(1 week ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
My Lords, I oppose Clause 191 standing part of the Bill.
Our role as parliamentarians, especially in this House, is to ensure that laws that make it on to the statute book are safe. Good laws require careful thought and prior consideration regarding any unintended consequences. Clause 191 fails to meet these criteria and should not become law. It was hastily added to an unrelated Bill and concerns a proposal that was neither a government manifesto commitment, nor called for by the public, nor subject to even rudimentary scrutiny.
Let me be clear: the law change proposed by Clause 191 does not relate primarily to one’s views on abortion, on which there will be a range of perspectives in this House. The abortion debate is often presented as pitting the rights of a woman against the rights of an unborn child at varying stages of development. It is not accidental that the legal limit for abortion is 24 weeks. That marks roughly the stage at which the baby is fully viable when born. This clause not only fails even to consider that person but would endanger the mother.
Laws exist for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, they exist to deter us from doing things that would cause significant harm to ourselves or others, out of motives that may be devious or simply desperate. The current law prohibiting women from performing their own abortions after 24 weeks is one such law. The existing legal deterrent protects women. For example, if a partner seeks to pressure a woman into an abortion beyond the 24-week limit, a limit which I note is already double that common in most European countries, a woman can currently point to the criminal law as a reason for not doing so. Removing this would make it much harder for vulnerable women to resist such pressure and would be particularly troubling given the dangers of unsupervised self-induced abortions later in pregnancy.
There is a supreme irony that those who claim to support legal abortion on the basis that the alternative would be unsafe—illegal abortions—are now proposing that women can perform such illegal abortions, outside the terms of the Abortion Act, in an unsafe environment. This law change would, in effect, reintroduce back-street abortion, as women would not be able to have terminations in a clinic beyond the 24-week limit but could do so at home, on their own, without the prospect of any subsequent investigation, using pills not designed for use outside of a clinical context beyond 10 weeks. The potential consequences are terrifying.
Does the noble Baroness accept that none of these things has happened in Northern Ireland? We changed the law and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland several years ago and literally none of the things that she is mentioning has happened there—nor in any of the other 50 countries where abortion is being decriminalised.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my Amendment 456 has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Falkner, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who unfortunately cannot be here due to a prior commitment overseas.
This is a simple amendment: it would reinstate the offences that Clause 191 would otherwise decriminalise for women acting in relation to their pregnancies. The amendment also provides that criminal proceedings against any woman acting in relation to her pregnancy could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the current law, a woman may avoid criminal liability if defences such as duress apply. The effect of Clause 191 would be that, regardless of circumstances, it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to do any act with the intention of procuring her own miscarriage at any stage of the pregnancy. It would, however, remain an offence for any other person to administer drugs or use instruments to cause an abortion. If Clause 191 is adopted, we would end up with a law that simultaneously denies criminal responsibility to the principal—again, regardless of individual intent or circumstances—while maintaining it for others.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for the very useful meeting that she arranged before Christmas for some of us and the proponents of Clause 191, in particular Ms Antoniazzi MP. As the proponents explained to us, what has prompted Clause 191 is a rise in completely unmeritorious investigations against women. Some of these cases are genuinely appalling. For example, we know of the case of a woman who went into spontaneous premature labour, called for help and instead of being met by medical support was met by the police. While she was still trying to resuscitate her prematurely born baby, even before the paramedics arrived, the police were in the house searching the bins. She was separated from her critically ill baby and investigated for a year for abortion offences, despite medical tests confirming she had not taken any medication.
There are other cases where women have been forced to take abortion pills by an abusive or violent partner, and they were put under criminal investigation while the partner was not. These investigations seldom result in prosecutions and the very few prosecutions hardly ever result in a conviction.
Under our amendment, the consent of the Attorney-General would be required to institute criminal proceedings, not to open an investigation, but there are reasons to believe that this procedural requirement would have a restraining impact on the investigation phase too. The Attorney-General cannot give consent retrospectively. The CPS’s guidance for offences that require AG consent makes it very clear that prosecutors should seek consent before charge.
The current policy for these offences also requires the involvement of senior officials. Before a case is submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for consent, a deputy chief crown prosecutor or deputy head of a central casework division must check that the case has been prepared to an appropriate standard. Following on from that, a lawyer at the Attorney General’s Office will review the application before placing it before the Attorney-General. That lawyer may seek further information or clarification from the relevant prosecutor and their line manager. It is also necessary to ensure that the Attorney-General is allowed sufficient time to consider the case, so that he can make his own assessment.
Finally, for all these offences, the role of the Attorney-General does not end with the consent to prosecution. The Attorney-General will have to maintain an interest in the progress of the case and be kept up to date.
The amendment cannot rule out the risk of an inappropriate or unmeritorious investigation. That risk cannot be ruled out for any offence on our statute book. The amendment seeks to balance competing legal and moral principles, while taking into account the reality of the situation.
The requirement for Attorney-General consent should discourage the police from investigating cases that will not pass muster not only with the CPS at a senior level but with the Attorney-General. The requirement would also offer an opportunity for a tightening of the policy in respect of these offences so that the risk of unmeritorious investigations and prosecutions is further reduced. The amendment does not specify a requirement for the Attorney-General to introduce guidance on the circumstances in which consent would be given, but it is to be expected that such guidance will be published and could make it clear that the bar is, indeed, high.
This is a probing amendment. There are other amendments in this group that I am interested in and inclined to support to mitigate what seems a rather radical approach in Clause 191. It would be of assistance in this debate if the Government could help us understand a bit more about what is really happening with these investigations.
To conclude, I have three brief questions for the Minister. First, what is the latest available data on these investigations, and do the data confirm an increase in criminal investigations against women since 2020? Secondly, how do the Government explain this rise in investigations? Finally, other than Clause 191—which, of course, was not part of the Bill originally—what policy steps have the Government been considering to remedy this problem?
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.
The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.
Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.
The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.
Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.
Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.
This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 456C, but I support Amendment 456, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The purpose of tabling Amendment 456C is to see if a compromise can be achieved between those who favour Clause 191 in its present form and those who are strongly opposed to it.
Late-term abortions are, of course, already lawful if they fall within the permissive provisions of Section 1(1)(b) to (d) of the Abortion Act 1967. Those paragraphs, of course, permit late-term abortions if there is a serious risk to the health of the mother or a serious risk of abnormalities in the unborn child. But Clause 191 goes very much wider than that. It would permit a mother, without any restriction in law, to abort a child right up to the moment of birth. I find it very difficult to make an ethical or moral distinction between killing a child immediately after birth and killing a child immediately before birth. One has been born, the other has not, but I cannot discern any difference in principle.
My Lords, I agree that all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity. I take the noble Lord’s points, but at the end of the day you have to establish a principle. May I complete my point before the noble Lord intervenes further? If there is powerful evidence that the mother has wilfully terminated the birth of a child immediately up to the moment of birth, it is right that Parliament should set out a process whereby she has to be investigated. If she falls within the defence, she will have a defence. I admit that that would not prevent an investigation, but at the end of the day you have to determine where you stand on whether or not this House is really going to guard human life.
