Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to take part in this Second Reading debate. I am particularly pleased to welcome my noble friend the Minister to her place and her first Bill—the first of many, I hope. My two noble friends on the Front Bench know that they have my support for the Bill.

Following the remarks from my noble friend Lady Lawrence, I was struck by the Government’s commitment in the Commons to introduce an amendment to make hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability aggravated offences. I look forward to its introduction in due course and offer my support to my noble friends the Ministers on it. As a Labour and Co-operative Peer and a former USDAW member, I also welcome that the Bill addresses retail crime.

In this debate, I intend to address Clause 191. I profoundly disagree with the two speakers who have spoken before me on this. On 5 June, MPs voted to insert the clause into the Crime and Policing Bill by 379 to 137 on a free vote. The clause would disapply the existing criminal law on abortion from women acting in relation to their own pregnancies, bringing the law for women in England and Wales into line with the changes that Westminster already made to abortion law in Northern Ireland in 2019, which works well and was debated at some length and agreed in this House.

The proposal to repeal the provision was led by my honourable friend Tonia Antoniazzi MP. In recent times, contrary to the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, we have seen a substantial increase in the number of investigations into and prosecutions of women in England and Wales under abortion law dating back to 1861. That has included women who were victims of domestic abuse, suspected victims of human trafficking and exploitation, and girls under the age of 18. Clause 191 is a simple, principled stance that reflects the strong position of cross-party MPs, and I strongly support it as it is.

Notwithstanding the words of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Viscount—as well as the hysteria from those outside our gates this morning—the Abortion Act 1967 will not be changed by this clause. However, a number of technical issues remain, which I and others believe it is our job in this House to consider as the legislation proceeds. They concern the lifelong impacts of investigation into, and convictions for, relevant offences. The change in the law under Clause 191 applies only to offences committed after the Bill receives Royal Assent. There are a number of women whose pre-existing cases remain under investigation where decisions have not been made, so the House needs to consider an amendment to halt ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed offences, to pardon women with criminal records and to expunge the records of those investigations.

If a woman is convicted of these offences, it precludes her from certain employment opportunities for life due to the DBS check. It also includes women who have not had a commitment, because that also stays on their record as part of a DBS check. In line with the Turing pardon for the criminalisation of same-sex activity and similarly outdated laws, an amendment that pardoned women with a criminal record for a repealed offence and expunged those records would be relevant.

Finally, notwithstanding the introduction of Clause 191, I note that a number of offences have been brought against women under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. It is therefore important that we ensure that the law is in step on this matter if we want to decriminalise abortion in these circumstances.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. When Section 149 of the Equality Act came into effect, it was seen largely as benign. It very reasonably imposed an obligation on public sector organisations to treat people with fairness and equality and to ensure that there was equality of opportunity within the organisation and in the interface that those bodies had with the wider public, whether it was local government, the NHS or other bodies. However, it has unfortunately been the subject of Parkinson’s law, where the work expands to fill the category. Therefore, instead of focus on the managerial targets, action plans and strategy documents which would deliver demonstrable improvement in policing performance across a wide number of areas and criminal activity, there has often, regrettably, been an overfocus on the public sector equality duty.

As someone with a background as a human resources manager and practitioner, I believe that every decent leadership in every organisation should have a set of policies which deliver fairness and equality within the organisation. It should not be incumbent upon the Government to compel organisations to do something that they should already be doing. Many leading organisations in the public and private sector do so anyway because treating people with fairness and decency and giving them opportunity delivers better performance.

I apologise to the Committee for mentioning again my experience on the British Transport Police Authority. At the end of October 2023, I was invited to attend a workshop on diversity, equality and inclusion. That cost the taxpayer £29,000 for, essentially, two days of a workshop, some handouts and some supplementary material which contained contested theories around critical race theory, white privilege and microaggressions. I declined to attend the first day; the second day was much more productive because it was focused on the senior management objectives of the British Transport Police. This expansion of the public sector equality duty has been inimical to the main objectives of policing, which are to tackle crime and protect the safety and security of our citizens—on the railways, in the case of the BTP, and in the wider country.

