Iran

Paul Flynn Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

It is very straightforward. There has to be evidence of nuclear weapons. We were told, for example, that there was no shortage of circumstantial evidence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it turned out that there were no WMD there. That shows how careful we need to be and how clear we need to be about the difference between circumstantial evidence and concrete evidence.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of any IAEA evidence on Israel’s nuclear weapons programme?

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. In certain quarters in the middle east, it is felt that double standards are being applied in that Israel has developed nuclear weapons and the west does not seem to worry about them. [Interruption.] My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) suggests that the evidence is circumstantial, and I am willing to grant him that point.

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[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

That might be an option, but the political reality is that Israel has had nuclear weapons for 30 years and that has not led to Arab countries threatening seriously to develop their own nuclear capability. The reason the Saudis and others have reacted in such a hostile way to Iran is that they know that Iran is intent on geopolitical dominance in the Gulf region by being the only country of the Muslim world, other than Pakistan, to have nuclear weapons capability or the reality of it. I believe that we cannot rule out a military response because the potential for such a response must be part of the equation.

[Paul Flynn]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not want to accept too many interventions, for the reasons you have mentioned, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Thirdly, the use of force will never be a desirable response, but it might be the least bad one if all else fails. In considering that, let me put to the House what I think is a very important point. Many commentators have drawn attention to all the downsides of a military response. They suggest that an attack by the United States—let us concentrate on the United States at the moment—would lead to a hike in the oil price, which is correct. They suggest that it might lead to increased terrorist support by Iran for Hezbollah or Hamas and to attempts to block the strait of Hormuz and all that that would entail, and they are right. There are various other downsides, too. But, when we think about it, we find that almost all the examples—the correct examples that have been given—of the adverse consequences of a military strike by the United States are relatively temporary. They are short to medium-term: they might last a few days, weeks or possibly even months, but they would gradually cease to have any impact.

The alternative, however, of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is not temporary; it is permanent. Therefore, we have to come to—we cannot avoid coming to—a judgment. If diplomacy fails, if negotiations go nowhere and if sanctions do not deliver, we will at some stage still have to come to an honest judgment: whether the downside, which I do not deny exists, nevertheless has to be borne if the long-term objective is either to destroy or seriously to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability.

That brings us to a crucial question: would such action in fact do so? Do the Americans have the capability? That is ultimately a military question, and we are not privy to the military advice that the President may be receiving. If the advice is, “No, it wouldn’t,” it is not worth considering the option, but, if the advice is that we could either destroy or seriously degrade Iranian nuclear capability so that it is pushed back five or 10 years, that is a different argument.

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[Mr Straw]

I have had a serious problem in my right ear since 1981, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman that there is a very good consultant just across the river at St Thomas’s, on the NHS. I have been treated there for 30 years. I think it was within the hearing of the House and Hansard when, within about my first two sentences, I spelled out that I would support the amendment moved by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington. I apologise if it did not quite get as far as the bubble in which the hon. Gentleman sits.

[Paul Flynn]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the current situation is very similar to the prelude to the war in Iraq? Does he really think that going to war on the basis of what proved to be non-existent weapons of mass destruction was worth the loss of 179 British lives?

[Mr Straw]

The two are very different, and in any case I have already said that I do not regard us as being remotely close to the bar for military action at present. It is important that Members, particularly those who support the amendment, are cautious and do not get themselves into a lather, as some but not all did in respect of Iraq and other issues. It is very important to acknowledge the evidence.

If the House refers to paragraph 53 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report of November, it will see that it states:

“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”

However, it continues that information

“indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.”

The truth is that—until recently, we think—the major part of the programme stopped in 2003. It is my judgment, but no more than conjecture, that Iran’s aim has been to build up a nuclear weapons capability on paper, but not to turn it into a nuclear weapons programme. With respect to the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, there is a big difference between the two.