How will we know? The noble Viscount needs to tell us how you would know that it was not the loss of a baby through natural circumstances? Who will decide?
It would be part of the process of investigation. In that context, I sympathise very much with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which would provide a further filter. There should be a prosecution only in cases where there has been a clear breach of the law. These are very sensitive matters and need to be conducted sensibly. But we have to stand on principle here.
This is not about abortion up to birth, because the Abortion Act 1967 still stands. It is really important that noble Lords try to be accurate in how they describe this. I am not disputing anything the noble Lord says, except that it is not the case that this is about abortion up to birth. This is about the 1967 Act staying in place and about not criminalising women, is it not?
That does not detract from the fact that Amendment 456 would create a robust filter, through which prosecutions would have to go before instituting criminal proceedings. That would need the consent of the Attorney-General and without that consent—
I have not quite finished.
I understand exactly what the noble Baroness is saying. I was not a criminal judge; I do not think I ever sent a woman to prison, so I am not qualified to speak on those issues. All I am really asking the Committee to reflect on is that we are principally being asked to change the law to support those who are not guilty of offences, and because the police are not behaving as they should.
I have two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. Why does the noble and learned Baroness think 50 countries have found this not to be a problem? Abortion is decriminalised in virtually every country that has had abortion legislation since the 1967 Act. So, I am wondering why the noble and learned Baroness thinks that is a problem. My second question is: why does the noble and learned Baroness think that adding further complications, which the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would, would make this any better?
My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.
I would like to proceed a little further and then I will give way to the noble Baroness.
If we wish to change abortion law, we are perfectly entitled to do so as a society, but this clause raises significant questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer, even though—I accept this—the Government said on Second Reading that they remain neutral on the clause and that they anticipated a free vote. As the clause seeks to repeal Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, can the Minister explain how charges could be brought in a case such as Mr Worby’s and others? This was a poisoning and an attempt to procure a miscarriage without the woman’s consent—and it happened without repealing those offences.
As the Government have not carried out a consultation on this proposed change, how will providers of pills by post be regulated further to ensure that late-term pregnancies still carry protections under the Abortion Act and other criminal law? Will the Government commit to carrying out an overall review of the extent of the problem with police investigations of these women and to opening discussions with the relevant authorities to ascertain how better to focus police interventions? That is the objective of our Amendment 456.
On all sides of the Committee, we recognise the distress caused to women by unfounded police intrusiveness. There must be other measures that could address how that can be done with care. Upholding the rights of women in terms of their bodily autonomy, as well as society’s obligations to provide the appropriate medical care for them at this vulnerable point of pregnancy, exists on the one hand. On the other, we have obligations to the rights of the unborn child.
I will say one more sentence before I sit down, and I will be happy for both noble Baronesses to intervene then.
We have obligations to the rights of the unborn child, as that is what very late-term abortions are about in terms of viability. These things engage our ethics and responsibilities in law. I suggest that the Minister seeks to engage with those of us tabling amendments to guide us on how we in this Committee can do both responsibly.
If you are being coerced into ending a pregnancy outside the law, and if you report that to the police, you yourself will be investigated for a criminal offence. That would be the case even though it is clear—as we know from that court case—that the man is the person who has coerced you into doing that. Can the noble Baroness say how this can be right? If a woman goes to the police in those circumstances—why would she?—she would be investigated for a criminal offence. That is what the law says now.
In the Worby case, the woman discovered what had happened to her, went to the police and was not investigated.
I have never committed murder or been a hangman, but I can take a view on capital punishment from a moral view. To disaggregate people and their right or obligation to comment on the debate is not helpful. I caveat that by saying I have an awful lot of respect for how eloquently the noble Baroness put her case.
As I said at Second Reading, this will harm women, increase the number of late-term abortions and dehumanise children in the womb in a way I find chilling. But that has not been reflected on in the way that this has come to form part of the Bill.
During the debate on Report in the other place, which lasted a little over two hours in total, three new clauses were debated: proposed new Clause 1, which is now Clause 191; proposed new Clause 20, which proposed an even more extreme form of decriminalisation than that which we are considering today; and proposed new Clause 106, which I am delighted to see tabled again as Amendment 460 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stroud, which, needless to say, I strongly support.
In fact, saying that there were two hours of debate on such a significant proposal is perhaps overly generous. Sandwiched between the remarks of the three Members moving the proposed new clauses and the responses of the Front Benches, just 46 minutes were given over to speeches from Back-Bench MPs. The point is that there has been a scandalous lack of consideration of this change in our law and its impact.
I accept that some aspects of abortion law are an issue of conscience, but that is not a “get out of jail free” card for failure to undertake any form of due diligence, particularly on proposals that many of us regard as potentially dangerous. There is no impact assessment, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny and there has been no consultation of any kind. I hope that the Minister, in responding to this group, addresses those issues.
I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in her proposal to remove Clause 191 from the Bill and will do so again on Report. However, the danger of Clause 191 is compounded by the continuation of the pandemic hangover policy of pills by post, which provides for easy access to abortion pills without sufficient checks. I am afraid I simply cannot understand the view that holds that Clause 191 is pro-women. In combination with the ongoing availability of pills by post, it instead seems to me to offer the worst of both worlds. It opens the gates for overly expeditious access to less-than-safe care.
As the Member for Reigate in the other place has said:
“Being pro-choice should not mean supporting fewer checks and worse care for women seeking an abortion. Indeed, this is an issue where both sides of the abortion debate ought to eschew tribalism and unite in support of common-sense measures that safeguard women”.
I hope that we can rise above tribalism on this issue and find some common ground.
There are amendments in this group which I strongly support, including Amendments 455 and 459, but I will move on to my own Amendment 461F. While I would pick out other excellent amendments from this group, in the interests of time I will speak to my amendment particularly. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the investigation of offences relating to abortion and infanticide within 12 months of the commencement of Clause 191. The amendment is concerned with providing clarity and clear protocols to distinguish between what would be a decriminalised self-induced abortion and a criminal act of infanticide or child destruction.
My amendment is also designed to reassure proponents of Clause 191, including some who advise concern about possible intimidation or distress caused to a woman who may have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth. I recognise those concerns. Women facing miscarriage, stillbirth or medical crisis deserve care, dignity and compassion and nothing in my amendment would change that. However, I point to the other way around and suggest that the absence of clear guidance is what can produce overreach and inconsistency. When professionals are left uncertain about the law and about thresholds, practice understandably becomes variable. Some cases may be mishandled—
I am puzzled by something that the noble Lord has said and perhaps he would like to clarify. I am not quite sure how jailing women is pro-women.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will forgive me, I did not quite hear the last part of her question.
The noble Lord has talked about being pro-women and I would like him to explain to the Committee why jailing women is pro-women.