There is a special case to be made that policing is different because it has the responsibility, as a corporate entity within the Peel principles, to police by consent and to treat people equally irrespective of their age, race, religion or ethnicity. There is an issue of undermining the trust and faith people have in the police if we concentrate too much on a duty which is quite divisive, contentious and controversial.

For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment and look forward to the Minister’s answer. I hope that he will at least engage with the argument. He is shaking his head—I do not know why, because we have not yet concluded the debate. He should know better than to dismiss any noble Lord before the conclusion of a debate. For the reasons I have enunciated, I hope that the Minister will at least engage with the debate in a thoughtful way, which is what we normally expect from him.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, the public sector equality duty exists so that our public services in the UK, which are funded by all of us, obey the laws on equalities. It is there because that is not what used to happen—and sometimes it still does not happen. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that all he had to do was watch the recent television programme about the goings-on—the racism and misogyny—in one of our local police stations to know that we need these things on our statute book. As a veteran of the Equality Act 2010, I am very proud that we have them there. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give his usual defence of, “It’s Labour that always triumphs and always puts forward equalities, because that is actually important for our society”.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for outlining the core, essential use of the public sector equality duty. I note that the Government’s website says:

“The Public Sector Equality Duty … requires public authorities to have due regard … when exercising their functions, like making decisions … It is intended to help decision-makers, including Government ministers, to comply with the duty”.


It does not talk about Pride marches or the detail of training.

Section 149 of the Equality Act says:

“A public authority must … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.


I do not think the police could argue with anything there. It must also

“advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.

That speaks to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about some of the very poor, racist behaviour we have seen from a few individuals. It must also

“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (1)”.

I have quoted that very short section because the descriptions by some previous speakers in this short debate have made it sound like something completely different. I would be very worried if the police no longer had to follow the public sector equality duty as set out in the Equality Act. We can all argue about whether we do or do not like going on training days, or about a certain amount of money being well spent or not, but we really want to see discrimination eliminated, and that is particularly important in the police.

The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, said on the last group that we all need common sense and practicality. The PSED is the tool that does that, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for outlining the detail. He is right that the police should follow the law; the point is that the PSED and the impact assessments also fit within that. Getting rid of the PSED would mean that unlawful discrimination might well be missed, and that would be dreadful. He also said that it is not down to the police to deliver equality. I think the Equality Act differs on that and, given the work the police do, we would be pretty horrified if they suddenly said they did not have to deliver equality.

One of the ways that racism can be eliminated from the police is by ensuring compliance with the PSED. It is not the PSED itself at fault, but what is going on inside police authorities. That is why, for the third group today, we are talking about the importance of the White Paper on policing that has just been published, which will change the culture and ensure that that stops. We on these Benches believe that the PSED is a vital tool for the police to deliver that.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 191 standing part of the Bill.

Our role as parliamentarians, especially in this House, is to ensure that laws that make it on to the statute book are safe. Good laws require careful thought and prior consideration regarding any unintended consequences. Clause 191 fails to meet these criteria and should not become law. It was hastily added to an unrelated Bill and concerns a proposal that was neither a government manifesto commitment, nor called for by the public, nor subject to even rudimentary scrutiny.

Let me be clear: the law change proposed by Clause 191 does not relate primarily to one’s views on abortion, on which there will be a range of perspectives in this House. The abortion debate is often presented as pitting the rights of a woman against the rights of an unborn child at varying stages of development. It is not accidental that the legal limit for abortion is 24 weeks. That marks roughly the stage at which the baby is fully viable when born. This clause not only fails even to consider that person but would endanger the mother.

Laws exist for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, they exist to deter us from doing things that would cause significant harm to ourselves or others, out of motives that may be devious or simply desperate. The current law prohibiting women from performing their own abortions after 24 weeks is one such law. The existing legal deterrent protects women. For example, if a partner seeks to pressure a woman into an abortion beyond the 24-week limit, a limit which I note is already double that common in most European countries, a woman can currently point to the criminal law as a reason for not doing so. Removing this would make it much harder for vulnerable women to resist such pressure and would be particularly troubling given the dangers of unsupervised self-induced abortions later in pregnancy.

