Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Bill that we are to discuss today is vital for the security of our nation. It enables the ratification and entry into force of the treaty between the UK and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, and thus protects the operation of an essential UK military base in the Indian Ocean. The consequences of not ratifying this treaty should not be underestimated. The inevitable effect would be to expose the UK to an unacceptable level of risk and legal uncertainty, which could deny us key military and security capabilities, dramatically reducing the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and security services. A binding judgment against the UK from an international court or tribunal would undermine our ability to operate globally to protect UK influence and counter the threats we face in an increasingly dangerous world, and it would put at risk security at home.

I understand that the treaty has divided opinion. We have had good debates in both this House and the other place on its substance, and I, of course, welcome this scrutiny. Since the Government signed the treaty, there have been Statements and debates across both Houses, hundreds of Questions raised and answered, and the completion of several committee inquiries by learned colleagues.

The necessity of the Diego Garcia treaty and of this Bill has been amply demonstrated. It has been tested in detail by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Both agreed that protection of the strategic value of Diego Garcia—a vital national asset—was necessary. The IAC clearly set out the path to significant risks to the base if the treaty were not ratified.

The Diego Garcia treaty has the support of our international allies. The United States has been engaged throughout the negotiations and supports it, as do the rest of our Five Eyes partners; Japan, South Korea and India support it as well. The UN, the Commonwealth and the African Union all welcomed it. Our overseas territories family supports it. The list goes on.

I welcome the opportunity to test this further today. The treaty is an important matter that the Government considered with great care. We bore the full weight of responsibility for not only the security of the British people but the integrity of the UK’s position on the global stage, and for respect for the experiences of those who had lived on the islands.

This treaty is critical to our national security. The base holds a range of vital capabilities, some of which are highly secret. I know that those with experience in this House will understand the military advantage of being able to deploy forces rapidly across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, and will appreciate the political and security importance of operating such a prized asset jointly with our closest partner, the United States.

The deal preserves this vital security footprint. With it, we will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, with robust provisions to keep adversaries out. These include: unrestricted access to and use of the base for the UK and the US; a buffer zone around Diego Garcia; a UK veto to ensure that no development or construction on the outer islands threatens base operations; and a ban on the presence of any foreign security forces. The protections were designed, tested and endorsed at the highest level of the US political and security establishment.

The Government acted to protect this vital asset because it faced an existential threat. This was well understood by the previous Government, which is why they started negotiations more than three years ago—negotiations that they entered in good faith, despite what we heard in the other place, and continued for 11 rounds, including detailed text-based negotiations in the weeks and months before the general election.

It was under the previous Government that Mauritius secured its string of legal and political victories against the UK. Noble Lords will be aware of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in 2019 and the loss of votes at the UN General Assembly. This was followed in 2021 by a ruling by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on a maritime delimitation dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. The special chamber, in a decision that was binding on the parties to the dispute, ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s determinations. This gave a clear indication of how this tribunal—and, quite possibly, other international courts and tribunals—would approach the ICJ’s advisory opinion and the sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius.

I urge noble Lords to reflect on the sound conclusions of the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. The learned members of both committees took evidence from eminent legal scholars, including a former member of the ICJ. The IAC concluded that, if the treaty is not ratified,

“Mauritius is likely to resume its campaign against the UK through international courts”

and stated that it heard evidence that

“any international court looking at this issue would be unlikely to find in favour of the UK”,

putting the base at risk.

The Government have been clear about the legal position. Had a long-term deal not been reached, it was highly likely that wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. There were several potential routes for this, which included further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. The United Kingdom’s long-standing legal view has been that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending our legal position on sovereignty in such litigation. Even if we had chosen to ignore legally binding judgments against the UK, their legal effect on third countries and international organisations would have given rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions. We have all heard the counter- positions—that the Government are bowing to an opinion that is merely advisory and that there was no viable route to a binding judgment—but I am afraid those simply do not reflect the reality of this situation.

It is clear that securing a deal was essential. The agreement that the Government have signed protects the base for generations and is firmly in the national interest. The Government did not secure the base at any cost; we negotiated a deal that is good value for money for the British people. The full financial details were published alongside the treaty on the day of signature. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. These figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. These figures draw on long-established methodology, used under this Government and previous Governments, to account for long-term projects. We have all heard, and I suspect we will hear again today, the Opposition claim that the cost is higher. This is grossly misleading. Accounting norms and processes set out in the Green Book are there for a reason: so we can understand the true value of things. Let us debate those values with transparency, not exaggeration or manipulation for political point-scoring.

I suspect that some in this House will have heard concerns regarding undue influence on Mauritius from hostile forces. The Opposition were quite vocal on the subject in the other place—although, interestingly, we heard barely a peep before 4 July last year, when they were in negotiations. The treaty is the only way to ensure the base continues to operate as it has done, with all the protections that I listed earlier, including threats from our adversaries; whereas, had Mauritius secured a binding judgment against the UK, there would have been nothing to stop it leasing different islands to different countries, dramatically undermining the utility of this prized military asset.

As with any government policy, it is crucial that we discuss the people who are at the heart of it. I know there is a deep strength of feeling, genuinely held, in this House and the other place about Chagossians. Let me be clear: this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state-to-state between Mauritius and the UK, and it is true that our priority was to secure the base, but that does not mean that the interests of the Chagossian community were set aside. Indeed, the treaty has the support of many in the Chagossian community. Olivier Bancoult, chair of the Chagos Refugee Group, which is the largest Chagossian group, has said

“we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward”,

and in a recent communiqué urged all Members of the UK Parliament to support the Bill.

The treaty provides that Mauritius may develop a programme of resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia, and noble Lords will also be aware of the £40 million trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians. I know many in this House are interested in the operation of these commitments. My noble friend Lord Collins noted in this place that, ahead of ratification, the Government would make a ministerial Statement in both Houses providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the trust fund.

I know that many noble Lords are also interested in the environmental consequences of the treaty. It is crucial that one of the world’s most pristine marine environments is protected, and this Government and Mauritius are committed to that. Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam has publicly stated his commitment to the marine protected area and confirmed it directly to the former Environment Secretary at the UN Ocean Conference in June.

Just yesterday, the Mauritian Government announced plans for the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area. This will be based on the robust International Union for the Conservation of Nature categories for marine protected areas. Critically, it makes it clear that there will be no commercial fishing across the entire 640,000 square kilometre area. The Great Chagos Bank will be given one of the highest levels of protection, with the rest of the MPA categorised as a highly protected conservation zone. There will be limited provision for controlled levels of artisanal fishing in confined zones intended for resettlement to allow for sustenance of the Chagossian community, while maintaining the commitment to nature conservation. This development should assuage the concerns we have heard in this House and the other place about Mauritian commitments to environmental protections.

Despite this progress, and the passage of the Bill in the other place, there are still those here who want to relitigate the debate that we had in July. There are Motions intended to probe and amend at Committee and Report. They are welcome, but Motions that are designed to wreck are not about the welfare of a community; they are a cynical tactic of delay and disruption. The Opposition Front Bench has tried blocking ratification, yet seems unable to accept the will of this House. I am disappointed, but unsurprised, that we all now look likely to have to witness an unedifying spectacle of it having another go.

Noble Lords will notice that we are not considering a committal Motion to commit the Bill to Committee today. As noble Lords know, it is extremely unusual to table a Motion to seek to divide the House to delay the passage of government legislation passed by the House of Commons. It is even more unusual for the Opposition to press such a Motion to a vote on the Floor of the House, as they have indicated they would. We know that His Majesty’s Opposition take their responsibilities seriously. They have said on multiple occasions to my noble friend the Leader of the House of Lords that their motivation is to properly challenge and scrutinise government legislation. That is their job; it is not to block legislation or stop the Government getting their programme through.

Let me share the truth of this matter. The amendment to the committal Motion favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is, in effect, a fatal Motion. I will explain why: it makes committal conditional on consultation. It is not credible to undertake meaningful consultation in the 30-day period set out in the Motion. It would therefore risk progress towards ratification becoming bogged down in litigation. The Front Bench opposite should know that; I would be surprised if they do not.

The Motion would wreck the Bill and mean a delay not of 30 days but of months, maybe years. In these circumstances, the Bill and the treaty that it is intended to implement could not move ahead. This is both reckless and deeply cynical. It is reckless because it threatens the continued operation of the base on Diego Garcia and, with that, the national security of the British people. It is cynical because the Opposition now seek to use, for their own ends, a community they systematically disregarded when in government. We all know their record: the decision not to consult Chagossians when meaningful consultation was possible at the start of negotiations; the decision in 2016 not to permit any resettlement by Chagossians across the archipelago; and the dramatic failure to spend 96% of the £40 million commitment to support Chagossians.

It is worth contrasting that record with the record of this Government. We are financing a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian community. We are working with Mauritius to start a new programme of visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty we have entered allows Mauritius to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. This Government are also increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These are initiatives that actually deliver for Chagossians; they are not empty promises or hollow words.

The Bill is relatively short. It preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory as laws that will continue to apply to Diego Garcia once the treaty is in force, allowing for the base’s continued, effective operation with minimal disruption. The Bill also grants a new power to make the domestic legal changes needed to implement the treaty and to manage responsibly the base’s future operation.

There will be no change to the British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds, whether it is a British citizenship or a British Overseas Territory citizenship, and current pathways for Chagossians to acquire British citizenship are also maintained. Most of the provisions in the Bill will commence only when the treaty enters into force. I trust that we will have a lively and thorough debate on this subject matter, and I look forward to debating the Bill’s contents. I beg to move.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill, and I will come to some of her points shortly. This is now the second opportunity that we have had to debate the UK-Mauritius agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, but it is of course the first time that your Lordships’ House has been asked to approve the agreement in law.

When we debated the Motion to approve the treaty under the CRaG process, I lamented the fact that the other place was denied the opportunity to have a substantive debate on the treaty at that point. If the Government are so confident in their arguments, why did they deny the other House the opportunity to debate this properly? As I said then, the Government played fast and loose with the conventions on treaty approval, despite promises that had been given by their own Ministers when the CRaG process was first introduced. The Government were elected on the back of pledges to put public service and integrity first; refusing to adhere to the conventions in this case hardly lived up to those promises.

That said, as a responsible Official Opposition—and recognising the primacy of the other place, which approved the Bill at Third Reading—we will not seek to deny the Bill a Second Reading today. We already know that the other place did not have the opportunity to debate the treaty when it was laid before the House, and the Bill subsequently received minimal scrutiny. In fact, Committee and Third Reading were both taken on the same day, and a total of just 17 hours of debate were allocated to a Bill that fundamentally changes our strategic security role in the Indian Ocean and puts £35 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money in the hands of politicians thousands of miles away from the UK.

Not only was there no mention of the Bill in the Labour manifesto; there was a specific promise to protect our overseas territories. For the election, the Minister’s party’s manifesto said:

“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.


It seems that tax is not the only manifesto commitment being binned today.

Crucially, the views of the Chagossian people have not been heard. We feel it is only right that the Government should be required to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of this treaty, including on the establishment of the Chagossian trust fund, which the Minister discussed. The UK taxpayer will fund it, but the Mauritian Government will have sole responsibility to distribute it however they see fit.

That is why I tabled the amendment to the original committal Motion that would have required the Government to consult the Chagossian community over a period of 30 days. If the Minister is concerned that 30 days is not long enough, I note that we talked about making it longer, but we did not do so because we wanted the Government to have the opportunity to get their Bill through this Session. If I had set the Motion at three months, the Minister would have told us that there is no time to have a Committee debate before the end of this Session because the Opposition are trying to deny them the Bill. We deliberately selected a short period so that the Minister could not argue that we were trying to wreck the Bill—that was not our intention. It was a measured, reasonable approach which we felt would have made up completely for the Government’s failure to consult the Chagossians to date and would help us in our work to give the Bill the proper scrutiny it deserves, informed by the outcome of that consultation. It was not a wrecking amendment, and the Minister knows that in her heart of hearts. Without that additional consultation—

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

If the noble Lord was so concerned to do this, first, why did he not consult earlier? Secondly, he can achieve his aims—which would not be wrecking but would be perfectly legitimate —by amendment to the Bill, delaying implementation, perhaps. Those things are standard. He could make his case, or perhaps even win his vote, and achieve his aims, should they be genuine and not a wrecking amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

This treaty is due to last 100 years. How is it a wrecking amendment to take 30 days to consult the people who will be affected by it? The Minister is talking nonsense, and she knows it.

Without that additional consultation of the Chagossian people, we fear that the Bill, which received so little scrutiny in the other place, will go on to become law without the affected Chagossians having their views heard, as they rightly should. I know that a number of them have turned up to the Public Gallery to hear this debate today.

I hope that the Government’s decision to withdraw the committal Motion at the last moment is an indication that they are listening to us and want to think about this more deeply. It is clear to us that we need that consultation, so I call upon the Minister to bring it forward as part of the committal Motion when the Government eventually bring it back to the House. As I said, the Government intend this treaty to last 100 years; surely, we can take one month to consult the people most affected by it.

To call the Bill a surrender Bill is an understatement. This is a strategic capitulation that will see us give away sovereign territory that has been British for two centuries. To add insult to injury, taxpayers are paying tens of billions to Mauritius for the privilege of doing so. We know the important, strategic role that the British Indian Ocean Territory has played internationally as a staging post for forward operations in both the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Handing over sovereignty, even with a lease agreement in respect of Diego Garcia military base, puts, in our view, that strategic role in jeopardy.

In particular, the requirement in the agreement that Mauritius must be informed of armed attacks on third states directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia is an astounding failure of diplomacy. Could the Government tell us how this would actually work in practice, in a rapidly changing armed conflict? Has the US, which actually runs this base, agreed to do that? How would it work in practice? How would we inform them in an emergency situation, with proper notice to enable us to take strategic action, as required?

My noble friend Lady Goldie will expand on some of the security implications of this agreement, but we are clear that it is a capitulation that weakens our influence on the international stage. It is a surrender orchestrated by international lawyers and implemented by a Prime Minister who is either unwilling or unable to stand up for the UK national interest.

The Bill does not just relate to the UK’s affairs in the Indian Ocean; the sheer cost of the treaty with Mauritius makes the Bill a domestic issue, too. By pressing ahead with this legislation, the Government are facilitating an agreement that will see the UK pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius. I notice that the Minister spent quite a bit of her time disagreeing with those figures, yet only one hour ago, when I asked her how much of the ODA budget is being dedicated to this agreement, she got a cheap laugh, and avoided the question once again, as she has now done four times. However, she knows, as I know, that some of that ODA budget is being used to fund this agreement. If she wishes to be so transparent and disagree with our figures, why does she not tell us how much of it is going to be spent from the ODA budget? She can stand up and do it now, if she wishes.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

All of our ODA spending is published. It is probably one of the most transparent bits of government funding. I will send the noble Lord the website address so he can have a look and satisfy himself on this point.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am grateful for that; that is a concession, of sorts. I have only asked her the question four times during Questions so far. Now that she is willing to be more transparent, that is progress, at least.

Against that backdrop, hard-working Britons will be furious that Ministers have somehow found £35 billion to send 6,000 miles away when we face such financial challenges here at home. The fact is that the treaty facilitated by the Bill will fund tax cuts for Mauritius while taxes are being hiked here at home. We put this deal on hold when we were in Government, when it was in its infancy. We saw its flaws, and we paused it. Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and are—

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am sorry, but that is factually incorrect and I would like to give the noble Lord the opportunity to correct it. It was paused, but when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary, he restarted those negotiations.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am happy to tell the Minister that I have spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about that. He agreed that it was paused, which I think she has just confirmed.

Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and, as so often with this Government, they have allowed themselves to be taken in by their international lawyer friends and donors. This all begs the question: why? Why did Ministers feel the need to pursue this agreement that puts Britain’s interests last? Why have the Government seen fit to saddle taxpayers with an additional financial burden, at a time when we are all being softened up for massive tax rises from the Chancellor of the Exchequer?

Ministers have told us, as the noble Baroness did again today, that this agreement is a legal necessity, but, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar when we debated the Motion to approve the treaty—I commend his speech to noble Lords who have not had the chance to see it yet—there is a range of views among very senior lawyers on this matter. The Government cannot hide behind legal advice, unless they want to publish it for us all to see. This was a political decision for which Ministers must take the political responsibility.

The almost single-minded obsession with international law has blinded the Government to the real threat from a country that itself pays absolutely no heed whatever to that same international law. We know that China has said that it wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius. As recently as 15 May this year, China’s ambassador to Mauritius said that the People’s Republic of China wanted to strengthen ties with Mauritius, noting the country’s “strategic advantages”, and expressed a commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Mauritius is on the record as offering, unsurprisingly, massive congratulations on the deal and stating that China fully supports Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national sovereignty”. It is a shame that China does not show that same regard to the national sovereignty of other nations.

That is who the Government have appeased with this agreement. When the Government took office, they claimed that they would protect our national security. Can the Minister please explain how ceding national sovereignty to a country that is known to be deepening its ties with a nation that we know to be a threat to the UK will help them achieve that manifesto commitment?

As the Official Opposition, we will seek to amend the Bill in your Lordships’ House to ensure that the Chagossian community is properly consulted and that the agreement facilitated by the Bill does not put the desires of international lawyers before the interests of the British people, who have paid the taxes which are now to be transferred with careless abandon to Mauritius.

Speaking of the rights of the Chagossians, I find myself on this occasion in the unusual position of agreeing with noble Lords to my left when I say that the Government have not handled this well. In the other place, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Dr Al Pinkerton, said that,

“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.].”

On this, we agree. Ministers have failed to properly consult the Chagossians to the point that the community is now furious with this Government, as we have all seen from our email inboxes.

However, there was another way. In the other place, the shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, tabled a presentation Bill which included specific requirements

“to consult and engage with British Chagossians in relation to any proposed changes to the sovereignty and constitutional arrangements of the British Indian Ocean Territory”.

That is what should happen. The Chagossian community should be heard and not ignored.

In conclusion, the questions at the core of all our debates will remain these. Is this treaty a good deal for Britain? Does the Bill put us in the service of the British people? I do not think that it does—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for her closing speech. It was exactly the kind of speech I would have expected from her. It was forensic and detailed, asking absolutely legitimate questions that any respectable Opposition should put to a Government proposing this kind of Bill. I will try to answer all her questions— I was writing as quickly as I could—but I may not get through them all. The idea of a letter in the Library, explaining the detail so that everybody can see what we have to say, is a very good one. I would be happy to do that.

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. It has been lively, as I suspected it might be. I might say that I agreed with some contributions more than others, and some were probably better informed than others, but that is the nature of these things. I will endeavour to respond to all the points raised by noble Lords, and we will, I hope, have further discussions in Committee on many of those.

I would like to remind the House why we are scrutinising and reviewing a Bill sent to us from the other place. The Bill is essential to ensure that the treaty with Mauritius can be ratified, a treaty that is fundamental to safeguarding the operations of a critical UK-US base on Diego Garcia and to the security of British people. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, the Bill is also vital to protecting the British citizenship rights of Chagossians.

Noble Lords have questioned the legal rationale for this deal and asked what court could give a binding judgment. Let me set this out again: as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, explained well in his speech, if a long-term deal had not been reached, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. Both the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, in scrutinising the treaty, heard evidence of where these binding judgments could come from.

