European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [Lords]

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 3rd September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

As the Foreign Secretary has set out, the context for this debate is the continuing crisis in the eurozone: the troika has yet to decide whether Greece has met its bail-out commitments; Spain appears to be on the brink of making a formal request for assistance; forecasters predict that the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Belgium will all miss the European Union deficit target next year; and there are serious doubts about whether Ireland and Portugal will be able to comply fully, with certainty, with the existing terms of their EU bail-out programmes. The need for decisive action by the eurozone is beyond doubt, and we believe that it is overwhelmingly in the British national interest that such action is taken.

Today’s debate, as we have already heard, relates specifically to the content of the European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill. As the Foreign Secretary has set out, member states agreed, following a meeting of the European Council in March 2011, to the amendment of article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, specifically to enable the creation of a permanent eurozone-only bail-out fund, the European stability mechanism.

We should recognise this as a major institutional development for the EU. It sets up an International Monetary Fund-type body for the eurozone on a permanent basis, replacing the separate intergovernmental European financial stability facility, which was agreed when the Greek emergency first broke. As this is a treaty within the EU-27 framework, any amendments or changes must be approved by the established procedures for treaty ratification in each and every member state, even though the ESM will apply only to those member states that are members of the euro. It is, therefore, unlike the fiscal compact, which, despite the Prime Minister’s so-called veto last December, Britain was unable to block, and over which this Parliament has had no say.

Indeed, the fiscal compact negotiated outside the EU framework by 25 members of the EU, without Britain or the Czech Republic in the room, establishes a completely new principle in European treaty ratification. It will enter into force when it is ratified by 12 of the 17 eurozone member states—a principle that, in our view, could work to Britain’s disadvantage in other contexts, and which is a direct consequence of not being in the room when such decisions are reached. The Bill, however, will lead to enabling legislation giving parliamentary approval to the European Council decision to establish a permanent eurozone-only bail-out fund.

Let me make clear the Labour party’s position on the Bill. We are legislating today not on the substance of the ESM, but only on the enabling treaty change to allow it to be set up. Labour recognises the need for that enabling measure, so we will support the Bill. A more stable eurozone is important for the UK’s long-term growth and prosperity. Indeed, as the eurozone accounts for more than 40% of our external trade, prospects for business investment and export growth depend on it.

[Mr Cash]

On the claimed virtues of the single market, does the shadow Foreign Secretary accept that we have in fact run up the most monumental deficit with the other 26 member states of the EU, to an extent that it is now damaging our economy and thereby preventing this country from achieving growth?

[Mr Alexander]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that if I were to draw up a list of what is damaging the economy of the United Kingdom at the moment, many items would stand above a recognition that the single market has provided British businesses with European markets constituting 500 million consumers. It would be perverse logic to suggest, at a time when we are struggling to secure growth in the British economy, that it would be to the advantage of British exporters or British businesses more generally to shrink the UK’s home single market from 500 million consumers to just 60 million.

A mechanism with sufficient firepower to restructure and recapitalise weak banks, and to bail out Governments who can temporarily no longer access the bond markets to finance their borrowing and debt, is a necessary part of bringing stability back to the eurozone, and a permanent bail-out fund is one key part of making that happen. However, the burden of responsibility for delivering that growth and prosperity must be taken by eurozone members themselves. In the establishment of the ESM, the European Council is making it clear that ultimate responsibility for ensuring the overall stability of the euro area rests with eurozone members. It will be a fund by the eurozone for the eurozone. That is clearly in the UK’s national interest, and we will not vote against a Bill that will allow the ESM to be established.

[Mr Jenkin]

Why, then, was the previous Government’s parting act to agree that the UK should be liable under the stability mechanism that they approved?

[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman is right to recognise the timing of that in the final days of our time in office, but the other significant event that was happening then was the real prospect of the eurozone collapsing completely. He might welcome that, but the Opposition certainly would not. That was why the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the outgoing Government made genuine efforts to consult the potential incoming Finance Minister, who is now the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That matter is discussed in the explanatory memorandum on European Union legislation dated 15 July, in which the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, now the Transport Secretary, stated:

“The Government regrets that the Scrutiny Committees did not have time to consider this document before it was agreed at Council. It should be noted that whilst agreement on behalf of the UK was given by the previous administration, cross-party consensus had been gained.”

If the hon. Gentleman is concerned that the outgoing Chancellor reached the wrong decision, he might like to put that point directly to the current Chancellor.

Let me be absolutely clear that our support for the Bill does not equate to unqualified confidence in the ESM or in the current package of eurozone policies of which it forms but one part. We have concerns about both the restrictive terms of the fiscal compact that eurozone members have negotiated to establish the ESM and the manner in which it is currently envisaged that the ESM will be operationalised. The Opposition are certainly under no illusion that the ESM in itself will resolve the eurozone crisis. Much more will be required to do so than is included in this two-clause enabling Bill. The establishment of the ESM represents but one part of a broader package of measures and reforms that members of the euro must adopt to deliver stability successfully and bring greater prosperity to the eurozone in future.

[Mr MacShane]

I am following my right hon. Friend’s speech with considerable interest and agreement, but should we not change the tone slightly? We hear, “The eurozone must adopt this”, “They’re at fault”, “The pound zone is perfect.” I am going to Poland tomorrow for a big eastern European economic conference, and there is not the same patronising indifference to the eurozone there. There is not a view that the zloty zone is perfect. We are all in this together, and the trouble with the Government’s approach is that it sells the public the lie that there is a thing called the eurozone out there, but it is a far-away economic region of which we know not very much and in which we are not very interested.

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[Mr Alexander]

I hope I can give my right hon. Friend the assurances that he seeks. The Opposition are far from indifferent about the future of the eurozone, not least for the reason that I have already explained—many British jobs and exports rely on the eurozone coming through the current crisis. His point highlights one of the delusions that is apparent among at least a few Members, which is that if Britain were to leave the European Union, the concerns that currently afflict the eurozone would somehow become remote from the interests of British jobs and workers. The eurozone will continue to be of absolutely fundamental interest to British manufacturers, exporters and jobs. The Prime Minister arrived at a recent summit lecturing the Germans and left being shouted at by the French, and that certainly does not seem to me to be how to secure the type of agreement that I sense lies behind my right hon. Friend’s question, which we want to see in the best interests of stability in the eurozone.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Is it not the case that countries such as Poland and Britain have the great advantage that they can choose a parity for their currency that is appropriate to their own economies, rather than being forced to adopt a wholly inappropriate parity through the eurozone like Greece, Ireland and a number of other countries? Does my right hon. Friend agree that if Britain had joined the euro with the parity that existed at that time, we would now have a wrecked economy?

[Mr Alexander]

It is hardly a revelation that I strongly supported the five economic tests back in the years immediately following 1997, whether in relation to the convergence criteria or more broadly. In that sense, the Opposition’s position has not changed. It was an intriguing interpretation of history by the Foreign Secretary to attribute to his own conduct out of office so much credit for what the Labour Government did in office in keeping Britain outside the euro. However, he is right to recognise that there is broad consensus, which extends even to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), that there is no immediate prospect of British entry to the euro, for some of the reasons that my hon. Friend describes.

Let me be clear about some of the Opposition’s specific concerns, in a spirit of genuine concern about and mutual interest in the eurozone. First, we believe that the eurozone firewall needs to be bigger in scale and more flexible in operation than the ESM alone currently allows. Although the ESM is a key part of that broader firewall, an effective European Central Bank should also be used to enhance, and contribute to the establishment of, an effective firewall. Since the House last debated the matter, the ECB has announced its intention to begin buying bonds if member states comply with the relevant conditions regarding the management of their fiscal budgets. That is a welcome development, and we look forward to the ECB president Mario Draghi’s announcement this Thursday of how that new programme will work. The ECB must now deliver on its promise if it is to function properly as a lender of last resort and provide the necessary firepower to support the eurozone economies effectively under bond market pressure.

[Mr Cash]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

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[Mr Alexander]

I am keen to make a little progress, but I will endeavour to give way to the hon. Gentleman in due course.

Secondly, stability in the banking system is vital, and where that requires action it should take place swiftly and with urgency. That is why we welcome the recent announcements about the ESM, which represent steps towards recapitalising weak eurozone banks. If responsibility for recapitalising national banks rests with national Governments, the problems of countries such as Spain risk getting worse, because state support for the banks will further worsen those countries’ fiscal outlook. We therefore agree that within the eurozone it makes sense for the ESM to be able to play a leading role in bank restructuring and recapitalisation. Although there is agreement in principle about that, it is vital that the eurozone begins taking action on it more urgently than it has to date. We cannot afford to wait for full agreement on a banking union before the process of recapitalising Europe’s banks begins. It needs to take place over the coming months.

The failure of eurozone members to accept fully the logic of a single currency must be addressed, and alongside a banking union some form of debt mutualisation may have to be considered. Simply put, creditor countries must be willing to shore up debtor countries in the short term if they are to guarantee their own stability in the long run. That may be a bitter pill for countries such as Germany to swallow, but it is the only cure for the eurozone as a whole.

[Mr Cash]

On the role of the ECB, Mr Draghi and the proposals on bail-outs, does the right hon. Gentleman agree with the president of the Bundesbank, Mr Weidmann, or with Angela Merkel?

[Mr Alexander]

I would not wish to intrude on the constitutional differences between the Chancellor of Germany and the governor of the Bundesbank. President Draghi bears a heavy burden of responsibility on Thursday to add detail to the terms of the guarantees that he was judged to have offered on the basis of his rhetoric at the previous press conference in the summer.

There is clearly a divide between those who, despite the economic facts, remain wedded throughout Europe to an austerity-only approach and those who recognise the need for a growth-led recovery alongside genuine efforts at medium-term deficit reduction. It is regrettable that our Government appear to be firmly on the wrong side of the divide. However, I welcome the fact that, at the last EU summit, a useful but modest growth package was agreed, although I regret that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom remained bound to the last to the old Merkozy-style approach.

As part of the new focus on growth across Europe, we support a significant increase in the capital of the European Investment Bank and the concept of infrastructure bonds to finance major capital investment projects. The European Union must also learn to use existing resources better without spending more. A genuine plan for growth must start with reform of the EU’s 2014-20 budget, which, at more than €1 trillion, has the potential to make a real impact on the European economy’s recovery by spending less on agriculture, more on infrastructure, small business growth and research and development, and better using the money currently spent through existing EU structural funds.

Alongside those targeted measures to stimulate growth, the Government should call for the completion of the single market and the digital and energy markets. Completely removing existing obstacles could translate into a 7% increase in incomes per head in the UK, according to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Further integration could therefore provide a genuine and much-needed boost to growth.

[Mark Reckless]

The shadow Foreign Secretary is giving us a tour of the European horizon, but may I pull him back to the Council’s decision, which we are asked to ratify tonight? Does he consider that decision to include the recitals?

[Mr Alexander]

As a former Minister for Europe—and the current Minister for Europe is sitting on the Front Bench opposite—I can say that there is a Council legal service, which can advise about the standing and authority of the recitals. If I recollect correctly, recitals have been judged in previous legal cases to have persuasive effect, and would certainly inform any subsequent legal judgment about Ministers’ intentions in the Council meeting at the time. I therefore think that it was appropriate for the Foreign Secretary to rehearse in some detail the terms of the recital to inform the House about the basis on which the Council reached the decision at the meeting. Perhaps I would add to the Foreign Secretary’s earlier comments that the other great strength of the proposal is the explicit nature of the understanding that the problem is for the eurozone and must be addressed by eurozone members. I have been candid in recognising that, in the teeth of the crisis, in the final days of the Labour Government, decisions were made that reflected the urgency of the moment. One reason why it is in Britain’s interest to support the amendment to the treaty is the facilitation of the eurozone countries’ assumption of the responsibility that we have long argued that they should accept for the currency’s continuing structural problems.

Let me turn to an issue that the Foreign Secretary raised only briefly, in passing. I anticipate that other colleagues will also raise it. It is fair to recognise that the eurozone crisis is now having an impact on the British economy. However, it is wholly wrong to claim, as the Government are trying to do in several different forums, that the current double-dip recession in the UK is the result of the ongoing eurozone crisis. That is an excuse, not an explanation.

First, for most of early 2012 and 2011, exports, including to the eurozone, were keeping the UK out of recession. Secondly, the UK recovery stopped in late 2010, well before the eurozone crisis had fully taken hold. Thirdly, of all the G20 countries, only Italy is in recession as well as the UK, and although the eurozone as a whole is now contracting, it is has not seen three successive quarters of negative growth as, alas, we have witnessed in the UK under the current Government. Although the crisis in the eurozone poses serious risks to the UK economy, the Government’s failed economic strategy has rendered our economy more vulnerable and more exposed to these risks than we needed to be.

The establishment of the ESM is therefore a necessary, if partial, response to the problems afflicting the eurozone. The risks still confronting the eurozone are real and immediate. Ratifying the treaty amendment that allows for the ESM’s establishment must not be seen as an excuse for inaction on the other vital areas where the eurozone is still required to act, or, indeed, on the change of course that is now needed here in the UK.

Amendment of the treaty is not only in the eurozone’s interest, but in that of the UK. For that reason, we support the Bill.

