Iran

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I must say that we need to examine these statements very carefully, because that translation too is open to dispute. It is all very well coming to the House with these translations, but Farsi is a complex language, as she will know, and we have to make sure that we get them right. Many scholars outside this place verify that President Ahmadinejad’s original statement was misquoted—theses have been written about it—which is why I ask the Foreign Secretary to clarify the situation. We need to get this quote clarified.

There can be little doubt that the west’s policy of sabre-rattling and sanctions has failed; the Iranians are not going to back down on their nuclear programme. Mr Mousavi, the unofficial leader of the green movement and one of the great hopes of the west, said during the 2009 presidential campaign that any backtracking on the nuclear issue would be tantamount to surrender. Iran’s statement that it is introducing an oil embargo for certain countries shows that it is impervious to sabre-rattling, yet we in the west still pursue that policy when confronting Iran. Indeed it is considered “naive”—I have heard that word used a lot—to rule out the use of force. We are told that all options must be left on the table. Some people go further: there seems to be a hairshirt auction among Republican candidates for the presidential nomination in America as to who can be toughest on Iran, with Mitt Romney openly advocating war over the nuclear issue. I would counter that by saying that what is naive is pursuing a policy that has clearly failed. Sanctions and sabre-rattling are yesterday’s policies and they have brought us to the brink of a military conflict, which is hardly the sign of success.

What compounds the error of that approach is that most agree that a military strike would be counter-productive to the point of being calamitous. It would reinforce the position of the hard-liners at the expense of the pragmatists within Iran, just as the Iran-Iraq war boosted patriotic support for the regime and helped to cement the revolution. Military intervention would not work; the US Defence Secretary judges that it would delay the Iranians for only a year at most. Knowledge cannot be eradicated by military intervention, and such intervention will only delay the inevitable. If Iran is set on acquiring nuclear weapons, she will not be scared away; and if she is not, a military strike would encourage her to do so. We even hear voices from within Israel against a strike. Meir Dagan, the hard-line former chief of Mossad—nobody could accuse him of being a pussycat—has referred to an attack on Iran as “a stupid idea.”

I ask hon. Members to reflect on a wider historical point. It is perhaps relevant to reflect more generally that military action often has an embedding effect: it reinforces the position of the existing regime. For example, communism has lasted longest in those countries where the west intervened militarily—North Korea, China, Cuba and Vietnam.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

My hon. Friend talks about the verdict of history. Is the verdict of history not also that when dealing with tyrannies it is unwise to rule out force in defence, and that sometimes it is wise to keep tyrannies guessing as to one’s intentions?

[Mr Baron]

Yes, although I suggest an exception: keeping an option on the table that heightens tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely is less worthy, and we have to examine that position.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

I have some sympathy with that view. I will argue that there have been instances where the regime in Tehran has come to judge where its own self-interest lies, and the continued pursuit of sanctions reflects that reality. That said, I sympathise with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s broader point about what is implicit within a relationship of deterrence. That is why, despite my appearance on the “Murnaghan” show on Sky television yesterday morning, I was rather restrained in my mild rebuke to the Foreign Secretary over his cold war analogy. He was more accurate in describing the potential risk of an arms race, but I would not say that the cold war is the perfect historical parallel. First, it involved a global struggle for supremacy, and it mischaracterises the threat that we are confronting in the middle east to suggest that there is a perfect parallel with a global struggle for supremacy. Secondly, it is fair to say that mechanisms were developed during the cold war that allowed for a peaceful resolution. In that sense, it was in some ways a prospect more favourable than that which we are facing now, unless we find a resolution as I have described.

I have been generous in taking a number of interventions. I would now like to make a little progress. What would I, on behalf of the Opposition, argue is the way forward? In my view, there has been too much discussion in recent days of possible military action and too little discussion of how diplomacy can still succeed. As one of my colleagues suggested, we must avoid talk of the possibility of military action becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our efforts must focus on how we can use all the diplomatic tools available to force the Iranian Government to change course. In the past, Iranian leaders have adjusted their behaviour in the face of international pressures—ending the war with Iraq in 1988 and stopping assassinations of Iranian dissidents in the 1990s are just some of the most significant examples.

Evidence is now accumulating that the sanctions are beginning to put unparalleled pressure on the Iranian regime. Sanctions in place for many years now on exporting materials relevant to the development of nuclear weapons have slowed Iran’s nuclear programme and directly hindered its ability to develop next-generation centrifuges. The combined effect of international sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, including steps taken by the Government last year, has triggered an enormous currency devaluation, which the regime is struggling to contain. The Iranian Government can no longer access reputable sources of international credit, insurance for its merchant fleets or investors for its state-led infrastructure programs. Crucially, Iran is struggling to find investors to revitalise its dilapidated energy infrastructure, which requires billions in new investment if production levels are to be maintained. Alongside that, the oil embargo, of which we have already heard a little, is increasing the strain on the Iranian regime even before the EU embargo comes into full force on 1 July.

