European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [Lords] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWilliam Cash
Main Page: William Cash (Conservative - Stone)Department Debates - View all William Cash's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
As the House will know, the reason for the treaty change that the Bill approves is the crisis in the eurozone. That crisis was predictable and, in fact, predicted by some present in the House. The existence of monetary union without fiscal or economic union has led to severe economic strains in a number of eurozone countries and permitted the build-up of excessive debts by some members to an unsustainable level.
I have always opposed Britain’s membership of the euro, as Opposition Members will no doubt recall, not only because of the single currency’s flawed design, but because of the limitations that it would impose on our national democracy. I think that there is now near-national consensus that we are better off with our own currency; I say “near” because the Leader of the Opposition has said that Britain could join the euro if he were Prime Minister for long enough—a pretty good reason for not allowing him to become Prime Minister at all.
None the less, there are solid majorities in every national Parliament in the eurozone that wish to retain their membership of the single currency and see it restored to stability. They have their reasons for that, and we should respect them. Obviously, it is also crucially in our interests for the eurozone crisis to be resolved. As the—
It is a little early, even for my hon. Friend. In a few paragraphs, I will of course give way to him—probably more than once, I should imagine.
The Governor of the Bank of England has said that the crisis is casting a black cloud of uncertainty over our economy. Eurozone countries could take a number of measures to bring about a resolution, and the decision about which are the right ones is for them. One measure that has been decided is the European stability mechanism, a permanent financial assistance mechanism established by the eurozone for the eurozone, to help eurozone countries that get into difficulties. The amendment to article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union confirms the ability of the eurozone countries to do that. The simple purpose of the Bill is to approve that decision.
I am most grateful to the Foreign Secretary. Why in his own judgment and opinion is he prepared to invoke the exemption arrangements, the effect of which is to say that the matter does not really affect United Kingdom businesses, as was set out in the explanatory notes to the European Union Act 2011? Plainly, the implosion in Europe does affect us, and this failed attempt to put a sticking plaster on an increasingly impossible situation is simply making the position worse.
As the Foreign Secretary has set out, the context for this debate is the continuing crisis in the eurozone: the troika has yet to decide whether Greece has met its bail-out commitments; Spain appears to be on the brink of making a formal request for assistance; forecasters predict that the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Belgium will all miss the European Union deficit target next year; and there are serious doubts about whether Ireland and Portugal will be able to comply fully, with certainty, with the existing terms of their EU bail-out programmes. The need for decisive action by the eurozone is beyond doubt, and we believe that it is overwhelmingly in the British national interest that such action is taken.
Today’s debate, as we have already heard, relates specifically to the content of the European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill. As the Foreign Secretary has set out, member states agreed, following a meeting of the European Council in March 2011, to the amendment of article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, specifically to enable the creation of a permanent eurozone-only bail-out fund, the European stability mechanism.
We should recognise this as a major institutional development for the EU. It sets up an International Monetary Fund-type body for the eurozone on a permanent basis, replacing the separate intergovernmental European financial stability facility, which was agreed when the Greek emergency first broke. As this is a treaty within the EU-27 framework, any amendments or changes must be approved by the established procedures for treaty ratification in each and every member state, even though the ESM will apply only to those member states that are members of the euro. It is, therefore, unlike the fiscal compact, which, despite the Prime Minister’s so-called veto last December, Britain was unable to block, and over which this Parliament has had no say.
Indeed, the fiscal compact negotiated outside the EU framework by 25 members of the EU, without Britain or the Czech Republic in the room, establishes a completely new principle in European treaty ratification. It will enter into force when it is ratified by 12 of the 17 eurozone member states—a principle that, in our view, could work to Britain’s disadvantage in other contexts, and which is a direct consequence of not being in the room when such decisions are reached. The Bill, however, will lead to enabling legislation giving parliamentary approval to the European Council decision to establish a permanent eurozone-only bail-out fund.
Let me make clear the Labour party’s position on the Bill. We are legislating today not on the substance of the ESM, but only on the enabling treaty change to allow it to be set up. Labour recognises the need for that enabling measure, so we will support the Bill. A more stable eurozone is important for the UK’s long-term growth and prosperity. Indeed, as the eurozone accounts for more than 40% of our external trade, prospects for business investment and export growth depend on it.
On the claimed virtues of the single market, does the shadow Foreign Secretary accept that we have in fact run up the most monumental deficit with the other 26 member states of the EU, to an extent that it is now damaging our economy and thereby preventing this country from achieving growth?
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that if I were to draw up a list of what is damaging the economy of the United Kingdom at the moment, many items would stand above a recognition that the single market has provided British businesses with European markets constituting 500 million consumers. It would be perverse logic to suggest, at a time when we are struggling to secure growth in the British economy, that it would be to the advantage of British exporters or British businesses more generally to shrink the UK’s home single market from 500 million consumers to just 60 million.
A mechanism with sufficient firepower to restructure and recapitalise weak banks, and to bail out Governments who can temporarily no longer access the bond markets to finance their borrowing and debt, is a necessary part of bringing stability back to the eurozone, and a permanent bail-out fund is one key part of making that happen. However, the burden of responsibility for delivering that growth and prosperity must be taken by eurozone members themselves. In the establishment of the ESM, the European Council is making it clear that ultimate responsibility for ensuring the overall stability of the euro area rests with eurozone members. It will be a fund by the eurozone for the eurozone. That is clearly in the UK’s national interest, and we will not vote against a Bill that will allow the ESM to be established.