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[Mr Cash]

I am delighted that my right hon. Friend makes that point and I endorse it as a general principle, but instances occur periodically that require a certain amount of investigation and analysis. I did not entirely endorse the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) in as many words, but I agree with him—and with others—that, at the time in question, decisions were taken that people now regret. I am glad that we have moved on from article 122 to the present European stability mechanism.

[Mr Douglas Alexander]

rose—

[Mr Cash]

I would rather get on with my speech than continue to dwell on the outrageous decision taken, but I will certainly give way to the shadow Foreign Secretary.

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[Mr Alexander]

First, may I identify myself with both the spirit and substance of the remarks offered by the Minister for Europe? Secondly, before the hon. Gentleman proceeds with his speech, does he accept that, notwithstanding his demand for continued investigations, one of his colleagues has perhaps fallen into error in suggesting that the named individual was the permanent representative in Brussels at that time? I think, in fact, that his predecessor was in post at the time when the decisions that are being discussed were reached.

[Mr Cash]

I cannot possibly comment, as they say, on that particular point because I am not aware of all the circumstances. Although mistakes were made, the point regarding the ESM is far more important. I accept that the EFSM is now in the past, but it was an unfortunate incident and all parties involved were culpable of allowing it to be endorsed as a proposal—it remained effective for far too long, with obligations on the United Kingdom and its taxpayers.

Balance of Competences

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his remarks today and for advance sight of the statement.

The Opposition have no objection to a proper, thorough and factual analysis of what the EU does and how it affects us in the United Kingdom, and we welcome the involvement of a wide range of external stakeholders in the exercise announced today. We are also clear, however, that we support a future for Britain within the EU. To cut ourselves off from a market of 500 million customers would imply not just that we had lost faith in Europe, but that we had lost faith in the ability of British companies to out-compete their European rivals. In an era of billion-person countries and trillion-pound economies, we need to find ways to amplify Britain’s voice on the world stage. Where we have shared goals—from climate change negotiations to tackling cross-border crime and human trafficking—working together in Europe makes global agreements more likely.

However, committed as we are to a future within Europe, we also recognise the need for reform of Europe. The Foreign Secretary made only passing reference today to the eurozone crisis, which is still afflicting Europe, so in many ways this was a curiously contextless and rather ahistorical statement, the announcement of which, I fear, owed more to enduring political problems than to immediate policy challenges. Let us remember that President Van Rompuy stated at the European Council just a couple of weeks ago that his plan was to

“submit to the December 2012 European Council detailed proposals for a stage-based process towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”.

Given that that timetable is much shorter than the one the Foreign Secretary has set out today for full publication of the internal Government audit, will he confirm that the work initiated today will not be completed and so will not inform the Government’s negotiating position in the critical weeks and months ahead? Given the broad terms of the Foreign Secretary’s statement, will he take the opportunity of his reply to set out more clearly to the House what the Government’s specific negotiating objectives are in the crucial six months ahead?

Every Member of the House knows that it has not exactly been a great week for coalition unity. That is perhaps reflected in the strength of support from the Liberal Democrats Benches for the Foreign Secretary’s statement today—

[Mr Charles Kennedy (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (LD)]

Quality, not quantity.

[Mr Alexander]

I am glad to say that what is missing in quantity is indeed made up for by quality on the Liberal Democrat Benches. There are still some true and honourable Liberal Democrats, I am glad to acknowledge.

The statement we have just heard from the Foreign Secretary will do little to create a greater sense of consensus between the coalition parties, I fear—indeed, the project is not even under way yet and already cracks are emerging. The Foreign Secretary’s Liberal Democrat colleagues, including the Deputy Prime Minister’s advisers, have reportedly been claiming that the audit is a small, low-key affair and largely a technical exercise. The Foreign Secretary today makes grand claims about the scale and scope of the project, but the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), co-chair of the Liberal Democrat parliamentary committee on international affairs, has already said:

“The call for a long list of demands for unilateral repatriation and carve-outs is neither achievable nor desirable.”

Indeed, the Deputy Prime Minister is reported in the newspapers to have already warned that the review must not simply provide a turbulent backdrop to what is already a tense relationship between Britain and its EU partners. Given that the Deputy Prime Minister knows a thing or two about tense relationships, what assurances can the Foreign Secretary give his colleague today that that scenario will not come to pass?

The timing of today’s announcement seems to have more to do with managing the fallout from the recent weekend of referendum shambles than with promoting Britain’s national interest, because the splits on Europe are not just between the coalition partners, but within the Conservative party. The timing seems to reflect growing rumblings from those on the Conservative Benches, many of whom will see today’s announcement as merely another step on the ramp towards an inevitable EU referendum. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Right on cue, and from the Conservative Front Bench. Let me therefore take this opportunity to ask the Foreign Secretary an important question that the Prime Minister failed to answer when he returned from last month’s EU summit. If the Conservative party were to propose a referendum premised on a package of powers being repatriated—a list that would probably be drawn from the audit announced today—but the Foreign Secretary was unable to secure such an outcome in his negotiations with members of the EU, would he contemplate advocating withdrawal in a subsequent referendum? I invite him to desist from warning about defeatism and simply to answer the question.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister himself said recently that it is vital for our country

“that we get our relationship with Europe right.”

Much that determines that relationship could well be decided before the Government’s review is completed. The truth is that Britain urgently needs an effective Europe strategy, and an audit, although worth while, is not a substitute for a strategy.

[Mr Hague]

Stripping away one or two of the remarks about political parties, I think that amounted to a welcome for the announcement, as the right hon. Gentleman said that he had “no objection”. That is as near as we get to enthusiasm from Opposition Front Benchers on this subject, so I am grateful to him for what counts as a very strong welcome and I look forward to the Labour party submitting its evidence to the review in due course.

Given that the right hon. Gentleman got into party political matters, let me say that it is a pity that Labour never conducted such a review. It might have helped the Labour Government when they were handing over so many competences without understanding what they were doing, without subjecting them to proper scrutiny in this House and without having a referendum. We remember—[Interruption.] Opposition Members are talking about particular treaties, but it was in the Nice treaty that Labour gave up the veto, which ended up with our being implicated in eurozone bail-outs under qualified majority voting—something from which this Government have now extracted the United Kingdom. The Opposition will therefore benefit enormously—and could have benefited in the past—from this kind of analysis, and I am glad that they have no objection today to its being undertaken.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about our priorities in the coming months. They are, of course, to protect the integrity of the single market. There is much talk about banking union, for instance, although different countries and different commentators mean different things by the term. We will protect the integrity of the single market, but above all our priority is to support measures that will really bring growth to the EU. They include removing barriers to business and pursuing free trade agreements with countries such as Canada and Singapore. Much of that agenda was endorsed at the June European Council.

The right hon. Gentleman went on to ask other questions about the future, and to suggest that the timetables were somehow amiss, but he himself said in an article in The Guardian on 1 July that

“there are also those within the Labour party who have speculated about the possibility of a referendum… We should not decide now because the pressing priority…is…securing Britain’s interests and protecting the single market”.

That is exactly what I have been saying. He went on:

“And we cannot sensibly decide now because none of us can fully predict where Europe will be in a few months, never mind a few years.”

So he does not want to answer the questions that he has just been putting to me about the longer-term future. What we do know is that, whatever happens, we will be in a better position if we have undertaken this work. It should have been undertaken before. It will inform our negotiations, improve our discussions with our partners and allow the public to be engaged in the process. Perhaps it will also lead to Governments undertaking more successful negotiations than the one that he will remember from his time as Minister for Europe, when he gave away £7 billion of our rebate. There is much to learn if we are to avoid negotiations that are so memorably, comprehensively and disastrously unsuccessful as those.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Safeguards will certainly be needed—my hon. Friend is quite right to raise that—but as things stand proposals and ideas about banking union take many different forms. Many people mean many different things by “banking union”. If such proposals are made more tangible and specific, we will set out the specific safeguards that we think we need for the single market. We are already making the case in European capitals that in the event of a banking union in the eurozone, which, by the way, we will certainly not be part of—let me make that absolutely clear—such safeguards will be necessary.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I am intrigued by the apparent complacency of the Foreign Secretary’s most recent answer. Given the Chancellor’s advocacy of greater integration in the eurozone, would the Foreign Secretary be willing to set out for the House what legal or political safeguards for British businesses and exporters the Government will be proposing at next week’s European Council?

[Mr Hague]

The Chancellor has set out exactly what we think should happen. For the eurozone to be successful, it is necessary to have more support from stronger economies, to help weaker economies adjust; more pooling of resources, whether through common eurobonds or some other mechanism; a shared back-stop for the banking system, to strengthen banks and protect deposits; and, as a consequence, much closer oversight of fiscal and financial policy. That is what we believe the eurozone needs to do. However, if it were to adopt measures that affect—or may affect, in any way—the ability of the single market to operate effectively and in the interests of this country, we will need the safeguards for which we are already making the case. Once we have specific proposals, we will set out those specific safeguards.

[Mr Alexander]

If President Hollande is successful at next week’s European summit in securing agreement for a jobs and growth package, will the Prime Minister support his new-found best friend in this endeavour or will the Government stick to their failing austerity-alone approach, which has delivered a double-dip recession here in Britain?

[Mr Hague]

The Opposition might need to take a closer look at some of the things that President Hollande is advocating, because he is saying that France must balance its budget by 2017. He is also saying that growth cannot come from state spending and that it must be reined in—to use his words—so perhaps the Opposition might care to decide whether they truly support the words of President Hollande.

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[Mr Hague]

My right hon. Friend and I have had this exchange several times, and he is right to point out the importance of the Sunni-Shi’a tensions, and sometimes conflicts, in the region. As I have said before, however, I believe that there is more to it than that. There are also many people in Syria, of different ethnicities, religions and beliefs, who want freedom and democracy in their country, and who want to be rid of their repressive regime. The factors that my right hon. Friend has mentioned are not the only ones at work, but they certainly add to the complexity of the situation. They also add to the importance of opposition forces representing all groups in Syria and preserving their rights in the future, as well as the importance of trying to negotiate a peaceful political transition in Syria, which is what we are attempting to do.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

In his recent answer, the Foreign Secretary reiterated his support for the Annan plan, but only last week the UN was forced to suspend the observer mission in Syria. In the light of that suspension, does he accept what is already clear to many people on the ground in Syria—namely, that the Annan plan is simply not working? Will he set out today the steps beyond the Annan plan that the UK is now advocating that the international community take to bring about a cessation to the violence in Syria?

[Mr Hague]

I accepted, some time ago, that the Annan plan was not working. It is not working at all at the moment, but it would be wrong to give up completely on the plan, because the road to any peaceful settlement in Syria will be through either the Annan plan or something very similar to it. It is therefore important to persist with those efforts, and we are doing that particularly in our talks with Russia. I met the Russian Foreign Minister again in Kabul last week, and the Prime Minister has met President Putin in the past 24 hours to pursue this matter further. We are seeking international agreement, including with Russia, on how to ensure the implementation of the Annan plan. We are ready to take that matter forward at the UN Security Council or in a contact group, or in both together. Of course, if all those efforts fail, we will want to return to the UN Security Council, as well as greatly to intensify our support for the opposition and to see more sweeping sanctions from across the world.

Syria

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it. If anyone was in any doubt as to the seriousness of the situation in Syria, a simple examination of the facts should be enough to convince them of the scale of the horror that we are witnessing. The conflict has been raging for 15 months and the death toll is estimated at more than 15,000. As the Foreign Secretary told the House in the last few minutes, the village of al-Houla was the scene of one of the worst massacres of which there are reports. UN observers on the ground have confirmed that at least 108 people were killed, including 49 children and 34 women. I therefore join the Foreign Secretary in recognising the work of UN monitors who attempt to document such events. They have been repeatedly shot at and obstructed in trying to carry out that important task.

This is not an historical conflict—it is unfolding in real time, documented on television screens and in YouTube footage. I therefore welcome this opportunity for the House to scrutinise the Government’s response. Fifteen months on, in recent weeks the conflict, instead of approaching its end, seems, if anything, to be entering a new and bloodier phase. We should be clear that the responsibility for the crisis lies primarily with the Assad regime, which continues to show utter contempt for the value of human life, perpetrating a violent and brutal crackdown on innocent people across Syria, for which it must ultimately be held to account. However, expressions of revulsion in response to the slaughter are not enough. Let us be candid and admit that the international community is dangerously divided on its response to the conflict. That division is drastically hampering the effort to stop the violence.

The point of consensus for the time being is the Kofi Annan peace plan, but by any honest reckoning that UN-backed plan has so far failed to bring an end to the violence. Does the Foreign Secretary therefore think that increasing the number of monitors and boosting Mr Annan’s resources would improve the prospects of the plan succeeding? To date, the Annan plan has been judged to be the only option on the table, but the Foreign Secretary rightly told the House a few moments ago that the “Annan plan is not an open-ended commitment.” Will he tell the House specifically what the time limit and tests for the Annan plan are? How much slaughter is required before the international community acknowledges the plan’s failure and begins to formulate a more effective alternative means of ending the crisis?