One possibility is that Mauritius would find a dispute under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that it could bring before an arbitral tribunal under Annexe VII of the convention. That also raises the prospect that Mauritius would seek provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Provisional measures of this type and the decision of an arbitral tribunal would each be legally binding on the UK. A further possibility is that a dispute under a multilateral treaty could be brought before the International Court of Justice. A judgment delivered in the manner by the ICJ in disputes between states may also be legally binding.

There are those—we have had this ever since we started debating this issue—who question where this binding judgment might arise, but they are fundamentally missing the point here. The risk was real. International courts were already reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty, and this in turn, as my noble friend Lord Browne explained, put the base at real risk. The point is that the treaty with Mauritius prevents that happening in the future.

Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to take a different view on the extent of that risk; that is absolutely their right. The Government’s view is that that risk is real. Having that view, any responsible Government making that assessment has to seek to resolve it and to come to some lasting, legally enforceable arrangement with Mauritius. That is why we did the deal. Noble Lords are entitled to disagree with the Government, and I have absolutely no issue with that, but please do not impute some sort of bad intent or motive around political correctness, colonialism or any of those things. Our intention is to secure that base for the benefit of the security of our country. We did it so an agreement could be concluded on our terms, rather than it being forced upon us so that we would have to accept the imposition of an arrangement that would not have been in our favour.

I am interpreting the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on the overseas territories as an invitation to the Government to restate their longstanding and clear commitment to all our overseas territories. The Conservatives, at some points in these debates, although not recently—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, never did this, but others did—would raise the issue of the Falkland Islands. I thought that that was the height of irresponsibility, and I am very glad that they no longer attempt to bring that question into these discussions, because it was wrong that they did that.

This treaty has a complex resolution process attached to it because it needs to be long-lasting, and we are trying to cover every eventuality that might arise. That is a really good subject for us to get into in Committee, and we must test that to make sure that we have got that right. I have every confidence that the noble Baroness and her colleagues will bring to us situations that we need to hold up against that process, to make sure that we have got that right.

On the notification of activities of third countries with our consent, there is a notification there. I think that is right, but it is not in any way conditional. We do not need consent. It is not about permission or any of those things. I hope that that is helpful.

On the ability to make law, we had an interesting discussion at the briefing about royal prerogative and the ability of the King to make law in Diego Garcia. We need to get into that in Committee. There will be things in the Bill that, when I was sitting in the noble Baroness’s place, I would have been asking questions about, such as powers and flexibilities, the ability of Ministers to make decisions, and the various methodologies. I expect we will be having long discussions about negative and affirmative procedures, for example, and law-making power is one such issue.

I want to address some of the points that were made regarding the Chagossian community. As I stated in my opening speech, this Government deeply regret how the Chagossians were removed from the islands. This is a community that the Government are committed to working with and supporting in the months and years ahead. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. She made a compelling and genuine contribution on this important issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and I commend those who have been working on this for very many years. She did her party proud, and I respect the longstanding commitment that she and others have had.

The Bill ensures that there will be no adverse impact on Chagossians’ nationality rights as a result of the treaty. Chagossians will not lose their current rights to hold or claim British citizenship, and no one will lose existing British Overseas Territory citizenship status. The Bill does, however, remove Chagossians’ ability to acquire British Overseas Territory citizenship in the future, because once the treaty comes into force, BIOT will not be an overseas territory.

On the trust fund, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, raised the possibility of an exchange of letters on the future treatment of Chagossians under this fund. This is, again, a genuine issue that we ought to explore. I appreciate that noble Lords will want more detail on how the trust fund will operate. I look forward to discussing this in Committee. Who knows? We might be able to reach some sort of agreement on that issue.

On the citizenship law, which was raised by one or two noble Lords opposite—it may have been the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—there have been mentions of section 76B of the Mauritian criminal code and concerns that Chagossians are leaving Mauritius for fear of being prosecuted for their affiliation with the UK. This is really important: no one has ever been prosecuted under this law; but just because no one has ever been subject to it, that does not make it right. Last week, the Mauritian Government repealed this section, and, as of April 2025, 94% of Chagossians with British nationality also had Mauritian citizenship.

On the right to self-determination, there have been questions during the debate, and leading up to it, about consultation with Chagossians. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily between states—the UK and Mauritius—and it is true that we have prioritised the operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That has been our priority. There may be people here who disagree with that and who would have preferred us to prioritise other issues, and I respect their right to hold that view, but that is not the view of the Government. We wanted to protect the base.

There were some, including the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who raised the right to self-determination for the Chagossians. I have followed the noble Baroness’s career for many years; I do not know why, but I have always been rather attached to following what she does and says, and I have a real long-standing respect for her. I completely understand why she wants to raise this issue, and why it matters so much to her. The fact is that the Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population, therefore, legally arises.

The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritians rather than Chagossians. Both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered, in a series of judgments since the 1970s, the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed these claims. The transfer of sovereignty, therefore, does not deprive Chagossians of any existing rights. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted, including in claims brought as recently as 2020. That all sounds very legalistic and cold; nevertheless, that is the legal position as it stands.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

I thank the Minister for addressing this issue, because it has become a real touchpoint in the general populace. Does she agree that, while we might differ on the legality issue, there is a moral duty on the Government to engage with the Chagossians, who feel so let down, not just by this Government—I made that very clear—but by the whole political establishment in this country?

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I agree, and I will say a little about engagement. It is an important point, and it deserves a proper response. If there is more that we can do, we would be very open to discussions about how it could be done in the right way that does not derail the process that we are trying to undertake about bringing the treaty into law.

Having said that, we recognise the importance of the islands to Chagossians, and have worked hard to reflect this in our wider policies. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has, as he said, a long-standing position on this which I understand and respect. His impressive command of the history of this subject was put to good use in his previous interventions. I completely agree with his point about the shameful treatment of the Chagossian population.

On engagement, in the past three years officials have met Chagossians and groups over 30 times to discuss the agreement and FCDO’s wider support to the community. The Minister for Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, has met with Chagossians four times since he has been in post since July last year and, on 2 September, the new Chagossian contact group met. It has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, Mauritius, the Seychelles and elsewhere to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making in the UK Government’s support for their community. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly hereafter.

Claims that all Chagossians are opposed to the agreement fail to respect the differing views of this diverse and vibrant community. We have seen some of that reflected in our discussions this afternoon. Many voices support the outcome reached, and these include the Chagos Refugees Group, the Chagos Islanders Movement, the UK Natives Chagossian Council and the Seychelles Chagossian committee. However, I accept that there are many Chagossians who take a different view, which is their right.

On resettlement, points have been made that the treaty does not guarantee Chagossians the right of return to the archipelago and that it should have done. This has come up several times. In 2016, when in government, the Conservatives ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands. The KPMG report, which has been mentioned several times and was commissioned by that Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. This agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms without requiring the UK taxpayer to foot the bill.

There has been a range of views about Mauritius and its reliability. Some noble Lords have implied that Mauritius is somehow an unreliable partner that cannot be trusted. These claims are insulting to Mauritius, which is a member of the Commonwealth and a westward-facing country with shared democratic values. Mauritius ranks among the top African nations in governance, human development and innovation. It is a full democracy, a regional leader in human rights and a trusted partner in upholding the rules-based international order. It ranks second out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim index of African governance. It is also one of only two African countries not to have signed up to China’s belt and road initiative. As an act of good faith, Mauritius stopped its legal campaign against us while we negotiated.

Much has also been said about China. There has been a substantial amount of complete misinformation about China’s influence in the region and reported plans to develop a military base in the Chagos Archipelago. The Mauritian Attorney-General has stated publicly that these claims are a gross falsehood and calls them a political gimmick. I can confirm, unequivocally, that the treaty prevents any foreign security forces, civilian or military, from establishing themselves in the archipelago. Furthermore, if the UK believes, for whatever reason, that any activity taking place in the archipelago would jeopardise the security of the base, Mauritius is obliged under the treaty to co-operate with us to prevent that risk, and the UK can veto any construction or development across the archipelago which we consider to be a security threat to the base. As for claims that China supports the treaty because it grants it greater influence in the Indian Ocean, that is, frankly, nonsense.

This is why our closest allies and partners have welcomed the deal, especially the US and other Five Eyes partners. They are satisfied that the treaty protects the base against foreign influence and think that it is essential for our capabilities for generations to come.

Many of the points on the issue of the environment are really quite important, including on marine protected areas. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, made a thoughtful speech about this. There have been claims made, both during the debate today and in the other place, that the Mauritian Fisheries Minister wished to issue fishing licences in the area, which would risk, the argument goes, the protection of the unique marine environment of the archipelago. It must be noted that the point the Minister was making was more to do with sovereignty than with fisheries policy, but, as I said in my opening speech, the Mauritian Government confirmed only yesterday that they will establish a marine protected area that follows current bounds of the BIOT MPA and that they will not allow any commercial fishing in any section of the marine protected area.

Noble Lords have quite reasonably sought assurances on enforcement of the MPA, and I expect this is something we will get into detailed discussion about in Committee. For today, I point out that, if the UK at any point believes that Mauritius is in breach of its environmental obligations, we can seek to resolve that using the agreed dispute resolution mechanism in Article 14. In any case, the UK and Mauritius are working to finalise the arrangements on maritime security to ensure that there are patrolling capabilities and that these are maintained.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

On the point about the marine protected area, I think the Minister said that Mauritius had duplicated the zone absolutely. Is it not the case that it is not a no-catch zone? Point B in the communiqué issued confirmed that fishing will still be permitted in over 600,000 square kilometres of the zone.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is right, and I said that in my opening speech. This is about artisanal fishing. In the event of some sort of resettlement on the outer islands, those communities would need to sustain themselves. They would fish using traditional artisanal methods, and that is what the permission relates to. It would not permit any other form of fishing, because that would clearly be detrimental to marine life.

The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, chair of the ISC, said—and this is about money—it is disappointing that there continues to be reference to artificially inflated figures of the cost of the treaty. It is misleading to ignore inflation and the changing value of money over time. The net present value of the treaty is what we have always said it will be: £3.4 billion over its lifetime. This is in line with long-standing practice in how the Government account for all long-term spend. The Office for Statistics Regulation and the OBR have verified these figures and confirmed that we have applied this methodology correctly.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the point is that, in accounting for money, cash accounting is used in government. What she is talking about is economic analysis, which is not the same as financial analysis. If she had been in the Chamber she would have heard my speech on this subject. It is clear that, when we come to draw up accounts for the Government, cash goes into this in pounds expressed in the time expended.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I apologise to the noble Baroness for missing her speech, and I will read it in Hansard; the bladder is only so strong. What matters here is that there is consistency across government and over time in the way that we do these things. These things are done the same as they would be done for any other agreement.

I know that some people take a different view of the OBR from the one that this Government take. We take it seriously, and it has looked at our figures and verified them. The noble Baroness could by all means come back to this in Committee—I am sure that she will—but, for tonight, I will stick with what the OBR had to say on this issue. The way that we have done this ensures that the figures are realistic and comparable, not inflated by simply adding up future payments while ignoring the depreciation of value over time.

The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, made quite a thoughtful speech. He is worried about the money. I should point out that we do not see this as an open market situation by any means. He seeks clarity about total cost. I can confirm that £3.4 billion is just that—it is the total cost.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, suggested that the US should be contributing to the cost of the treaty, given its joint use of the military base. We have to recognise that the US pays for the operating costs of the base, and these are several multiples greater than any payments by the UK. We benefit greatly from this arrangement. This allows us to access a valuable capability that keeps our country safe and the US is paying far more for it than we do.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

Does my noble friend agree that this agreement also allows the Americans to forward plan for their investment, which, as she quite rightly says, is substantial?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Absolutely. I thought the point made by the former Secretary of State for Defence, my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton, added to this very well when he talked about how future investment is jeopardised by the legal uncertainty that we are seeking to resolve.

Some have questioned the use of defence money in particular for this treaty. To be absolutely clear, the cost will be split between the FCDO and the MoD, as is appropriate given the shared interests of both departments in maintaining the future of the base. As set out by the Defence Secretary in his Oral Statement on the treaty in the other place, the costs represent a fraction of a percentage of the total defence budget—less than 0.2%. It is a bit far-fetched to suggest that the annual payments are in any way comparable to the biggest uplift in defence spending that we have seen since the end of the Cold War.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, raised sea level change. I do not know why I am dealing with this in the money section, but this is where I have written it down so we might as well get it on the record. As he said, it is true that sea level change has been less than 1% over the past 50 years, but it would be helpful for us to explore in Committee how a future sea level change, which he quite rightly alerts us to, would be treated by the dispute resolution process. I do not have a clear answer to that tonight but that is what Committee is for: getting to the bottom of exactly those sorts of questions.

I will give the last word to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He made the very strong argument—it is not one that I had thought of, but I will definitely use it again—that this House voted in July to ratify the treaty. The Bill facilitates the enactment of this House’s wishes, because we voted in favour of the treaty. The Bill is necessary so that we can complete the ratification with Mauritius and therefore secure the critical military base on Diego Garcia. I thank noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to debating this in Committee.

Bill read a second time.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

That is extremely helpful. I very much welcome my noble friend’s intervention.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

I am very much going to regret getting involved in this, but I think it is helpful to understand what this House has and has not done. Both Houses of Parliament have voted that the Government should ratify this treaty. That is the situation as it is. This debate is about making sure we have the right legislation to enable us to enact the treaty.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I think lots of positions will be endlessly stated on that; I am not going to take it any further now. I do not see anyone changing their minds about that, but I would like to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who suggested that this was really about a reluctance ever to cede sovereignty and to allow any colony to go its own way.

One of the peculiar features of British rule overseas was the nature of its dissolution. The British Empire, unlike most others, had a self-dissolving quality because it had the democratic self-determination principle that was adumbrated in this House and then exported. Very few imperial moments ended so peacefully. Yes, there were tragic exceptions in Kenya, Cyprus, India and Palestine, I suppose. Ireland was a slightly different story, because it was not treated as a colony but as part of the country itself. But those were exceptional; in most places, including most Caribbean countries and Malaya, independence happened without a shot being fired in anger because there was that belief in self-determination. Quite often the imperative to decolonise, as my noble friend Lord Lilley suggests, overrode self-determination.

Some noble Lords will, I am sure, remember that in 1956 Malta voted in a referendum, by 77%, to turn itself into three Westminster constituencies and become part of the United Kingdom. It was turned down and, soon after, Malta ended up not just independent but outside NATO and the Commonwealth, and pursuing an extremely unhelpful line. During the Maltese process of accession to the European Union, I discussed this with Dom Mintoff, who was still alive. He was an old and revered figure at that time, and he said, “My wife is British and I love Britain, but how do you expect anyone to respond to being treated in that way?”

I mentioned Malta because there was a similar debate, which I do not think has come up in any of your Lordships’ deliberations, in one of the parties in Mauritius in the 1960s about whether to adhere to the United Kingdom and seek representation at the other end of this building. The idea that this is really about some kind of grasping imperial power refusing to let go is wrong in the generality and especially wrong in this case, because we are refusing to recognise the wishes of the people concerned—the only people who ever formed a permanent population of the Chagos Archipelago between 1714 and the early 1970s.

Self-determination does not always mean independence. It means exactly that: you can self-determine to be part of a larger bloc. The referendum in Scotland in 2014 was an act of self-determination; it did not stop being self-determination because of the referendum result. That is what we mean by democracy. I fear that self-determination, which is a core principle of the United Nations and of the legal order that we have defended even since the Atlantic charter in 1941, is being overridden here for no good reason at all. This is what makes me so frustrated. Every time I sit down to draft what I want to say about these amendments, I start getting angry all over again about the utter needlessness of it all, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Lilley. We are surrendering to a case where there is no jurisdiction over us. If Ministers think that that is wrong, I would love to hear the Minister explain why the Government will not accept my noble friend’s amendments.

It seems that what we are doing here is creating a hierarchy of norms, not by the intrinsic importance of their jurisdictional power, but on the basis of taste and fashion. The principle of self-determination is thus ranked below the principle of general decolonisation—getting out of the way—and that is fundamentally because of a transient public mood. It is considered unfashionable to have flags with little Union Jacks in the top corner, which sets a very dangerous precedent.

It may be—I do not know—that the Government will argue that the reason we are following this non-binding resolution, which is not a legal judgment, is not because there is some hidden reason that we really have to, as my noble friend suggests, but, they may say, because we have to give an example. It would be because the international order is in danger; countries are throwing their weight around; Machtpolitik is prevailing; the whole post-war order is looking shaky; even the United States, on which it rested, is now asserting its interests without recourse to treaties. Therefore, we need to set a lead.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.

It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.

On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:

“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]


That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate—slightly wide ranging, but that often happens with the first group in Committee. I am sure we will return to some of the issues raised in proper depth when we get to the relevant amendments, and I look forward to that. We have heard some interesting claims from the Opposition, but it is the Government’s contention that none of the amendments in the first group is necessary, and I will explain why that is.

Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is unnecessary because it is clear what the purpose of the Bill is. It has been debated many times over. The Bill implements in domestic law, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained very clearly, those elements of the treaty between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago that require such implementation. There are also elements of this amendment that are just false. We will have a further debate shortly, I am sure, but it is incorrect to state that the Bill seeks to limit Chagossian citizenship rights. The Bill makes changes necessary so that no new claims for British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made, but it also preserves the existing British Overseas Territory citizenship for those who hold it. The Bill preserves Chagossians’ rights to obtain British citizenship and the British citizenship of those who already hold it. We have been clear about this, and anything that suggests otherwise is helping, I think, to circulate misinformation, which does no good for anyone, least of all the Chagossians.

Amendment 8 would jeopardise our national security if accepted and fundamentally goes against what this treaty and Bill do, which is to safeguard our national security. This amendment would prevent the UK ratifying the treaty until an international court delivers a binding ruling. In that scenario there is a very real risk of the deal collapsing, and the Government’s view is that this would put the UK in a very weak negotiating position—far weaker than that in which we started negotiating. Actually, we did not start negotiating; as many noble Lords have observed, there were 11 rounds of negotiation under the previous Government. We have set out our legal rationale on multiple occasions, but for the avoidance of doubt I will restate it here: the Government acted to protect the Diego Garcia base because it faced an existential threat. The previous Government knew this, and that is why they started negotiations over three years ago and continued them for 11 rounds. Under the previous Government, Mauritius secured a string of legal and political victories against the UK.

On Amendment 9, the Government have already published their legal reasoning for signing the deal and have set this out clearly to Parliament on several occasions. Committees have heard expert testimony on these points, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us.

On Amendment 21, a notice will be published in the London Gazette on the day the treaty enters into force, as is the usual practice, and we will consider the utility of whether a Statement in Parliament at that point would be beneficial. It may well be.

On the clause stand part notice, Clause 1 sets out when the different clauses of the Bill come into force. Clauses 2 and 4 commence at the same time that the treaty enters into force. Article 18 of the treaty states that the treaty enters into force on the first day of the first month following the confirmation by both the UK Government and the Government of Mauritius that they have ratified the treaty.

Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Therefore, this clause provides that legal certainty and ensures that there is no ambiguity as to when the British Indian Ocean Territory is no longer an overseas territory or as to which laws will be saved. As I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State will publish a notice in the London Gazette when the treaty enters into force.

