(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend, who is a huge campaigner for his area. We have given 300,000 opportunities to young people through our national youth guarantee. That is not just about the youth clubs that I have mentioned; we have also given 12,000 disadvantaged young people an opportunity to have adventures away from home; we have made 30,000 places for the Duke of Edinburgh award scheme; and we have created 250 new uniformed youth groups.
It was Labour Government funding that enabled me, a working-class girl from Pontypridd, to access specialist music lessons, to fall in love with opera and to take part in a specialist workshop with Welsh National Opera. We all know what is sadly happening with the WNO, so what steps is the Secretary of State taking to safeguard our world-class WNO and the jobs and opportunities it provides for young people and everyone across Wales and the south-west?
I am really delighted to have an opportunity to answer this question about funding in Wales, because, notwithstanding the fact that arts is devolved to Wales, this Government have given £4 million through the Arts Council to Welsh National Opera—the same amount that the Welsh Government have given. Furthermore, the Arts Council has given transition funding. In fact, Welsh National Opera has been in the top 10% of organisations that have been funded. My position is that the Labour Government in Wales have reduced their funding to the Arts Council of Wales by 10%, and have been called out by those in Wales, so I am very grateful to the hon. Member for giving me the opportunity to point that out.
(4 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Member is absolutely right about the importance of fans and communities to football, which is why the Government are bringing forward legislation to protect fans across the country. My junior Minister is a valued colleague who supports me and works very hard across his portfolio. I know he has raised this issue with the EFL, and I will talk to him about it.
This Government recognise just how important the arts are, which is why the Chancellor used the Budget to extend, introduce and make permanent a range of tax reliefs to drive growth and investment in our creative industries. We have provided tax reliefs worth £1 billion over the next five years for museums, galleries, theatres, orchestras, independent film productions, film studios and the visual effects industry. In addition, as Sunday draws near, I want to wish all those running and taking part in the London marathon the best of luck—in particular, the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire).
With Monday marking the 35th anniversary of the Hillsborough tragedy, we will always remember the 97 victims who were killed unlawfully. Does the Minister agree that, in their memory, we must take a stand against those who think it is acceptable to ridicule this disaster in order to rile up rival teams? If so, what is she doing to tackle this issue of so-called tragedy chanting?
Tragedy chanting is absolutely abhorrent and has no place in football, or indeed in any sport. The Government fully support the football leagues and the police in their efforts to identify and deal with the culprits. Tragedy chanting can be prosecuted as a public order offence, with guilty individuals being issued with football banning orders preventing them from attending matches in the future.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of professional wrestling event licensing and guidance.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Betts. The all-party parliamentary group on wrestling is without a doubt one of the most joyous and exciting in this institution. I am proud to be an active vice-chair, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) and the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher)—our co-chairs—and to our group secretary, Danny Stone. They have brought serious and appropriate discussion of wrestling into this place, where too often in the past it was mocked.
Among our number we have fans of World Wrestling Entertainment, All Elite Wrestling, Impact, New Japan Pro-Wrestling and, most importantly, British promotions such as the all-women show EVE, PROGRESS, Revolution Pro Wrestling, NORTH, TNT and Renaissance, as well as start-ups such as the all-new women’s promotion, Galzilla, which literally hatched from an egg on the stage at the amazing Wrestival festival in London this year. Those wrestling promotions span the country, as do wrestling schools. In my constituency of Warrington North, we have our own wrestling academy, the Warrington Wrestling Academy, and I look forward to many Warringtonians making their way to the major leagues in years to come.
Fans often remark that, in the UK, one could go to a wrestling event nearly every night of the week, if one wanted to do so, and pack out the weekends with entertainment. Shows run in schools, gyms, entertainment venues and even fields. Of course, to run events safely and to a standard, there is a licensing requirement—or at least there should be.
In April 2021, the APPG released what constitutes the first ever thorough, systemic parliamentary analysis of wrestling. One of its key themes is the categorisation of wrestling as either theatre or sport. That might appear a simple matter, but wrestling involves serious athleticism alongside dramatic performance. There are competitions, albeit predetermined ones. Both Sport England and Arts Council England have funded wrestling, but neither particularly wants the responsibility of being a home for English wrestlers or wrestling.
Our APPG took the view—a novel one, I think—that for wrestling schools, the designation should be sporting, whereas promotions should be classed as theatrical. As the report made clear, defining promotions as theatrical entertainment opens up conversations about licensing, representation, governance, and improved policies and procedures. On the matter of policies and procedures, we were pleased to work recently with Loughborough University, with support from the PlayFight wrestling school, on the first ever parliamentary conference on wrestling, and we are developing a guide to better practice, which we hope will be informed by those in the industry, to help others across the British wrestling world.
We were told during the all-party group’s inquiry that the lack of a definition, whether as sport or art, created a minefield when it came to insurance and licensing. We have concerns that for promotions, the licensing system may still be somewhat of a minefield, particularly when people are navigating different licensing schemes. We know for certain that there are issues in this wholly unregulated industry. Concerns were raised with us about poor or, in some cases, illegal practices, ranging from tax malpractice and fraud to dangerous health and safety arrangements and sexual harassment. We were repeatedly warned about a lack of adequate medical supplies and supervision. The inquiry received one submission that drew on a wider understanding of promotions in the north of England and suggested that expertise to identify and treat injuries was “only intermittently present” at shows.
I am particularly grateful to Professor Claire Warden at Loughborough for her insights. She highlighted how the approaches of local councils can differ remarkably in just a few miles, even if the language used in licensing forms is similar. In Leicester, for instance, wrestling is considered “regulated entertainment”—in itself interesting, given the wholly unregulated nature of wrestling in actuality—alongside the performance of a play, exhibition or music, or an indoor sporting event. Boxing is the only sport mentioned on the list.
In Nottingham, wrestling is licensed under the “regulated entertainment” classification, but with a caveat that, although no licence is required for Greco-Roman or freestyle, combined fighting sports are licensable as boxing or wrestling entertainment, rather than an indoor sporting event. Similarly, Derby City Council, which has a whole section on boxing, wrestling and fighting sports, seems to compare wrestling to mixed martial arts rather than theatre.
Manchester thinks about numbers, acknowledging that a licence is not required for a play, dance, film, indoor sporting event or, indeed, boxing or wrestling, defined as a
“contest, exhibition or display of Greco-Roman wrestling or freestyle wrestling between 8am and 11pm,”
where attendance is 1,000 or fewer. By including the sense that wrestling might be a “display” rather than a contest, it opens up potential for confusion about whether professional wrestling is included. Surely all Greco-Roman and freestyle wrestling is a contest, as that is what actively defines them as different from professional wrestling.
There are difficulties, too, in other areas. I appreciate that this is a devolved matter, but we are told it can be difficult to run shows in Edinburgh, for example, because wrestling is classed as sport for licensing purposes, and therefore performances in theatres and other venues can apparently be very difficult.
What that means in actuality is confusion and potentially dangerous situations. There are examples of licensing schemes causing problems. In Derby, one venue had a licence for live music and sports events, but the council required a temporary licence for wrestling, which was seen as separate from sport. The council refused the licence to the venue, owing to fears about congestion—notably, not about safety or the suitability of the athletes or venue.