Further diplomacy is of course needed if the divisions in the international community are to be overcome, but the difficulty of the task must not detract from its urgency. What, therefore, is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the recent and fairly brutal judgment of Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader and former High Representative for Bosnia, who said of the British Government’s strategy for dealing with the crisis:

“I don’t think that is wise diplomacy”?

As the Annan plan is currently not working, the challenge is to ask what, beyond the Annan plan, can be done, even accounting for the divergence of views in the international community. Several steps short of military intervention should be considered to sharpen the choice facing the Syrian regime. First, on the financing of the regime, without a comprehensive oil embargo Syria can still export oil to countries outside the EU and United States. What discussions has the Foreign Secretary had with the Government of India, who do not have bilateral sanctions and who have allegedly been approached by the Syrians to purchase Syrian oil? The Syrian regime is also still able to import diesel from countries such as Venezuela, which allows it to sustain its military operation, including tanks, through foreign imports. What is the likelihood of a comprehensive oil ban being agreed by the United Nations? Failing that, what realistic pressure have the Government put on countries continuing to trade with Syria in such a way?

Secondly, on the security situation and particularly on support for the opposition, there are steps that could alter the realities on the ground without breaching the arms embargo, such as blocking the communications of Assad’s forces and choking off his remaining finance from neighbours such as Lebanon, which we understand are still not enforcing the Arab League sanctions that they have previously agreed to.

The Syrian military is one of the key pillars still sustaining the political regime in Damascus, and the newly appointed head of the Syrian National Council, Abdulbaset Sayda, was right to call for mass defections from the regime in one of his first statements since taking control of the SNC. What is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the current rate of such defections, and what steps can the international community to take to encourage and facilitate them further? Does he agree that more should be done to publish internationally the names of any officers ordering the current atrocities, as a clear signal of intent that they will face the full force of international justice for their crimes?

The Foreign Secretary mentioned in passing that al-Qaeda is operating in Syria. What is the British Government’s view of the scale of its activity within Syria to date?

I welcome wholeheartedly the Foreign Secretary’s recent visit to Russia. Does he believe that the Russian position is likely to shift significantly in the immediate future as the situation deteriorates further? I also welcome his comments about the friends of Syria group and the news that a further meeting of the group is being planned. He said that the Prime Minister intended to raise the issue of Syria at the G20 in Mexico. In the light of statements by a Chinese Minister earlier today that the situation in Syria should not be on the agenda at the G20 meeting, will the Foreign Secretary give us his assurance that he is taking all the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate time is found for a discussion that must take place at that meeting?

The Foreign Secretary said in his statement that if the Annan plan was not implemented, the UK Government would argue for “a new and robust UN Security Council resolution aimed at compelling the regime to meet its commitments under the plan”. How will the British Government endeavour to shift Russia’s view to allow for agreement at the Security Council on the passing of such a resolution? That is surely the real test of whether there is a Security Council route beyond the Annan plan, about which the Foreign Secretary was more circumspect.

The scale of the humanitarian crisis is growing by the day, as the Foreign Secretary acknowledged. This morning, The Times reported that a group called the Union of Free Syrian Doctors had questioned the international community’s commitment and said that help for doctors trying to get medical supplies in through Turkey had come only from a one-off donation by France and by private individuals. Will he use this opportunity to shed some light on that?

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I am listening intently to the shadow Foreign Secretary. He has provided much food for thought for the Secretary of State, who I am sure will be delighted to respond to each of his pertinent inquiries. I feel sure that those pertinent inquiries are coming very shortly to a close.

[Mr Alexander]

Indeed, Mr Speaker.

There is one final question that I should like to pose to the Foreign Secretary in the light of his remarks. What thought has been given to creating large humanitarian enclaves for civilians in neighbouring countries—safe areas in countries such as Turkey—given that the humanitarian crisis is as serious as he suggested?

[Mr Hague]

As the right hon. Gentleman said, the facts about the terrible atrocities that have been committed speak for themselves. He illustrated the fact that support for the work of the UN monitors and abhorrence of the crimes that have been committed are universal across all political parties and all shades of opinion in this country. He agreed, too, that the clear responsibility for the crisis lies with the Assad regime.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the Annan plan and the possibility of increasing the number of monitors. I have discussed that possibility with Kofi Annan several times. Certainly the United Kingdom would support an increase in the number of monitors if Kofi Annan were to ask for it. I will have a discussion with him again later today, and we will see what his latest assessment is. He points out, and we have to remember, that this is not a peacekeeping force. It was meant to monitor a ceasefire that had been agreed, so it is not a case of just increasing the size of a peacekeeping force. Of course, the monitors are going into very dangerous situations.

The mandate from the existing UN resolution would expire on 20 July, which is pertinent to the right hon. Gentleman’s point about a deadline. I do not think it is wise to set an arbitrary deadline. If we said now that the Annan plan had so many days or weeks and found the day before that deadline expired that it was possible to hold an international conference to push the Annan plan, that would not necessarily be wise. Inevitably, the need to review the work of the monitors before 20 July will focus minds in the UN Security Council well before that on whether it is feasible or right to do so.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the comments by my noble Friend Lord Ashdown. From my memory of that article, I think his argument was that we should focus on other countries’ responsibility for addressing the situation rather than emphasising our own responsibility. I do not think he was criticising any of the diplomatic moves we have made. A more extended quotation might have been a good idea at that point in the right hon. Gentleman’s questions.

On the question of discouraging oil purchases, of course we do that. We discourage all countries and I have taken the matter up with Foreign Ministers of many countries filling in for the EU sanctions on Syrian oil. The Syrians have found their particular type of heavy grade oil difficult to sell in other markets, so the income of the regime has been substantially reduced by the EU sanctions. In Istanbul last week, I also raised with Arab Ministers the enforcement of Arab League sanctions and the case for Arab nations adopting sanctions similar to those of the European Union.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about defections, which take place from army units and seem to happen on a regular basis. The Assad regime tries to prevent high-level defections, not only by placing people under house arrest but by threatening the families of anyone who manages to defect from the regime. It makes it extremely difficult for them to do so. The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the names of army officers and those responsible for crimes, and of course some have been added to each list of EU sanctions. I will also consider his further point about whether more can be done to publicise those names.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the G20. The agenda of the formal meetings of the G20 will be for the Mexican presidency to finalise, but whether or not the subject is on the formal agenda there will be many bilateral meetings. It is possible for leaders to discuss whatever they wish, and the Prime Minister will therefore certainly be discussing Syria in and around the G20 meetings.

Our dialogue with Russia on this subject is continuous, and I think it is fair to say that the Russian position has certainly shifted its emphasis and perhaps its substance to some degree, which increasingly emphasises that the Russians are not wedded to Assad and that they want to see stability in Syria. The most persuasive thing for them is not what any of us say but the fact that the situation is clearly deteriorating and that Syria is on the edge of the things we have described—collapse or full civil war. That is a terrible scenario for all the nations of the United Nations Security Council and for all who wish to see international peace and security. Russia can see that deterioration, too, and that is why they have made their proposals, to which we are unable to agree immediately for the reasons I have given, for an international conference. Russian diplomacy is being adjusted as the days go by, and my judgment is that it is worth continuing that dialogue with Russia and continuing to try to move them towards insistence that the regime implement the Annan plan.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked about large humanitarian enclaves. That would require the willingness of neighbouring countries, many of which are doing very good work in looking after the refugees on their soil—26,000 in Turkey, more than 22,000 in Jordan and 17,000 in Lebanon, which are large numbers in any case. People are taking refuge in those countries and we are helping to provide humanitarian assistance through international agencies. People are finding refuge in neighbouring countries, but issues such as safe areas or enclaves in Syria—that is perhaps not what he was suggesting—are a different matter. As I have said, we are not ruling out any option for the future but such safe areas would have to be truly safe and effective. Making them safe and effective raises all the issues about military intervention with which the House is familiar.

Foreign Affairs and International Development

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Let me begin by paying tribute to the many Foreign and Commonwealth Office staff, both at home and abroad. Their contribution is significant, their skills considerable and their efforts very much appreciated by Members on both sides of the House.

This debate takes place at a time when Britain’s influence in the world has rarely been more needed, but when threats to that influence are growing. We meet in the shadow of a Europe convulsed by a continuing currency, banking and economic crisis. We have seen changes in the Arab world that have brought down old orthodoxies, but which have thrown up new challenges that the global community still grapples with today. Also, as we have just heard, we witnessed the death of Osama bin Laden, which marked a decisive moment in the struggle against al-Qaeda, but also signalled the emergence of a new era, defined more by the events of 2011 in the middle east than 9/11.

Such dramatic events alone would be enough to shake the foundations of the global order in which we operate, but underlying these moments in history is a far deeper historical trend that we in this House would be irresponsible to ignore. In recent years, there has been an ever-accelerating movement of wealth and power from north to south, from west to east. It is unlikely that our generation will witness a more profound reordering of geo-economics, and, potentially, geo-politics, than the one currently under way. It means that today Britain risks becoming less relevant in the two key relationships that have for decades defined our place in the world: less relevant in a European Union that has focused on the crisis and consequences of a currency that the last Labour Government rightly decided not to join; and less relevant to a United States that is weary of 10 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq and that is now consciously rebalancing its priorities and focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Yet at this time when our influence risks being undermined, this Government do not appear to have a compass by which to navigate the changes we are witnessing.

I say this with respect, but self-congratulation, schadenfreude and a hint of imperial delusion are not a recipe for a serious strategy in these troubled times. Only this morning, The Times quoted from a newly published report that sets out the Government’s failures in stark and graphic terms. The Atlantic Council report, compiled by some of today’s foremost foreign policy practitioners, offered a damning judgment on the incoherence that has marked this Government’s foreign policy. It stated that the

“coalition government has yet to develop a coherent strategic vision for the United Kingdom’s role in a changing global landscape…Aside from pursuing a policy of ‘commercial diplomacy’ and robust development assistance, British foreign policy vision and strategy remain unclear.”

[Julian Smith]

Will the right hon. Gentleman take this opportunity to congratulate British business, whose exports were more than £50 billion extra last year, across 2011?

[Mr Alexander]

I am only too happy to congratulate and applaud British business, but if the hon. Gentleman is urging people to say the right thing to British business, he might direct his remarks to the Foreign Secretary, who chose to insult British business this weekend in The Sunday Telegraph. If the hon. Gentleman wants a job in government, he should, to quote the Foreign Secretary, work a little harder.

This Government’s inadequate foreign policy approach is being exposed by analysts concerned by the path that the Government have chosen, as well as by events that the Government are unable either to navigate or to predict. They have sought a foreign policy of conscious minimalism and strategic shrinkage. They emphasise trade and bilateralism—we heard it again today—because a clear strategy of our interest is not being articulated and because of a limited ambition for what we, as a nation, can today hope to achieve. Such an approach risks our being left unprepared and ill equipped to face the new challenges that we may face in the coming years. Regrettably, we saw that in the Government’s approach to the strategic defence review, which was not anchored in any clear view of Britain’s role in the world and so left us with significant and, indeed, dangerous gaps in defence capability, which were all too quickly exposed in the Arab spring. This Government are careless about the influence of the United Kingdom and complacent about the risks to the United Kingdom.

Before I discuss the areas where our concerns are greatest, let me first generously acknowledge those areas where we are in agreement with the Government and there is common ground across the House. First, on Afghanistan, an issue that I will address in more detail shortly, we continue to support the mission and we will continue to seek a bipartisan approach as combat operations move towards their conclusion. I also, of course, echo the Foreign Secretary’s condolences to the families of the fallen.

On the issue of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, there is clear support on both sides of the House for the islanders’ right to self-determination, a principle set out in the United Nations charter and recognised in the Falkland Islands constitution. More broadly, we share the Government’s concerns about the continued repression of human rights in countries around the globe. Where those injustices continue, as in the case, as was mentioned, of Belarus, Burma, Russia and Colombia, the Government can rely on our full support in seeking to tackle them.

On Ukraine, the case of Yulia Tymoshenko casts a continuing shadow that country. The circumstances of her trial and the treatment she has received in custody are, of course, matters of grave concern. In light of that, can the Minister say what the British Government’s policy will be towards UK Ministers visiting Ukraine during the European football championships? On the accession of Croatia, we support the Government’s Bill. On Turkish accession to the European Union and on the recently negotiated French defence treaty, we also have a clear and bipartisan approach.

On the continuing combat operations in Afghanistan, we will discuss a number of countries in today’s debate, but only in one country are the best part of 10,000 British troops still in harm’s way. It is right that we take this opportunity to praise the professionalism, courage and sacrifice of our armed forces and of their families back home. Let me also pay tribute to our diplomats and aid workers, who, in challenging circumstances in Afghanistan, are doing truly outstanding and important work. The Prime Minister came to office promising that Afghanistan would be his No. 1 foreign policy priority, so why is it now 10 months since he made a parliamentary statement about the situation in Afghanistan?