I will give a little more detail about something that has come up several times. Noble Lords suggested that there is no legal risk here and, further, that there could never be any legal question around this. That really makes me wonder what on earth the previous Government were doing with officials’ time, ministerial time and the time of officials from other Governments, when they set about negotiating for 11 rounds. They paused the negotiations when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary and then restarted them. If there was no legal jeopardy whatever, what on earth were the previous Government thinking when they set about that process? On the question of what court—

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I asked a very clear, core question: from which international court does she fear a damaging, binding judgment? She will not tell us. She says that she does not know but that the previous Government must have known.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Forgive me, but I did not say that I did not know; I was just about to answer that specific question. I was making a point about the inconsistency and—frankly—ludicrousness of the Opposition doing something that, when they were in government, took up a great deal of time and resource, but which they now contend they never, ever needed to do.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Will the Minister give way? We keep hearing that the previous Government negotiated over 11 rounds and went on negotiating, but surely that reveals something about the previous Government’s steadfast determination to secure a good deal. If the Government had not been able to get a deal, would they have eventually signed up to an agreement? I do think they would have done.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

At the risk of jumping further down the rabbit hole with the noble Lord, my point was simply that to contend now that there was never any possibility of any legal jeopardy, as many noble Lords have sought to do today, does not correspond with the fact that the previous Government did enter into negotiations. If there was never a legal risk, why did they do that? That is the point that I am seeking to make, a pretty straightforward point.

The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, asked me about binding judgments and courts; they are fair questions. I believe that I have responded to them previously, but I am happy to go into more detail today, as that is what Committee debates are all about. There are numerous avenues through which Mauritius could pursue a legally binding judgment, including under the dispute provisions of the treaties to which both states are parties or further arbitral—

[A noble Lord]

Arbitral proceedings.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am getting on to that. Noble Lords are very impatient this afternoon. We are in Committee—we have time, and I am in no hurry. I am prepared to stay here as long as we need to get these things done.

[A noble Lord]

Oh!

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am speaking for myself; other noble Lords may take different views on that point.

Mauritius could also pursue a legally binding judgment through further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK—and I will come on to the points about the extent of those judgments and sovereignty, too. Such cases could be brought rapidly and include provisional measures, themselves legally binding, which could be introduced within weeks. The long-standing legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.

The other important element to note here is that, even if the UK chose to disregard any legal rulings—that is not something that this Government would want to do, but we could—we rely on third countries to service the base. Therefore, the operability of the base depends on other states taking a view on such rulings. We of course control what we do, but we cannot control what other states do. If we need those states to agree with us and to ignore a legal ruling too, we may not be successful. It may be that we then compromise the operability of the base. That is a very real threat; we were concerned about that, as were our allies and partners, including the United States.

The risk of a binding ruling relating to sovereignty from this type of tribunal is simply too great, given the importance of the base for national security. Some have pointed to the 2015 arbitration between the UK and Mauritius, in which the tribunal was clear that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of sovereignty. That is right. However, that was before the advisory opinion in 2019 and before the 2021 judgment of a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in a case about delimitating the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives. In that case, it was ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s advisory determinations. These have changed the legal landscape.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Will the Minister confirm that, in those proceedings to which she just referred, the United Kingdom was not a party and made no submissions?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I never said that we did; that was between Mauritius and the Maldives. My point is to make the case to noble Lords that the advisory opinions—advisory though they are—stand to inform subsequent opinions of international tribunals. That is what happened in that case, and that is why I bring that as a supporting argument for the Government’s case—to help noble Lords understand how we have got to where we are.

While an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS almost certainly would not address the question of sovereignty directly, it may reach decisions on related matters based on conclusions about sovereignty. Noble Lords may disagree, but the Government’s position is that we are concerned about this—and I suggest that the previous Government were also concerned about this; otherwise, what were they doing? We are concerned not just about the effects of a binding judgment on the UK but about the legal effect on third countries and international organisations, which could give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions.

Although I do not expect there to be agreement on this, I believe that we cannot say that the Government have not fully considered all the potential legal jeopardy in which we would place ourselves. Further, we believe that the suck-it-and-see approach that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, advocates would leave us in a much weaker position when it comes to negotiating with Mauritius.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

May I press the Minister on that point? I am very grateful to her for giving way. She said that there was an existential threat to the base. So that I have understood that clearly, is she saying that there was something in addition to the possibility of an adverse UNCLOS judgment? As she conceded a moment ago, UNCLOS has no sovereignty; I just looked up what it says on its website, and it says, “We don’t do sovereignty issues”. That issue was tested with the case between the Philippines and China, when the latter was building reefs over some contested land, and UNCLOS said that it had nothing to do with it. Therefore, is there something else? Is an adverse judgment from a body that cannot decide sovereignty, in her view, an existential threat to the existence of the base? Would it make the existence of that base impossible?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

What do we mean by existential? We could still have a Diego Garcia—there could be something there. However, it would be existential because, if the operability is compromised, the base as it exists today—it is a unique place and it does things that we do not do anywhere else—would be compromised. To that extent, I suggest that that is an existential threat to the operability of the base.

With that, I hope that noble Lords who have presented their amendments are satisfied. If not, we can of course return to these issues on Report.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Can the Minister answer my point about the UN Security Council and the UK’s ability and right to veto?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

We are not saying that this goes to the Security Council. We are saying that there could be further rulings. With respect, that is a bit of a red herring. There could be rulings that affect how we are able to operate on the base. There could be votes at the General Assembly, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained quite well. He is right; we could veto something at the Security Council, but we do not anticipate that, and that is not the legal threat that we are concerned about. It is a different legal threat.

If there are no further interventions, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her replies. This has been an interesting debate. As she says, this is how the first debate in Committee normally goes. It is fairly wide ranging, and I am sure we will return to many of these issues.

Just before I address some of the other issues, I return briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. We have already made the point that it is not Parliament’s role to ratify treaties under CRaG. Parliament has the right to delay them only, but the Government still have the right to agree them. I am not questioning the Government’s right to agree treaties under the royal prerogative. I might not like it—in fact, I really dislike it—but of course they have the right to do that. The reality is that they have now presented us with a Bill to implement the treaty that they have agreed. We fundamentally disagree with that treaty, so we have the perfect right to put forward amendments to the Bill that they have presented us with—the Table Office has ruled our amendments in order—and to debate them and vote on them if we wish.

I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for his excellent amendments in this group. I look forward to working with him throughout Committee and Report. We should certainly return to the question of international law on Report. My noble friend Lord Hannan made some excellent arguments as well.

I listened carefully to the Minister’s reply to my amendments, and I will look carefully at her remarks before we return to the Bill next year on Report. However, there is one point that she has not addressed. I return to and reiterate the point around the 1967 agreement with the United States. There was not a CRaG process in 1967, but that treaty, which has presumably been ratified, was agreed under whatever process we had then. Does the Minister not think it is still valid? Would she like to reply to that?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am very happy to respond to that, and I am very sorry for not including that in my closing remarks. Obviously, the UK and the US are party to that treaty, and parties to treaties can agree to do things with those treaties. I remind the noble Lord and everybody else that the US very much supports what we are doing with our treaty with Mauritius.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Is she saying that the United States has agreed to abrogate that treaty?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am saying that the United States publicly and in terms supports the treaty that we have agreed as a Parliament to ratify with Mauritius.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I heard that, but that was not in fact the question that I asked. If the original agreement is still in force—it is still an international treaty and is presumably still lodged—I assume that the Minister is telling me that the US has not yet agreed to abrogate that treaty. Therefore, if we concede the sovereignty of the BIOT, we are in breach of that treaty. She wants to talk to her noble and learned friend the Attorney- General, who is so keen to refer to international law all the time.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My point is that we will be doing so with the consent of the other party to the treaty.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will look at Hansard, but I do not think that she has answered the question here.

The other point I want to make, going back to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is that I think he said at one stage that he has proposed amendments—plural. I can see only one amendment, unless another one has gone in recently that I have not yet seen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very interested to hear all the contributions from noble Lords on this important debate on the consultation of the Chagossians, or rather the lack of consultation. There have been some powerful speeches, particularly that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. Establishing a permanent representative of the Chagossians, as he proposes in his Amendment 37, would indeed be a very powerful thing. I think everybody has agreed that we need to give them a voice. They have not been properly consulted by the Foreign Office, and I am happy to concede to the noble Lord that they were not properly consulted by previous Governments either. No legislative scrutiny will change that.

The noble Lord postulated that it was a bit like him being offered the Dauphin of France, but, given the distance from Northern Ireland to Paris and that from Mauritius to the Chagos, it would be more appropriate for him to be offered the monarchy of Azerbaijan rather than Paris. But the Foreign Office needs to consult the community properly, and that process might be helped if they had a champion of their own.

Amendment 49 speaks to an interesting question about a shared civic identity between the Chagossians and the Mauritians. I think everybody has agreed that there really is not one. This reminded me of the contribution of my noble friend Lord Biggar at Second Reading. In pure terms of identity and self-determination, it makes absolutely no sense that Mauritius and the Chagos Islands should be lumped together in this way. It all stems from some bizarre decision by British imperial administrators many years ago and has absolutely nothing to do with the interests of the Chagossians.

We all know that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted, and that when I tabled an amendment to the committal Motion that would have required a consultation before the Bill could proceed, the Government, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, from the Dispatch Box, raised concerns about the practicality of any such consultation. In fact, the noble Baroness said in a meeting we held with others afterwards that 30 days was not long enough. Fair enough; it is a reasonable point. But when I asked how long was long enough, answer came there none. The Foreign Office has no interest whatever in consulting because, I suspect, despite what the Minister says about there being different opinions among the community, she knows what answer she would get. As it would find it far too difficult a question, the Foreign Office has sidestepped it completely and said that there is no self-determination right for the Chagossians in this case.

This, in my view, is not an acceptable state of affairs and we firmly believe the Government must consult the Chagossian community. It is great that the International Relations Committee is now doing so, but given the time available because the Government would not agree to extend the time for this Bill any further, there is no substitute for a proper consultation. The committee will do its best in the limited time it has.

I will return to the issue of a referendum later, but in the absence of a proper consultation with the Chagossian community in the lead-up to the UK Government’s decision to reach agreement with Mauritius, we see this as a very reasonable step to ensure that they are not left out in the cold as the future of the islands they once called home is determined as they are handed over lock, stock and barrel to a nation they know very little about.

The Government’s treatment of the Chagossians is nothing less than shameful, and I believe we have an opportunity to remedy that in some small way with these amendments. There are many other things that I could say about these amendments, but I think I will leave it at that.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, it is worth restating—and many of the contributions this afternoon have stated this too—that this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the Chagos archipelago. If I can commend just one speech that we have heard in consideration of this group, it would be that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. I found that an impactful, passionate speech that was sincerely given and heartfelt. I do not think I am going to make him happy this afternoon, but what he said was sincerely felt and I respect the way he put his argument and many of the things he said.

We remain committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. I know—and I agree with much of what has been said—that this House clearly feels very strongly about Chagossians and ensuring that their views are properly heard. We have agreed that the International Relations and Defence Committee will undertake an important piece of work looking at Chagossian views on the treaty. We are looking forward to its report and I am sure we will all read it with great interest.

Turning to the arguments we have just debated, Amendments 13 and 28—I think the noble Lord said he was degrouping Amendments 14, 25, 64 and 84—all relate in some way to holding a referendum or some sort of consultation with Chagossians on the transfer of the Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. I know we have said before—there will be some repetition of argument on these issues—that in the negotiations on the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius, our priority was to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. I accept that there will be those who disagree with that priority.

The Chagos archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. Therefore, on the question of self-determination for its population, the English courts have, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius rather than of Chagossians. That feels incredibly cold and hard to read from this Dispatch Box, but that is the situation legally as determined by English courts. I do not think it helps anybody, not least the Chagossians, to somehow pretend that that is not the case. That is the situation we are in. We can regret that, we can argue about it, we can say that should not be the case; but that is the legal reality.

In a series of judgments since the 1970s, both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have also considered the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights that are said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims. The transfer of sovereignty therefore does not deprive Chagossians of any existing right. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

The Minister is repeating what she said at Second Reading, and I acknowledge that that is the case. I said to her then that while the courts have taken a particular view in relation to this matter, it does not rule out Parliament taking a different view, given that we believe in parliamentary democracy and parliamentary sovereignty. Given the way in which this community has been treated for 60 years now, it is fair to say, do we not have a moral obligation to accord them the right to have a say? Regardless of the fact that there have been court judgments on this, can we as not parliamentarians indicate that we believe that the best way forward is to listen to their voices?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I think we can. I do not think we can call it self-determination in the legally applicable sense, but I agree, and I think Parliament agrees too, that the Chagossians deserve the respect of a different kind of relationship with the UK Government, and we need to make sure that we engage with them in a respectful and meaningful way. I will get on to whether that means a referendum, but the noble Baroness makes a very strong point about the importance of listening to the voices of Chagossians themselves, however we might choose to do that. I have mentioned this being a long-standing legal position, but as I am trying to explain, we recognise the importance of these islands to the Chagossians, and we are working hard to reflect this in our wider policies, not all of which are reflected in the Bill because they do not require legislation.

Given that the treaty has been signed, however, and the Bill is reasonably well advanced, having been through the other place, I say with great sincerity that any formal consultation at this stage would not be honest or sufficiently meaningful. I think that was what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was gently trying to point out to us, because that window was open at one point. It was open when the now Opposition were in government, and they never decided to consult the Chagossians. We agree with that Government, as they were—now the Opposition—that there is no actual legal duty in this situation to do that, but it is vital to respect the many different views within the Chagossian community, including that of several groups that welcome the deal.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I do not want to get ahead of myself, because Amendment 80 is a long way away. My appeal to the Minister—I would say exactly the same to the Mauritian Government if they were here—is that, while discussions on the treaty have concluded, it is obvious that there are ongoing discussions with the Mauritian Government. It is not closed yet for there to be consideration of structures of representation that are currently not in the treaty nor the Bill. My appeal at this early stage of Committee would be for the Minister to retain an open mind on potential structures for further discussions when it comes to representation including, perhaps, a firmer position on how the Chagossian community will be able to be represented going forward.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is a constructive proposition. The Government are very willing to engage in that kind of conversation and I note the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, which we will come to later in our considerations—perhaps not this evening, given our current rate of progress.

I point noble Lords to the statement by Olivier Bancoult, the leader of the largest Chagossian group, the CRG. I think it demonstrates that, while there are different views among Chagossians, there is strong support for the agreement from a significant number in the community.

I thought that Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, was really interesting. I am pretty sure this is not exactly what he intended, but in some respects it seems to be trying to replicate that which our elected Members of Parliament are there to do: to represent the views of their constituents, including, in a number of cases, Chagossians. I draw attention to the All-Party Parliamentary Group, which does an excellent job of liaising between Chagossians and Parliament.

In addition, the Government have established a Chagossian contact group, which has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, but also in Mauritius, Seychelles and elsewhere, to give Chagossians the formal role—this is what I think noble Lords seek —that can shape decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, again reminded us, he will seek to make sure that that group can be as effective as I know noble Lords want it to be. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly thereafter. As my noble friend Lord Coaker and I said in our letter to all Peers, we are exploring opportunities for enhancing that group, including increasing its transparency and frequency. But we are clear that any decisions about the contact group have to be made in agreement with its existing members, and the Government will engage with the group on these questions.

I forget whether we are considering Amendments 29 and 32 or whether they have been degrouped. I think we are doing those. They were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and relate to the UNGA resolutions. I do not think that would be an especially constructive exercise. The treaty expressly states that it constitutes the full and final settlement of all claims by Mauritius in relation to the Chagos Archipelago; it is hard to see how the proposed report would add to that.

In relation to Amendment 49, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, there has never been a claim that all Chagossians share civic identity with Mauritius. As I have said, and as has been said numerous times in this Chamber and in the other place, it is a diverse community with a wide range of views. I said at the beginning of this contribution that the Government have prioritised the needs of security and securing the base on Diego Garcia. I know there are those who disagree with that and I have heard them. That being said, it does not mean that the Government should not do the very best job that we can of engaging with the Chagossian community, and making sure that its diverse range of views are reflected as best we can, as we move forward on the functioning of the contact group, the trust fund and other issues. I commit from the Dispatch Box that this Government will do everything they can to make sure that that happens, and I hope that the noble Lord will therefore seek to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

With the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for moving Amendment 3 on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. We all hope his family member gets well soon. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her very powerful speech.

These amendments all touch on the impact that the Bill will have on the citizenship rights of Chagossians. Clause 4 will limit the rights of those descended from Chagos Islanders to gain British citizenship, in several ways. My amendments in this group also seek to challenge the Government’s approach. It should be noted that settlement in the UK is not what many Chagossians want. Many want to return to the archipelago, and this is something that Ministers have discussed previously. That said, British citizenship should be an option for the Chagossians given the responsibility that I think everybody here believes that we owe them thanks to our historic links and, I am afraid, our record of mistreating their community.

My Amendment 7 would prevent the citizenship provisions coming into effect with the treaty, allowing more time for the Government to consider their approach in domestic law alongside the treaty. It might also allow for greater consultation of the Chagossian community, who are ultimately the people who will be affected by Clause 4. In her reply can the Minister confirm whether the Government have had any conversations with Chagossians about the effect of Clause 4? Can she confirm whether substantive discussions on citizenship rights have been held with the Chagossian contact group, which she claims to have met on a couple of occasions? What was the outcome of those discussions? I would also like to know whether Ministers have made any changes to their plans on citizenship rights as a result of some of the concerns raised by the Chagossian community.

My Amendment 39 probes the limitation of citizenship rights by birth year. Will the Minister please explain why 2027 has been chosen as the cut-off date? What opportunity will there be for the Chagossian community to make a case for its extension, should circumstances require it? Another important issue with any cut-off date for applications is communication. Have Ministers given any consideration to the procedure that should be followed to ensure that eligible Chagossians are contacted about their rights?

I have tabled Amendment 40 to probe the requirement that a person must not have previously held British citizenship to be eligible under the changes made by Clause 4. We can understand why it would not be appropriate for a person who has had their citizenship revoked not to be eligible, but why should a person who has given up their citizenship voluntarily be barred by this clause? I hope the Minister will be able to address these questions.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their speeches. A host of amendments, as we have heard, have been tabled in relation to citizenship rights. Some of them come from a bit of a misunderstanding of what Clause 4 does. I hope that I can explain the detail of what the Bill will mean. If it is not enough, I am very happy to write a letter and put it in the Library, because it is detailed and a little bit complicated. If that would be helpful, that is something I am happy to do. Let me have a go at explaining it all properly this evening and that may suffice.

Clause 4 makes provisions related to British nationality as a consequence of the dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory. These provisions are essential to ensure that the existing entitlements the Chagossians have to British citizenship remain unchanged. This clause also amends the British Nationality Act 1981 to reflect that BIOT will no longer be a British Overseas Territory, and as a result no future claims to British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made on the basis of a connection to BIOT.

This will not result in any change to the existing British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds; this remains protected. Any Chagossian who currently holds British Overseas Territory citizenship retains it. Current routes to British citizenship will also continue to exist with their original expiry dates for application. This clause is vital in order to protect Chagossians’ rights to continue to obtain British citizenship. Seeking to delete the clause would be to play politics with this right.

