Chris Leslie
Main Page: Chris Leslie (The Independent Group for Change - Nottingham East)Department Debates - View all Chris Leslie's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move amendment 9, page 41, line 27, at end add—
‘(2) The Chancellor shall review the bank levy and publish a report, before 31 December 2011, on—
(a) the Government’s analysis behind the rate and threshold chosen for the bank levy;
(b) the adequacy of the bank levy in the context of other reforms to the wider banking system; and
(c) the total tax revenues expected from banks across all categories of taxation in each year from 2011-12 to 2016-17.’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.
We find ourselves in the Committee stage of the Finance Bill, a rather large two-volume measure that, over the coming two days on the Floor of the House, we will no doubt explore in some detail. The Bill will then progress upstairs to Committee, where more detailed scrutiny will take place.
It is a peculiarity of Ways and Means resolutions and of the way in which proposed finance legislation is scrutinised in the House of Commons that hon. Members who are not Ministers may not table amendments to Finance Bills that would have the effect of raising the level of taxation. That was news to me, perhaps because I was in government and did not think about tabling such amendments, but the rules of order are as they are, so the amendment does not propose—because we cannot—an increase in the rate of the bank levy. Instead, it calls for a review of the rate and the general approach to bank taxation adopted by the Treasury. It seeks to look into the rationale behind the rate that the Treasury has chosen for the bank levy and why a number of other choices were made.
Does my hon. Friend agree that in setting the rate the Government missed an opportunity? The bank levy could have raised significant sums to help with the other policies that we hoped they might pursue.
Indeed. Were it possible under the rules of order for the Opposition to table an amendment to increase the bank levy rate, we probably would have done so. However, we were unable to do so because of the slightly arcane rules of order. We need to examine the rationale behind the rate chosen by the Minister and understand why the Government moved from a threshold approach to triggering the bank levy, to a tax-free allowance of a certain amount before which banks would pay against the chargeable liabilities of the bank levy.
We also need to understand whether the bank levy is, as my hon. Friend suggests, an adequate step when considered in the context of the wider economy and public finances. Ultimately, we need to understand whether the Treasury is being straight with the public and honest about the taxes that the banks will pay over the years ahead. We have debated the Government’s approach to the banking sector before, and we look forward to the final report of the Vickers commission on the state of competition and regulation of the banks so that never again can these institutions take such extreme risks and gambles that land in the lap of the taxpayer when the going gets tough, as they did before the credit crunch.
The Government are seeking to take £2.5 billion in revenue from the tax that they have imposed, but has my hon. Friend assessed the corporation tax reductions that the banks will experience, which are thought to be £100 million this year? Has he projected the figure by the end of the Parliament? Can we arrive at a net figure to see the real impact of the Government’s policy?
My hon. Friend makes an extremely prescient intervention, because the Chancellor, under pressure from the Opposition, had to cave in to a concession on corporation tax in the March Budget. The Government announced the bank levy last June, so we knew that they would be introducing this tax, yet the corporation tax cuts will clearly benefit the banks significantly. The Treasury claims that in the March Budget it offset the benefit that the banks will apparently get as a result of the reduction in corporation tax rates, but we will have to wait to see whether the slight increase in the bank levy—around £100 million—introduced in the Budget will be sufficient to offset the full corporation tax cuts that the banks will enjoy over the lifetime of this Parliament. I recall that the written answer to a question I tabled on the predicted benefits to the banks of the corporation tax reductions suggested that that would be about £100 million in year one, £200 million in year two, £300 million in year three, and so on, but that largely reflects the reductions in corporation tax rates. That is something of a moot point, because we contend that the design of the bank levy is insufficient. Today’s debate should provide an opportunity to seek proper redress for the crisis and ensure that we put the banks on a fair tax basis, but that is not what the Government are seeking with this pathetically small bank levy proposal.
It is indeed, and that is the crux of the argument that we will make to try to encourage hon. Members to support our amendment. The overall situation is that taxation levels on the banks are reducing, not increasing. The previous Administration introduced a bank bonus tax, which yielded more than £3 billion in revenue. The bank levy needs to be put in place alongside a bank bonus tax, which would be a fairer approach to take. However, the Government are refusing to continue the bank bonus tax, and I would like to hear their rationale for not doing so.
In defending the bank bonus tax and the revenue that would have been raised by continuing with it, what allowance has the hon. Gentleman made for increasing levels of legal tax avoidance by those no doubt skilful bankers who would have been keen to avoid paying tax under that regime?
If the reason the hon. Gentleman refuses to advocate a repeat of the bonus tax is that the bankers might have sophisticated accountants who can avoid it, that is a pretty poor state of affairs for this Parliament. We ought to be introducing fair and just taxation on the obscenely high bonuses that are still being paid. Even though it is supposedly claimed in Project Merlin that the bonus pot has come down by 8%, we can see that the bonuses are absolutely enormous. Today’s debate is clearly about priorities. The Government are not on the side of families, teachers, nurses, working people or pensioners. Clause 72 shows that they are on the side of the highest-earning bankers who receive each year in bonuses sums that ordinary people dream of winning on the lottery once in a lifetime.
Would my hon. Friend be interested, as I am, to find out exactly what the financial value is to the financial services sector of the now implicit Government guarantee that it enjoys? If anything, that should point us towards greater recompense to the taxpayer for that implicit Government guarantee.
The ongoing implicit taxpayer guarantee for the banks is very significant. Indeed, I understand that the Bank of England has suggested in its financial stability reports that an implied subsidy of about £100 billion each year offers a safety net for the profitability of the banks. Without that taxpayer guarantee, banks’ borrowing costs would be higher, they would not be able to make such great profits and, therefore, their remuneration and bonuses could not be so high. Many bonuses and excessive profits are being made on the back of the taxpayer, but does that encourage the Treasury to take action? It certainly does not.