Despite rejecting offers of talks in past years, Iran has now signalled that it is willing to resume talks with the E3 plus 3, and reports suggest that Iran’s supreme national security council replied last week to a letter from Cathy Ashton, on behalf of the European Union, inviting Iran to resume those talks without preconditions. Those are encouraging signs, but let me be clear that we must remain vigilant against the prospect of Iran seeking to draw out talks while continuing its nuclear programme unabated. The Opposition welcome the diplomatic steps that the international community has so far taken: the United Nations Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran in less than six years, and the EU, the US, and the UK Government and others have all taken important steps in recent months to increase further the pressure on Iran. However, despite those efforts, we have seen too little progress. What is needed now is a more concerted and co-ordinated international response. At this crucial time, it is vital that we remain focused on pursuing the twin-track approach, which remains our best route to resolving the crisis.

As we have heard, sanctions are not designed to punish the Iranian people. They are intended to increase pressure on the regime, and those pressures now seem to be mounting. This month, the Iranian Parliament voted to hold a special session to force President Ahmadinejad to account for some of the dire economic and social indicators in Iran today. Unemployment is high, growth is low and anger is mounting. The Iranian regime is beginning to show signs of doubt as to whether international isolation is simply too great a price to pay. Alongside that, parliamentary elections to elect new members of Islamic consultative assembly are due to be held in Iran on 2 March. They may offer yet another opportunity for the regime to change course and for a new leadership to steer Iran away from the brink of international isolation. The Iranian political calendar, the internal political dynamics, and the domestic economic and social pressures all imply that the next few months could be crucial.

The motion focuses on the use of military action, which has rightly been the subject of much debate in the House today. The risks facing the region are real, but I believe we must make it clear to our friends in Israel that now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike. However, notwithstanding our view that pre-emptive action should not be taken now, we are firm in our view that all options must remain on the table. That is because the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are enhanced, not undermined, by all options remaining on the table at the present time. Leaving all options on the table actually strengthens the international community’s hand in negotiations and therefore increases the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution, to which I believe the whole House is committed.

[Mr Leigh]

Wars often start because of an element of uncertainty, so let us be quite clear: notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition favour negotiations at this point, is it the Labour party’s position that we must not tolerate Iran being nuclear-armed?

[Mr Alexander]

I have said on the record previously that the cost of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is too high. I could not be clearer that this is an issue not simply for Iran’s immediate regional neighbours, but for the whole international community. That is why I am grateful for the Foreign Secretary’s gracious acknowledgment that the position being advanced by the British Government today is entirely consistent with the position that was advanced when Labour was in office.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brian Binley (Northampton South) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on his courage. I fear that my conclusions might mean that I cannot go through the Lobby with him, which is saddening. May I also pay tribute to Lord Corbett of Castle Vale, who sadly died very recently? He was a great contributor to debates on Iran, and I know that many Members of this House would wish to join me in saying how greatly he will be missed.

This is an opportune moment to consider Iran. The conduct and ambitions of the Government of Iran run counter to our interests and to the peace and security of the region. We must not lose sight of that fact. We therefore need a credible and sustainable response, and our actions should be based on the most up-to-date information and analysis. To my knowledge, that has sadly not been the case in the Foreign Office over the past 15 years—indeed, at a meeting with a previous Minister, who has now left this place, I was assured that the People’s Mujahedin of Iran had not renounced its pledge to give up weapons and fight for peaceful internal change in Iran. The fact that the Foreign Office was not in control and that it had that information in its hands six years after that position was stated and agreed is very worrying indeed. My hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) made the point that much misinformation has been accepted as information by the Foreign Office, which has been harmful to our cause.

I wanted to talk at length about the Iranians’ human rights record, but many others have paid heed to that problem. It is indeed a scar on the face of humanity, as we all know. We also know that the Iranian regime is not one that we can do business with as a trusted ally, and it never will be. We should, however, strive for robust and honest relations with Iran. There are Iranians who share that appetite for positive dealings. Sadly, until a few months ago our approach to them was variable. Our dealings with the PMOI and with Camp Ashraf are symptomatic of that weakness. As I said, the PMOI stated in 2002 that it was working for a peaceful transition to a democratic Iran, but that aim was not recognised. Ministers need to make decisions based on the best and most reliable information, but there have been serious concerns about the quality of analysis and the currency of the information available.