We welcome the fact that the Government have been clear in their commitment to withdraw British combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but a strategy for withdrawal is just one element of what we need if we are to have an end state in Afghanistan to match an end date. To honour the sacrifices that have been made over the past decade, an exit strategy cannot afford to be all exit and no strategy. The coming days will see the NATO summit at Chicago, and as a bare minimum we suggest that it must have four key achievements. The first is a co-ordinated timetable for the withdrawal of NATO forces, a matter that the Foreign Secretary chose to glide over in his remarks about the summit. British troops are currently expected to stay in Afghanistan in a combat role until the end of 2014, the newly elected President of France has said that he wants all French troops to leave Afghanistan by the end of this year and the US Defence Secretary claims that American forces will end their combat role by mid 2013, so today there remains a very real risk of a disorderly rush for the exit as NATO countries announce unilateral and divergent withdrawal dates. I hope sincerely that that is addressed in Chicago.

Secondly, there needs to be a stable and sustainable funding arrangement for Afghan security forces, and I welcome what the Foreign Secretary had to say on that matter. Thirdly, more clarity is needed on the status of forces agreement required between Afghanistan and international forces in the country post-2014 draw-down. We welcome the signing of the strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan earlier this month, but many issues remain unresolved, not least the position of British forces. Fourthly, the summit must surely agree a new diplomatic effort to match the scale of the military sacrifice. We need a standing meeting of Foreign Ministers to lead on the political process and a serious attempt at closed-door diplomacy, even at this late hour, on the scale of Camp David, Sunningdale or Wye River. An inclusive political settlement is needed with the tribes in, and, of course, al-Qaeda out, and regional partners need to be engaged and involved.

When I met Prime Minister Gilani on his visit to London last week, it was clear that Pakistan, just like China, Russia, India, the central Asian republics and Iran, would be ill-served by a chaotic Afghanistan that is a stage for the kind of problems that were encountered following the departure of Soviet troops in the early 1980s. It is now apparent, however, that Pakistan will not even be present at the coming Chicago meeting. Will the Minister tell us what actions the British Government are taking to get relations with Pakistan and key members of the international community on a better and more sustainable footing?

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that when the international community comes together at next week’s Chicago summit to discuss the future of Afghanistan, it should also discuss the issue of women in Afghanistan? A recent survey by ActionAid showed the concern that many women still have about their futures once NATO troops leave.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

I am happy to give the assurance that my hon. Friend is looking for. Indeed, she anticipates what I was about to say. The gains that have been made by many Afghan civilians, particularly women, as regards their political rights, access to health and education and basic human rights are significant, of course, yet any of us familiar with that country knows how fragile those rights are, particularly for women and girls. I hope that the Minister will set out what steps are being taken at Chicago to ensure that the process is embedded, not eroded, in the coming years.

[Mr MacShane]

On a tiny technical point, since the debate started, I have received information that Pakistan is being invited by the United States to Chicago. That is a decision of the US State Department and has very little to do with our Government.

[Mr Alexander]

If that is the case, I welcome it. Of course, Pakistan is not a member of NATO, but anyone who is familiar with the challenge of trying to secure an end state as well as an end date in Afghanistan knows that Pakistan will have a key role to play. As well as attendance rates at the NATO summit in Chicago, land transportation for ISAF forces is an issue. In recent weeks, there has been a significant issue with the ability of land convoys to supply troops. If attendance has now been secured by the US Department of State that will anticipate further changes in Pakistan’s attitude to supply lines coming into Afghanistan.

All of us who have engaged with such issues will know that there is neither a military-only nor a development-only solution to the challenges faced by Afghanistan. Only politics can complete the bridge between where Afghanistan is and where we need it to be by the time of the NATO transition. We have heard too little on that matter from the Government today and over recent months.

[Caroline Lucas]

In light of those comments, will the right hon. Gentleman clarify whether he and his party support the position of the French socialist Prime Minister and the Australian Prime Minister in favour of a very swift return of troops from Afghanistan?

[Mr Alexander]

It is not the Labour party’s position that troops should be withdrawn by the end of this year. We want a co-ordinated approach. I understand that the discussions within NATO reflect the fact that some countries have already unilaterally announced that they are going to withdraw, with France saying that it will withdraw troops by the end of this year, the Americans talking about the end of the 2013 fighting season and the British Government holding to the position of having a NATO transition by the end of 2014. I hope that there will be greater clarity on taking a genuinely co-ordinated approach because if one has the opportunity to see, as I have, the work that British troops are doing in Helmand, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which American combat operations could cease in July, August or September of 2013 and Britain could maintain its current presence in central Helmand after that.

In the same way that we have been able to benefit from a strong bipartisan approach to the Government’s conduct in relation to Libya, I hope that we can continue to speak with one voice in the House on Iran, about which the Foreign Secretary said more this afternoon. The threat that Iran poses to Israel, to the wider stability of the region and to international security as a whole is real and deeply concerning, and it warrants urgent and concerted diplomatic efforts. We are clear that our objective in Iran is a change of policy, not a change of regime, and we support the steps taken by the Government to introduce and impose strict sanctions on the regime. However, I would welcome more clarification from the Minister in summing up than the Foreign Secretary was able to offer on the issue of providing insurance for ships carrying Iranian oil. There were many words, but not many answers. Given the Foreign Secretary’s remarks, I think that oil prices are a material consideration in determining the timing on when Britain chooses to impose sanctions on Iran. I would be very grateful if the Minister could confirm where the balance of authority on this lies within Government and whether this is a decision being led by the Treasury or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, because many allies and many in the international community will have been troubled by the Foreign Secretary’s remarks. If some of the reports—they are only reports—are to be believed that Britain is one of the back markers and that this is being driven by a view from within the Treasury, that would be of great concern to Members on both sides of the House.

More broadly, we all welcome the fact that the next meeting of the international community—the P5 plus 1 process—will take place in Baghdad on 23 May. However, previous negotiation rounds have too often started in earnest and ended in frustration. The stakes are too high for that to be allowed to happen again. We must be clear about what we are seeking from the talks, and I would welcome a little more clarity from the Minister on what the British Government are looking for at Baghdad beyond the 20% enrichment issue that the Foreign Secretary shared with the House a few moments ago. This is delicate but vital work and we must not allow misjudged rhetoric to inflame or hinder vital diplomatic efforts. Let us be candid: if this debate had taken place three months ago, it would have been dominated by the threat of a potential strike on Iran. Since then, thankfully, the Iranians have signalled that they might be willing to make some compromises, and senior elements of the Israeli security establishment have signalled that they would be uncomfortable with a strike any time soon.

A negotiation path has now been opened up and the UK has a key role to play within it, but as surely as the temperature on this issue has dropped in recent weeks, so it could rise again in coming weeks. There may well be voices claiming that negotiations have stalled and that military action is therefore required immediately. Will the Minister assure the House that Britain will be unyielding in its commitment to advancing the case for negotiations as a diplomatic settlement in the immediate months ahead? To assist the negotiations, all options must remain on the table, but we are firm in our view that this opportunity must be seized by all sides so that military action can be avoided.

Let me address the pressing issue of Europe and the eurozone crisis.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

Before my right hon. Friend moves on, may I ask him about Zimbabwe? I wanted to ask the Foreign Secretary about this, but he did not give way. If we had been having this debate two years ago, the Foreign Secretary would have mentioned Zimbabwe. I think that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), who is responsible for Africa, has done a very good job, but should not the Secretary of State be saying how he is going to ensure that pressure is put on South Africa to continue the work needed to get a global political agreement brought to fruition and get Zimbabwe back to being a fully democratic country?

[Mr Alexander]

My hon. Friend makes an important point about the salience of Zimbabwe. In that, of course, we are as one. I had the opportunity in recent weeks to meet Morgan Tsvangirai when he visited the United Kingdom and was able to emphasise on behalf of my party our continuing interest, concern and deep worries about some of the developments that endure within Zimbabwe. When I was in the Foreign Office and had the opportunity to meet Morgan Tsvangirai long before he took office in the Zimbabwean Government, there was a constant tension between Britain’s capacity to make public statements and its capacity to exercise private influence in relation to the South Africans. The Minister may be able to comment on that. We were constantly aware that if we made some of the statements that we were minded to make in relation to Zimbabwe, we were vulnerable to their being used to offer succour, encouragement and a propaganda advantage to Mugabe. Therefore, I sincerely hope that the Government are following a path of quiet diplomacy and making sure that the regional leaders who bear a heavy responsibility—principally South Africa, as my hon. Friend suggests—recognise their heavy responsibility as we anticipate the potential for further violence and intimidation ahead of further elections in the country.

On the pressing issue of Europe and the eurozone crisis, there are many in the House who would like any discussion of Europe to focus on the question of an in/out referendum. If we are to believe the blogs and the briefings, our part-time Chancellor of the Exchequer is spending more time considering the electoral implications of such an approach than he appears to be spending on helping to solve the eurozone crisis that is engulfing parts of the continent. Let me be very clear about this. Opposition Members believe that Britain should now be focused on jobs and growth and leading the recovery in Europe so that many millions of British jobs that depend on Europe are secured, even in these turbulent times.

Within the eurozone itself, forecasters are predicting that Spain, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Belgium would all miss the EU deficit target next year, as well as Ireland, Greece and Portugal, which are not expected to be able to comply with the terms of the EU bail-out programmes. The International Monetary Fund is forecasting shrinking economies and rising debt. No wonder firms are reluctant to invest, with such bleak prospects. An austerity-only economics—the voodoo economics of our time—driven by 23 out of the 29 Governments of Europe being held by the centre right, has been shown to have failed both here at home and abroad in Europe, yet have this Government shown themselves to be worthy of this moment? I would argue, far from it.

When British exporters and firms desperately need influence, the Prime Minister last December chose isolation instead. Why did he make that choice? Perhaps he was following the advice that was attributed to the Foreign Secretary on the eve of that fateful summit:

“If it’s a choice between keeping the euro together or keeping the Conservative Party together, it’s in the national interest to keep the Conservative Party together.”

But at what cost has this political party bargain been struck? They claim that they used their veto to stop a treaty that would harm British interests, but even the Deputy Prime Minister, who is not present in the House today, begged to differ. He said:

“The language gets confusing. Veto suggests something was stopped. It was not stopped.”



What of the so-called protections that the Government secured for British jobs and for British business? The Foreign Secretary was totally silent today on the fact that not one of the measures included in the fiscal compact would have applied to Britain, and still the Government are unable to point to a single extra protection that their so-called veto managed to secure for Britain’s financial services. But he need not take our word for it. It was no less than Lord Heseltine who summed it up so well in the week of the summit when he stated, “You can’t protect the interests of the City by floating off into the middle of the Atlantic.” We now know that this is not a Tory party following in the tradition of Macmillan, who applied to join the EEC; of Heath, who took us into Europe; of Thatcher, who signed the Single European Act; or of Major, who signed the Maastricht treaty. This is a Conservative party being followed and not being led by those on the Government Front Bench.

[Michael Ellis]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that when he was Minister for Europe in the last Government he gave away £7 billion at the last European Union budget negotiations? Does he not accept that it is rather difficult to take him seriously when it comes to negotiations with Europe?

[Mr Alexander]

I am flattered and touched by the interest that the hon. Gentleman takes in my record as Minister for Europe. If he had been in the House at the time, he would have known that there was broad bipartisan support for the accession of the eastern European countries to the EU. If he is respectfully suggesting, seven years on, that somehow there would not be consequences for the European budget from the accession of 10 former eastern European countries, I would respectfully differ. If he wants a job for reading out the Whips’ briefing, he has to work a little harder than that.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

rose—

[Mr Alexander]

Somebody else can have a go.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I was a Member of the European Parliament when the right hon. Gentleman was giving away most of our rebate, and I remember the discussions distinctly. What did he get in return for giving away that amount of the rebate?

[Mr Alexander]

What we managed, which most people would recognise, was the successful integration of 10 former eastern European countries into the world’s largest single market. There were also some changes in the common agricultural policy in 2008, which followed as a consequence of the budget deal that was struck in December 2005. But, as I say, it is simply an attempt to rewrite history for Government Members to suggest that there would never be consequences for Europe’s budget from the inclusion of 10 former eastern European countries.

[Mr MacShane]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that in 1984, Britain’s contribution to the EEC was £656 million? Under Margaret Thatcher, it rose to £2.54 billion by 1990. It went up 400% under Margaret Thatcher. God bless her.

[Mr Alexander]

I think I am with my right hon. Friend in all of his remarks. Perhaps I shall write to him on the final phrase of his intervention.

In all seriousness, isolation can sometimes be a price worth paying for getting one’s own way in international affairs, but isolation achieving only defeat is surely unforgiveable. Even at this late stage, the Government must set out what steps they will take to ensure that real and urgent progress is being made at this month’s EU Council meeting. Alongside the welcome measures—

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Alexander]

I am happy to give way and I am sure that it will be a comradely and unifying question.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Indeed. On a positive note, it is certain that at least one member of the eurozone, and almost certainly several others, are about to recreate their own national currencies. Given that we sensibly have our own national currency, is there not a good case for us building strong relationships with these countries with their new national currencies? We could work with them to mutual benefit and help them in their difficulties.