Another interesting story emerged in 2011, when the Royal Albert Hall, a venue famous for holding wrestling shows since the beginning of professional wrestling, faced local opposition to its request to add boxing and wrestling to the list of permitted activities. The complaints seemed entirely focused on
“problems with antisocial behaviour, public safety, noise and disturbance, and degradation of the surrounding area.”
Again, safety was not mentioned, but there was the sense, as there is so often, that wrestling appeals to people less socially acceptable to residents than, say, Proms-goers.
A similar opinion seems to be held by residents around Headingley in Leeds, despite the fact that it is a sporting venue. In that case, the council’s licensing committee unanimously refused the application, saying that the event was
“very different in nature and duration to rugby matches held regularly at the venue.”
Wrestling Resurgence, a midlands-based promoter, sent us the various procedures it puts in place when obtaining a licence from Nottingham City Council—specifically, that a medic must be present—but argued that
“some form of ‘fit and proper persons’ test should be in place for prospective promotions, similar to ownership tests in football, or that at minimum some basic standardised requirements put in place.”
The company highlighted the disparity in licensing requirements, saying:
“In Nottingham, where we run events, it is a requirement that wrestling event organisers ensure a medical professional is present at all times during a performance. This is something that is not required in Leicester.”
We certainly think that medics are a must, but, as Wresting Resurgence says,
“A national approach to licensing would be very welcomed.”
It is quite right—it would.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, and I am proud that she is the vice-chair of the APPG that I proudly co-chair. On Monday, I attended a very special conference at Loughborough University with Professor Claire Warden, focusing on concussion in professional wrestling. The point about licensing was raised time and again, as was the utmost importance of having a registered professional medic available at events. That should be part of the requirements, given the nature of the sector and performances, because concussion is likely. That is why such provisions are vital. Does my hon. Friend agree?
I could not agree more. I know that British wrestling is doing a lot of work with the Rugby Football League, for example, on concussion protocols. Unfortunately, despite the pre-determined nature of what happens in a wrestling ring, injuries and accidents are common, so medics should be there to make sure that such risks can be mitigated as far as possible.
The evidence I mentioned fed into the APPG’s inquiry and our recommendation that:
“For any sized promotion, having even limited safety measures in place should be part of the key requirements for running an event, either through requirements to use council property, the TENs licence or a governing body and in the absence of the latter, we recommend that the Home Office brings forward proposals to broaden TENs licence guidance to include health and safety and other minimum standards protocols for wrestling suppliers. We recognise that the legislation is different in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but we request that both devolved administrations assess whether their current licencing rules adequately cover wrestling promotions”.
In June 2021, we wrote to the then Minister of State at the Home Office, Lord Stephen Greenhalgh, to seek his assistance with the implementation of the recommendation in the APPG’s report, which was welcomed at the Dispatch Box by the Government. We asked about the possibility of widening the temporary events notice licence guidance to include health and safety, and other minimum standards protocols, for wrestling suppliers, and sought guidance on arrangements for Scotland and Northern Ireland. The APPG followed up on the letter, but to no avail, so I am delighted that the Minister will be able to update us today on what progress there has been and what plans might be in place.
I hope the Minister can also demonstrate a degree of updated thinking. Cam Tilley, who wrestles under the moniker Kamille Hansen—and who is a former researcher in this place—pointed out to us, through the dissertation that she has just finished on related issues, that these matters have already been discussed in this House. In the 1960s, questions were posed about the prohibition of wrestling performances by women, with the reply that there was no evidence to suggest that the issue was widespread enough to merit action and that this was ultimately a matter for local authorities to decide on as part of their licensing powers. However, London County Council had already fallen into the mode of effectively banning women’s wrestling in venues that it had licensed in the previous decades.
In 2002, during a debate on what would become the Licensing Act 2003, the other place was told:
“we know that boxing and wrestling and their audiences present a significant issue with regard to public safety. As the noble Baroness said, the relationship between wrestling and its audience is particularly engaging, and its showmanship can engage the audience very directly. But, as has been known for many decades, boxing also engages passions. From time to time, boxing bouts have aroused as much vigour in the audience as in those participating in the ring—in some cases, rather more than occurs in the ring.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 December 2002; Vol. 642, c. 391.]
Wrestling and boxing are far from the same; I speak as someone who has now been to multiple wrestling shows, large and small. That is not to say that boxing is always violent or problematic, but the lumping together of boxing and wrestling for licensing purposes has certainly caused problems. Wrestling has no concussive intent—although, as my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd said, of course concussive injuries occur—whereas the sole intent of boxing is to knock out the opponent. To conflate the two for licensing purposes makes very little sense.
We were told that some years ago that Tower Hamlets turned down wrestling events on advice from the local police, who had taken a decision based on boxing events. Similarly, we were told that in the past inter-promotional wars were waged between those wrestling companies that had clocked the importance of boxing-related restrictions on a licence and those that had not, with one company forcing another to forfeit a licensing opportunity.
The constant association of wrestling with boxing is deeply problematic. The concern is always that the local licensing process is so complex and likely to lead to rejection that wrestling shows are occurring around the country in unregulated venues or without licensing. We in the APPG would like to see some consistency in approaches to licensing, enhanced confidence for promoters so that they can hold a show, and certainty for all about how wrestling should be categorised by local authorities and what the requirements are or should be. I hope that the Minister can begin to set out that pathway to clarity for us today.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Secretary of State for that update, and for advance sight of her statement. I, too, pay tribute to all the campaigners who have long been calling for better regulation and reform of the gambling industry. I should also inform the House that my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell), the shadow Secretary of State, had given her apologies for her absence today long before we knew of the statement.
What we all know to be true is that updated gambling regulation is long overdue. The most recent legislation is from 2005, long before the huge rise and growth in online and mobile gambling opportunities. As a consequence, people can now gamble constantly and make huge losses in a very short time. I have met many people whose lives, and whose families’ lives, have been devastated by gambling harm. It is because of them that Members of this House are coming together from across the parties to call for better regulation of gambling. Anyone can fall into gambling addiction, so we need a modernised, robust system that is fit for the future.
Some forms of gambling, from bingo to the races, are of course a traditional British pastime. Around half of adults participate in some form of gambling, the vast majority with enjoyment and in moderation. Indeed, bingo halls are important in sustaining our local communities, especially in coastal and rural towns. Let us be clear: bingo halls, adult gaming centres and casinos face pressure as a result of sky-rocketing energy bills, and concerns about the sustainability of their business model in the face of significant online competition. It is therefore welcome that the announcement distinguishes between bricks-and-mortar bingo halls and low-stake adult gaming centres on the one hand, and the unique dangers of the online world on the other.
However, I must push the Secretary of State further. We have waited a long time for the statement, but it is very light on substance. Can she confirm exactly how the levy contributions of land-based and online gambling forums will differ? That is an important point, and I urge her to clarify that for the industry and the 110,000 people employed in it. What is the Treasury’s economic impact assessment of this announcement? The Government have delayed the White Paper many times. Everything that they are announcing today was ready to go a year ago. Six gambling Ministers and four Culture Secretaries have promised to publish this White Paper imminently. That being said, we welcome many of the measures announced; they are things we have long called for, and are a move in the right direction.
