John Baron
Main Page: John Baron (Conservative - Basildon and Billericay)Department Debates - View all John Baron's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
I beg to move,
That this House believes that the use of force against Iran would be wholly counterproductive and would serve only to encourage any development of nuclear weapons; and calls upon the Government to rule out the use of force against Iran and reduce tensions by redoubling diplomatic efforts.
May I start by thanking the Backbench Business Committee for supporting my application to debate this subject today? Statements by the Government allow opportunities to ask a question, but rarely allow a thorough examination of the issue. I also thank those Members who supported me in calling for this debate. Many did not agree with the motion, but all felt that such a debate was long overdue, as is borne out by the number of people who have put in to speak this evening.
The debate is urgently required. With tough new sanctions in place and further ones threatened by Iran, with naval forces mustering in the Persian gulf and with state-sponsored terrorism ongoing inside and outside Iran, this might be the only opportunity for Back Benchers to discuss the topic before hostilities begin. Israel is contemplating an air strike, and we could be on the brink of a regional war. I called for today’s debate because I believe that we need a fresh approach. The sanctions and the sabre-rattling are yesterday’s failed policies, and the fact that we are once again on the brink of military conflict is testament to that failure. My motion calls on the Government—and, by implication, the west—to rule out the use of force in order to reduce tensions and bring us back from the brink of war and military conflict, and to redouble diplomatic efforts. That would give us time to reflect on some of the inconvenient truths that the west chooses to ignore, and on the need for a fresh approach.
I shall start by outlining some of the inconvenient truths. The catalyst for the latest round of condemnation was the report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency last November. The United States and the United Kingdom chose to see the report as evidence that Iran was building nuclear weapons, and further financial sanctions followed, which led directly to the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, inexcusable though that was. We should be careful about accepting such reports at face value, however. Close reading of the report reveals no smoking gun: there is no evidence of attempts to produce nuclear weapons, or of a decision to do so.
Mr Baron
I want to make some progress, then I will try to accommodate all colleagues who wish to intervene.
The fact that there is no evidence of attempts to produce nuclear weapons or of a decision to do so was confirmed by Peter Jenkins, the UK’s former permanent representative to the IAEA. Robert Kelley, a former director of the agency, highlighted the fact that the report contained only three items that referred to developments after 2004—the year in which the American intelligence services concluded that Iran had ceased its nuclear programme. Indeed, the agency spends 96% of a 14-page annexe reprising what was already known. I therefore ask the Foreign Secretary to highlight for the House today the paragraphs in the report that provide evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. He has referred to this matter many times, but I can see no such evidence in the report. Is he willing to highlight those paragraphs for the benefit of the House now? I am willing to take an intervention from him.
Robert Halfon
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Is he aware that paragraph 43 of the IAEA report states that Iran worked
“on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components”?
Mr Baron
I will take and answer one intervention at a time, if I may.
We need to be careful when considering the report. Much has been made of the circumstantial evidence and of western intelligence reports, but Iraq should have taught us to be careful about basing our foreign policy decisions on secret intelligence and circumstantial evidence. That is a lesson that we should have learned from Iraq.
Martin Horwood
Another section of the report talks about the
“acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network”.
It concludes that:
“While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.”
How else are we to interpret that?
Mr Baron
That does not answer the actual question. That is circumstantial evidence; it is not concrete evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. It is as straightforward as that. I challenge the hon. Gentleman who asked the question: if he could point to concrete evidence, it would be useful for the House.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
Will my hon. Friend outline when in his view circumstantial evidence becomes actual evidence—is it when the bomb has dropped, for example?
Mr Baron
It is very straightforward. There has to be evidence of nuclear weapons. We were told, for example, that there was no shortage of circumstantial evidence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it turned out that there were no WMD there. That shows how careful we need to be and how clear we need to be about the difference between circumstantial evidence and concrete evidence.
Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)
Is the hon. Gentleman aware of any IAEA evidence on Israel’s nuclear weapons programme?
Mr Baron
The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. In certain quarters in the middle east, it is felt that double standards are being applied in that Israel has developed nuclear weapons and the west does not seem to worry about them. [Interruption.] My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) suggests that the evidence is circumstantial, and I am willing to grant him that point.
Mr Stewart Jackson (Peterborough) (Con)
Can my hon. Friend name any experts in the field who would explain how enrichment to a 20% threshold, currently being undertaken by the Iranian regime, could plausibly be for civilian and not military use?
Mr Baron
My hon. Friend makes a fair point, which I will address later in my speech, but I say to him now that there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and actually having nuclear weapons. I am sure that the House would accept that difference.
A second inconvenient truth relates to the usual depiction of Iran as intransigent and for ever chauvinistic in her foreign policy. Western Governments, I suggest, too easily forget that Iran is not totally at fault here. There have been opportunities to better relations between Iran and the west, but the west has spurned those opportunities. We forget, for example, that following 9/11, Iran—unlike many in the middle east street—expressed solidarity with the US. We forget also that attempts were made to develop contacts during the early stages of the Afghan war. What was Iran’s reward? It was to be labelled or declared part of the “axis of evil” by President Bush, which led directly to the removal of the reformist and moderate President Khatami. Despite that, there were further attempts at co-operation in the run-up to the Iraq war, but those efforts were similarly rebuffed.