Finally, I urge caution. I hope that we hear less of the suggestion that were Iran to get a nuclear weapons capability, there would automatically be an arms race in the middle east. I do not believe that. A senior Saudi diplomat said to me, “I know what we’re saying publicly, but do you really think that having told people that there is no need for us to make any direct response to Israel holding nuclear weapons, we could seriously make a case for developing a nuclear weapons capability to deal with another Muslim country?”

This is a complicated issue, and we need a resolution to it. We need to ensure that the Foreign Secretary does not go into negotiations without options open to him, but I also believe that with sensible negotiations, and working with the United States, Europe and other allies, we can ensure that there is a peaceful solution.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing the debate and welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s policy towards Iran. I pay tribute to two distinguished predecessors of mine who have just spoken with the benefit of their enormous experience. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) made a compelling, almost unanswerable, case for his amendment and against the motion tabled by my hon. Friend. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), to whom I have often paid tribute in the House for his efforts to reach a rapprochement with Iran—I do so again today—spoke with his great experience of the difficulty of trying to arrive at an accommodation. I did not agree with quite everything he said, but he said many wise words about the current situation.

Iranian nuclear proliferation risks one of the most serious crises in foreign policy that the international community has faced in many years. As Iran moves closer to acquiring the capability to build and deliver a nuclear weapon, and as it continues its confrontational policies elsewhere in the world, that crisis is coming steadily down the track. Three years after Iran’s secret nuclear site at Qom first came to the attention of the world, it is expanding its uranium enrichment programme in defiance of the United Nations Security Council, and it is enriching uranium to 20% on a scale greater than that needed for a civil nuclear power programme. It remains in breach of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and it is not meeting the requirements of IAEA resolutions.

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay asked me to read the relevant extracts from the IAEA report of November. The right hon. Member for Blackburn has already referred to one of them. Paragraph 53 states:

“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”

The report goes on to make the points to which the right hon. Gentleman referred.

[Paul Flynn]

Does not the right hon. Gentleman see the danger that increasing tension between the west and Iran might well persuade it to expel the IAEA inspectors from its land, meaning that the transparency that we have now will end?

[Mr Hague]

First, it is of course not the IAEA’s view that Iran has been fully transparent. Indeed, it states in paragraph 52 of that report that

“the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”.

I hope the hon. Gentleman listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, who pointed out that it could very well be argued that adopting the policy prescribed in the motion would increase tension and the likelihood of military conflict in the near term. I certainly hold to that view.

Another part of the IAEA report says that

“in 2005, a senior official in SADAT”—

that is, the Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies—

“solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.”

A solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives can be found only in the core of a nuclear weapon.

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[Mr Alexander]

For the reasons that I have outlined and will continue to outline, I believe that it would be wrong to take those options off the table. When calibrating the way forward, one has to factor in the potential for change within the Iranian regime, given the prospect of elections next month. We are facing some critical months in terms of judgments to be reached in Tehran and elsewhere. That is why the responsible course at this juncture is to advance the twin-track approach that has characterised the attitude of the international community.

[Paul Flynn]

Does my right hon. Friend think that, although the Foreign Secretary rightly condemned what were probably terrorist attacks by Iran, he failed to attack incidents involving major explosions in Tehran, a cyber-attack against Tehran and the murder of four of Iran’s scientists? If we are to be taken as honest brokers, is it not right that we attack terrorism on both sides and insist on transparency not only in Iran but in Israel?

[Mr Alexander]

There is surely consensus on both sides of the House on the desire for a peaceful resolution to this crisis. That is why I argue that the strengthening of the sanctions regime to an unprecedented level is a necessary response to the growing tensions. All of us have an interest in a peaceful resolution.

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[Mr Llwyd]

The hon. Gentleman is right that that is the core of the debate. It is where he and I disagree. He may be right; I may be right. I know not, but this is the debate we are having. I do not pretend to be an expert in international law, but I heard it said that Iran will not be favoured; nobody wants to favour its position.

