European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful case. Does he agree that if we are to have the deep and special relationship that Ministers say they want with the rest of the EU, we have no choice but to continue to harmonise our standards on employment rights, equality, and health and safety? Even if they were not good things to do in their own right, which they are, it will be crucial to keep those standards at the same level as the EU or higher if we are to have that kind of trading relationship.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. Of course we will need to do that, and businesses will have to comply with those standards. That is why we need to ensure that the EU and EU-derived rights we have are underpinned by an enhanced status. We will then need to move on to the conversation—which we will have to have—about how to stay in some form of regulatory alignment, if we want the type of deep and comprehensive deal that I think both sides envisage.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I will not, as so many Members want to speak. I am afraid that I must make progress.

I want to close my remarks by saying that we are in a hiatus that is deeply damaging to the British economy. We are drifting and rudderless. We are floating in a mist of ambiguity and indecision on the part of the Government, because they refuse to set out the road map to our future relationship. We know that there is not time to do that bespoke deal and that we need a well established and well understood deal off the shelf. We also know that it is necessary to trigger article 127 of the EEA agreement to leave the EEA, because we signed up to that agreement as a single and sovereign contracting party.

Legal opinion is divided on the issue. Therefore, it becomes political. It is time for the House to show some leadership, have the debate about our future relationship with the single market and take back control in this sovereign Parliament. I therefore commend new clause 22 to the Committee.

[Caroline Lucas]

I rise to welcome and support a number of proposals in this group, in particular new clause 2, new clause 25, the amendments on the EEA and new clause 22.

I shall be brief because many others wish to speak. First, new clause 22 seems to me to be eminently reasonable and, in a sense, asks no more from Ministers than they have already pledged verbally. Call me suspicious, but I would like to see that locked down legally as well, but it goes no further than what they have already said.

Indeed, the new clause reflects repeated statements by Ministers, not least the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not lead to a weakening or a dilution of workers’ rights in particular. In October 2016, the Prime Minister herself said that

“existing workers’ legal rights will continue to be guaranteed in law”.

The same month, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union said this:

“To those who are trying to frighten British workers, saying ‘When we leave, employment rights will be eroded’, I say firmly and unequivocally ‘no they won’t’… this… government will not roll back those rights in the workplace.”

The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has said that he wants not just to maintain environmental laws, but to enhance them. It is puzzling why there is still resistance to translating all that rhetoric into legal certainty. That is all we seek this afternoon.

Those and other more recent statements are welcome, because in June 2016 electors were not voting to jettison hard-won rights and legal protections. On the contrary, they were assured by the leave campaign that taking back control would mean improvements to their rights and legal protections, denied them, apparently, by the evil bureaucrats of the EU. However, the Bill risks retained EU law being vulnerable to chipping away through secondary legislation. That is a real concern and those are important protections. Furthermore, if we are to have that deep and special relationship with the EU27, in particular in trade, we will have to abide by those regulations in any case, so why not lock them down with certainty here and now in this debate?

New clause 25, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), again asks little of Ministers. I hope it will be accepted. It would simply ensure that the quite extraordinary delegated powers that the Bill grants be used only in pursuit of the Bill’s stated purpose—namely, to allow retained EU law to operate effectively after withdrawal.

As the Bill stands, it will allow Ministers to use those delegated powers to modify what are currently EU regulations. That simply does not provide a good enough guarantee that those delegated powers will not be used to water down EU-derived standards on key environmental safeguards—for example, on chemical and timber regulation—without proper parliamentary and public scrutiny. New clause 25 would address that weakness by establishing a new process for modifying retained EU law after Brexit—one that I believe strikes a better balance of powers—and it acknowledges that it is sometimes necessary to amend technical provisions using secondary legislation. It allows for that, but it would also ensure that more substantive modifications to retained EU law can only be made by an Act of Parliament.

I want to say a few words about the amendments on the EEA. I simply want to reinforce what other hon. Members have said—that while the EEA might not be the most ideal port for a ship seeking shelter from the worst of the Brexit storm, because by almost any standard EEA membership is clearly inferior to full membership of the EU, when the storm is bad sailors can nevertheless be glad to find shelter in any available port, and with the sand now running fast out of the article 50 hourglass, one would have thought that any strong and stable Government worthy of the name would want to keep their options open.

Membership of the EEA would at least allow the UK to retain access to the EU single market. That means that British citizens would still be able to live and work in EU member states. British businesses would have the certainty of being able to trade freely with countries in the EU single market and access that market’s more than 500 million consumers. It would mean as well that the NHS would not be facing the crisis that it is currently facing, with so many nurses and health workers now being put off from coming to work in our NHS because they are no longer welcome. It means that we would not have the crisis in agriculture, where we literally have crops rotting in the fields because we do not have workers here to actually do the work in those fields. Crucially, it would also mean that those EU citizens who have made their lives here in good faith, and who have paid their taxes and worked here alongside us as our family, our friends and so on, would not feel unwelcome in a country that has been their home, in some cases for decades and decades.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

rose—

[Caroline Lucas]

I feel ashamed of this country and of this Government when I see so many good people feeling so unwelcome and feeling that their only recourse is to leave this country. That is not right.

I believe that membership of the EEA is a compromise that we might look at, going forward. I commend very strongly the speech and the amendment from the hon. Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander). She made the incredibly powerful point that we have had so much rhetoric about pulling together, about not dividing society, and yet EEA membership would offer a compromise that perhaps people could gather around. There was no mandate on the ballot paper on 23 June for the kind of extreme Brexit that this Government are pursuing, pushing us potentially to the very edge of that cliff and beyond. That was not on anyone’s ballot paper. There is no mandate for that. So if there is to be any seriousness about bringing people together, to try to heal the deep rifts that there now are in this country, proposals of the type set out in new clause 22 will be vital.

[Alison McGovern]

I represent a fairly finely balanced constituency. Many of my constituents voted leave and many voted remain. In view of that, I approached the election in June with some trepidation because I thought, “How do you bring people together in an area where many have opposing views?” But it turned out to be fairly straightforward. I told them what I thought we could do to get a deal done. The priority of those who voted leave was to get it done, so that we could move on. They want to leave the European Union but they do not want the process to be dragged out. Those who voted remain just want stability, and I think new clause 22 would provide that, as others have said.

Of course, the nub of new clause 22, which I will focus my remarks on, is not whether we ought to remain a member of the EEA or not; it is who has the right to choose whether we should stay in the single market or not. The Minister said earlier that this discussion was not about policy; it was about powers. Well, I know that, but the problem is, I am worried about what the policy will be unless we make sure that the powers reside in this House.