The Secretary of State mentioned the Premier League’s voluntary ban on gambling adverts on the front of shirts. That really is quite weak. It does not cover hoardings, or even the side or back of shirts. It also will not come into effect for three years. In that time, what is to stop the Premier League from reversing the voluntary ban once public attention has moved on? Will the Minister press the Premier League to go further?
There are further points arising from today’s announcement on which I must press the Secretary of State. First, as I say, we welcome the levy, but can she tell us exactly what the levy will be? Labour welcomes the new powers for the Gambling Commission, but she must confirm whether it will get extra resources to match the additional responsibilities. The National Audit Office has already found that the Gambling Commission has insufficient capacity to regulate the industry, and now it will have more to regulate. Is she confident that it will have the capacity for the expanded role that it will take on? On affordability checks, further sharing between gambling companies is badly needed, and I await details of the checks after the consultation. However, it is vital that rules on affordability checks be set independently, not by the industry. Will the Secretary of State provide reassurance on that?
The Secretary of State refers to stake limits and “safer by design” mechanisms, which of course we welcome, but will stake limits be based on how dangerous a product is? Who will decide that? It took years, and the resignation of a Minister, to get stake limits for fixed odds betting terminals, so will the Secretary of State reassure the House that the limits will have teeth, and will reduce harm from day one?
Finally, it is clear that we need greater protections for children and under-18s, so will the measures provide for stronger action on loot boxes, and other in-game features that are proven to make young people more likely to experience harms relating to gambling and problem gambling, harm to their mental health, and financial harm? Labour has been clear that we stand ready to work with the Government to tackle problem and harmful gambling; we have been for a long time. We have repeatedly called for updates to the completely outdated legislation. The Government have a real opportunity here to do the right thing, and make positive, real-world change. The Secretary of State must commit to getting these updates over the line in good time. The time for more and more consultation has been and gone. Will the Secretary of State confirm that all the necessary statutory instruments will be passed before the House rises for the summer? She must crack on and make good on these long overdue promises. I look forward to further clarification from her on the points that I have raised, and to working together to tackle gambling at its root.
I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. The shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell), made her apologies to me, for which I am grateful; I understand the reasons for her absence.
I am pleased that the shadow Minister said that we need to update the rules, and that the measures will have cross-party support. I very much look forward to working with the shadow Front Benchers on this matter, which is so important. She mentioned the delay; I would reiterate a number of points, including the fact that we have taken measures over the past few years, including cutting the stakes for fixed odds betting terminals, banning credit card gambling, reforming online VIP schemes and introducing new limits to make online slots safer. She will know that I have been in post only two and a half months, but this has been a priority for me. I have brought this White Paper in with some speed and timeliness, I would say, and she can be confident that we will continue to ensure that these measures make it into the necessary regulations. We are bringing many of them through via statutory instrument, which will speed up the process, and I very much look forward to the co-operation of those on the Opposition Front Bench in ensuring that we can do so as soon as possible.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: ‘Section [Safety duties protecting adults and society: minimum standards for terms of service] Minimum standards for terms of service’ ‘Section [Harm to adults and society assessments] Harm to adults and society risk assessments Section [Adults and society online safety] Adults and society online safety’
New clause 2—Offence of failing to comply with a relevant duty—
‘(1) The provider of a service to whom a relevant duty applies commits an offence if the provider fails to comply with the duty.
(2) In the application of sections 178(2) and 179(5) to an offence under this section (where the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of an officer of the entity or is attributable to any neglect on the part of an officer of the entity) the references in those provisions to an officer of an entity include references to any person who, at the time of the commission of the offence—
(a) was (within the meaning of section 93) a senior manager of the entity in relation to the activities of the entity in the course of which the offence was committed; or
(b) was a person purporting to act in such a capacity.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(4) In this section, “relevant duty” means a duty provided for by section 11 of this Act.’
This new clause makes it an offence for the provider of a user-to-service not to comply with the safety duties protecting children set out in clause 11. Where the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of a senior manager or other officer of the provider, or is attributable to their neglect, the officer, as well as the entity, is guilty of the offence.
New clause 3—Child user empowerment duties—
‘(1) This section sets out the duties to empower child users which apply in relation to Category 1 services.
(2) A duty to include in a service, to the extent that it is proportionate to do so, features which child users may use or apply if they wish to increase their control over harmful content.
(3) The features referred to in subsection (2) are those which, if used or applied by a user, result in the use by the service of systems or processes designed to—
(a) reduce the likelihood of the user encountering priority content that is harmful, or particular kinds of such content, by means of the service, or
(b) alert the user to the harmful nature of priority content that is harmful that the user may encounter by means of the service.
(4) A duty to ensure that all features included in a service in compliance with the duty set out in subsection (2) are made available to all child users.
(5) A duty to include clear and accessible provisions in the terms of service specifying which features are offered in compliance with the duty set out in subsection (2), and how users may take advantage of them.
(6) A duty to include in a service features which child users may use or apply if they wish to filter out non-verified users.
(7) The features referred to in subsection (6) are those which, if used or applied by a user, result in the use by the service of systems or processes designed to—
(a) prevent non-verified users from interacting with content which that user generates, uploads or shares on the service, and
(b) reduce the likelihood of that user encountering content which non-verified users generate, upload or share on the service.
(8) A duty to include in a service features which child users may use or apply if they wish to only encounter content by users they have approved.
(9) A duty to include in a service features which child users may use or apply if they wish to filter out private messages from—
(a) non-verified users, or
(b) adult users, or
(c) any user other than those on a list approved by the child user.
(10) In determining what is proportionate for the purposes of subsection (2), the following factors, in particular, are relevant—
(a) all the findings of the most recent child risk assessment (including as to levels of risk and as to nature, and severity, of potential harm), and
(b) the size and capacity of the provider of a service.
(11) In this section “non-verified user” means a user who has not verified their identity to the provider of a service (see section 57(1)).
(12) In this section references to features include references to functionalities and settings.’
New clause 4—Safety duties protecting adults and society: minimum standards for terms of service—
‘(1) OFCOM may set minimum standards for the provisions included in a provider’s terms of service as far as they relate to the duties under sections 11, [Harm to adults and society risk assessment duties], [Safety duties protecting adults and society], 12, 16 to 19 and 28 of this Act (“relevant duties”).
(2) Where a provider does not meet the minimum standards, OFCOM may direct the provider to amend its terms of service in order to ensure that the standards are met.
(3) OFCOM must, at least once a year, conduct a review of—
(a) the extent to which providers are meeting the minimum standards, and
(b) how the providers’ terms of service are enabling them to fulfil the relevant duties.
(4) The report must assess whether any provider has made changes to its terms of service that might affect the way it fulfils a relevant duty.
(5) OFCOM must lay a report on the first review before both Houses of Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.
(6) OFCOM must lay a report on each subsequent review at least once a year thereafter.’
New clause 5—Harm to adult and society risk assessment duties—
‘(1) This section sets out the duties about risk assessments which apply in relation to Category 1 services (in addition to the duties about risk assessments set out in section 8 and, in the case of Category 1 services likely to be accessed by children, section 10).