I turn to the amendments tabled. Amendment 4 is a good example of an amendment that I would gently say is somewhat misconceived in its intent. Chagossians born on the Chagos Archipelago already automatically hold British Overseas Territory citizenship and British citizenship. This amendment would therefore seek to require the Secretary of State to bring forward legislation that would apply to anyone of any nationality born on the Chagos Archipelago once it is no longer a British territory.

The Government are clear that, as BIOT will no longer be an overseas territory, it will no longer be possible to make a new claim for British Overseas Territory citizenship. Instead, the Bill preserves Chagossians’ ability to claim British citizenship. Whether a Chagossian has British Overseas Territory citizenship or not will have no bearing on their ability to claim British citizenship under their bespoke citizenship route.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I was going to say that this has been an excellent debate, but it has not really been much of a debate seeing as nobody from the Labour side has bothered to get up and try to defend the Government’s actions on this matter. Not even the Foreign Office trade union crowd on the Cross Benches have come along to justify the Government’s actions on this. I note from the media reports that apparently the Mauritian AG is in London for discussions, no doubt to celebrate his brilliantly successful negotiation. He will probably find that the Foreign Office has given him another £100 million today for his trouble in coming over here in the first place.

It would not be right for me to begin my contributions without mentioning the excellent forensic speeches of my noble friends Lord Altrincham and Lady Noakes at Second Reading. It seemed to me very convincing that the Government have increasingly got their numbers wrong. I look forward to the noble Baroness attempting to explain her financial figures again.

I am sure that some noble Lords will argue—maybe the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will—that this agreement has been made and there is nothing we can do about it. They might say that it is an unfortunate oversight, but we cannot change the agreement. However, the treaty, as we have discussed previously, has not yet been ratified; it is not final. The Government could still change their approach. It is unlikely, and it would take political will, but everything is possible.

Now that we know that the treaty is not inevitable and that the overall cost expected when the agreement was reached was wrong, I hope Ministers will take the opportunity to reconsider. In any other walk of life, a decision-maker faced with a significantly higher cost than expected would reassess their position. Why are Ministers failing to take that responsible approach with taxpayers’ money? The Chancellor will get up next week and tell us that the country is bust, and that we need to raise taxes and cut spending, but the FCDO seems to take no account of the extra costs when negotiating this agreement.

My Amendment 22 would require a review of the overall financial cost of the agreement. With such uncertainty about the overall costs, I think this is an entirely reasonable amendment that would give greater transparency to taxpayers on how much of their money will be sent to Mauritius, over time, as we have said before, to fund tax cuts over there. We pay more tax over here, but the Mauritians will be able to cut their taxes with the money that we are very generously sending to them.

As I said, on value for money we are being told to expect spending cuts at the Budget on 26 November. Before the Government cut a single extra service for the British people, Ministers should first consider cutting their surrender deal with the Mauritian Government. In my view, most of the British public would be aghast when presented with the fact that the Government have surrendered territory to a foreign state and simultaneously somehow found themselves paying for the privilege. This is a clear failure to deliver value for money to taxpayers.

My Amendment 70 would require the Government to make a statement explaining why they believe that each payment to Mauritius represents value for money. My Amendment 75 would require the publication of a schedule of expected payments to Mauritius along with their dates. The Government should not resist measures which increase transparency on the financial elements of the agreement.

I gave a wry smile when the noble Lord, Lord Weir, asked the Minister for the breakdown of the costs of this agreement between the MoD budget and the FCDO budget. I hope he has more success than I have in asking this question, because I have asked it five times and she has refused to tell me how much is being paid out of the different budgets. One was beginning to suspect that she does not even know how much money we are handing over on behalf of this deal.

I additionally ask the Minister what powers Ministers have to ensure that the money we hand over to Mauritius is spent as agreed. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, particularly highlighted the trust fund supposedly set up for the benefit of Chagossians, but how they spend it is entirely within the control of Mauritius. There have been well-documented corruption cases in Mauritius; how do we know how that money will be spent? I think we should be told or Ministers should at least seek to find out.

Finally, Amendment 74 relates to a slightly separate question on the part of the UK-Mauritius agreement relating to the employment of Mauritians on the Diego Garcia military base. I tabled it to ask the noble Baroness some specific questions on the practical effect of the article of this agreement. Can she confirm whether this article means Mauritians will be prioritised for employment on the Diego Garcia military base over, for example, British citizens or Chagossians? Who ultimately would their employer be? This also speaks to value for money. Can the Minister confirm whether her department has made any assessment of the impact of the provisions relating to the employment of Mauritians and how much that will contribute to the cost of running the base?

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

I am not sure that diplomacy is quite the thing for the noble Lord to aspire to. We will move to discussing the amendments that deal with the financial issues and the payments to be made under the treaty. Inevitably in Committee, other issues will be raised as part of the discussions, including those around the trust fund and the way it is managed, as well as security. These are important questions but, if it is okay with noble Lords, it is probably better to deal with them when we reach the appropriate group, so that we can get into sufficient depth when we deal with those specific amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

I was stressing the point that the agreement is about the Chagos Archipelago, but we are interested in Diego Garcia. If Diego Garcia is not available, the treaty requires us to continue to pay Mauritius for the 100 years or whatever it is. We would then be paying for something we do not even have, let alone have the use of. It would seem sensible to have some arrangement in the treaty to cope with this. I am surprised there is not one. If not, how will it be handled?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

We do not expect to be confronted with this situation in the case of Diego Garcia. I am sure there will be adaptations to mitigate this, as there already have been. In the event that sea levels rise to the extent that they would need to in order to make the base unusable, the entire planet would be facing very real threat. That would confront us in very many locations, including Montserrat, St Helena and Ascension. This would probably be the least of our problems.

Out of respect for the noble and gallant Lord and his genuine concern—it is not an unreasonable question— I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he cares about this and wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that. Luckily, this is the first day of Committee and we have the opportunity to allow ourselves further conversations on these issues.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My concern is that we would have to continue to pay under the present agreement, even though there was not a base available.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I understand fully the nature of the noble and gallant Lord’s concern. He has explained it well and repeatedly, and I have committed to come back to him with a further response. I do not think I can do any more than that tonight.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I fully respect the noble and gallant Lord’s position on the base not being available due to natural disasters—or, as we called it when I was a solicitor, an act of God—but what happens if the base becomes simply unusable because of an act of aggression by a bad actor in 50 years’ time, which we have no sight of at this moment? The point is that if it becomes unusable for whatever reason, whether by act of God or an act of aggression, will we still continue to pay for a base that we cannot use?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I simply cannot answer that because it would depend so much on the circumstances and on who would be culpable. I do not know. I will think about that and come back to the noble Baroness. It is very difficult to respond to hypotheticals. I could create a few hypotheticals that answer those specific questions but I do not think that would necessarily get us anywhere. She is probably after something a little more concrete than that. I will give that some further thought and see whether I can come back to her with something more satisfactory. I guess, ultimately, that if there is some unavailability we have the option of breaching the terms of the agreement through non-payment, which would end the agreement. However, I will look into our legal position in that situation and make sure we have some clarity so that we can consider this further if we need to.

On the issue of the split and how the money will be found, the noble Lord opposite—in his usual charming way—suggests that we have not really thought about this. Some of the money will come from the FCDO and some from the MoD. It is all government money; it is all taxpayers’ money. I really do not understand the preoccupation with this. That split will be fair. We are very used to paying for things jointly. We do it all the time on various things. This is not an unusual situation.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Will the Minister tell us how much? There is a difference between the money that is spent from her aid budget in the FCDO and the money spent from the MoD. If it is such a simple, straightforward issue that she keeps brushing the question aside then why not just give us the figures? How much of it is coming from the MoD budget and how much of it is coming from the ODA budget, which is, of course, capped?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is not capped, actually. Not all ODA money is spent by the FCDO. The MoD spends ODA as well. Not all money spent by the FCDO is ODA. You can spend ODA only on certain activities in certain places. My reading of the OECD rules is that I do not think the DAC would allow us to spend ODA for the purpose of paying for a military base. That does not mean we could not spend ODA in Mauritius if we wanted to—we have a very small programme there at the moment. I hope that helps. The noble Lord may wish to go away and read up on the DAC rules, which might assist him in answering this question.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I was not asking for an explanation of how the different split works between Foreign Office money and ODA money; I was simply asking her how much of the Bill is spent from the Foreign Office budget and how much of it is spent from the MoD budget. I do not see what is so difficult about answering a simple question.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

But the noble Lord did ask me about ODA.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

That was part of the question: how much is coming out of the ODA budget?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is not coming out of the ODA budget—that is my point—but that does not mean it is not coming out of the FCDO budget, which is different. Does that help the noble Lord?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Why does the Minister not just tell us how much?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I do not know how much will be from the FCDO and how much will be from the MoD. It is not ODA, which is the bit I am responsible for. I do not fully understand—perhaps the noble Lord could tell me—why it makes a difference to him how much comes from the FCDO and how much comes from the MoD. I might be better able to assist him if he wishes to explain why this is important. It is not ODA, if that is his concern.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

That is an interesting clarification that I have not heard before. Is she telling us, then, that none of the money funding this agreement comes out of the ODA budget?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

You cannot pay for a military base out of your development budget.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I have not given way; I have had enough of this. The noble Lord should probably write to me and explain his question, because we are clearly not getting very far with this. If the noble Baroness on the Back Bench wants to have a go and puts it in a different way, I would be very happy to try to answer.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

The Minister wants this in writing, but unless I am particularly stupid, I thought it was a very simple question.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

The question was: how much is going to be from the ODA budget? I have answered that, and I do not know how to answer that any more clearly. As for how much comes from the FCDO and how much from the MoD, the Treasury will allocate us different amounts of money for different things. I do not quite understand why that makes a difference to the noble Lord—

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I know the Minister was not attracted by the charms of the Front Bench, so I will try slightly differently. I suppose what we are trying to establish first of all is the percentage breakdown between the FCDO and the MoD. It matters because if this is not additional money, there will be a level of opportunity cost. If, for example, we are eating into the MoD budget, that money could be spent on other things. I think, from what I have gathered from what the Minister has said, that the bulk of the money would come from the MoD because of restrictions, but it would be useful to have percentage terms.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Okay, I will see whether we can get that. I do not know that that will be consistent over time, and I do not know whether the Treasury will want to be making that clear from now on. The MoD is deciding to buy itself some capability with this money. It is a significant investment, but it is not beyond the realms of what the MoD would spend on a capability such as this. That is my understanding. Exactly how much comes from each department will be published as we go along, because these things are published in the ordinary run of things.

The confusion in my mind comes from the interchangeable use of “ODA” and “FCDO”, and they are clearly different things. I look after the ODA budget, but the FCDO spends an awful lot more than just ODA. The MoD spends the ODA, too, as does DESNZ, the Department of Health, Defra and many other departments. Does this help noble Lords? Are we getting somewhere?

On Amendments 70, 74 and 75, all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, I repeat that Parliament has already agreed the principles of the treaty and has not decided to vote against ratification. Any requirement for further approval from Parliament for the payments ignores the thorough and correct process that the treaty and Bill have already gone through and risks undermining the treaty, since non-payment by the UK is a ground for termination.

Regarding Amendment 74, I reassure noble Lords that there are no impacts on the cost of running the base from Article 10. This article pertains to the normal contractual arrangements, with any preference being to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with existing policies, requirements, laws and regulations.

Finally, regarding Amendment 75, I remind noble Lords that an annual payment to Mauritius is a fundamental part of the agreement, and this principle, and the amounts of those payments, were published in full on the day of treaty signature. I hope that in the light of this, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

I asked the Minister a specific question about whether His Majesty’s Government knew about India and Mauritius. Did they know or not?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Of course we knew. My understanding is that this pre-dated negotiations and refers to something on the island of Mauritius itself. if I am wrong about that, I will correct the record and inform the noble Baroness.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

With the Committee’s permission, I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Probably to get some more money. Indeed, we should have dealt with that in the previous session on money. How much more money is he asking for? One understands there are debates in Mauritius saying they have done so well that they should now reopen discussions and get a little more.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, wants a serious response to that last comment. I will respond to the noble Lord’s point that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yes, this is true, but if the asset is legally contested to the extent that a close ally is no longer investing in it, and third-party friends and allies are possibly unwilling to support its operability, I would say that possession of that asset is worth a lot less than one that has legal certainty, the investment of the United States and the ability to operate it, because third parties will not be questioning the legal basis on which it is held. But we have been through this at some length already.

I turn to the amendments in the group concerning various mechanisms surrounding termination and the extension of the treaty. We will deal with the issue of sovereignty and termination in a subsequent group. On Amendments 6, 12, 79 and 89 about the implications of terminating the treaty, I should remind the House that there are extremely limited grounds for termination once the treaty is in force, both of which are within the UK’s control. The first would be if we did not pay the sums due under Article 11. Secondly, to answer the point made by the noble Lord, it would be in the case of an armed attack, or threat of one by the United Kingdom on Mauritius, or one directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia. This base is, of course, to be operated by the United Kingdom and the United States together.

It is in our interests that the grounds for termination are limited in this way. It means that Mauritius is unable unilaterally to terminate the agreement except in very specific circumstances. These amendments would therefore force us to reopen negotiations on an area in which we have already secured the strongest terms, and which have also been endorsed by our US allies. It is also highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination. It is important that we understand and are clear about that.

On Amendment 11, Article 13 already sets out the basis on which we can extend the duration of the treaty, including our right of first refusal. The treaty will last for an initial 99 years and may be extended for a further 40 years and beyond, by agreement between the UK and Mauritius. Even if no agreement were reached, the UK would have the right to first refusal on the use of Diego Garcia. If exercised, this would prevent the use of the base by any other party. I was asked—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but it may have been another noble Lord—how exactly this would work and on what terms. I will get a full answer on this specific point. For today, I am relying on the right of first refusal. I will come back to noble Lords and clarify exactly what is meant by this.

I welcome the interest shown by Amendment 77 in the establishment of the joint commission. Its precise structure is still being developed and will continue to be a point of negotiation between the UK, Mauritius and the US. This includes the development of terms of reference as to how the joint commission will function. However, the following principles have already been agreed, as set out in Annexe 3 to the treaty. I think these answer some of the points that were put, although, because we are still negotiating, it is useful to get the responses, understanding and views of noble Lords on some of these things. The joint commission shall consist of one senior representative from each party as co-chairs, and four additional representatives from each party. The US shall have the right to introduce items for discussion in the joint commission and to designate a representative to attend meetings and provide views and advice. The joint commission shall meet at least twice a year, or more frequently on the request of either party. All decisions of the joint commission shall be taken with the agreement of both parties.

While I welcome the opinions of noble Lords on the best means of keeping the House informed on the development of the joint commission, I do not think that a statutory obligation to publish a statement would be the most appropriate means of doing so, although I will think about this a little more.

On this issue of prerogative and the law on Diego Garcia, this applies only to the law on Diego Garcia. We did have quite a complex exchange about this in one of our briefing conversations and it does not apply to the operation of the treaty, so it would not concern non-payment or any of those other issues. It is only about the law as it applies to Diego Garcia. I hope that that is helpful and that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. As usual, my noble friend Lord Lilley made an excellent contribution to the debate, and I thank the Minister for her reply. I do not think she has answered all the questions that we asked, or certainly that I asked—I know that she answered some, but not all. She set out the legal position on the commission, as it is in the treaty, but she has not provided any more details on who will be its members, how they will do the appointments et cetera. I would be grateful if she would write to us with the details of that.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I would never deliberately not answer a question from the noble Lord. I have set out what has been agreed so far, and I have explained that the commission is subject to negotiation and that I will commit to updating the House. I do not quite understand the niggle in the noble Lord’s voice.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am not being niggly; I am just repeating the questions that I asked. Who will be the members of the commission? How will they be appointed? Those are the questions that I asked. She set out the numbers, which we could see from the original agreement, but she has not provided the further details that we asked for. I did say that she had answered some of the questions but not all of them.

The long-term legal status of the archipelago is supposedly the driving motivation behind the Government’s decision to seek this agreement with Mauritius, so I think the questions that have been posed are entirely reasonable to seek clarity on the status of what would happen should the treaty be revoked.

I also think we need clarity on the UK’s right to withdraw from the treaty and withhold payments in line with the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Goldie. I think that that is all the information we are going to get out of the Minister tonight so, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Lord that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital, which is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit change to a treaty that has already been negotiated in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong. On the noble Lord’s question about how often we have discussed resettlement, it has been discussed throughout and repeatedly—of course it has. It is a very important part of the negotiation that we have had with the Government of Mauritius.

We are coming to some amendments on the operation of the trust fund in the next group, but some news will come from Mauritius shortly on exactly how that will operate. I think that will be reassuring for noble Lords and I hope that we get it very soon so that we can include it in our considerations.

I would point out that resettlement now is non-existent. It has not been possible. They have not even been having heritage visits since Covid; the previous Government did not get round to sorting them out. Having said that, it is good that the Conservative Party is now turning some attention to this.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, “But consider if the islands had not been depopulated”. In response, I point out that if the islands had not been depopulated then there would not be a base and we would not have a treaty. They probably would have been returned to Mauritius, as part of decolonisation, and be Mauritian now anyway. I am at a bit of a loss—but the noble Lord is going to tell me now what he was getting at.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Forgive me, but I am not sure that is quite true. I do not think the Americans wanted the entire archipelago voided of population; they were satisfied with having Diego Garcia. The Minister and I were not born then, but our predecessors went ahead and volunteered the complete evacuation, which was the beginning of all our problems.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

But that is what happened, and it cannot be undone. We are in a situation where there is clearly no prospect of resettlement now on Diego Garcia—I am glad that that has not explicitly come up in debate—but there is the possibility of resettlement on the other islands and the prospect of visits to Diego Garcia in a way that has not happened for some years.

Specifically on the amendments in this group, I do not think that Amendments 10 and 72 are necessary, but I should explain why. Under the terms of the agreement, Mauritius is already free to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia. It will be for Mauritius to decide whether it takes that forward. We have already committed to making a ministerial Statement in both Houses, providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement. The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill. We know that would be considerable, because of the KPMG report.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

Our Governments over the past 30 or 40 years refused to allow the Chagossians to go back. Why does the Minister think the Mauritian Government will ever allow them? What if they say, “Absolutely no”. Have we any say? Can we do anything?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is for the Mauritian Government to make that decision. I understand the noble Baroness’s scepticism, especially given our reluctance to undertake this. To serve citizens living in such a remote place with so few services is a considerable thing to do, which is why we are very careful and mindful of the warnings that we have heard about not wanting to give false hope or a false impression, or to make this sound straightforward. That guides us all in our discussions. It is, of course, an incredibly difficult prospect and very expensive. There is the trust fund. I do not know how that would operate and whether it would enable some of this to happen. This is for the Government of Mauritius to determine; we are completely clear about that. The noble Baroness might not wish that to be so, but I point out that the UK Government, for over 50 years, have made it absolutely clear that we would not facilitate return to the islands, for security and financial reasons.

On Amendment 72, it is important that negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on this matter—which I completely accept is sensitive—can take place in confidence. Publishing the records of confidential negotiations such as this would be damaging to trust in the UK keeping matters confidential in the future. That relates not just to our negotiations with Mauritius; it would obviously relate to the prospect of our negotiations with other states on other equally or more sensitive matters. With that, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their comments on this. I feel that we have discussed the issue of a referendum fairly comprehensively, as the noble Baroness suggested.