The simple point is that if Clause 191 is incorporated into the Bill, we will have a situation where many more women are under threat of coercion and many more women will face complications. Even the incomplete and substandard figures produced by the Department of Health on abortion in 2023 show that, at over 20 weeks’ gestation, 60.3% of women per 100,000 experienced complications arising from abortion in all clinical settings. That phenomenon will continue and will get worse. I hope that that is sufficient for the noble Baroness.
My amendment is directed towards striking an appropriate balance by providing legal certainty that would prevent overzealous investigation, weighed against the need to protect children. By defining clear thresholds for investigation, we protect vulnerable women while maintaining a shield for infants born alive. Clause 191 fundamentally changes our legal landscape and it is appropriate and reasonable to require updated public consultative guidance so that police and prosecutors understand what remains investigable, what standards apply and how to act lawfully and consistently.
In conclusion, if Parliament insists on decriminalising the woman’s role in procuring her own abortion, it has a profound moral duty to ensure that the law can still protect the infant the moment it leaves the womb. Amendment 461F is a measured attempt to ensure this and arguably the bare minimum in terms of responsible lawmaking. I urge noble Lords to support my amendment and others in this group, which seek to protect women and the most vulnerable lives among us. I urge Ministers to consider my Amendment 461F carefully as the Bill moves to Report.
(1 week ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a full, difficult and passionate debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I know that issues of conscience such as this arouse very strong feelings, but I am pleased that we have managed to keep the debate respectful, as we always do in your Lordships’ House.
At the outset, I recognise that there are two aspects to this debate that we must firmly and definitively distinguish. The first is a matter of substance and the second is a matter of procedure. More specifically, the first is about the merits of the substance of Clause 191 and the second is about the process by which it became part of a government Bill.
On the first matter, that is an issue of conscience, and on this the Opposition do not and will not take an official position. I acknowledge that there is a multitude of views across the Committee, and indeed within my own party. That diversity of opinion is to be expected and welcome, but this is and always has been a matter of personal conscience.
However, the second matter is very different. Regardless of one’s views on the rights or wrongs of decriminalisation, the process by which Clause 191 was inserted into the Bill was, on any view, insufficient and, as a matter of procedure, deficient. The amendment was proposed on Report in the other place by Tonia Antoniazzi MP. It was not discussed in the Public Bill Committee or a Select Committee. As others have said this evening, it received 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Many Members in the other place were limited to less than five minutes of speaking time. On such an issue of profound social change, in no way can that be described as a full and proper debate—compare that to the vigorous debate we have had today.
Because this was an amendment to legislation brought in on Report and not part of the Bill as introduced or as amended in Committee, and because it was not government policy, this proposal has not undergone any of the usual stages of policy formation. As your Lordships will well know, where a major change to the law is proposed, the Government would normally publish a White Paper or Green Paper, commission an expert panel or review, gather evidence, conduct a public consultation, and publish an impact assessment and relevant supporting documents. The policy proposal would then be published as part of the Bill. It would be subject to detailed scrutiny in a Public Bill Committee, where witnesses would be invited to give evidence. None of these steps has been taken. Whatever one’s views on the merits of Clause 191, that is not a recipe for good law.
Let us just pause and reflect on the wide variety of issues that have arisen today—the amendments themselves cover a lot of ground. We have discussed issues of police procedure and investigation, a panoply of medical issues, and issues around potential coercion, telemedicine, prosecution policy and the vulnerability of women. There is a multitude of difficult and intricate issues to cover.
It is interesting that, when Parliament considered the Abortion Bill in 1967, the abolition of the death penalty and, more recently, the legalisation of gay marriage, all were introduced as separate Bills that underwent the full process of parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, your Lordships Committee is currently considering another piece of social legislation, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. Despite being a Private Member’s Bill, that Bill has been subject to a rather more robust process and more significant scrutiny than this clause before us today. Of course, that is absolutely right; these are matters that, if we get them wrong, could have severe and perverse consequences. Again, whether or not noble Lords support Clause 191, the Committee is being asked to pass judgment on a provision to alter fundamentally the legal status of abortion, for right or wrong, without the possession of all the necessary evidence.
Indeed, during the debate on the clause in the other place, when discussing wider abortion law reforms, Tonia Antoniazzi, who as we know proposed Clause 191, said:
“More comprehensive reform of abortion law is needed, but the right way to do that is through a future Bill, with considerable collaboration between providers, medical bodies and parliamentarians working together to secure the changes that are needed. That is what a change of this magnitude would require”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 305.]
I agree that these are changes of magnitude. A separate and distinct Bill would be a better way forward. Comprehensive reforms of legislation on social matters should have considerable collaboration between all relevant stakeholders. That has not happened with Clause 191. It is fair to say that, whatever one’s views on the moral element of the change, Clause 191 is so far-reaching, consequential and of such magnitude that it is questionable whether it is appropriate for it to be bolted on to the side of a crime and policing Bill.
Finally, I turn to the approach of the Government to Clause 191. Ultimately, this is now a clause in a government Bill. The Government may or may not have wanted it in the Bill, but, regardless of their neutrality, this clause is now in their Bill. If the Bill passes with Clause 191 remaining, it will be the Government’s job to implement it. It will unequivocally be government legislation.
Does the noble Lord believe that the 379 MPs who voted for this were duped into it in some way?
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has been around this circuit before, I think on a Private Member’s Bill proposed by one of his noble friends, about collecting the statistics. It shows that he does not actually seem to have checked what statistics are already collected before deciding that these things need to be done. I thought that it might be useful for the Committee to know that the annual abortion statistics already include the ethnicity of the woman and medical complications as part of the treatment. The noble Lord will also be aware that it is incredibly rare that the sex of the foetus is known, because the vast majority of abortions are carried out or happen before 10 or 12 weeks—so that is simply not known or collectable.
Complications from abortion care are extremely rare and are already reported. Abortion care providers are regulated and scrutinised through long-established accountability mechanisms, including published safe- guarding reports and Care Quality Commission inspections. These are on the public record; I am not sure why the noble Lord has decided that these things are not. Doctors are already legally required to provide information about abortions to the Chief Medical Officer, including gestation complications and grounds for an abortion.
The noble Lord is bringing forward amendments that would cause a huge amount of bureaucracy and might risk leaving medical professionals permanently unsure of the status of abortion law. I am sure that we would wish to avoid that happening. I shall be very interested to hear from my noble friend the Minister what the Government have to say about the implications of all these amendments.
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. We live in what a lot of us would describe as a post-truth world, in which facts are often passed off as opinions or, worse, that terrible phrase “fake news”. Sometimes opinions are passed off as being completely truthful facts, and sometimes we have misinformation going around the globe that comes not simply from conspiracy theorists on the internet but, sadly, sometimes from world leaders.
Given that context, it is important that when this House resolves on any legislation, looking into the future, that it should be on the basis of evidence, truth and facts. That is particularly true when it comes to abortion. It is an issue, irrespective of your views on it, which is deeply sensitive, and on which raw emotions are often provoked. To some extent we saw that earlier when, at times, the atmosphere of the Committee got a little bit tense. People have genuinely conflicting views on this, so the more we can try to base this on evidence, the better.