Again, I ask the Foreign Secretary whether he is prepared to deny that the west has made mistakes in its dealings with Iran and has missed opportunities to better relations. I would genuinely like to hear his views on that and would welcome an intervention.
Mike Gapes
I am grateful. The hon. Gentleman refers to lost opportunities. Does he agree that the Iranian regime was at fault in rejecting President Obama’s initiative when he first came to office? Is that not a sign that the regime in Tehran is afraid of international engagement and is pursuing this course relentlessly?
Mr Baron
I am the first to agree that Iran was completely wrong on President Obama’s offer. Let me make it clear that I am not an apologist for Iran. No one can agree with its human rights record, its sponsoring of state terrorism or the storming of our embassy—all are terribly wrong—but they are not arguments for military intervention; they do not justify war. Rather, I suggest that no one’s hands are clean in this region, including our own, particularly after the invasion of Iraq on what turned out to be a false premise. Opportunities have been missed on both sides. I would have thought there can be little doubt about that.
Let us get to the nub of the issue and think the unthinkable. Let us assume, despite the lack of substantive evidence, that Iran is moving towards the option of nuclear capability. Hon. Members will be fully aware that there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and possessing nuclear weapons. This is perhaps understandable. We in the west underestimate the extent to which status is important in that part of the world. The reason Saddam Hussein did not deny possessing weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that he did not have them, was that it was in his interest not to deny it. He had, after all, failed in his invasion of Iran. Iran’s insecurity is also understandable. Those who view the map from Tehran’s point of view will see that she is surrounded by nuclear powers: Russia, Pakistan, a United States naval presence, and Israel. All those powers contribute to Iran’s feeling of encirclement.
I am very conscious, as the House will be, of the argument that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, that will lead to a nuclear arms race in the region but without the safety mechanisms that existed during the cold war, which in itself could lead to a nuclear escalation. However, I do not accept that argument. There is no reason why the theory of nuclear deterrence to which the west adheres should not be equally valid in other parts and regions of the world. Paul Pillar, the CIA’s national intelligence officer for the middle east between 2000 and 2005, recently wrote that there was
“nothing in the record of behavior by the Islamic Republic that suggests irrationality”.
That view was reinforced by Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defence Minister, last year.
India and Pakistan have fought wars, yet both have shown nuclear restraint. As the House is well aware, only one country has ever used nuclear weapons in anger. Furthermore, the view that an Iranian nuclear capability would start a nuclear arms race in the region does not take into account the possibility that regional allies of the west will opt to shelter under a US nuclear umbrella. That happens in Japan and in South Korea.
Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)
I am afraid that this is sounding terribly like an appeasement argument. If the hon. Gentleman does not wish his position to be characterised as such, will he say something about what the western powers should do to support legitimate protest in Iran by the people who are pushing for regime change, whom we have supported in other countries and whom we should support in this instance?
Mr Baron
I ask the hon. Gentleman to be patient. I promise to deal directly with that later in my speech.
At this point, many invoke President Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be wiped off the face of the map. Surely, they say, that is proof of irrationality; surely that is evidence that Iran cannot be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. However, a careful examination of the translation suggests that President Ahmadinejad was badly misquoted. Even The New York Times, one of the first outlets to misquote Ahmadinejad, now accepts that the word “map” was never used. A more accurate translation offers
“the regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time”.
Given that Ahmadinejad compared his desired option—the elimination of “the regime occupying Jerusalem”—with the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran, it is quite clear that he was talking about regime change and not about the destruction of Israel itself, just as he did not want the end of Iran in his comparison. The pedantry over the translation is important. Some Members may scoff, but this is a terribly important point. The immediate reaction to Ahmadinejad’s speech in 2005 was the then Israeli Prime Minister’s call for Iran to be expelled from the United Nations, and the US urging its allies to “get tougher” on Iran.
That mistranslation is used to this day, even by former Foreign Secretaries outside the House. I wonder why the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has not provided more clarity on the point. I hope that it is not to do with a hidden agenda. Perhaps it is to do with a shortage of properly qualified Farsi speakers, but we would appreciate clarity from the Foreign Secretary in due course. I ask him to tell us whether he denies at least the possibility that President Ahmadinejad was misquoted.
Mrs Louise Ellman (Liverpool, Riverside) (Lab/Co-op)
If the hon. Gentleman is so dismissive of Iran’s statement that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth, can he explain why, in February 2011, Ayatollah Khamenei repeated the statement that Israel was a “cancerous tumour” that must be removed?
Mr Baron
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I must say that we need to examine these statements very carefully, because that translation too is open to dispute. It is all very well coming to the House with these translations, but Farsi is a complex language, as she will know, and we have to make sure that we get them right. Many scholars outside this place verify that President Ahmadinejad’s original statement was misquoted—theses have been written about it—which is why I ask the Foreign Secretary to clarify the situation. We need to get this quote clarified.