[Paul Flynn]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the immediate priority is to ensure that the present war of words does not deteriorate into a war of weapons, and that our task should be to reduce tension, not to increase it?

[Mr Llwyd]

That is absolutely right. I referred to sabre-rattling, and the hon. Gentleman puts it succinctly. That is not the way to have a diplomatic dialogue with any country.

We might not like the Government of Iran. Its human rights record remains appalling, despite reports last week that it is looking at revising its penal code. There are many Governments around the world, however, with whom we would not agree. Iran is a highly developed and complex society, and stereotyping makes it easier to demonise and create an atmosphere of fear based around simple sketches of society and the dehumanisation of those within it. It seems we have quickly forgotten the scenes in Tehran in 2009 when the green revolution was taking place and millions voted for Mousavi. Iran has a highly developed middle class, which often disagrees with Ahmadinejad. My point is to remind us all that the spirit of democracy is alive and well, and that when we make international judgments we should remember that the Government are not always representative of the views of their people.

As a party, we believe in being internationalist and in being committed to peace and justice. We are also strong believers in the importance of international law and diplomacy. We support the United Nations and we would like to see it strengthened. We reject weapons of mass destruction and military alliances based on the possession thereof. We support a role for the European Union in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. These, I think, must be our core aims, but as we speak, the drums of war are beating—and they are a ghastly echo of the run-up to the Iraq conflict. We must ensure that we do everything possible through every diplomatic means to silence those drums of war.

I hope that the IAEA’s mission in Tehran this week is unequivocally successful. With elections in Iran and in the US this year, we know that there is a lot of political mileage in talking tough and ramping up the rhetoric. Our role in this House, however, is surely to listen to the facts, make a calm and reasoned examination of the situation and scrutinise the actions taken on our behalf by our Government. I hope that every effort is made to pursue each and every diplomatic avenue vigorously in order to avoid war and the accompanying destruction of countries and lives. We should pause and listen to reason from informed observers.

One such person is Hans Blix, whose essay was published in the New Statesman of 20 February. He said that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the middle east was originally advanced in 1974 in a UN General Assembly Resolution sponsored by Egypt and Iran. That was obviously aimed at Israel. He continued by saying that

“the idea of an agreement between the parties in the Middle East—including Israel and Iran—to renounce”

nuclear weapons

“does not seem far-fetched to me”.

He went on to refer to a recent poll in Israel in which a substantial majority of Israeli people said that they thought it would be better to have no state in the middle east with nuclear weapons than to have two states with them. I commend this article to all those listening to this debate. I believe that the motion is consistent with the good thinking of that article.

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[Nicholas Soames]

I agree. I think that the Arab spring is a very fragile flower, and that we must guard it with great care.

The role of the British Government should be clear: we should encourage every effort to ease tensions, and, for our own part, try to repair diplomatic relations. In that regard in particular, our strong connections and relationships in Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are extremely important in maintaining stability and retaining peace in the region. We need to work alongside them, the United States and Saudi Arabia.

I hope that our Government will be bold, and will be prepared to explore—either with or without our immediate allies and if necessary, of course, in secret—the options for setting the choreography, which is always so critical in these difficult matters, of who does what and in what order. I remember well that, in the midst of the cold war negotiations with the Soviet Union, it was considered essential for us to develop confidence-building measures so that each side could convince itself, through some small but significant successes—that could convince everyone—that it was worth working with the other side, and thus allow diplomacy to bear fruit. We in Britain must remember those lessons.

Given the American elections on the one hand and the Iranian elections on the other, this is a good time to think about some specific steps that could be taken in regard to confidence-building. I am sure that the IAEA will have some very good ideas on the technical side, and perhaps we could promote a protocol to prevent “incidents at sea”. I believe that it is only a question of time before some ill-disciplined patrol boat sets off a major shooting match in the strait of Hormuz. Perhaps we could also co-operate in dealing with drugs from Afghanistan. Iran, the United States and Afghanistan, perhaps with specialist European Union help, might be able to work together on controlling the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan into Iran. We know that Iran is worried about that, and of course we are very worried about it too.

