I send someone from the embassy to go and get close to it and do something to it? Shall I send in Spetsnaz covertly—you know, go to Salisbury and poison some people? Or shall I go to war?” You have that whole range of things and they all relate to each other. And all of them relate to sabotage. We need to approach this by understanding what the adversary is doing and not having little bits of powers in some criminal damage legislation, or in the Computer Misuse Act. That will not do because that is not the purpose of the opponent.
I have described it for disruption and destruction in a sense of warfare, and I have used a kind of Gerasimov Russian example. It is very interesting when one looks at the way in which intellectual property has been stolen. There are a few cases where we see the end-to-end Chinese state effort, where you begin with remote cyber-attacks in close proximity—the case I am thinking of was in the United States—and an inability to get in by those means. Eventually, the subversion and recruitment of a member of staff operating in Switzerland provided them with the intellectual property, which they were not able to access using the cyber techniques. All the way through they were intervening in the networks and activities of that company.
One final thought on this: one of the difficulties with this grey space activity, as Sir Alex described it, is that if you have a presence for an intelligence purpose, you can flick it over and turn it into a disruptive or destructive attack. That is where that preparatory bit is quite important, too: understanding that the simple fact of engaging and being present quickly takes you towards sabotage. I think these are absolutely vital powers.
Holly Lynch
Q
Paddy McGuinness: The Clerks may have told you, or it may be in my bio, I do not know, but after I left Government I was asked by the Oxford Internet Institute to join them in a thing called the Oxford Technology and Elections Committee, prior to the 2019 elections—with an urgency because of what had happened in the United States in 2016—to come up with some practical suggestions for what we might do to protect our elections. I refer you to it: it is a great bit of work, and the Oxford Internet Institute has gone on doing that work. I am no longer as involved, but there is good work there.
The way I would frame it is this: it is a bit like what I said about the powers that we have. Because we do not occupy the space, others step into it, so because there are not strong controls and real clarity about what is happening around our electoral processes, people mess about in that space. It is really important—this rather echoes something Sir Alex said—that we do not take messing about in the electoral space as being the same thing as delegitimising an election. We have a strong tradition in the United Kingdom of being able to make judgments about whether the way in which candidates have behaved or the way in which money has been spent in a given constituency makes an election void, and you possibly have to run it again. We are used to making that judgment.
One of the risks that I note in this space—again, this is a point Sir Alex made very nicely about Vladimir Putin’s intent, which is to have us off balance—is that if the Russians do hack into a political party’s servers and mess about within them, and maybe mess with the data or interfere, or if they play games with a technology platform that people rely on for information and put out information, and we decide as a result that we cannot trust a referendum or an election, they succeed. That is success for them, so I think what really matters in this space is the ability to measure the impact that state activity has on the democratic process we are looking at, and—as Sir Alex said—that there is bright transparency so we know who is doing what.
Rights of Children (Police Custody)
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 10 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Hollobone. I pay tribute, as others have done, to my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby), who shared individual cases and statistics revealing that children and young people spend lengthy periods in custody. I thank her for securing the debate, for being a true champion and campaigner on this issue, and for the all the different ways she has used the parliamentary tools at her disposal to keep the spotlight on securing best practice.
Children and young people are a protected group with specific age-related vulnerabilities. Their treatment in detention is governed not only by domestic law, but by the UN convention on the rights of the child, which the UK has signed and ratified. Legislative requirements and best practice are outlined in various documents, including, most significantly, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—commonly referred to as PACE—and its codes of practice, guidance from the College of Policing, and the Home Office’s concordat on children in custody.
It is absolutely right that officers must take into account the age of a child or young person when deciding whether statutory grounds for arrest apply. Police should pay particular regard to the timing of any necessary arrests of children and young people, ensure that they are not detained any longer than necessary, and avoid holding them overnight in police cells unless it is absolutely necessary.
The College of Policing is right to stress in its guidance that
“Everyone who works with children has a responsibility for keeping them safe.”
That means that they have a role to play in identifying concerns about a child’s safety and wellbeing, sharing information and taking prompt action when it is needed to protect a child. A child who has been detained and is in police custody presents an opportunity to understand why, to disrupt their behaviour if it is criminal, and to safeguard them and the public from further harms.
West Yorkshire police’s violence reduction unit has undertaken several pieces of significant research to better understand the relationship between young people and violent crime. Nationally and in West Yorkshire, the number of proven offences committed by 10 to 17-year-olds has fallen dramatically, particularly over the past five years. The number of young first-time entrants into the criminal justice system has also plummeted. However, worryingly, in 2019-20, more than half of the offences committed by 10-17 year olds were violence against the person, compared with 39.7% in 2013-14.