[Mr Alexander]

There is a rare moment of unity between myself and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in saying that I am not sure it is entirely wise to speculate today about which countries have a future within the eurozone. But I would certainly concur with my hon. Friend’s point that the Labour Government did make the right choice in saying that the economics did not make the case for Britain entering the euro. I know that it was the present Foreign Secretary who argued that we had 24 hours to save the pound. I checked, and I think we have had 90,192 hours since he made those remarks, and as far as I am aware, we all still have a pound in our pocket, thanks to the actions of 13 years of a Labour Government and a little time from the Conservatives thereafter.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

rose—

[Mr Alexander]

I have been generous and I am keen to make a little progress.

Alongside the welcome measures set out in the Bill to allow for the establishment of a eurozone-only bail-out fund, further steps are needed if we are to have hope of a genuine recovery in Europe, including a real capital lift for the European Investment Bank, new infrastructure bonds and a comprehensive review of how EU structural funds operate.

Before I leave the subject of Europe, let me ask the Foreign Secretary another question that curiously he omitted from his lengthy remarks today. The Government defined themselves in opposition and in the early days of government by their commitment to publish a White Paper on the repatriation of powers from the EU back to Britain. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will update the House on when we can expect that White Paper to be published. With great flourish, he announced another White Paper was due to be published on the overseas territories, but he curiously omitted any mention of a White Paper in relation to repatriation. The last time he mentioned it in the House was November 2011, when, in a written answer to me in February, he said:

“The Government’s stated intention is to examine the balance of the EU’s existing competences. That review does not have a pre-determined outcome.”—[Official Report, 9 February 2012; Vol. 540, c. 366W.]

Can he at least confirm to the House whether it has a pre-determined time frame? I hope that when the Minister replies to the debate he will be able to share that information with the House.

If there is one example of where the European Union could serve to amplify Britain’s voice and maximise our influence, surely it is in the middle east and north Africa in the wake of the extraordinary events we have witnessed over the past 18 months. In the early part of last year we saw protests spread, from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east, with the success of one set of demonstrators giving energy and inspiration to others. But the Arab spring has not been uniform in its impact, and nor are its outcomes guaranteed. We see continuing and very different challenges in countries as diverse as Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. In the case of Syria, I can assure the House that there is bipartisan support for the continued efforts the Foreign Secretary spoke of to stop the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on its own people.

At a time when the waves of change are sweeping through the region, it is surely a matter of deep regret to us all that progress on the negotiations in Israel and the Palestinian territories remains frozen. Our shared goal across the House is to secure a universally recognised Israel living alongside a sovereign and viable Palestinian state. The international community and the majority of Israelis and Palestinians share a common view of what the principles of a final agreement should be based upon: land swaps around the 1967 borders, Jerusalem as a shared capital, and a fair settlement for refugees.

[Mr Slaughter]

Does my right hon. Friend share my disappointment that Prime Minister Netanyahu has once again refused to countenance a settlement freeze as a precondition for opening negotiations? Does he accept that while settlements are being built there are unlikely to be meaningful negotiations?

[Mr Alexander]

Of course I regret continued settlement building, because the position of the previous Government and, to be fair, that of the present Government are the same: settlement building in the occupied territories is illegal. That is why it was a matter of some pride that, when Secretary of State for International Development, I was able to commit funds to the Palestinian Authority to allow them to map the settlements themselves so that in the subsequent negotiations—alas, we are still waiting for them—there would be documentation allowing justice to be achieved and a proper settlement to be secured. It is a matter of regret, which I am sure is shared on both sides of the House, that so little tangible progress has been made in that regard. Progress seems to have stalled and efforts are needed to reinvigorate it.

[Fabian Hamilton]

I think that we all agree that a two-state solution is the answer, but does my right hon. Friend not agree that leading conflict resolution experts from Israel who are trying to come to the UK to promote a two-state solution, such as Dr Moti Cristal, are being denied a voice by certain organisations in the UK? Will he condemn that?

[Mr Alexander]

I am not familiar with the specific case of which my hon. Friend speaks, but I am clear that I do not regard boycotts on the basis of nationality as in any way constructive or helpful in achieving the two-state solution that we all want to see. That, in part, informed the position we took on the issue of universal jurisdiction when it came before the House, because surely we cannot be in a position in which those parties that are committed to a two-state solution are physically barred from countries and so are unable to enter them and facilitate that dialogue and those discussions. I will be very clear that those who continue to argue that the way forward is to seek to isolate and somehow delegitimise the state of Israel, whatever political party or organisation in the United Kingdom they are in, do a disservice to the pursuit of peace, and the absence of hope about those negotiations is one of the greatest threats to seeing and securing them.

[Alex Cunningham]

When I put this question to the Foreign Secretary he dodged it and said that he would address the issue later in his speech. What is your view on the use of EU grants by businesses in the illegal settlements in the west bank? Do you not agree that those grants should be stopped once and for all?

[Mr Alexander]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I am sure that you will not presume to speak for me, Mr Alexander. I think that the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) was asking you for your view, not mine, and when you answer him will you make sure that you address the whole Chamber? Thank you.

[Mr Alexander]

Of course, Madam Deputy Speaker. I listened with interest to my hon. Friend’s question. I am not familiar with the grant of which he speaks, given that the principal EU grants I encountered when in government, as I recollect clearly, both related to the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support and provided facilities, training and support for the Palestinian Authority to develop their own security capability, something that has been one of the glimmers of light in the enveloping darkness of recent years. Significant support has also been provided for economic development in the west bank. Alas, that has not proved possible in relation to Gaza, because of the continuing security blockade there, but there has been real economic development that has been secured in part thanks to EU funding.

[John Woodcock]

Does my right hon. Friend share my hope that the new coalition within the Israeli Government can—and must—provide a new impetus for peace and a return to negotiations by both sides?

[Mr Alexander]

I find myself echoing the spirit of the Foreign Secretary’s words on that point. Of course, all of us must hope that as broad a degree of support as Prime Minister Netanyahu has now secured in the Knesset can be the foundation on which he takes steps that he has previously chosen not to take.

There needs to be engagement from both sides on the way forward, but I have listened carefully to, and read with interest, the remarks about the opportunity that the inclusion of Kadima members of the Knesset affords the Prime Minister, and I sincerely and genuinely hope that he takes that opportunity, because honestly, as someone who for many years has advocated a two-state solution, I am concerned that time is not on our side.

This situation represents perhaps the greatest diplomatic failure that we have seen in the middle east for many decades, and I am deeply concerned by the number of voices now being heard in the region itself, arguing that a two-state solution is no longer feasible. In that sense, all of us who remain resolute in our view that a two-state solution is the way forward have to ensure, through whatever channels are available to us, that a real sense of urgency is brought to the need to create an effective and credible re-engagement in negotiations.

When we speak in this House of a middle east peace process, we are in denial of the fact that meaningful negotiations are not happening, so I very much hope that Prime Minister Netanyahu, Abu Mazen and others will seize the opportunity afforded by the new Government to advance negotiations.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

To take my right hon. Friend back to the issue of European trade with Israel, does he agree that it would be completely inappropriate to upgrade the EU-Israel trade agreement while Israel continues its settlement policy and the imprisonment of Palestinians, and that there should be no stealth by which any other agreement opens up European markets to, for example, Israeli pharmaceutical companies and others, given that it would undermine the whole resolve behind trying to enforce human rights through the EU-Israel trade agreement?

[Mr Alexander]

I have just spoken of the important role that economic development can play on the west bank, and I genuinely believe that, if we are to offer young Palestinians hope and an opportunity to renounce violence and to build a better future for themselves, economic development and trade will have a key role to play. It would therefore be difficult to argue that part of the solution to the conflict is to encourage development on one side of it while on the other hand saying that the way to secure an advance in the peace process is to deliver greater isolation to the Israelis. Instead, we have to say, “How do we use what political pressure we can to encourage both sides to seize the moment and to recognise,” as I have said, “that time is not on our side?”

Let me turn briefly to an issue that my shadow ministerial colleague and hon. Friend the Member for Bury South (Mr Lewis) will address more extensively in his closing remarks this evening. As a previous Secretary of State for International Development, I know the vital role that aid plays in embodying the values of this country, as well as in securing and protecting our vital interests. That is why I regret the fact that the Government have broken yet another promise by failing to include in this year’s Queen’s Speech legislation on the 0.7% target, despite promising to do so in both the Tory election manifesto and, indeed, in the coalition agreement.

[Mr Tom Clarke]

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for making that point. Was he not a little surprised, as I was, that the Foreign Secretary, during his rather long speech, could not say a few kind words about his colleague the Secretary of State for International Development, and even more so that the Foreign Secretary failed to explain this very important omission of something that we know has been dear to the heart of the International Development Secretary, namely introducing legislation on the 0.7% target?

[Mr Alexander]

I am entirely in favour of people being very nice about past and present Secretaries of State for International Development, and in that sense it was a curious omission, given the close friendship that the Foreign Secretary and the International Development Secretary enjoy and their close working relationship, which I hope is of genuine benefit to the United Kingdom.

Today’s foreign policy environment poses grave challenges to this country that are hard to resolve but even more difficult, at times, to predict. It is true, as the Foreign Secretary said, that the United Kingdom has significant strategic and economic interests that are dependent on engaging and influencing countries that vastly outstrip us in terms of population, natural resources or the scale of their militaries. However, I would argue—I think that this is a divergence of views between those on both Front Benches—that bilateral relationships can take our country only so far. We need a coherent approach to conducting multilateral foreign policy in an increasingly multi-polar world, and yet this is where the Government’s current approach is surely falling short, at least on the basis of the speech that we have heard today, in lacking any real defined strategy for demonstrating leadership at a multilateral level.

The threats that we in the United Kingdom face today transcend borders—threats to do with global security, climate change, terrorism, and food and water supplies—and they all require international co-operation to an extent that was not previously required. Later this week, as leaders of the G8 meet at Camp David, they will be contemplating the need for international consensus in the face of many of these global challenges. Co-operation requires leadership, and yet we heard little from the Foreign Secretary about what this Government hope to achieve and plan to deliver as a result of the G8 summit that is only a few days away, and even less about what their agenda will be when they take the leadership of that grouping in 2013.

[Jeffrey Donaldson (Lagan Valley) (DUP)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

I am keen to make a little progress, but I will give way once more.

[Jeffrey Donaldson]

Before the shadow Secretary of State leaves the question of strategy, will he at least acknowledge the excellent work of the stabilisation unit in many parts of the world today, and the role of the building stability overseas strategy, which is widely acknowledged as something that we can all support? It is setting very high standards and giving the UK some credit in many places where there has been conflict.

[Mr Alexander]

I am entirely in favour of the stabilisation unit, and I am always happy to pay tribute to the Government when they continue a successful policy that was begun under the previous Labour Government.

On all these multilateral fronts, the Government are failing to meet the demands of the moment. It was a genuine disappointment that no leadership role was set out as regards the G8 meeting later this week, and that we heard nothing about the 2013 meeting of that grouping. Nor has any clear strategy been set out for the forthcoming G20 meeting that takes place next month. There was no mention of how the Government intend to try to engage in the World Trade Organisation talks, despite the fact that if we were to see progress in the WTO, that would surely offer a shot in the arm for the global economy at a time when that is vital. There is a continued failure to set out the steps that the Government need to take to ensure that the NATO summit does not merely deal with the build-up of the Afghan forces but ensures the far more comprehensive political settlement that is required. In relation to Europe, where we have a responsibility to help to lead and shape the agenda because of its impact on British jobs, British manufacturers and British firms, the Government seem content with isolation at the expense of Britain’s influence and interests.

At a time of great risks and peril, Britain deserves better. Impotence, not splendour, is the consequence of isolation in today’s world. The price, I fear, will be paid in British jobs, British growth and British leadership. We need leadership worthy of these troubled and challenging times.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend knows that we are fully in favour of a process of reconciliation and that the British Government have been encouraging that—the last Government did it towards the end of their term of office and this Government have continued to do so. However, a successful reconciliation requires a readiness to reconcile on the part of the other party as well, and that has been lacking from the Taliban so far. I suspect that it would be even more lacking if we were to relax our military efforts and let the Taliban think that they could have success entirely on the battlefield.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I have listened with care to the latest answer that the Foreign Secretary has given. I welcome what seems to be his implication that these latest attacks do not detract from the case for dialogue with elements of the insurgency. However, could he tell the House what work is being done and what progress is being made—specifically, by the Afghan Government, the US Government and the British Government—in pursuit of that goal?

[Mr Hague]

Progress has been made, and the right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the announcement of a Taliban political office in Qatar. That was an indication of a readiness to begin a process of reconciliation. Since then, the Taliban have suspended that intention. It is not surprising that efforts at reconciliation go backwards and forwards, or that sometimes there is a readiness to engage and sometimes they move back from that. That does not mean that we stop our efforts. The important thing is to maintain all our efforts to improve security and to build a viable state in Afghanistan so that, whether or not reconciliation succeeds, the Afghan national security forces are able to maintain security in their country.

[Mr Alexander]

Let me turn specifically to the NATO summit in Chicago in May, which has already been mentioned. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the summit needs to agree a co-ordinated timetable for the withdrawal of NATO forces, a stable and sustainable funding arrangement for Afghan security forces and a status of forces agreement on the role of any international forces, post-2014? Does he also agree that, as well as setting those three goals, the summit must achieve genuine progress on a stable political settlement in Afghanistan, and specifically on bringing the regional powers on board in a more meaningful way than has been achieved to date?