[Paul Flynn]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Nicholas Soames]

I will not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.

Whatever steps are taken, they must not loosen the sanctions regime or, indeed, involve a renunciation of the possible use of force, but must rather show that we are serious about progress and the possibility—if it could be there—of reaching a peaceful agreement.

I do not believe that Iran has any interest in outright war, whether with the United States or with the wider international community. In my judgment, its actions and reactions must be seen through the prism of coercion. It is applying what coercive tools it has—for example, the ability to restrict traffic through the strait of Hormuz, or the use of terrorist proxies around the world—in response to the west’s application of its own coercive tools, such as the escalation of sanctions. New sanctions will cause damage to Iran. They will almost certainly enrich its strongmen, but they will not directly affect the nuclear programme. Unless we are prepared to break out of the conventional approach, this dance will get worse and worse.

The Foreign Secretary and his fellow Ministers have re-marshalled and re-energised the efforts of the foreign service to the great advantage of this country, and are in the process of revitalising the new global networks that will in future constitute a global super-highway through which great diplomatic and international disputes will be settled. I was very impressed by the line taken by the Foreign Secretary tonight, and with the commitment that he showed. I appeal to him to ensure that we in Britain use all our resources, all our relationships, and all our influence and help—quite apart from our relationship with the United States of America, and our conventional relationships in the Commonwealth, the European Union, the United Nations and the IAEA—to get ourselves into a position in which we can at least agree on some future ground rules for engagement and progress in the future. I fear that, in the absence of such action, this dispute has the potential to have the most dreadful long-term consequences, and we must avoid those at all costs.

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[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

This House engaged in a war with Iraq that was based on non-existent weapons of mass destruction, and 179 of our brave British soldiers died along with an uncounted number of Iraqis. We remained in Afghanistan and went into Helmand on the basis of a non-existent terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from the Taliban. When we went into Helmand, two British soldiers had died in warfare and five more in other ways; having gone into Helmand, however, the figure is now 398. We are now in a position of stumbling into another war on the basis of non-existent nuclear weapons and non-existent missiles.

Some of us present when those decisions were taken vividly remember how the decision on Iraq went through this House—not on the basis of truth or evidence, but because this House was bribed, bullied and bamboozled into taking a decision that many thought was wrong. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) was one Member and the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) another who opposed that decision because the evidence was not there.

We should look at the evidence before us now of the threat from a missile in Iran with a range of 6,000 miles. Members will recall that we heard of this threat three or four years ago when America wanted to set up missile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians were quite rightly angry about this, but the pretext for it was the protection of the Russians and the Poles from missiles from Iran. It was a wholly implausible threat and we have not heard much of it since, but now that an election is coming up in America, the myth has been resurrected.

I claim some pedigree in opposing nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in Iran. I raised the subject in December 1992 in parliamentary questions—I shall not bore the House with the details—to the then Minister, Michael Heseltine. At that time, we were told that it was absolutely right to hand over nuclear technology to our ally at the time—the Shah of Persia.

One Conservative Member said, “We must still punch above weight.” Why? Punching above our weight means dying beyond our responsibilities. A young soldier from south Wales died last month, but he will not be counted among the 398 dead in Afghanistan. He was shot twice there and was slightly injured in two further incidents involving improvised explosive devices, but the event that destroyed him was watching his virtually limbless best friend die in his arms. He came back broken in mind, and last month he took his life.