We know that children and young people are capable of committing serious crimes and we cannot shy away from that, given the impact on victims, who are often children themselves. One comprehensive piece of research undertaken by Crest with the West Yorkshire and Harrogate Health and Care Partnership and the violence reduction unit found five key health inequalities that are influential in the lives of young people in West Yorkshire and their journey either towards or away from violence and exploitation: deprivation and socioeconomic disadvantage, trauma and unmet mental health need, education engagement, poor quality or lacking service provision and delivery, and contextual harm. More than 61,000 of 11 to 25-year-olds in West Yorkshire—13% of the population—were at risk of serious violence as a result of income deprivation and high levels of neighbourhood crime. One reality drawn out of the research that I find particularly depressing is how young people are being drawn into gangs and criminality by family members who are already involved. The report found that young people are often recruited by their own family. The reasons young people get involved in crime and find themselves in police custody serve as a reminder that some children’s lives could not be more different from our own and that harm and risk is all around them.
How can we ensure that encounters with the police and any time spent in custody have a positive impact on these children’s trajectory and do not compound the negative experiences surrounding them? The West Yorkshire violence reduction unit research recommended the development of trauma-informed practice across partnerships such as the complex childhood trauma steering group, which should be used to evaluate and standardise the trauma-informed offering across the region, and more and better mental health support for young people, all of which could and should be a feature of a child’s limited time in custody. The aspiration has to be that the more we understand the risks and recognise the value of targeted intervention upstream, the more time in custody can be avoided entirely for children and young people.
One of the key features of the opening speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East was about the provision of appropriate adults. Research conducted by Dr Miranda Bevan of Goldsmiths, University of London, and Dr Vicky Kemp from the University of Nottingham, and shared by my hon. Friend found that it is not unusual for appropriate adults to not arrive until six or more hours have passed. Having got a better understanding of some of the reasons for that from my local police just today, I am sympathetic that trying to make contact initially with parents, who may or may not be available and who, sadly, are sometimes not willing to attend, then approaching the emergency duty team within child social care, and then, if they can still not get someone to attend, approaching the National Appropriate Adult Network, starts to show where the practical barriers to making swift progress are—and that is when attempts are made straightaway, which, as we have already heard, is not always the case.
From speaking to colleagues in West Yorkshire’s liaison and diversion team earlier today, I know that problems are often exacerbated when looked-after children are in custody. Lines of parental responsibility prove harder to establish at a time when some of the most marginalised children are required to make serious decisions, without support, in conditions that are designed to be uncomfortable. Indeed, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who it is always a pleasure to see in Westminster Hall, made the right and powerful point, which has been supported by almost all the speakers made here today, about asking these children to decide for themselves if they want or require legal representation, when it should be the default.
In its research, the National Appropriate Adult Network points out that children in custody are disadvantaged by more than just cognitive development. They are much more likely than other children to have poor mental health, to have a learning disability, at up to 22% for that cohort compared with 4% in the wider population, to have a communication disorder, at up to 90% versus 7%, to be autistic, at 15% compared with 1%, and to have suffered a head injury with loss of consciousness for more than 20 minutes, at 18% versus 5%. If we are looking for confirmation of why appropriate adults are essential for children in those circumstances, the statistics could not make the case any clearer.
We know that there are routine delays in getting someone to attend on behalf of a child. Are we not able to establish a model of best practice that works for both the police and the child, and moves things forward by having someone skilled on hand to provide that service? I hope the Minister will share her thinking on that when she responds, and address the pilot scheme that my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East outlined, which appears to be delivering significant results. Once we have that in place, it opens up conversations about how swiftly we can move a child through police custody, and we can look again at 24 hours.
I am very much taking into account your comments, Mr Hollobone, but the Minister will be aware that alarm has been raised about strip searches in recent weeks. In response to a written question tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), the Minister for Crime and Policing confirmed that the Ministry of Justice is supporting a project with the National Police Chiefs’ Council with the aim of addressing the difference in experience of ethnic minority children and adults in police custody. My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Marsha De Cordova) shared some particularly powerful experiences of her constituents.
The Minister for Crime and Policing said that a wide range of agencies and independent advisers have contributed to that work, which engages a number of police forces across the country and builds on existing initiatives in the workplace, including a dedicated independent strip search scrutiny panel in Norfolk and Suffolk police. He said:
“From December 2022 we will be including more detailed custody data in the annual Police Powers and Procedures statistical bulletin which will include data on whether an appropriate adult was called out for a detained child and the number of strip searches & Intimate searches carried out, broken down by age, gender, ethnicity, and offence type.”
My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea also spoke about the importance of data. That piece of work is welcome, so will the Minister confirm when it will be concluded and published? It struck me that the response to that written question said that the research will determine if an appropriate adult was called. I very much expect to see that that requirement was upheld entirely.
I have spent a great deal of time trying to improve the modern slavery provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and looking at when children come into custody. If there are concerns that they are victims of child criminal exploitation, county lines gangs or trafficking, the push to keep children out of custody for all the right reasons cannot mean that we cut corners and miss opportunities in our safeguarding obligations. Where the police arrest children and seize drugs or cash due to unlawful possession, they and other statutory agencies should fully understand the potential dangers for those children of being releasing without them, potentially back into the grasp of those who have been criminally exploiting them. We must work through that by involving all the relevant safeguarding agencies to truly disrupt the criminal activity that has a grip of the young person, and deliver that wraparound support as urgently as possible.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East once again for securing this debate, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to her powerful calls for best practice, scrutiny and oversight, and for making sure that children in custody are recognised and treated as children.