(2) A duty to carry out a suitable and sufficient harm to adults and society risk assessment at a time set out in, or as provided by, Schedule 3.
(3) A duty to take appropriate steps to keep an harm to adults and society risk assessment up to date, including when OFCOM make any significant change to a risk profile that relates to services of the kind in question.
(4) Before making any significant change to any aspect of a service’s design or operation, a duty to carry out a further suitable and sufficient harm to adults and society risk assessment relating to the impacts of that proposed change.
(5) A “harm to adults and society risk assessment” of a service of a particular kind means an assessment of the following matters, taking into account the risk profile that relates to services of that kind—
(a) the user base;
(b) the level of risk of adults who are users of the service encountering, by means of the service, each kind of priority content that is harmful to adults and society (with each kind separately assessed), taking into account (in particular) algorithms used by the service, and how easily, quickly and widely content may be disseminated by means of the service;
(c) the level of risk of harm to adults and society presented by different kinds of priority content that is harmful to adults and society;
(d) the level of risk of harm to adults and society presented by priority content that is harmful to adults and society which particularly affects individuals with a certain characteristic or members of a certain group;
(e) the level of risk of functionalities of the service facilitating the presence or dissemination of priority content that is harmful to adults and society, identifying and assessing those functionalities that present higher levels of risk;
(f) the different ways in which the service is used, and the impact of such use on the level of risk of harm that might be suffered by adults and society;
(g) the nature, and severity, of the harm that might be suffered by adults and society from the matters identified in accordance with paragraphs (b) to (f);
(h) how the design and operation of the service (including the business model, governance, use of proactive technology, measures to promote users’ media literacy and safe use of the service, and other systems and processes) may reduce or increase the risks identified.
(6) In this section references to risk profiles are to the risk profiles for the time being published under section 85 which relate to the risk of harm to adults and society presented by priority content that is harmful to adults and society.
(7) See also—
(a) section 19(2) (records of risk assessments), and
(b) Schedule 3 (timing of providers’ assessments).’
New clause 6—Safety duties protecting adults and society—
‘(1) This section sets out the duties to prevent harms to adults and society which apply in relation to Category 1 services.
(2) A duty to summarise in the terms of service the findings of the most recent adults and society risk assessment of a service (including as to levels of risk and as to nature, and severity, of potential harm to adults and society).
(3) If a provider decides to treat a kind of priority content that is harmful to adults and society in a way described in subsection (4), a duty to include provisions in the terms of service specifying how that kind of content is to be treated (separately covering each kind of priority content that is harmful to adults and society which a provider decides to treat in one of those ways).
(4) These are the kinds of treatment of content referred to in subsection (3)—
(a) taking down the content;
(b) restricting users’ access to the content;
(c) limiting the recommendation or promotion of the content;
(d) recommending or promoting the content;
(e) allowing the content without treating it in a way described in any of paragraphs (a) to (d).
(5) A duty to explain in the terms of service the provider’s response to the risks relating to priority content that is harmful to adults and society (as identified in the most recent adults and society risk assessment of the service), by reference to—
(a) any provisions of the terms of service included in compliance with the duty set out in subsection (3), and
(b) any other provisions of the terms of service designed to mitigate or manage those risks.
(6) If provisions are included in the terms of service in compliance with the duty set out in subsection (3), a duty to ensure that those provisions—
(a) are clear and accessible, and
(b) are applied consistently.
(7) If the provider of a service becomes aware of any non-designated content that is harmful to adults and society present on the service, a duty to notify OFCOM of—
(a) the kinds of such content identified, and
(b) the incidence of those kinds of content on the service.
(8) In this section—
“harm to adults and society risk assessment” has the meaning given by section [harm to adults and society risk assessment duties];
“non-designated content that is harmful to adults and society” means content that is harmful to adults and society other than priority content that is harmful to adults and society.
(9) See also, in relation to duties set out in this section, section 18 (duties about freedom of expression and privacy).’
New clause 7—“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc—
‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part.
(2) “Priority content that is harmful to adults and society” means content of a description designated in regulations made by the Secretary of State as priority content that is harmful to adults and society.
(3) “Content that is harmful to adults and society” means—
(a) priority content that is harmful to adults and society, or
(b) content, not within paragraph (a), of a kind which presents a material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of adults in the United Kingdom.
(4) For the purposes of this section—
(a) illegal content (see section 53) is not to be regarded as within subsection (3)(b), and
(b) content is not to be regarded as within subsection (3)(b) if the risk of harm flows from—
(i) the content’s potential financial impact,
(ii) the safety or quality of goods featured in the content, or
(iii) the way in which a service featured in the content may be performed (for example, in the case of the performance of a service by a person not qualified to perform it).
(5) References to “priority content that is harmful to adults and society” and “content that is harmful to adults and society” are to be read as—
(a) limited to content within the definition in question that is regulated user-generated content in relation to a regulated user-to-user service, and
(b) including material which, if it were present on a regulated user-to-user service, would be content within paragraph (a) (and this section is to be read with such modifications as may be necessary for the purpose of this paragraph).
(6) Sections 55 and 56 contain further provision about regulations made under this section.’
Government amendments 1 to 4.
Amendment 44, clause 11, page 10, line 17, , at end insert ‘, and—
“(c) mitigate the harm to children caused by habit-forming features of the service by consideration and analysis of how processes (including algorithmic serving of content, the display of other users’ approval of posts and notifications) contribute to development of habit-forming behaviour.”’
Amendment 82, page 10, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A) Content under subsection (3) includes content that may result in serious harm or death to a child while crossing the English Channel with the aim of entering the United Kingdom in a vessel unsuited or unsafe for those purposes.’
This amendment would require proportionate systems and processes, including removal of content, to be in place to control the access by young people to material which encourages them to undertake dangerous Channel crossings where their lives could be lost.
Amendment 83, page 10, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A) Content promoting self-harm, including content promoting eating disorders, must be considered as harmful.’
Amendment 84, page 10, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A) Content which advertises or promotes the practice of so-called conversion practices of LGBTQ+ individuals must be considered as harmful for the purposes of this section.’
Amendment 45, page 10, line 36, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
‘(d) policies on user access to the service, parts of the service, or to particular content present on the service, including blocking users from accessing the service, parts of the service, or particular content,’.
Amendment 47, page 10, line 43, at end insert ‘, and
“(i) reducing or removing a user’s access to livestreaming features.”’
Amendment 46, page 10, line 43, at end insert ‘, and
“(i) reducing or removing a user’s access to private messaging features.”’
Amendment 48, page 11, line 25, after ‘accessible’ insert ‘for child users.’
Amendment 43, clause 12, page 12, line 24, leave out ‘made available to’ and insert
‘in operation by default for’.
Amendment 52, page 12, line 30, after ‘non-verified users’ insert
‘and to enable them to see whether another user is verified or non-verified.’
This amendment would require Category 1 services to make visible to users whether another user is verified or non-verified.
Amendment 49, page 12, line 30, at end insert—
‘(6A) A duty to ensure features and provisions in subsections (2), (4) and (6) are accessible and understandable to adult users with learning disabilities.’