It is hardly a revelation that I strongly supported the five economic tests back in the years immediately following 1997, whether in relation to the convergence criteria or more broadly. In that sense, the Opposition’s position has not changed. It was an intriguing interpretation of history by the Foreign Secretary to attribute to his own conduct out of office so much credit for what the Labour Government did in office in keeping Britain outside the euro. However, he is right to recognise that there is broad consensus, which extends even to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), that there is no immediate prospect of British entry to the euro, for some of the reasons that my hon. Friend describes.
Let me be clear about some of the Opposition’s specific concerns, in a spirit of genuine concern about and mutual interest in the eurozone. First, we believe that the eurozone firewall needs to be bigger in scale and more flexible in operation than the ESM alone currently allows. Although the ESM is a key part of that broader firewall, an effective European Central Bank should also be used to enhance, and contribute to the establishment of, an effective firewall. Since the House last debated the matter, the ECB has announced its intention to begin buying bonds if member states comply with the relevant conditions regarding the management of their fiscal budgets. That is a welcome development, and we look forward to the ECB president Mario Draghi’s announcement this Thursday of how that new programme will work. The ECB must now deliver on its promise if it is to function properly as a lender of last resort and provide the necessary firepower to support the eurozone economies effectively under bond market pressure.
I am keen to make a little progress, but I will endeavour to give way to the hon. Gentleman in due course.
Secondly, stability in the banking system is vital, and where that requires action it should take place swiftly and with urgency. That is why we welcome the recent announcements about the ESM, which represent steps towards recapitalising weak eurozone banks. If responsibility for recapitalising national banks rests with national Governments, the problems of countries such as Spain risk getting worse, because state support for the banks will further worsen those countries’ fiscal outlook. We therefore agree that within the eurozone it makes sense for the ESM to be able to play a leading role in bank restructuring and recapitalisation. Although there is agreement in principle about that, it is vital that the eurozone begins taking action on it more urgently than it has to date. We cannot afford to wait for full agreement on a banking union before the process of recapitalising Europe’s banks begins. It needs to take place over the coming months.
The failure of eurozone members to accept fully the logic of a single currency must be addressed, and alongside a banking union some form of debt mutualisation may have to be considered. Simply put, creditor countries must be willing to shore up debtor countries in the short term if they are to guarantee their own stability in the long run. That may be a bitter pill for countries such as Germany to swallow, but it is the only cure for the eurozone as a whole.
I would not wish to intrude on the constitutional differences between the Chancellor of Germany and the governor of the Bundesbank. President Draghi bears a heavy burden of responsibility on Thursday to add detail to the terms of the guarantees that he was judged to have offered on the basis of his rhetoric at the previous press conference in the summer.
There is clearly a divide between those who, despite the economic facts, remain wedded throughout Europe to an austerity-only approach and those who recognise the need for a growth-led recovery alongside genuine efforts at medium-term deficit reduction. It is regrettable that our Government appear to be firmly on the wrong side of the divide. However, I welcome the fact that, at the last EU summit, a useful but modest growth package was agreed, although I regret that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom remained bound to the last to the old Merkozy-style approach.
As part of the new focus on growth across Europe, we support a significant increase in the capital of the European Investment Bank and the concept of infrastructure bonds to finance major capital investment projects. The European Union must also learn to use existing resources better without spending more. A genuine plan for growth must start with reform of the EU’s 2014-20 budget, which, at more than €1 trillion, has the potential to make a real impact on the European economy’s recovery by spending less on agriculture, more on infrastructure, small business growth and research and development, and better using the money currently spent through existing EU structural funds.
Alongside those targeted measures to stimulate growth, the Government should call for the completion of the single market and the digital and energy markets. Completely removing existing obstacles could translate into a 7% increase in incomes per head in the UK, according to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Further integration could therefore provide a genuine and much-needed boost to growth.
The Bill is living proof of the Alice in Wonderland Euro-fantasy that permeates every nook and cranny of the failed European project.
Decisions, which were taken as long ago as 25 March 2011, when we last debated the issue—shortly afterwards, several of us voted against the proposals on a deferred Division—cannot and do not work. It is as simple as that. There is simply not the money to go round, as I said when I had the opportunity of cross-examining the Prime Minister at the Liaison Committee well over a year ago.
It may be very fine to provide a quack remedy to make the Euro-integrationists feel that something is being done, but the proposal, which Mr Van Rompuy and the European Council described as
“ensuring the stability of the euro area”
is as effective as taking a dose of snake oil to hold off the consequences of an economic earthquake.
A Harris opinion poll this week on whether the measures will deal with the debt crisis in the eurozone showed that only 15% in the United Kingdom were confident that they would have any effect. That applied to only 25% in France, 33% in Italy, 20% in Spain and 24% in Germany. That is the most recent opinion poll on the effect of the proposals in the eyes of the voters, not the Governments, élite or establishment in each of those countries, let alone many others.
Of course, we all know that Germany holds the key to the eurozone. As I said in interventions on the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary, Jens Weidmann, the increasingly realistic and sceptical president of the Bundesbank, stated only a few days ago that, as I have often said, intervening in the bond market is effectively breaking the no bail-out rule, which was set up under Maastricht—I foretold that it would not work—and prohibits the ECB from financing Governments and states. He said that if the Governments of the eurozone become dependent on the power of the ECB, they will never do anything for themselves, that it would be like pouring money into a black hole and that it
“can become addictive like a drug”.