Draft Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Consequential Provision) Regulations 2022
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 10 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Sharma. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. I hope that he will be relieved to hear that we recognise and agree with much of what he said.
As the Minister has already outlined, the proposed changes follow recommendations by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, as part of his review of the multi-agency public protection arrangements. The independent reviewer’s work will always carry a great deal of weight with the Opposition, and we treat his recommendations with the utmost seriousness. The proposed changes also follow a recommendation from the inquest into the horrendous Fishmongers’ Hall attack in November 2019. As always with such attacks, it is important that we make a detailed review of our processes and legislation in order to plug any gaps that could be exploited by those wishing to do us harm. On that basis, we are keen to see the draft regulations enacted.
Of course, with any such extension of powers there can be unintended consequences or missed opportunities, so I look forward to Jonathan Hall considering the effect of these powers once they come into effect. We will continue to consider their effectiveness to ensure that the right balance has been found. We also look forward to seeing the revised code of practice in the coming days.
Overall, the Opposition are satisfied that the changes are proportionate to the security challenges we face and necessary if we are to reduce the risk of future attacks. I will not delay proceedings further as we support the proposals in the national interest.
Oral Answers to Questions
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 10 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Canada, one of our Five Eyes partners, recently announced sanctions against Alexander Lebedev as one of 14 people who
“have directly enabled Vladimir Putin’s senseless war in Ukraine and bear responsibility for the pain and suffering of the people of Ukraine.”
I have asked this question of the Government six times now, but I have not had anything resembling an answer: did the Prime Minister meet Alexander Lebedev without officials and without close protection during the Salisbury poisonings in April 2018—yes or no?
Damian Hinds
I do not know the detailed contents of either individual’s diary. What I can tell the hon. Lady and the House is that this Government have acted on sanctions against Putin-linked elites—the people who have propped up and supported that regime—without fear or favour. That extends to more than 1,000 individuals, entities and subsidiaries, and we will do more as required.
HM Passport Office Backlog
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 11 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Like every other MP who has spoken in the debate and, I suspect, every other MP across the Benches, I have an inbox and postbag full of Passport Office delays. We opened 30 cases last month, as the target for passport processing has slid to 10 weeks.
To share some further examples from my Halifax constituency, we have been working with a family who made an application on 17 March for the renewal of a child’s passport for a holiday on 30 May. We chased multiple times and escalated the case as the holiday got closer. The passport was finally processed and arrived the day before their holiday. However, the Passport Office made a spelling mistake in the child’s name, despite its having been spelled correctly by his parents on all the forms. It took that family more than 10 weeks to get the passport, and when it arrived it was wrong. They had no choice but to cancel their family holiday.
Another family applied for the passports of both their son and daughter to be renewed at the same time, with exactly the same information provided for both, other than their names, dates of birth and genders. Remarkably, the son’s application was processed immediately and arrived two weeks later. The daughter’s, however, is still ongoing, with the Passport Office continuing to raise new issues with it. First it queried the mother’s parental responsibility; then it said the referee who had countersigned the passport was not eligible to do so. Those may well be legitimate queries, but the information being questioned was exactly the same information provided for her brother’s passport, which was processed in two weeks. We are in a position where the process cannot be right, which prompts the question: why the inconsistency? Where is the oversight?
A third family applied for their daughter’s passport six weeks before she turned 16. They sought advice, given that if someone is within three weeks of turning 16 they are advised to apply for an adult passport. However, the Passport Office advised them to still apply for a child’s passport. Unsurprisingly, they have now been told she needs to apply for an adult passport and the family need to start the application process again, with their family holiday now imminent and hanging in the balance.
We have heard too many such cases in the Chamber today. My hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham (Mary Kelly Foy) spoke of exhausted staff of Her Majesty’s Passport Office having to witness threats of self-harm from a member of the public who was desperate for a passport. I thank her for her dedication and for being such a powerful advocate for those staff today.
My hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Nick Smith) told heartbreaking stories of lost holidays that his constituents had shared with him. My hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi) told the story of her constituent Tom, who has endured various problems, setbacks and issues in applying for a passport for his six-year-old son. My hon. Friend the Member for Weaver Vale (Mike Amesbury) highlighted the challenges in just getting access to the data that we would all so like to see, including the answer to the big question—the size of the backlog.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden), who is a brilliant champion of her constituents, spoke of the local campaign she was involved with to retain her local passport office, working alongside the PCS union. She also spoke powerfully, as others have done, of the impact on children in particular of not knowing whether their family holidays will go ahead as planned, or will ultimately have to be cancelled at very short notice.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend and neighbour the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), who spoke of this not being the only crisis in the Home Office. I am afraid the crisis in political leadership and its lack of compassion is making for an agonising time for anyone who needs Home Office services. My hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Kate Hollern) spoke of a family who had to pay £1,000 to change the date of their holiday.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby) reminded us that there are so many different reasons why people need to travel, and told some particularly heartbreaking stories. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Tahir Ali) spoke of his constituents who had been unable to attend the funerals of loved ones—an utterly heartbreaking position to be in.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mohammad Yasin) again spoke of people’s missing family funerals and significant family events, not for public health reasons, but for admin reasons, which has had a devastating impact on his constituents. My hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones) spoke of the Prime Minister’s claim that everybody is getting their passports within six weeks—an utter nonsense, when we have all shared constituency stories from our caseloads. Last but by no means least, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Ruth Jones) spoke about the predictability of the surge in demand and asked why we were not prepared for it.
Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)
My hon. Friend is telling the stories of so many of our hon. Friends. I could not be here earlier in the debate, but I want to share a story from my constituency. Many of my constituents are frequent business travellers or academics. They cannot release their passport for 10 weeks. Many of them have been trying to get a one-week appointment online so that they can go in person and sort it out, but those appointments are not available online; nobody can get them, even though they cost double what a normal passport does. Is that not also a massive issue for frequent travellers?
Holly Lynch
My hon. Friend makes an important point, speaking to the variety of reasons why people have to unlock this backlog, whether for work or personal reasons. There are economic reasons why we must get productivity up and have people able to travel again, alongside the family connections that we need to see re-established and people’s ability to undertake holidays once again.
As the Minister for migration is back in his place, I must say that I am grateful for the occasions when I have been able to reach out to him and he has intervened on cases where I have made an appeal directly to him. However, I am privileged in that I have his mobile number; what we are trying to get to is a position where—[Interruption.] For purely professional reasons, for anyone who made an odd noise there. We are trying to get to a process whereby a constituent out there would not need to have access to the Minister’s mobile number in order to have their case resolved by this Home Office.
At a time when the cost of living crisis is hitting the country hard and after two years of family holidays having to be postponed and rearranged, Home Office incompetence is landing British families with yet more unnecessary costs as they pick up the tab for the failures and pay for fast-track passport services, or face losing hundreds of pounds in cancelled holidays. The number of monthly fast-track applications has more than doubled since December 2021, as other colleagues have said. In April this year alone, British families spent at least £5.4 million on fast-track services.
The Passport Office’s own forecasts show that it expects to receive more than 240,000 fast-track applications between May and October this year, at a cost of an incredible £34 million. The cost of passport failure is being passed on to families stuck between a rock and a hard place, at the worst possible time. Even the fast-track service, as we have just heard, is not always a guarantee, with the website often saying that there is no availability of appointments due to high demand. My constituents report that they are calling day after day with no success. One constituent emailed:
“Another stressful day has passed of getting no answers from the passport office. It’s nothing but incorrect information and false hope. I’ve arranged 3 call backs, one of them being from the upgrade team and not one of them have got back to me. I’m due to travel next Friday, and I have no hope whatsoever.”
The trade union PCS says that the Home Office originally estimated that 1,700 new staff members would be needed to deal with the backlog, but as far as we are aware—and we have had confirmation of this—only about 500 have actually been recruited. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed the timeline for when those additional staff members will be joining their colleagues on the frontline.
In April, the Prime Minister reportedly said that he wanted to privatise the Passport Office, using more unparliamentary language than I have at the Dispatch Box. However, the Minister has confirmed to the House that most of the services within the process have already been privatised, with in-house staff dealing only with decisions on applications themselves. I suspect that it will come as a surprise to precisely no one to hear that the Prime Minister is not across the detail on this, but what does he think is left to privatise, and how exactly, based on the performance of the existing contractors, does he think it will improve the service? Looking at the three private service providers involved in passports, freedom of information requests published by the Mirror last month revealed that TNT, as the courier service for the Passport Office, has lost hundreds of passports and documents in the past two years despite applications being lower due to the pandemic, with 519 lost items in 2020 and a staggering 1,196 in the first seven months of 2021. This £77 million three-year contract was awarded in July 2019 and is due to be reconsidered this summer, so how do the Government propose to transform the courier service?
Sopra Steria, which provides frontline and support services including scanning, uploading and storage of documents, has its own backlogs, with PCS estimating that by April 500,000 applications completed by customers were awaiting opening and scanning on to Sopra Steria’s system. As we have heard, the performance of Teleperformance, which operates the helpline, has already been deemed unacceptable by Ministers. So how exactly does the Prime Minister think that to simply repeat the words “privatise it” is fixing a broken system that is already largely privatised?
Another constituent who got in touch shared their utter frustration:
“We got married on the 7th May after postponing 3 times. I applied for an urgent upgrade a week ago as I travel a week today and I’ve still not had a phone call back to make the payment and begin fast track. I have less than a week to get my passport to go on my honeymoon. I applied with plenty of time and also applied for the urgent upgrade.”
Another said:
“This issue has caused me and my family a great deal of distress, expense and now we are potentially looking at having to cancel our holiday, losing a significant amount of money.”