[Mr Hague]

All those things are important, of course. The timetable was set by the Lisbon summit in November 2010, and as I have said, we are sticking to it. The right hon. Gentleman’s point about funding is very important, and we are doing a lot of work to ensure that there is a clear plan and a clear commitment from sufficient countries for the funding of the Afghan national security forces after 2014. I regard that as of the highest importance in regard to what we agree in Chicago. Of course there will be a network of bilateral agreements for forces, as well as any arrangements with NATO and ISAF, including our own commitment to having an officer training academy in Afghanistan after 2014. We also continue to promote a political settlement alongside all that, but the funding arrangements will be of the greatest importance in Chicago.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we have very tough sanctions in place, imposed through the European Union, and the Arab League has sanctions of its own. But as he will also know, some Arab League countries do not implement, or do not fully implement, those sanctions, particularly countries that are close to Syria, such as Iraq. For that reason, it is extremely difficult to impose the general blockade that my right hon. and learned Friend talks about, and arms shipments continue to reach Syria from Russia as well. Cutting off all such arms supplies without the co-operation of the countries I have mentioned is not possible. What we now have to do is try to ensure that the terms of the UN Security Council resolution are met, and clearly warn the Assad regime that if they are not met, we will be able to return to the Security Council for further measures.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Let me stay on the issue of the Security Council resolution, and echo the words of praise for the UK mission in New York. We welcome the authorising of the deployment of observers from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the fact that, as I understand it, members of the group have now started arriving in Damascus, but will the Foreign Secretary say when he expects the observer group to be up to full strength, when it will begin reporting back, and what his personal assessment is of the chances of its being able to go about its work peaceably?

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman is right to sound a sceptical note about the group’s ability to go about their work, as the Assad regime did not fully co-operate with the Arab League observers who were in the country previously. That shows the importance of passing, in the Security Council resolution, clear language about “unhindered deployment of…personnel”, full

“unimpeded and immediate freedom of movement”,

as well as “unobstructed communications” and a requirement to be able

“to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria”.

The observers will therefore be able to report on a continuous basis on whether these terms are being met, and the Security Council will then be able to debate those terms. They are terms that have been agreed by Russia and China as well as by countries such as ours. The expansion of this monitoring team into a team of several hundred, rather than 30, depends on the observance of the ceasefire, what progress is made over the coming days, and the passage of a further UN Security Council resolution.

Oral Answers to Questions

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Tuesday 28th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I have had many discussions over the last week with Turkey and Arab nations on the margins of our Somalia conference, in Tunis and at other meetings. That idea has been debated—in public, never mind in private—but the difficulty of establishing safe areas without agreement with the country concerned is considerable. Without such agreement, military force will be required—and sufficient military to force to be wholly effective, because one of the worst things we could do, I believe, is to tell people that they might be safe and be unable to provide that safety to them. None of those discussions, therefore, have led to the idea being adopted in the international community.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

The Opposition welcome the fact that the EU yesterday announced further sanctions on Syria. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that those sanctions included travel bans on a further seven close associates of President Assad? If that is correct, does he agree that the public naming of many more individuals in that way, specifically including military commanders presently engaged in murder and slaughter in Homs, would help to sharpen the choice for individual members of the security apparatus?

[Mr Hague]

Yes—I agree in general. We adopted a number of measures yesterday in Brussels, including sanctions on the Central Bank of Syria. As the right hon. Gentleman says, we also extended by another seven names the list, which is now more than 150 strong, of individuals and entities on whom we have restrictions, travel bans and asset freezes. We are entirely open to extending that list further, but we of course take care to ensure that we are sure of our ground and that those individuals are actually complicit in the regime’s repression. As further evidence accumulates, we will certainly want to add to that list.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I do agree with that. As the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), has often pointed out, we have made very strong representations to the Israeli Government whenever settlements have been announced in recent times. Settlements are on occupied land, they are illegal—that is the view of almost the whole of the rest of the world—and this is an issue that Israel must address.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Given the recent violence in Afghanistan in response to the unintentional burning of the Koran at a United States air base, and given that it took some time for President Karzai to call for an end to the violence, are the Government fully satisfied with the efforts that he is making to bring the situation fully under control?

[Mr Hague]

Yes. The British Government, along with our partners, condemn any behaviour that disrespects any religion. We welcome the apology from President Obama to President Karzai, which demonstrated sincere regret for the incident—which was, I believe, a genuine mistake, as was reflected in the right hon. Gentleman’s question—and we welcome the calls for calm from the Afghan Government. We echo President Karzai’s call to the Afghan people, as he put it,

“not to allow the enemies of peace to exploit the opportunity for their own ends”.

[Mr Alexander]

Is the Foreign Secretary fully satisfied more generally with the work that President Karzai is doing? The objective of achieving peace is one that we all share, but according to the latest reports there are continuing concerns about corruption, governance and, more broadly, the provision of services and security.

[Mr Hague]

Of course there are always things that we are urging the Afghanistan Government to do, and addressing accusations of corruption and improving governance—both from Kabul and around the country—are important examples. However, our relations with the Afghanistan Government are very good. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Prime Minister and President Karzai met a month ago to sign a long-term enduring partnership between our countries, which demonstrates the good basis of trust between our Governments.

Iran

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I commend the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) for securing this debate and welcome the timely opportunity for the House to debate the subject of Iran. Like the Foreign Secretary, I will urge hon. Members to support the amendment in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).

I shall start with the broader regional context of the issues before the House this evening. Iran stands more isolated today than it has for many years. As several hon. Members have suggested, in recent years Iran has sought to build its influence across the middle east, supporting groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and backing repressive regimes that could help to enhance Iran’s network of influence in the region, most notably that of Assad in Syria. Today, however, the regional balance of power has shifted away from Tehran. Recent events in Syria leave Iran further isolated, and in time Iran will lose this vital state ally in the Arab world and its main proxy for the arming of Hezbollah. Iran’s hold on the region is slipping, and even previously reluctant players, such as the Saudis, have now publicly condemned Iran and given their support to the EU oil boycott by promising to fill the gap in Europe’s energy demands. Sanctions today, unlike those in the past, are showing signs of having an impact and the Iranian regime seems to be struggling to contain their effect.

The Iranian regime’s response to declining domestic legitimacy and increasing international isolation has been to channel discontent towards external enemies beyond its own borders. The regime continues to support terrorist groups across the region, and by its sponsorship of terrorism threatens the lives of British service personnel today in Afghanistan. In particular, members of the regime have directed their hatred towards Israel, from their denial of the holocaust to the continued threats to the people and state of Israel, and for those statements and threats they deserve our clear and unequivocal condemnation. Israel should know that the international community is united in condemnation of this violent and abhorrent rhetoric and the world view that it reveals—there can be no excuse and no defence for such outrageous and inflammatory language about any member of the international community, and it should be condemned without qualification—but Israel should also understand that its friends in the international community see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as affecting not only Israel’s security alone, but the security of the broader region and indeed the world.

The non-proliferation treaty is clear: Iran can have civilian nuclear power, but it must not have nuclear weapons. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, its capacity to destabilise the middle east would be enhanced. It is disconcerting to be at odds with a distinguished former Foreign Secretary on my own Benches, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), but I believe that the potential response from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others would put at risk the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In so unstable a region, the chance of a nuclear weapon being used again would significantly increase.

Several Members have mentioned the IAEA’s latest report, issued last November, which sent the clearest warning yet that Iran had carried out tests

“relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”.

As this debate takes place, IAEA representatives are in Iran having talks aimed at clarifying the possible military aspects of its nuclear programme. Everyone in the House is aware of the decades of failed negotiations, despite the best efforts of some Members present today, and the numerous Iranian breaches of the terms of the NPT. Iran is a signatory of the treaty and so is under obligations to comply with its terms, but despite that, Iran hid an enrichment programme for nearly 18 years. As a result, the Security Council has rightly decreed that until Iran’s peaceful intentions can be established it should stop all enrichment, and has imposed seven rounds of UN sanctions in the face of continued Iranian defiance.

The IAEA report sets out clearly that Iran is not complying with its international obligations and therefore the intentions behind its nuclear activities cannot be accounted for. Alongside the deception, secrecy and concealment that have characterised Iran’s relationship with the IAEA, the report for the first time highlights evidence to suggest that Iran is undertaking activities that could indicate a military dimension to its nuclear programme. To quote directly from the report:

“The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”

Following the publication of that most recent report, the IAEA board of governors passed a resolution expressing “deep and increasing concern” over the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and said it was “essential” that Iran provide additional information and access to the IAEA. We are right to heed the IAEA’s warnings.

[Mr Baron]

Can the right hon. Gentleman provide any evidence that the theory of nuclear deterrence would not be effective in this region, as it has been in others? India and Pakistan have fought wars and shown nuclear restraint. The evidence suggests that Iran is no more irrational than any other country. Can he provide the evidence to counter that assertion?

[Mr Alexander]

The environment in the middle east—the sectarian divides, the history of tension and its multifaceted nature—surpasses even that of India and Pakistan in its potential threat not just to regional security but to global security. It would be a very brave or very naive individual who, in the absence of the sorts of communication that were the foundation of our capacity to maintain peace over the 50 years of the cold war, presumed that we could feel confident that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, there would not be a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in the region. That is why it is right that the House try today to speak with one voice in urging on the Iranians a different course from the one implicit in the scenario that the hon. Gentleman depicted, which is the development of nuclear weapons.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) has twice mentioned nuclear deterrence, but would the right hon. Gentleman agree that nuclear deterrence requires a threat from a nuclear armed state to deter another country with a nuclear weapon? Other than the Saudis and other Arab states themselves becoming nuclear weapon states, that would require an American nuclear umbrella guarantee, with all its implications, including American bases in the region, for the indefinite future.

[Mr Alexander]

I listened with great care to the point that the distinguished former Foreign Secretary made about the American security guarantee and the potential for basing within the Gulf and elsewhere. I would also suggest, though, that given the financing of A. Q. Khan in the past, one would also need at least to countenance the possibility that, rather than rely on an American nuclear umbrella, other states in the region might take matters into their own hands. Although it might take 10 or 15 years for the development of nuclear technology, it could spur the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other means, principally financial, rather than through research. We should work extremely hard to avoid any of those scenarios in these circumstances.

[Angie Bray (Ealing Central and Acton) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there would be not only a scramble among other nations in the middle east to get hold of nuclear weapons to balance things out, but a danger that some of the weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists and so be even more difficult to control?

[Mr Alexander]

We must do everything in our power to avoid nuclear weapons first proliferating and secondly falling into the hands of non-state actors. When we reflect even for a moment, as the Foreign Secretary did for the elucidation of the House, on the track record of the regime in Tehran in supporting non-state actors and their violent methods, even in recent days, we should redouble our efforts to avoid a scenario in which Tehran would have that choice. That would be a deeply worrying prospect not only for its immediate neighbours but for global security more generally.

[Mr Stewart Jackson]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be foolish to take any options off the table, given that many foreign policy specialists believe that President Ahmadinejad is under severe threat, that he and his supporters might be removed from the parliamentary elections in 2012, and that he might be excluded from the presidency in 2013 and replaced by revolutionary guard-supported politicians and a more theocratic, militarist, jihadist regime?

[Mr Alexander]

For the reasons that I have outlined and will continue to outline, I believe that it would be wrong to take those options off the table. When calibrating the way forward, one has to factor in the potential for change within the Iranian regime, given the prospect of elections next month. We are facing some critical months in terms of judgments to be reached in Tehran and elsewhere. That is why the responsible course at this juncture is to advance the twin-track approach that has characterised the attitude of the international community.

[Paul Flynn]

Does my right hon. Friend think that, although the Foreign Secretary rightly condemned what were probably terrorist attacks by Iran, he failed to attack incidents involving major explosions in Tehran, a cyber-attack against Tehran and the murder of four of Iran’s scientists? If we are to be taken as honest brokers, is it not right that we attack terrorism on both sides and insist on transparency not only in Iran but in Israel?

[Mr Alexander]

There is surely consensus on both sides of the House on the desire for a peaceful resolution to this crisis. That is why I argue that the strengthening of the sanctions regime to an unprecedented level is a necessary response to the growing tensions. All of us have an interest in a peaceful resolution.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I do not want to embark on a theological discussion about deterrence, but does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the party against which nuclear weapons might be used being unwilling to accept the consequences of using them? To base the whole issue of non-proliferation in the middle east on something so uncertain—the regime is renowned for its uncertainty—would be very dangerous.

[Mr Alexander]

I have some sympathy with that view. I will argue that there have been instances where the regime in Tehran has come to judge where its own self-interest lies, and the continued pursuit of sanctions reflects that reality. That said, I sympathise with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s broader point about what is implicit within a relationship of deterrence. That is why, despite my appearance on the “Murnaghan” show on Sky television yesterday morning, I was rather restrained in my mild rebuke to the Foreign Secretary over his cold war analogy. He was more accurate in describing the potential risk of an arms race, but I would not say that the cold war is the perfect historical parallel. First, it involved a global struggle for supremacy, and it mischaracterises the threat that we are confronting in the middle east to suggest that there is a perfect parallel with a global struggle for supremacy. Secondly, it is fair to say that mechanisms were developed during the cold war that allowed for a peaceful resolution. In that sense, it was in some ways a prospect more favourable than that which we are facing now, unless we find a resolution as I have described.