The use of article 122, which the Foreign Secretary attempted to argue around—somewhat disingenuously, I say with respect—breaks the law. The European Scrutiny Committee said that, to all intents and purposes, its use was illegal—not that it was not needed, but that it was illegal. It is there for dealing with natural disasters and earthquakes, not economic problems.
The hon. Gentleman is making his usual case that the use of article 122 was illegal. That may be his view, but it was clearly being used for the European financial stabilisation mechanism and therefore posed a liability for this country. Surely he must welcome a Bill mechanism that allows a treaty that reduces our liability. The new ESM will not include Britain, and we will not have that same liability. As a good Europhobe, he should support the Bill.
As a Euro-realist, I am glad we will no longer be liable under the European financial stabilisation mechanism, but that does not exonerate the arrangements that were made by the then Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, and by the current Chancellor, not to mention the Business, Innovation and Skills Secretary. In May 2010, as the former Chancellor makes clear in his book, they were all involved in endorsing the decision on the transitional arrangements between the outgoing Government and the current one. The illegality is shared by all members of the previous and current Governments.
My hon. Friend ascribes responsibility to a number of politicians, but what about the role of Sir Jon Cunliffe, our permanent representative in Brussels at that time? He had a key role in the matter, and since that time has been promoted.
My hon. Friend and others have pursued that relentlessly and still have no real answers. The truth of the matter is that a number of things were done at or around that time that many people now rather regret—let us put it that way. The fact that the EFSM is now described as “not needed” is disingenuous because people know perfectly well that it was illegal. That is not just my opinion—I make this comment to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood)—but the one reached by members of the European Scrutiny Committee as a whole in the light of what we heard.
May I make a plea to my hon. Friend and to my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless)? It is one thing to criticise Ministers or Government policy on the European Union, but will they please not direct criticism directly at named officials, who serve Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Ministers loyally and to the best of their ability in the impartial tradition of the British civil service?
I am delighted that my right hon. Friend makes that point and I endorse it as a general principle, but instances occur periodically that require a certain amount of investigation and analysis. I did not entirely endorse the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) in as many words, but I agree with him—and with others—that, at the time in question, decisions were taken that people now regret. I am glad that we have moved on from article 122 to the present European stability mechanism.
First, may I identify myself with both the spirit and substance of the remarks offered by the Minister for Europe? Secondly, before the hon. Gentleman proceeds with his speech, does he accept that, notwithstanding his demand for continued investigations, one of his colleagues has perhaps fallen into error in suggesting that the named individual was the permanent representative in Brussels at that time? I think, in fact, that his predecessor was in post at the time when the decisions that are being discussed were reached.
I cannot possibly comment, as they say, on that particular point because I am not aware of all the circumstances. Although mistakes were made, the point regarding the ESM is far more important. I accept that the EFSM is now in the past, but it was an unfortunate incident and all parties involved were culpable of allowing it to be endorsed as a proposal—it remained effective for far too long, with obligations on the United Kingdom and its taxpayers.
The individual concerned was a senior official in the Treasury at the time—I was referring to his current position. The Europe Minister and the shadow Foreign Secretary have supported what their senior officials in a number of positions say, but if the House had had the chance to scrutinise the individual concerned, and if either the European Scrutiny Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee had been able to determine his appointment, we might be in a different position.
We have probably gone through that in as much detail as is required or necessary on this occasion. My point is that it is not the case, as the Foreign Secretary and the papers to which he is religiously sticking state, that article 122 arrangements for the EFSM are no longer needed. That is not only disingenuous, but verging on something much worse. It is not just a question of them not being needed, but I will leave it at that for the time being.
The real question is on the problems that will emerge in practice from the continuous stream of payments and bailouts, putting heads in the sand and the complete abnegation of reality. It is clear—the most recent edition of The Economist indicates as much—that the euro will turn into a soft currency with high inflation. The general secretary of the CSU, the Bavarian party that makes up part of the coalition in Germany, accuses the European Central Bank—this is a far worse accusation than any regarding the EFSM—of becoming
“the currency forger of Europe”.
There are profound reasons for that accusation, which is made by one of the most senior members of the German coalition. I could spend a fair amount of time going through technical and legal points on the European Act 2011, the exemption conditions and the opinion of the Foreign Secretary, but the issue is much more serious than treading through the maze of legalities created by the Act. This is about the substance of the manner in which the European Union functions and fails.
I shall come to the attitudes of German voters later, but it is important that people throughout Europe recall, as Germans do, what happened in the 1930s and subsequently. The economy’s implosion and high inflation—evidence that the economy was completely out of kilter with reality—ultimately led to disaster and the emergence of Hitler from the Weimar republic. Those things are brought to mind by the CSU general secretary’s accusation that the ECB is becoming
“the currency forger of Europe”
to provide the scale of bailouts contemplated under the Bill and the treaty. Massively high inflation is caused by printing money when a country does not have it on the basis of how it runs its economy. No wonder only 24% of more than 1,000 German voters polled had confidence in the short-termism that such measures represent.
Angela Merkel is certainly bidding for a new European treaty—it has not been received with enthusiasm, but the treaty issue has not gone away. In December, there is a fair chance that she will come back for a new treaty that will effectively create yet another step towards political union. We know perfectly well—it is no longer taboo, although I have been saying it for the best part of 25 years and it is now reality—that Germany is now moving further and further towards political union, which it will largely dominate, although more and more Germans are against the bail-outs, even to the point at which, as The Economist suggested last week, Mr Weidmann is now seen increasingly as Angela Merkel’s Thomas à Becket, having been one of her most loyal supporters. This is a very serious matter, but the shadow Foreign Secretary simply does not see it. I asked him whether he agrees with Angela Merkel or with Mr Weidmann because that is what is at the heart of this Bill.