This Government are presiding over backlog Britain. If it is not passports, it is drivers’ licences, NHS waiting times, court dates, charging decisions, asylum decisions, housing waiting lists and Ukraine visas—and the list goes on. People cannot be expected to find the additional cash needed to bypass Home Office failure. They deserve better. This Government must apologise and find a way of delivering better.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I need to emphasise once again how important it is for colleagues to come back for the wind-ups in order to be able to hear the responses from both the shadow Minister and the Minister to what they have said in their speeches.
Draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2022
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 11 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Ms Elliott.
I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. I was listening carefully. He and his colleagues will be aware that the Opposition expressed a series of grave concerns about the Nationality and Borders Act, which allowed for these provisions, but we very much recognise the practical nature of the changes in the draft order as we work collectively to keep our nation safe. We are satisfied that changes to the code of practice for examining and review officers under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act are proportionate and appropriate to keep the country safe from the threat of terrorism.
The Minister outlined that this draft legislation will extend existing powers for use away from UK ports in specific circumstances. We recognise that small boats continue to arrive at varied locations, including remote beaches outside established travel hubs, and that measures have to be able to respond to that challenge. As the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, said in his consultation response:
“In principle, people arriving irregularly in the UK, should be liable to counterterrorism examination, as much as those arriving at sea ports and airports.”
I welcome that the Government have been clear that the powers cannot be used as a mass screening mechanism and that the provisions in the new order remain entirely separate from immigration enforcement, given our staunch opposition to the immigration and asylum changes brought about by the Nationality and Borders Act. We feel that the consultation and the Government’s response to it have improved this delegated legislation, and we particularly welcome the response I mentioned provided by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC.
If I may, I will ask the Minister to respond to two particular points. The consultation responses highlighted the fact that clarification would be beneficial about which facilities would be included under paragraph 28 of the draft revised code, which states that the
“presence of the person in an immigration detention centre, police station or equivalent location”
in certain specified circumstances may support an officer’s belief that a schedule 7 examination can be conducted. I note that the Government recognised the calls for clarity about the use of equivalent locations but argued that for the code to exhaustively categorise or list the various types of location would risk excluding some relevant locations or facilities simply because they were not explicitly included. Saying that is particularly relevant where some facilities are operationalised or closed at short notice—for example, because of covid-19.
Needless to say, given some of the facilities that were operationalised at short notice by the Home Office during the covid pandemic, and operationalised without public health guidance being adhered to, I would have liked to see a list of suitable equivalent locations available for scrutiny and would still urge the Government to consider that further.
We endorse the recommendation that examination locations are also able to be inspected under article 4 of the optional protocol to the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to ensure that we are in keeping with article 6 of the European convention on human rights, and we hope that the Minister will confirm that that is the case. We also support Jonathan Hall’s recommendation that consideration should be given to training counter-terrorism police officers to deal with individuals who have arrived in the UK irregularly and therefore have special welfare considerations. We note that the Government have committed to considering that and so will the Minister update the Committee on any such discussions with the College of Policing and counter-terrorism policing in establishing training and guidance relevant to best practice in the exercise of schedule 7 powers?
We believe those recommendations to be sensible and appropriate, but I again stress that we recognise the stark reality of needing to be ever vigilant about those terrorist organisations and so-called lone actors who are ruthlessly opportunistic in seeking to exploit weaknesses in our defences. Consequently, it is right that we ensure that our national security legislation is dynamic in responding to contemporary and emerging challenges, if we are to minimise that risk.
National Security Bill
Holly Lynch ExcerptsMonday 6th June 2022
(1 year, 11 months ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the detailed and powerful contribution by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker). It is an honour to close this debate for the Opposition. While all debates in this Chamber carry weight, no legislation can be more serious than that which concerns our national security.
Before moving to the substance of the debate, which has been exceptionally well informed and well managed, I want to pay tribute to our security services and police forces who worked so hard to make sure that the platinum jubilee could be celebrated safely, as it should be, this weekend. I have never been prouder to be part of our great nation than when seeing and taking part in the celebrations this weekend. From street parties across our communities, the lighting of beacons and the celebration of the emergency services at the magnificent Piece Hall in my constituency to the world-class performances and execution of the Platinum Party at the Palace and the royal pageant, it has been a people-powered celebration to mark 70 years of Her Majesty the Queen’s loyal service to the country. She has provided a masterclass to all of us in public service.
Yet behind those celebrations was a policing and security operation like no other in recent history. I was grateful to the Metropolitan Police’s gold commander, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Barbara Gray, for briefing on those efforts last week. I pay tribute to those on duty this weekend on the frontline of keeping us all safe. The police and security services work around the clock, ever-vigilant to the constantly evolving threats that we face as a country, whether in times of national celebration or on any other day of the week. We are truly grateful for their service, their bravery and their sacrifice.
As outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the shadow Home Secretary, in her opening contribution, we welcome the National Security Bill, which builds on the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Law Commission and delivers long-overdue updates to our current legislation. As threats and technologies have evolved and been exposed, so too have the gaps in the legislative defences necessary to keep our country safe from hostile state threats.