There is a supreme irony that those who claim to support legal abortion on the basis that the alternative would be unsafe—illegal abortions—are now proposing that women can perform such illegal abortions, outside the terms of the Abortion Act, in an unsafe environment. This law change would, in effect, reintroduce back-street abortion, as women would not be able to have terminations in a clinic beyond the 24-week limit but could do so at home, on their own, without the prospect of any subsequent investigation, using pills not designed for use outside of a clinical context beyond 10 weeks. The potential consequences are terrifying.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness accept that none of these things has happened in Northern Ireland? We changed the law and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland several years ago and literally none of the things that she is mentioning has happened there—nor in any of the other 50 countries where abortion is being decriminalised.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 456 has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Falkner, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who unfortunately cannot be here due to a prior commitment overseas.

This is a simple amendment: it would reinstate the offences that Clause 191 would otherwise decriminalise for women acting in relation to their pregnancies. The amendment also provides that criminal proceedings against any woman acting in relation to her pregnancy could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the current law, a woman may avoid criminal liability if defences such as duress apply. The effect of Clause 191 would be that, regardless of circumstances, it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to do any act with the intention of procuring her own miscarriage at any stage of the pregnancy. It would, however, remain an offence for any other person to administer drugs or use instruments to cause an abortion. If Clause 191 is adopted, we would end up with a law that simultaneously denies criminal responsibility to the principal—again, regardless of individual intent or circumstances—while maintaining it for others.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for the very useful meeting that she arranged before Christmas for some of us and the proponents of Clause 191, in particular Ms Antoniazzi MP. As the proponents explained to us, what has prompted Clause 191 is a rise in completely unmeritorious investigations against women. Some of these cases are genuinely appalling. For example, we know of the case of a woman who went into spontaneous premature labour, called for help and instead of being met by medical support was met by the police. While she was still trying to resuscitate her prematurely born baby, even before the paramedics arrived, the police were in the house searching the bins. She was separated from her critically ill baby and investigated for a year for abortion offences, despite medical tests confirming she had not taken any medication.

There are other cases where women have been forced to take abortion pills by an abusive or violent partner, and they were put under criminal investigation while the partner was not. These investigations seldom result in prosecutions and the very few prosecutions hardly ever result in a conviction.

Under our amendment, the consent of the Attorney-General would be required to institute criminal proceedings, not to open an investigation, but there are reasons to believe that this procedural requirement would have a restraining impact on the investigation phase too. The Attorney-General cannot give consent retrospectively. The CPS’s guidance for offences that require AG consent makes it very clear that prosecutors should seek consent before charge.

The current policy for these offences also requires the involvement of senior officials. Before a case is submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for consent, a deputy chief crown prosecutor or deputy head of a central casework division must check that the case has been prepared to an appropriate standard. Following on from that, a lawyer at the Attorney General’s Office will review the application before placing it before the Attorney-General. That lawyer may seek further information or clarification from the relevant prosecutor and their line manager. It is also necessary to ensure that the Attorney-General is allowed sufficient time to consider the case, so that he can make his own assessment.

Finally, for all these offences, the role of the Attorney-General does not end with the consent to prosecution. The Attorney-General will have to maintain an interest in the progress of the case and be kept up to date.

The amendment cannot rule out the risk of an inappropriate or unmeritorious investigation. That risk cannot be ruled out for any offence on our statute book. The amendment seeks to balance competing legal and moral principles, while taking into account the reality of the situation.

The requirement for Attorney-General consent should discourage the police from investigating cases that will not pass muster not only with the CPS at a senior level but with the Attorney-General. The requirement would also offer an opportunity for a tightening of the policy in respect of these offences so that the risk of unmeritorious investigations and prosecutions is further reduced. The amendment does not specify a requirement for the Attorney-General to introduce guidance on the circumstances in which consent would be given, but it is to be expected that such guidance will be published and could make it clear that the bar is, indeed, high.

This is a probing amendment. There are other amendments in this group that I am interested in and inclined to support to mitigate what seems a rather radical approach in Clause 191. It would be of assistance in this debate if the Government could help us understand a bit more about what is really happening with these investigations.