At a time when Roger Bootle of Deloitte reports that for the first time for four years in a row the real incomes of real people are falling, does my hon. Friend not think it particularly peculiar that the real incomes of bankers—of all people—are likely to rise?
My hon. Friend is entirely right, and that is why we have to take a step back and look at the context of today’s debate. The Government are clearly still on the side of the big banks at a time not just when the living standards and wages of ordinary people are being frozen or reduced, but when vital public services are being slashed. Indeed, it is worth reminding ourselves of the consequences of the cuts that the Government are pursuing.
Teaching assistants, youth workers, library staff and lollipop ladies are being made redundant; binmen, street cleaners, environmental health officers and park keepers are disappearing from our neighbourhoods; police detectives, forensic scientists, 999 operatives and police community support officers are no longer affordable in the fight against crime; and hospital cleaners, nurses, paramedics and ward clerks are having their posts eradicated when the NHS needs them more than ever. How dare Ministers say that we are all in this together when they take such a weak and feeble approach to the banks.
My hon. Friend seeks to use an argument based on contrast, but there is also an argument based on causality. In his remarks, it has to be made clear that the causal relationship between the misery that some people will suffer over the next few years and the actions of some bankers is very real. There is real disquiet in the House about the Government’s proposal not just because some people are doing well and some are doing less well, but because, given that contrast, there is a causal relationship for those people doing badly.
Absolutely, and, as we have heard time and again, Government Members clearly do not understand the causes of the deficit, so they are not the right people to solve it. If they understood and acknowledged that the banks played a significant role in causing the deficit, maybe—just maybe—we would take up their suggestions on how we go forward, but they choose to ignore the role that the banks played—[Laughter.] If the hon. Members for Chippenham (Duncan Hames) and for St Austell and Newquay (Stephen Gilbert) think that the banks did not play a role in the deficit, we will all be interested to hear from them, but surely they have to acknowledge that point.
The bonus pools and pots continue to be significant, however, and some bankers receive obscene, life-changing sums of money, so we do not really need to worry too much about poor banking executives; we should worry about those who depend on vital services but will now go without as a result of Ministers’ choices.
I have only just understood the criticism from Government Members. The criticism of the bankers bonus levy, however, which the previous Government introduced, was that there would be tax avoidance and it would not raise enough. I attacked the former Chancellor on the bonus levy, because I felt that his estimate of £500 million was pathetic and did not go far enough, but may I now admit guilt? It actually raised seven times that amount, £3.5 billion, so it was probably one of most successful tax regimes that the previous Government introduced. I thought I had better get that off my chest.
My hon. Friend’s arguments become increasingly attractive, and he makes an important point. The bank bonus tax, which the previous Labour Government introduced, appeared at first to be modest, but in fact the yield was very significant indeed. Did the banks collapse as a result of the bonus levy? No. Did they all flee abroad to relocate somewhere else, as threatened? Absolutely not. So, too, with the continuing scale of the bonus pot, which has hardly changed at all, it is absolutely right that we look to reinstitute the levy this year, along with a decent bank levy, as we are discussing today.
Hon. Members will know that the concept of a bank levy was first developed at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in 2009, and then championed by my right hon. Friend the former Prime Minister and taken forward by the International Monetary Fund in its report, which aimed to encourage less risky funding to enhance financial stability. Two broad conclusions were reached at the Pittsburgh summit. There was a call for a financial activities tax, or financial transactions tax, which we need to debate another time when we consider some of the extra levies that might be put on activities. The Chancellor of the Exchequer himself still professes to be in favour of a financial activities tax, although he has done absolutely nothing to advocate it in ECOFIN or in other financial meetings around the world, so we will see whether anything comes of his repeated promises to pursue it.
The second prong of the IMF’s report was a financial stability contribution, otherwise known as a bank levy, to be charged on equities and liabilities rather than assets or profits because of the need to disincentivise dangerous potential charges such as those that landed on the taxpayer during the credit crunch. The bank levy is a sensible idea in theory, and we broadly support it. However, the yield suggested in the Bill—only £2.6 billion—is not just small but pathetic by international standards when compared with the rate being pursued in other countries. It is perplexing that Ministers settled on that figure, and there has never been any evidential basis published for why they did so. Will the Minister clarify why the Chancellor chose the figure of £2.6 billion, as that seems to be the pole around which all aspects of the bank levy revolve? If there is any sense in which the revenue might go beyond that envelope, the Treasury tweaks and turns down the dials on the other aspects of the levy to squeeze it back into that £2.6 billion of revenue—the predetermined level that it put out to consultation last summer, never explaining why it was set. Compared with the substantial amounts of taxpayers’ money put up in the bail-out of the banks—£76 billion of shares purchased in the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds, £250 billion of guarantees, another £280 billion of other insurances, and a further £100 billion of annual implied subsidy, according to the Bank of England—a £2.6 billion bank levy is very puny.
It is interesting to look at the Treasury document that lists the respondents to the bank levy consultation. There were 44 respondents, all of which are major financial institutions.
Did the hon. Gentleman respond?
I will respond to the Minister when I have heard his comments. If he wants me to respond again, I am more than happy to have Government time dedicated to the general principles of bank taxation.