I have been generous in taking a number of interventions. I would now like to make a little progress. What would I, on behalf of the Opposition, argue is the way forward? In my view, there has been too much discussion in recent days of possible military action and too little discussion of how diplomacy can still succeed. As one of my colleagues suggested, we must avoid talk of the possibility of military action becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our efforts must focus on how we can use all the diplomatic tools available to force the Iranian Government to change course. In the past, Iranian leaders have adjusted their behaviour in the face of international pressures—ending the war with Iraq in 1988 and stopping assassinations of Iranian dissidents in the 1990s are just some of the most significant examples.

Evidence is now accumulating that the sanctions are beginning to put unparalleled pressure on the Iranian regime. Sanctions in place for many years now on exporting materials relevant to the development of nuclear weapons have slowed Iran’s nuclear programme and directly hindered its ability to develop next-generation centrifuges. The combined effect of international sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, including steps taken by the Government last year, has triggered an enormous currency devaluation, which the regime is struggling to contain. The Iranian Government can no longer access reputable sources of international credit, insurance for its merchant fleets or investors for its state-led infrastructure programs. Crucially, Iran is struggling to find investors to revitalise its dilapidated energy infrastructure, which requires billions in new investment if production levels are to be maintained. Alongside that, the oil embargo, of which we have already heard a little, is increasing the strain on the Iranian regime even before the EU embargo comes into full force on 1 July.

Despite rejecting offers of talks in past years, Iran has now signalled that it is willing to resume talks with the E3 plus 3, and reports suggest that Iran’s supreme national security council replied last week to a letter from Cathy Ashton, on behalf of the European Union, inviting Iran to resume those talks without preconditions. Those are encouraging signs, but let me be clear that we must remain vigilant against the prospect of Iran seeking to draw out talks while continuing its nuclear programme unabated. The Opposition welcome the diplomatic steps that the international community has so far taken: the United Nations Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran in less than six years, and the EU, the US, and the UK Government and others have all taken important steps in recent months to increase further the pressure on Iran. However, despite those efforts, we have seen too little progress. What is needed now is a more concerted and co-ordinated international response. At this crucial time, it is vital that we remain focused on pursuing the twin-track approach, which remains our best route to resolving the crisis.

As we have heard, sanctions are not designed to punish the Iranian people. They are intended to increase pressure on the regime, and those pressures now seem to be mounting. This month, the Iranian Parliament voted to hold a special session to force President Ahmadinejad to account for some of the dire economic and social indicators in Iran today. Unemployment is high, growth is low and anger is mounting. The Iranian regime is beginning to show signs of doubt as to whether international isolation is simply too great a price to pay. Alongside that, parliamentary elections to elect new members of Islamic consultative assembly are due to be held in Iran on 2 March. They may offer yet another opportunity for the regime to change course and for a new leadership to steer Iran away from the brink of international isolation. The Iranian political calendar, the internal political dynamics, and the domestic economic and social pressures all imply that the next few months could be crucial.

The motion focuses on the use of military action, which has rightly been the subject of much debate in the House today. The risks facing the region are real, but I believe we must make it clear to our friends in Israel that now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike. However, notwithstanding our view that pre-emptive action should not be taken now, we are firm in our view that all options must remain on the table. That is because the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are enhanced, not undermined, by all options remaining on the table at the present time. Leaving all options on the table actually strengthens the international community’s hand in negotiations and therefore increases the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution, to which I believe the whole House is committed.

[Mr Leigh]

Wars often start because of an element of uncertainty, so let us be quite clear: notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition favour negotiations at this point, is it the Labour party’s position that we must not tolerate Iran being nuclear-armed?

[Mr Alexander]

I have said on the record previously that the cost of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is too high. I could not be clearer that this is an issue not simply for Iran’s immediate regional neighbours, but for the whole international community. That is why I am grateful for the Foreign Secretary’s gracious acknowledgment that the position being advanced by the British Government today is entirely consistent with the position that was advanced when Labour was in office.

[Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman has been gracious in most of his remarks about the Foreign Secretary, but as he has said, he did not agree with the cold war analogy. Will he clarify the Labour party’s position on that? Is it not the case that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) pointed out, we are talking about the difference between a hot war—a fiery and more immediate conflagration—and a cold war-type scenario, where Iran has a nuclear device, with all the hostilities and the fractious situation that would evolve from that, potentially over the very long term? The analogy with the cold war is therefore quite accurate in the circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

I remain unconvinced. I listened with care to the explanation of his remarks in The Daily Telegraph that the Foreign Secretary offered on the Andrew Marr programme yesterday morning, but it is really up to him to elucidate the analogy he chose to set before the public. My view is clear: this is a point at which we need clear minds and cool heads. We need to ensure that the language we use is consistent with the approach, which I welcome, that the Foreign Secretary set out before the House today: that there should be a 100% focus on finding a diplomatic resolution.

In line with the arguments that I have put to the House, the Opposition support the amendment, which is supported by two former Foreign Secretaries as well as by Members from across the House. In the spirit of that amendment, we agree that the Government should focus their efforts on finding a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue and recognise the value of making it clear to Iran that all options remain on the table, but the threat of military action must not be allowed to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike on Iran. Now is the time for redoubling our diplomatic efforts to capitalise on the progress that is being made.

Let no one doubt that Iran presents a real and urgent threat. We should be doing all we can to dissuade Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With Iran feeling the pressure from co-ordinated international sanctions, I believe that the prospects for finding a diplomatic resolution have been enhanced, not diminished. The coming months are crucial. To digress, deviate or dither at this crucial stage would be to undermine the months and, indeed, years of diplomatic and co-ordinated efforts to increase pressure on the regime and promote dialogue as the path to a peaceful resolution of this issue.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Somalia

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I was a little surprised that the Foreign Secretary chose to mention the Maldives without the courtesy of prior notification, but I have noted all that he said on the matter.

I welcome the opportunity to debate Somalia this afternoon. Although I obviously welcome the conference on 23 February, it is necessary to put the changes of recent months within the broader context of the decades of conflict, poverty and violence that Somalia and the horn of Africa more widely have endured. Somalia’s crisis did not begin with the poor rains of 2010 or the collapse of the Somali dictatorship in 1991; the tragedy in Somalia has been the inevitability of the cycles of despair from which, to date, it is has been unable to escape.

It is right to begin by acknowledging, as the Foreign Secretary did, the significance of Somalia to the United Kingdom. Somalia’s trajectory of decline poses real threats to our security and continues to draw on British resources. The threat of piracy, kidnapping and terrorism, and the potential radicalisation of British youth in terrorist training camps across the country, all directly threaten the security and stability of the region, as well as posing an immediate risk to British interests at home and abroad.

Alongside the security threat, the United Kingdom is also deeply affected by the inevitable burden of responsibility that it rightly shares with the rest of the international community to protect and provide for those affected by the ongoing humanitarian crisis and seeking refuge, aid and sanctuary during these desperate times. Given all those factors, I support the Government’s stated intention to affirm Somalia as a key priority of British foreign and development policy in the years ahead.

Although Somalia’s decline goes back much further than the past few months, the timeliness of this debate reflects the fact that the situation on the ground has changed dramatically in recent months, as the Foreign Secretary made clear. Al-Shabaab has suffered several military setbacks that have seen it pushed out of parts of the southern border areas of Somalia and most of Mogadishu, creating an opportunity for the Government to strengthen their hold in these crucial areas. In the second half of last year, famine struck six regions of southern Somalia, and although the United Nations has, I am pleased to say, declared the famine officially over, the situation remains fragile and millions more could still die if international support is not maintained.

The changing situation in the country provides an opportunity, but no more than that—I respectfully suggest—because the causes of state failure lie much deeper than the recently changing dynamics on the ground. For many years, the state in Somalia has not existed in any meaningful sense. It has failed to secure its borders, monopolise force within the territory and even to provide basic services to its people. As a result, Somalia faces challenges of security, governance and corruption that would test even the strongest of states.

That is the context of the conflict with the Islamist terrorist organisation, al-Shabaab, and of a famine that has put 4 million people in crisis and caused the displacement of about 2 million people and the spread of violence perpetrated by terrorists and pirates who terrorise the local population and destabilise the region as a whole.

It is vital that we can distinguish between symptom and cause in relation to a state that has failed as comprehensively as Somalia. The structural failures of widespread violence, endemic corruption, weak governance and a state unable to maintain a monopoly of force over its own population in turn contribute to desperate poverty, the rise of non-state terror and violence, and the Government’s failure to deliver basic goods and services. It is vital, therefore, that the London conference and the work that follows from it address not simply the symptoms but the causes of Somalia’s decline—at root a profound failure of politics and, more broadly, of governance.

Each of us inevitably brings our own perspective and experience to this debate. For myself, this involves not only being a Member representing a constituent, a merchant seaman, taken hostage for some time by Somali pirates but my work as International Development Secretary in the previous Government working to find ways to deliver aid and support development in what is undoubtedly one of the most challenging environments on earth during some of the most desperate years of violence and famine that the country has experienced.

Aid to Somalia increased from just over £3 million in 2002 to more than £30 million by 2009, which meant that we could achieve limited but real progress in dealing with some of the most acute challenges facing Somalia, including helping to deliver basic health care, treatment for malnutrition and improved clean water and sanitation facilities. I say with genuine humility, however, that notwithstanding these sustained efforts, progress was limited. This was not a failure of will but a testament to the scale of the challenge that we faced then and that remains today.

Then, as now, it is important to acknowledge that a response to the pressing humanitarian crisis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for dealing with the broad spectrum of challenges that face Somalia. Circumstances on the ground, specifically the changing security situation, provide new opportunities for action, so I shall first address some of the symptoms of Somalia’s recent decline before addressing the root cause.

I shall begin with the most immediate level of human suffering that has added such an immense sense of urgency to this crisis. The humanitarian situation in Somalia has been described as a chronic catastrophe. The horn of Africa has experienced one of the worst droughts in 60 years and the most severe food crisis in the world since Somalia’s famine in 1991. The situation in Somalia is deteriorating so rapidly that for the first time in 10 years, the UN last year announced a famine across the country. Almost 4 million people—more than half the population—are living in crisis, with 750,000 of them living in absolute famine. That is an increase of 46% from July last year.

The situation is made all the more severe as a result of the deteriorating security situation in parts of the country and the stranglehold of the Islamist organisations that continue to hold sway in parts of the country. Since the first failed rains in 2010, international aid efforts have been in place, but from the outset they have been beset by challenges, particularly al-Shabaab’s decision to ban some aid organisations from operating in the country. An immediate task, therefore, is to alleviate the suffering resulting from the famine declared by the UN. When the Minister winds up this debate, will he share with the House some of the Government’s thinking about how the immediate humanitarian needs can be better addressed and international efforts better co-ordinated in the critical months ahead?

I turn to the piracy off the coast of Somalia, which was mentioned by the Foreign Secretary. Somali piracy has recently grown into a major international problem, exacerbating many of the underlying challenges that we face in promoting the rule of law and in helping Somalia to recover from conflict and famine, not least because many argue that some of the ransom money paid to Somali pirates is finding its way back into funding groups like al-Shabaab.

Somali piracy also threatens vital trading routes and poses significant risks to international security, which makes it an ever-more pressing aspect of the crisis which must be addressed if significant progress is to be made. I welcome the limited progress of which the Foreign Secretary spoke, but there are currently thought to be between 1,500 and 3,000 pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. Some 49 of the world’s 52 hijackings last year took place off the coast of Somalia, and the global annual cost of piracy has been estimated at between $7 billion and $12 billion. Despite nine United Nations Security Council resolutions, three multinational naval operations and a counter-piracy policy that has been taken forward by a number of different international bodies, progress remains limited. The number of attempted attacks, the cost to the industry and the cost of ransoms have all increased significantly since 2007.

In addressing the issue of piracy, a co-ordinated international response is therefore key. NATO, the European Union and the combined maritime taskforce have all thankfully established naval operations to counter piracy, and we welcome the fact that the UK has contributed naval assets to all three operations. We also support the Prime Minister’s recent announcement that armed guards will be allowed to be used in protecting UK ships, although I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether the terms of engagement for those armed guards have been agreed. Although tackling Somali piracy cuts across a number of Departments, will the Minister also indicate which has the overall lead on countering piracy?

Let me turn more generally to terrorism and criminality, which continue to plague Somalia and pose an increasing risk to British security and British interests. Large areas of Somalia are today still controlled by militants, and Somalia has become a haven for some of the worst criminality and terrorism to be found anywhere on earth. As early as 2010, the MI5 director general warned of the threat posed to Britain from the rise of terrorist training camps in Somalia, one of the gravest security threats that our country faces, not least because there are now steady numbers of UK nationals known to be receiving training in al-Shabaab camps in Somalia. We are right to be concerned that those who are today fighting alongside al-Shabaab could some day redirect their focus back towards the population in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister give an updated assessment from the agencies of the scale and character of the Somali-based threat to British interests?