To conclude, I have three brief questions for the Minister. First, what is the latest available data on these investigations, and do the data confirm an increase in criminal investigations against women since 2020? Secondly, how do the Government explain this rise in investigations? Finally, other than Clause 191—which, of course, was not part of the Bill originally—what policy steps have the Government been considering to remedy this problem?

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.

The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.

Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.

The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.

Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.

Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.

This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 456C, but I support Amendment 456, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The purpose of tabling Amendment 456C is to see if a compromise can be achieved between those who favour Clause 191 in its present form and those who are strongly opposed to it.

Late-term abortions are, of course, already lawful if they fall within the permissive provisions of Section 1(1)(b) to (d) of the Abortion Act 1967. Those paragraphs, of course, permit late-term abortions if there is a serious risk to the health of the mother or a serious risk of abnormalities in the unborn child. But Clause 191 goes very much wider than that. It would permit a mother, without any restriction in law, to abort a child right up to the moment of birth. I find it very difficult to make an ethical or moral distinction between killing a child immediately after birth and killing a child immediately before birth. One has been born, the other has not, but I cannot discern any difference in principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I agree that all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity. I take the noble Lord’s points, but at the end of the day you have to establish a principle. May I complete my point before the noble Lord intervenes further? If there is powerful evidence that the mother has wilfully terminated the birth of a child immediately up to the moment of birth, it is right that Parliament should set out a process whereby she has to be investigated. If she falls within the defence, she will have a defence. I admit that that would not prevent an investigation, but at the end of the day you have to determine where you stand on whether or not this House is really going to guard human life.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

How will we know? The noble Viscount needs to tell us how you would know that it was not the loss of a baby through natural circumstances? Who will decide?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

It would be part of the process of investigation. In that context, I sympathise very much with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which would provide a further filter. There should be a prosecution only in cases where there has been a clear breach of the law. These are very sensitive matters and need to be conducted sensibly. But we have to stand on principle here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

This is not about abortion up to birth, because the Abortion Act 1967 still stands. It is really important that noble Lords try to be accurate in how they describe this. I am not disputing anything the noble Lord says, except that it is not the case that this is about abortion up to birth. This is about the 1967 Act staying in place and about not criminalising women, is it not?

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

That does not detract from the fact that Amendment 456 would create a robust filter, through which prosecutions would have to go before instituting criminal proceedings. That would need the consent of the Attorney-General and without that consent—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I have not quite finished.

I understand exactly what the noble Baroness is saying. I was not a criminal judge; I do not think I ever sent a woman to prison, so I am not qualified to speak on those issues. All I am really asking the Committee to reflect on is that we are principally being asked to change the law to support those who are not guilty of offences, and because the police are not behaving as they should.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I have two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. Why does the noble and learned Baroness think 50 countries have found this not to be a problem? Abortion is decriminalised in virtually every country that has had abortion legislation since the 1967 Act. So, I am wondering why the noble and learned Baroness thinks that is a problem. My second question is: why does the noble and learned Baroness think that adding further complications, which the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would, would make this any better?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I would like to proceed a little further and then I will give way to the noble Baroness.

If we wish to change abortion law, we are perfectly entitled to do so as a society, but this clause raises significant questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer, even though—I accept this—the Government said on Second Reading that they remain neutral on the clause and that they anticipated a free vote. As the clause seeks to repeal Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, can the Minister explain how charges could be brought in a case such as Mr Worby’s and others? This was a poisoning and an attempt to procure a miscarriage without the woman’s consent—and it happened without repealing those offences.

As the Government have not carried out a consultation on this proposed change, how will providers of pills by post be regulated further to ensure that late-term pregnancies still carry protections under the Abortion Act and other criminal law? Will the Government commit to carrying out an overall review of the extent of the problem with police investigations of these women and to opening discussions with the relevant authorities to ascertain how better to focus police interventions? That is the objective of our Amendment 456.