I remind Members that Camp Ashraf is home to 3,500 Iranian dissidents, including 1,000 women, living in Iraq. All members of the PMOI, they originally opposed the mullahs’ regime. The PMOI is the largest opposition group and the greatest thorn in the side of the present Iranian regime, as proved by the fact that more than 90% of the 120,000 political prisoners executed by the regime have been members of the PMOI. It is that group’s success in harnessing widespread support that engenders the hatred directed towards it by the regime. That is why the blacklisting of the PMOI was an initial Iranian precondition for participation in international talks in 2002. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) sadly acceded to that request as a result of attempting to appease Iran. The talks, of course, never happened.

[Mr Leigh]

No one doubts the courage of members of the PMOI, but how will attacking Iran help them?

[Mr Binley]

I will explain. My hon. Friend asks how looking at the case of the PMOI will help to resolve the Iranian situation. The truth is that cruelty and inhumanity have been visited on Camp Ashraf residents as a matter of routine by the Iraqis at the behest of Iran—the Iraqis have acted as Iran’s proxies. Ensuring that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr al-Maliki, and the Iraqi Government change their attitude, as they should do, would diminish Iran’s position in the middle east and weaken its role in the wider world. That is how changing attitudes towards the PMOI and to the people who live in Camp Ashraf can be of help.

This is not just a matter of a few thousand Iranian dissidents in Camp Ashraf, however. The situation raises fundamental questions about the entire region, and beyond. The al-Maliki Government’s flagrant disregard for human life, universal rights and international laws should ring alarm bells. When people see that the depth of cruelty and inhumanity following western intervention is not much better than it was under Saddam Hussein, is it any wonder that they are cynical about our motives and actions? When they see that the al-Maliki Government’s actions present him as a western-supported puppet of the Iranian regime, are they not entitled to ask why we sacrificed so much blood to achieve that objective? If we are to find an effective way to tackle the crisis of intransigence and hostility from the Iranian Government, it will not be done through examples of that kind.

That is why I call on the Government tonight to promise to act to ensure the removal of Iraqi forces from the perimeter of Camp Ashraf, to end the siege and to lift the ban on journalists, parliamentary groups, lawyers and families of residents entering the camp. Residents, particularly those who have been wounded, must be given immediate access to medical services in public hospitals. There must be an independent inquiry by a panel of jurists into the actions perpetrated at the camp. Residents should also be entitled to the return of their personal belongings. Such actions would, I repeat, immediately undermine al-Maliki’s role and position as a proxy of the Iranians, which would be in the interests of us all.

We have heard some bold attacks by the Minister of late, and they are most welcome, but I regret the fact that we have not pressed the United Nations to take action on Camp Ashraf. I look to the Minister tonight to say that we will do so, if for no other reason than respect for the lives lost in Iraq, which we should honour and can honour, by protecting the very people now under attack by the Iraqi regime. If we are to overcome the real threat of Iran, we must stop appeasing the regime as we are in relation to Camp Ashraf and the PMOI.

Following the failed adventures in Iraq, Iran is much more powerful. Threatening it with military adventures is not the answer, but we need to stop being weak in the face of the Iranian bullies and work with those best placed to bring about positive change for Iran, in Iran and by Iranians themselves—many of them young people who have a vision far more positive than Ahmadinejad and his supporters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

The hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) knows that I followed him into the Lobby to vote against the war in Iraq, doing so because I place great belief in the traditional concept of deterrence. I have never been a unilateral disarmer, but I have always been a multilateral disarmer and I always assumed that deterrence would work with Iraq. I must admit that I was not that prescient and that I, like everybody else, assumed that Iraq did have some sort of weapons of mass destruction and was astonished when none were discovered. But I did oppose that war and I have since visited Iraq, when I saw the agony of the country and of the mothers who had lost their sons; it is not just British troops who, sadly, lost their lives, but tens of thousands of people there. So I am with the hon. Gentleman on Iraq and I am also with him, to a certain extent, on Afghanistan—I have, again and again, questioned that. There is no doubt in my mind that the Taliban are remaining there and that there is a great danger that after the terrible loss of life of British troops we will end up with another Taliban Government. I believe that it was and is possible to keep their heads down.

[Mr Stewart Jackson]

We are neglecting to acknowledge that Afghanistan was the incubator for a violent jihadist, Islamist ideology that resulted in the deaths of 3,000 men, women and children on 11 September 2001, and we should not casually disregard that.

[Mr Leigh]

Not for a moment does anyone in this House casually disregard it. I have always argued that there had to be a means, through special forces or even through the limited use of air strikes, to have controlled a Taliban Government. However, I am with the hon. Member for Newport West so far and, to an extent, I am also with him and with others who opposed the Libyan conflict. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), and I also accept the argument that we should not assume that deterrence would break down if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s having a nuclear weapon would be of a different geopolitical order from what we were confronting in Iraq. Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a calamity, but a pre-emptive strike at this stage would be calamitous. Therefore, we are in an extraordinarily dangerous position. I do not need to say this, because it is so obvious, but as a Government we need to urge our American and Israeli allies to proceed with extreme caution.