I want to make a couple of remarks about just how crucial that membership of the single market is. I do not really belong in this debate—I am not a lawyer; I am not from a legal background. I tend to focus my thinking on the economic fortunes of my constituents above all else. But the problem is that the legal discussion will govern the economic fortunes of my constituents above all else, and that is why we have to focus on the kind of Brexit we actually want. Do we want to remain in a European family of trading nations, or not? Do we want to keep our terms and our trade with our partners, or not? This is the choice before us. Do we think that some kind of free trade agreement will offer us enough to keep our constituents in their jobs, or do we need the surety of the single market? Let me make three brief points about why it is obvious that the EEA is the answer, and why we must have the power to decide.

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[Caroline Lucas]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Temporary Chair (David Hanson)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 60—Retention of principles of EU environmental law—

‘(1) On and after exit day the environmental principles of European Union law become principles of United Kingdom law in accordance with this section.

(2) The “environmental principles of EU law” are the principles set out in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the precautionary principle; the principle that preventive action should be taken; the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay).

(3) A court or tribunal interpreting or applying an enactment must, so far as it is possible to do so, construe or apply the enactment in a manner that is compatible with the environmental principles of EU law.

(4) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have regard to the environmental principles of EU law.’

This new clause would ensure that after withdrawal from the EU, the environmental principles of EU law would be retained as part of UK law.

New clause 67—Environmental protection: principles under Article 191 of TFEU—

‘(1) Principles contained in Article 191 of TFEU in relation to environmental protection and listed in subsection (2) shall continue to be recognised and applied on and after exit day.

(2) The principles are—

(a) the precautionary principle as it relates to the environment,

(b) the principle that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage,

(c) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and

(d) the principle that the polluter should pay.’

This new clause would ensure that environmental principles under Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would continue to apply in the UK after exit day.

Amendment 93, in clause 4, page 2, line 45, leave out sub-paragraph (b).

The test set out at Clause 4(1)(a), that such rights are available in domestic law immediately before exit day, is sufficient for those rights to continue to be available following the UK’s exit from the EU.

Amendment 70, page 2, line 47, at end insert—

‘(1A) Rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures under subsection (1) shall include directly effective rights contained in the following Articles of, and Protocols to, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—

[Caroline Lucas]

I am pleased to speak in support of new clause 30, which is in my name and those of many other hon. Members, as well as new clause 60 and amendments 93 to 95. I am hopeful of finding support across the House for new clause 30, on animal sentience, because I do not think it should be controversial.

By way of background, in 1997—20 years ago—the UK Government, during their presidency of the EU, convinced the then 14 other member states that EU law should explicitly recognise that animals were sentient beings, and not simply agricultural goods like bags of potatoes that could be maltreated with impunity. In other words, it was a recognition that, like us, animals are aware of their surroundings; that they have the capacity to feel pain, hunger, heat and cold; and that they are aware of what is happening to them and of their interaction with other animals, including humans.

The resulting protocol, which came into force in 1999, changed how animals were regarded and ensured that future EU legislation was not implemented on the basis of the lowest standards of animal welfare, but that it took animal sentience into account. That understanding has since informed more than 20 pieces of EU law on animal welfare, including the ban on sealskin imports, the ban on conventional battery cages and the ban on cosmetics testing on animals.

In 2009, the original protocol was incorporated into the Lisbon treaty as article 13 of title II. The Government have rightly and commendably committed to transferring all existing EU law on animal welfare into UK law under the Bill, but because the text of the Lisbon treaty is not transferred by the Bill, the wording of article 13 on animal sentience will not explicitly be incorporated into UK law. As things stand, despite having one of the longest-standing animal welfare laws in the world—something of which we are rightly proud—the UK has no legal instrument other than article 13 of the Lisbon treaty to provide that animals are sentient beings.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

EU laws on animal sentience have allowed Wales to lead the way on animal welfare. When Plaid Cymru was in government, for instance, we banned the use of electric shock collars on cats and dogs. Does the hon. Lady agree that as well as explicitly incorporating the wording of article 13 on animal sentience into UK law, the UK Government should not hinder or stifle any future progress on animal welfare in Wales by dictating what it can and cannot do in areas of devolved competence?

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, and I absolutely support what she says. Last night, I proudly went through the Lobby on amendment 79, which would have given the devolved Administrations more of a say on the Brexit process.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

We in this country are of course well known throughout Europe as a nation of animal lovers. The hon. Lady was kind enough to say that we started off this whole process. Once we leave Europe, will she join us in ensuring that in our own laws we have the best animal welfare protection in the world?

[Caroline Lucas]

As a passionate animal rights and animal welfare campaigner, I obviously want the best possible animal welfare laws in this country and in all countries, and I will not diminish my commitment to that.

I simply want to say that the omission in not transferring this bit of EU law into UK law—I understand why it cannot be transferred directly—is something that we could very easily rectify. As I say, I do not expect anyone to find any great controversy in doing so. New clause 30 is simply seeking to make sure that we close that gap. I am not for a moment suggesting that the result of our not closing it would be that we all suddenly went out and started murdering kittens—no one is suggesting such a thing—but I am saying that this is an important protocol. It was important enough for the British Government to use all their influence in the EU to have it included in the Lisbon treaty, and we should continue to have it in UK law.

[Mrs Main]

Does the hon. Lady agree that, once we have left, we will be able to increase our animal welfare standards—for example, by stopping the live transportation of horses and other animals, which we are currently forbidden to do—

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[Mrs Main]

The hon. Gentleman asks about badgers. I have actually been leading some of the campaigning against culling badgers. I hope that the hon. Lady agrees that we will have the ability to raise standards where we are currently forbidden to do so.

[Caroline Lucas]

No one would be more delighted than me if we had the political will, which is as important as the political legalities, to make that happen. If there was the political will to secure higher animal welfare standards in this country, no one would be happier than me.

With new clause 30, I am simply suggesting that the principle of animal sentience is an important one. In a sense, it is almost by accident that the law will not be transposed. It has been very important in the development of animal welfare law in this country, and I therefore hope that there will be agreement across the House simply to close this loophole.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

The hon. Lady is making a great speech. We completely agree with her and want to take her side on this issue. Does she agree that the reality is that high animal welfare standards sometimes mean higher input costs, and that in the big wide world, as we seek new deals with countries that perhaps have much lower animal welfare standards, there will be an economic temptation to lower our standards? That is why it is so important, as she says, to incorporate those welfare standards in the Bill.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman makes an incredibly important point. He has anticipated what I was going to say, but he is exactly right. When it comes to such trade agreements, it will be even more important that our standards are absolutely enshrined in law, so that they cannot be bargained or negotiated away in the interests of getting a better deal.

The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has said that he believes this gap should be closed. I very much welcome his support, because this is an important ethical and practical issue. It is of great significance to the UK’s ability to trade freely with the EU27 in the future. As I have said, the UK was the original proposer of the protocol, so we surely have a responsibility to ensure that its provisions are not lost from UK law by our withdrawal from the EU.