The responses showed that the Treasury’s original design for the bank levy had a threshold that triggered payment of the levy for any organisations, institutions or banks with more than £20 billion of equity and liabilities. Ministers realised that that would yield £3.9 billion—nearly £1.5 billion more than the Treasury had expected—which, by the way, would be more than enough to reverse all their police funding cuts, for example. What did the Chancellor do when he realised that the Treasury’s own design for the bank levy could yield £3.9 billion? Did Ministers think that this might be something they should go ahead with? Absolutely not—they gave in, capitulated, and converted the threshold into a tax-free allowance of £20 billion. Hon. Members will know that the Liberal Democrats have long made great play of the increase in personal allowances, which is pretty much the only thing they are getting out of the coalition as they cling on to it, and there might be a few hundred pounds in that here and there. How about having a tax free allowance of £20 billion? That is what they have decided to give the banks. The banks now do not need to pay on their liabilities below that amount.
Would my hon. Friend also contrast that with the £7 billion that banks and financial institutions are paying out this year in bonuses?
Indeed; the machine rolls on. We will have to look at the detailed papers on Project Merlin when they emerge. The Chancellor supposedly persuaded the banking sector to change its ways. Of course, things have fallen apart at the seams since then. As I will say in a moment, some of the bonuses are still, frankly, obscene.
If we accept the Government’s ludicrous argument that they were worried about the cliff-edge marginal rate of the levy at £20 billion of chargeable liabilities, why did they not keep that trigger but have a smaller allowance, perhaps of £10 billion or smaller? But no; they caved in straight away with the £20 billion allowance and lost a phenomenal opportunity to redress the balance of the tax burden in this country. The Americans, who have not yet triggered their bank levy, have named their version a financial crisis responsibility fee. That says more accurately on the tin what it does. They have done so because it is incumbent on the institutions that caused the crisis and the consequential fiscal deficit to do their duty and pay back what they owe the taxpayer.
Is it not amazing that we are talking about a minute bank levy when hundreds of thousands of public sector workers will lose their jobs, and when those who stay in their jobs will see their pay frozen for two years and their pension contributions go up by 50%, all as a result of the failure of the banks? The Government parties think that that is okay.
It is a crying shame that there will not be more publicity for this debate; perhaps the complexity of bank taxation is difficult to report, for whatever reason. If people knew about the Government’s weakness in trying to claw back the money that is owed to the taxpayer and their enthusiasm for cutting public services and raising taxes on ordinary people, they would see that it is a scandal.
Of course, the Liberal Democrats advocated the opposite of that before the general election. Obviously they had good, sound reasons to change their view rapidly over a weekend.
Will the shadow Minister say how much tax he thinks should be imposed on the banks, and how he would go about doing it?
As I said, we would repeat the bank bonus tax that we instituted last year, and we think that the bank levy needs to be more substantial.
The Government’s original design suggested that it would yield £3.9 billion—that was reported in The Observer, I think, back in November. Of course, that was why they panicked and decided that they would have to go back down to the £2.5 billion or £2.6 billion level. They stepped away from that original yield level.
Of course, we are not the Government; we are the Opposition, and we are not even allowed under the rules of order to table our suggested variants of the rate of the levy or the design of the clause. All that we can do for now is advocate a fairly urgent review of the general levels of bank taxation in this country.
Is not the irony, when comparing pay cuts in the public sector with bankers’ bonuses, that in effect some bankers are public sector workers because the taxpayer has had to bail them out? Does my hon. Friend agree that if we mainly own a bank, such bonuses should not be paid while the bank is still in deficit?
It is absolutely mystifying. There is a sense that the shareholder—the taxpayer—somehow has to allow all sorts of activity to take place as though it was nothing to do with them, even though those banks would not exist had we not intervened to save them. That shows the incredibly laissez-faire, hands-off attitude of Ministers, who are the shareholders of the banks making large awards.
Does my hon. Friend agree that my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon (Mr Anderson) is being a little unfair? Bankers are taking their share of pain. I understand that Eric Daniels, the outgoing chief executive of Lloyds bank, is getting only £1.4 million in bonus rather than £2.3 million.
I wonder whether Hansard is able to record the irony in my hon. Friend’s comments. Sometimes I wonder whether we need a new annotation in our proceedings, because I do not honestly think that he is showing sympathy. I think he is suggesting that even when there is an apparent reduction in bonuses, the sums of money involved are the sort for which our constituents would buy a lottery ticket in the hope of winning. If they won that amount it would change their lives tremendously, yet those life-changing sums of money are not even salaries but bonuses on top of salaries.
I wish to talk about the rate at which the Government have chosen to set the bank levy, because it is a low rate by international standards. It is less than a third of the level that has been set in France, for example. Ministers will know that the rate varies in a number of jurisdictions, but I think that it is 0.25% in France. The levels involved are still quite small, but in Hungary it is 0.53%, in the USA it is 0.15%—although, as I said, it has not been enacted at this point—in Portugal it is 0.1%, and so on. It is to be only 0.078% here in the UK for short-term liabilities, and 0.039% for long-term liabilities, which is very small by international standards.
To emphasise a point that my hon. Friend made earlier, does he agree that the robustness of the statements of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister on bankers’ bonuses before and just after the election led the general population to expect a much stronger and more ferocious levy?
Indeed, and not only can we see the low yield figures in this country; we can also look at international comparisons and see that the rate is clearly very low indeed. Ministers have let it drift—as soon as it looks as though it might be a serious tax, back they come from the rate they have set, saying that it would raise too much and they must reduce it again.
Many contributions have shown that the shade of the right hon. Member for Twickenham (Vince Cable) is noticeable by its absence.
With the exception of the National Bank of Cuba when it was governed by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, can my hon. Friend think of any example of any country where the bankers have recoiled from the brutal fiscal hammering imposed upon them by a state legislature and taken their toys and left? Is there any such country in the history of the world that he could mention?
In financial services it is called regulatory arbitrage. People come up with terminology that makes things sound mystical and obscure, but regulatory arbitrage is basically the threat to leave the country that is often peddled when a bank does not like proposals. We have heard such threats time and again, but they are not carried out, because banks locate in this country for reasons other than taxation. We have Greenwich mean time and the civilised rule of law, and any number of decent public services that bankers themselves like to enjoy.