The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed the finger at the Lib Dems and accused them of inconsistency. I do not always see eye to eye with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, nor with the Liberal Democrats, but if you want consistency on this issue, I do not think you could do much better than the noble Lord or his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who has championed the rights of the Chagossians for very many years. I have frankly never heard a peep out of the noble Lord opposite or from many of his colleagues on this topic, the rights of Chagossians, resettlement or anything else to do with the Chagos Islands. If we are after consistency, then the Liberal Democrats have, to be fair, been pretty consistent on this issue for very many years now.

On the issue of a referendum, I remind the Committee that negotiations on the treaty were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise. This has been tested in the English courts, as we said in our earlier debate, in a series of judgments since the 1970s. The transfer of sovereignty does not deprive the Chagossians of any existing right.

A time for a referendum or some formal legal basis of a consultation would have been prior to this point, maybe even prior to or during some of the 11 rounds of negotiation undertaken by the previous Government. This is despite the fact that they clearly now think that there is absolutely no legal risk to the security of the islands. It is really important that we do not allow the Chagossian community to have the impression that a consultation or a referendum held now would in any way be able to affect a treaty that has already been agreed by two Governments and that we have been instructed to ratify by votes in both Houses. The Bill has also been through all its processes in the other place.

With that, I hope the noble Lord decides to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The Minister will not be surprised that I am not convinced by her arguments. I am sure this is something that we will return to at later stages of the Bill but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)]

The noble Baroness has moved that the House do now resume. I will take advice as to whether it is debateable. It is debateable, in which case the Motion now stands before the Committee.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I wish to oppose the noble Baroness in the suggestion, because I think we have made some good progress this evening and had some good debates. We are about to discuss some very important issues around the marine protected area. I am here and ready to do that, despite the bizarre late degrouping for no apparent reason, when we had a repeat of an earlier debate. I think it would be good to make some progress this evening.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

I imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, would want his two amendments grouped with the other marine protected area amendments. Unfortunately, he is not here. It would be good to have all those amendments grouped together, so that we could have a thorough exposition of the environment, instead of part of it tonight and part of it next Tuesday. I would have preferred it if my Amendment 20A was grouped with the right of Chagossians to return, which was already debated but, because it was not, it now has to wait until next week. So I think there is an argument to have the next group next week, so that all the marine environment amendments can be heard together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I had not intended to speak on these amendments because there are other far more qualified people who I thought would do so. I served on your Lordships’ Environment and Climate Change Committee when it produced the report in July 2023 on the biodiversity agreement in Montreal. As I recall, that commitment, the Montreal treaty, requires Britain to protect 30% of its marine areas by 2030; it was called the 30 by 30 agreement. We were very proud, and I think it was mentioned in that report, that the largest single area of sea that was being protected was the British Indian Ocean Territory’s sea. We accepted tacitly that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect that, that it was a very important area of biodiversity for the world as a whole, and that it was our responsibility.

It now seems that we have handed that over to Mauritius, but Mauritius has no means of policing that area. It has no boats or aeroplanes that could cover that distance and that area. I doubt whether we had permanent boats stationed there, but if there were problems we could. We have the capacity to send both sea- and airborne reconnaissance aircraft to make sure that things are being properly respected.

I wonder, therefore, whether this treaty which we are now legislating to implement is not in contravention of our commitments under the Montreal biodiversity treaty. Are we abandoning commitments we made there and leaving them, in effect, unpoliced?

Another treaty was passed which we did not investigate and which was investigated by another committee of this House. I cannot even remember the name of the treaty but it was about areas of the sea which are outside national jurisdiction. It would seem that this now covers the BIOT—or does it? I hope the Minister will tell us which of these two treaties it is covered by. Is it covered by the old one, which we had responsibility for but have now given up, despite our international obligations under international law, which are normally sacrosanct, or is it under another treaty, which means that it is now dealt with as if it is beyond national jurisdiction?

These are clearly very important matters. It is a shame that we are discussing them at this time of night when people far better informed than I, who could bring their expertise and knowledge to bear, are not here. Since they are not here, I am raising these questions and hope that the Minister will be able to respond to them.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I am happy to respond. As I understand it, details about the Mauritian marine protected area were published only last week, or it may have been the week before. There will be a new treaty which will be lodged at the UN in a similar way to ours. It will not be a BBNJ issue. I think we will be considering it in this House next week, when we can get into it in a little more detail now that the noble Lord is back into these issues after a bit of a break. Because this would not be biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, it would be the responsibility of the Mauritians and covered by the new treaty. I can talk about that a bit more now.

Amendments 15 and 66 would prevent Clauses 2 to 4 coming into force until the UK Government had published a report on how it intended to preserve the Chagos Marine Protected Area. The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement. They have already announced the creation of the MPA, which they will create once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the marine protected area. Low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians will be allowed in certain limited areas and will be compatible with nature conservation. The UK will continue to support Mauritius in the establishment of this marine protected area and in protecting the globally significant ecosystems of the Chagos Archipelago.

On Amendments 38 and 65, while I appreciate and understand the noble Baroness’s commitment to sustaining the unique and pristine environment around the archipelago, recycling and waste management systems on the outer islands would be for Mauritius to deliver. On Diego Garcia itself, waste management is currently undertaken by the US and monitored by the UK to ensure compliance with environmental standards. This will continue following the entry into force of the agreement, with no identified need to change current processes.

On Amendment 60, while Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, the UK will continue to provide support to protect migratory bird species. Within the agreement, under the international organisations’ exchange of letters, the UK and Mauritius will, for instance, agree separate arrangements to maintain the listed Ramsar wetlands site on Diego Garcia, which provides a unique protected habitat for migratory birds. Further protections will be a matter for Mauritius.

On Amendments 16 and 68, Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, including enforcement. On 3 November, the Mauritian Government announced the creation of the Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area. They have confirmed already that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the MPA. They will, however, allow low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians in certain limited areas, which will be compatible with nature conservation.

The UK has agreed to co-operate with Mauritius on maritime security and provide assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty. The terms of this co-operation and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.

Amendment 73 is completely unnecessary. We have been clear on this. The UK has not and will not make any financial payment to the Mauritian Government to establish a new MPA in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. The UK has agreed to provide support and assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty, protecting the vital military base on Diego Garcia, and the terms of this support and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.

Amendment 76 is no longer required. On 3 November, Mauritius, as I have said, announced the creation of its MPA once the treaty enters into force. Similarly, the points about artisanal fishing apply to that amendment as well. With that, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers, but I think the debate reflects the complexity of the environmental provisions. As my noble friend said, it is a shame that we could not have had it at a more reasonable time, when there could have been more participants in the debate, but the Government clearly do not wish to do that.

This is not a niche issue: protecting the unique and biodiverse environment on and around the islands is of international significance. The Chagossians, the scientific community and many others want to see the Chagos Islands’ unique ecosystem protected, and it would be an abrogation of the Government’s responsibilities if they were to press ahead with this deal without first securing the appropriate assurances from Mauritius.

I am obviously delighted that Mauritius has announced the marine protected area—I am sure we are all really pleased to see that—but I think the key point was the one raised by my noble friend, which is the matter of enforcement. Mauritius is a small island, it has very few resources and it is thousands of miles away from the Chagos Islands. The waters surrounding the Chagos are rich in fishing and biodiversity and I am sure that, in a few years’ time, we will probably see them being exploited, not for any lack of willingness on the part of the Mauritians but simply because they are completely unable to enforce the provisions. That would be a shame for one of the most unique environments in the world. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

To govern is to choose. The Prime Minister has made a choice: to stand with his learned north London, prosecco-drinking friends, against the wishes of his plain-talking, pie-and-pint caucus in his wider party and the wider interests of the British people and our kinsmen on the Chagos. This is a bad Bill and we should fight it as hard as we can.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not sure whether anybody else wanted to follow that last speech. I do not think I have ever seen the Prime Minister drink prosecco—he would prefer a pint, I think.

Anyway, I thank noble Lords for their speeches on this quite important set of amendments, and I would be very surprised if we did not come back to some of these issues on Report, because, for all the nonsense we have just heard, there are actually some very thoughtful and quite important considerations here. Someone put it very well when they said that, while they might not agree with everything we are doing, there is a shared view across the House that we need to do as best we can through this process for the Chagossian communities.

Regarding Amendments 17, 26 and 78, the Chagossians are already entitled to work on the base and have done so. There are a range of job opportunities on Diego Garcia, open to Chagossians with British, Mauritian and Seychelles citizenship. A link to vacancies advertised by KBR, the main contractor responsible for recruiting and managing support staff at the base, is already available on the GOV.UK pages, setting out UK government support for Chagossians. On Amendment 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

How many Chagossians are actually working on the base today?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I do not think that data is published anywhere, I am afraid. If it is, I shall provide it to the noble Lord.

I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as I always do, but it is unjustifiable to define Chagossians as only those holding British Overseas Territories citizenship. I think that is what he was getting at. There are many Chagossians living in Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond, and this would also exclude anyone who holds British citizenship, but not British Overseas Territories citizenship.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which is one of many that would require the Government to seek something from Mauritius, is not needed. We have already committed to making a Statement to Parliament—and I think it is right that we do this—on the modalities of the Chagossian trust fund and eligibility for resettlement. That is in large part a response to the considerable interest that there has been from noble Lords across the House in making sure that the trust fund is run properly and fairly.

Taking this together with Amendment 38A from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, on air travel to Diego Garcia, I say that, as we have said numerous times, the UK is taking forward planning for a programme of heritage visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. These were paused in 2019 because of Covid, but we are working hard to reinstate them as soon as possible. Now, as then, these visits would include visits to key heritage sites. Specifically on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, there are no commercial flights to Diego Garcia, and nor would they be practical, as it is a working military base that is highly sensitive. Allowing commercial flights would interfere with the operational use of the base. Heritage visits in the past have often involved the use of charter aircraft and this may be the case for future visits also, but there is nothing in the treaty that would prevent this.

On Amendment 20C, noble Lords will recall that we debated the environmental impacts of the treaty and the marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago last week. Both the UK and Mauritius are committed to protecting the unique environment around the islands. Noble Lords will be aware that on 2 November Mauritius issued a statement announcing the creation of a marine protected area once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the MPA. Low levels of artisanal fishing, compatible with nature conservation or for subsistence of the Chagossian community, would be allowed in certain limited areas.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to delay the implementation of the Bill and the entry into force of the treaty. The treaty has already been reviewed by two Select Committees of this House. They have reported their findings and agreed that the treaty allows for positive environmental work, with the IAC welcoming

“the Government’s assurance that it will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled Marine Protected Area”.

Amendment 38C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would require the Government to implement the resettlement recommendations of the 2015 KPMG study. The KPMG report, commissioned by the Conservative Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. The then Government ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Will the Minister confirm that there were three different options for how many people you would resettle, and the costs of all of them were substantially lower than the transfer payments that we are making to Mauritius alone under the current deal?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is correct, but those payments would not have paid for a legally secure operation of the base alongside our United States allies. Whatever legal geniuses we have opposite us today, those in the White House differed on the analysis now being put forward by the Conservative Party, which is clearly different from what they put forward in the not-so-distant past.

The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill.

On Amendment 81G from the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, as I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty comes into force. I am very sympathetic to the way he put his case on this, but it would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money to keep reporting on something that is not in our gift to achieve. The Government are increasing their support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and beyond, as well as education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, asked me about commitments on this going forward. We are committed to these at least until the end of this Parliament. He will understand that what happens beyond that may depend on decisions of Ministers in the future.

Amendment 31 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and Amendment 55 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, ask for an equality impact assessment on the payments to be made by Mauritius to Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around equalities and the impact assessment.

Amendment 50A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, raises a really important issue. We do not think it is necessary to make provision for this in the Bill, but we understand her concern. As I said in my letter in relation to the first day of Committee, we will work with relevant authorities to ensure that official documentation reflects historic connections to the Chagos Archipelago wherever possible. British passports issued to Chagossians will continue to display their place of birth and, if they wish, those who already have British Overseas Territories citizenship status can hold a British passport reflecting their status as British Overseas Territories citizens. I am very sympathetic to the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness and commit to making diplomatic representations to the Government of Mauritius to ensure that place of birth is recorded accurately on documentation.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

I very much appreciate the Minister’s commitment to do that, because this is such a hurtful thing. Sometimes, those of an Irish republican disposition will say that I am not British but just Irish, so it is something I feel very strongly about. The Chagossians are entitled to have their identity confirmed, and I would be very pleased if she could write to me after she raises those issues through the diplomatic channels.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Of course, I would be very happy to do that.

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[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

On the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I put forward, as was alluded to in a number of speeches, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the reason why we raised equality issues as regards financial payments is the potential role of Chagossians within the trust fund. There is a widespread concern at present that we are simply hoping that Mauritius does the right thing with that. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in the position today to give any level of direct assurances. However, can she at least go away and come back before Report with the Government’s thoughts or information—perhaps after discussions with the Mauritian Government —as to how we can inject a level of Chagossian direct involvement and control over that trust fund? That would be very helpful for whenever we reach Report.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is not too much to ask. We are talking to the Mauritian Government about this, because we want the same thing as the noble Lord. I had hoped that we would be able to say something a little bit more detailed about that by now. We have not quite got there, but we will use best endeavours to get there before Report. I understand the motivation behind this, and it is right that we do what we can to make sure that noble Lords have the assurances they need by Report.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

In light of the reaffirmation that there will be both ongoing citizenship as well as dual nationality, and, perhaps uniquely, that community will be impacted directly by the terms of this treaty, does the Minister accept the principle that formal mechanisms of representation for the duration of this agreement, rather than just between now and the treaty coming into force, in principle warrant very serious consideration?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It depends on what we mean by formal and what that looks like. We have an arrangement at the moment via the contact group and a commitment to strengthen and expand that, to make sure that does the job it is intended to do and the Government can support it in doing that. However, we are clear that we do not do anything to it without its consent. It is an area on which we are interested in having further conversations—I think the noble Lord knows what I am getting at. Whether that completely satisfies his desire for formality, we will probably continue to explore together.

With that, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the Minister that this has been a fascinating debate. It was a real pleasure to hear so many noble Lords focusing, as we rightly should, on the rights and futures of the Chagossian people.

The trust fund is an essential part of the treaty. Essentially, it is the only part of the treaty that is positive for the community. Therefore, we must not allow it to be maladministered, or worse, by the Mauritian Government. My noble friend Lord Ahmad made some very good points about the management of the existing fund, to which he got some answer from the Minister. We are certainly clear that the UK Government should take all necessary steps to hold the Mauritian Government to account for their management of the fund to ensure that the Chagossians are properly looked after and no longer treated as second-class citizens. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Fuller for trying to apply a little imaginary lipstick to his proverbial pig in this matter.

The points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, were particularly important and extremely serious. I was pleased to hear the assurances given to her by the Minister. We should not allow the Chagossian people to be treated in this manner by Mauritius.

This speaks to our concerns on value for money. Whichever figures you take, this agreement is a major financial undertaking, costing the British taxpayer billions of pounds over the lifetime of the deal. Any situation where the fund is capitalised but not managed properly would surely be unacceptable, and we should make sure that there are powers to hold Mauritius to account should that happen.

My noble friend Lord Hannan, in his excellent contribution, made some great points on how the Chagossians could be resettled in future and many of the alternative occupations that they could take in such circumstances.

If the Minister is not satisfied that the Government have the powers that they need to do that, I hope Ministers will go back to the Mauritian Government to ensure that we have those stronger powers before the treaty takes effect. The Minister is right that many of these matters will be returned to on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 36, which, as the noble Lord mentioned, relates to asylum seekers who arrive on Diego Garcia, or anywhere on the Chagos Islands. Its purpose is very simple: it ensures that, if any person fleeing danger or persecution lands on those shores, they will not be subjected to unlawful detention, denial of due process, or the kinds of conditions that a British judge has already found to be in breach of international law.

I got a very nice personal letter from a native Chagossian, saying:

“We were exiled from our islands once, but we must not watch new injustice happen on our shores again. Anyone who arrives in our homeland must be treated with dignity. No one should suffer in the Chagos as we once did … As a native islander, I insist that any asylum seeker reaching the Chagos must have their rights respected. We were once denied justice. We cannot allow injustice to happen again in our name”.


Of course, the background has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that in late 2021 more than 60 Sri Lankan Tamils were intercepted at sea and brought to Diego Garcia after their vessel was found in distress. Those individuals, many of whom intended to seek asylum in Canada, were accommodated for almost three years in a fenced compound on the island. This was not a temporary holding area; it became a long-term camp. The conditions are a matter of judicial record. The British Indian Ocean Territory Supreme Court found that the asylum seekers were effectively held in unlawful detention. The acting judge described the camp as

“a prison in all but name”

and said it was unsurprising that the individuals felt they were being punished. Evidence presented to the court documented leaking tents, rodent infestation, extreme heat, restricted movement, repeated incidents of self-harm and at least one mass suicide attempt. Some were warned that leaving the compound would expose them to the risk of being shot on security grounds. Those words are not mine—they were the court’s findings.

We also now know, again from the court’s judgment, that progress on their protection claims was impeded because of political factors, including concerns within the Home Office about the Government’s Rwanda policy. Rwanda seems to get mentioned everywhere. The effect of that delay was that these individuals were kept in a camp, in extreme conditions, for far longer than should ever have been contemplated. Most have now been brought to the United Kingdom, as has been said. I think that my noble and learned friend Lord Hermer was involved in that before he became Attorney-General. The Government described this as a one-off transfer and said that Diego Garcia would not be used again for long-term processing, but it remains the case that nothing in statute today prevents a future commissioner, Minister or Government using the islands in exactly the same way, should another vessel arrive. That is why this amendment is necessary; it gives effect to what the United Kingdom is already legally bound to do and ensures that any transfer to Mauritius or any other state happens only under an agreement that guarantees humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law. These are not new standards; they are the minimum standards that the United Kingdom already owes to any asylum seeker, regardless of geography.

This amendment also speaks to something deeply felt by the Chagossians. The Chagossian people know what it is to be held without rights; they know what it is to have decisions made about their lives thousands of miles away; and they know what it is to be told they have no voice in decisions taken on their own islands. They have told us repeatedly that they do not want Diego Garcia, or any part of the Chagos Archipelago, to become a place where other vulnerable people suffer in silence.

There is also a simple and moral point. The only civilians permitted to remain long-term on the islands in the past decade were not the native Chagossians but asylum seekers confined in a manner that a British judge found to be unlawful. That fact alone should give the Committee pause for reflection. It was perfectly okay for asylum seekers to be on Diego Garcia but not the original Chagos people.

This amendment seeks to ensure that asylum seekers under Mauritian jurisdiction must have binding guarantees for monitoring, appeal rights, independent oversight and humanitarian standards. The Chagossian community has raised serious concerns about the treatment of vulnerable people already in Mauritius. These concerns cannot be dismissed and certainly cannot be ignored. The Government now intend that asylum seekers arriving in Chagos should be sent there.