[Dr Drew]

On that very point, there cannot be a green group that the Secretary of State has not embraced or an animal welfare group he has not cuddled since he has been in post. Is this not a good test of whether the Government will turn their words into action? This new clause and other amendments need to be added to the Bill, otherwise it is just a case of warm words and no action.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention is spot-on. This is exactly such an opportunity for the Government to demonstrate that there is political will behind their words. Let us hope that, as a result of new clause 30 being on the amendment paper, we can agree it tonight, and then get on with many of the other big issues. I simply say that I am looking forward to the Minister’s response, but if it is not satisfactory, I very much hope to press the new clause to a vote.

[Zac Goldsmith (Richmond Park) (Con)]

The intervention by the hon. Member for Stroud (Dr Drew) was a little unfair on the Secretary of State, because he is not just using warm words. There has been a flurry of activity and real commitment in the past four months, including banning neonicotinoids just a few days ago, placing CCTVs in every abattoir in the country, raising sentencing from six months to five years for those who engage in cruelty to animals, and banning the ivory trade. I could spend 10 minutes reeling off the Secretary of State’s achievements, promises, commitments and actions. We should celebrate that. It is extraordinary.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I agree with him—so far. There are still more tests to be applied to how far-reaching this Secretary of State is, but the commitments he has made so far have certainly been welcome. I hope that he will also take strong action on this Brexit Bill, in terms not only of new clause 30 but of the crucial issues of environmental governance and principles. To be honest, what I have heard so far is that different commitments will be put into national policy statements, but that is not good enough. They are not robust or rigorous enough. The jury is still out on some things, but I certainly join the hon. Gentleman in saying that the progress so far has been pretty extraordinary by the standards of previous Secretaries of State.

[Geraint Davies]

Does not what has just been said simply show that the Secretary of State can lift standards within the EU? The whole point about the EU is that it is not possible to push standards below a minimum threshold, but it is possible to do so outside the EU. In the future, therefore, if we are out, they can go up and down; but if we are in, they can go only up.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. It is not just about the fact that they can go only up; if we are in the EU, we can actually have an influence on the other 27 member states, as we have done on many issues, not least that under discussion, and make sure that animal welfare is improved not just in our own country but right across the EU28.

[Mary Creagh (Wakefield) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the ban on neonicotinoids would not have taken place were it not for years of sustained campaigning by environmental groups and scientific research by the European Commission? It stated that we should invoke the precautionary principle to protect our bees from those potentially toxic chemicals, but the precautionary principle will no longer be in place when the Bill is enacted.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady neatly brings me on to the next issue that I want to address. She is absolutely right to say that there is real concern about what will happen to those vital principles as a result of the Bill. Her new clause 60 aims to address precisely that by ensuring that, after withdrawal, the environmental principles embedded in EU law are fully retained as part of UK law. I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has a planned consultation on the principles, but I am worried about the timescale, because we need the outcome to be meaningful and to know what it is before the Bill finishes its passage through both Houses of Parliament. I hope that the Secretary of State will be in listening mode, because so many people are deeply and rightly concerned about what will happen to those principles as a result of the Bill as it stands.

The environmental law that the Bill rightly sets out to transfer into UK law is composed of not only specific legal obligations such as the prohibition on certain chemicals, but a broad and comprehensive framework in which those obligations are embedded. That framework includes a number of environmental principles—including the precautionary principle, the “polluter pays” principle and sustainable development—and they underpin and aid the interpretation of those legal obligations. That assists Governments, agencies and courts to understand and correctly interpret the aims and objectives of EU environmental law.

Currently, those environmental principles are set out in the EU treaties, and they have been instrumental in decisions such as the EU ban on imports of hormone-fed beef, the moratorium on neonic pesticides and the control of the release of genetically modified organisms in the EU. To give just one example of how that has benefited environmental protection in the UK, the “polluter pays” principle states that the polluter should bear the expense of carrying out pollution prevention and control measures. The EU’s water framework directive, which drives the sustainable management of the UK’s waterways, has led to enormous improvements in the quality of our drinking water and it is specifically based on the “polluter pays” principle.

[Mrs Main]

The hon. Lady is making a valid point, but some of the EU’s principles are lower than ours. For example, it will not allow us to ban microbeads. We are very concerned about plastics in the water, so I look forward to being able to enhance our waterways by being able to ban microplastics.

[Caroline Lucas]

I disagree with the hon. Lady. I do not think there is anything relating to the EU that is stopping us from banning microplastics. We have just done it, and in doing so we have demonstrated how the UK can show leadership. That is not just happening here in the UK. We have an influence we should be proud of, and we should be rather sad that we will probably lose it as a result of this whole process.

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[Mrs Main]

On a point of clarification, the hon. Lady said that she was not aware that we could not ban microbeads in plastics, but an independent report from the House of Commons Library warns that any attempt to impose a unilateral ban could break EU free trade laws because microbeads are in products. I think she will actually find that even though the Government wanted to ban them in July 2017, we were warned that we would be in breach of EU trade laws if we did so.

[Caroline Lucas]

I really do not understand the hon. Lady, because we have done it—it has been done. All the fears that we might not be able to do it because of EU law have been absolutely shot down by the fact that we have done it. It has been recognised—done; over; finished; kaput.

[Mary Creagh]

The Environmental Audit Committee had a very interesting meeting this morning at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs with its Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey), who is in the Chamber. We look forward to the statutory instrument that will ban the manufacture of microbeads from 1 January and their sale—hopefully—from 1 July. I hope it will be laid before the House very shortly and that we are all able to sit down and pass it very swiftly.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that helpful update. There are many myths about what the EU prevents us from doing, so it is useful to get that clarification.

I was just explaining the different areas in which we need these environmental principles to apply. My concern is that the Bill delivers on only the first: the interpretation of retained EU environmental law. Clause 6(3) states that general principles of EU law will be retained in UK law, and that the courts will be able to interpret EU-derived law in accordance with the retained general principles of EU law, but it is not yet clear whether the environmental principles will be considered to be general principles of EU law. Neither the ECJ nor the treaties have defined “general principles”. The concern is that if the Bill does not explicitly recognise environmental principles as general principles, they could be lost altogether. Even if they are retained, as they should be, the Bill explicitly limits how they could then be applied in two ways: first, UK courts will not be able to overturn decisions or challenge actions that do not conform to the principles; and, secondly, there will be no compulsion on public bodies or businesses to refer to the principles in future actions and decisions.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

The environmental protections should be enshrined in UK law because we do not want the Government to go the way of the United States on the environment, given the damage that the Trump Administration have done. The Government could be tempted to follow that.

[Caroline Lucas]

I agree. This country will be very interested in forming more free trade agreements as soon as possible, and under circumstances that might not necessarily be in the best interests of our own environment and standards. It therefore even more important that these things are enshrined in law, as the hon. Gentleman says.

Paragraph 3 of schedule 1 explicitly limits the legal remedies available when general principles are contravened. It will not be possible to take an action in court, or to challenge or quash any law or activity on the basis of the principles. The courts will be unable to overturn decisions, and individuals and non-governmental organisations will not be able to challenge decisions on the basis that they are not compatible with environmental principles such as sustainable development. In short, as the Bill stands, if a business or public body contravenes the principles of environmental law, it will not be possible to challenge that in court.