There can be little doubt that the west’s policy of sabre-rattling and sanctions has failed; the Iranians are not going to back down on their nuclear programme. Mr Mousavi, the unofficial leader of the green movement and one of the great hopes of the west, said during the 2009 presidential campaign that any backtracking on the nuclear issue would be tantamount to surrender. Iran’s statement that it is introducing an oil embargo for certain countries shows that it is impervious to sabre-rattling, yet we in the west still pursue that policy when confronting Iran. Indeed it is considered “naive”—I have heard that word used a lot—to rule out the use of force. We are told that all options must be left on the table. Some people go further: there seems to be a hairshirt auction among Republican candidates for the presidential nomination in America as to who can be toughest on Iran, with Mitt Romney openly advocating war over the nuclear issue. I would counter that by saying that what is naive is pursuing a policy that has clearly failed. Sanctions and sabre-rattling are yesterday’s policies and they have brought us to the brink of a military conflict, which is hardly the sign of success.
What compounds the error of that approach is that most agree that a military strike would be counter-productive to the point of being calamitous. It would reinforce the position of the hard-liners at the expense of the pragmatists within Iran, just as the Iran-Iraq war boosted patriotic support for the regime and helped to cement the revolution. Military intervention would not work; the US Defence Secretary judges that it would delay the Iranians for only a year at most. Knowledge cannot be eradicated by military intervention, and such intervention will only delay the inevitable. If Iran is set on acquiring nuclear weapons, she will not be scared away; and if she is not, a military strike would encourage her to do so. We even hear voices from within Israel against a strike. Meir Dagan, the hard-line former chief of Mossad—nobody could accuse him of being a pussycat—has referred to an attack on Iran as “a stupid idea.”
I ask hon. Members to reflect on a wider historical point. It is perhaps relevant to reflect more generally that military action often has an embedding effect: it reinforces the position of the existing regime. For example, communism has lasted longest in those countries where the west intervened militarily—North Korea, China, Cuba and Vietnam.
Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
My hon. Friend talks about the verdict of history. Is the verdict of history not also that when dealing with tyrannies it is unwise to rule out force in defence, and that sometimes it is wise to keep tyrannies guessing as to one’s intentions?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. May I remind Mr Baron that he has already taken 20 minutes? This is an over-subscribed debate, and we will impose an eight-minute limit on speeches after the Front-Bench contributions. He would be generous to his colleagues if he began to draw his remarks to close.
Mr Baron
I very much take that on board, Mr Deputy Speaker. If hon. Members will forgive me, I will not accept any more interventions.
A strike by Israel or the west would unite Iran in fury and perhaps trigger a regional war, and it would certainly encourage the hard-liners to push for a bomb. Despite that, the present policy is to refuse to rule out the use of force. Such a policy is not only naive, but illogical: we are keeping an option that we all know would be a disaster, against a country that chooses to ignore it, yet that option heightens tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely. That is nonsense.
A fresh approach is required. Israel will not attack Iran if Washington objects. Now is the time for the US to make it clear to Israel that force should not be used. Ruling out the use of force would have the immediate effect of reducing tensions and making conflict less likely. That would lessen the chance of another accident like the shooting down of Iran Air 655, which could spark conflict. Such a policy in the longer term would give diplomacy a greater chance of success. Iran will not be persuaded to give up her pursuit of nuclear technology. We need to understand and engage better with Iran, and offer the prospect of implicit recognition of Iran’s status as a major power in the region—a status we created ourselves through our misguided invasion of Iraq, which fundamentally altered the balance of power in the region.
There is a precedent for recognising that new status. In the 1960s, when the US presence in Asia was waning and China was beginning to flex her muscles, Nixon did not respond by denying the reality of Chinese power. His visit to China in 1972 took everyone by surprise, but it was the right decision—it was a defining moment. I suggest that the US needs to realise that this is one of those defining moments, which needs to be seized.
Israel and Iran are two proud nations but they are perhaps uncertain about the best course of action. The US needs to put behind it the underlying antagonism towards Iran that defines this crisis. That will not be easy, but speaking as an ally of the US, I suggest that too often in the past the US approach has been to overwhelm an issue rather than to solve it. This is not one of those occasions.
In conclusion, the US needs to adopt a wider perspective: it needs to make it clear that an Israeli attack would be unacceptable, and then to engage better with Iran. That would be in Israel’s long-term interests. No one is suggesting it is an easy option, particularly given the presidential elections in both countries, but without it discussions on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and a host of other issues will remain needlessly difficult. The west underestimates the opportunity to influence Iran. She is a state in transition, with multiple centres of authority and constant power struggles. The challenge for the west is to influence those internal debates and struggles. Crude threats of military intervention and sanctions, along with talk of regime change, only reinforce the hard-liners’ position.
We need a better understanding of what makes Iran tick. We need to better understand the culture, the people, the history, the religion—the British Museum’s current Hajj exhibition is a well worth a visit. We need to renounce the option of a military strike and go the extra mile for peace. War should always, I remind the House, be the measure of last resort, to be used when all other avenues have been exhausted. We have not reached that point with Iran. As such, it is my intention to test the will of Parliament by dividing the House on the motion tonight.
