European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [Lords]

Denis MacShane Excerpts

Monday 3rd September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Hague]

For entertainment value, I give way to the right hon. Gentleman.

[Mr MacShane]

The Foreign Secretary’s two colleagues have made important points. This treaty requires ratification by the Parliaments of the eurozone and it is going through that parliamentary ratification. The notion that it could simply have been nodded through as a statutory instrument is silly. It is quite an important treaty, and this Parliament is right to be adopting it tonight; other Parliaments are doing likewise.

[Mr Hague]

Yes, other Parliaments are doing that in their own various ways. My point is that the reason this requires the full examination and passing of a Bill is the passage through this House of the European Union Act 2011, which the right hon. Gentleman probably opposed if he voted on it. A much briefer procedure was required under the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, which he supported. Parliamentary scrutiny has been enhanced by the recent change, and I am merely establishing that point. [Interruption.] Labour Members are reminding me that they did not vote against the EU Act 2011—although they were probably unable to vote for it. Having taken so many positions on the holding of a referendum, they decided not to have a position at all.

As the House will remember, the background to the ESM is that in response to the first Greek crisis, the previous Government, in their very last days, agreed to the establishment of two emergency instruments to respond to financial crises. The first is the European financial stability facility, an emergency facility established intergovernmentally by euro area member states. It has been used to provide loans to euro area member states in financial difficulty. The UK is not a member of that facility and has no exposure to financial assistance provided by it. The EFSF will operate alongside the ESM up until its wind-down by the end of June next year. The second is the European financial stabilisation mechanism, or EFSM. This allows the Council to agree by qualified majority a Commission proposal to provide assistance using money raised on the financial markets, backed by the EU budget. It has been used for assistance to Portugal and the Republic of Ireland, for which we also contributed a bilateral loan.

In the new Government, we have never thought that that was a satisfactory state of affairs. It was a questionable use of article 122 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. An inability to access the markets because of the unsustainability of public finances is not a natural disaster, and it is hard to argue that it is an exceptional occurrence beyond a country’s control, and those were meant to be the criteria for the use of article 122. When qualified majority voting was introduced into the provision under the Nice treaty, we warned the then Government of the risk, and that warning was dismissed. The amendment to article 136 gave us the opportunity to deal with the problem, and we took that opportunity. Britain is not in the euro, we are not going to join the euro, and we should have no liability for bailing out eurozone countries.

On coming to office, therefore, the Government found established a mechanism which enabled the Council of Ministers to decide by qualified majority voting to allow the European Commission to raise funds on the capital markets guaranteed by the headroom in the EU budget—about €60 billion—for loans to eurozone countries. We must grant that thus far this has not cost the British taxpayer a penny. The money is borrowed from the markets by the European Commission against the headroom in the EU budget. It must be granted that these are only contingent liabilities that would be called on only if Portugal or the Republic of Ireland defaulted on their loan obligations. However, it is still not right that a country outside the euro should be obliged to assume contingent liabilities for matters that are clearly the responsibility of countries that are in the euro. That is why this Government were determined to bring the situation to an end, and we have succeeded in our goal. That is a good example of this Government repairing the damage caused by the last one.

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[Mr Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman is right to recognise the timing of that in the final days of our time in office, but the other significant event that was happening then was the real prospect of the eurozone collapsing completely. He might welcome that, but the Opposition certainly would not. That was why the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the outgoing Government made genuine efforts to consult the potential incoming Finance Minister, who is now the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That matter is discussed in the explanatory memorandum on European Union legislation dated 15 July, in which the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, now the Transport Secretary, stated:

“The Government regrets that the Scrutiny Committees did not have time to consider this document before it was agreed at Council. It should be noted that whilst agreement on behalf of the UK was given by the previous administration, cross-party consensus had been gained.”

If the hon. Gentleman is concerned that the outgoing Chancellor reached the wrong decision, he might like to put that point directly to the current Chancellor.