The worst of it is that in fact it is not going to work anyway. Mrs Angela Merkel knows that Mr Weidmann is right on economics, but she has her own agenda of political union as the centrepiece for the destiny of Germany, as she has repeatedly argued. It is not just Germany. Spain is rapidly following Greece over the euro cliff, with Italy not far behind, not to mention the continuing problems in Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and a stack of other countries. It is even now becoming a problem in respect of the individual provinces in Spain—Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and other regions are lining up while Spain dives into a double-dip recession. There simply is not the money to pay for the catastrophe that the European economic system has created.
Does the hon. Gentleman not think it odd that we should lecture the eurozone about double-dip recessions when we are in one ourselves, created by the Government whom he purports to support?
That is a very nice little intervention, because the reason we are in a double-dip recession—in so far as we are—is, first, the massive deficit that the hon. Gentleman’s Government left us with. Secondly, for reasons that I will explain, it is because of the massive deficit—as I said to both the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary—that the European Union has with us. We are in such incredible deficit with the other 26 member states that it will be impossible for us to gain out of the 50% of our trade with them the growth that is needed to enable us to come out of recession and grow our economy.
I was disappointed, to say the least, that the problems with the eurozone were not even touched on in the exchanges between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Andrew Marr yesterday, when everybody knows that the failure of the UK economy is partly because of the deficit we inherited, but also because we cannot grow with a bankrupt European Union, with the exception of Germany. Indeed, half of our deficit with the other 26 member states is our deficit with Germany alone. So we have to be conscious that this is a real problem that needs to be resolved, and this Bill will do almost nothing except damage our economy.
Greece is currently in the throes of an EU-IMF economic investigation. One can almost hear the words of endorsement from the EU and the IMF before they have reported. I will be very surprised if they do not try to find some way to muddle through. As with the Bill and, I am afraid to say, the Government’s policy on Europe, real EU reform is off the agenda, as is a referendum.
The hon. Gentleman is very free in his criticism of the IMF—
I beg your pardon, Mr Deputy Speaker. I will try to do better.
The hon. Gentleman is free with his criticism of the IMF and the EU and everyone else, but may I ask him a basic economic question? If not this, what? Does he advocate the chaotic disintegration of the eurozone? Does he ask the Germans not to seek guarantees for the finance they are providing for other European economies? Does he suggest that there should be no legal framework behind the necessary steps to tackle structural deficits in the eurozone countries? I can think of nothing that would more surely damn the whole European economy, including ours, than a chaotic disintegration of the eurozone.
Again, I am grateful for the intervention because back in the 1990s during the passage of the Maastricht treaty—and I say this without any sense of self-satisfaction—I predicted that this is where we would end up. Massively high unemployment, riots in the streets, the rise of the far right and the implosion of the European economic system were all predicted in the Maastricht treaty debates. It is there in black and white. It is no good now saying that because those of us who took that position and made those predictions then were right that, somehow or other, we should say, “Well, that is just the past. Let us not worry about the present.” We are looking towards the future and we need to have an association of nation states based on the principle of consent by the voters, who have already expressed their views in repeated opinion polls and are denied referendums.
Does my hon. Friend recall that almost exactly the same lines of argument and descriptions were applied back in 1990 to the same prophecies about the UK exit from the exchange rate mechanism?
Indeed, although it is known by others as Black Wednesday. However it is described, it saved our economy then.
To come back to the unemployment that has been inflicted by treaties that are not meant to be changed—the single currency is regarded as irrevocable—the youth unemployment level in Spain has moved beyond 52%, as it has in Greece. Other countries are moving in the same direction and the quack remedy contained in these bail-out provisions does not have enough snake oil in the bottle to make it even half realistic.
There are those, such as the coalition Government, who claim that under the arcane procedures of section 4(4) of the European Union Act 2011, we should vote for this arrangement because it will solve the euro crisis and—miracle of miracles—will not affect us. That is but a harrowing indication of the pain of hopelessness in the face of proven experience. There have been at least 20 economic summits in the past 24 months and not one has come up with a rational solution. All they ever do is promise more and more money that they do not have, with the implicit assumption that if they do not have it they will print it, and break the rule of law—the law laid down through the European Union that we implement under the European Communities Act 1972. Although we are not members of the eurozone, it certainly affects us, and it certainly affects the other European countries.
The explanatory memorandum to the 2011 Act, which I and many other colleagues here voted against, put down amendments to and did everything in our power to prevent from passing, because it simply was not going to work, stated that
“an Article 48(6) decision does not apply to the UK merely”—
I repeat “merely”—
“because it may have consequences for individuals or organisations within the UK, such as UK businesses.”
Believe it or not, that is given as a reason why a referendum is not required—because it would “merely” have an effect on UK businesses. That is on the astonishing grounds that although it has consequences for the daily lives of our voters and their small and medium-sized businesses, it is a mere detail that under the 2011 Act the Government can swat away with reference to “the opinion of the Foreign Secretary”. And that opinion cannot be properly challenged. Anyone who knows anything about administrative law knows that where an Act of Parliament states, “In the opinion of”, it effectively bars challenge in judicial review. I would be extremely surprised, therefore, if it was possible to set up a judicial review—I noted that the Foreign Secretary said that none had been forthcoming. People might well assume that because those words are in the Bill—it has not been enacted yet—there is no point in seeking to upset it because it will only have effect when it becomes an Act of Parliament.