This amendment does not oppose the transfer of asylum seekers. It does not dictate the policy of future Governments; it simply ensures that the mistakes made between 2021 and 2024 can never be repeated on British responsibility. It ensures that any person arriving on those islands is processed humanely, lawfully and with respect for their basic rights. For the Chagossians, who were themselves displaced without rights, this is not an abstract principle. It is an affirmation that the islands they still regard as home will not again be a theatre for human suffering. It is a modest and necessary amendment, which is fully consistent with our international obligations and our national values. I therefore commend it to the Committee and urge noble Lords to support it.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 19 and 27 from the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, now in his place, seek to ensure that Mauritius will be responsible for any illegal migrants who may arrive at Diego Garcia. These are important amendments, and it is helpful that they have been tabled to allow us to clarify this point. I can reassure both noble Lords that the treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility and closes a potential—as they correctly identify—illegal migration route to the UK. Mauritius, as the sovereign state and as specifically referenced under Annex 2 of the treaty, has jurisdiction over irregular migration to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia.

To the extent that the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, through their amendments are seeking clarity on the arrangements with Mauritius to put that responsibility into practice, I can assure them that the UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in Annex 2 paragraph 10 of the treaty, to assist and facilitate in that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. These are ongoing negotiations on which I will not provide a running commentary; suffice to say that there will be no need to force the Government to provide a report on the negotiations.

Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, is another helpful amendment. It seeks to ensure that any arrangement entered into with Mauritius regarding migrants ensures the humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law of any asylum seeker or refugee. It is an important amendment, and I can confirm that the Government will, of course, ensure that any arrangement we enter into will comply with applicable international law and our domestic obligations. For that reason, I think that the amendment is unnecessary, but I thank her for tabling it and allowing us to make that clear. I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her contribution to this important debate. We know how strongly the British public feel on illegal immigration. It would have been outrageous if we handed over the territory yet retained responsibility for dealing with any illegal immigration.

I will look carefully at the words that the Minister used in her response in Hansard, but it seems as though she has provided the reassurances we are seeking that no illegal arrivals in the Chagos Archipelago will be able to make a claim in the UK for asylum now that sovereignty has been handed over. She used the famous government expression “I am not going to provide a running commentary”, which often means “I am not going to say”. Nobody is asking her to provide a running commentary; we just wanted a clarification on the issues or any outcome of the discussions. If there is a resolution to the discussions before we get to Report, I hope she will update us in writing. Apart from that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, reminds us, this amendment gets to the core of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government’s approach to this Bill so far. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out numerous times during the debates on the first day in Committee, it is very difficult to see which court could have delivered a binding judgment against the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Yet it is the repeated contention of the Government that this treaty is somehow essential to deliver legal certainty.

The question remains of which court could have delivered a binding judgment that would have threatened that legal certainty and the security of the military base. I hope that the Government can finally provide us with an answer. If they cannot answer that question then the argument that this treaty and this Bill were both necessary falls apart. Indeed, the argument that the treaty and the Bill are needed urgently also falls apart, and we should consider whether the Government should take a more circumspect approach. That is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, suggests.

If this treaty is necessary, Ministers must surely have considered other options before coming to this agreement with Mauritius. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what consideration was given to resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago by Chagossians, for example. What would the cost have been for that? What is the difference between that cost figure and the true cost associated with this treaty? I say “true cost” because the Government’s initial claims on costs have now been thoroughly discredited.

There were lots of options that should have been considered, so perhaps the noble Baroness can tell us what options were in fact considered. I understand that these are specific questions about the process followed by Ministers before agreeing to the treaty with Mauritius, so if the noble Baroness cannot say with certainty what potential approaches were considered, perhaps she could write to us to confirm the details.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

In relation to Amendment 20J, the House has dedicated at least 15 hours to debating the Government’s rationale for entering this treaty. It has been subject to two reports, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Three separate committees—the IAC, the IRDC and the Foreign Affairs Committee—have held evidence sessions and questioned the Minister for the Overseas Territories.

The Government have been consistently clear throughout. The legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative. A policy of hanging tough, which I assume the noble Lord has in mind, would have been a real gift to our adversaries. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the continued operation of the base was under threat. Courts were already making decisions which undermined our position. If a long-term deal had not been reached, further wide-ranging litigation was likely, with no realistic prospect of the UK successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such cases.

Legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, affecting, for example, our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia. Both the IRDC and the IAC recognise that the treaty provides legal certainty for the base. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. I have noticed that no one has spoken against the amendment, other than the Minister who brought her explanation and reason. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 20K, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to oblige the Government to publish a report on the ability of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago and on the implications of the treaty for international peace and stability. The IRDC concluded that the treaty gave the UK legal clarity on which it could capitalise to enhance defence co-operation and that it was a platform for reinforcing operational links with key regional partners, allowing the UK to position itself as a credible contributor to regional stability grounded in the rule of law. Under the treaty, the UK retains full operational control over Diego Garcia. There are robust provisions in place to protect the security of the base. The treaty is the best way to ensure the continued operation of the joint UK-US base and therefore to protect international peace and security. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The Minister has not even attempted to address any of the questions that we have asked.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am very happy if the noble Lord would like to ask me a specific question that I have not already answered in previous groups. Would the noble Lord like to do that?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Will the Minister comment on the ability of the Mauritian coastguard actually to enforce the marine protected area, for instance?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I suggest that the noble Lord looks at the ways in which marine protected areas are generally enforced. It is not, as he seems to imagine, by patrolling in vessels around the ocean, checking on things. That is not how these things work. But I will gladly send him some information about that.

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[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report

“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.

What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.

I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.

There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.

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[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.

We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.

I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.

Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.

The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is agreed.

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On the increased legal risk, my noble friend is absolutely right that the international law case is definitely not cut and dried. There are agreements that confirm British sovereignty, and we do not understand why the Government are ignoring those agreements. With that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.

Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.

Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.

Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.

Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.

Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.

I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.

On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.

Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.

I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his Amendment 81 that he has just talked about, which rightly puts the focus of our debate on the citizens of the Chagos Islands, the Chagossian community themselves. It has so far been a disappointing aspect of this Committee to hear the Government dismiss the rights of the Chagossian community. Throughout the process of agreeing the treaty, it is clear that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted. In fact, the Government’s official view—I think the noble Baroness has repeated it again this evening—is that there is no relevant claim of self-determination in respect of the Chagos Archipelago.

I also welcome Amendment 50B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. The resettlement of the Chagos Islands under the treaty is an option, not a requirement, and it is increasingly clear that it is possible that the Mauritians will simply ignore it and not take any steps whatever to achieve resettlement of the Chagossians.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, would certainly help put pressure on the UK Government and, in turn, the Mauritian Government to use the provisions of the treaty in respect of resettlement and allow those Chagossians who wish to to return to the outer islands.

On a separate but related note, I am of course pleased that the International Relations and Defence Committee has launched its relatively short piece of work to finally hear the views of the Chagossian community, but I think there are some serious procedural flaws in its survey. There seems to be no control of who can submit views: I am sure the relevant Chinese bots are already on the subject of submitting the survey forms, and there are already concerning reports of Mauritian government officials actually filling in the forms on behalf of Chagossians in Mauritius. But, when the results are in and we have the report of the committee, I hope the Minister will commit to considering it carefully before we proceed to the next stage of the Bill.

We obviously understand that there may be limited time between the committee’s publication of its report and Report stage, so the Government may not have the time to consider and table their own amendments to reflect the views of the Chagossian community as expressed in the—valid, hopefully—responses to the committee. Should that be the case, we would ask the Government to engage constructively with others in this House on amendments before Report so that we can put the needs and welfare of the Chagossian community front and centre as we progress with the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be able to give that assurance today.

As the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to do, we need to step up and support the Chagossian community, who have been mistreated for far too long.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 20M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, requests that the treaty does not come into force until the publication of

“a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty”.

As I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty enters into force. It is not sensible, or a good use of taxpayers’ money, to be reporting on something that will not be in our gift to achieve.

The Government are increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and elsewhere, education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians.

Amendment 81, from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, requests a report of the forecast impact of the treaty on Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around an equalities impact assessment. This, in addition to the IRDC’s current review, should support understanding of the impacts to the Chagossian community.

I understand, respect and appreciate the noble Lord’s support for the Chagossian community, but I must also speak to the many different views within the Chagossian community, including several groups that welcome the deal. I think that this will perhaps be surfaced as a result of the work that the IRDC is doing, and I obviously commit to reflecting on it as the Bill proceeds.

Amendment 50B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, seeks to recognise in the domestic law of the UK that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. I hear absolutely what she says about lived memory and the persuasive way that she puts that across. But the unfortunate fact—and I think it is unfortunate—is that both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered in a series of judgments since the 1970s the related questions of a claimed right of abode or other rights said to flow from the rights that she seeks to gain for the Chagossians through her amendment. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims.

Had that not been the case—the noble Baroness clearly wishes that that had not been the case; it is her strongly held view and I can see why she feels so—the Government would perhaps have had to take a very different course, because the rights would have held a different weight in law. However, the situation is that history has taken us to a position where, much as we do not like it and it goes against some of the things that we feel and what we may even argue is the moral case, the legal situation is, I am afraid, as it is.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

The legal situation is as I have described. The noble Baroness may wish that that were not the case, but the legal position is as it is, and the Government do not intend to amend the Bill in order to change that legal position.

[The Earl of Leicester (Con)]

That legal position is guidance; it is not law.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

There have been legal judgments in English courts and elsewhere that have established that the right that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to grant to the Chagossian people does not currently exist in law. It is not guidance. Those are decisions of English courts. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I thank the Minister. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who were diligent and eloquent in their defence of the dispossessed Chagossians. Sometimes people approach the story of Britain overseas as a kind of morality play where Britain plays the villain, the Alan Rickman of the global drama. We heard a hint of it, I think, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in the previous round. Every disengagement was somehow disagreeable. Here, the disagreeable thing is pulling out in a way that disregards the wishes of the people who have been most injured. I was grateful to the Minister for making the clarification on birth certificates. She is doing enormously well defending this position, I have to say. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.

We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.

The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.

The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.

So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?

We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.

Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.

Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.

The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am happy to speak outside the Chamber.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 20T and 81K, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley, seek to achieve a similar objective to Amendments 80 and 82. Given the similarity of the two pairs of amendments, I was slightly surprised to see the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, degroup his amendments. We could have had a very satisfactory debate with the original grouping, but of course I fully respect the noble Lord’s right to degroup his amendments. I am slightly surprised, because he criticised me for doing something similar last week, but it is, of course, only right that noble Lords should be able to debate their amendments in the groupings that most suit them.

I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Lilley has the right to self-determination, as confirmed by a referendum of the Chagossians, in his amendment. This is an important point that I am sure many noble Lords will agree with.

Amendment 20T would also delay the implementation of the key parts of this Bill until some progress has been made on establishing the joint parliamentary commission. It seems to me that too many core parts of the treaty are not tied to deadlines or quantifiable outcomes. As a result, it would be hard to monitor whether Mauritius, and indeed the UK, are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty in a timely manner. My noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment helpfully ties the joint parliamentary commission to the coming into effect of the Act, forcing Ministers and their Mauritian counterparts to get on with the job so that the commission can play an important role from the very beginning of the treaty’s effect. It is a very sensible proposal.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on whether the Government will agree that establishing a joint parliamentary commission would be a useful tool going forward.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord opposite has indicated, it is slightly surprising that the four amendments on establishing a joint UK-Mauritius parliamentary commission or committee have been degrouped. Members are well within their rights to do this and I am glad at least that this time noble Lords have had sufficient notice of what is happening.

I am sensitive to the sentiment of these amendments. I take them to come from a genuine desire for greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the implementation of the treaty on specific areas that are of concern to the Committee. The Government have always said that they welcome scrutiny, and this remains the case. We are not opposed to the strengthening of links between the UK Parliament and that of Mauritius, although this would be a somewhat novel approach. I think it seems pretty likely that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, took inspiration from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on this occasion.

There is a question of proportionality and the proper extent of the remit of such a parliamentary commission. Out of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I propose to discuss this in much more detail when we reach the debate on Amendment 80, which he has tabled. I hope that is acceptable to the noble Lord. I will be very happy to meet with him and other noble Lords to discuss this proposal, and specifically the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in more detail. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that his amendments are somewhat narrower but much more justified than my broader amendment. When the appropriate moment comes, I will not press my amendment and leave his standing.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

In response to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that we are clearer in the Bill about what it does, I have read it a couple of times and honestly do not think that it could not be any clearer. It is a Bill to enact an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. I think that is sufficient, and if he does not, I am not sure what he is getting at.

The Government rejects Amendment 33 on the basis that the provision in question is not redundant. It is needed to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. It ensures clarity on which law will apply through the jurisdiction that the UK will exercise under the treaty. Legal continuity and certainty for operations on the base once the British Indian Ocean Territory is dissolved is far from unnecessary.

Let me explain why we have Clause 3. This clause saves the law of BIOT, and law which relates to BIOT, as the law of Diego Garcia and law which relates to Diego Garcia. This has been done as the default, to ensure the continued effective running of the base on Diego Garcia and to make sure that there is no legal gap. Detailed work is being carried out to establish where technical amendments may be needed to this preserved law to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is defined in Clause 3 as the whole area that the UK can exercise jurisdiction over, as covered in the treaty. This includes the island of Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical miles surrounding it. Preserving the existing prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia means that we can continue to operate the base and its legal architecture in much the same way that we do today, and it gives the maximum flexibility for the future.

Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seems to be based on a misapprehension. As I mentioned in my response to the amendments related to Clause 3, His Majesty has a prerogative power to legislate for BIOT at present and Clause 3 preserves this power. It does not allow him to make laws for other parts of the realm about BIOT or Diego Garcia. If the noble Lord reads that clause of the Bill again, he will see that I am right about that.

The statutory power in Clause 5 is necessary to enable amendments to Acts and statutory instruments which form part of the law of Diego Garcia and amendments to legislation which forms part of the law of other jurisdictions—the UK Crown dependencies and the other OTs. These other jurisdictions have laws which refer to BIOT or treat it as one of the overseas territories. Amendments to those laws may be necessary to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia.

I see that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—as is becoming classic in his contributions on these occasions—has read the report from the DPRRC. His Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C appear to seek to implement its recommendations. Amendment 51BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appears to be less consistent with the recommendations—I think he has recognised that in his remarks—in that it would impose the affirmative procedure in respect not just of Orders in Council, which amend primary legislation, but of those which amend secondary legislation. Without showing too much leg so late at night, we are still considering these suggestions and we will return to them on Report. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and others who contributed to this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her reply to my amendments. I appreciate that they are technical and relate to the prerogative, but they are important none the less.

In essence, we seek to understand whether the Government believe that Clauses 3 and 5 will limit the prerogative in any way because as we see from the drafting of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which we discussed earlier, this has effectively ended the Government’s adherence to the original Ponsonby rule. Statute is so often deficient when compared with convention. As in the case of the prerogative, statute should not limit the prerogative without very careful consideration.

I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. Given the complexity of these issues, I hope she will write to us to set out the impact of the Bill on the prerogative before we proceed to Report. In the meantime, I will, of course, study her reply in Hansard. Obviously, we reserve the right to return to any unresolved issues on Report.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I have said repeatedly throughout these deliberations that the Government are very interested in thinking about different ways of working alongside the Chagossian community on these issues. That applies to Amendment 47 as well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, asks the Government in her amendment to produce a report consisting of a demographic study of the Chagossian community. I am going to have to disappoint her this evening. It will not be possible to produce a useful report, at a cost to taxpayers, in time for it to do anything of consequence alongside this treaty. It is not a bad idea to have a report such as this, for many of the reasons that have been described. I would not be against it. What I am saying is that the responsibility for conducting the study does not belong in this Bill, but that does not mean it is a bad thing to do in principle. The noble Baroness will know, as we have heard most recently from the noble Earl, Lord Leicester, about the IDRC leading a report into the Chagossians, which I hope will be published soon. I hope that all these things will help to mitigate some of the noble Baroness’s concerns.

I saw that Jeremy Corbyn had also written to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, wo chairs the IRDC, which is responsible for the survey. It is not something that the Government are responsible for. We are looking forward to the results. We were asked what weight we put on the survey. It is for the committee to determine that. I am sure that it will take on board the comments that have been made by those who are concerned about how the survey has been conducted. I know that some Chagossians would be completely unable to access a survey such as this, for reasons of literacy or access to the means by which the survey is being conducted. I am sure that the committee will want to reflect on that. We certainly will when we receive its report. I look forward to it and hope that it is useful in assisting us to understand the complexity of opinion that exists within Chagossian communities.

On the substantive point that the noble Baroness raises, such a piece of work may well be useful, but I am not able this evening to commit the Government to commissioning it. With that, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that rather thoughtful answer. I note that she did not rule out what I said—that the Americans would still be seeing uncertainty in the future. I think that we will see that whatever happens in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, this is the last group of amendments in Committee. I am delighted to see so many noble Lords opposite taking a close interest in the Bill and what it will do to the Chagossian people. I am delighted that they are taking an interest in what their Government are finally doing to the Chagossians.

I have already spoken to my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendments, which are similar in drafting to those of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I must say that I prefer my noble friend’s amendments to his Amendments 80 and 82, principally because they include reference to a referendum of the Chagossians. My noble friend the Earl of Leicester has talked about how deficient the current survey being undertaken by the International Agreements Committee is. I think that we could greatly improve on that, but the best mechanism would be simply to hold a referendum of the Chagossians asking them whether they approve of this treaty.

I know that the Liberal Democrats were previously very supportive of a referendum, but, despite criticising the position of my party, this amendment implies that they may not now be so supportive. I hope to see information to the contrary from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. His amendment also differs from my noble friend Lord Lilley’s, in that it would apparently come into force after the treaty, whereas that of my noble friend would come into operation beforehand, which seems much more appropriate. I am of course happy to take up the offer of the noble Lord to discuss the wording of amendments because, as is so often the case in your Lordships’ House, we bring about improvements to a Bill only if we work together. I am certainly prepared, from my point of view, to work with him on the drafting of these amendments. I hope my noble friend Lord Lilley would be involved as well, so we can get them into a form where we can support them on Report and ask the Government to move on this.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the considered and balanced contribution that he has made throughout the Bill but particularly on his Amendment 80. The amendment is interesting, and I understand the effect that he is seeking to achieve. It is a welcome addition to our debate today. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, earlier, I will also take Amendment 81K into consideration in the comments that I am about to make.

The proposal put forward by the noble Lord is a novel one. I could not recall any examples of where there have been joint committees set up between different legislatures in this way, but the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned some, and I will reflect on those to see whether there is anything we can glean from them that might be useful.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has made some changes to his amendment, but, unfortunately, we still cannot accept it in its current form today. The structure is not something that the treaty with Mauritius was drafted to contemplate. Of course, there is nothing to prevent parliamentarians in the UK engaging with their equivalents in Mauritius on these matters, but we do not see this as being a matter for domestic legislation in the way that we are considering it at the moment because, obviously, that does not have any effect on what the Mauritians themselves do.

Some elements in the noble Lord’s proposed scope for a joint parliamentary commission seem to be very much for the UK alone, so we could look at them. The Government are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is based on respect. As noble Lords will be aware, we have established a Chagossian contact group to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. We are also providing additional support to build the capacity of community groups so that more are eligible for grants.

There are two elements in the amendment that are an issue for the Government and that we will disagree on at the moment, and those are the right to self-determination and compensation. On self-determination, we have been over this several times in this House and in the other place. To put it simply and plainly, in legal terms no question of self-determination applies. The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius. On compensation, again it is legally the case that the UK paid compensation to the Chagossians in the 1980s and the English courts in a series of judgments and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that this settled the claims definitively.