On all sides of the Committee, we recognise the distress caused to women by unfounded police intrusiveness. There must be other measures that could address how that can be done with care. Upholding the rights of women in terms of their bodily autonomy, as well as society’s obligations to provide the appropriate medical care for them at this vulnerable point of pregnancy, exists on the one hand. On the other, we have obligations to the rights of the unborn child.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I will say one more sentence before I sit down, and I will be happy for both noble Baronesses to intervene then.

We have obligations to the rights of the unborn child, as that is what very late-term abortions are about in terms of viability. These things engage our ethics and responsibilities in law. I suggest that the Minister seeks to engage with those of us tabling amendments to guide us on how we in this Committee can do both responsibly.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

If you are being coerced into ending a pregnancy outside the law, and if you report that to the police, you yourself will be investigated for a criminal offence. That would be the case even though it is clear—as we know from that court case—that the man is the person who has coerced you into doing that. Can the noble Baroness say how this can be right? If a woman goes to the police in those circumstances—why would she?—she would be investigated for a criminal offence. That is what the law says now.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

In the Worby case, the woman discovered what had happened to her, went to the police and was not investigated.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I have never committed murder or been a hangman, but I can take a view on capital punishment from a moral view. To disaggregate people and their right or obligation to comment on the debate is not helpful. I caveat that by saying I have an awful lot of respect for how eloquently the noble Baroness put her case.

As I said at Second Reading, this will harm women, increase the number of late-term abortions and dehumanise children in the womb in a way I find chilling. But that has not been reflected on in the way that this has come to form part of the Bill.

During the debate on Report in the other place, which lasted a little over two hours in total, three new clauses were debated: proposed new Clause 1, which is now Clause 191; proposed new Clause 20, which proposed an even more extreme form of decriminalisation than that which we are considering today; and proposed new Clause 106, which I am delighted to see tabled again as Amendment 460 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stroud, which, needless to say, I strongly support.

In fact, saying that there were two hours of debate on such a significant proposal is perhaps overly generous. Sandwiched between the remarks of the three Members moving the proposed new clauses and the responses of the Front Benches, just 46 minutes were given over to speeches from Back-Bench MPs. The point is that there has been a scandalous lack of consideration of this change in our law and its impact.

I accept that some aspects of abortion law are an issue of conscience, but that is not a “get out of jail free” card for failure to undertake any form of due diligence, particularly on proposals that many of us regard as potentially dangerous. There is no impact assessment, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny and there has been no consultation of any kind. I hope that the Minister, in responding to this group, addresses those issues.

I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in her proposal to remove Clause 191 from the Bill and will do so again on Report. However, the danger of Clause 191 is compounded by the continuation of the pandemic hangover policy of pills by post, which provides for easy access to abortion pills without sufficient checks. I am afraid I simply cannot understand the view that holds that Clause 191 is pro-women. In combination with the ongoing availability of pills by post, it instead seems to me to offer the worst of both worlds. It opens the gates for overly expeditious access to less-than-safe care.

As the Member for Reigate in the other place has said:

“Being pro-choice should not mean supporting fewer checks and worse care for women seeking an abortion. Indeed, this is an issue where both sides of the abortion debate ought to eschew tribalism and unite in support of common-sense measures that safeguard women”.


I hope that we can rise above tribalism on this issue and find some common ground.

There are amendments in this group which I strongly support, including Amendments 455 and 459, but I will move on to my own Amendment 461F. While I would pick out other excellent amendments from this group, in the interests of time I will speak to my amendment particularly. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the investigation of offences relating to abortion and infanticide within 12 months of the commencement of Clause 191. The amendment is concerned with providing clarity and clear protocols to distinguish between what would be a decriminalised self-induced abortion and a criminal act of infanticide or child destruction.