That is particularly true for the proposed changes that are being made in Clause 191, for two main reasons. First, although there has been some mention that this has been in the ether for a number of years, the specifics of this legislation came about by way of a Back-Bench amendment to a different piece of legislation, with a limited amount of debate on it. It was not part of a government programme or manifesto commitment. Any Back-Bench Member is perfectly entitled to bring forward an amendment; that is the normal procedure. The downside of that is that there has not been a direct level of consultation on this specific proposal.
Secondly, despite what has been said, there are some concerns about the quality of the data that we have on a range of issues. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, and it seemed that she was putting forward two somewhat contradictory positions. You can either make the argument that all this data is already there and already gathered, and therefore these amendments are unnecessary, or, alternatively, you can make the argument that this would involve so much gathering of data that it would be a bureaucratic nightmare. You can argue either of those propositions, but the two are somewhat mutually exclusive in that regard. It strikes me that when we take decisions on this, it is important to get the data.
It has been highlighted—I think it was mentioned in a Private Member’s Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, proposed—that there are sometimes concerns over the quality of the data. Perhaps not unsurprisingly—it is not unique to this particular debate—we have heard different people on different sides of this argument quote sometimes contradictory data as to where we are.
It strikes me that there are one or two solutions to these problems, neither of which is mutually exclusive. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in the next group of amendments, proposes, apart from anything else, that we pause things until there is a proper consultation period. These amendments then look towards the idea of producing data and a report, and gathering evidence so that there can be a review of the procedures and how things work out. They highlight the range of issues that formed a number of the concerns in the previous debate. These are issues around the level of coercion, the medical complications that arise as a result of changes, whether it leads to a driver on sex selection, and, as mentioned, the incidence of late abortion, which then leads to a live birth. This range of issues highlights a lot of the concerns that were raised in the last group.
I appreciate that we have had this debate today, and that the proponents of Clause 191 will say that the concerns that have been raised—although I am sure they will accept they are genuine—are, in their view, misplaced or perhaps exaggerated, and that we have nothing to fear from Clause 191. Various incidents of what has happened in other parts of the world have been quoted. It is important, therefore, that we test that out. These amendments would gather that data and allow us to assess that. If we are dealing with false fears then, for the proponents of Clause 191, this will strengthen their argument in a year or two years’ time, whenever these things are reviewed. If the fears are genuine and are realised, however, then it is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, says, that if we gather evidence, it is not some sort of desktop exercise where we simply look at figures. If we gather evidence then it should be on the basis of having the opportunity, if it shows that there are increased dangers, for instance, to women or concerns over any other categories, to take a level of corrective action. That seems a very sensible course of action. I do not think there is anything that anybody should have to fear in these amendments, so I commend them to the Committee.
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 562, particularly his proposed new subsection (13)(e). I did not hear from the Minister earlier about what they are going to do once Clause 191 goes ahead—assuming it does; we will decide on Report whether or not that will happen. I do not think that the Minister will answer that today.
Amendment 562 would require the Government to give some proper consideration to how this is going to work in practice before it is enacted. For that reason, it is a sensible way to get a bit of breathing space to open up what we are walking into and, for those where potential crimes are committed, given that one person in the arrangement has been decriminalised, what is going to happen to the people who have facilitated what could be a crime. That is why I support Amendment 562 at this stage.
As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, basically, this suite of amendments drives a coach and horses through abortion rights as a whole, as well as, of course, completely opposing the clause that is under discussion. For example, virtually zero abortions occur at 39 weeks’ gestation. Taking abortion pills at that stage of gestation would simply induce labour. To accept the amendment would mean continuing criminal offences for abortion for vulnerable women. The same applies to the other suite. There would be delays and reversals, and vulnerable women would continue to face life-changing and traumatic investigations.
Amendment 563 is a wrecking amendment linked to all the other amendments to delay the implementation of the change in law. So while the noble Lord might say that he is—
Forgive me for interrupting the noble Baroness, it is just that the annunciator has still had my name for the last minute, when indeed it is the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has just changed now.
I do not mind. At this stage, they are probably a bit tired too, changing the annunciator.
The noble Lord might say that he is not opposed to abortion but, frankly, these amendments suggest that he probably is.
Lord Doyle (Lab)
My Lords, I should make the point that I jumped to my feet to make earlier—on the comment that the noble Lord made about how long this issue had been debated in the other place for.
The noble Lord was a Member of the other place previously. I have not had that privilege, but we should show colleagues there a little bit more respect, in that the amount of time that they spent debating this issue should not be seen as an indication of whether or not they actually supported it. I am not sure whether the noble Lord is suggesting, if they had debated it for 46 hours or 46 days that, somehow, the 379 MPs who voted for the clause would not have done so or that they were not aware of what they were voting for in the first place.
(3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI put on record my thanks to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and—I think I can call her a noble friend, even though she is not on my Benches—Lady Campbell, who is much missed; I am pleased that she will be returning to us in the new year. As ever, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raises very important points. I think trust has increased, but that is difficult to tell in an environment where misinformation is rife; making sure that people have access to genuine information is truly one of the most challenging parts of this. We have discussed in your Lordships’ House many times the ability of IBCA to communicate and the need to make sure that it is providing relevant information.
That said, the claim managers have played an incredibly important role. We are seeing that when claims are finished—obviously this is a small community, relatively speaking—people are asking the claim managers who have just finished with them if they will be the claim manager for their friends, or for other members of the community, by name. This suggests that trust in the claim managers, at least, is clear, which is an important part of this.
The noble Baroness makes two incredibly important points. One is about access to medical records. Our claim managers are not investigators but, where there is clearly paperwork missing, they are working with the recipients to help them find the paperwork; so the onus is not just on the members of the infected blood community—there is someone helping them get the paperwork. We still have challenges in making sure that we can access some of the medical records. Noble Lords will appreciate that, as we move forward away from registered infected cases and towards estates and other areas, that may well be challenging, but we are working on what new technologies we can use to harness some of that material.
As regards advice to recipients who want to be protected, we are offering paid financial advice to make sure that it is easily accessed. We have to appreciate that these are very vulnerable people who have had horrendous experiences and could be targeted again, so making sure that we can work to protect them will be an incredibly important part of what we do going forward.
My Lords, I feel that I am a veteran of this issue, like many other Members of your Lordships’ House. Indeed, I was a Health Minister in 2009 and 2010, and I think that might have been the first time I had a huge row with civil servants because they would not let me say sorry. That is something that featured through many Administrations, with great shame. I was on the Opposition Benches when we came to agreeing the amendments, and thus finally agreed the scheme that we see before us today. I congratulate my Government on finding the funding to be as generous as possible in this compensation scheme.
I want to ask my noble friend the Minister about transparency, how that has been built into what happens next and, indeed, the wider lessons that need to be learned from the way in which the scheme has been constructed, as well as other issues that might arise in the future and that will need this kind of attention.