Alongside the threat from al-Shabaab-affiliated camps, there is also growing concern about the spread of al-Qaeda-inspired jihadists across the country. Somalia today is showing many of the worrying characteristics that made Afghanistan so dangerous a seedbed for terrorism under the permissive regime created by the Taliban. Strengthening counter-terrorism co-operation in Somalia—and, indeed, across the region—is of vital national interest to the United Kingdom, and will be a crucial step on the path towards securing peace and stability for Somalia. I hope and trust, on the basis of the Foreign Secretary’s remarks, that it will therefore find a place on the agenda of the London conference.

I have spoken of the symptoms of decline that have plagued the people of Somalia and threatened the vital interests of the UK and the wider international community. It is right that tackling those symptoms should remain a high priority for the Government, but let me turn to what I believe are some of the underlying causes that must be addressed if we are to make genuinely sustainable progress on other fronts. Military efforts—although welcome, and significant in recent months—will not alone bring a lasting peace to Somalia. Structural political reform is the only sure foundation for progress. The depth of the failure of governance has to be understood in order to understand the depth of the crisis still facing Somalia today. Somalia has not had a functioning Government for 21 years. Since 2004, the country has, at least in name, been governed by the transitional federal Government. Beset by corruption and institutionally weak, Somalia’s transitional Government now have only six months before their mandate expires. However, in these crucial few months, the situation on the ground has changed dramatically. For the first time in years, Somalia now has a Government who can hold and control a portion of Somali territory beyond the borders of Mogadishu. That is a significant advance, but the fundamental question remains whether the TFG are in a position to benefit from, and capitalise on, the military progress being made, and thereby fully assume responsibility for security across the country.

The international community cannot ignore the reality that the TFG are seen by many Somalis as inadequate and ill-equipped to deal with the immense task at hand. For many Somalis, the record of the TFG is marred by allegations of corruption, embezzlement and state-sponsored violence. For others, the TFG are still largely seen as a Government made up of the victors of Somalia’s bloody civil war. Many struggle to see the current leadership as representing Somalia as a whole. In August, even as the United Nations agreed to extend the TFG’s transitional mandate for one more year, it noted that the TFG had failed to accomplish a single one of their previously agreed goals in the seven years since they were created, including completing a Somali constitution and holding local elections.

In less than six months, the transitional period is due to come to an end. Neither allowing a political vacuum to develop nor simply continuing with business as usual is sufficient under the circumstances. A key challenge for the London conference, therefore, is to encourage the development of a political process that is deemed legitimate and judged inclusive, and that allows all those Somalis who wish to play a constructive role in their country’s future to take part. For durable progress to take hold, the transition stage must end and the task of establishing permanent representative government structures, based on robust constitutional processes, must begin.

Alongside the pressing need for an effective transitional political arrangement in Somalia, establishing effective political structures will also be a crucial step towards enabling the people of Somalia to engage with the ongoing demands and struggles for representation and self-determination that communities in the country have long been seeking. On that issue, I praise the work that many colleagues across the House have done to promote the cause and facilitate the genuine progress that has been achieved—in particular, the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Alun Michael). In government, we were clear in acknowledging the unique and distinct character of Somaliland and Puntland, and continue to defend their right to appropriate representation. However, we must be clear that the task of securing legitimate representation must not be divorced from the broader task of developing the inclusive national political structures that are a necessary part of Somalia’s development into a stable and secure country.

The case for focusing sustained effort on Somalia is clear. However, there have been many attempts—which, to be fair to the Foreign Secretary, he acknowledged—by the international community that have so far failed to resolve the underlying tensions that have had such devastating consequences for the people of Somalia in past decades. Given that, we would like to ask the Minister some specific questions about the approach that he plans to take at the upcoming conference on 23 February and what steps he will take to ensure that it is not a missed opportunity, but the start of real progress. Given that the strength or weakness of the TFG will prove to be as decisive for the future of Somalia as the strength or weakness of Al-Shabaab, how will the conference progress without either guarantees of security on the ground or a credible partner in the TFG for the task of political reconciliation and reform? It is clear that the problems of Somalia will not be solved by a single conference, but will require a continued process of engagement and reform. Given that, what measures are being put in place now to ensure that the outcomes of the conference are sustainable over the long term?

In order to be sustainable, the outcomes must be closely linked to the existing United Nations structures—the Djibouti process has been mentioned—that are already in place. Given that, what measures are being taken to ensure that the decisions taken at the conference are effectively linked to the existing goals, strategies and objectives of the United Nations operation in Somalia? Given that part of the task of the conference must be to tackle the root cause of so many of Somalia’s problems—a chronic failure of governance—what steps has the Minister taken to ensure that civil society groups from across Somalia are engaged at all stages of the process of political transition? Finally, will the Minister set out how the goals and objectives of the conference are expected to tie in with the existing timetable, set out in the road map on political reform that is already in place?

It is clear that Somalia today stands at a critical juncture in its history: 2012 is a crucial year for the political process in Somalia, and 2011 saw significant security progress on the ground. It is right, therefore, that we must seize this opportunity to make real progress and deliver a better and more secure future for the people of Somalia. However, our broad experience of supporting countries emerging from conflict—as well as our more recent experience of state building—demonstrates that changes in the security environment in Somalia will not alone be sufficient to bring real hope for development. Instead, what is needed is an approach to reform the governance structures that lie at the heart of so many of the more visible symptoms of state failure that we see on the ground in Somalia today. The challenge is one that will take years and decades to tackle, not weeks and months; but this should harden, rather than weaken, our shared resolve.

Afghanistan

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it. Of course, the context of this discussion is the number of British personnel currently serving in Afghanistan—almost 10,000—who are harnessing their professionalism and expertise to the task of securing a stable Afghanistan that will not threaten this country’s security again. Their bravery is rightly and regularly praised in the House, but each time it is a genuine and sincere reflection of the admiration on both sides of this House for the work they do on our behalf.

The Foreign Secretary knows that we supported the mission in Afghanistan in government and continue to do so in opposition. We are keen to discuss these issues in a spirit of shared support for the mission, but it is also the Opposition’s job to scrutinise, and that task is especially important when the lives of our servicemen and women are at stake. I hope that he will see my questions in that spirit.

I will divide my questions between the security situation and the diplomatic effort. On the security situation, the Foreign Secretary has just told the House:

“British and ISAF troops will continue to perform combat roles until the end of 2014.”

How is that consistent with the comments of the American Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, who only last week said:

“Hopefully by mid- to the latter part of 2013 we’ll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role”?

Incidentally, that comment was confirmed by the Prime Minister’s official spokesman, but there was no statement to the House. Given the integrated nature of ISAF’s work, both in Helmand and across Afghanistan, is the Foreign Secretary seriously suggesting that British military personnel will be involved in combat operations for potentially between a year and 18 months after our American allies have transferred from combat operations to providing training, advice and assistance?

What is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the military implications of America’s decision to wind down combat operations more than a year before the previously stated deadline for withdrawal? What is his assessment of the impact on the ISAF mission’s timetable for transition of the announcement in January by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, that French troops will now leave Afghanistan by the end of 2013?

The statement comes shortly after the publication of a leaked NATO document cataloguing the depth of links and assistance between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani security services. The report also details widespread collaboration between the insurgents and the Afghan police and military, so what is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the findings of the report, and how does he reconcile its bleak findings with his description today that

“we are making steady progress”?

The Foreign Secretary has just told the House:

“For the first time since 2006, year on year violence levels decreased across Afghanistan in 2011.”

How does he reconcile that statement with the report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan only last week that indicated that the number of civilians killed and injured has risen for the fifth year running, with the majority of deaths caused by insurgents? The report documented 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011, compared with 2,790 in 2010 and 2,412 in 2009.

The Foreign Secretary said in his statement that 120 British troops will be based at the Afghan national academy. Will he reassure the House that all necessary force protection measures will be in place for them at that time? He stated that the Afghan national army now numbers 170,000. Will he confirm how large the British Government now expect the Afghan national army to be at the time of transition in 2014 and say a little more about how these force levels are to be financed in the light of the deficits he spoke of?

Let me now turn briefly to the diplomatic effort. We have expressed our concern in the past that there was not an oral statement to the House following the Bonn conference in December and that, despite the intense effort required in these critical months, the Prime Minister has not made a statement on Afghanistan to the House for many months. It is vital that the scale of our military effort is matched by diplomatic efforts. The Foreign Secretary spoke of November’s Istanbul conference, but will he set out for the House what sustained efforts are being made to co-ordinate the regional players, such as China and Pakistan, and bind them into the work of securing a stable and durable peace?

The Foreign Secretary spoke of the Taliban’s willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. While it is suggested that only talks about talks are now under way, what progress is being made on the broader and more inclusive political settlement needed within Afghanistan for a stable state post-2014? Specifically, will he update the House on what progress has been made by the Afghan High Peace Council, established at the London conference in 2010, on reaching a consensus on constitutional arrangements and how it is ensuring that women have a proper role in Afghanistan’s future?

Finally, given the timetable for transition, will the Foreign Secretary provide the House with the British Government’s assessment of the capacity of the Afghan state to undertake, as is planned, free and fair presidential elections during 2014?

We now have an end date in Afghanistan, but it is through urgent diplomatic work that we can also have an end state worthy of the sacrifice endured during this long decade.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. He rightly pays tribute to the bravery of our armed forces and reflects how sincere those tributes always are in this House, particularly from those of us on both sides who have travelled in Afghanistan and seen the work of our armed services and what happens in field hospitals. We recognise the extraordinary commitment of all involved. He is quite right to point out again—I am grateful to him for it—from the Opposition Benches that those operations enjoy support across the House, and I certainly take his questions in the spirit in which they are obviously intended.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about reconciling what I have said today with what the US Defence Secretary has said over the past couple of weeks. The US Defence Secretary has stressed that US forces will remain combat-capable and ready in Afghanistan to the end of 2014, and he has also said very clearly:

“We’ve got to stick to the Lisbon strategy. The United States has a very strong commitment to Lisbon and to the strategy that was laid out there.”

That strategy involves withdrawing from a combat role after the end of 2014.

Sometimes, in the reporting of different comments, there is confusion between lead responsibility and full responsibility. As I said in my statement, however, we expect Afghan forces to have lead responsibility throughout Afghanistan in mid to late 2013, and I also reflected on how they have lead responsibility for many operations now in Helmand. Full responsibility—that is, full transition to Afghan security control—is from the end of 2014, so we are not conscious of any difference between the approach of the United States, and its intentions for its armed forces, and ours; nor would we want there to be any difference. The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to express alarm at the idea of such a difference, which is not something that the Government intend or would accept.

The leaked document to which he refers should not have too much importance attributed to it. It was actually a collection of the views and various opinions of Taliban detainees held in custody, and it should not be taken as a necessarily accurate reflection of the overall strategic situation. I do not accept, therefore, that a leaked document of Taliban views contradicts everything I have said in this statement about the steady progress that is being made—steady progress always qualified by my saying how fragile it is in some areas, and how the picture has been varied.

That brings me to the right hon. Gentleman’s next question, because he asks about the number of incidents. It has risen over the past year in Regional Command East and Regional Command South West, but it has gone down in Regional Command South, down particularly sharply in Helmand, our own area of responsibilities, and down on average throughout the country. It is true also, nevertheless, that some of those incidents have been considerable attacks and cost civilian lives. About 80% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan are caused by insurgent activity, and that is why the civilian casualty figures are as he cites—something, therefore, that we cannot at all be complacent about.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the academy, and I can of course assure him that the necessary protection will be in place. The academy will be on the same site as the United States academy, and full protection will be afforded to it.

On the strength of Afghan national security forces, they will be built up, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, to a total strength of 352,000. Decisions will be made—probably at the NATO summit in Chicago, which the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister and I will attend—about the strength of Afghan national security forces in later years, and about what the international community’s financial contribution will be. We certainly expect the United Kingdom to make a significant contribution to those forces after 2014.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about oral statements, but I must gently point out that we introduced the quarterly statements on Afghanistan, having called for them for a long time during the previous Parliament, and indeed a monthly report to Parliament. We will always consider requests for further statements, but we have a great deal more statements on the matter than was the case in the previous Parliament.

On regional efforts, the Istanbul meeting was important, and the forthcoming economic co-operation conference that I mentioned will be important also in binding in the partners, but at the Bonn conference it was striking how the regional partners were committed to economic and development co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as all of us who make such a large security contribution.

It would not be fair to say that a consensus on the future, which the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly looks for in Afghanistan on constitutional arrangements, has yet been reached, but the meeting of the Loya Jirga was important progress, as is the establishment of the Taliban’s political office, although that is at an early stage. It does not indicate necessarily that they have signed up to the idea of reconciliation overall, nor that they are united on it, but it is one indication of progress.

The conduct of forthcoming elections, including the presidential one, will be a very important factor in Afghanistan’s political future and in its stability. We saw in the most recent round of elections—the presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan—an improvement in the holding of free and fair elections conducted in an orderly way. We look for another improvement in the next presidential election.