Having said all that, I recognise and understand the noble Lord’s intentions and his determination with this amendment. He has been consistent about arguing along these lines throughout our consideration of this Bill, and I suggest that we meet to discuss his amendment in more detail to see if we can find a way to move this forward ahead of Report. With that, I hope that for today he would be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad there are so many witnesses who saw my ability to bring the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and the Minister together with some form of consensus at the end of this Committee. I am grateful for both the noble Lord’s and the Minister’s responses. She will know that I have been keen to see the areas where we can move towards formalisation and a degree of statutory underpinning for some structures of ongoing representation, because this is a special case. Even if it was novel—I am sure officials will now be studying all the examples I have given; by the time we get to Report I will try to find some more—I believe it is justified, given the circumstances are in. I am grateful for the willingness to discuss this. There are ongoing debates on the particular aspects the Minister said she had difficulty with. I will happily give way to the noble Lord.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I wish briefly to speak to Amendment 40 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I am struck by the fact that, in all his interventions so far in these debates—at Second Reading, in Committee and, now, on Report—he has never referred at all to the report of the International Agreements Committee on this treaty. He also seems not to have registered, let alone to respect, the vote that was taken at the end of the debate on 30 June.

The point I am making is that, were the noble Lord to go back to the documents and the evidence that was tabled at the time when the International Agreements Committee’s report was laid before this House, he would find there the testimony of Sir Christopher Greenwood. It is remarkably convincing and answers the question posed by the noble Lord in his Amendment 40; it describes what Sir Christopher thinks would happen in circumstances where Mauritius returned to a route that involved international litigation.

It is all set out there. He is an extremely distinguished British national judge of the International Court of Justice. It has nothing to do with the advisory opinion. It is to do with his views about the situation that would then exist. He believes that Mauritius would not have too much difficulty in convincing any international court to which it took litigation that the Chagos Islands were transferred at the time of Mauritian independence.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for not writing to him, but I hope that I can answer his concerns this afternoon.

Amendments 1 and 38, tabled by the noble and gallant Lord, relate to the termination of the treaty based on environmental degradation of Diego Garcia island. As I am sure that he will appreciate, given the importance of the base to both UK and US national security, we and the US are working hard to ensure that the base is protected from environmental damage. We have a programme to address coastal erosion and, while we cannot predict future erosion, specific studies have concluded that the overall land area of parts of the island that are not shaped by military construction decreased by less than a single percentage point over the last 50 years. However, I know that this is not really his point. He is using climate change and rising sea levels, but equally a significant pollution event, a meteor strike or something else could happen, so have the Government considered what they would do in an unpredicted and unpredictable situation that may arise and render the base unusable? That is the kernel of what he is getting at.

For obvious reasons, we do not want to get into a debate about other future hypothetical scenarios, whether they relate to the base becoming unusable or its no longer being needed. It is difficult to see that happening. The US, which has invested heavily in Diego Garcia, agrees that opening up the possibility of the agreement with Mauritius being terminated early is not helpful. However, I take the noble and gallant Lord’s point that, when dealing with a treaty over such a long period, we must at least be aware of the possibility that things can change. That is why we have included in the treaty the joint commission as a mechanism for agreeing between the UK, the US and Mauritius any developments relating to the base that we wish to raise. Should any of the hypothetical scenarios that I have referred to transpire, these are the sorts of issues that could be discussed in the joint commission, with decisions taken based on all the circumstances at the time. We have also included provision in the treaty for the matter to be raised up to prime ministerial level if necessary.

Using these mechanisms the UK and Mauritius would, in close consultation with the United States, agree a way forward. Ultimately, there is provision in the treaty for it to be terminated on two grounds, both of which depend on action by the UK. One is our failure to make payments. As noble Lords know, the UK abides by its international obligations, but in any particular case the Government of the day would need to consider their options in light of all the circumstances, looking at the terms of the treaty as well as wider international law. It is this wider international law, which we have not discussed previously, that I encourage the noble and gallant Lord to consider. He may wish to bear in mind that the international law of treaties permits the termination of a treaty when it becomes impossible for the treaty to be performed as a result of

“the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty”.

That is wider international law; that is not something that is held within this treaty itself. That is helpful and I hope it reassures him about his concerns.

I hope that the noble and gallant Lord can see that we are taking steps that are necessary to prevent the base becoming unusable and that, however hard hypothetical situations might be for us to imagine today, there are processes in place established by the treaty to resolve them. Using these processes, based on the circumstances of the time, no doubt any future UK Government would do what was in the best interests of the UK.

In the same vein, Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, discusses the ability to extend the agreement at the end of its initial 99 years. I assure him that there is already provision for the treaty to be extended by 40 years and beyond with the agreement of both parties. Even if agreement is not reached, the UK has the right of first refusal during that first 40 years after the initial period expires, meaning that no other country can use Diego Garcia without the UK being offered use first. I cannot accept his amendment as it seeks to change a carefully negotiated aspect of the treaty.

Similarly, I cannot accept Amendment 40, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which calls on the Secretary of State to publish a statement of the Government’s understanding of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago should the agreement be terminated. The noble Lord is aware that the UK honours its international obligations and is committed to the treaty. The grounds for terminating the treaty are incredibly limited, as I have said, and entirely depend on the UK’s actions.

I thought it might be helpful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, in particular, to outline a little more detail about from the law of treaties, which I am relying on in my attempts to persuade him this afternoon. Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the UK and Mauritius are both parties to, provides that:

“A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.


Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty”.


That covers the situation that he refers to—sea level rise—but would also cover many of the other situations that, at this stage, we are able to envisage occurring in the future.

I hope that noble Lords feel able to not press their amendments.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness very much for the way in which she has attempted to deal with my and our concerns. She has certainly pointed to an alternative way, but I still feel that this is something which should and could be sorted out before we get into formal ratification, and therefore I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I accept the admonishment with regard to the spelling and drafting. I cannot blame the clerks for that; it is my fault. If, in proposed new subsection (5)(b), “participation in the operation in” and “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia means jobs, I accept that also.

Recognising that the treaty is some distance from being ratified anyway, I strongly believe that other elements need to be in place, in agreement with the Government of Mauritius, before it is ratified. These measures are some of the elements that should be put in place before the treaty is ratified. We will discuss other elements in considering later groups, but between now and ratification, extra measures should be put in place to ensure that the consent of the Chagossian community is given and that their rights are underpinned by statute.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, as I have stated throughout the Bill’s progress through the House, I would like to acknowledge at the outset the importance of the islands to Chagossians as well as the different views within the Chagossian community on their future. This Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgment of the wrongs of the past.

I also acknowledge the strength of feeling in this House on addressing the range of issues raised by Chagossian communities here in the UK and in other parts of the world. In this context, I thank the IRDC for undertaking its recent review and publishing its report on the views of the Chagossian community regarding the UK-Mauritius agreement on the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia. As the report acknowledges, there is a wide range of diverse views among the Chagossian community, and I thank the noble Lord for introducing the report.

Such diversity of views is vital when considering Amendments 2, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 33, 33A and 55, which pertain to engagement and consultation with the Chagossian communities. I agree with those in this House who say that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital. That is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit a change to a treaty that has already been negotiated and signed in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong.

The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state to state, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That is what we have done. This deal will protect our national security for generations and ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a range of threats.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

Before the Minister sits down, could she tell us whether our very distinguished Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, had given any advice—admittedly, she cannot tell us what advice—to the Government on the report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which has come out so strongly against what His Majesty’s Government are doing on the Chagos Islands?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Not that I am aware of. I point out that the committee to which the noble Baroness and others have referred is not a legal body of the UN; it does not speak for the UN or for any UN member states. It is important for noble Lords to be aware of that, so that they are not labouring under a misapprehension.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, could I clarify one point? She is aware that the committee was set up under the UN charter to monitor the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. All UN members signed up to that and, although it is advisory, it carries a huge amount of influence, as do the other two tribunals, which are also advisory and which the Government have said they need to go along with.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

They are very different things. I encourage the noble Lord to investigate this a little further and am happy to work with him on that. The fact is that this particular committee does not speak on behalf of the UN and there are many equivalent committees across the UN that also do not speak on behalf of member states. If noble Lords want to verify that, it is entirely up to them to do so, but that is the situation.

To continue, the Government’s priority remains the protection of the British people, including British Chagossians. As the location of a military base with sensitive capabilities and assets vital to the UK’s national security, it would not be appropriate for Diego Garcia to be included in Mauritius’s programme of resettlement. However, both the UK and the Republic of Mauritius remain committed to facilitating a programme of heritage visits to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Chagossians will also retain the opportunity to work on Diego Garcia through contracted employment at the base.

In respect of Amendments 9, 16, 24 and 48 concerning the 2 December decision by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Government’s position is clear. The CERD is an independent body of experts that—I am repeating myself, but I want to make it absolutely clear for noble Lords—does not speak on behalf of the United Nations or of UN member states. The UK does not agree with the approach that the CERD has taken. The UN Secretary-General and the African Union chairperson have both welcomed the agreement. The treaty protects the base and our national security, which is why it has also been welcomed by the US, our Five Eyes partners and other important partners who appreciate the strategic importance of the base. Mauritius has also firmly and categorically rejected the CERD decision, and the Government therefore reject the tabled amendments.

Amendment 5 on migrants and asylum, from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not necessary and therefore we do not accept it. The treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility for and jurisdiction over all migrants arriving to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty closes a potential illegal migration route to the UK. The UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in paragraph 10 of annex 2 of the treaty to assess and facilitate that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. There are ongoing negotiations; I will not provide a running commentary, but both Mauritius and the UK agree that it would be for Mauritius to take responsibility for any migrants, including for any asylum or international protection claims. There is therefore no need for the Government to provide a report on the negotiations through an amendment to the Bill. I hope that answers noble Lords’ queries about that issue at this stage and that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I thank the Minister for her response, but it seems to me that she still has not answered the fundamental question that many of my colleagues and others have posed to her: why are some UN advisory tribunals to be obeyed without question? They should not be questioned and we have to do exactly what they say, but others can apparently be safely ignored when it does not suit the Government’s case. She tells us that Mauritius was against the conclusion, and I bet it was, but apparently—this is what I have read and I hope it is correct—Mauritius is also actually a member of the tribunal that found against the treaty and recommended that it be disposed of.

We have heard some fantastic contributions, but of course we have not heard the opinion of the FCDO mandarinate on the Cross Benches, who are normally so keen to tell us that international tribunals have to be respected without question—but apparently not this one.

Nevertheless, I am proud to speak alongside every noble Lord who has spoken up for the Chagossian people and outlined how they have been so ill-treated and for so long ignored. The Minister has said a number of times that there is a diversity of opinion within the Chagossian community. I am sure she is right, which is why we need a referendum to determine the absolute view of what those opinions are. I pay particular tribute to my noble friend Lord De Mauley and his committee for the sterling job that it has done in attempting, in so brief a period, to provide at least some information on what the Chagossian community think. The fact that so many of them responded so quickly in the period before Christmas underlines the concerns that many of them have about this agreement.

We also share my noble friend Lord Lilley’s concerns about the reparations. It seems reasonable that, once Mauritius has sovereignty over the islands, it would bear the burden of any future claims for reparations. I am also grateful to the Minister for her clarification about the legal position on asylum seekers.

I will not detain the House any further. I reiterate our firm support for Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. It might be only half a loaf but we are grateful for that half. Still, we will also seek to be greedy and support the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, on the remainder of the loaf when those Divisions are finally called. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

We can address those concerns by passing at least one of these amendments.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 31A, 42 and 43 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, all relate to the marine protected area and the Mauritian intent to establish its own marine protected area. It will be for Mauritius to implement this MPA. However, we welcome the announcement on 3 November by the Mauritian Government of the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area, to be known as CAMPA, and particularly their commitment that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the area.

Amendment 31 from the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Godson, follows a similar vein, seeking to oblige the UK Government to report on the Mauritian MPA. But we have been clear that CAMPA will be for the Mauritian Government to enforce and fund, and the UK will not be providing direct funding to Mauritius to maintain or set up this MPA. Renegotiation of the treaty at this stage is not a practical proposition, as Mauritius has already made this public commitment to the MPA, which covers the protections requested in the noble Lords amendments. We therefore do not think they are necessary. Likewise—

[Lord Deben (Con)]

What the Minister repeats is what the Mauritian Government have promised. I do not in any way attack what they have promised, but they cannot do it. They have not done it anywhere else, so why are we not insisting that we provide the resources for them to do it?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I will come on to that. It is a perfectly legitimate question, although I would urge people not to speak about the Mauritian Government, who have said everything we would all want them to say on these matters. We work with them in a positive light, and we want to work in partnership with them to make sure that the commitments they have made are followed through. The right way for us to do that is in a more positive way. I was about to come on to the question the noble Lord put, but I will gladly give way to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way because the question is related. The Mauritian Government may be saying everything our Government want to hear, but at the moment we have no mechanism whatsoever to enforce it and to ensure that what happens in the future can also be enforced.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

The noble Baroness has amplified the point made earlier by the noble Lord; it is an important point, and I will address it. However, at this stage we are going to reject Amendment 28, which seeks to oblige the UK to publish the proposed arrangements on MPA management and security before entry into force of the treaty. The UK and Mauritius are working together to finalise an arrangement on maritime security to ensure that patrolling, which provides enforcement regarding the future MPA, is maintained after entry into force. We will publish relevant MoUs, including on maritime security, once these are finalised, because we accept that it is vital. Everything that David Miliband said—I thank the noble Lord for reminding us of what he said—we stand by.

Amendments 29 and 30, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Godson, seek to ensure that money is set aside in the treaty for the establishment and maintenance of the MPA, and that the Government amend the treaty to allow for non-payment if Mauritius does not protect the marine environment. We agree that the continued protection of the environment is important. As previously set out, the UK is not going to be providing direct funding to Mauritius for this purpose. It is true, however, that the UK-Mauritius Strategic Partnership Framework does provide for technical support and expertise to enable the Mauritian Government to work alongside the environmental partners noble Lords have referred to, including the Zoological Society of London, to make sure that the ongoing protection of the marine environment is secure. This is separate to the treaty.

The noble Baroness asked what we would do if there was a breach. If the UK believes that Mauritius is in breach of its commitments in Article 5, on the environment, it can follow the process set out in Article 14, on settlement of disputes. There is therefore no need to include a further way to settle any disputes over protection of the environment, so we do not accept these amendments.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

Before the Minister concludes, my understanding is that Article 14 does not provide for any recourse. There is no sanction, there is no provision, and it is not a mechanism referred to by anyone who has addressed this issue today.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Article 14 has been agreed as the way to settle disputes. A failure to deliver on environmental commitments could be something we would want to challenge, and the process by which we would do that is included in Article 14. In treaties, we do not need to have a sanction or punishment; the right thing to do is to try to resolve these things so that the impact can be changed. What we want is to make sure that the marine protected area is sustained and that what is environmentally special about this place is secured. That is something we all agree on, but where we differ is that I believe that the mechanisms in the treaty are sufficient to allow for that. What will make the real difference is the quality of the partnership we are able to develop with Mauritius on the work with ZSL and other partners, so that it is equipped to comply with the commitments it is making.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

How are the Government addressing the fundamental fact—which has not been addressed by the Minister, I am afraid—that Mauritius does not have the capacity to police these waters in any way? We are simply in ignorance about all of this.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

She said it, not me. That is why you can buy technical assistance; it is why technical assistance exists. We have a technical assistance partnership with many countries. It is a much better way, working alongside countries to make sure that environmental improvements happen. That is the approach the Government have taken, and it is in the treaty.

I hope that noble Lords will consider withdrawing and not pressing their amendments.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister’s remark to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was a little uncalled for.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I was joking.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The Minister may say that she was joking, but it was not a very good joke.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In Committee, noble Lords across the Chamber set out their profound concerns about the practical ability of the Mauritian Government to deliver on their commitments. As I said, nobody doubts what they have said and the statements they have made; however, I think we all doubt their ability to enforce this crucial MPA.

I do not need to repeat all the excellent points that have been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, my noble friend Lord Goldsmith and others in their contributions to this debate; they very closely reflect our concerns. Given the critical importance of the ocean around the archipelago for global diversity, we believe that it is necessary to press the Government on this, so that we can have a formal statement of the Government’s expectations of Mauritius under Article 5 of the treaty. We also believe that we need clarity on what steps Ministers will be willing to take to ensure the maintenance of the MPA in perpetuity by the Mauritian Government. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 50, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred; I am grateful for her support.

This treaty is both a diplomatic measure, when it comes to sovereignty, and a financial relationship; it also adds some obligations to a community whose rights have, as we have acknowledged, been diminished. So it is quite unusual. That is why, at Second Reading, I raised concerns around the financial elements of the treaty, the lack of clarity around how much will be allocated to addressing the rights of the Chagossian community, and the lack of transparency. I acknowledge Letter No. 1, which is appended to the treaty and outlines the figures, but I feel that further clarity is required.

I will not repeat the points I have made previously, but Amendment 50 seeks to address the major concerns around the lack of transparency in the planned implementation of the financial elements of the treaty—including through, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, indicated, a five-yearly update to Parliament on both progress and the contemporaneous situation with regard to the finances.

New subsection (4) in Amendment 50 also introduces what I would consider to be a break clause in the financial relationship outlined in the treaty and in letter one. Earlier in our proceedings, the Minister helpfully said that the treaty could be terminated on two grounds only. The second ground was in reference to the Vienna convention, if there are circumstances which mean the treaty is unimplementable, and the first element is the failure to make payments by the UK.

I say this without suggesting that Mauritius will act in bad faith or has entered into the treaty in bad faith, but there are no mechanisms which would allow us to consider whether Mauritius is also operating to fulfil its obligations, beyond those which have been elevated on diplomatic terms to Prime Minister level for dialogue. If that dispute mechanism has been exhausted, we believe that there should be some formal mechanism by which Parliament should then have the ability to say that the agreement on the finances reached under letter one should require supplementary approval. Indeed, the obligation on the Government of the day would be to come back to Parliament to say that the dispute mechanisms have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, and therefore that this needs to be brought back. The sums of funds are extremely high; the obligations are serious. Therefore, I hope the Government will consider moving on this element.

Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not at all contradictory to this, and if he tests the opinion of the House, we will support him on that amendment. I am also grateful so far for the indications of support for my amendment.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 7, 39, 47, and 50 all relate to financial transparency and parliamentary oversight of expenditure under the treaty.

Amendments 39 and 47, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seek to require the Government to publish a schedule of payments to Mauritius and a detailed statement of the total cost of the treaty, including the methodology used by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Treasury. These amendments are not necessary, as we published full details of the financial arrangements on the day the treaty was signed, including the finance exchange of letters and the Explanatory Memorandum laid before Parliament.

These documents set out the payment schedule and confirm that the net present value of the treaty is £3.4 billion in today’s money, calculated using the standard Green Book methodology that successive Governments have applied to long-term projects. The average annual payment is £101 million—less than a 0.25% of the defence budget and a fraction of the cost of comparable overseas facilities. This is a sound investment in our national security, and the figures have been confirmed by the Government Actuary’s Department. For these reasons, we reject these amendments.