I thank my noble friend for her work in getting us to this point. We put on record our thanks to her, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as the leading negotiators making sure we got to this point. My noble friend was not allowed to say sorry, but I can say sorry to those people who have been affected by this. I get to do that because of the fights that she had. For that, I am grateful; I do not have to have so many fights with my civil servants.
With regard to transparency, noble Lords will appreciate that we are talking about a cohort of people who have been affected by infected blood and who have no trust. Rightly, there is no reservoir of good will. We have to be as transparent and open as we possibly can to make sure that they know what is happening, why it is happening, at what speed and in what process. While the speed may be a challenge, we have to make sure that it is in place.
One thing that I have not said yet but wanted to put on record is that, as of 1 October, staff at IBCA are now directly employed and are no longer seconded civil servants. They are now public servants who work for IBCA. I think that helps lead to transparency of and trust in IBCA. In addition to the fact that we publish everything—the reviews are making sure that we are able to do that, including transparent publication in relation to the technical meeting group—everything we are doing is trying to rebuild trust with that community.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the regulations before your Lordships today seek to update the education curriculum in Northern Ireland to make age-appropriate, comprehensive and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights, covering contraception and access to abortion, a compulsory component of the curriculum in all grant-aided schools in Northern Ireland.
I understand and respect that there will be differing views on this issue. I also recognise the will of this Government to deliver on their statutory obligations. In passing the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, Parliament decided to implement the recommendations made by the 2018 report of CEDAW, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Section 9 of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, which passed with a majority in the House of Commons of 232 and one of 145 in your Lordships’ House, places a legal duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the recommendations in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the CEDAW report are implemented in full. This is a specific and unique duty which arose from a vote in Parliament. In implementing this decision, the Government have always sought to ensure that the education provided would be similar to that already provided in England with regard to contraception and abortion, and these regulations do this.
It has been widely reported that there is a problem with how sexual education is being taught in schools in Northern Ireland. This has been highlighted by a number of recent studies, including by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. In its report into relationship and sexuality education in post-primary schools in Northern Ireland, it recommended that a standard level of RSE be introduced throughout all schools in Northern Ireland. That was in June this year. Separately, a survey commissioned in September 2022 by a health charity, Informing Choices NI, highlighted that 78% of MLAs agreed that there should be a standardised curriculum, regardless of a school’s ethos.
I am acutely aware that education is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland—indeed, I am looking at a former Education Minister, in the form of the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, right now. It has always been the Secretary of State’s and this Government’s preference that the Department of Education in Northern Ireland updates the curriculum. However, with nearly four years having passed since the executive formation Act, adolescents in Northern Ireland are still not receiving comprehensive and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights. This is why, on 6 June, the Secretary of State, my right honourable friend Chris Heaton-Harris, laid these regulations in Parliament to comply with his statutory duty.
This SI has the following effects. It amends the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, and the Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007 for adolescents, to make age-appropriate, comprehensive and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights, covering prevention of early pregnancy and access to abortion, a compulsory component of the curriculum. It places a duty on the Department of Education to issue guidance by 1 January 2024 on the content and delivery of the education required to be provided and places a duty on the board of governors and principal of every grant-aided school to have regard to the guidance. Also, the Department of Education is required to publish a report by 1 September 2026 on the implementation of the updated curriculum in grant-aided schools and to lay the report before the Assembly. I say in parenthesis that I trust that there will be an Assembly back in place and fully functioning well before that date.
The Government recognise the sensitivity of this topic and that some parents may wish to teach their child about sex education or to make alternative arrangements to be provided in line with their religious background or their belief about the age that their child or children should access sex education. In recognition of this, this SI also place a duty on the department to make regulations about the circumstances in which a pupil may be withdrawn from education on sexual and reproductive health and rights, or elements of that education, at the request of a parent. This follows the approach taken elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
It is important to state that this Government believe that educating adolescents on issues such as contraception, the legal status of abortion and how relevant services may be accessed should be done in a factual way that does not advocate a particular view on the moral or ethical considerations of abortion or contraception. While schools will be under a duty to teach the updated curriculum within the 2023-24 school year, there will also be a period of implementation and a need for meaningful engagement with parents and teachers. The amendments to the curriculum come into force on 1 July, in preparation for the 2023-24 academic school year. As I said, the duty on the department to issue guidance on the content and delivery of the required education will come into force on 1 January 2024.
Officials in my department, the Northern Ireland Office, will continue to work closely with those in the Department for Education. They have also been engaging with relevant educational bodies to make them aware of the changes to the curriculum. We understand that further engagement with schools, parents and young people is also very important so that they feel reassured about the content of this updated curriculum. However, it is important that children and adolescents are given the correct information so that they can make informed choices.
That summarises the changes that are introduced by these regulations, and I commend them to the Committee. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations. Of course, the Secretary of State is not only empowered to make these regulations but legally obliged to do so. With the regulations, the Secretary of State is making a statutory duty to implement recommendation 86(d) of the report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. As a result, as the Minister has told us, age-appropriate, comprehensive and scientifically accurate education on sex and reproductive health and rights, covering the prevention of early pregnancy and access to abortion, will become a compulsory component of the curriculum for adolescents in Northern Ireland.
The Labour Party fully supports these measures. On these Benches, we believe that they are a critical step in ensuring that all parts of the United Kingdom meet their human rights obligations to children in this area. All adolescents deserve age-appropriate, comprehensive and scientifically accurate relationship and sex education. For too long, relationship and sex education has been unavailable to adolescents in Northern Ireland. In May 2019, Sir John Gillen’s independent review into how the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland deals with serious sexual offence cases made a series of recommendations, including the need to include in the school curriculum for RSE matters such as consent, personal space, boundaries, appropriate behaviour, relationships and sexuality. In April this year, an evaluation by Northern Ireland’s Education and Training Inspectorate found that 44% of schools reported that they were delivering the topic of consent
“to a small extent or not at all”.
Earlier this month, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, as the Minister told us, published a report into its investigations of relationship and sexuality education in post-primary schools, and found that the curriculum on relationship and sexuality education does not meet human rights standards. According to the commission, most schools are not providing
“age appropriate, comprehensive, scientifically accurate education”
on access to abortion services. The investigation also found that some schools actively contribute to the shame and stigma surrounding unplanned pregnancy and abortion by making statements such as abortion is not a means of contraception and those who knowingly engage in casual sex must bear the consequences of their actions. It revealed that some schools are teaching children that homosexuality is wrong.
In England, Scotland and Wales, compulsory RSE that embeds reproductive rights and choices within the curriculum, implementing the CEDAW recommendations, is already in place. The Labour Party welcomes the fact that today’s regulations will help to ensure that the curriculum for children in Northern Ireland meets that standard too. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has welcomed the new regulations and emphasised that implementation and monitoring will be critical. Schools should support and develop their capacity to deliver RSE, and the commission and other expert independent organisations have offered their expertise to help with that.