The legislation goes further. Clause 1(3) explicitly states that the decision taken by the European Council on 25 March 2011 does not warrant a referendum, on the spurious grounds that it is the view of the Foreign Secretary, whose opinion once given cannot be effectively challenged, irrespective of the consequences for voters and UK businesses. I certainly concede that we are not part of the eurozone or directly contributing to the bail-out, but what is happening is having a devastating impact on our growth.
As I said in reply to an intervention a few moments ago and as I clearly demonstrated in an article I wrote for The Daily Telegraph on 14 August, I simply do not subscribe to the view that changes in planning law and ever-more Keynesian attempts to boost public spending will do anything if we do not sort out the problems with the single market. We are trading a monumental deficit with the EU, and it is doing immense damage to our economy. Trading with the EU is now like trading with a bankrupt company. The Bill will allow the drug of continual bail-outs, so heavily criticised by the President of the Bundesbank, with the involvement of the ECB, to drag Europe into an ever-deeper maelstrom. To then pretend that it does not affect us, when 50% of our trade is with the EU, is economic and political nonsense on stilts, which is why I voted against the proposals in 2011. Since then the situation has got worse and worse.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, with whom I nearly always agree, for giving way. However, if Europe is determined to follow an economic policy for the eurozone that is completely idiotic, there is no referendum in this country that could stop it. So I do not see what a referendum on this subject would do.
I am merely arguing that, given the consequences of the mistakes being made and the damage they are causing to our economy, in the light of the 50% trading, we need to renegotiate the economic governance of Europe. The consequences of our not doing so would take us into the same kind of deep black hole that it is already in. I did not say, at this juncture of my speech, that I thought that a referendum on this issue would necessarily produce all the answers to that question. I am committed to the idea of a referendum on more general terms—with respect to the EU as a whole—but I take my hon. Friend’s point on that particular issue. I insist, however, that the European project needs to be renegotiated into an association of nation states, not unlike the European Free Trade Association in the EU, based on the principle of consent. That issue should be the subject of a referendum on the broader landscape of the direction in which the EU is taking us.
The explanatory notes to the Bill state that the exemption condition is met if the Bill, as enacted, states that the decision is not within section 4 of the 2011 Act. In other words, under the Bill, everything is fine, whatever the consequences, if Parliament is foolish enough to state in the Bill that what is patently absurd can possibly benefit the voters of the UK. I have pressed the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Europe for about 18 months on the proposals in the Bill. It is impossible for me to understand why a referendum on the broader landscape of the EU is not provided for, and I cannot understand why the Prime Minister continually reaffirms his commitment to this failing, unreformed EU project. I know that many other Members agree with me.
By the same token, as the UK appeases the EU and Germany, so Germany pushes up the ante of a radical vision of deep fiscal and political union for the EU as a whole, while the ESM evolves into a full European monetary fund. That is why I argued in my article that we must refocus our trading relationship. The shadow Foreign Secretary referred to the single market as the answer to our questions, although I admit that he qualified that by saying that other things needed to be done, but, among those things, as I said in a pamphlet I wrote last year called, “It’s the EU, Stupid”, we have to refocus our trading relationship with the rest of the world, given the massive deficit that exists between us and the member states, half of which is with Germany itself. We have real options for trading with the Commonwealth and the Americas. Indeed, last year alone we ran a surplus of £36 billion with the Americas, yet the Bill re-endorses the nonsensical view of Europe adopted by the Euro-elite, and our acquiescence in the Bill is part of our failure.
Only recently, 41% of German voters indicated to YouGov that they wanted to return to the deutschmark, and similar indications are growing in other countries, but with them are also growing dangerous moves towards the far right, which I constantly warned would be the consequence of breaking the rule of law in Europe and of creating the kind of situation we now face. Europe is in the throes of a massive schizophrenia, and at stake is not only the stability of democracy in Europe but of the stability of our democracy. In Germany and Ireland, the ESM is being taken to the courts—to the German constitutional court at Karlsruhe and to the European Court of Justice in respect of Ireland. I have to say, however, that past references of this kind give us little confidence that the legal route will solve the problem.
The rule of law, on which this whole edifice is based, is constantly being broken, not only on the article 122-EFSM basis but in respect of the stability and growth pact, which was broken by Germany and France in 2003. This is a challenge not only to the interests of the UK and other member states but to the rule of law in Europe as a whole. I most strongly urge the Government not to proceed with this Bill, and as it proceeds I will strongly urge all Members of Parliament to vote against it.
The treaty should have been vetoed, just as the Prime Minister rightly vetoed the fiscal compact. The figure of €500 billion or so that is being proposed has simply been plucked out of the air. Most serious commentators believe that the current crisis in Spain, Italy, Greece and elsewhere would need at least €2 trillion, and probably much more, yet it is simply not there. Given the evidence of the continually evolving euro crisis in those countries, €500 billion-plus—some suggest that the figure could be €700 billion—is peanuts compared with the billions that are wasted and is inadequate to deal with the problem that this failed European economic governance has created. It is about time that we put our foot down in this Parliament, because the issue affects those whom we represent in their daily lives and we increasingly gain so little from our deficit with the single market. In pursuit of their failed ideology, the euro integrationists call for more and more Europe, however much the problem lurches from one disaster to another. That is not remorseless logic; it is a remorseless path to disaster.