Mr Michael McCann (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (Lab)
I welcome the procurement of the debate by the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), but I fear that many of the Members who contribute to it will not support the position that he outlined. I will support the amendment.
I should start by declaring that my sister is married to an Iranian and that I have strong links with the Iranian community in the west of Scotland. I have taken the community’s temperature on this issue.
We know that every Government face challenges, foreign and domestic, during their period in office. The longer the Government are in power, the more likely that challenges will come along and that their frequency will increase. The foreign challenges that we face focus public attention, at times, on making decisions or considering military options that will put our people in harm’s way. Sadly, over the past decade or so, we have seen many challenges in foreign lands—Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, the coalition Government deployed UK forces in Libya.
On each occasion each Member of the House has had to come to a view on where they stand on the issues. Some will always adopt a pacifist approach. Others will weigh up other factors. The pacifists among us will always have respect and legitimacy for the principled position that they hold, but they must also recognise that their position lacks remedies in the harsh territory—
Mr McCann
I shall make progress. The hon. Gentleman has just had the opportunity to move the motion. He should not try to come in again so swiftly.
The pacifists among us do not always recognise that their position lacks remedies in the harsh territory of international conflict and that at times it can be seen as a white flag in the face of tyranny. What is more difficult to absorb are those non-pacifists who disagree with a particular decision and then seek to stand astride the moral high ground after the event and lecture us about how they did not support the action in the first place.
Iraq is the most obvious recent controversy. I have often mused about what would have happened in March 2003 had the French and Russians put their vested interests aside and supported a united final UN resolution. Would Saddam have capitulated? We will never know. I have no issue with those who seek to post-rationalise events, but I do have an issue with those who seek to do so in a manner which neglects to mention that they did not have a feasible proposition to resolve the original problem—in the Iraq context, Saddam’s refusal to abide by the will of the international community. Now we look to Iran.
I do not support the motion; I support the amendment. In reaching that decision I have examined the actions of the Iranians thus far, and in particular the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the issues. What actions have the Iranians taken thus far? The International Atomic Energy Agency stated on 8 November 2011 that Iran had sought to design a nuclear warhead, that Iran was continuing its atomic weapons programme research, that it could have a nuclear bomb in months and that preparations to install a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile were taking place.
To this I add the Iranians’ rhetoric that the holocaust did not take place and President Ahmadinejad’s declaration that Israel should be wiped off the map; I refer to the comments of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay. If that declaration was somehow misinterpreted, were the Iranians also misinterpreted when they said that the holocaust did not take place? We must also question the Iranians’ close relationship with Syria.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
I do not want to accept too many interventions, for the reasons you have mentioned, Mr Deputy Speaker.
Thirdly, the use of force will never be a desirable response, but it might be the least bad one if all else fails. In considering that, let me put to the House what I think is a very important point. Many commentators have drawn attention to all the downsides of a military response. They suggest that an attack by the United States—let us concentrate on the United States at the moment—would lead to a hike in the oil price, which is correct. They suggest that it might lead to increased terrorist support by Iran for Hezbollah or Hamas and to attempts to block the strait of Hormuz and all that that would entail, and they are right. There are various other downsides, too. But, when we think about it, we find that almost all the examples—the correct examples that have been given—of the adverse consequences of a military strike by the United States are relatively temporary. They are short to medium-term: they might last a few days, weeks or possibly even months, but they would gradually cease to have any impact.
The alternative, however, of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is not temporary; it is permanent. Therefore, we have to come to—we cannot avoid coming to—a judgment. If diplomacy fails, if negotiations go nowhere and if sanctions do not deliver, we will at some stage still have to come to an honest judgment: whether the downside, which I do not deny exists, nevertheless has to be borne if the long-term objective is either to destroy or seriously to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability.
That brings us to a crucial question: would such action in fact do so? Do the Americans have the capability? That is ultimately a military question, and we are not privy to the military advice that the President may be receiving. If the advice is, “No, it wouldn’t,” it is not worth considering the option, but, if the advice is that we could either destroy or seriously degrade Iranian nuclear capability so that it is pushed back five or 10 years, that is a different argument.
Mr Baron
I am listening very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, but does he not accept that even the US Defence Secretary admits that a successful military strike would only delay the programme for about a year—those are his words, not mine—and that what my right hon. and learned Friend ignores is the possibility that a strike could actually do much worse and inflame a regional war?
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
Panetta was probably referring to the consequences of an Israeli attempt to damage Iranian nuclear capability which, because the Israelis do not have cruise missiles or bunker-busting bombs, would clearly have a much more limiting effect, even if it had some limited success.
In the interests of time, I shall share my final point with the House. Sometimes the inference of those who argue against even the option of a military response is that the world would be a much more peaceful, happy and gentle place if only we renounced the use of force, even as an option, in resolving this dispute. I say to my hon. Friend, however, that we have to contemplate— for a very brief moment, Mr Deputy Speaker—the consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon state. There is not just the one response, to which my hon. Friend referred—whereby the Saudis themselves, pretty certainly, feel obliged to become a nuclear weapon state, Egypt and Turkey perhaps follow them and, therefore, the middle east, which is already the most dangerous part of the world, becomes incredibly volatile for all the perfectly obvious reasons that I do not have to go into. The only alternative, which my hon. Friend touched on, is that in order to discourage any Saudi, Egyptian or Turkish response of going nuclear the United States would have to give a nuclear umbrella guarantee to the Arab and Gulf states of the region, just as it has to NATO members, to Japan and to South Korea. In each case, when the United States gives such a guarantee, however, the guarantee is not credible unless the United States has bases in the area, as it has had in western Europe and has in the far east.