My amendment is also designed to reassure proponents of Clause 191, including some who advise concern about possible intimidation or distress caused to a woman who may have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth. I recognise those concerns. Women facing miscarriage, stillbirth or medical crisis deserve care, dignity and compassion and nothing in my amendment would change that. However, I point to the other way around and suggest that the absence of clear guidance is what can produce overreach and inconsistency. When professionals are left uncertain about the law and about thresholds, practice understandably becomes variable. Some cases may be mishandled—

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I am puzzled by something that the noble Lord has said and perhaps he would like to clarify. I am not quite sure how jailing women is pro-women.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

If the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will forgive me, I did not quite hear the last part of her question.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

The noble Lord has talked about being pro-women and I would like him to explain to the Committee why jailing women is pro-women.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The simple point is that if Clause 191 is incorporated into the Bill, we will have a situation where many more women are under threat of coercion and many more women will face complications. Even the incomplete and substandard figures produced by the Department of Health on abortion in 2023 show that, at over 20 weeks’ gestation, 60.3% of women per 100,000 experienced complications arising from abortion in all clinical settings. That phenomenon will continue and will get worse. I hope that that is sufficient for the noble Baroness.

My amendment is directed towards striking an appropriate balance by providing legal certainty that would prevent overzealous investigation, weighed against the need to protect children. By defining clear thresholds for investigation, we protect vulnerable women while maintaining a shield for infants born alive. Clause 191 fundamentally changes our legal landscape and it is appropriate and reasonable to require updated public consultative guidance so that police and prosecutors understand what remains investigable, what standards apply and how to act lawfully and consistently.

In conclusion, if Parliament insists on decriminalising the woman’s role in procuring her own abortion, it has a profound moral duty to ensure that the law can still protect the infant the moment it leaves the womb. Amendment 461F is a measured attempt to ensure this and arguably the bare minimum in terms of responsible lawmaking. I urge noble Lords to support my amendment and others in this group, which seek to protect women and the most vulnerable lives among us. I urge Ministers to consider my Amendment 461F carefully as the Bill moves to Report.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a full, difficult and passionate debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I know that issues of conscience such as this arouse very strong feelings, but I am pleased that we have managed to keep the debate respectful, as we always do in your Lordships’ House.

At the outset, I recognise that there are two aspects to this debate that we must firmly and definitively distinguish. The first is a matter of substance and the second is a matter of procedure. More specifically, the first is about the merits of the substance of Clause 191 and the second is about the process by which it became part of a government Bill.

On the first matter, that is an issue of conscience, and on this the Opposition do not and will not take an official position. I acknowledge that there is a multitude of views across the Committee, and indeed within my own party. That diversity of opinion is to be expected and welcome, but this is and always has been a matter of personal conscience.

However, the second matter is very different. Regardless of one’s views on the rights or wrongs of decriminalisation, the process by which Clause 191 was inserted into the Bill was, on any view, insufficient and, as a matter of procedure, deficient. The amendment was proposed on Report in the other place by Tonia Antoniazzi MP. It was not discussed in the Public Bill Committee or a Select Committee. As others have said this evening, it received 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Many Members in the other place were limited to less than five minutes of speaking time. On such an issue of profound social change, in no way can that be described as a full and proper debate—compare that to the vigorous debate we have had today.

Because this was an amendment to legislation brought in on Report and not part of the Bill as introduced or as amended in Committee, and because it was not government policy, this proposal has not undergone any of the usual stages of policy formation. As your Lordships will well know, where a major change to the law is proposed, the Government would normally publish a White Paper or Green Paper, commission an expert panel or review, gather evidence, conduct a public consultation, and publish an impact assessment and relevant supporting documents. The policy proposal would then be published as part of the Bill. It would be subject to detailed scrutiny in a Public Bill Committee, where witnesses would be invited to give evidence. None of these steps has been taken. Whatever one’s views on the merits of Clause 191, that is not a recipe for good law.

Let us just pause and reflect on the wide variety of issues that have arisen today—the amendments themselves cover a lot of ground. We have discussed issues of police procedure and investigation, a panoply of medical issues, and issues around potential coercion, telemedicine, prosecution policy and the vulnerability of women. There is a multitude of difficult and intricate issues to cover.

It is interesting that, when Parliament considered the Abortion Bill in 1967, the abolition of the death penalty and, more recently, the legalisation of gay marriage, all were introduced as separate Bills that underwent the full process of parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, your Lordships Committee is currently considering another piece of social legislation, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. Despite being a Private Member’s Bill, that Bill has been subject to a rather more robust process and more significant scrutiny than this clause before us today. Of course, that is absolutely right; these are matters that, if we get them wrong, could have severe and perverse consequences. Again, whether or not noble Lords support Clause 191, the Committee is being asked to pass judgment on a provision to alter fundamentally the legal status of abortion, for right or wrong, without the possession of all the necessary evidence.