Amendment 53, page 12, line 32, after ‘to’ insert ‘effectively’.
This amendment would bring this subsection into line with subsection (3) by requiring that the systems or processes available to users for the purposes described in subsections (7)(a) and (7)(b) should be effective.
Amendment 55, page 18, line 15, at end insert—
‘(4A) Content that is harmful to adults and society.’
Amendment 56, clause 17, page 20, line 10, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
‘(6) The following kinds of complaint are relevant for Category 1 services—
(a) complaints by users and affected persons about content present on a service which they consider to be content that is harmful to adults and society;
(b) complaints by users and affected persons if they consider that the provider is not complying with a duty set out in—
(i) section [adults and society online safety]
(ii) section 12 (user empowerment),
(iii) section 13 (content of democratic importance),
(iv) section 14 (news publisher content),
(v) section 15 (journalistic content), or
(vi) section 18(4), (6) or (7) (freedom of expression and privacy);
(c) complaints by a user who has generated, uploaded or shared content on a service if that content is taken down, or access to it is restricted, on the basis that it is content that is harmful to adults and society;
(d) complaints by a user of a service if the provider has given a warning to the user, suspended or banned the user from using the service, or in any other way restricted the user’s ability to use the service, as a result of content generated, uploaded or shared by the user which the provider considers to be content that is harmful to adults and society.’
Amendment 57, clause 19, page 21, line 40, leave out ‘or 10’ and insert
‘, 10 or [harms to adults and society risk assessment duties]’.
Amendment 58, page 22, line 37, at end insert—
‘(ba) section [adults and society online safety] (adults and society online safety),’
Government amendment 5.
Amendment 59, clause 44, page 44, line 11, at end insert
‘or
(ba) section [adults and society online safety] (adults and society online safety);’
Government amendment 6.
Amendment 60, clause 55, page 53, line 43, at end insert—
‘(2A) The Secretary of State may specify a description of content in regulations under section [“Content that is harmful to adult and society” etc](2) (priority content that is harmful to adults and society) only if the Secretary of State considers that, in relation to regulated user-to-user services, there is a material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of adults presented by content of that description that is regulated user-generated content.’
Amendment 61, page 53, line 45, after ‘54’ insert
‘or [“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc]’.
Amendment 62, page 54, line 8, after ‘54’ insert
‘or [“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc]’.
Amendment 63, page 54, line 9, leave out ‘are to children’ and insert
‘or adults are to children or adults and society’.
Government amendments 7 to 16.
Amendment 77, clause 94, page 85, line 42, after ‘10’ insert
‘, [Adults and society risk assessment duties]’.
Amendment 78, page 85, line 44, at end insert—
‘(iiia) section [Adults and society online safety] (adults and society online safety);’
Amendment 54, clause 119, page 102, line 22, at end insert—
Amendment 79, page 102, line 22, at end insert—
Government amendments 17 to 19.
Amendment 51, clause 207, page 170, line 42, after ‘including’ insert ‘but not limited to’.
Government amendments 20 to 23.
Amendment 81, clause 211, page 177, line 3, leave out ‘and 55’ and insert
‘, [“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc] and 55’.
Government amendments 24 to 42.
Amendment 64, schedule 8, page 207, line 13, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 65, page 207, line 15, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 66, page 207, line 17, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 67, page 207, line 21, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘content that is harmful to adults and society, or other content which they consider breaches the terms of service.’
Amendment 68, page 207, line 23, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 69, page 207, line 26, leave out ‘relevant content’ and insert
‘priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 70, page 208, line 2, leave out
‘or content that is harmful to children’
and insert
‘content that is harmful to children or priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 71, page 208, line 10, leave out
‘and content that is harmful to children’
and insert
‘content that is harmful to children and priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 72, page 208, line 13, leave out
“and content that is harmful to children”
and insert
‘content that is harmful to children and priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 73, page 210, line 2, at end insert
‘“content that is harmful to adults and society” and “priority content that is harmful to adults and society” have the same meaning as in section [“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc]’.
Amendment 50, schedule 11, page 217, line 31, at end insert—
‘(1A) Regulations made under sub-paragraph (1) must provide for any regulated user-to-user service which OFCOM assesses as posing a very high risk of harm to be included within Category 1, regardless of the number of users.’
Amendment 74, page 218, line 24, leave out
‘and content that is harmful to children’
and insert
‘content that is harmful to children and priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 75, page 219, line 6, leave out
‘and content that is harmful to children’
and insert
‘content that is harmful to children and priority content that is harmful to adults and society’.
Amendment 76, page 221, line 24, at end insert—
‘“priority content that is harmful to adults and society” has the same meaning as in section [“Content that is harmful to adults and society” etc]’.
Amendment 80, page 240, line 35, in schedule 17, at end insert—
‘(ba) section [Harm to adults and society assessments] (Harm to adults and society assessments), and’.
Once again, it is a privilege to be back in the Chamber opening this debate—the third Report stage debate in recent months—of this incredibly important and urgently needed piece of legislation. I speak on behalf of colleagues across the House when I say that the Bill is in a much worse position than when it was first introduced. It is therefore vital that it is now able to progress to the other place. Although we are all pleased to see the Bill return today, the Government’s delays have been incredibly costly and we still have a long way to go until we see meaningful change for the better.
In December, during the last Report stage debate, we had the immense privilege to be joined in the Public Gallery by a number of the families who have all lost children in connection with online harms. It is these families whom we must keep in our mind when we seek to get the Bill over the line once and for all. As ever, I pay tribute to their incredible efforts in the most difficult of all circumstances.
Today’s debate is also very timely in that, earlier today, the End Violence Against Women and Girls coalition and Glitch, a charity committed to ending online abuse, handed in their petition, which calls on the Prime Minister to protect women and girls online. The petition has amassed more than 90,000 signatures and rising, so we know there is strong support for improving internet safety across the board. I commend all those involved on their fantastic efforts in raising this important issue.
It would be remiss of me not to make a brief comment on the Government’s last-minute U-turns in their stance on criminal sanctions. The fact that we are seeing amendments withdrawn at the last minute goes to show that this Government have absolutely no idea where they truly stand on these issues and that they are ultimately too weak to stand up against vested interests, whereas Labour is on the side of the public and has consistently put safety at the forefront throughout the Bill’s passage.
More broadly, I made Labour’s feelings about the Government’s highly unusual decision to send part of this Bill back to Committee a second time very clear during the previous debate. I will spare colleagues by not repeating those frustrations here, but let me be clear: it is absolutely wrong that the Government chose to remove safety provisions relating to “legal but harmful” content in Committee. That is a major weakening, not strengthening, of the Bill; everyone online, including users and consumers, will be worse off without those provisions.
The Government’s alternative proposal, to introduce a toggle to filter out harmful content, is unworkable. Replacing the sections of this Bill that could have gone some way towards preventing harm with an emphasis on free speech instead undermines the very purpose of the Bill. It will embolden abusers, covid deniers, hoaxers and others, who will feel encouraged to thrive online.