My hon. Friend’s view leads to the point that, if Iran became a nuclear weapon state, to have any prospect of discouraging the Saudis and others from becoming nuclear powers themselves, we would have to envisage not just for a few weeks, a few months or the odd year or so, but for the indefinite future, the middle east as a region where the United States, far from disengaging, became more committed and involved than it ever has—committed by guarantee not just to go to war, but if necessary to use its nuclear weapons in the defence of what would then be its allies, in the sense that NATO is an alliance, alongside the need for bases in the region, with all the inflammatory consequences of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on a permanent basis.
The stakes are very high, and my hon. Friend cannot just sleep quietly, saying, “I don’t think we should have the military option, and everything would be peaceful if only people accepted the judgment that I have come to.” It has to be an option. We must hope that it never comes to that, but it cannot be ruled out at this stage. It is no one’s interests that it should, and therefore I commend the amendment to the House.
Mr Hague
I had better continue, because the embassy is a bit of a side point.
Our quarrel emphatically is not with the Iranian people: we want them to enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities as we do and to live dignified lives in a prosperous society. Today, they labour under a repressive political system that attempts to stifle all opposition and has incarcerated more journalists and bloggers than any other country in the world, on top of its appalling wider record on human rights. Let there be no doubt that the Iranian Government’s current policies endanger the interests of the Iranian people themselves, as well as undermining global security.
Mr Baron
One does not condone the human rights record of Iran; there are many regimes around the world that have abysmal human rights. May I bring my right hon. Friend back to the report? Does he agree that there is a world of difference between moving to the option of capability and what we have sometimes heard about evidence suggesting a nuclear weapons programme or a decision to develop one? He has still failed to present the House with proof that nuclear weapons are being developed or that a decision has been made to do so.
Mr Hague
I read out some quite interesting paragraphs from the IAEA report. My hon. Friend should also consider the evidence that is now coming out of Iran saying that it will use its expanding stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium to make fuel for the Tehran research reactor. That reactor is designed to produce medical isotopes, but its capacity is being expanded to produce near-20% enriched uranium to levels far beyond what would be required for that purpose. On that basis, one would have to be extraordinarily trusting and innocent in world affairs to believe that this programme had entirely peaceful purposes and that no possible provision was being made for the development of nuclear weapons. My hon. Friend must remember, too, that the regime deliberately concealed—we do not know for how long, because western nations revealed it—the construction of the secret underground facilities at Qom. It has a strong track record of deliberately concealing aspects of the nuclear programme, and that might lead him to be just a little bit suspicious about its purposes.
Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)
I commend the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) for securing this debate and welcome the timely opportunity for the House to debate the subject of Iran. Like the Foreign Secretary, I will urge hon. Members to support the amendment in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).
I shall start with the broader regional context of the issues before the House this evening. Iran stands more isolated today than it has for many years. As several hon. Members have suggested, in recent years Iran has sought to build its influence across the middle east, supporting groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and backing repressive regimes that could help to enhance Iran’s network of influence in the region, most notably that of Assad in Syria. Today, however, the regional balance of power has shifted away from Tehran. Recent events in Syria leave Iran further isolated, and in time Iran will lose this vital state ally in the Arab world and its main proxy for the arming of Hezbollah. Iran’s hold on the region is slipping, and even previously reluctant players, such as the Saudis, have now publicly condemned Iran and given their support to the EU oil boycott by promising to fill the gap in Europe’s energy demands. Sanctions today, unlike those in the past, are showing signs of having an impact and the Iranian regime seems to be struggling to contain their effect.
The Iranian regime’s response to declining domestic legitimacy and increasing international isolation has been to channel discontent towards external enemies beyond its own borders. The regime continues to support terrorist groups across the region, and by its sponsorship of terrorism threatens the lives of British service personnel today in Afghanistan. In particular, members of the regime have directed their hatred towards Israel, from their denial of the holocaust to the continued threats to the people and state of Israel, and for those statements and threats they deserve our clear and unequivocal condemnation. Israel should know that the international community is united in condemnation of this violent and abhorrent rhetoric and the world view that it reveals—there can be no excuse and no defence for such outrageous and inflammatory language about any member of the international community, and it should be condemned without qualification—but Israel should also understand that its friends in the international community see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as affecting not only Israel’s security alone, but the security of the broader region and indeed the world.
The non-proliferation treaty is clear: Iran can have civilian nuclear power, but it must not have nuclear weapons. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, its capacity to destabilise the middle east would be enhanced. It is disconcerting to be at odds with a distinguished former Foreign Secretary on my own Benches, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), but I believe that the potential response from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others would put at risk the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In so unstable a region, the chance of a nuclear weapon being used again would significantly increase.