And royal weddings, as my hon. Friend suggests. This is a great place to do business, and the small changes in taxation that the Opposition advocate are certainly not enough to send banks abroad.
In the spirit of helpfulness, the hon. Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound) might be interested to know that in Sweden the banking sector diminished following the introduction of such measures.
Even the Swedish advocate a bank levy, and we must acknowledge that the alternative financial changes are being made in a number of jurisdictions across the world. Obviously, the more jurisdictions in which such measures are pursued, the better, because that will remove the argument on regulatory arbitrage.
However, it is worth looking at the pathology and history of the bank levy, and at how the Chancellor has tweaked the rate. The Government pull back from a higher rate when they think it is too much, but sometimes the Chancellor gets into hot water and feels the need to change that approach. On the fateful morning of 8 February, at 7.30, the Chancellor went on the “Today” programme and announced a mini-Budget. It just so happened, by pure coincidence, that that was on the day of Treasury questions, when he was struggling with the banks in the negotiations on the damp squib that was Project Merlin. While we are on Project Merlin, we should not let go the opportunity to note that borrowing is increasingly expensive for small and medium-sized enterprises, and that according to the most recent data, there is less and not more availability.
The Chancellor changed the rate again in the March Budget, when, as I said, the Government were forced into a U-turn in the face of criticism of the reductions in corporation tax. That would have been a massive cash-back bonanza for the banks—it could still turn out that way, but we must wait for the final figures. At no point during the design of the bank levy have the Government said why they are capping revenues at just £2.6 billion. What is their fixation with that yield?
Before my hon. Friend moves off the subject of Project Merlin, does he agree that it was more than pathetic that, after telling the banks that they would increase the banking levy unless the banks came up with the goods, the Government made a pipsqueak change which did not rise to the occasion?
Absolutely. I cannot figure out why the Government refused to go beyond that £2.5 billion or £2.6 billion. That is a strange way to design a tax. Normally, a Government would think about whether the rate set was fair and just, and about the requirement for revenue yield, and they might even analyse the effect of the levy in a regulatory impact assessment or whatever. However, at no point have the Government said why they are reluctant to go beyond that £2.6 billion. Perhaps there has been a deal behind the scenes between the Chancellor and the banks, but if there has been such a deal, it is probably the only one that he has been able to reach.
I think that my hon. Friend is referring in particular to part 2 of schedule 19, which hangs off the clauses we are debating, and which contains a seven-step guide that actually has an extra step that does not apply in some cases. Is that not the most complicated way ever in legislation of determining a charge? Why does it need to be so complicated?
The Minister needs to answer that question. Hon. Members might care to turn to page 297 of the Bill. The steps might at first appear quite straightforward, but then we get to this odd provision in paragraph 7, with its proportions X, Y and Z of various different amounts and so on. I understand that that provision is triggered because the Treasury has to recoup retrospectively some of the money taken, since the Chancellor tweaked the levels of tax on 8 February and again in March. It therefore becomes incredibly complex and difficult to hold to account. The design of the bank levy has not been made easy by the Chancellor’s decisions.
On the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), is it not rather strange, given that the Chancellor has set up an Office of Tax Simplification and announced as his first measure in the Budget that he wanted to put the principle of simplification at the forefront of tax consideration, that here we have something that is almost as complex as it gets?
As I said, the reason for the complexity is that all the variables in the design of the bank levy have to be amended because the Treasury wants to squash it around that figure of £2.5 billion or £2.6 billion of revenue. In other words, the whole of the bank levy is being driven by that particular sum, which is a very odd way of designing a tax.
In fact, there are not just one or even two different rates being introduced—which one might understand, given the difference between long term and short term—but 10, each of which will undoubtedly pay for thousands of accountants, as they crawl over what counts in each category. Surely that is nonsensical and an example of the kind of legislation that banks which might want to stay in this country will abhor.
Far be it from me to defend the poor banks in their compliance with the provisions, but obviously the more the compliance costs go up, the higher the likelihood that customers will end up footing the bill of taking on accountants to address the complexity of what should be a simple banking levy. Whether there are two rates or 10, however, all the rates in the bank levy are far too generous and far too low.
I do not know whether Ministers have published the change to HMRC staffing needed to deal with these complex provisions. One would think that more staff will be needed, but my understanding is that staffing at the Revenue is being reduced.
Staffing at HM Revenue and Customs is under incredible pressures. Indeed, there have been a number of redundancies and posts lost. It has not been explained where the extra resources will come from to ensure that the bank levy, in all its complexity, can be enforced adequately. Again, the Minister needs to say what extra capacity HMRC will have to implement this increasingly complex bank levy.
In a moment, but I need to make some progress.
I understand that there is a difference between short-term and long-term liabilities. However, what will be the impact on businesses in the real economy if short-term liabilities are less attractive to major banks? For example, if a small firm has a bank deposit of over £100,000—to protect its cash flow or whatever—that happens to be above the level of the deposit guarantee scheme, what is to stop the banks raising their bank charges on SME deposit accounts to try to divest themselves of such short-term liabilities? That is an important point, because there will be consequences from the design of the bank levy. I would like the Minister to explain to the Committee why short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities have been divided in that way.
Can the Minister explain the position on the reported legal challenge under European Union law, which I understand many in the banking community are watching carefully? The Hungarian Government have introduced a levy on their energy and telecoms sectors. I understand that a case has been taken—or is due to be taken—to the European Court to claim that a levy on a specific sector of the economy is somehow unfair or not possible. To what extent is the Minister confident that the case will not have a bearing on the implementation of a banking levy here in the UK?