Amendment 7, which ties commencement of Sections 2 to 4 of the Act to the discharge of duties under Amendment 47, would introduce unnecessary delay in ratification. The Government have already provided the transparency sought by the noble Lord through the published Explanatory Memorandum and accompanying documents, as well as a significant number of Parliamentary Questions and debates in this Chamber and the other place. We therefore do not accept this amendment.

Amendment 50, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, proposes an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval of future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has already undergone scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and neither House objected to ratification during the statutory period.

The treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under Article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power. While the standard annual estimates process still applies, the introduction of additional parliamentary approval requirements is not necessary and would undermine the certainty and stability that this long-term agreement provides. As I have said on many occasions, the US covers the running costs of the base on Diego Garcia, which are significant, but any expenditure met by this Government will be published in our annual departmental accounts.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I will very briefly talk to my Amendments 10 and 15. When any Administration shift from the original arguments which justified their policy to a new set of arguments, you know that they are moving from evidence-based policy to policy-based evidence. That seems to be what is happening here.

When the original Statement was made about this treaty on 22 May, the Defence Minister in the other place said that if we did not have this treaty, within weeks we would face a binding legal judgment which would in due course render the base inoperable. That was implicitly based on the case before the International Court of Justice, but no mention was made that that ruling was purely advisory, not binding. No mention was made that it was based on General Assembly resolutions, which themselves are not binding and had never been ratified by the Security Council, where, in any case, we have a veto. There was no mention that when we signed up to the ICJ, we specifically precluded it from hearing or being bound by anything relating to disputes between the UK and Commonwealth members, and that subsequently, in 2012, the Cameron Government had tightened that by saying it should be not just present Commonwealth members but present or past Commonwealth members, just in case Mauritius should leave the Commonwealth to pursue its case.

When we mentioned these things, the Government did not say, “Oh yes, you’re quite right: we should have mentioned this earlier”. They simply shifted to talking about the possibility of tribunals in other fora, above all the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—but that convention cannot address sovereignty. In Committee, the Minister mentioned that in a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives, in which Britain was not represented, the tribunal assumed on the basis of the ICJ treaty that the boundaries of Mauritius should include Chagos and ruled on that basis. But we have the right in any future dispute that involves us to be represented; above all, we have the right to invoke, I think, amendment 238, which precludes military matters. The Diego Garcia base is above all a military matter. So I do not see where any binding legal judgment could come from, which is why I say that this should not come into force until we see that there is a binding ruling from some international body. If it is going to happen within weeks, that is not going to delay the whole matter very much.

The second issue, which is dealt with in my second amendment, is the reference to any ruling—by whichever international body it is—effectively rendering the base inoperable. When we press on that, we are told that it would mean that countries that supply the base and provide facilities for the base would be able to withdraw those facilities, which in some way would render it inoperable. As to what these facilities are, I presume they get food from neighbouring countries in boats—but nothing much has changed. If countries wished effectively to impose an embargo on the Diego Garcia base, with or without an international resolution from the ICJ or any other tribunal, they could do so. If that would render the base inoperable, the base is much weaker than we thought; and, if they cannot do so, surely there is nothing much to worry about on whether there is a legal ruling.

I do not want to go on at length because I know that noble Lords want to get on to the important business of expressing their views in the Lobbies. But the fundamental basis of this whole treaty has shifted, like the Goodwin Sands—and, like sinking sands everywhere, when they shift, they swallow you up. The Government’s rationale for this whole Bill has been swallowed up by their refusal to just wait and see whether some tribunal would come up with some ruling which would, in some very strange way, render the base inoperable. I find that imaginary but, if it is possible, let us suck it and see.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

We have been through this quite a few times, which I suppose is why other noble Lords are not jumping to their feet. Why not wait for a binding ruling? We have discussed previously that that would leave us in a disadvantaged position in terms of negotiation, were we to be negotiating with Mauritius following a binding ruling. The point that there can never be a binding ruling because no tribunal exists that could make one rather begs the question of why the previous Government committed themselves to 11 rounds of negotiations to protect themselves from something that could never happen.

Having said all that, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, concern the legal rationale and the risks of the agreement, including, in Amendment 10, waiting for a binding ruling on sovereignty over the archipelago. I must again reject this argument and this amendment, given that waiting for such a thing, with the treaty with Mauritius not ratified, would put us in an incredibly weak position. It would risk the future of the base, the delay would be highly dangerous to UK national security, and we are just not going to do it.

We published our legal rationale for the deal on the day that the treaty was signed. The House has dedicated hours to debating that rationale. It has been the subject of two reports by respected committees in this place. The Government have been consistently clear throughout all this that the legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative for managing the risk, which is why the previous Government undertook so many rounds of negotiation. We are confident that this agreement secures the base from legal threat, protecting UK national security for generations. I hope the noble Lord does not press his amendments to a vote.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for the amendments in this group. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have had some interesting debates on the future of the prerogative. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has made its recommendations on this point, and I understand why my noble friend has therefore tabled his amendment. The Constitution Committee has drawn Clause 5 to the attention of the House but fell short of matching the recommendations made by the DPRRC. We on the Opposition Front Bench have read carefully the Government’s response to the DPRRC’s report, which we believe has some merit. That said, we will not seek to oppose my noble friend should he choose to divide the House on this matter.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 34 to 37 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to amend Clause 5 of the Bill. I appreciate that Amendments 34 to 36 would implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government have carefully considered the committee’s report on the Bill and responded to it but, on this occasion, we do not accept those recommendations.

I note what the noble Lord said about Third Reading. I am grateful to him for his detailed engagement with these provisions. I want to clarify one point about which noble Lords might not be entirely clear. The effect of the Bill is that there will be two powers. One is the prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia only, which is preserved under Clause 3. We seem to have some agreement on that point. The other power is a new statutory power conferred by Clause 5. Orders in Council made under Clause 5 will be statutory instruments. The Bill currently provides that those will be subject to the negative procedure where they amend primary legislation, and otherwise to no procedure. That is not because we argue that they are prerogative orders but because it is appropriate given their subject matter.

So far as the power to amend primary legislation is concerned, we have been clear that the negative procedure is appropriate, given that the changes to be made to legislation will in very large part be technical in nature. The purpose of the power is to ensure that the Government can bring the domestic statute book into conformity with both the purpose and effect of the treaty, making consequential changes as necessary. That works hand in hand with Clause 3, which provides a default position of continuity of the law. The Clause 5 powers will be necessary to make amendments to that law to adapt it to the treaty and the new status of Diego Garcia. This is not just about the law of Diego Garcia; UK legislation which refers to BIOT needs to be brought into line.

Applying the negative procedure here is consistent with the Cyprus Act 1960, which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, referred to. Section 3 of the Cyprus Act also provides for the law of the UK in relation to Cyprus or the sovereign base areas to continue and for statutory Orders in Council to be made under the negative procedure to make further adaptations as required.

The Hong Kong Act 1985 also provides for the negative procedure for statutory Orders in Council under Schedule 3, amending the law of the UK or of other British possessions.

The Government’s position is that it is appropriate that no procedure applies when the Clause 5 power is used other than to amend primary legislation. The operation of the base on Diego Garcia and the treaty as a whole are in the realm of international relations, defence and security, as the noble Lord said. Given the subject matter, it is appropriate for those instruments to be subject to no parliamentary procedure.

There will, of course, be statutory instruments, which will be registered and published in the usual way. It is not uncommon for Orders in Council which relate to the overseas territories to have no procedure attached to them. I am happy, and I think it would be a good idea, to continue to discuss this with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, ahead of Third Reading. I would be very happy to do that. I hope he withdraws his amendment.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am grateful for that response, and in order not to delay the House, if I may, I will leave it at that point. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 34 and to return to this, if necessary, at Third Reading.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 51 and 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, concern the establishment of a UK-Mauritius inter-parliamentary committee to oversee the implementation and operation of the treaty. I would love to please the noble Lord—I am happy to continue talking to him—but I am afraid that I will disappoint him this evening.

Amendment 51 seeks to require the Government to engage with Mauritius to create a committee, with equal representation from both parliaments and the purpose of promoting mutual understanding of the provisions of the treaty. The committee would have responsibilities, including monitoring the implementation of the treaty and its impact on Chagossians. Amendment 54 ties the commencement of the Act to the establishment of this committee.

I completely recognise that the intention behind the amendments is to promote dialogue and scrutiny. However, Mauritius’s agreement to it could not be guaranteed, and the treaty itself makes no provision for an inter-parliamentary committee. Indeed, there would seem to be some potential for overlap—perhaps even conflict—between the proposed role of the committee and that of the joint commission under the treaty. Furthermore, introducing this requirement would at least delay, if not prevent, the ratification and implementation of an agreement that is vital for our national security.

There are numerous committees across the two Houses that can—and, I am sure, will—undertake periodic inquiries into the operation of the treaty. This joint committee could overlap with the work of these Select Committees—and that would not be right. We have Select Committees for a purpose, and it is for them to scrutinise the work of departments, so I do not believe that we should try to replicate that.

I know that the noble Lord feels passionately about supporting Chagossians. He has told me that and I commend him on it, but I do not think a joint committee will increase trust among the Chagossian community. As mentioned on earlier groupings, this Government are committed to a relationship with Chagossians built on trust and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. There are also elected representatives in the other place who are there to advocate for their constituents, and there are many in this House who also do this.

The agreement has already been subject to extensive scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and both Houses have had the opportunity to consider its terms. The treaty also establishes a joint commission under Article 12 to manage its operation, which is the appropriate forum for bilateral engagement. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for his indication of support, and to the Minister for her reply. I listened carefully to what she said. Of course, the joint commission on the treaty is executive-to-executive level, and I have consistently sought an opportunity for parliamentary dialogue to continue. It is absolutely right that elected Members of Parliament will represent their constituents and their constituents’ interests; indeed, MPs in the Mauritian parliament will do likewise. My ambition is to find a vehicle by which that can be done in a systematic way, not to contradict or to conflict with parliamentary committees but for there to be a parliamentary voice on behalf of the community where our commitment for their rights should be ongoing and not end once this treaty is ratified.

I am grateful for the Minister saying that she is willing to continue to talk. Equally, I understand that that is language not to give any commitment to anything at Third Reading, but I would like to continue the engagement with the noble Lord and the Minister on this, and indeed with other parliamentary vehicles. Because of the lateness of the hour—we have had a very busy Report stage—and notwithstanding the importance of this issue, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 12th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington]

1: Clause 6, page 4, line 38, leave out from “Parliament” to end of line 41
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make all orders under clause 6(1) subject to parliamentary control in the form of negative procedure.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, this government amendment will change the parliamentary procedure applicable to the delegated power in Clause 6. With this amendment, all instruments made using that power would be subject to the negative procedure. Previously, no parliamentary procedure applied unless the power was used to amend, repeal or revoke Acts of Parliament or statutory instruments made under them.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his contribution to this. I am glad that we were able to agree on a sensible compromise which puts into effect one of the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope that this assures the noble Lord and the DPRRC that the Government have listened to the views of noble Lords and are willing to find compromises where they are sensible. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I want to say a big thank you to the Minister for her engagement following Report and for tabling this amendment by way of, as she says, what I hope is very much an agreeable compromise.

While the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made the good point that Henry VIII powers should only exceptionally be subject to other than the affirmative procedure, in fact, when one looks at the detail of the Bill in the Government’s further response, it is quite clear that it would be excessive for the House to be detained on an affirmative debate on some of this legislation in relation to what are clearly not controversial matters. However, establishing the principle that all statutory orders should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny is, I think, important. I am very glad that the Government have accepted that.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington]

That the Bill do now pass.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their engagement on this crucial legislation, which secures a vital element of the UK’s national security and the UK’s transatlantic defence partnership. I thank noble Lords across the House for their expertise, which they have used to scrutinise the security of the base, the costs of the treaty, support mechanisms for the Chagossian community and environmental conservation provisions, to name a few.

The UK-Mauritius treaty protects the Diego Garcia military base and ensures that the UK retains full control over this vital asset. This in turn will protect our national security for generations, ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a wide range of threats, and keep the British people safe. The Bill ensures that the treaty can be ratified. As the world grows more dangerous, so too does the importance of the base for our national security. Noble Lords will not need to be told how crucial it is that the treaty is ratified and the base protected in the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape of our age.

We have had extensive debate in this House, and it has been good debate. I thank noble Lords on this side of the Floor, including my noble friend Lord Beamish, for their thoughtful and insightful contributions. I thank noble Lords from across the House for their thoughtful contributions throughout the passage of the Bill, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Hannay, Lord Jay and Lord Purvis of Tweed. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord Lilley, for their exuberant speeches, even if I have not always agreed with them. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, for their passionate speeches. I thank my noble friend Lord Coaker for his support on leading the Bill. I thank my honourable friends in the other place, the Minister for Overseas Territories and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, who have spoken at length with Peers about the detail of the Bill.

Finally, I thank the officials who have supported the Bill. I thank those on the Bill team—notably Helena Brice, our indefatigable Bill manager—and the policy teams in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence. They have worked tirelessly behind the scenes, often working to challenging deadlines. I thank those in my private office, in particular Bola, who have of course been crucial in supporting me. My thanks must be offered to all the parliamentary staff who have ensured the smooth process of this Bill.

Amendment to the Motion

Moved by

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an important debate on an important Bill and a considerable treaty that impacts on people’s lives and on international law, and which has direct relevance to UK national security. But this regret amendment has a bit of a Cambodia year zero feel to it, as if it all started last summer.

A casual observer would not be aware from this debate—notwithstanding the point that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, just indicated—that the previous Government chose to open negotiations to cede sovereignty in November 2022, without a mandate or consulting the Chagossian people. That decision by the previous Government, which we now know was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and considered a mistake by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was done without consultation and was not predicated on guaranteeing Chagossian rights. Furthermore, we now know that it was actively ongoing in April 2024. It was at that point that the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, wrote to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to confirm the continuation of the negotiations, but also, regrettably, the ongoing denial of the resettlement and consultation rights of the community. So if we are to have regrets, perhaps there is quite a lot that can be shared around the Chamber.

I have previously said, and I do not want to repeat it, that we have a deep regret with the current Government. They have chosen not to change the path of the previous Government in coming to office, and they chose not to conclude the process differently. That has been the essence of the votes on the amendments in this House. At each step of the way, I have sought to raise the concern about a lack of consultation, consent and rights. I am very pleased that the House backed my amendments to seek to address this, and I hope very much that the Commons will now back this too. Putting the permissive elements of Chagossian rights in the treaty on a Mauritian and UK statutory footing should now be the priority. I hope this will get cross-party support.

From the outset, I have raised concerns over the lack of transparency in the financial arrangements and value for money. I was also very pleased that the House backed my amendments to give Parliament, and through it the wider Chagossian community, a much greater say—indeed, a final say—on ceasing making payments if Mauritius does not honour its commitments as part of the treaty. As the House knows, there are mechanisms in place only if the UK renege on commitments, not Mauritius. I am not saying that it will and I am sure both parties have entered into the agreement in good faith, but if, for whatever reason, they fail to honour commitments, Parliament must have the ability to cease the financial elements of the agreement. I hope that the Government will move on these areas as they are the view expressed by this House.

I turn to some of the wider political arguments that we have heard—and we have heard quite a lot. Notwithstanding the “year zero” feel of this amendment, anyone listening to the debate or reading it in Hansard should understand the basic numbers of this House, because some external messaging about stopping the Bill, and the last-ditch efforts of people who have not stopped it, need to be put into context. There are—and I like many of them—281 Conservative Members of this House, while my Benches have 75. There is a separate argument as to the numbers, of course, but the number of Conservative Peers alone could sway the decision today if the Motion is voted on, and I understand that it will be. It is basically a regret Motion. The Conservatives have chosen, with the fire and fury that we have heard in opposition, not to oppose the Bill today but to complain about it. The whole public should be aware that that is the reality of what will be happening today, and we will see how many of those 281 will at least complain about it, even though they are not seeking to stop it.

As we reach the end of this Bill, I thank most particularly the Chagossian community, many members of which have watched our debates. I have regretted some of the language that they have had to listen to, but I hope many of them feel that there are many people in this House who believe sincerely in their rights.

I thank Ministers who have been willing to listen, engage and—on certain occasions, as we have heard today from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—agree. I want to chat with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about how persuasive he was, because I hope the Minister will now act on the other amendments that we have heard, but presumably that will have to be for ping-pong.

I support those who have helped me in the debate, including Adam Bull in our whips’ office, and many other people who have been in touch. I hope we can make progress and focus now on the priorities, which are Chagossian legal rights of resettlement, active consultation and participation, value for money and finance. We should return to these issues after the Commons has considered our sensible amendments.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are doing the tough and vital work necessary to protect our national security. We were in opposition for a long time, 14 years, so I understand the temptation to play political games whenever you get the chance—I completely get that. However, one thing that we never did was put our national security at risk.

I do not aim these remarks at all the noble Lords and Baronesses opposite; I know for a fact that the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, whose aim is true, have genuine, long-standing support for the Chagossian community, and they apply that to this debate. However, I have not seen that same integrity and care expressed by some others. Over the years, I often shadowed the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but I do not think I have ever heard him mention the way that the Chagossian community has been treated or their rights or needs. I am the first to say that they have been badly treated, and have said so many times throughout the passage of the Bill.

I disagree with everything in the Motion. The deal secures the long-term future of the critically important military base on Diego Garcia. If we had not done a deal then that would have left the future of the base, as well as current operations, in jeopardy, with likely further wide-ranging litigation, which would have undermined base operations. Waiting for that risk to crystallise, as some noble Lords opposite encouraged us to do, would have placed us in a much weaker position from which to negotiate. Either there was legal jeopardy, which is presumably why the previous Government embarked upon round after round of negotiation, or, as they now ask us to believe, there was never any legal jeopardy, in which case what on earth were they doing with their time and that of officials undertaking negotiation in bad faith?

Unlike the previous Conservative Government’s strategy with the Rwanda deal, we have been upfront about the costs. We have set them out clearly in our Explanatory Memorandum and in the finance exchange of letters, which were published on the same day as the treaty and have been debated many times since.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am sorry that the Minister has chosen to end this debate adopting a totally different tone from that which she pursued during Committee and Report. I asked a clear question: which goods, services and facilities will be withheld by which countries if we do not do this deal? She has not answered. She has said that there must be an answer to that question because the previous Government negotiated. She is the Minister and they are the Government; she must give us the answer and not say that there must be an answer from someone else.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I have clearly annoyed the noble Lord, given the finger-pointing this afternoon. My tone comes because this is the conclusion to these considerations. I would invite noble Lords to consider, when we talk about legal jeopardy and our reliance on third states, the remoteness of these islands and the complexity of sustaining a base of this nature. We rely on other states for supplies, for refuelling and for communications purposes. That is why we rest part of our argument on the need to resolve the legal jeopardy that the previous Government, as well as this Government and other states, could see existed here. We were determined to resolve this because, left unresolved, our position becomes weaker and weaker over time. This needed to be settled.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her replies. I do not think she said anything different from the points she made earlier. We had a lot of party-political insults but, yet again, no dealing with the actual issues that we raised. The one concession that I thought I heard from her—I will check Hansard—was an admission of what we have been saying all along: Mauritius does not in fact have the capabilities to resource the protection of the marine protected area. She has never said that in any previous assertions. Anyway, there are lots of points that I could take up more of the House’s time with, but I will not do that. I will just say that I would like to test the opinion of the House on my Motion.