I have read with care the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s report on these regulations and the debate that took place in the Commons yesterday. I of course agree with my honourable friend Peter Kyle and the Minister in that debate about the need to move forward on this matter. However, there are a few matters from this report that particularly concern us. The first is the question of consultation—or lack of it, as the committee says at paragraphs 54 to 56. The Minister needs to clarify that and address it. The second is the use of outside contractors to deliver RSE. How will the Department of Education in Northern Ireland ensure that the delivery of RSE meets the updated curriculum that these regulations set in motion? Thirdly, will the Northern Ireland Office liaise with the Department of Education to provide detailed information about implementation, which the report mentions at paragraph 43? Finally, is the Minister assured that the Department of Education will have the necessary regulations in place regarding parents withdrawing their children from RSE?
With those questions, which I am sure the Minister will be happy to address, we offer him our support.
My Lords, I am watching the annunciator because I am due to speak on amendments in the Chamber. I know that we are expecting a vote very shortly, which will probably mean the suspension of the Committee, but noble Lords will understand if I leave and cannot participate in the whole debate, which I want to do.
These regulations are profoundly controversial in terms of their content and the procedure that attended their development. In the first instance, they suffer from a similar legitimacy deficit to that attending the abortion regulations 2020 on account of the fact that they are made by the same parent legislation, Section 9 of the 2019 Executive formation Act. At this stage, lest I forget, I want to challenge something that the Minister said. It was not so much that what he said was inaccurate, but that it was not the whole story. He said that 78% of MLAs voted for this. Yes, but it was 78% of 30; there are 90 MLAs and only 30 voted. That was not said, but it needs to be. However, for reasons that I shall explain, the legitimacy deficit attending these regulations is significantly more extensive.
Section 9 was the result of a vote in another place on 19 July 2019 the impact of which pertains exclusively to Northern Ireland, in a context when every single Northern Ireland Member of Parliament who took their seat in the democratically elected House voted against this provision. It becomes quite disturbing. We are always told by others who maybe have never been to Northern Ireland, or are very rarely there, “We know better than you lot that live there”. In other words, a provision that pertained only to Northern Ireland was imposed on Northern Ireland over the heads of its elected representatives.
I interrupt the noble Lord just to say that I spent the weekend before last in Ireland, just over the border, and in Enniskillen with my family. We had a lovely time.
I am glad that the noble Baroness enjoyed Northern Ireland. Most people who come to Northern Ireland enjoy it because there is so much to do and see. Right now, we can even provide the weather, which we cannot always. I am delighted to hear that she made a visit and I hope she will come back some other time.
Although there is nothing technically wrong with using the votes of other parts of our union to impose changes on specific parts of it in violation of the wishes of its elected representatives, every time that happens there is a clear legitimacy deficit. That is why apologies were subsequently issued for the flooding of Capel Celyn in Wales and the imposition of the poll tax a year early in Scotland.
However, in the case of Section 9, the legitimacy deficit is more extensive, because the Executive formation Bill had been subject to accelerated procedure on the basis that it was about just one issue, and it was widely reported at the time that the clerks in another place advised that the amendment that resulted in Section 9 was not in scope. This meant not only that profoundly controversial legal changes were imposed on Northern Ireland but that we were not even afforded the dignity of a full debate.
My Lords, I speak as a former Education Minister for Northern Ireland. I will keep my remarks relatively succinct, because a lot of the substantive ground has been covered by my two colleagues who spoke previously. We are also due to speak in the House on the debate on illegal migration. I join them in expressing concerns about the content of this and in particular the way it has been brought about. The phrase that keeps coming back to me in the context of the implementation of this SI is “lack of respect”: a lack of respect for the sensitivities around the issue of abortion, a lack of respect for the ethos and belief of many people in Northern Ireland, a lack of respect for the devolutionary settlement, a lack of respect for basic democratic process, a lack of respect for educational process—I will touch on that later—and a deep lack of respect for education stakeholders at so many different levels.
As has been indicated, this is something on which myriad steps have been taken and in which undemocratic process has been grafted on top of other undemocratic process. As has been said, it arises from Section 9 of the legislation, which itself had an accelerated passage and was grafted on top of a one-issue subject. Indeed, the CEDAW recommendations, which were meant to be advisory, were themselves grafted on to the issue of abortion within Northern Ireland. As has been indicated, in terms of democratic scrutiny, the provisions in paragraph 86(d) of the CEDAW report did not merit a single minute of debate when this was discussed in relation to primary legislation. Beyond that, we now see these regulations being introduced without any consultation whatever. The concerns raised in relation to that have been highlighted by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which also highlighted that some of the provisions will—it seems uniquely—be brought in immediately rather than after the normal 21 days.
The Minister said in his opening remarks that the Government’s intention was to put Northern Ireland in a similar position to that of England, yet that is not accurate. In England, proper consultation at least took place. There are many things done by government that all of us will disagree with to different levels but, if we are all given the opportunity to have an input through proper consultation, due process will at least have taken place. This process has circumvented that and has not put the people of Northern Ireland in the same position; it has put them in an inferior position to the people of England and Wales.
This also cuts across educational process. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, rightly made reference to the Gillen report. The substance of that report around RSE focused on critical issues of consent, respect for females and ensuring that relationships were conducted in a respectful manner that hopefully means that we can reduce—and, in an ideal world, eliminate—sexual abuse within that. Yet, it has to be said, this SI tackles none of the subjects at the forefront of the Gillen report. Indeed, it circumvents the work that has been going on in the Department of Education and Department of Justice on the Gillen report. When I was a Minister alongside Minister Long, we did not hold similar views on issues such as abortion—
Does not the existence of a properly run relationship education include all the things that were mentioned in the Gillen report? That is why I referred to it.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may ask a question. I have a great deal of sympathy for the noble Lords’ amendments. I am not sure what my Front Bench is going to say, but this sounds like a very useful discussion to have about how to extend local rights. My question, because I am a champion of social enterprises and the voluntary sector, is whether they, too, will be able to challenge for those national services that might appropriately be delivered at a local level. That would seem appropriate.
Lord Jenkin of Roding
Immediately, exactly the same bodies and people, including local charities and voluntary bodies, should be able to challenge these national services, in the same way as the Bill provides for them to challenge local services.
I am standing up to give the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, time to move his amendment, which comes before mine in this group.
My Lords, if the House is willing to be tolerant, I will admit that I was asleep.
In that case, I will speak to my amendments and give the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, a chance to catch up on his amendments in this group. Before I do so, I declare an interest as an ambassador for Sporta, the trade group of social enterprises which deals with local sports and leisure services, and as the founding chair of the Social Enterprise Coalition. I shall speak to Amendments 130A and 131A, and comment on some other amendments in this group, although I may leave that until they have been spoken to. My noble friend Lord Patel is right to say that Clause 68 is important. I have always believed that socially owned businesses, founded and run in this case by local people, have an important and valuable role to play in the provision of public services.
Amendment 130A seeks to put beyond doubt the kind of enterprise which can challenge and be considered appropriate to contract for the services under consideration. I seek clarification from the Minister about this because, as it stands, it seems that the expression of interest could be used by local authority employees setting up a private company. I believe that that might be a loophole that would need to be closed. Amendment 130A states that,
“after ‘authority’ insert ‘who have formed an organisation for charitable purposes or a community interest company or industrial and provident society’”.