It is said that under the European Union Act 2011 a referendum is not required unless it involves a new power or competence affecting the UK. What does it take to hold a referendum when a Bill actively encourages the European Union to implode, with dreadful consequences not only for Europe, but for the United Kingdom?
I would simply say to my hon. Friend that Britain is not bound by the ESM; it is very clear that only eurozone member states will be affected. Is it proportionate for us to stand in the way of those countries that are wrestling with and trying to decide what is going to happen with the euro? Is it proportionate for us to block that particular tweak to that treaty? I just do not feel that it is. I agree with him in that I want renegotiation and I want it, at some future point, to be put to a referendum. However, we need to pick our battles and pick our moments, and I think it is wrong to nit-pick over what I would regard as a small change.
My hon. Friend was kind enough to say that he agreed with my general analysis of the problems that have led, through the treaties, to the difficulties that the European Union as a whole now represents. That explains why giving more money to this particular fund and doing it in this manner is likely to exacerbate the deep black hole that has already been created. It affects us because we trade so much with the European Union.
My hon. Friend makes a point that I was going to deal with. I simply return to what my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) said, as I do not think that by blocking this Bill we are going to stop the ESM. Other countries will continue, because they have decided that they need to do so to try to save the euro.
We also need to give the Government and the Prime Minister credit when they achieve things and make progress. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone and I would like to see faster progress made and a renegotiation sooner rather than later, but we should give the Government credit where they safeguard British interests and improve on the situation we inherited. We should not blame our own Government for the mistakes the previous Labour Government made. They engaged in sloppy negotiation, and, as a result, we ended up with the former arrangements in the EFSM. The situation has now been improved with the ESM and we should support that.
I might have agreed with my hon. Friend that the general sense of direction would lead to the conclusions he has drawn, but is he not conscious of the fact that Angela Merkel is now proposing a new union treaty—full political union and all the panoply that goes with that—which is likely to come forward in December?
It may come forward, but there will be better opportunities than this Bill to pick the moment to have that negotiation. This is not the Bill or the issue on which to say to other European countries, “Unless you give us a full-scale renegotiation, we are going to veto the proposal.” It is disproportionate to take that approach in this instance.
So much for the areas on which we disagree. I want to come on to some of the areas on which we are probably in agreement and to echo some of the points made. There is a big question about whether the ESM will be a solution to the crisis, or even part of one, and there is also doubt about whether there is any solution to the crisis gripping the eurozone. Although, as the Foreign Secretary said earlier, the polls in all the countries in the euro consistently show their wanting to stay in the currency, in reality they do not want to take the decisions or accept what the euro inevitably entails. That is where the real problem lies.
Let us consider Germany, for example. It is undoubtedly benefiting at the moment, almost freeloading on the other member states and enjoying a lower exchange rate than it would have if it had its own independent currency. The Germans have kidded themselves into believing that it is all down to German ingenuity and marvellous engineering, and granted they have made some improvements in their labour market and sorted out some of the structural problems in their economy in the past decade, but German industry is undoubtedly benefiting significantly from having a lower exchange rate than it would otherwise have. Meanwhile, countries such as Greece and Spain do not want to do what the euro entails in terms of fiscal discipline and so on. They have spent, borrowed a fortune and shown a complete lack of prudence over the past 10 years. Although such countries say that they want the euro, they do not want what the euro means, which is a real problem.
We should not stop member states trying to save the euro. If they want to save it and want to make that attempt, let us let them do it. I think the most likely scenario, however, is that the euro will be partially broken up and some member states will be allowed to leave it. Although I can understand that the Government would not want to entertain any such talk or to spook the markets by commenting on that idea—I do not expect the Minister will do so when he wraps up the debate—I hope that they are developing some serious contingency plans for handling a break-up of the euro, whether it is orderly or disorderly. Despite all the rhetoric when the euro was introduced about its ending volatility and being all about stability and stable growth, we might find that the conditions for stability and stable growth are best created by floating exchange rates, which can help countries adapt to shocks to their economies and changes in the world economy as well as to transition when things go wrong.
I was in the anti-euro no campaign and worked for it for four years, and I remember that a decade ago, when that debate was going on, many people who are now on the Opposition Benches—the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), who is no longer in his seat, was one of them—accused us Eurosceptics of putting our heads in the sand and of saying, “Stop the world, I want to get off.” Who are the people who have their heads in the sand today? Who is in denial about the realities, particularly the financial realities, of the world in which we live? The fact is that the euro was an incredibly stupid idea. It was introduced only through a triumph of political belligerence on the part of people such as Chancellor Kohl and François Mitterrand over economic reasoning.
Economists at the time pointed out all of the problems that have come home to roost. They warned that there was a lack of convergence and that that was not just about the cyclical convergence of one’s economy and the levels of growth but, more fundamentally, about structural convergence, the make-up of one’s industries and the differences between economies. They were ignored. They warned that we would get asymmetric shocks to the world economy that would hit some countries worse than others, which would cause tensions in the euro, but they were ignored. They warned that to work properly the euro would require fiscal union and fiscal integration, that it would require very painful long-term adjustments in the absence of an exchange rate that could help people through those adjustments, that countries on the periphery would face prolonged periods of high unemployment and would be forced to cut wages, and that we would have to accept large migrations of people within the European Union from deprived areas to areas that were succeeding under the euro. Those warnings have all come true, but they were all dismissed at the time.
The final thing that everybody pointed out when the euro was debated was that we needed political union to make the euro a success, so that there was clarity in decision making. That has been proved right, too, because despite the warning from those on the pro-euro side that we would not have a seat at the table, all we have at the moment is 17 member states around a table squabbling and unable to reach a clear and coherent decision. That is one reason the euro continues to limp forward.