I would also be grateful if the Minister could answer the question about complexity and opacity in the bank levy accounting systems. As I understand it, overseas banks can sometimes not use IFRS—international financial reporting standards. If those banks do not use them, they will need to re-compute their chargeable equity and liabilities with reference to the UK’s GAAP—generally accepted accounting principles—or IFRS, in other words, by preparing a notional consolidation under those systems, including for branches. Is that anticipated to create a problem? What do the Government foresee as a solution to that level? Obviously we have banks that cross jurisdictions and use a series of different accounting platforms, so I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify some of the comments that have been made about that.
However, it is the Government’s general approach to banks and banking taxation that concerns many hon. Members—a general approach that, as we know, is quite woeful. Hon. Members have already raised their concerns about some of the bonuses that we have seen and the breathtaking behaviour that the banks have engaged in, even though they were the root cause of the credit crunch.
That makes the Government’s tax giveaway to the banks even more staggering. The post-Budget reaction last June, when the bank levy was announced, was indeed positive from the bankers themselves. They enjoyed the Government’s decisions on the bank levy. One commentator said:
“We’d expect most domestically-orientated banks…to be better off after four years than they were pre-Budget”,
and a City insider said that
“some banks will have a feeling of glee at the way this has worked out”.
Clearly, we need to advocate a bank bonus tax to raise £3.5 billion, as it did before. That deserves to be repeated this year. Even if it were to raise just £2 billion, that would make a massive difference to our society and our economy. For example, we have calculated that such an amount could be used to establish a youth jobs fund—using a similar model to the future jobs fund, which this Government have abolished—creating 90,000 new youth jobs at a time when youth unemployment is close to 1 million, with one in five young people on the dole.
That money could also help to construct 25,000 new homes for low-cost home ownership and affordable social renting. That would create tens of thousands of jobs in the construction industry and new apprenticeships alongside them. The money could also provide £200 million of funding for the regional growth fund, the Government’s rather lamentable replacement for the regional development agency funding. That could help to provide for regional projects and promote growth. The Government’s changes represent a two-thirds cut on the previous funding, and the first wave of £450 million in grants was several times oversubscribed with bids. We therefore need to revisit the regional growth fund, and a repeat of the bank bonus tax could support that.
The bonuses being paid are still vast; they remain at eye-watering levels. Despite the smoke and mirrors of Project Merlin, in which Ministers broke their promises to take action despite the warm words in the coalition agreement, the bonuses remain high. Let us just remind ourselves of what the coalition agreement promised. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats said:
“We will bring forward detailed proposals for robust action to tackle unacceptable bonuses in the financial services sector; in developing these proposals, we will ensure they are effective in reducing risk.”
That is on page 9 of the agreement, right up front among the promises that the coalition made.
The Government could not even bring themselves to promote the basic transparency that we expect when it comes to bonuses and remuneration. The most that they could extract voluntarily from the banks in Project Merlin was an agreement to report anonymously on the total remuneration of the five highest paid senior executives of the bank, excluding board members. That is a weak and shameful compromise. The Government are not even forcing the banks to disclose all bonuses above £1 million, even though Labour’s legislation allows them to do so. That provision is already on the statute book.
Will my hon. Friend return briefly to the alternative uses to which that £2 billion could be put—the very low figure that the re-imposition of our levy would yield? As a result of the abolition of the Advantage West Midlands regional development agency, the funding for the west midlands has been cut by nearly 70%, and the outlook for my constituents in Coventry is very poor indeed. The additional funds could be used for investment in the proposed NUCKLE—the Nuneaton, Coventry, Kenilworth, and Leamington—railway line, and a host of other important development projects that have been put on hold or simply thrown out as a result of that 70% cut. In the west midlands, and in Coventry in particular, unemployment levels are rising disproportionately compared with the rest of the country, and the level of output is dropping disproportionately in a key area that is vital to the eventual resurgence of manufacturing that we want to see. That money could be put to great use in the regional development fund.
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. As I have said before, this shows the failure of the Government to understand the paradox of austerity. When they take away some of that vital investment that would support jobs and growth, they are fuelling unemployment and raising welfare bills, which will cost the country more in the long run. That is why we are seeing borrowing levels rising rather than falling, and why, in the last six months of the economic experience in this country, we have seen economic growth flatlining. The House of Commons Library tells me that that will cost the Exchequer an extra £6 billion that will need to be added to borrowing. So this is the fallacy that the Government pursue—that simply cutting all elements of public investment is the way out of the deficit. They just do not understand how the economy works.
Following up that point, this applies to investment not just in manufacturing, but in services, too. Yorkshire Forward had decided to make two investments: one of £5 million to help enable the National Railway museum to redisplay its collection; and a £1 million grant towards the cost of restoring York Minster’s great east window. Why did it do this? Because it realised that the additional tourism generated would create many jobs, particularly for people without high skill levels, in the York economy. When I raised this matter with the Minister, I was encouraged to get the National Railway museum to apply for the regional growth fund, which, with help from his Department, it did—yet it has received not a penny.
Order. Before the hon. Gentleman responds, may I remind Members that interventions are supposed to be brief—not mini-speeches in their own right? There will be plenty of opportunity to join in the debate later.
Thank you, Ms Primarolo. Notwithstanding your strictures, that was an incredibly important intervention from my hon. Friend, who is correct, particularly in his assessment of the attractions of York as a destination for tourism, which was of course helped by the investment that the previous Administration put into some of those key elements within his constituency. I do not want to be diverted, however, as time is short and we need to focus on the amendment.