Indeed, during the debate on the clause in the other place, when discussing wider abortion law reforms, Tonia Antoniazzi, who as we know proposed Clause 191, said:

“More comprehensive reform of abortion law is needed, but the right way to do that is through a future Bill, with considerable collaboration between providers, medical bodies and parliamentarians working together to secure the changes that are needed. That is what a change of this magnitude would require”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 305.]


I agree that these are changes of magnitude. A separate and distinct Bill would be a better way forward. Comprehensive reforms of legislation on social matters should have considerable collaboration between all relevant stakeholders. That has not happened with Clause 191. It is fair to say that, whatever one’s views on the moral element of the change, Clause 191 is so far-reaching, consequential and of such magnitude that it is questionable whether it is appropriate for it to be bolted on to the side of a crime and policing Bill.

Finally, I turn to the approach of the Government to Clause 191. Ultimately, this is now a clause in a government Bill. The Government may or may not have wanted it in the Bill, but, regardless of their neutrality, this clause is now in their Bill. If the Bill passes with Clause 191 remaining, it will be the Government’s job to implement it. It will unequivocally be government legislation.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord believe that the 379 MPs who voted for this were duped into it in some way?

--- Later in debate ---

For those reasons, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has been around this circuit before, I think on a Private Member’s Bill proposed by one of his noble friends, about collecting the statistics. It shows that he does not actually seem to have checked what statistics are already collected before deciding that these things need to be done. I thought that it might be useful for the Committee to know that the annual abortion statistics already include the ethnicity of the woman and medical complications as part of the treatment. The noble Lord will also be aware that it is incredibly rare that the sex of the foetus is known, because the vast majority of abortions are carried out or happen before 10 or 12 weeks—so that is simply not known or collectable.

Complications from abortion care are extremely rare and are already reported. Abortion care providers are regulated and scrutinised through long-established accountability mechanisms, including published safe- guarding reports and Care Quality Commission inspections. These are on the public record; I am not sure why the noble Lord has decided that these things are not. Doctors are already legally required to provide information about abortions to the Chief Medical Officer, including gestation complications and grounds for an abortion.

The noble Lord is bringing forward amendments that would cause a huge amount of bureaucracy and might risk leaving medical professionals permanently unsure of the status of abortion law. I am sure that we would wish to avoid that happening. I shall be very interested to hear from my noble friend the Minister what the Government have to say about the implications of all these amendments.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. We live in what a lot of us would describe as a post-truth world, in which facts are often passed off as opinions or, worse, that terrible phrase “fake news”. Sometimes opinions are passed off as being completely truthful facts, and sometimes we have misinformation going around the globe that comes not simply from conspiracy theorists on the internet but, sadly, sometimes from world leaders.

Given that context, it is important that when this House resolves on any legislation, looking into the future, that it should be on the basis of evidence, truth and facts. That is particularly true when it comes to abortion. It is an issue, irrespective of your views on it, which is deeply sensitive, and on which raw emotions are often provoked. To some extent we saw that earlier when, at times, the atmosphere of the Committee got a little bit tense. People have genuinely conflicting views on this, so the more we can try to base this on evidence, the better.

That is particularly true for the proposed changes that are being made in Clause 191, for two main reasons. First, although there has been some mention that this has been in the ether for a number of years, the specifics of this legislation came about by way of a Back-Bench amendment to a different piece of legislation, with a limited amount of debate on it. It was not part of a government programme or manifesto commitment. Any Back-Bench Member is perfectly entitled to bring forward an amendment; that is the normal procedure. The downside of that is that there has not been a direct level of consultation on this specific proposal.