That is a clear departure from continuity, as the EU courts have strongly upheld the environmental principles, such as by overturning planning decisions that contravene the precautionary principle. The level of environmental protection after exit day will not therefore be as strong and rigorous as it was before exit day, unless we accept new clause 60 and do something right now to enshrine these principles in our law.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Is it not vital for air quality that we enshrine these principles in UK law, given that the Government have been told four times by the courts to improve air quality but failed to do so? It is essential that actions can be brought to enforce such really important things.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The role of the ECJ in applying fines has concentrated the minds of policy makers in the UK. It was only the threat of significant fines that led to the air being cleaned up in places such as London. One of the many things that worry me about the Brexit process is that, even in what the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said about closing the so-called governance gap, I have not heard any proposal from him for real sanctions to concentrate the minds of policy makers on bringing their laws into conformity.

In EU law, the environmental principles are forward looking and play a formative role in guiding not just day-to-day decisions, but future policy development. That role could be lost under the Bill as drafted. In the months and years ahead, the principles of environmental law should be applied to UK decision making in a number of high-risk areas, such as trade policy, chemicals, and infrastructure planning, but unless the Bill is amended, the legal force of the environmental principles to guide future policy and decision making will be lost.

I want to end with a few words about national policy statements. The Government have suggested several times that instead of enshrining the principles in UK law, they might instead consider using the NPS route. I have real concerns about that because an NPS is not a fixed, long-term commitment, and does not provide the long-term certainty of primary legislation. Such an approach would represent a serious step backwards from the current position.

The statutory framework for establishing an NPS limits its scope to planning matters, so we would need a new statutory instrument to have a much broader scope. Also, an NPS lacks the binding character of legislation. Courts could give little or no weight at all to policy statements so, essentially, the basic problem with an NPS is that a Secretary of State has a great deal of control over it, unlike with primary legislation. In a case in which a non-governmental organisation or an individual wanted to use an NPS to hold the Government and public bodies to account, there could be a serious temptation for the Government to amend the NPS precisely to make it less effective at holding them to account.

I want briefly to express my support for amendments 93 to 95, which the hon. Member for Bristol East will no doubt speak to. Those amendments speak to the primary intention of the Bill as expressed by Ministers. Without them, it could not be said that the same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before, as the Prime Minister has pledged. They are needed to ensure that our laws and our rights, and indeed the intent and purpose behind them, remain the same immediately after withdrawal from the EU. Any changes to those laws and rights, other than to ensure the faithful conversion of EU law into domestic law, should be made following our exit from the EU only through primary legislation, not by any other means. Those amendments therefore ask, in a sense, little of Ministers, and so, as with new clauses 30 and 60, I hope that the Minister will respond positively to them.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I have a large degree of agreement and sympathy with what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has just said. So far as animal sentience is concerned, I suspect we may find that there is more on that already in UK law than she is allowing, but I wait to hear from the Government about that. However, I do agree that, one way or another, we need it to be present in UK law at the end of this, and I think the Secretary of State is probably pretty convinced of the same thing.

I want mainly to talk about the question of new clauses 60 and 67, or more precisely what they are aiming at and how best to achieve it, because the point at which I disagree with the hon. Lady is not one of ends but one of means. It is a rare thing to happen in the House of Commons, but I hope I might at least half-persuade her by the end of my remarks that it would be better for her to adopt a different view of the mechanics than she is suggesting.

Let me begin with this: I agree with the hon. Lady wholeheartedly that, in the light of schedule 1, we cannot possibly rely on clause 6—even as I hope it will subsequently be adjusted—and still less on clauses 2 and 3 to do the heavy lifting that she rightly wants to get the precautionary principle and other critical principles into UK law. She is absolutely right about that.

The question that the hon. Lady and I are both asking is, how best can we get over that problem and get to the position where the UK courts and the UK Administration as a whole—the Government and their agencies—carry on applying those principles in a sensible and serious way to our environmental protection over succeeding decades? This is obviously a matter not just of a minute or a day or a year, but of a long period over which we want a settled, continued policy being carried on by succeeding UK Governments of different persuasions.

If that is the question, clearly one route would be some variant of new clause 60, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), or new clause 67 or some other variant. I completely admit that that is a route, but I want first to explain why I do not think it is an optimal route and then to explain why what has been talked about by the Secretary of State is a better route.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

And his mind is one that is capable of grasping these matters, if ever the mind of a Member of the House of Commons was. The first point, then, is that a proper statutory basis is superior to a specific amendment to the Bill.

[Caroline Lucas]

Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that the two are mutually exclusive? Why could we not have the security of knowing that we have a provision in the Bill? We are delighted with the new Secretary of State, but how long will he stay? Who knows? Who might come next? We want the certainty of the Bill now, as well as the nice hope of the environment Act that so many of us have been requesting for such a long time.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

First, I am confident that this Secretary of State will be here for rather longer than some other Secretaries of State have been recently. I welcome that, because I think he is a very, very fine Environment Secretary. Secondly, I am not saying that it is inconceivable that there could be two pieces of legislation, but I think it rather inelegant to legislate in a slightly awkward way, and then to repeal that legislation in a Bill that would probably start its passage before the passage of this Bill has been completed. I would prefer it to be done properly, although opinions may differ.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

What gives me the confidence is that I think it is perfectly doable, and I think the Secretary of State intends to do it. I am in a slightly odd position—the Secretary of State has to nod each time I say these things, because I cannot speak for him—but I assure the hon. Lady that I really am very confident about that. Let us proceed for a moment, however, on the assumption that that is indeed going to happen. That gives us a place in which to do things, although of course it does not solve all the problems.

My second point is that, unlike the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, I think that a national policy statement is an ideal vehicle for the translation of these principles into something much more solid and much more determinate. A national policy statement is not just something that a Minister dreams up and issues like a piece of confetti. It comes before the House of Commons and is subject to resolution by the House of Commons, and it is therefore debated. It is exposed in draft, and it is discussed by the green groups.

There will of course be considerable debate about the exact terms of a national policy statement that seeks to turn those principles into something much more concrete, but I think there is ample scope for turning it into something of which we could be really proud. It would also have a huge advantage over mere principles when the courts came to judge the actions of the state and measure them against it—for that is exactly what would happen. A national policy statement is a policy statement by Ministers. If Ministers do not follow that policy, they are, by hypothesis, acting irrationally and in a Wednesbury unreasonable way, and can therefore be judicially reviewed. When they are judicially reviewed, the courts will look at the policy statement and compare it with their actions. If the policy statement is properly debated, properly exposed and properly expressed, those actions can be measured against it in a very determinate and careful way, and we can end up with a much more solid environmental protection than we would ever have got out of the principles.