The amendment relates to the level of the bank levy in the context of bank taxation and the bonus culture. As I said, the Government could not even bring themselves to have transparency on what the bonuses were, let alone take action against them. However, we know some things about the realities of bank bonuses today, and the figures are truly astonishing. From the limited disclosure that we have seen, we know that in 2010, John Varley, the former chief executive of Barclays, received a £2.2 million bonus; Stuart Gulliver, the chief executive of HSBC, received only £5.2 million in bonuses; Stephen Hester, the chief executive of RBS—wholly owned by the taxpayer, by the way—got £2 million in bonuses; and Eric Daniels, the chief executive of Lloyds, largely owned by the taxpayer, got £1.45 million in bonuses. Let us not forget Bob Diamond, the chief executive of Barclays since January this year, who received £6.5 million in bonuses in 2010. He was head of Barclays investment banking before that and perhaps his bonus relates to that. Poor old Bob Diamond, however, loses out in the bonus bonanza when compared with the top two managers at Barclays: Tom Kalaris received a cool £10.9 million in salary and bonuses in 2010 and its other top manager received a tidy £10.6 million.
Ms Primarolo, can you guess the name of that other top manager at Barclays? His name is Rich Ricci—and I kid you not! It would be the stuff of a Dickensian novel if it did not sound so far fetched, but it is indeed true. Between them, the top five earners at Barclays—including Mr Rich Ricci, but excluding executive directors—received more than £38 million in salary and bonuses in 2010 alone.
I agree with my hon. Friend how mind-boggling the amounts are that these individuals receive. It makes one wonder what they do with the money. Was he shocked, as I was, to learn that more than 50% of donations to the Conservative party last year came from the City, including large donations from individuals such as Jeremy Isaacs, the former head of Lehman Brothers Europe, who donated £190,000?
“But surely that is a complete coincidence”, he said ironically! I do not know whether my hon. Friend was making the point that this is payback time, but the level of these bonuses is incredible.
Let me finish my point about Barclays. I was saying that £38 million in bonuses and salaries went to just the top five earners. That is enough money to pay the wages of more than 1,000 qualified nurses in our NHS. That gives some meaning to the scale—enough money to pay for 1,000 qualified nurses.
Absolutely; but, quite apart from the obscenity of the scale of some of those bonuses, there is a hard-headed economic rationale for more transparency. If shareholders cannot see what senior executives in the banking sector are being paid, that indicates a dysfunction in the corporate governance of the banks, and if the bonus pots of certain executives are being swelled by their behaviour—by the choices that they make and the risks that they are taking—perhaps those were some of the antecedents of the credit crunch. We need transparency to prevent us from repeating the problems that occurred in 2008.
Surely, in the case of banks in which the Government were a major shareholder, they had an opportunity to deal with the situation as shareholders.
It is the inactivity of the Government, as the shareholder, that perplexes me. Ministers laugh with scorn at the idea that they, with the stewardship of the taxpayer’s share, should take any action in regard to the current activity of the banks. If the Minister wishes to intervene on the specific issue of his inactivity as a shareholder I shall be more than happy to give way to him, but he clearly does not wish to say anything at this stage.
That is one of the issues to which we shall have to return, perhaps in the Public Bill Committee. The banks are a social necessity—a utility, as it were—in our society, and whatever we think of their behaviour, it is necessary for them to exist to provide the credit that is required to keep the engine of the economy moving. We do not need a dysfunctional banking system; we need a functioning banking system that faces much more towards its customers. We need to stand up for the taxpayer interest, but also for the consumer interest, which must include businesses.
The bonus and remuneration projections are not diminishing, as the Government like to suggest. The Centre for Economics and Business Research recently released an estimate that, whereas bonus payouts in the City for 2010-11 were 8% lower than those for 2009-10—down from “only” £7.3 billion to £6.7 billion—they are forecast to rise from that level to £7.2 billion in 2011-12. The apparent fall in bonuses is largely offset by a 7% increase in the salaries of senior bank executives. So bonuses fall by 8%, and salaries rise by 7%. Obviously that pay rise outstrips pay rises in virtually every other sector of the economy.
Does my hon. Friend agree that for the financial services sector it is apparently business as usual, whereas for my constituents, who have seen pay held down and prices high, it is far from business as usual and incredibly tough?
Indeed, and I think it important for us to convince the Government of the need to act. I look forward to hearing the Minister demonstrate that he will stand up to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We know that he is not a patsy in the Treasury. He is a senior figure there, and he is able to show the Chancellor that the House of Commons was determined to send the Treasury the message that we do not accept its policies on bonuses and bank taxation.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. He is being very generous.
UK Financial Investments, the Treasury body that manages the state’s role in the Royal Bank of Scotland, gave its approval for Stephen Hester’s package, which included £1.2 million in basic pay, a £2 million bonus, and share options that could amount to £4.5 million. It has already given in.
Again, I think that we need to engage in a proper debate about corporate governance of the state-owned banks. It is important for us to understand the potential powers that Ministers have, and the consequences of their choosing not to exercise those powers. If they choose to approve a certain level of remuneration, that constitutes intervention just as much as disapproval does.
May I make a little progress? Time is short.
As a result of European Union reforms championed by Labour Members of the European Parliament who tried their best to restrain some of the excess, some bank bonuses must now be deferred and given in the form of shares. Bankers cannot take them in cash immediately. However, the Minister needs to explain why he is counteracting those bonus deferral arrangements by introducing a loophole in new section 554H, in schedule 2, allowing a concession to bankers whose bonuses are paid largely in the form of shares rather than cash. Rather than having to pay the tax at the point at which the bonus is awarded, they will need only to pay it on a date down the line when the shares are sold, possibly avoiding the current 50p rate of tax. The Sunday Times wrote about that last weekend. There is speculation that the Chancellor will cut the 50p rate at some point, and that, as a result of the Minister’s reforms, bankers will be allowed to wait and to avoid it. Can the Minister explain why he has made that valuable concession?