Several Members have mentioned the IAEA’s latest report, issued last November, which sent the clearest warning yet that Iran had carried out tests
“relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”.
As this debate takes place, IAEA representatives are in Iran having talks aimed at clarifying the possible military aspects of its nuclear programme. Everyone in the House is aware of the decades of failed negotiations, despite the best efforts of some Members present today, and the numerous Iranian breaches of the terms of the NPT. Iran is a signatory of the treaty and so is under obligations to comply with its terms, but despite that, Iran hid an enrichment programme for nearly 18 years. As a result, the Security Council has rightly decreed that until Iran’s peaceful intentions can be established it should stop all enrichment, and has imposed seven rounds of UN sanctions in the face of continued Iranian defiance.
The IAEA report sets out clearly that Iran is not complying with its international obligations and therefore the intentions behind its nuclear activities cannot be accounted for. Alongside the deception, secrecy and concealment that have characterised Iran’s relationship with the IAEA, the report for the first time highlights evidence to suggest that Iran is undertaking activities that could indicate a military dimension to its nuclear programme. To quote directly from the report:
“The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”
Following the publication of that most recent report, the IAEA board of governors passed a resolution expressing “deep and increasing concern” over the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and said it was “essential” that Iran provide additional information and access to the IAEA. We are right to heed the IAEA’s warnings.
Mr Baron
Can the right hon. Gentleman provide any evidence that the theory of nuclear deterrence would not be effective in this region, as it has been in others? India and Pakistan have fought wars and shown nuclear restraint. The evidence suggests that Iran is no more irrational than any other country. Can he provide the evidence to counter that assertion?
Mr Alexander
The environment in the middle east—the sectarian divides, the history of tension and its multifaceted nature—surpasses even that of India and Pakistan in its potential threat not just to regional security but to global security. It would be a very brave or very naive individual who, in the absence of the sorts of communication that were the foundation of our capacity to maintain peace over the 50 years of the cold war, presumed that we could feel confident that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, there would not be a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in the region. That is why it is right that the House try today to speak with one voice in urging on the Iranians a different course from the one implicit in the scenario that the hon. Gentleman depicted, which is the development of nuclear weapons.
Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth). I agree with a great deal of what he said. I am pleased to support the amendment that stands in his name and in the names of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and many others.
I also agree with quite a lot of what the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said in his opening remarks. It is rather a shame that in the wording of the motion and in some of his emphasis on the nature of the evidence that we have, he has almost extracted disagreement from potential agreement. In particular, he gave the unfortunate impression at times that he was searching for excuses for the Iranian regime, when none should be given. He concentrated a great deal on the difference between circumstantial and actual evidence, when the difference is between evidence for the existence of nuclear weapons, which I do not think anybody is asserting, and the clear evidence, which I think is in the IAEA report, of intent to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA is pretty clear about that and produces convincing evidence for that.
Mr Baron
May I correct the hon. Gentleman, for the record? He is wrong to suggest and almost alone in believing that I was trying to make excuses for the Iranian regime. I was making the point that mistakes have been made by both sides and opportunities have been missed by both sides, as has been acknowledged by speakers on both sides. As for his point about the report, there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and developing nuclear weapons and a decision to do so—something that is not recognised enough by the hon. Gentleman.
Martin Horwood
I agree with the hon. Gentleman about that important point, to which I shall return. He is right to emphasise the importance of evidence and that the international community on this occasion acts in response to and with proper observation of the evidence, by contrast with what has happened on other occasions. However, if we are going to trust the evidence of the IAEA, two things follow. First, we must believe the IAEA when it says that there are elements of the nuclear programme in Iran that can only be contributing towards the development of a nuclear weapons programme. If we are trusting the IAEA to produce the evidence, we must believe it when it says that. Secondly, there is the contrast with the situation before the war in Iraq, when we did not spend long enough listening to the evidence from the weapons inspectors, Hans Blix and his colleagues. In effect, military action pre-empted the end of the weapons inspection process. With hindsight, we know that there were no weapons of mass destruction present at that time, and we went to war, in my view, on a false prospectus. That is an important contrast to make.
There are other contrasts with what happened in Iraq and the more recent military action on Libya. The Foreign Secretary said there were three important characteristics to the military action that the international community took in respect of Libya: first, it had a clear legal and humanitarian justification; secondly, there was clear regional support; and thirdly, there was explicit UN sanction. All those features were present in the intervention in Libya; none of them was present in the intervention and the invasion of Iraq, which is why I am still proud that Liberal Democrats opposed that at the time; and those conditions are not present now in the case of Iran, either. That is why we should be clear that we should not be talking about an attack on Iran.
There is a further parallel with Iraq which is extremely important: that is, just how unpredictable military action can be. We all remember George Bush on an aircraft carrier in the Gulf rather prematurely celebrating victory in the war in Iraq, whereas as we know, it turned into an incredibly complex, costly and painful conflagration and insurgency, where allied troops ended up embroiled in an almost interminable series of interlocking and violent episodes. We must hesitate before we get embroiled in anything similar in the case of Iran.