In Committee, the Government also chose to remove important clauses from the Bill that were in place to keep adults safe online. Without the all-important risk assessments for adults, I must press the Minister on an important point: exactly how will this Bill do anything to keep adults safe online? The Government know all that, but have still pursued a course of action that will see the Bill watered down entirely.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, as we discussed in the Bill Committee, there is clear evidence that legal but harmful content is often the gateway to far more dangerous radicalisation and extremism, be it far-right, Islamist, incel or other? Will she therefore join me in supporting amendment 43 to ensure that by default such content is hidden from all adult users?
I completely support my hon. Friend’s comments and I was pleased to see her champion that cause in the Bill Committee. Of course I support amendment 43, tabled in the names of SNP colleagues, to ensure that the toggle is on by default. Abhorrent material is being shared and amplified—that is the key point, amplified—online by algorithms and by the processes and systems in place. It is obvious that the Government just do not get that. That said, there is a majority in Parliament and in the country for strengthening the Online Safety Bill, and Labour has been on the front foot in arguing for a stronger Bill since First Reading last year.
It is also important to recognise the sheer number of amendments and changes we have seen to the Bill so far. Even today, there are many more amendments tabled by the Government. If that does not give an indication of the mess they have made of getting this legislation over the line in a fit and proper state, I do not know what does.
I have said it before, and I am certain I will say it again, but we need to move forward with this Bill, not backward. That is why, despite significant Government delay, we will support the Bill’s Third Reading, as each day of inaction allows more harm to spread online. With that in mind, I too will make some progress.
I will first address new clause 1, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell). This important addition to the Bill will go some way to address the gaps around support for individual complaints. We in the Opposition have repeatedly queried Ministers and the Secretary of State on the mechanisms available for individuals who have appeals of complaints. That is why new clause 1 is so important. It is vital that platforms’ complaints procedures are fit for purpose, and this new clause will finally see the Secretary of State publishing a report on the options available to individuals.
We already know that the Bill in its current form fails to consider an appropriate avenue for individual complaints. This is a classic case of David and Goliath, and it is about time those platforms went further in giving their users a transparent, effective complaints process. That substantial lack of transparency underpins so many of the issues Labour has with the way the Government have handled—or should I say mishandled—the Bill so far, and it makes the process by which the Government proceeded to remove the all-important clauses on legal but harmful content, in a quiet room on Committee Corridor just before Christmas, even more frustrating.
That move put the entire Bill at risk. Important sections that would have put protections in place to prevent content such as health and foreign-state disinformation, the promotion of self-harm, and online abuse and harassment from being actively pushed and promoted were rapidly removed by the Government. That is not good enough, and it is why Labour has tabled a series of amendments, including new clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7, that we think would go some way towards correcting the Government’s extremely damaging approach.
Under the terms of the Bill as currently drafted, platforms could set whatever terms and conditions they want and change them at will. We saw that in Elon Musk’s takeover at Twitter, when he lifted the ban on covid disinformation overnight because of his own personal views. Our intention in tabling new clause 4 is to ensure that platforms are not able to simply avoid safety duties by changing their terms and conditions whenever they see fit. This group of amendments would give Ofcom the power to set minimum standards for platforms’ terms and conditions, and to direct platforms to change them if they do not meet those standards.
My hon. Friend is making an important point. She might not be aware of it, but I recently raised in the House the case of my constituents, whose 11-year-old daughter was groomed on the music streaming platform Spotify and was able to upload explicit photographs of herself on that platform. Thankfully, her parents found out and made several complaints to Spotify, which did not immediately remove that content. Is that not why we need the ombudsman?
I am aware of that case, which is truly appalling and shocking. That is exactly why we need such protections in the Bill: to stop those cases proliferating online, to stop the platforms from choosing their own terms of service, and to give Ofcom real teeth, as a regulator, to take on those challenges.
Does the hon. Lady accept that the Bill does give Ofcom the power to set minimum safety standards based on the priority legal offences written into the Bill? That would cover almost all the worst kinds of offences, including child sexual exploitation, inciting violence and racial hatred, and so on. Those are the minimum safety standards that are set, and the Bill guarantees them.
What is not in those minimum safety standards is all the horrendous and harmful content that I have described: covid disinformation, harmful content from state actors, self-harm promotion, antisemitism, misogyny and the incel culture, all of which is proliferating online and being amplified by the algorithms. This set of minimum safety standards can be changed overnight.
As the hon. Lady knows, foreign-state disinformation is covered because it is part of the priority offences listed in the National Security Bill, so those accounts can be disabled. Everything that meets the criminal threshold is in this Bill because it is in the National Security Bill, as she knows. The criminal threshold for all the offences she lists are set in schedule 7 of this Bill.
That is just the problem, though, isn’t it? A lot of those issues would not be covered by the minimum standards—that is why we have tabled new clause 4—because they do not currently meet the legal threshold. That is the problem. There is a grey area of incredibly harmful but legal content, which is proliferating online, being amplified by algorithms and by influencers—for want of a better word—and being fed to everybody online. That content is then shared incredibly widely, and that is what is causing harm and disinformation.
No, I will not. I need to make progress; we have a lot to cover and a lot of amendments, as I have outlined.
Under the terms of the Bill, platforms can issue whatever minimum standards they wish and then simply change them at will overnight. In tabling new clause 4, our intention is to ensure that the platforms are not able to avoid safety duties by changing their terms and conditions. As I have said, this group of amendments will give Ofcom the relevant teeth to act and keep everybody safe online.
We all recognise that there will be a learning curve for everyone involved once the legislation is enacted. We want to get that right, and the new clauses will ensure that platforms have specific duties to keep us safe. That is an important point, and I will continue to make it clear at every opportunity, because the platforms and providers have, for far too long, got away with zero regulation—nothing whatsoever—and enough is enough.
During the last Report stage, I made it clear that Labour considers individual liability essential to ensuring that online safety is taken seriously by online platforms. We have been calling for stronger criminal sanctions for months, and although we welcome some movement from the Government on that issue today, enforcement is now ultimately a narrower set of measures because the Government gutted much of the Bill before Christmas. That last minute U-turn is another one to add to a long list, but to be frank, very little surprises me when it comes to this Government’s approach to law-making.
I have to say to the hon. Lady that to describe it as a U-turn is not reasonable. The Government have interacted regularly with those who, like her, want to strengthen the Bill. There has been proper engagement and constructive conversation, and the Government have been persuaded by those who have made a similar case to the one she is making now. I think that warrants credit, rather than criticism.
I completely disagree with the right hon. Member, because we voted on this exact amendment before Christmas in the previous Report stage. It was tabled in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), and it was turned down. It was word for word exactly the same amendment. If this is not anything but a U-turn, what is it?
I am pleased to support a number of important amendments in the names of the hon. Members for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) and for Ochil and South Perthshire (John Nicolson). In particular, I draw colleagues’ attention to new clause 3, which would improve the child empowerment duties in the Bill. The Government may think they are talking a good game on child safety, but it is clear to us all that some alarming gaps remain. The new clause would go some way to ensuring that the systems and processes behind platforms will go further in keeping children safe online.