[Caroline Lucas]

The idea that judicial review will be an adequate recourse is misguided. Judicial review is about only the process, not the outcome. Moreover, it is becoming harder and harder for people to obtain the necessary funds: plenty of people would not know how to begin to do it. I also do not share the right hon. Gentleman’s confidence about the way in which a court will necessarily regard a national policy statement. An NPS does not have the same quality of judiciability as primary legislation.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Perhaps we will not reach agreement about this. I disagree with every part of what the hon. Lady has just said. First, judicial review has been a highly successful mechanism for environmental campaigners. It is, in fact, from judicial review that the clean air measures have arisen. Secondly, the reason why it is particularly effective in the case of a national policy statement is that a policy statement is a policy statement by Ministers and therefore creates a presumption of Wednesbury unreasonableness if it is departed from, so it is very easy to use as a tool for judicial review. Thirdly, judicial review is the mechanism that the principles in the new clause of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, or the Opposition new clause or the new clause of the hon. Member for Wakefield, would have to operate on. It is not the case that the courts in our country would simply take a set of principles and apply them to some set of cases. They would not know what to do with them. The Government would have to be judicially reviewed for failing to apply those principles in their policy.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will give way in a moment.

It is much better to be in a position where we can take the Government to judicial review for failing to apply a much more detailed set of policies, which are the Government’s policies, as approved in the House of Commons by resolution, and which have been fully debated and where we then know whether the court is likely to find that the action is or is not in accordance.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mary Creagh]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The Secretary of State is again nodding. That is why we have agreed that it is necessary under that same statute to create a body which is a prosecutorial authority, wholly independent of Government, along the lines of the Victims’ Commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner, the Office for Budget Responsibility, or the Equality and Human Rights Commission—we can choose which model—and which is an entity that is small and lean but, like the Committee on Climate Change, very serious. It would be established under statute, and charged with a duty under statute to ensure that the NPS is observed. I advocated the CCC when I was first working with Tony Juniper to get what became the Climate Change Act accepted in this House, and at an early stage I came to believe that the combination of clarity of objective and a body wholly independent and staffed by serious experts was a powerful mechanism, and so I think it has proved to be.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am interested in what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Is he proposing that the body he is describing would have the same power of sanction that currently—as we have been talking about—the ECJ has, in the ability to fine Governments, which is what finally made them conform to the air quality laws, for example? Will this body have the capacity to do something as strong as fining Government to make sure they put their house in order?

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

indicated dissent.

[Richard Benyon]

I know that that was not quite what the hon. Lady said, but I have the scars on my back. When the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) was Environment Secretary, he rightly made Britain stand up for the conservation of the seas by opposing the over-fishing of tuna in the Atlantic. The first thing sitting in my in-tray when I arrived at DEFRA in 2010, however, was a very big infraction fine against the UK for going against the EU’s direction to fish unsustainably. I also remember working with organisations such as the International Whaling Commission and sitting for hours in a meeting of the EU co-ordination body before putting our case for better whale and cetacean conservation, only to have Britain’s pro-environmental polices watered down. We have an opportunity, if we can get this right, to be more ambitious than that.

On Second Reading, I looked for measures that would secure for the long term the environmental protections we have learned to value—I entirely agree with the hon. Lady and others that measures such as the water framework directive need to be transposed into UK provision—and for a replacement mechanism following the loss of infraction. Infraction keeps Ministers awake at night, but what is the position for a sovereign nation on its own, outside a pan-national body? I have looked for an alternative, and I was tempted by her new clause, and by the Leader of the Opposition’s new clause, because I thought they might tie future Governments. However, after consultation with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith), we looked for another mechanism.

Working with the Environment Secretary has been a textbook lesson in how to improve law. He and the Government recognise that there is a governance gap that we have to fill. One suggestion is the belt-and-braces but perhaps over-complicated arrangement that the hon. Lady and others have suggested, but there is an alternative that I find intensely attractive. When we took the issue to the Secretary of State, he listened and then asked questions—the process was rather like a university tutorial—and he then asked us back to tell us what he had done. His suggestion, which has been backed up by the Minister today, is something that green groups such as Greener UK and the Green Alliance have been asking for: a proposal that really locks in these measures.

The Secretary of State first suggested that we set up this new body. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset is absolutely right, because we need, through this consultation, to ensure that the body is independent, that we know its remit, that its sanctions are in place, and that it has the level of independence of the Children’s Commissioner, for example. The Secretary of State seems determined that that is what it should be, so I think we have the offer of a very good measure, because it will secure the vital ingredient, which is the national policy statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I regret the fact that I am rising to speak on this subject, but it is a matter of enormous public concern about which I have received dozens of representations from my constituents. It is an enormous shame that this debate has been delayed to such an extent that we have such a short time to discuss a matter of national importance about which our constituents are so concerned.

I want first to focus on animal welfare. We have heard Ministers say many times—we heard it again today—that animal welfare will be non-negotiable in our trade deals post Brexit. However, for those looking from the outside, it jars—perhaps that is the appropriate word—to hear the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs making those commitments after the Secretary of State for International Trade has suggested that chlorinated chicken could be defended. Provisions need to be hardwired and applied to the whole of Government, and that can occur only through primary legislation.

I served as a Labour MEP for three years. In that role, I was very aware that EU legislation was not perfect, as many Members have pointed out, particularly when it came to live animal exports. I was also aware that Britain went further than many other European countries in areas such as animal testing. It remains the case, however, as so many people have said, that about 80% of British animal welfare and environmental legislation comes from the EU.

Amendment 350 proposes transposing article 13 of the TFEU into UK law to recognise the sentience of animals. If we look at the words of the Environment Secretary, the Government seem to have changed their position. They appeared to give a commitment to transpose the provision back in July. I do not understand why expert groups such as the Association of Lawyers for Animal Welfare or Wildlife and Countryside Link would be suggesting that we need a separate provision if it already existed in existing animal welfare legislation. They are the experts on this, and I am listening to them. I point out that even under EU law, Britain is not a beacon in this regard. A constituent of mine, Mr Peter Tutt, has done a huge amount to raise awareness of the fact that much marine life that is recognised as sentient in other countries is not recognised as such in the UK.

The right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) says he believes that legislation of this type should come forward separately, but Opposition Members have made many persuasive objections to that. I would add that a core element of the leave campaign was that environmental and animal welfare protections would be preserved after Brexit, so it is absolutely correct that they should be part of our approach and set out very clearly in this Bill. Furthermore, we cannot rely on a consultation, as its outcome is unclear and it will not be calibrated with the progress of this Bill. I will end now, because I see that Mrs Laing is asking me to do so.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for what has been an interesting and good debate, albeit sadly too short.

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response to new clause 30. It is not good enough to claim that animal sentience is already covered by UK law by virtue of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 since the protocol is not even explicitly included or referred to in that Act and the word “sentience” does not appear anywhere in it. The Act applies only to companion animals—domestic pets. It does not apply to farm animals, wildlife or laboratory animals. For those reasons, I intend to press new clause 30 to a Division.