Let me be absolutely clear that our support for the Bill does not equate to unqualified confidence in the ESM or in the current package of eurozone policies of which it forms but one part. We have concerns about both the restrictive terms of the fiscal compact that eurozone members have negotiated to establish the ESM and the manner in which it is currently envisaged that the ESM will be operationalised. The Opposition are certainly under no illusion that the ESM in itself will resolve the eurozone crisis. Much more will be required to do so than is included in this two-clause enabling Bill. The establishment of the ESM represents but one part of a broader package of measures and reforms that members of the euro must adopt to deliver stability successfully and bring greater prosperity to the eurozone in future.

[Mr MacShane]

I am following my right hon. Friend’s speech with considerable interest and agreement, but should we not change the tone slightly? We hear, “The eurozone must adopt this”, “They’re at fault”, “The pound zone is perfect.” I am going to Poland tomorrow for a big eastern European economic conference, and there is not the same patronising indifference to the eurozone there. There is not a view that the zloty zone is perfect. We are all in this together, and the trouble with the Government’s approach is that it sells the public the lie that there is a thing called the eurozone out there, but it is a far-away economic region of which we know not very much and in which we are not very interested.

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[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). He is the Private Frazer of our European debates. For nearly 20 years I have been listening to him saying, “We’re doomed! We’re doomed!”, “There’s no hope at all”, “Europe is schizophrenic”, “Europe is extreme”, or, “Europe is locked in riots and difficulties.”

That is a good description, frankly, of our country. It is only 12 or 13 months ago that London was set ablaze for three days. The state completely lost control of the streets, and the rioting, looting and burning spread to other cities. We are now the recession queen of Europe. It seems that we are in a triple-dip recession. While the hon. Gentleman complains about the threat of inflation and the printing of money, we are the great printers of bank notes—it is known as quantitative easing—and we are printing them as fast as we can, just as the United States is. By comparison, the European Union is relatively restrained. It has been our banks—some nationalised still, some still in private hands—that have been going to the European Central Bank to avail themselves of cheap-cost euros, to the tune of several billion. My point remains, as always, that we are all in this together.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Stone is quoted in Bundestag speeches as Eurosceptics there look for a friendly British voice to pray in aid, just as he assiduously reads The Economist and the Financial Times. Indeed, in the many friendly debates that I have had with him, both in this House and outside, he always has a quotation to sustain his case. However, as somebody who reads the German press a little bit, let me gently say to him that there are quotations and opinions like that bubbling up every day, just as there are in this country. The broad thrust of German economic policy is for stability and open markets. The notion that Europe’s currencies and Europe’s trade should be balkanised is of no advantage to the German economy at all. Far from creating an über-Germanised Europe, Mrs Merkel and the Social Democratic party—I was with some of its leaders at the weekend at a congress in South Africa—are very conscious of the fact that they carry a heavy responsibility. Part of the reason is that they took some tough decisions at the beginning of this century—to hold down wages, recapitalise industry, and transfer a lot of technology offshore to Poland and integrate the new EU member states into the broader German economic zone—while we, sadly, were over-fetishising banks. Now Britain is associated with LIBOR, the collapse of other banks and the great problem of illegal trading in offshore money in Mexico.

We really ought occasionally to put a mirror in front of our noses before we patronise and condescend to other countries. We have always lent money to countries in need. We poured money into Greece in the 1940s after the war and in the 1950s to stabilise it. We did so again at the beginning of the 1960s, when there was a great deal of turbulence in connection with the end of British rule in Cyprus. That has always been a British tradition. Quite intelligently, we prefer to use our treasure rather than shed our blood when things break down in Europe.

We are out of the current arrangement—this kitty of €500 billion. As the Foreign Secretary said—I could not find much to disagree with in his speech, and I am sure that the Bill will receive its Second Reading—we are not directly concerned. However, he went to such great pains to point that out that I thought he was over-striving for effect. Indeed, the hon. Member for Stone is absolutely right on one point: the so-called euro referendum Act, which the Foreign Secretary prayed in aid, is a piece of completely phoney jiggery-pokery. It gives the Secretary of State the sole, exclusive right to say whether there has been a significant transfer of competences or sovereignty to the wider Europe Union. If he alone decides that, he triggers a referendum; if he does not, as with this Bill, there will be no referendum. This is not about a referendum lock or allowing the British people or Parliament to have greater scrutiny or a greater say over European affairs; it is a completely cynical piece of legislation, which frankly is irrelevant to the broader European debate.