In addition, we are pleased, as I have mentioned, to support amendment 43, which calls for the so-called safety toggle feature to be turned on by default. When the Government removed the clause relating to legal but harmful content in Committee, they instead introduced a requirement for platforms to give users the tools to reduce the likelihood of certain content appearing on their feeds. We have serious concerns about whether this approach is even workable, but if it is the route that the Government wish to take, we feel that these tools should at least be turned on by default.
Since my hon. Friend is on the point of safeguarding children, will she support Baroness Kidron as the Bill progresses to the other House in ensuring that coroners have access to data where they suspect that social media may have played a part in the death of children?
I can confirm that we will be supporting Baroness Kidron in her efforts. We will support a number of amendments that will be tabled in the Lords in the hope of strengthening this Bill further, because we have reached the limit of what we can do in this place. I commend the work that Baroness Kidron and the 5Rights Foundation have been doing to support children and to make this Bill work to keep everybody online as safe as possible.
Supporting amendment 43 would send a strong signal that our Government want to put online safety at the forefront of all our experiences when using the internet. For that reason, I look forward to the Minister seriously considering this amendment going forward. Scottish National party colleagues can be assured of our support, as I have previously outlined, should there be a vote on that.
More broadly, I highlight the series of amendments tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester Central that ultimately aim to reverse out of the damaging avenue that the Government have chosen to go to down in regulating so-called legal but harmful content. As I have already mentioned, the Government haphazardly chose to remove those important clauses in Committee. They have chopped and changed this Bill more times than any of us can remember, and we are now left with a piece of legislation that is even more difficult to follow and, importantly, implement than when it was first introduced. We can all recognise that there is a huge amount of work to be done in making the Bill fit for purpose. Labour has repeatedly worked to make meaningful improvements at every opportunity, and it will be on the Government’s hands if the Bill is subject to even more delay. The Minister knows that, and I sincerely hope that he will take these concerns seriously. After all, if he will not listen to me, he would do well to listen to the mounting concerns raised by Members on his own Benches instead.
I do not have time, but I thank all Members who contributed to today’s debate. I pay tribute to my officials and to all the Ministers who have worked on this Bill over such a long time.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThese Government amendments confer a duty on Ofcom to create and publish a list of companies that are approaching the category 1 threshold to ensure that it proactively identifies emerging high-reach, high-influence companies and is ready to add them to the category 1 register without delay. That is being done in recognition of the rapid pace of change in the tech industry, in which companies can grow quickly. The changes mean that Ofcom can designate companies as category 1 at pace. That responds to concerns that platforms could be unexpectedly popular and quickly grow in size, and that there could be delays in capturing them as category 1 platforms. Amendments 48 and 49 are consequential on new clause 7, which confers a duty on Ofcom to create and publish a list of companies that are approaching the category 1 threshold. For those reasons, I recommend that the amendments be accepted.
It will come as no surprise to Members to hear that we have serious concerns about the system of categorisation and the threshold conditions for platforms and service providers, given our long-standing view that the approach taken is far too inflexible.
In previous sittings, we raised the concern that the Government have not provided enough clarity about what will happen if a service is required to shift from one category to another, and how long that will take. We remain unclear about that, about how shifting categories will work in practice, and about how long Ofcom will have to preside over such changes and decisions.
I have been following this Bill closely for just over a year, and I recognise that the online space is constantly changing and evolving. New technologies are popping up that will make this categorisation process even more difficult. The Government must know that their approach does not capture smaller, high-harm platforms, which we know—we have debated this several times—can be at the root of some of the most dangerous and harmful content out there. Will the Minister clarify whether the Government amendments will allow Ofcom to consider adding such small, high-harm platforms to category 1, given the risk of harm?
More broadly, we are pleased that the Government tabled new clause 7, which will require Ofcom to prepare and update a list of regulated user-to-user services that have 75% of the number of users of a category 1 service, and at least one functionality of a category 1 service, or one required combination of a functionality and another characteristic or factor of a category 1 service. It is absolutely vital that Ofcom, as the regulator, is sufficiently prepared, and that there is monitoring of regulated user-to-user services so that this regime is as flexible as possible and able to cope with the rapid changes in the online space. That is why the Opposition support new clause 7 and have not sought to amend it. Moreover, we also support Government amendments 48 and 49, which are technical amendments to ensure that new clause 7 references user-to-user services and assessments of those services appropriately. I want to press the Minister on how he thinks these categories will work, and on Ofcom’s role in that.
I agree with everything that the hon. Lady said. New clause 7 is important. It was missing from the earlier iterations of the Bill, and it makes sense to have it here, but it raises further concerns about the number of people who are required to use a service before it is classed as category 1. We will come later to our amendment 104 to schedule 11, which is about adding high-risk platforms to the categorisation.
I am still concerned that the numbers are a pretty blunt instrument for categorising something as category 1. The number may end up being particularly high. I think it would be very easy for the number to be wrong—for it to be too high or too low, and probably too high rather than too low.
If Twitter were to disappear, which, given the changing nature of the online world, is not outside the realms of possibility, we could see a significant number of other platforms picking up the slack. A lot of them might have fewer users, but the same level of risk as platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. I am still concerned that choosing a number is a very difficult thing to get right, and I am not totally convinced that the Government’s way of going about this is right.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. All companies will still have to tackle the risk assessment, and will have to remove illegal content. We are talking about the extra bits that could take a disproportionate amount of resource from core functions that we all want to see around child protection.
I would push the Minister further. He mentioned that there will not be an onus on companies to tackle the “legal but harmful” duty now that it has been stripped from the Bill, but we know that disinformation, particularly around elections in this country, is widespread on these high-harm platforms, and they will not be in scope of category 2. We have debated that at length. We have debated the time it could take Ofcom to act and put those platforms into category 1. Given the potential risk of harm to our democracy as a result, will the Minister press Ofcom to act swiftly in that regard? We cannot put that in the Bill now, but time is of the essence.
Absolutely. The Department has techniques for dealing with misinformation and disinformation as well, but we will absolutely push Ofcom to work as quickly as possible. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Secretary of State, has said, once an election is done, it is done and it cannot be undone.
These Government amendments seek to change the approach to category 1 designation, following the removal from the Bill of the adult safety duties and the concept of “legal but harmful” content. Through the proposed new duties on category 1 services, we aim to hold companies accountable to their terms of service, as we have said. I seek to remove all requirements on category 1 services relating to harmful content, so it is no longer appropriate to designate them with reference to harm. Consequently, the amendments in this group change the approach to designating category 1 services, to ensure that only the largest companies with the greatest influence over public discourse are designated as category 1 services.
Specifically, these amendments will ensure that category 1 services are so designated where they have functionalities that enable easy, quick and wide dissemination of user-generated content, and the requirement of category 1 services to meet a number of users threshold remains unchanged.
The amendments also give the Secretary of State the flexibility to consider other characteristics of services, as well as other relevant factors. Those characteristics might include a service’s functionalities, the user base, the business model, governance, and other systems and processes. That gives the designation process greater flexibility to ensure that services are designated category 1 services only when they have significant influence over public discourse.
The amendments also seek to remove the use of criteria for content that is harmful to adults from category 2B, and we have made a series of consequential amendments to the designation process for categories 2A and 2B to ensure consistency.