We need to learn the lessons. Why were all those economists ignored? Why was there so much mindless, blind faith in the idea that the euro was somehow historically inevitable? We still see that from some Members on the pro-euro side. The lesson we must learn is that nothing is inevitable. It is not inevitable that the euro will survive, but nor is it inevitable that it will collapse. The idea of ever closer union is certainly not inevitable any more and it is not inevitable that Britain will always be alone as the only country on the outside talking sense. I think it is quite likely that we will gain allies and that our ideas will start to gain traction.
There was a failure under the previous Labour Government and the truth about new Labour is that an unquestioning pro-Europeanism was almost an article of faith. Anti-Europeanism was blamed for the fact that they were not elected during the 1980s and that association was targeted at people such as my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), with whom I have campaigned on this issue many times. That perspective on Europe was very unquestioning and unprincipled. It was simply a political line to take, with no intellectual rigour, and it led to Tony Blair and the previous Labour Government simply going with the flow on whatever emerged on the European agenda.
This Government have made a very good start. The European Union Act 2011 was much more significant than many people on the Government Benches give it credit for, but we need to develop it and to build on what has been achieved to forge a new doctrine for the future of the European Union. That doctrine must end the dogma of ever closer union and encourage the idea of a multi-tier Europe—a pick-and-choose Europe where countries are able to adopt the policies they want and withdraw from those that they do not like and do not work for them. Too often in the past, we faced the problem of people saying that we would not have enough allies to make a point because there were not enough countries to support us. We need to leave such attitudes behind, because unless we begin the debate now we will never end up in the right place. We should be articulating a proactive vision of an alternative European Union, which does not require deeper integration in one direction.
I start by thanking all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in the debate. To the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) I say that I will be happy to send her a copy of an article that I published in The Sun on Sunday earlier this year, which set out in good, plain English the case that I have consistently made for a constructive, critical and engaged approach by the United Kingdom in the European Union.
As several hon. Members have said—especially my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg)—it is important to note that we are debating this initiative to change the European Union treaties in the context of a debate on primary legislation. In an earlier intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) questioned whether the European Union Act 2011 had made any difference. He was correct to state that in the case of treaty changes that were agreed before 2008, treaty amendments could be approved here only through primary legislation, but in 2008 the law was changed. At the same time as the Lisbon treaty was being taken through by the then Government, they provided in section 6(1)(a) of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 that all that would be needed henceforward to approve the use of the simplified revision procedure would be for each House of Parliament to approve a Government motion without amendment.
As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset pointed out with characteristic acuity, there is a considerable difference between the kind of detailed examination and debate that takes place on the Floor of the House during the various stages of proceedings on primary legislation and the brief 90-minute or two-hour debate on a motion tabled under the provisions of the 2008 legislation. I would hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends, whatever our differences on one or two other matters to do with the EU, would acknowledge that the 2011 Act has made an important and significant difference in restoring the central role of Parliament and, in particular, the Chamber of the House of Commons, as the place where things as important and significant as European treaty amendments can be considered in full. The disgrace is that the 2008 legislation sought to take those powers away from Parliament in the first place.
Before moving to the content of the Bill, I want briefly to respond to some of the points made by hon. Members during the debate. I turn first, of course, to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East said that she had returned from the summer break feeling invigorated and ready for the European fray once again. I have descended from the mountains of Snowdonia full of enthusiasm and relish to debate with my hon. Friend once again. I agreed with a fair measure of his analysis, and I think that most of those who contributed to this debate, from whatever party, agreed that the euro was created without sufficient thought being given to ensuring the stability of the single currency area, given that there was not the degree of fiscal, economic and political integration normally expected in a currency area.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone warned in stark terms that the current eurozone crisis contained not only profound economic risks but significant—he would probably say dangerous—political challenges, and he has been consistent in arguing those points. I am one of those survivors on the Government Benches who has vivid memories of his contributions at 5 o’clock in the morning during proceedings on the Maastricht legislation in 1992-93. I agree that the crisis facing the euro presents the eurozone countries with important political as well as economic challenges. If it is agreed to centralise or co-ordinate decisions on some of the fundamentals of economic policy, it also has to be decided how those decisions, which are so important to the citizens of the countries concerned, are to be made democratically accountable. There is, then, a political, as well as an economic challenge, for our friends and neighbours in the eurozone.
It would be foolish, however, for British politicians to assume that the leaders and voters in other EU member states will necessarily respond to those political challenges in the same way as the UK electorate might be expected to do. Each European country has its own historical experience and economic and geographical particularities to take into account.
Let me take, for example, the conversations I had with members of the Governments of the three Baltic republics during my visits there. One of the things that they were keen to make clear to me was that although they certainly valued and cherished their hard won independence—the reclamation of their freedom—they also saw the integration of the European Union not as a threat, but as a way to entrench their European and democratic identity, so that never again could they be pulled back towards an eastern alignment or towards Russian influence, which they still feared, for understandable historical reasons.
Let us take Germany, which is a very different case. Where I parted company with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone was when he spoke of Germany. I do not think it was his intention, but some of the phrases he used came across in such a way as to present Germany as somehow having sinister intentions towards the rest of Europe. However, whenever one speaks to German politicians, from whichever political party they come, what one finds striking is that they see support for European integration as a means of providing reassurance to their neighbours that Germany is not going to go off on some nationalist course again; that France, the Netherlands and other countries that were occupied by Germany in the mid-20th century would see Germany’s commitment to European institutions and European methods of governance as a reassurance to them, not a threat.