That covers basically all the organisations that are not private enterprises.
Amendment 131A again seeks to make completely clear an issue which is, in a way, about the size of the organisation. I believe that there should be a requirement that the expression of interest can be initiated by a local organisation or in collaboration with a local organisation. Many national charities already provide and contract for services at a local level—for example, Barnardo’s and Action for Children, which I know about through a long association with them. I believe that those national charities, along with any national social enterprise—indeed, there are those that are contracting which are building social businesses providing social care—would want to contract for those services at a local level. But they have to prove that they are working collaboratively with local agencies to provide locally integrated solutions.
This would still allow national organisations, which have great skills and experience in delivering these services, to bid but would ensure that the Bill meets its main objective of devolving power and giving a voice to local communities. The involvement of a national social enterprise or a national charity may be the difference between a local body being able to challenge and contract for local services and it not having the capacity to do so. It is important that large and small, and local and national, collaborative working is part of this Bill and is put beyond doubt. That is what these two amendments are about. I beg to move.
My Lords, I apologise for falling asleep; it is these Zs all over the place which are doing it. I am not speaking to Amendment 130ZD, which I missed. However, Amendment 133ZN has exactly the same meaning. I was going to apologise for putting down the same amendment twice in the group but it seems that that was providential. I certainly have a great deal of sympathy and support for what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has just said.
We put down amendments to take out the reference to employees not because we do not think that in appropriate circumstances it is a good idea for employees to take over running the services for which they are employed, but because we are not at all convinced that this Bill is the best place to legislate for employee buy-outs, employee buy-ins, employee takeovers or whatever. They do not quite fit with the concept of the community—however the community or somebody in the community is defined—making a challenge and saying, “We can run this service. Can we have a go please?”. Employees are very different in that sense as they represent the producer side of the service rather than the consumer side and, clearly, if consumers or citizens or residents take over a service, they become producers as well. Equally, employees can make the same journey in the other direction.
Perhaps I may help the Minister with this because the point about my noble friend’s Amendment 131AA is that where a voluntary body generates a surplus, it can be legitimately used for several purposes. It can be used to undertake further activities consistent with the social aims, as set out in its governing document, which could include but not be restricted to local community benefits. It could be used to invest in strengthening the organisation itself, so that it becomes more resilient and can expand its work, and it can be used to repay loans and other investment. It might, for example, include a payment of dividends to shareholders following a community share issue within the limits established by the incorporation of the community interest company or the IPS. Those are safeguards against excessive private gain. I do not think this is the right amendment but the point is that it seeks to clarify whether points two and three are permitted within the Bill. We might need to discuss this further.
I am even more confused but I will endeavour to look at that in due course. As I was saying, the Bill already states that a voluntary body’s activities should not be carried on for profit. The purpose of a voluntary body’s activities should surely be to benefit the particular community it represents. As for what the noble Baroness has said, we are in Committee and we can clearly look at this again, but I saw this in simple terms. I cannot get it out of my head, quite frankly, that you may get a community association bidding which, in its building, has a kitchen where it will do its meals on wheels. It might make a bit of a profit from the meals on wheels service in that community. It seems to me that if it makes a small profit from that exercise, it can use that for the benefit of the rest of the association that it is carrying on in that building. That is as I see it in simple terms.
Amendment 130A would require employees of a relevant authority to set up a charity, community interest company or industrial and provident society in order to submit an expression of interest. Requiring employees to form a specified organisation in order to submit an expression of interest and get a fair hearing for their idea would create an unnecessary and bureaucratic burden. It risks putting employees off exercising the right altogether. The Government are committed to giving public sector workers the right to bid to take over services that they deliver, and the community right to challenge implements this commitment for relevant authority employees.
I am sorry for interrupting the Minister again but this is a very important point. I can cite two examples. Sunderland Home Care was set up by home care workers as a co-operative and, quite rightly, the employees of that local authority in Sunderland provided much better terms and conditions to contract with Sunderland Council. Greenwich Leisure started the whole movement of leisure trusts because Greenwich Council was going to close down its swimming pools— this was 10 or 12 years ago—due to something called rate-capping, which some of your Lordships may remember, and it was the employees who initiated the move to contract with the local authority to take over all the leisure services.
Those examples both make a surplus—and quite right too—because that is how they reinvest back into their local communities, so that the charges in Greenwich for leisure services are now much lower proportionately than they were. They are also both able to support contracting in other areas, so that Sunderland Home Care now provides training for home care workers across the north-east. The point about this amendment is that by defining the legal form that community groups, or any group of employees, use to do the challenging, we actually safeguard the social purpose against private profit being made which then does not get put back into the community.
My Lords, I understand what the noble Baroness is saying, but there is a concern about being overprescriptive. It is important that we do not do anything to put employees off. We can return to this; there is no reason why not; but we know what the intention is. It is to free up the opportunity for employees to take part in a right to challenge. I am far from certain that we should be prescribing that there are these various routes and it is outside the theology if they take the fifth route and not routes one to four. We need to be a bit careful about that.
I am quite clear that, if there are two employees, we are back to the whole business about looking at who is backing this and whether the people who will ultimately benefit from this service think that it is a good idea. It is unlikely that the local authority would say, “Off you go; you look a great pair”. It is very doubtful that that would be the case. That is the route to putting a stop to that. It may well be that our friend, regulations, will come into this as to the power of stoppage that there would be in these circumstances.
Amendment 133ZN would prevent the Secretary of State providing advice and assistance in using the right to a body that is formed of, or includes, any employees or ex-employees. That would introduce a disparity. It would mean that advice and assistance could not be provided to a voluntary and community body formed of employees and ex-employees, but could be provided to other voluntary and community bodies that did not contain such individuals. No decisions have been made on the form of any advice and assistance in using the right, but we expect to focus on those that need it most. This is likely to mean smaller, newer voluntary bodies, but it is sensible that we have the powers to provide assistance to any relevant body that might need it. I understand that an impact assessment has been done on this and the suggestion is that, across the country, £20 million will be required. It is not yet in any budget, but that is the suggestion in the impact assessment.
Clause 73(4) ensures that this includes employees who have formed a body to take on the delivery of a service, including where they have left the employment of the authority. This supports the Government’s commitment to give public sector workers the right to bid to take over the running of the service that they deliver. I trust that these comments will mean that these amendments are not pressed at the present time.
I rather expected that the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, would be doing the heavy lifting at this point in the debate. I thank the Minister. We need to have further discussions about this to make sure that we are safeguarding things. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Newton, that definitions are not a problem here, because we are seeking to create a variety of different ways for local organisations and groups to set up social businesses which will be able to contract for services. The way that they will define themselves is by choosing a legal framework which fulfils the purpose as outlined in the Bill. There are only a few things that they could choose: a company with charitable purposes; a community interest company or an IPS, a co-operative of a different sort. There is a limited number. They define themselves, in a way. It looks complex, because there are lots of different ways of doing this and, in fact, the Government’s role in providing information support at local level will be very important. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I do not understand, then, why Clause 73(1)(b) talks about,
“participation in a procurement exercise”.