[Mr Jenkin]

Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that there is an inconsistency in saying that we do not want a referendum on this issue, yet vetoing the fiscal union treaty in December? We are effectively consenting to the process of fiscal union by allowing the treaty amendment to go through almost on the nod, effectively abolishing the no bail-out clause, which will be the foundation of fiscal union.

[Mr MacShane]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. The Prime Minister found himself, through no fault of his own—inexperience, 2.30 in the morning, exhaustion—thinking that he was speaking for half of Europe, but at the end only the Hungarians were left. We created a British-Hungarian empire overnight, and even they peeled off in the end. It was deeply embarrassing. I do not think the Prime Minister actually understood how European decision making works or how to present our case effectively. That is part of the price that the Government pay for opting out of any political engagement with European partners. Working in the European context is a learning curve. It is about building relationships, networking, trading, and give and take. At times, certainly, it is about stamping our foot and not allowing something to go through. Indeed, I was a witness to all sorts of European countries and leaders doing that when I was Minister for Europe. However, in this case the Prime Minister found himself not so much naked in the conference chamber as utterly alone, without anybody else in the slightest bit interested in anything the United Kingdom had to say.

As a result, we will now move forward to a new treaty—the hon. Member for Stone is absolutely right about that. The German Government are quite determined. I was talking to a senior associate of François Hollande over the weekend, and the French now accept that quite soon we will be moving to a serious banking union—a serious treaty—that will do for banking what the Coal and Steel Community did in 1950 and what subsequent treaties did, in placing under broad supranational supervision a good and important chunk of the European economy. There is a huge debate about how far that process should go. Should it, for example, include the small regional banks and savings banks—the cajas, as they are called in Spain? Should banks be closed down, as happens quite regularly in the United States? When banks there are no longer able to stand on their own two feet, they are not bailed out—they are closed down.

Some supranational authority is now being created, however, and the British banking and financial system will not be able to operate wholly independently of that authority, because banking systems are permanently intertwined. Anyone walking through the streets of Madrid, Munich or Geneva will see British high street names such as Lloyds and Barclays operating there. Those banks will come under the control of any banking union. The more we pretend to ourselves that we can stay out of that arrangement, the less influence and say we will have over the new rules as they come into being. That is what really worries me. The notion that expelling Greece from the eurozone and re-drachmatising, if that is the right word, the Greek economy—I always prefer to use a Greek term, so I prefer “grexodus” to “grexit”—will somehow save the British bacon is just foolish.

The hon. Member for Stone is fond of citing YouGov polling in Germany. I did not know that YouGov—“Anything you want, guv”—was now a polling company in Germany as well. If we look at the Irish vote on the referendum to accept quite onerous conditions, we can see that they voted by 60% to 40% to stay in the euro, and any Greek polling will show a massive majority—up to 80%—in favour of staying in the eurozone. Those countries are mature enough to realise that it is their internal policies, not the existence of a currency, that lie at the heart of their economic difficulties. For example, there was no housing boom in the Netherlands, which had low-interest euros to play with, just as the Spanish and the Irish did. Why not? Because people in the Netherlands have to put between 5% and 10% down before they can buy a house or a flat there. In other words, economic, administrative and political decisions could be, and are being, taken in all the countries concerned.

However, it is quite right to criticise those countries, and especially the accounting in Greece, where the shipping industry and the Greek Orthodox Church—the country’s biggest land and property owner—pay no tax. Greece spends twice the share of its gross domestic product as we or the Turks do on defence, rather than ensuring a clean taxation system. This moment of truth is, very painfully, forcing those countries to take new directions and new decisions, yet paradoxically, if for some reason the euro were to dissolve into drachmas, pesetas and lira, that would take all the pressure off the political and administrative classes in those countries to take new decisions.