We have lost 398 and at least 1,000 others are also broken in mind and body because we as a House decided that we wanted to punch above our weight in the world. That was our decision, and we cannot escape from it. The present Government and previous Governments have tried to minimise the extent of the bereavement and the loss. Those who have suffered because of this, the loved ones and the bereaved, will face an awful situation in the future. When the death toll reaches 400, which it surely must, although we all regret it, all the grief will be churned up again and there will be attention to it. To get the list of the dead on to the Order Paper requires 24 early-day motions, but what we should look at is what those people will see. Many of them were consoled by the belief that their loved ones died in a noble cause—that they died preventing terrorism on the streets of Britain. What conclusion will they reach when, in a few years’ time, we hand over the government of Afghanistan to the very people whom we said we were fighting against, to the very same threat? We will be handing it back to the Taliban.

The hon. Member for Northampton South (Mr Binley) was absolutely right. The effect of our intervention in Iraq was to replace one rotten, cruel, oppressive regime with another rotten, cruel, oppressive regime, and the result in Afghanistan will be the same. A bad regime, the Taliban, will go out, and we will replace it with what? With the Taliban again. It seems extraordinary that we have to behave as though we were still in the 19th century and that Britannia still rules the waves. We do not have to take on these situations. We do not have to be the Little Sir Echo to American policy.

There is an unsolved riddle in the House about how we have been represented. There was an investigation of the conduct of the last Defence Secretary that was alleged to constitute a breach of the ministerial code, but the investigation itself constituted a breach of the ministerial code because it was not carried out by the sole enforcer of that code, Sir Philip Mawer. He has resigned within the last couple of months and someone else has been put in his place. There is great concern that the person involved in this matter, Adam Werritty, who was the adviser to—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is about to return to the subject of Iran. I am sure that that is where he is heading next.

[Paul Flynn]

This is precisely about Iran, because it has been claimed that Adam Werritty and the former Secretary of State were in meetings with Israelis—indeed, it is a proven fact that at least five meetings took place—and that the subject of those meetings was Iran. That has been reported in many of our national newspapers. However, the investigation has yet to be carried out. We have seen a brief investigation by a civil servant who was not entitled to carry it out, and we have seen the resignation of the person who is the sole enforcer and who told a Select Committee that he believed that he, not Gus O’Donnell, should have conducted the investigation.

We have yet to find out what on earth was going on. Did we have a Secretary of State who was conducting his own foreign policy on Iran and perhaps bringing us closer to war? The Select Committee has yet to finish its report, but a fortnight ago I asked Philip Mawer’s successor, “If the Committee decides that you are not a fit person to take on this job”—because he has not shown the robust independence that is necessary to the job—“what will you do?” He said that he would relinquish his position. That has yet to be decided.

Finally, let me say that the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay deserves great praise for introducing the debate. He has already succeeded—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I call Mr Edward Leigh.

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[Mr Leigh]

Not for a moment does anyone in this House casually disregard it. I have always argued that there had to be a means, through special forces or even through the limited use of air strikes, to have controlled a Taliban Government. However, I am with the hon. Member for Newport West so far and, to an extent, I am also with him and with others who opposed the Libyan conflict. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), and I also accept the argument that we should not assume that deterrence would break down if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s having a nuclear weapon would be of a different geopolitical order from what we were confronting in Iraq. Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a calamity, but a pre-emptive strike at this stage would be calamitous. Therefore, we are in an extraordinarily dangerous position. I do not need to say this, because it is so obvious, but as a Government we need to urge our American and Israeli allies to proceed with extreme caution.

There has not been a great deal of debate so far about what is actually happening on the ground. I do not accept the argument that all the evidence is circumstantial. The Fordow site has enriched uranium to 20%. Enrichment of 90% to 95% is required for weapons, whereas only 5% is required for less sophisticated civil reactors and more sophisticated reactors run on 3% or less. There is no doubt that this enrichment is for military purposes. I am not necessarily arguing that Iran would take the final step to acquire a capability to deliver these nuclear weapons, but I believe that we are in a very dangerous position.