As my right hon. Friend outlined, however, the Bill still poses a series of serious questions as we seek to work through the detail. There are measures that we expected to form part of the Bill that are missing, as well as genuine questions about the oversight of the powers within it and the appropriate scrutiny of how and when those powers are used.
The measures proposed in the Bill have been a long time coming; the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee outlined just how long some of the measures in the Bill have been called for. The Home Secretary raised the appalling 2018 Salisbury poisonings and the need to update our laws to provide the legislative cover necessary in the face of the contemporary threats we face as a nation. While Russia’s illegal and despicable invasion of Ukraine has certainly focused minds, it would be wrong to say that the provisions in the Official Secrets Act became outdated overnight.
In his annual threat update, MI5’s director general Ken McCallum stated:
“The Official Secrets Act 1911…remains a cornerstone of our espionage legislation…in 1910, just six months into MI5’s existence, founding Director General Vernon Kell included in his first progress report a plea for strengthening the Official Secrets Act, as it was proving hard to prosecute espionage cases. Kell’s push led to the Official Secrets Act 1911…it is now—obviously—hugely out of date.”
Our security services need to have confidence in the legislation that underpins their vital work. They need a justice system that is ready and able to respond to those they identify and expose as acting on behalf of hostile states and to the tradecraft of their intelligence operatives.
I assure the Government of our commitment to engage constructively as we work to fortify the Bill, so it successfully ensures that the UK’s law enforcement and intelligence community has the modern tools, powers and protections that it needs to keep us all safe. In turn, however, we expect to be heard in the same spirit when we raise genuine concerns and issues. I suspect that it will not come as a surprise to the Minister when I say that perhaps the most glaring omission from the Bill is the absence of a foreign agents register. As hon. Members have already said, particularly those who have served on the Intelligence and Security Committee, not least my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), it was promised by the Government in 2019 and repeated formally in the 2021 integrated review. Britain is lagging behind its allies and Five Eyes partners Canada, America and Australia, who all have variations of such schemes in place.
As recent events have unfortunately shown, a register is urgently required to ensure that individuals in this House, and leaders and decision makers across the country, know whether the lobbyists, PR firms or other professionals they encounter are acting in good faith to further genuine business interests or causes, or are instead acting on behalf of hostile states. I was particularly interested in the contribution of the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and some of his detailed proposals on that. As the notion of elite capture increasingly becomes a form of creeping corruption that all MPs and decision makers have a responsibility to steel themselves against, the legislation before us fails to deliver the transparency and clarity that a register would bring in assisting lawmakers and others in high office to protect themselves from becoming soft targets for those acting on behalf of foreign states.
I am grateful to the Minister and his officials for their time last week. Further to the words of the Home Secretary in her opening remarks, it is our understanding that the Government intend to introduce a foreign agents register in the form of a Government amendment to the Bill later in its passage through Parliament. I stress, as others have, just how vital it is that both Houses have the opportunity to scrutinise any such scheme. I therefore urge the Government to grant both the House and such a substantial addition to the Bill the respect they deserve and to bring forward plans for the foreign agents register before the Commons Committee stage, so that we can all do our due diligence in considering the proposals effectively before we get into the somewhat relentless intensity of line-by-line scrutiny of the rest of the Bill. Almost everyone who contributed to the debate made that point.
In addition to the absence of a foreign agents register and reform of the 1989 Act, we are surprised that the Bill does not go further to tackle head-on the online misinformation and disinformation that is being peddled by countries that seek to undermine us—a point also made by the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins). It has been well documented that for many years now the Russian state has regularly pushed disinformation on social media, as part of its strategy to sow division and stoke tensions in the west. Information on one so-called Russian troll factory was reported in 2017, when journalists identified 118 accounts or groups on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter that were linked to the troll factory. The so-called trolls had contacted around 100 real US-based activists to offer financial help to pay for transport or printing costs to support their protests and action relating primarily to, as we have heard, race relations, Texan independence and gun rights.
Rather than support one side of a particular issue or debate, the troll factories typically encourage and offer financial assistance to groups from opposite ends of the political spectrum to amplify divisions. Disinformation has also been a facet of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A special cybersecurity report from Microsoft found that in the run-up to the invasion Russian actors used disinformation on social media in an attempt to destabilise the Ukrainian Government and Ukrainian society. Just this weekend, The Times reported on how Kremlin trolls are stirring up anti-Ukrainian refugee sentiment online in Bulgaria, and they are no doubt attempting to do the same elsewhere.
Although there are clauses in the Bill that could offer some relevant new powers in very general terms, we are surprised that neither the Online Safety Bill nor this Bill present measures that are aimed at exposing the aggressive online activity I have described, addressing its scale, disrupting it and stopping it at source. We hope that, during the Bill’s passage, we can work together to enhance such measures. Given the evidence base and societal impact, a failure to do so would be a regrettable and massive missed opportunity.