Yes, there will be enhanced supervision of those countries’ economies and budgets, but that also happened after the war as a result of the Marshall plan. Along with the credit from the United States came the Marshall planners—technocrats who sat in ministries to ensure that, in accordance with the broad remit of the plan, there was no improper abuse of the credit lines that the United States was providing.

My plea is rather more philosophical. I feel sorry for the Foreign Secretary—who is not in his place— because he has consistently championed out-and-out Euroscepticism. He has encouraged all the false hopes. Let us remember his famous statement before the 2001 election, when he warned the British people that if they voted Labour, Britain would become a foreign land. That was about as sensible as the earlier remark made by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) that signing the treaty of Amsterdam would mean the abolition of Britain. We have constantly been told by leaders of the Conservative party that being in Europe was bad for us. The hon. Member for Stone presents the most brutalist version of Conservative party thinking, but he is swimming in the same sea as many members of the Cabinet. He is simply rather more honest in describing the endgame that he wants to see.

I am fundamentally opposed to that aim; I do not want to see the eurozone break up. The entire western liberal market-economic world is going through a great crisis, as evidenced by problems in America and China, but there is a wider crisis, as evidenced by the difficulties in India, Russia, China and even Brazil, whose economy is now slowing down. How we get out of that is a huge challenge for all of us, but it is naive in the extreme to suggest that dissolving the eurozone would present a magic solution that would instantly liberate productivity, growth and employment and ensure the disappearance of extremist parties so that all the nation states could enter into a happy-clappy relationship.

This debate signals the firing of the first serious shot in what will be a much greater debate in our nation. The €500 billion in the kitty to bail out distressed countries sounds like a lot of money, but it is actually very small beer. We are going to have to take much bigger decisions about the future of Europe.

Over the summer, I was concerned to see a lot articles in the European press saying that Britain was about to withdraw from Europe. The language of repatriation and referendums was being used and, for the first time, a British Prime Minister said that he had no problem with linking the word “referendum” with Europe. He might not have any such problem, but neither Lady Thatcher nor any other British Prime Minister has used that language since Britain joined the EEC in 1973. Those headlines were appearing all over Europe, however, and the Minister for Europe, the right hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr Lidington) had to be rushed out to comment on them. I was leafing through my copy of Le Monde one day and I was surprised to see his by-line in it; I thought I had an exclusive franchise to write in that newspaper. He said that Britain was not going to leave Europe, and that we were very committed to the EU. I have not brought the article with me, so I cannot read it out. Dagens Nyheter in Sweden said the same thing.

The Government went into total panic mode as they realised that a lot of people in Europe thought that the hon. Member for Stone spoke for the Conservative party, and that we were on our way out—[Interruption.] I hear cheers and “Hear, hear” from the Government Back Benches. I am delighted that we now seem to have buried the proposals for boundary changes, so that all those right hon. and hon. Gentlemen can perhaps be returned to the House at the next election. They will then have to make big decisions, however, on whether Britain should remain part of this thing or not. We are approaching a fundamental turning point in our nation’s life. I remain firmly committed to our staying a partner of the other countries in Europe, although I agree that there are huge problems to be resolved, and I agree with a lot of the reform agenda that is advanced by right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House.

The Bill gives the first flavour of the much greater debate that is about to come, but the Conservative party seems wholly ill-prepared for the seriousness of some of the decisions that we are going to have to take in the next two or three years. I am confident that, with greater study and work, our eminent shadow Europe Minister and the Labour party will become fully prepared to take part in that debate, but I fear that the possibility not just of a “grexodus” but of a British exit is now seriously on the table. We would be foolish if we did not accept that Britain could now be on the point of taking a fundamental decision that would significantly alter the nature of our lives and our nation.

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[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice). I agreed with much of his speech, particularly his emphasis on the desirability and common sense of flexible exchange rates—not necessarily floating exchange rates, but flexible exchange rates, at the very least, so that countries can choose and negotiate currency arrangements that suit their economies. If all countries can do that, they are free to reflate their economies and to drive growth, so everybody benefits. That is the great advantage. Co-ordinated reflation was a slogan that many of us on the Keynesian left called for back in the 1980s. Indeed, co-ordinated reflation would be desirable now, but we have co-ordinated deflation—savage deflation whereby people wonder why the economies of the world are getting into difficulty. It is because Government after Government are cutting deficits, driving cuts and deflating their economies. There is quite a lot that we in the debate have in common.