On the environmental principles, the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) made very interesting and exciting points. I have long called for an environment Act, but I still do not see why that has to be at the expense of getting something in this Bill. That is important, because essentially the protections need to be in law from day one of Brexit. My worry is that I do not share his optimism about how quickly we could get an environment Act through the House. I would love to think we could do it in that time, but I am not convinced we will. I shall therefore press new clause 30 to a vote.

[Geraint Davies]

On a point of order, Mrs Laing. We have had insufficient time for the debate, certainly to hear from me and others who wanted to speak at greater length about these very important constitutional and environmental issues.

RSPCA (Prosecutions)

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Westminster Hall

[Simon Hart]

I am sorely tempted to say yes, but I will say no for the moment.

That is why we are here. The RSPCA can be, and often is, a huge force for good, particularly at a local level; that is why I was a member for many years. The debate is not about country sports or the differences of opinion we might have about animal welfare; it is about the RSPCA’s role as possibly the most prolific private prosecutor in the UK.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Simon Hart]

I will give way to the hon. Lady. [Interruption.] She asked more nicely.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman quoted Richard Martin a moment ago. Did he not also say:

“If legislation to protect animals is to be effective, it must be adequately enforced”?

Is what the RSPCA is doing with the Heythrop hunt not enforcing exactly that legislation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Williams. I have to put it on the public record that I am a proud member and vice-president of the RSCPA. I am also proud of the fact that the UK has laws protecting animals from abuse and neglect. There is always room for improvement, but, taken as a whole, this legislation is a marker of a civilised society that refuses to condone cruelty or tolerate the exploitation of other species.

[Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

I should like to say, as a member of the Committee that considered the Animal Welfare Bill in 2006, that when we make legislation we want it to be enforced. Does the hon. Lady agree that there is no point designing legislation and ensuring that it is workable and enforceable if it is not enforced?

[Caroline Lucas]

I agree, which is why it is so extraordinary that, somehow, upholding the law can be regarded as a political or, worse, a party political act. I do not get that.

It is interesting to note that the hon. Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart), who secured the debate, has coyly not mentioned the H-word. That is probably because he realises that he has lost that case. We have clear guidance from the Charity Commission, which says that

“the Commission does not consider that the trustees have breached their duty of prudence in the case of this prosecution.”

Having lost that case, the hon. Gentleman is now hitting out wildly with a lot of accusations, not based on evidence, about prosecutions more generally.

Like the vast majority of members of the public, I strongly support the Hunting Act 2004—I am not afraid of using the H-word—and I am committed to strengthening its provisions, as well as to seeing the ban on the use of dogs in chasing and killing wild mammals rigorously upheld. As the hon. Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) said, as with other legislation designed to protect animals, or anything else, enforcement is critical. That is why bringing prosecutions is so important. The RPSCA is uniquely placed to carry out that task.

Colleagues know that in 2005 a Select Committee concluded that the RSCPA was the only organisation with the requisite expertise to undertake animal welfare prosecutions. The Association of Chief Police Officers has also gone on the record to pay tribute to the importance of this role and its fulfilment by the RPSCA, saying:

“Were the RSPCA, as a charity, to decide next week not to do this work any more none of the rest of us in the public service could pick it up. Animal welfare would not be furthered; it would be significantly disadvantaged.”

Thanks to its excellence and consistent best practice, in 2010, the RSPCA secured the convictions of 2,441 defendants for animal welfare offences and gave out 86,354 welfare improvement notices under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. In 2011, a total of 3,114 convictions were secured, further reinforcing the message that the law is essential to its work as a charity charged with protecting animals from abuse.

This work as a private prosecutor is clearly identified in the RSPCA’s constitution as part of its charitable aims, which include preventing or suppressing cruelty towards animals In the charity’s own words:

“Upholding the law is not a political act but is in direct furtherance of the RPSCA’s charitable purpose.”

That said, it rightly has a clear duty to ensure that any prosecutions undertaken both meet a public interest test and are backed up by strong evidence that animal cruelty is taking place. The Charity Commission says:

“If considering a prosecution, charities must consider whether bringing a prosecution is a reasonable and effective use of the charity's resources, what the prospects of success are, and whether the public interest is served by a prosecution.”

Let me take each of those considerations in turn in relation to the decision to prosecute the Heythrop hunt, as that case in particular seems to have prompted this debate.

[Nigel Adams (Selby and Ainsty) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady agree with the district judge who thought that the amount of money was not proportionate? He said that £320,000-odd on the particular case referred to was staggering. Could donors’ money not be put to better use?

[Caroline Lucas]

I shall come on to that in a moment. There are many reasons why that amount of money had to be spent. I do not suppose that any of us would choose to spend money in that way, but, to return to the wonderful comment by the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), if people stopped breaking the law the RSPCA would not have to keep spending the money.

Given that the RSPCA has a 98% prosecution success rate, compared with 50% at the CPS, it would seem to be pretty well practised at assessing whether a case looks set to succeed. In the instance of the Heythrop hunt, the charity’s judgment was correct and a conviction secured. It was a landmark case, the first time that a hunt has faced corporate charges for illegal hunting and the first case brought by the RSPCA for breaches of the Hunting Act. That case was based on footage of foxes being chased by dogs, filmed on several occasions in Gloucestershire and Oxfordshire during November 2011 and February and March 2012. Expert analysis verified that the offences were deliberately committed.

All that indicates that the charity thought carefully before bringing a prosecution under the Hunting Act. It considered the evidence and judged accurately that the case was likely to be won. It assessed the impact of the case in acting as a deterrent and in sending out a clear message about upholding the ban on dogs chasing and killing wild mammals, thus preventing animal cruelty. Judging by the interest that the ruling has attracted, the charity made a pretty smart call on using resources effectively.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

To defend the organisation, is it not true that this has nothing to do with a false concern about the expenditure of money, and that it is about neutralising the RSPCA before a new onslaught to repeal the hunt legislation?

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right: there is a smoke screen, and I want to show how the case is not coherent and has no real rigour.

Much of the interest has been about the amount of money spent, with concerns expressed that the expense was not justifiable. I disagree. It was a test case and one based on a high volume of evidence, which needed careful examination to determine whether it constituted a strong enough case to bring to court. Ironically, many critics of the cost are also questioning the RSPCA’s judgment on the prospects of success, even though the charity’s thoroughness in considering whether prosecution was appropriate and its experience of other high-profile criminal prosecutions were what allowed it to budget accurately and appropriately.

It is also worth noting that the defendants indicated right up until trial that they would defend all charges rigorously. Given the importance of the case, and that the evidence and public interest tests were met, the RSPCA had a duty to respond with equal rigour and not to back down in the face of lawbreakers and those guilty of animal cruelty. Indeed, the Charity Commission has vindicated the RSPCA’s decision, stating in the letter I just quoted that it did not consider the trustees to have

“breached their duty of prudence”.