Will my hon. Friend clarify the chronology? Subsection (1)(d) of new section 554H states that the section applies if
“the vesting date is not more than five years after the award date”.
Does he believe that the Government are certain to reduce the 50p rate within the lifetime of this Parliament?
I do not know whether we have to hope that the Liberal Democrats will take strong action before that moment comes—I do not know whether that is an oxymoron—but the Government have dangled the prospect of a tax cut for only the very richest people. It is interesting that they are designing the Bill’s provisions to allow the potential avoidance of the 50p rate following what I considered to be a fairly positive change at European level to defer bonuses in an attempt to discourage short-term high-risk activities.
I understand my hon. Friend’s point and I disagree with what the Government are doing, but I suspect that he is wrong. I suspect that the Government will not obtain the tax take that they will need over the next few years. Because of the way in which they are managing the economy—because of the profound risks that they are taking with the economy—there is no chance that they will introduce tax cuts of any kind before the next general election unless they also engage in another massive round of cuts in public services.
However, the alacrity and, almost, relish with which the Government have introduced some of their spending cuts make me wonder whether their rewards for the bankers constitute a payback for the cover to get stuck into public investment in the way that they always wanted to do, and for which purpose many of them came into politics.
The bank levy is a weak response to the debts that banks owe the taxpayer. The Government say that they want a big society, but they are happy to see public investment shrink and rewards for banks grow, built on the backs of taxpayers. It is a big society if you are a banker, but a very small society if you are not. Our amendment would at least make the Government pause and reflect on their increasingly untenable position—we hear that they are good at pausing and reflecting—and I urge Members to support it.
Amendment 9 seeks to require a report into the effectiveness of the new bank levy, which is introduced in clause 72. I will come to the components of the amendment shortly, but I think it would help hon. Members if I first explained the role and features of the levy.
The levy is a new tax that will ensure that the banks fairly contribute to the Exchequer, while encouraging them to move to less risky forms of funding. This levy forms part of the Government’s far-reaching plans for banking reform. We have already announced an overhaul of financial regulation, marking a break from the light-touch regime championed by the shadow Chancellor when he was the City Minister. We have created an Independent Commission on Banking, which published its interim report last month and is due to publish its final report in September.
When Labour Members were in government, they refused to debate the structure of the banking sector. They were afraid of banking reform and they were afraid to understand and tackle the lessons from the financial crisis. This debate would have been better if one of them had had the courage to accept the failures of the previous Government on the regulation of the banking sector. Not one of them did so. I think this whole debate is a cover for their bluster. When we proposed in March last year to introduce a bank levy, on a unilateral basis if necessary, Labour Members were against it. The then Chancellor was against it and the present leader of the Labour party, who wrote the Labour manifesto, was against it, too. What we have heard today is a whole load of bluster, rhetoric and empty words about how we must tax the banking sector properly when Labour Members lacked the courage to champion these moves when they were in government. We have taken the lead on the issue, when they would have hung back and waited for international consensus and agreement. We have taken the lead, as I say, and France and Germany have joined us in announcing levies. Others have since followed, including Hungary, Austria and Portugal.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) made great play of the various rates that other countries were introducing. Let me point out to him, then, that in France the levy is expected to raise only €500 million. In Germany, the levy is expected to raise €1 billion annually. The hon. Gentleman prayed in aid the US on two occasions, but the US has not yet introduced legislation, so his comments are empty—
On a point of order, Mr Hoyle. I understood that this was a Committee stage, and that we were considering the Bill in detail. Is it usual practice for a Minister responding to a debate not at least to give way and allow a dialogue on the clause in question?
That is not a point of order. It is up to the Minister to decide whether to give way, and I am sure that he heard the cries for him to do so.
Subsection (2)(a) of the amendment requires a report on
“the Government’s analysis behind the rate and threshold chosen for the bank levy”.
It might help Opposition Members if I explained how we designed the levy, and why we set the rate and threshold as we did. The levy is intended to ensure that the banking sector makes a fair and substantial contribution, reflecting the risks that it poses to the financial system and the wider economy. It is intended to encourage banks to move away from risky funding models, and complements the wider regulatory agenda to improve standards and enhance financial stability. During the crisis, it became clear that some banks had become over-reliant on short-term funding for long-term lending. When financial markets seized up, those banks were exposed.
I must emphasise that the levy is based on the liabilities of a bank, not on its assets. It is based on the bank’s deposits, its share capital and loans made to it, not on loans made by it. It applies to the global balance sheets of UK banks, building societies and banking and building society groups, and to the UK operations of banks from other countries.
In determining the scope of the levy, we concluded that foreign banks operating in the UK also posed potential risks to the UK financial system and the wider economy, whether they operated as branches or as subsidiaries. It therefore follows that they should contribute on the same basis, and branches and subsidiaries of foreign banking groups are included to ensure that they cannot avoid the levy by group restructuring. That will ensure the provision of a level playing field for all banks operating in the UK.
The levy will be paid by between 30 and 40 building societies and banking groups, and we have made it clear that we expect it to yield about £2.5 billion of revenues each year in its steady state. That appropriate contribution balances fairness with competitiveness, and the rates of the levy were chosen to allow it. We initially announced that a reduced rate would apply for 2011, recognising the uncertain market conditions prevailing at the time, but we no longer consider that to be necessary.
In December the Bank of England noted that the near-term outlook and resilience of the UK banking sector had improved. Markets also now have greater certainty about the timing and direction of regulatory change, with the Basel III regulatory reforms being introduced in 2013 and transition periods being extended to 2015. We therefore decided that from 1 March this year, the full rate of the levy should be introduced for 2011. The levy will now yield £2.5 billion in that year. The steady state target yield was set out last year, when we also announced our intention to make significant cuts in the main rate of corporation tax.
