Finance (No. 3) Bill

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

As I said, we would repeat the bank bonus tax that we instituted last year, and we think that the bank levy needs to be more substantial.

The Government’s original design suggested that it would yield £3.9 billion—that was reported in The Observer, I think, back in November. Of course, that was why they panicked and decided that they would have to go back down to the £2.5 billion or £2.6 billion level. They stepped away from that original yield level.

Of course, we are not the Government; we are the Opposition, and we are not even allowed under the rules of order to table our suggested variants of the rate of the levy or the design of the clause. All that we can do for now is advocate a fairly urgent review of the general levels of bank taxation in this country.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

Is not the irony, when comparing pay cuts in the public sector with bankers’ bonuses, that in effect some bankers are public sector workers because the taxpayer has had to bail them out? Does my hon. Friend agree that if we mainly own a bank, such bonuses should not be paid while the bank is still in deficit?

[Chris Leslie]

It is absolutely mystifying. There is a sense that the shareholder—the taxpayer—somehow has to allow all sorts of activity to take place as though it was nothing to do with them, even though those banks would not exist had we not intervened to save them. That shows the incredibly laissez-faire, hands-off attitude of Ministers, who are the shareholders of the banks making large awards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Redwood]

How many times will I have to deal with this idiotic canard that Labour dreamt up? The report was very clear: it said the then Government were not regulating cash and capital strongly enough, and it was a cash and capital problem that the banks had that led to the crisis. If the then Government had taken our advice, the banks would have been made to have more cash and capital at a much earlier stage of the cycle, so we would not have gone into the period of banking weakness during the credit crunch.

We also said that the mortgage regulation introduced by the then Labour Government was not fit for purpose, was useless and might as well be scrapped. Our case was proved extremely well, because it was the mortgage banks that crashed—the very banks that were the object of the extra regulation. The extra regulation was clearly regulating the wrong things. We were not against regulation: we said mortgage banks and other banks should be regulated, but it was vital to understand what the problem was. It was very clear in ’06 and ’07 that the problem was an excess of lending of poor quality. It was also very clear that the answer was more cash and capital, and that was what we recommended. It is a great pity that the then Government did not follow our advice.

[Graham Stringer]

I agree that it is clear that there was something wrong with the previous regulation, although I would not go along with the right hon. Gentleman’s argument entirely, but does he agree that there is a villain in the piece who hardly ever gets mentioned: the credit rating agencies that allowed the banks to sell snake oil to each other? Does he agree that we in this House should do something about that?

[Mr Redwood]

I hold no brief for the credit rating agencies, but nor have I prepared a case against them. I am sure the hon. Gentleman can make his own case and come up with his own remedies. In my view, there have been many villains in this historic piece, including the regulators, the Bank of England for its misconduct in the money markets, and the commercial banks that took advantage of ridiculously lax conditions and got themselves into a great pickle, which we had to sort out.