The Foreign Secretary’s remarks over the weekend, which were clearly intended to discourage others from getting involved in such a potential conflagration, were well made. His clear messages to our friends and allies in the United States and in the region were similarly well made. It might well be that a military attack to get rid of a potential nuclear programme is impossible in practice. It might require a sustained campaign of bombing over a number of sites across the entire country. We know that the nuclear programme has been dispersed in Iran, so it would be a very dangerous undertaking in any case.
The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay was right: we should go the extra mile for peace. I want to make it clear that the Liberal Democrats believe that a preventive attack on Iran would probably be illegal and quite possibly unsuccessful, and it could destabilise the entire region and lead to the ignition of a war over which we would then have no control. As the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) said, it might well boost the likes of Hamas, Hezbollah and even al-Qaeda in the region and could undermine the fledgling democracies of the Arab spring and any potential for an equivalent Persian spring in Iran.
Martin Horwood
I wondered whether that would come up. That is the phraseology in the hon. Gentleman’s motion today, but it is not the phraseology that we used. We talked about opposing military action against Iran. That was written before—[Interruption.] No, it is not weasel words. It is about moving with events. It was written before the attack on the British embassy and before Iran, in effect, threatened the use of military force to close the straits of Hormuz. It would have been better to say clearly that we opposed preventive military action against Iran. That is why I do not support the motion, which rules out the use of force, apparently in any circumstances. We have minesweepers in the Gulf: if those came under attack, would we really rule out the use of force?
Mr Dodds
We have learned in recent years that each country is different and has different circumstances. Some of us might like to go back in time and take different approaches. We have seen different approaches to intervention in Libya and Syria, for instance. We are dealing with Iran, and I believe that there is an opportunity to do something to prevent Iran getting hold of nuclear weapons, but I believe that Iran, given its dire and direct threats against the state of Israel and its particular threat to the people of the entire world, poses a unique threat. We should be conscious of that and we must be prepared, if necessary, to do something about it.
I commend the bravery and courage of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay in proposing the motion, but I am afraid that its terms remind me of the motion that was once proposed in the Oxford Union—that this House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country. The word “appeasement” has been used. I think that the motion, if passed, would smack of appeasement. It is vital that we send out a strong message.
Mr Baron
I am giving the right hon. Gentleman an extra minute to wind up his speech, so I hope that he will smile upon me accordingly. The word “appeasement” has been used several times. A number of us in this House are former soldiers and have medals to prove that we are not appeasers. There is no doubt about that. We believe in the case for a just war. I have seen comrades killed by the enemy. The right hon. Gentleman must surely accept that the policy of sanctions and sabre-rattling that has characterised the west’s approach has failed. Iran will not step down, so is this not the right time for a fresh approach that recognises her regional status?
Mr Dodds
I am glad that I was able to give way to the hon. Gentleman just before the time limit. It remains to be seen whether the policy of sanctions and negotiations has failed, because we are in the middle of that process. I have the utmost respect for him and others who have served in Her Majesty’s forces and I fully respect his personal position, but that in no way detracts from the ability of others to describe the policy they enunciate in the terms we have used. The significance of the famous debate in the Oxford Union was the message it sent out to those in Nazi Germany who were following the policy. If the motion is carried tonight, this House will be sending a strong signal to the Iranian regime to carry on and aim for nuclear weapons, because we will do nothing about it. We need to send out a clear message that is the reverse of that, which is that we will not stand for that kind of approach.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
As my hon. Friend, who is often spot on, will know, Iraq is virtually a proxy state of Iran. That is a hugely important step for the world, because both countries combined have 19% of the world’s proven oil reserves, so instability in the region will lead to a real problem. That compares with a figure of about 7% in Kuwait and about 2% in the United Arab Emirates. To put it into context, the figure for the proven oil reserve in the hands of Iran and Iraq is very significant indeed.
The Iranian regime not only promotes instability and terror in its own country—the example was given of five executions only last night—but is one of the greatest exporters of terror around the world. I have always been a supporter of Israel, but I would shudder to live in Israel today, with Hezbollah from the Syrian state and Hamas from the Palestinian state. The Israelis are in a very difficult position. If war were to break out in Iran, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex that the proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, would become even more active than they are at present.
I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he said at the weekend that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could trigger an arms race in the middle east. One or two Members have disputed that, but we should look at history and the example of Pakistan and India. The moment one got nuclear capability, the other had to have it. If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia will probably do so, the Syrian regime, if it survives, will certainly want to, and perhaps other states in the middle east will, too.
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
I knew somebody was going to make that point to me, so I anticipated it. Of course Israel has a nuclear capability, although it has never acknowledged it, but the difference between Israel and Iran is that Israel is a stable democracy and Iran is an unpredictable country—under its current regime. That is not to say that under a future regime it will not change, but under its current regime I should not predict the circumstances in which it might or might not use such nuclear capability.
The whole essence of the cold war—Russia, America, Britain, France—was that none of us dared use nuclear weapons even if we had the inclination, which I am sure we never did, because we knew the destruction that they would cause, having seen it in Japan during the second world war. It is a huge thing to press the nuclear button, so, despite my hon. Friend disagreeing with me, I think that we have to be very careful about reaching such a situation with Iran.