The public interest test is important. Enforcing such an important piece of animal welfare legislation is in the interests of the public, for both those who support the law and those who wrongly believe that they are above it.

[Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)]

Rather than worrying about whether the RSPCA is misusing its funds in bringing the prosecution, should we not as taxpayers be criticising the CPS for not being prepared to spend its funding on bringing fox-hunting prosecutions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady makes an incredibly good point. That is exactly where the focus of our ire should be, and not on the RSPCA, which had to step in to fulfil such work.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The assertion that has just been made is entirely and completely incorrect, as I will explain in my speech. The CPS will prosecute cases referred to it.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Minister for his intervention, but the evidence and experience that we have is that the CPS does not prosecute in the number of ways in which the RSPCA would. I am sorry that he disagrees, but that is our experience in the area.

Eighty per cent. of people in Great Britain feel that, where there is evidence of people hunting illegally with dogs, such people should be prosecuted. In addition, 70% support animal welfare charities bringing private prosecutions against those whom they believe to have been hunting illegally, provided there is strong evidence and if the police or CPS, for whatever reason, do not proceed. In other words, the public want the RSPCA to prosecute in cases such as that of the Heythrop hunt; to do so is justified by their charitable aims.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Does the hon. Lady agree—she may not, of course—that the RSPCA is in danger of being not only a charity and a campaigning organisation, but an investigatory and prosecuting body that is pursuing a militant animal rights agenda? That is a concern that we have.

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman is probably not surprised that I do not agree. That was an extraordinary statement. I return to the words of Richard Martin, a founder of the RSPCA, quoted at the beginning of the debate:

“If legislation to protect animals is to be effective, it must be adequately enforced.”

The evidence is available, and I have quoted from the police and other authorities that if the RSPCA did not prosecute, it would not be done.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Caroline Lucas]

I am sorry, but to accept more interventions would not be fair to other Members. I have been generous.

[Simon Hart]

I emphasise that nowhere in any of my comments have I ever suggested that the RSPCA should not be allowed to prosecute. The hon. Lady is misleading the House by suggesting that that is what I am recommending. I am recommending that the process needs to be reviewed, not the policy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

Yes, I think I thank the hon. Gentleman for that.

I will not go back over the motivation for introducing the debate. We all have our views and nothing can be proved.

I will finish, Mr Williams, as you want us to move on. I simply want to ask why the case was brought to the attention of the Charity Commission. I can only conclude that those who did that wanted to undermine the RSPCA—that was what it was about, not about the hunt per se. That move is cynical and not worthy of anyone acting in the public interest or in the interests of animal protection.

The UK has a body charged with the oversight of charities, the Charity Commission. That body has confirmed that it is not investigating the RSPCA, because there is nothing to investigate. A Press Complaints Commission case on misleading and inaccurate media coverage is pending, yet some have persisted in attempting to smear the RSPCA and to question its role as a prosecutor.

[Angela Smith]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the so-called rebuke referred to earlier, from the Charity Commission, was actually the usual advice issued to organisations that have been under the media spotlight, and that the RSPCA has already started a review of its procedures, because it is confident that they are robust?

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady is right: the RSPCA began that review before the Charity Commission mentioned anything.

I welcome the opportunity both to put on the record my understanding of how the Heythrop hunt prosecution and other prosecutions demonstrably further the pursuit of the RSPCA’s charitable objectives, and to represent the large number of constituents who have written to me, as to many hon. Members, about the importance of protecting the RSPCA’s important legal work.

[Hywel Williams (in the Chair)]

We need to start the winding-up speeches at 10.40 am. I call Cheryl Gillan—briefly.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

It is a great pleasure, Mr Williams, to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart) on securing this debate. I know from discussions with him that he has considerable experience of the matter and feels strongly about it. I think the matter has been passed to me because, although my Department does not cover hunting—far from it—I superintend the prosecutorial services in England and Wales.

I shall start by dealing straight away with the point raised by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). The Crown Prosecution Service prosecutes cases instituted and referred to it by the police. They include hunting and wildlife offences. Since 2005, the CPS has prosecuted 378 offences under the Hunting Act 2004, and it regularly prosecutes other wildlife offences. In 2011-12, it prosecuted 298 offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, 16 offences under the Deer Act 1991, 43 offences under the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, and 54 offences under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. The CPS publishes legal guidance on prosecutions under the Hunting Act 2004 and of prosecution of wildlife offences generally on its website. If I have time, I will return to that.

[Caroline Lucas]

The RSPCA has a 98% success rate in prosecutions, compared with around 50% for the CPS.

[The Attorney-General]

I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is talking about a general figure for the CPS or about wildlife figures for the CPS.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am talking about wildlife cases—comparable cases, so we are comparing like with like.

[The Attorney-General]

That may well be, but the point remains that the hon. Lady suggested that the CPS does not take on those cases. If a case is referred to the CPS by the police, it will be considered for prosecution, and if it passes the code test for Crown prosecutors, it will be prosecuted.

The RSPCA, on the other hand, is a private prosecutor when bringing prosecutions. It is an unusual set-up, but the right to bring a private prosecution in England and Wales is an ancient right, which has existed from the time when the state did not have prosecution authorities and citizens were required to prosecute cases themselves. That certainly was the position when the RSPCA was set up. Although most prosecutions are now conducted by public prosecuting authorities, the right to bring a private prosecution remains, preserved by Parliament in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

Speaking personally, I once threatened to bring a private prosecution when I was dissatisfied because the police were not taking action, which did at least lead to my getting a proper explanation from the police as to why they were behaving in the way they were. I believe that it is a fundamental and important right that we have in a free society. Private prosecutions allow an individual to bring a prosecution when the state, for whatever reason, does not. Prosecutions by the RSPCA are, however, just that—private prosecutions. It has no public or special status as a prosecutor. The RSPCA sets out, in accordance with its charitable aims and in its own literature, that it applies the full code test for Crown prosecutors. If I may say so—I do not mean this in any way pejoratively—that is a self-assertion. The RSPCA may well be correct, but it certainly cannot be independently verified, and it is in no position to do that.

To pick up on something that was said, I have no doubt that ACPO may well be correct in saying that were it not for the work of the RSPCA, the burden that would be placed on the police to investigate such crimes would be considerable. I am the first to recognise, as I am sure everybody in the room today does, that the RSPCA, through its charitable work, has performed an extremely valuable role in dealing with animal welfare and cruelty issues.

Assisted Suicide

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) not only on persuading the Backbench Business Committee to make time for this debate, for which I am grateful, but on his thoughtful contribution, which set the tone for the debate. I also congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock) and the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) on their contributions. In my view, the debate is one of the highlights of this parliamentary term, and it is such a shame that there is unlikely to be a great deal of interest from the media, as I think that the debate shows the House at its best.