I should make two points before proceeding. One is to emphasise my support for the strong view put by the Minister for Europe—and indeed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), the shadow Foreign Secretary—that civil servants should remain non-political. It should be Ministers who are accountable and Ministers who are political. Ministers, as well as Members of the House and politicians, should make political statements, not civil servants. The great tradition of non-political civil servants for whom Ministers are responsible should be preserved and given strong support. We should not accept the contagion of the officials in the European Commission, who are politicians in the guise of officials who drive policies themselves. Our civil servants are not like Commission officials, and we should not let them drift in that direction due to the contagion they experience in Brussels.

I shall not speak for long, but I want to emphasise that we are in serious difficulty—not just in Britain, but across the European Union. It is my view that the euro will ultimately not prevail and will not last simply because it cannot work. Countries cannot constantly deflate their way to success. There will come a point at which Greek people will realise that it is the euro that is their problem. Some on the left think that now, but many others will come to that view.

When Greece is able to escape from the euro, re-create the drachma and devalue substantially, people will find imports too expensive and what they spend will be directed to the domestic economy, which will help their domestic economy to grow. Greece’s exports include tourism and holidays, and when Greek holidays drop to half the price they are now, many more people will have holidays there.

[Mr MacShane]

I am following the argument, but will my hon. Friend explain why the British pound experiencing a severe devaluation of up to 25%, or perhaps nearly 30%, of its value in the past four years has led to a worsening balance of trade and an increased recession? If devaluation of a currency is the magic recipe, why has it not worked for us?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

There is a case that we still have not depreciated our currency enough, but demand for our exports is falling because there is deflation elsewhere, particularly elsewhere in the EU. We should consider the history of devaluations; the proper ones have invariably been very beneficial. After the escape from the exchange rate mechanism in 1992, the economy bounced back strongly and many Conservative Members would agree that, had they managed to stay in office for three or four more years, people might have realised that that big devaluation was driving economic growth and falling unemployment. We reaped the benefit of the collapse and what happened in the ERM, particularly in my constituency, which was the epicentre of housing repossessions and negative equity, which led to my having one of the largest swings to Labour in the country, simply because of the ERM.

I was one of the few people who wrote about economics in 1990 who were saying that the ERM would be a disaster. I predicted—I surprised myself, indeed—the precise course of that experience and said what would happen in the end: interest rates would go through the roof and eventually we would come out of the ERM and devalue, which we did. However, that is not the point that I am making tonight.

I agree with the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) on many things, but I do not agree with him on economic policy. I doubt that many Conservative Members read the New Statesman, but in the last week or two it has featured a series of economists who initially signed a letter of support for the Government, but are now recanting, saying that they made a mistake and should not have called for deflation and cuts. They are implying that that situation ought to be reversed. I agree with them, and I was one of the few in the House who absolutely and profoundly disagreed with the Government from the beginning, quoting Paul Krugman and others, who said that they were going in precisely the wrong direction, towards the savage deflation that led to the 1930s’ depression.

We are in danger of going in that direction now. Countries have to find a way to expand their economies, and they will not do that when they are stuck in stupid arrangements such as the euro. We must have a deconstruction of the euro. There is much talk of an uncontrolled crash, but currency zones can be deconstructed rationally. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all the countries of the ex-Soviet Union created their own currencies. That was done fairly straightforwardly. When Slovakia and the Czech Republic separated as Czechoslovakia broke up, they created their own separate currencies. That worked. It can be done in a controlled and not-too-difficult way. I shall not say that it will be that easy, but it is not impossible and there are examples of such a thing happening. I suggest that, initially, Greece, and perhaps one or two other countries, ought to quit the euro and recreate their own currencies. That might mean freezing banks for a few days and so on.