That would be the exercise that is carried out by the local authority. It does not say how the authority should procure, it simply acknowledges that there will be a procurement exercise. I understand that these are wide-ranging powers, and I understand the noble Lord expressing his view on that. I think, however, that there are two quick responses—and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will no doubt warm to this theme. It could well be that if employees are expressing an interest, under these clauses, provision could be made—and that may indeed be via a local authority rather than the Secretary of State—to give them help and assistance in forming a community interest company. That sort of advice and assistance, and seed-corn money, might enable such groups of employees to enter into expressions of interest. If they did not have that, they would be unable to.
The noble Lord invites me to comment on this. My comment is that it is not the Secretary of State’s job to provide this advice and assistance. It is the local authority’s job, or else that of some association which is under its control. It is the Government’s job to provide the resources for them to do it. This gives too much power to the Secretary of State.
The noble Baroness takes words out of my mouth. I did indeed say that that is exactly what could happen. I hope that, in the circumstances, these amendments will not be pressed, and that the clause will be able to stay. As I indicated right at the start, regulations are with us, and we will all need to see that we are happy with them. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said that he wanted convincing before the Bill leaves this House. It will be a while yet before it leaves.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Jenkin of Roding
I want to make one or two points. I have been hugely impressed by what my noble friends have been saying about this. I listened with care to what my noble friend on the Front Bench said about the objectives behind these provisions and I shall want to read that very carefully in order fully to understand. I am not sure, possibly as a result of my poor hearing, that I got it all, but I will read it.
My fear is due to the fact that the whole essence of localism is supposed to be building a partnership between local authorities and local communities. It depends for its development on the good will that will be generated by this process. I have put my name to a lot of amendments, including that to which the noble Lord, Lord Cotter, spoke earlier, because it seems to me that that is essential.
We are talking about public assets. I find it quite extraordinary that this is intended to apply to a wide range of privately owned assets. Businesses, yes—the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, made the point that, if there is a business such as a post office, a pub or something else that is going out of business, it is perfectly reasonable that a community might wish to say, “We can run this. We will take it over. We cannot open for the full time, but we will be open so many hours in the week” and be able to do that. That is a voluntary and community partnership.
What I find difficult is that this is all to be imposed by central government. There must be some way in which the statute could be drafted so as to build on the idea of community partnership with local authorities rather than giving everyone the sense that this is being imposed on them from the centre. One fact tells the story: there are 54 references to specific cases where the Secretary of State can issue regulations from the centre in this part of the Bill alone. The whole thing is being imposed from the centre.
I do not want to go on singing this song because I have sung it a good deal during the passage of the Bill, but the amount of detail that the Government are seeking to impose is absurd. Why do they have to decide and lay down what is of community value? Why can a local authority not establish criteria? Guidance could be given about the sort of principles, but does that need to be included in statute? Why does the Secretary of State have to decide who can make a nomination and who cannot? This gets the whole thing off on entirely the wrong footing, and it is the wrong sort of emotional approach to what one is trying to achieve—that is, localism, local responsibility and the ability of local authorities to respond to the desires of the local community. After all, the councillors are elected by people from the local community. That is the relationship that one should be building on. As a number of people, including my noble friends Lord Greaves and Lord Tope have said, this gives the impression that no one in Whitehall trusts local authorities unless they are being told what to do.
I am sorry, but I get quite hot under the collar about this because it rather upsets me. I have some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, who put his name to the question on whether the clause stand part, to which I have also added my name. Having considered the details of the anxieties and objections of the local authority associations—I have them all here but I will not weary the House with them—I have come to the view that we cannot go ahead with this part in the way that it is currently conceived or drafted. The whole concept behind this seems to be drawn up on the wrong principles. I hate having to differ in such a rooted way from my noble friends on the Front Bench but one really has been driven to this. I have not had anything like the representations that my noble friends have had and have spoken about but, hearing them and realising what is behind this, I beg my noble friends to think again.
My Lords, it is time that someone stood up and said how much they welcome what the Minister had to say and how much they agree, although it may not help her for me to say so from these Benches. On what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said about Governments of a different complexion, I say to him that in my view my own Government were really rather timid on this matter.
Why does the community right to buy matter? There are thousands of community organisations in this country that need the right to buy. This is not about central government imposing something on the local community; it is about giving a right to buy. I shall take a moment to explain. Healthy, viable communities are in the interests of landowners and everyone else. The community right to buy in the Bill is a significant step towards realising the aspirations of localism, the big society, the good society and community regeneration—aspirations that to a high degree are shared across the political spectrum. It would be a bitter blow for hundreds of communities if these actually quite modest proposals were derailed in this House.
Earl Cathcart
My Lords, just for clarity, I point out that the noble Baroness referred to a “community right to buy”, whereas the Bill is actually about the right to bid. Did the noble Baroness mean “right to bid” rather than “right to buy”?
Thank you for that clarification.
As the noble Baroness said, it is not about forcing a sale, or forcing landowners to sell to a particular bidder; it is about creating even more use of assets, some of which were previously liabilities. In the past, disused buildings, wasteland, schools, libraries, town halls and offices which were becoming redundant have all been used by local communities. The Bill promotes an extension of that activity. For example, in London the Westway Development Trust took over 40 acres of derelict land under the A40 to create a thriving community. In North Yorkshire local villagers bought a failing pub last year and have thus safeguarded a vital community resource. However, a major impediment to this has been the lack of a window of opportunity, to allow time for community groups to bid for key assets in their neighbourhoods before the assets are sold on the open market. Often key assets of huge community significance have slipped through their fingers as a result.
This is an important and practical step. The Government have sought to build safeguards into the Bill, to protect owners’ interests. It would be a great shame if we were to lose what would be a relatively modest step towards giving communities the right to make use of assets which they very much need.
My Lords, as I understand it, what this is about, as the noble Baroness has just described, is the concept of a period of pause. It has not yet been specifically defined, but if the shop or the pub closes, the community might have a period of six months, during which to get the money together to buy it. During such a period the owner would be constrained from selling it.
In itself, that sounds not unreasonable. I am somewhat concerned at the length and complexity of legislation that that rather simple idea has given birth to. When I sit back and think about it, the issue of price is absolutely fundamental. As was just pointed out by the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, this is a right to bid, not to buy. However, if the owner of the property does not wish to sell, or believes that he can sell at a much higher price, then clearly he is not going to sell, and so the right to bid is not going to do the community much good. Equally, if it turns into a right to buy, there is still the question: what is the price? Who is going to determine the price? Will there be some premium in the price? I am a little concerned that these very complex arrangements—the central objective might more easily be achieved simply by defining a time period in which community groups have grace to assemble the money—as they are presently structured may be self-defeating in a situation in which the owner is not willing to sell. To say that price should be left to market—well, what is market, when something has been listed? I am not sure that the provisions of the Bill can achieve their objectives without thinking about price.