If I may make just a short observation about my right hon. Friend’s remarks, it is, fundamentally, that in my judgment Germany is very concerned about government by rule, whereas we in the United Kingdom are much more concerned about government by consent. The fundamental problem is one of democracy, as illustrated by the fact that about 99% of the Bundestag agreed to all the arrangements, yet we know from opinion polls what percentage of the German people take a different view. It is that dichotomy which causes concern, and there are other factors in relation to Angela Merkel’s agenda.
I do not want to get drawn into a detailed debate about a comparative political analysis between the British and German approaches. Let me say briefly to my hon. Friend, first, that when Germany looks at her history, she has good reasons for looking to firm rules and strong institutions, such as the constitutional court. Secondly, it is not completely unknown for the House of Commons to vote by a large majority in favour of something that every opinion poll tells it the majority of the British public opposes, so I do not think we should get too hung up on there being some vast difference in democratic interpretation between the two nations.
Ultimately, it has to be for the electorate in each country to decide on the extent to which they want to take part in integration. My experience over the past two years of talking to Government leaders and other politicians in the other 26 countries, as well as following—as far as one can—the movement of opinion among the public in those countries, tells me that there is a greater level of support or toleration for Europe’s political and economic integration than there tends to be in the UK. I am generalising, of course, and there are significant differences among the 26 countries, but the historical experience of the United Kingdom in the 20th century differs from that of much of continental Europe, which helps to explain the difference in political attitudes towards European integration.
Various hon. Friends have raised a number of points during the debate, to which I wish to respond. My hon. Friends the Members for Stone and for Rochester and Strood both asked why the measure that we are debating today should be exempt from the requirement in the European Union Act 2011 for a referendum. The Act requires a referendum to be held when European Union treaties are changed in such a way as to create a transfer of competence or power from the United Kingdom to the European Union. The plain fact is that, as my hon. Friends the Members for Stroud (Neil Carmichael) and for North East Somerset pointed out, this measure does not transfer any such power or competence from this country to the institutions of the European Union. It does not even apply to the United Kingdom.
The amendment that we are debating is an amendment to article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, which is the first article under chapter 4 of that treaty. That chapter is entitled “Provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro”. So, in that important legal treaty sense, this measure does not apply to the United Kingdom, although our ratification is needed to bring it into effect. Because it does not apply to us and does not transfer power or competence, there is no requirement for a referendum.
My two hon. Friends have made other related comments, to which I would like to reply first. If they then wish to intervene on me, I will give way.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone and the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) said that the referendum pledge in the 2011 Act was meaningless because my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary could, in effect, decide on a whim whether a referendum was needed or not. They made reference to the requirement in the Act for the Secretary of State to make and publish a decision on whether a referendum was required. Those fears are wide of the mark, however. The Secretary of State is not permitted to act on a whim; he has to act in accordance with the law, and it is the 2011 Act that sets out in some detail precisely when a referendum is required. In making the statement to Parliament, the Secretary of State must say whether the referendum is or is not required under the terms of the Act.
My hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood, in asking why no referendum was required in this case, pointed to what he saw as a contradiction in the Government’s approach. I need to divide my response to him into two parts. Paragraph 3 of the recitals or preamble to the decision of 25 March 2011 formally recalls the previous decision by the European Council that article 122(2) would no longer be needed and “should not be used”. The text of the decision comes after paragraph 6 of the recitals and is introduced by the words “has adopted this decision:”. The text of the amendment to the treaties is what is being ratified by this Bill. So the 2011 Act bites on the amendment to the treaties, which is the narrow addition to article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. This measure would attract a referendum if it included one or more of the elements listed in sections 4(1) to 4(3) of the 2011 Act. Those subsections, which provide quite a long list, define what we mean by a transfer of competence or powers. This treaty amendment does not include any of those elements that require a referendum, so we do not require a referendum in this case.
I appreciate that my right hon. Friend is in a labyrinth and that it will take more than the minotaur to get him out of it. The problem is that, as the Bill’s explanatory notes clearly state, the exemption condition, which is what we are talking about,
“is met if the Act”—
the Bill, as enacted—
“providing for the approval of the decision states that the decision does not fall within section 4 of the Act.”
The bottom line is that the Government’s ultimate defence that they have got the process right is that under the Act the very decision that is taken is endorsed by Parliament when it passes the Bill; it is not about whether or not the provisions have been complied with. Clause 1(3) states that the
“decision does not fall within section 4 of the European Union Act 2011”.
In other words, we are being told, “Do not argue with me Back Benchers, because in this Act, when it goes through, that is final.” That is the bottom line of this provision.
That part of the Bill is included because it is a requirement of the 2011 Act that we bring this to Parliament to ask it to ratify formally the Government’s judgment as to whether or not a referendum is required. However, that judgment by the Government—that opinion embodied in the statement by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary—followed a very careful analysis of the treaty amendment in the light of the provisions of the 2011 Act. Obviously I regret bitterly that I have clearly been unsuccessful in playing the role of Ariadne to guide my hon. Friend out of a labyrinth, but I somewhat suspect that he is not that keen to extract himself from it. The one thing he has not challenged me on is whether the treaty amendment contains any of the transfers of power or competence to the European Union from the United Kingdom specified in sections 4(1) to 4(3) of the 2011 Act. I am sure that we will have the delightful opportunity of pursuing those points further in Committee.