Secondly, despite what has been said, there are some concerns about the quality of the data that we have on a range of issues. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, and it seemed that she was putting forward two somewhat contradictory positions. You can either make the argument that all this data is already there and already gathered, and therefore these amendments are unnecessary, or, alternatively, you can make the argument that this would involve so much gathering of data that it would be a bureaucratic nightmare. You can argue either of those propositions, but the two are somewhat mutually exclusive in that regard. It strikes me that when we take decisions on this, it is important to get the data.

It has been highlighted—I think it was mentioned in a Private Member’s Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, proposed—that there are sometimes concerns over the quality of the data. Perhaps not unsurprisingly—it is not unique to this particular debate—we have heard different people on different sides of this argument quote sometimes contradictory data as to where we are.

It strikes me that there are one or two solutions to these problems, neither of which is mutually exclusive. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in the next group of amendments, proposes, apart from anything else, that we pause things until there is a proper consultation period. These amendments then look towards the idea of producing data and a report, and gathering evidence so that there can be a review of the procedures and how things work out. They highlight the range of issues that formed a number of the concerns in the previous debate. These are issues around the level of coercion, the medical complications that arise as a result of changes, whether it leads to a driver on sex selection, and, as mentioned, the incidence of late abortion, which then leads to a live birth. This range of issues highlights a lot of the concerns that were raised in the last group.

I appreciate that we have had this debate today, and that the proponents of Clause 191 will say that the concerns that have been raised—although I am sure they will accept they are genuine—are, in their view, misplaced or perhaps exaggerated, and that we have nothing to fear from Clause 191. Various incidents of what has happened in other parts of the world have been quoted. It is important, therefore, that we test that out. These amendments would gather that data and allow us to assess that. If we are dealing with false fears then, for the proponents of Clause 191, this will strengthen their argument in a year or two years’ time, whenever these things are reviewed. If the fears are genuine and are realised, however, then it is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, says, that if we gather evidence, it is not some sort of desktop exercise where we simply look at figures. If we gather evidence then it should be on the basis of having the opportunity, if it shows that there are increased dangers, for instance, to women or concerns over any other categories, to take a level of corrective action. That seems a very sensible course of action. I do not think there is anything that anybody should have to fear in these amendments, so I commend them to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 562, particularly his proposed new subsection (13)(e). I did not hear from the Minister earlier about what they are going to do once Clause 191 goes ahead—assuming it does; we will decide on Report whether or not that will happen. I do not think that the Minister will answer that today.

Amendment 562 would require the Government to give some proper consideration to how this is going to work in practice before it is enacted. For that reason, it is a sensible way to get a bit of breathing space to open up what we are walking into and, for those where potential crimes are committed, given that one person in the arrangement has been decriminalised, what is going to happen to the people who have facilitated what could be a crime. That is why I support Amendment 562 at this stage.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, basically, this suite of amendments drives a coach and horses through abortion rights as a whole, as well as, of course, completely opposing the clause that is under discussion. For example, virtually zero abortions occur at 39 weeks’ gestation. Taking abortion pills at that stage of gestation would simply induce labour. To accept the amendment would mean continuing criminal offences for abortion for vulnerable women. The same applies to the other suite. There would be delays and reversals, and vulnerable women would continue to face life-changing and traumatic investigations.

Amendment 563 is a wrecking amendment linked to all the other amendments to delay the implementation of the change in law. So while the noble Lord might say that he is—

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Forgive me for interrupting the noble Baroness, it is just that the annunciator has still had my name for the last minute, when indeed it is the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has just changed now.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I do not mind. At this stage, they are probably a bit tired too, changing the annunciator.

The noble Lord might say that he is not opposed to abortion but, frankly, these amendments suggest that he probably is.

[Lord Doyle (Lab)]

My Lords, I should make the point that I jumped to my feet to make earlier—on the comment that the noble Lord made about how long this issue had been debated in the other place for.

The noble Lord was a Member of the other place previously. I have not had that privilege, but we should show colleagues there a little bit more respect, in that the amount of time that they spent debating this issue should not be seen as an indication of whether or not they actually supported it. I am not sure whether the noble Lord is suggesting, if they had debated it for 46 hours or 46 days that, somehow, the 379 MPs who voted for the clause would not have done so or that they were not aware of what they were voting for in the first place.