The other point that I wish to make, in the rapidly shrinking time that I have this evening, is that I wholly support the efforts of my right hon. Friends in the coalition to bring about a diplomatic solution. That solution has to be backed up with sanctions, and I wholly believe that we must have the military option available to us when we go into the diplomatic negotiating chamber. I profoundly disagree with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd, because if we rule out that option before we have even completed diplomatic negotiations we will be in a considerably weaker position.
Of those three legs to the stool, we need to concentrate on sanctions, and the greatest role that the British Foreign Office—our Government, our Ministers—can play is to get some of our allies on side: to get Russia, China, Turkey and India all on side to make those sanctions effective. If the reports in the newspapers today are to be believed, and Turkey, China and India are participating in barter deals to get around our banking sanctions, that very considerably weakens them. I hope that my hon. Friends on the Front Bench take that point well and truly on board.
This country has always been very good at soft power. Our diplomatic service has always been the best and our British Council has always been the best, but in this situation one of the greatest contributions we can make to resolving the problem without the necessity of going to war—I cannot stress enough that I do not advocate war, which is the last thing we want to see—is, as the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said, to look very carefully at the BBC World Service. The BBC’s Farsi service can contribute a huge amount to the situation, and we should go the extra mile to ensure that it is not jammed, that we do not cut the service and that we broadcast the optimum number of hours on shortwave, over the internet and on television, for those middle class people in—
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
I was with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) for much of his speech until he reached the very end. The same is true of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I confess that I began the day rather sympathetic to his motion, largely because the preferred profession for many people in my constituency, as has been shown in many opinion polls—and this is true across many former mining constituencies—is the armed forces. I do not want to send more British armed forces—young people from the Rhondda—to go to fight in a war a long way from home that may have no discernible goal, and may have a very uncertain future. However, I did not find his argument persuasive. In fact, I found it the opposite of persuasive. I found it deeply unpersuasive and I will not be able to support him tonight.
This is not about whether we like or dislike the Iranian regime. I do not think there can be anybody in the House who likes the Iranian regime, perhaps because of its phenomenal and extraordinary use of the death penalty. It owned up to 252 cases last year but the figure is far more likely to be 600, which puts Iran second only to China, which is a much larger country. There are currently 143 people under the age of 18 on death row in Iran. It is a security state, in the way that the former Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, described the term in the late 1930s. It has laws against harming national security, against disturbing public order and also against insulting public officials. The regime uses them whenever it wants to repress dissent.
I found the hon. Gentleman’s argument about Israel to be naive. I would rarely use that term in the House, but a pedantic argument about the semantics of what Ahmadinejad said or did not say is neither here nor there. The truth is that there is a powerful body of opinion within the leadership in the Iranian regime which is wholly inimical to the success of the Israeli state. Whatever criticism I may have of Israel and its failure to adhere to United Nations resolutions and the rest, I believe that Israelis have the right to self-determination and to believe that they can live in their country in security.
Mr Baron
The hon. Gentleman should be a little careful with his words. I did not argue for one moment that there are not those within Iran—many within Iran—who loathe the state of Israel. There are many Arabs and Jews within the state of Israel who disagree with their own Government on many issues, but that cannot justify military intervention. He needs to be careful when he talks about naiveté. I would suggest to him that it is naive to pursue failed policies.
Mr Baron
I think it can safely be said that I have been in a very small minority in today’s debate, but I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for participating in it. The extent of the interest shown, particularly with a one-line Whip, has proved that it has been worthwhile, and there have been many interesting contributions. I remain of the view, though, that Government and Opposition Members have failed to address various points and have missed opportunities to better relations between Iran and the west.
The current policy of sanctions and sabre-rattling has failed. Iran will not be deterred, and yet the policy has brought us to the brink of military conflict. As most people accept, a military strike by Israel would be a disaster. It would unite Iran in fury behind the hard-liners in the country, it would not work because it would merely delay matters for perhaps a year at most, and it could lead to a regional war. Those who think otherwise are very wrong. Yet the Government and the Opposition keep the option of force on the table despite the fact that it would be disastrous, despite the fact that Iran ignores it, and despite the fact that it increases tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely. My contention is that by ruling it out we would reduce the tensions, bring ourselves back from the brink of military conflict, and give diplomacy a greater chance.
There has been no answer to my suggestion that the time has come for a fresh approach that recognises the status of Iran as a regional superpower. We need better to understand and engage with Iran. The precedent for this new relationship is Nixon’s rapprochement with the Chinese during the 1960s and 1970s; after all, China and the west had been at war in Korea just a decade before. The US needs to make it very clear to Israel that military action will not be acceptable. I saw no appetite for that in the House today, and I believe that we are missing a defining moment.
I hope that most of us, if not all, can accept that war should be the measure of last resort to be used only when all other avenues have been exhausted. My belief, by contrast with many of those who have spoken, is that we have not yet reached that point. I shall therefore oppose the amendment to my motion.
Question put, That the amendment be made.