An attack would be extraordinarily difficult. It would not be simple like the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981. As we have heard, the Iranian programme is geographically, as well as functionally, extensive. It includes not 15 sites, as was mentioned earlier, but up to perhaps 30 sites, which could not be destroyed in a single attack—it would likely take an air war lasting several weeks to do that. In addition, as we know, the Qom facility was kept secret. I do not believe that Israel alone could stop Iran’s nuclear progress; only America could reliably destroy the nuclear capability. The conclusion must be that Israel does not have the capability to attack effectively; it could wound but not kill, which might be the most dangerous thing of all. Israel does not have the capability and America does not have the will, and if Israel were to attack, it is plausible that Iran would retaliate against not only Israel, but, much more worryingly, Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is only 150 miles from Iran at its closest point and shares a maritime border with Iran along the length of the Gulf. There are only 258 troops from US central command in Saudi Arabia at the moment. General Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the elite revolutionary guard, has threatened retaliation, stating:

“Any place where enemy offensive operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran originate will be the target of a reciprocal attack by the Guard’s fighting units”.

There is no doubt in my mind that if there were an attack on Iran it would elicit an immediate and perhaps devastating response against Saudi Arabia. Israeli planes would experience problems, even in attack, and would have to overfly a combination of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia just to reach Iran.

Will economic sanctions work? We have to proceed on that basis, but they may not, which is why I come on to the second part of my speech. I am sorry that there is not a simple solution, but I cannot follow the hon. Member for Newport West in saying that we can do nothing—that we can accept the motion and rule out force and that somehow things will be all right. Yes, it is calamitous to attack, but it is even more of a calamity if that country acquires nuclear weapons.

[Paul Flynn]

Does the hon. Gentleman think that it would be better if he followed the example of Harold Wilson in Vietnam, rather than the example of Tony Blair in Iraq?

[Mr Leigh]

That is a very different situation, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying so. I am not sure that what was going on in Vietnam was a direct threat to us or to the whole region.

What happens if Iran acquires nuclear weapons? We cannot just dismiss that and say that deterrents would work. It is widely believed—and I think that it is true—that Saudi Arabia would acquire nuclear weapons very rapidly. Could we forgive it for doing so, if Iran developed a nuclear weapon? Saudi Arabia is reported to have made a deal with Pakistan on buying nuclear warheads in exchange for the substantial assistance that it gave Pakistan during its nuclear development in the 1980s. If the Israelis attacked, there would doubtless be a response from Hezbollah. Iran is perhaps the worst governed country in the region, because of strong ethnic identities and the opaque system of government we have heard about. No doubt there would be a confused and difficult response.

What is my conclusion from all those difficult conundrums? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, there is no good solution, there is only the least bad solution. I believe that any attack on Iran would have negative consequences for stability in the middle east in general, and would directly affect our allies in the region. Iran is extremely volatile, and it could easily overreact to provocation, so an attack at this stage would be disastrous. Any attack without American support would hinder but not stop the Iranian nuclear programme. My right hon. and learned Friend is right, however, that taking the possibility of an attack off the table would make Israel more likely to act unilaterally to retard Iran’s programme.

So what do we do? The only thing that we can do is continue with economic sanctions and be realistic about their likely impact; we must recognise Iranian concerns, and not engage in sabre-rattling; and we must recognise that it is a proud nation that feels that it is surrounded. All of that is very wise. We should try to take the issue off the boil and keep them guessing. That is why I am sorry that I cannot support the motion tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, as it would be wildly dangerous to remove from the table the threat of military action. It is not necessary to do so. As I said, when dealing with tyrannies—surely, this is the verdict of history—we have to keep them guessing.

The Foreign Office had a policy of keeping our potential enemy guessing in the 1930s, but ultimately that policy, too, was disastrous, because there was no certainty about our intent, which brings me to my conclusion that there should be no pre-emptive strike. We should keep talking, and keep them guessing. Ultimately, the Iranian regime must know that if it is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons, the west—namely America and Israel—will act at that stage, and must do so to defend all our freedoms and to defend stability in the entire region.