Because of the Bill’s nature, it inherently gives new statutory powers to the police, security services and the Home Secretary. Labour recognises the requirement for the new powers in principle; nevertheless, it is important that within a mechanism that grants such powers there are appropriate safeguards and accountability. We firmly believe that the legislation would benefit from much more clarity on the face of the Bill about the appropriate scrutiny and oversight from either a relevant commissioner or independent reviewer.
As the Minister knows, we have engaged with him and his officials on our serious concerns about the drafting of clause 23, and I am grateful for the note he shared today with me and my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary in response to those concerns. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) gave a typically detailed rebuttal of why clause 23, as currently drafted, is necessary, given the existing legislation. I hope the Minister will respond to her and to so many others when he sums up.
In addition to the introduction of a foreign agents register, we believe more needs to be done to protect the Government and their officials from becoming the potential targets of hostile states actors—much in the same spirit as the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). I am afraid there are outstanding questions about the conduct of the Prime Minister—if he still is the Prime Minister; he certainly was when I got to my feet—when he served as the Foreign Secretary, and I have written to the Minister about them.
I have asked questions at this Dispatch Box and tabled written parliamentary questions, simply asking whether the Prime Minister met the former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev in April 2018. The House deserves to know what happened, because if the then Foreign Secretary did not understand how inappropriate such a meeting would be—without officials and without close protection officers—at the height of the Salisbury poisoning, we need legislation that is unequivocal in its clarity. We will therefore table amendments to the Bill to address any such lapses in judgment, which stand to have consequences for our national security, while we await answers from the Government as to exactly what did happen in April 2018.
Once again, we in the Labour party are unwavering in our commitment to keeping the country safe. We will work with the Government to support these measures where they are right and overdue, and we expect to be heard and to be able to work together where opportunities for enhanced protections and greater oversight are necessary, appropriate and responsible. We look forward to Committee stage.
Preventing Crime and Delivering Justice
Holly Lynch Excerpts(1 year, 12 months ago)
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Priti Patel
Many of these issues are devolved matters, but this is such important work—a lot of good work is taking place through the integrated end-to-end approach, and also through the scorecards that we are now setting up—that I would be very happy for the hon. Gentleman to speak to our Ministers about best practice, learnings and how the work can come to Northern Ireland. There is, it is fair to say, a great deal more that we do need to do in Northern Ireland, and I know we have had these conversations many times.
The data reform Bill will modernise the Information Commissioner’s Office so that it can take stronger action against organisations that breach data rules. We now have more than 490 Crown court places available for use, which is comparable to pre-pandemic levels, and more than 700 courtrooms that can safely hold face-to-face hearings are open across the civil and family justice system. An additional 250 rooms are available for virtual hearings. In March, we announced the extension of 30 Nightingale courtrooms, and we have opened two new super-courtrooms in Manchester and Loughborough. Furthermore, we are ensuring sufficient judicial capacity by expanding our plans for judicial recruitment.
The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 will mean that we can focus our support on those who need it most, not on those who can afford to pay the evil people-smuggling gangs to come into our country. The Act increases the sentences for those coming here illegally and means that people-smugglers face life behind bars. It also makes it easier for us to remove dangerous foreign criminals, as demanded by the British public but not by those on the Opposition Benches or those lawyers working to undermine the will of the public. The British public’s priorities are those of this Government. We are on their side, and we will continue to do everything we can by making this Act viable and workable and delivering for the British people.
We are hospitable and charitable as a country, but our capacity to support the more than 80 million people worldwide who are on the move is not limitless. Many Labour Members and others on the Opposition Benches do not seem to understand that, but we do. It is why we have developed our world-leading migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda to deter illegal entry. We are providing solutions to the global migration challenges that countries across the world are facing. As ever, we hear very little from the Opposition, who seem to support the same old broken system and uncontrolled migration to our country.
Two terrorist incidents highlight how we can never be complacent. The attack outside Liverpool Women’s Hospital last year would have been a disaster, had it not been for the incredible quick thinking and courage of the taxi driver involved on the scene. The terrible murder of our dear friend Sir David Amess was shocking, but not without precedent. We have worked closely together, Mr Speaker, to tighten security for Members, and we will continue to do so, and this Government will continue to work with our Five Eyes partners to keep the United Kingdom and our allies safe.
The “National Cyber Strategy 2022” outlines my approach to tackling cyber-crime. We have terrorist activity committed online and information circulated by terrorist individuals and organisations. Going further, the G7 forum on ransomware launched new programmes, such as our work on economic crime, to counter illicit finance and commodities. Improving our international partners’ ability to disrupt organised crime and terrorist activity is a priority to which this Government are committed.
In the past 12 months, we have completed a review of police firearms licensing procedures in response to the terrible and tragic shootings in Plymouth last August. New statutory guidance came into force in November. It improves firearms licensing safety standards and will ensure greater consistency in decision-making. The measures in the national security Bill will further protect our national security, the British public and our vital interests from those who seek to harm the UK. It delivers on our manifesto commitment to ensure that the security services have the powers they need.