Assisted suicide is certainly a difficult issue, and I do not believe that anyone has an immediate and obvious answer to that difficulty. Personally, I am always slightly suspicious of those who believe that there is a ready answer. The issue is perhaps made more difficult by the fact that, as politicians in a democracy, it is our job to reflect public opinion, and when it comes to such issues the public far too often behave like ostriches, wanting to bury their heads and forget about it. No one wants to believe that they or those whom they love would ever be so ill that they would want to die. The truth, however, is that many of us will find ourselves in that situation.

Despite the fact that we have an increasingly ageing population, we also fail to address additional, related problems, such as the problems of pensions and long-term care, which have led to the social care crisis. Again, that is because none of us wants to believe that we will have difficulties in old age or that we will be seriously ill and need assistance. Therefore, it is not terribly surprising that we have failed to address the issue of how we ought to have a good death. Some of us will die peacefully in our sleep, but many of us will not. With advances in medicine, many of us will live with a medical condition that, even 10 years ago, we would have been unlikely to survive, and which would likely have resulted in a speedy death, so many of us are likely to live longer.

Many of us, however, are likely to live with a painful, debilitating disease that will shorten our lives. Some of us believe that that is the will of God; some of us believe that life comes from God and it is for God to take that life away; many of us believe that Pope John Paul II was an inspiration, given the dignity he showed in dealing with his Parkinson’s; and some of us—I am one of them—believe that if more hospice and palliative care was available to those coming towards the end of their lives, they would wish to live as long as they could, so long as they could remain pain-free and continue to live with dignity. I was very moved when I went to Trinity hospice, and I would consider myself fortunate, if necessary, to see out the end of my days in such a hospice.

Others, however, do not believe that such an approach is sufficient. Diane Pretty and Debbie Purdy, for example, do not wish, even with the greatest assistance, to live until the time when God, if there is a God, takes that life away; they wish to have some control over the end of their life.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Does the hon. Lady agree, however, that the essence of the Director of Public Prosecution’s advice is to give dying people the ability to live? It is precisely the knowledge that they have control over when they are able to die that allows them to live more fully and, often, for longer.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, who in fact takes me to my next point, which is that no one could fail to be struck by the clearly unaffected joy of Debbie Purdy and her caring husband, Omar Puente, when they believed that there had been clarification of the stage at which they might jointly have been able to decide when she could die. The fact that they seemed to be overjoyed by that showed an essential truth in relation to them and to the decisions that they personally needed and wanted to make—and wanted the law to allow them to make.

Having rattled through the difficulties in relation to the issue, may I move on to the motion and to the amendments before the House? The motion welcomes the Director of Public Prosecution’s guidance on cases of encouraging or assisting suicide, and it is certainly my view that, as others have said, the guidelines are sensible and proportionate. The hon. Member for Croydon South rightly said that they are compassionate, and many members of the public believe that they are.

When the public saw that Diane Pretty, despite all her efforts, eventually did suffocate—exactly what she did not want, because she wanted to be able to end her life before that with assistance, if necessary—they found the DPP’s response to the case of Debbie Purdy a few years later was proportionate, and it had their broad support. The motion does not seek to change the law.

Amendment (a), in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford, would not change the law, either. It

“invites the Government to consult as to whether to put the guidance on a statutory basis.”

When looking at amendments and at quasi-legal documents, I think that the safest way to interpret them is to interpret what they say as meaning what they say, and the amendment simply asks the Government to consult on whether the DPP’s guidance should be put on a statutory basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I very much welcome this debate, and I commend the Backbench Business Committee for giving it time, and the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) for tabling the motion.

I am a vice-chair of the all-party group on choice at the end of life, and I am personally supportive of a change in the law on assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. That said, I want to reiterate that today’s debate is about the application of the existing law on assisted suicide, and not about a change in the law. Of course, I fully support the development of palliative care provision, and I welcome the amendment tabled on that. I am encouraged that the evidence from countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as from states such as Oregon, shows that a change in law to support greater choice at the end of life often goes hand in hand with improvements to palliative care.

[Fiona Bruce]

Are those improvements not due to the progress made on scientific and medical developments in recent years?

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[Caroline Lucas]

They might be partly to do with that, but the Economist Intelligence Unit’s research into palliative care across the world found that the pressure brought to bear on policy makers in public debates on assisted suicide often acted as a catalyst for the improvement of palliative care. I do not think that we need to see the two concepts as being in opposition to each other. The move for greater palliative care can also come about as a direct result of greater debate on assisted dying.

I also recognise that, no matter how much we might wish it to be otherwise, such care cannot remove all the suffering from someone who is dying. There will be those who request assistance from loved ones to help them to end their lives. The way in which the law deals with those cases is of the utmost importance to all those involved, and it is therefore right that this should be the subject of today’s debate and that Members of Parliament should express their views on it.

I welcome the clarification provided by the DPP’s guidelines. There is no doubt that those who maliciously or irresponsibly encourage suicide should be prosecuted, and I do not think that anyone is saying otherwise. However, it is not in the public interest to prosecute a normally law-abiding citizen who, out of love and compassion, helps a loved one to die. As Members of Parliament, we have to ask ourselves whether a normally law-abiding person should face automatic prosecution for a one-off, compassionately motivated act. I hope that this is an area of common ground between those who support, and those who oppose, a change in the law on assisted dying, just as I am sure that there is a shared commitment to palliative care.

Many hon. Members have shared moving stories of their own personal experience. I have a story to share that is at one remove, as it involves someone whom I do not know directly. A mother wrote to me about her daughter, Lizzy. She explained to me that her daughter was nearly 21 when she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, and that

“From the time of diagnosis she had hoped that if her health got too bad she would want to be able to choose the manner of her death. As we approached Christmas 2008 she asked me if I would start to make arrangements, she didn’t want to face another birthday with deteriorating health.”

They thought that they would be given the green light by September 2009, but, as Lizzy’s mother explained,

“we had a nasty fright when instead of the green light we were reported to Social Services. The DPP’s guidelines had been put in place earlier that year so when the police, social workers, psychiatrist and various other representatives interviewed Lizzy and me, the rules laid down made a clear case for her to be allowed to travel.

In hindsight I am very grateful to the person who contacted the authorities, it allowed them to hear from Lizzy herself, rather than me having to persuade officials that this was her desire. I…wish that people had seen the relief on her face when the letter giving her the green light actually came, it was really touch and go whether her health would hold up for travel and she was very scared of being trapped in a slowly dying body…We eventually travelled to Switzerland on 7th December 2009 and Lizzy passed away peacefully on 11th December.”

If there is a lesson to be drawn from Lizzy’s story, I think it is that regulation, clarity and openness should guide public policy in this area, rather than what may be an understandable desire to turn a blind eye. I think that any assisted death should take place within a rigorous framework of regulation, as well as in the context of the availability of the highest level of palliative care. Very few of us would want to suffer against our wishes at the end of life, and I think we have a clear responsibility to consider how our laws protect people confronting such momentous decisions—people like Lizzy and her mother. I therefore welcome the DPP’s policy on assisted suicide, and support this important motion.