I am going to continue my speech.
We were clear at that time, as we are now, that the bank levy yield far outweighs the benefits that banks receive from the corporation tax change. Other sectors will benefit from the reduction in corporation tax, but the banks will not benefit because of the levy. In the March Budget, the Chancellor went further in helping our economy to grow, and announced an additional 1p reduction in the main rate of corporation tax. At the same time, to offset the benefits to banks from that further cut and maintain the same incentives for them to move to less risky funding, we announced that the rate of the levy would increase from 1 January 2012, to 0.078%.
The threshold has prompted some discussion. The initial announcement on the bank levy last year proposed that it would include a threshold of £20 billion. However, as part of the subsequent consultation exercise, we explicitly sought views on whether it would be preferable to make it an allowance rather than an all-or-nothing threshold. A threshold would provide a cliff edge that banks would avoid by restructuring. Respondents to the consultation made that clear to us, and even suggested that banks, or indeed building societies, might avoid growing their UK operations to avoid the threshold and to avoid paying the levy. We accepted that argument, and have therefore decided that there should be an allowance on the first £20 billion of liabilities liable for the levy. That means that smaller banks, building societies and foreign banks with a small UK presence—that is, those whose liabilities are less than the £20 billion allowance—will not pay the levy.
The allowance will ensure that the levy is proportionate to the risks inherent in banking businesses of different sizes. It balances the probability that the failure of a bank could pose a systemic risk against the relative burden imposed in order to gather additional revenue at the margin. While size is not the sole factor in determining risk to the system, it is an important one. Increasing the allowance would risk excluding banks or building societies that are highly likely to pose a systemic risk if they fail. Similarly, setting the allowance at a lower level—which Opposition Members seem very keen on doing—would risk imposing an unnecessarily high burden on institutions that do not pose a systemic risk to the UK economy in the way that larger banking institutions do. These details, along with many others, have already been made public, and I am sure that the Opposition Members who tabled the amendment are aware of the steps the Government have taken to explain the basis of the decisions. All tax measures now have a tax information and impact note, which sets out clear information relating to the measure and its impact, and which has provided a significant amount of analysis on the levy so far. It is clear that there is no need for a report to provide an analysis of the rates and threshold of the bank levy.
Let me turn to the second element of the amendment.
claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).
Order. I think it would be of interest to the House to hear from the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), and I am sure that he will not take too long.
Thank you, Mr Hoyle. The Chief Whip really needs to take a breath and perhaps calm down for a moment. [Interruption.] I did not quite put it in the way that the Prime Minister might.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury usually does act honourably by trying to respond to the debate, and probably he secretly would have done so today. Our debate was wide ranging and we covered a number of specific points on the detailed design of the bank levy, with which he entirely refused to engage. He refused to give way in this Committee stage of the Finance Bill, which shows the Government’s thinly veiled contempt for the parliamentary process. No debate, no scrutiny and no contributions came from those on the Government Benches, other than the speech by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood). They have accepted absolutely no challenge and no scrutiny. They have put their heads down and ploughed on—the Lansley strategy of policy making in action.
The Financial Secretary gave no explanation of why the Government set the banking levy at this puny £2.6 billion or why they have given a very generous tax-free allowance of £20 billion to the banks. Their original design, as set out in June, could have netted £3.9 billion, but when the banks complained the figure went back down to £2.6 billion. He says that we should not criticise the levy for being set at such a low rate because the French levy will raise less, but of course it will because the French banking sector is smaller. The fact is that our banking levy is being set at a third of the rate that the French are pursuing. He did not answer any questions on the netting of derivatives, the double taxation treaties or what would happen in terms of accounting practice. He certainly did not address the outrage in the country, never mind in the House, about the continuing appalling abuse of bonuses in the banking system. That is an obscene ongoing process and although bonuses might reduce slightly in one year, that is offset by the increase in the salaries that those bankers are enjoying. He did not even address the new loophole he is introducing in the Bill so that those enjoying deferred bonuses will now be able to pay the tax rates in future years, thus perhaps avoiding the 50% income tax rate when eventually the Government scale back from that.
Does my hon. Friend agree that we had a wide-ranging debate, including on bankers’ bonuses, and that the Financial Secretary did not even address that issue in his wind-up?
Astonishingly, the Financial Secretary, having had his coat tugged by the Government Chief Whip, did not even address many of these points at all. As I say, the right hon. Member for Wokingham made his points about the role of the state-owned banks, how they ought to behave and how perhaps they would change their behaviour in a different market position.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wansbeck (Ian Lavery) made an important point about the comparison between those who enjoy exceptionally high bonuses and ordinary working people who, I think he said, might take 125,000 years on average to earn the bonuses that some bankers earn in one year.
My hon. Friend the Member for Scunthorpe (Nic Dakin) said that the Government have no mandate for their approach, and that is absolutely true.
My hon. Friends the Members for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) also made important points about the feeble nature of the design of this element of bank taxation.
My hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), in his rapid canter across the landscape of banking taxation, made a point about the obscenity of bonuses, which the Government have singularly failed to address through their failures on Project Merlin. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) talked about the impact on his constituency of the public services that will be cut because the Government will not pursue the sources of revenue that could be necessary to help ameliorate some of those reductions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) made, I think, the most important point of all: our amendment is no threat to the Government. We are simply asking for a review and a report on the levels of bank taxation and the banking levy. The Government are introducing a tax cut for the banks and the bank levy proposal is weak and fails to ensure that banks pay their fair share. This is a simple amendment that is surely unobjectionable and I think we should seek the Committee’s view.
Question put, That the amendment be made.