There has not been a great deal of debate so far about what is actually happening on the ground. I do not accept the argument that all the evidence is circumstantial. The Fordow site has enriched uranium to 20%. Enrichment of 90% to 95% is required for weapons, whereas only 5% is required for less sophisticated civil reactors and more sophisticated reactors run on 3% or less. There is no doubt that this enrichment is for military purposes. I am not necessarily arguing that Iran would take the final step to acquire a capability to deliver these nuclear weapons, but I believe that we are in a very dangerous position.

An attack would be extraordinarily difficult. It would not be simple like the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981. As we have heard, the Iranian programme is geographically, as well as functionally, extensive. It includes not 15 sites, as was mentioned earlier, but up to perhaps 30 sites, which could not be destroyed in a single attack—it would likely take an air war lasting several weeks to do that. In addition, as we know, the Qom facility was kept secret. I do not believe that Israel alone could stop Iran’s nuclear progress; only America could reliably destroy the nuclear capability. The conclusion must be that Israel does not have the capability to attack effectively; it could wound but not kill, which might be the most dangerous thing of all. Israel does not have the capability and America does not have the will, and if Israel were to attack, it is plausible that Iran would retaliate against not only Israel, but, much more worryingly, Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is only 150 miles from Iran at its closest point and shares a maritime border with Iran along the length of the Gulf. There are only 258 troops from US central command in Saudi Arabia at the moment. General Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the elite revolutionary guard, has threatened retaliation, stating:

“Any place where enemy offensive operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran originate will be the target of a reciprocal attack by the Guard’s fighting units”.

There is no doubt in my mind that if there were an attack on Iran it would elicit an immediate and perhaps devastating response against Saudi Arabia. Israeli planes would experience problems, even in attack, and would have to overfly a combination of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia just to reach Iran.

Will economic sanctions work? We have to proceed on that basis, but they may not, which is why I come on to the second part of my speech. I am sorry that there is not a simple solution, but I cannot follow the hon. Member for Newport West in saying that we can do nothing—that we can accept the motion and rule out force and that somehow things will be all right. Yes, it is calamitous to attack, but it is even more of a calamity if that country acquires nuclear weapons.

[Paul Flynn]

Does the hon. Gentleman think that it would be better if he followed the example of Harold Wilson in Vietnam, rather than the example of Tony Blair in Iraq?

[Mr Leigh]

That is a very different situation, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying so. I am not sure that what was going on in Vietnam was a direct threat to us or to the whole region.

What happens if Iran acquires nuclear weapons? We cannot just dismiss that and say that deterrents would work. It is widely believed—and I think that it is true—that Saudi Arabia would acquire nuclear weapons very rapidly. Could we forgive it for doing so, if Iran developed a nuclear weapon? Saudi Arabia is reported to have made a deal with Pakistan on buying nuclear warheads in exchange for the substantial assistance that it gave Pakistan during its nuclear development in the 1980s. If the Israelis attacked, there would doubtless be a response from Hezbollah. Iran is perhaps the worst governed country in the region, because of strong ethnic identities and the opaque system of government we have heard about. No doubt there would be a confused and difficult response.

What is my conclusion from all those difficult conundrums? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, there is no good solution, there is only the least bad solution. I believe that any attack on Iran would have negative consequences for stability in the middle east in general, and would directly affect our allies in the region. Iran is extremely volatile, and it could easily overreact to provocation, so an attack at this stage would be disastrous. Any attack without American support would hinder but not stop the Iranian nuclear programme. My right hon. and learned Friend is right, however, that taking the possibility of an attack off the table would make Israel more likely to act unilaterally to retard Iran’s programme.

So what do we do? The only thing that we can do is continue with economic sanctions and be realistic about their likely impact; we must recognise Iranian concerns, and not engage in sabre-rattling; and we must recognise that it is a proud nation that feels that it is surrounded. All of that is very wise. We should try to take the issue off the boil and keep them guessing. That is why I am sorry that I cannot support the motion tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, as it would be wildly dangerous to remove from the table the threat of military action. It is not necessary to do so. As I said, when dealing with tyrannies—surely, this is the verdict of history—we have to keep them guessing.

The Foreign Office had a policy of keeping our potential enemy guessing in the 1930s, but ultimately that policy, too, was disastrous, because there was no certainty about our intent, which brings me to my conclusion that there should be no pre-emptive strike. We should keep talking, and keep them guessing. Ultimately, the Iranian regime must know that if it is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons, the west—namely America and Israel—will act at that stage, and must do so to defend all our freedoms and to defend stability in the entire region.