The Bill represents the biggest overhaul of state threats legislation for a generation. We have world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but they face an ever-present and increasingly sophisticated threat. The Bill gives them an enhanced range of tools, powers and protections to tackle the full range of state threats that have evolved since we last legislated in this area. It will also prevent the exploitation of civil legal aid and civil damage payments by convicted terrorists. The Bill enhances our ability to deter, detect and disrupt state actors who target the UK, preventing spies from harming our strategic interests and stealing our innovations and inventions.
The Bill also repeals and replaces existing espionage laws, many of which were primarily designed to counter the threat from German spies around the time of the first world war. It will introduce new offences to address state-backed sabotage, foreign interference, the theft of trade secrets and the assisting of a foreign intelligence service. The Bill will for the first time make it an offence to be a covert foreign spy on our soil. A foreign influence registration scheme will require individuals to register certain arrangements with foreign Governments, to help prevent damaging or hostile influence being exerted by them here.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Can the Home Secretary confirm whether the national security Bill will clarify whether it would have been inappropriate or unlawful for a Foreign Secretary to have met a former KGB officer, as we understand the Prime Minister did back in April 2018?
Priti Patel
If I may, I will not comment on that specific example that has been given. Actually, I think the focus should be on the legislation that is coming forward in this House, where there are plenty of debates to be had, rather than making a point like that. I think it speaks to how the Opposition treat matters of national security, and the disdain that they show to the significance of the threats posed.
Oral Answers to Questions
Holly Lynch Excerpts(2 years ago)
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Priti Patel
First, the new plan for immigration spells out absolutely the Government’s approach to safe and legal routes. As I have said many times in the House, every safe and legal route needs to be bespoke, based on the crisis that we are seeking to address.
Secondly, in response to the hon. Lady’s question about Afghanistan, she will know that under the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme we will welcome up to 20,000 at-risk people who have been affected by the most appalling events in Afghanistan. That scheme was announced last year and will include women and girls and members of minority groups, given their vulnerability.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
A family who are still in Ukraine have been reporting back to their Homes for Ukraine sponsors in Halifax that they have been able to hear the bombs getting closer every day of their 29-days-and-counting wait for a visa. The family in Ukraine have twins under the age of 10 who have, remarkably, had their visas processed at different speeds. A Home Office whistleblower has described the scheme as “designed to fail”. Government figures show that 40,000 visas have been issued under the Homes for Ukraine scheme, yet just 6,600 Ukrainians have actually arrived in the UK, because families who need to travel together cannot do so because the visa of just one family member, often a child, is delayed. Will the Home Secretary explain why, if 40,000 visas have been issued, so few Ukrainians have arrived in the UK? What is she doing to correct the situation?
Priti Patel
I thank the hon. Lady for her question because she makes an important point. There are a number of points to make in response.
First, on the reason why low numbers have come to the UK, as I have already said, more than 71,000 visas for both schemes have been granted. The Minister for Refugees, Lord Harrington, went to the region just 10 days ago to find out why and what more could be done to bring over families who have been granted their visas to come over. First and foremost, as we have heard repeatedly from the Ukrainian Government and from Governments in the region—[Interruption.] Would the hon. Lady like to stand up and respond? First of all, those families want to stay in region. That is a fact and that is exactly why we are working with the various Governments in region.
The hon. Lady made an important point about families and younger children. Much of that is down to the checks, because they are not always travelling with parents. Safeguarding checks are being undertaken to ensure that they are all linked members of families. They are important checks that have to take place.
Draft Licensing Act 2003 (Platinum Jubilee Licensing Hours) Order 2022
Holly Lynch Excerpts(2 years ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a real pleasure to serve under you as Chair, Dr Huq.
Members will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to detain the Committee for long. Unusual as this is, I am in full agreement with the Minister on this occasion. The draft order is an amendment to the Licensing Act that will allow licensed premises to continue to sell alcohol, offer entertainment and serve late night refreshment for longer than usual on the extended bank holiday. We are happy to support it, not least in Halifax, where plans for celebrations are well under way right across the borough.
I have had the pleasure of being involved in the celebrations planned for our magnificent Piece Hall, which involve, as part of the jubilee festivities, a special day to give thanks to our emergency services as defenders of the Queen’s peace. I encourage others to consider doing the same in their respective patches. As we all know, however, the main focus of the jubilee weekend is the opportunity to bring communities together to celebrate Her Majesty the Queen becoming the first British monarch to celebrate a platinum jubilee: 70 years of service. She has served this country with humility and understated determination for 70 years.
The proposals will recognise the exceptional national significance of such a milestone and will allow for festivities to continue into the evening a little longer than usual. We must note, of course, that extended licensing hours may lead to more instances of antisocial and disorderly behaviour, and other misdemeanours associated with the consumption of alcohol. I urge the Minister and his colleagues to be alive to that, and to respond positively to any anxieties and requests that the police and local authorities may have in ensuring that all revellers engage in festivities responsibly. In conclusion, however, I am happy to support the Government’s proposals, and wish all Members a wonderful platinum jubilee weekend.