I have commented extensively on the flaws in the categorisation process in this and previous Committees, so I will not retread old ground. I accept the amendments in this grouping. They show that the Government are prepared to broaden the criteria for selecting which companies are likely to be in category 1. That is a very welcome, if not subtle, shift in the right direction.
The amendments bring the characteristics of a company’s service into consideration, which will be a slight improvement on the previous focus on size and functionality, so we welcome them. The distinction is important, because size and functionality alone are obviously very vague indicators of harm, or the threat of harm.
We are pleased to see that the Government have allowed for a list to be drawn up of companies that are close to the margins of category 1, or that are emerging as category 1 companies. This is a positive step for regulatory certainty, and I hope that the Minister will elaborate on exactly how the assessment will be made.
However, I draw the Minister’s attention to Labour’s long-held concern about the Bill’s over-reliance on powers afforded to the Secretary of State of the day. We debated this concern in a previous sitting. I press the Minister again on why these amendments, and the regulations around the threshold conditions, are ultimately only for the Secretary of State to consider, depending on characteristics or factors that only he or she, whoever they may be, deems relevant.
We appreciate that the regulations need some flexibility, but we have genuine concerns—indeed, colleagues from all parties have expressed such concerns—that the Bill will give the Secretary of State far too much power to determine how the entire online safety regime is imposed. I ask the Minister to give the Committee an example of a situation in which it would be appropriate for the Secretary of State to make such changes without any consultation with stakeholders or the House.
It is absolutely key for all of us that transparency should lie at the heart of the Bill. Once again, we fear that the amendments are a subtle attempt by the Government to impose on what is supposed to be an independent regulatory process the whim of one person. I would appreciate assurance on that point. The Minister knows that these concerns have long been held by me and colleagues from all parties, and we are not alone in those concerns. Civil society groups are also calling for clarity on exactly how decisions will be made, and particularly on what information will be used to determine a threshold. For example, do the Government plan on quantifying a user base, and will the Minister explain how the regime would work in practice, when we know that a platform’s user base can fluctuate rapidly? We have seen that already with Mastodon; the latter’s users have increased incredibly as a result of Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter. I hope that the Minister can reassure me about those concerns. He will know that this is a point of contention for colleagues from across the House, and we want to get the Bill right before we progress to Report.
I beg to move amendment 104, in schedule 11, page 213, line 11, at end insert—
“(1A) Regulations made under sub-paragraph (1) must provide for any regulated user-to-user service which OFCOM assesses as posing a very high risk of harm to be included within Category 1, regardless of the number of users.”
This amendment allows Ofcom to impose Category 1 duties on user-to-user services which pose a very high risk of harm.
I would say this, but I think that this is the most important amendment. The key area that the Government are getting wrong is the way in which platforms, providers or services will be categorised. The threshold is based on the number of users. It is the number of users “and” one of those other things, not the number of users “or” one of those other things; even that would make a significant difference.
The Secretary of State talked about the places that have a significant influence over public discourse. It is perfectly possible to have a significant influence over public discourse with a small number of users, or with a number of users that does not number into the millions. We have seen the spread of conspiracy theories that have originated and been perpetuated on very small platforms—very small, shady places on the internet that none of us has experienced or even heard of. Those are the places that have a massive impact and effect.
We know that one person can have a significant impact on the world and on people’s lives. We have heard about the physical harm that people can be incited to cause by the platforms they access, and the radicalisation and extremism they find themselves subject to. That can cause massive, damaging effects to anybody they choose to take physical action against, and to some of the most marginalised communities and groups in society. We are seeing an increase in the amount of hate crime and the number of people who believe conspiracy theories, and not all of that is because of the spread of those things on Facebook and Twitter. It is because of the breadcrumbing and the spread that there can be on smaller platforms.
The most extreme views do not necessarily tip over into “illegal” or “incitement”; they do not actually say, “Please go out and kill everybody in this particular group.” They say, “This particular group is responsible for all of ills you feel and for every negative thing that is happening in your life”, and people are therefore driven to take extremist, terrorist action. That is a significant issue.
I want to talk about a couple of platforms. Kiwi Farms, which is no longer in existence and has been taken down, was a very small platform that dramatically damaged the lives of trans people in particular. It was a platform where people went to incite hatred and give out the addresses of folk who they knew were members of the trans community. Some of those people had to move to another continent to get away from the physical violence and attacks they faced as a result of the behaviour on that incredibly small platform, which very few people will have heard about.
Kiwi Farms has been taken down because the internet service providers decided that it was too extreme and they could not possibly host it any more. That was eventually recognised and change was made, but the influence that that small place had on lives—the difficulties and harm it caused—is untold. Some of that did tip over into illegality, but some did not.
I also want to talk about the places where there is a significant amount of pornography. I am not going to say that I have a problem with pornography online; the internet will always have pornography on it. It attracts a chunk of people to spend time online, and some of that pornography is on large mainstream sites. Searches for incest, underage girls, or black women being abused all get massive numbers of hits. There is a significant amount of pornography on these sites that is illegal, that pretends to be illegal or that acts against people with protected characteristics. Research has found that a significant proportion—significantly more than a half—of pornography on mainstream sites that involves black women also involves violence. That is completely and totally unacceptable, and has a massive negative impact on society, whereby it reinforces negativity and discrimination against groups that are already struggling with being discriminated against and that do not experience the privilege of a cis white man.
It is really grim that we are requiring a number of users to be specified, when we know the harm that caused by platforms that do not have 10 million or 20 million United Kingdom users. I do not know what the threshold will be, but I know it will be too high to include a lot of platforms that have a massive effect. The amendment is designed specifically to give Ofcom the power to designate as category 1 any service that it thinks has a very high risk of harm; I have not set the bar particularly low. Now that the Minister has increased the levels of transparency that will be required for category 1 platforms, it is even more important that we subject extremist sites and platforms—the radicalising ones, which are perpetuating discrimination—to a higher bar and require them to have the transparency that they need as a category 1 service. This is a place where the Bill could really make a difference and change lives, and I am really concerned that it is massively failing to do so.
The reason I have said that it should be Ofcom’s responsibility to designate category 1 services is on the basis that it has the experts who will be looking at all the risk assessments, dealing with companies on a day-to-day basis, and seeing the harms and transparencies that the rest of us will not be able to see. The reporting mechanisms will be public for only some of the category 1 platforms, and we will not be able to find out the level of information that Ofcom has, so it is right that it should be responsible for designating sites as having a very high risk of harm. That is why I tabled the amendment, which would make a massive difference to people who are the most discriminated against as it is and who are the most at risk of harm from extremism. I urge the Minister to think again.
I rise briefly to support everything the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just said. We have long called for the Bill to take a harm-led approach; indeed, the Government initially agreed with us, as when it was in its first iteration it was called the Online Harms Bill rather than the Online Safety Bill. Addressing harm must be a central focus of the Bill, as we know extremist content is perpetuated on smaller, high-harm platforms; this is something that the Antisemitism Policy Trust and Hope not Hate have long called for with regards to the Bill.
I want to put on the record our huge support for the amendment. Should the hon. Lady be willing to push it to a vote—I recognise that we are small in number—we will absolutely support her.
I want to speak briefly to the amendment. I totally understand the reasons that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has tabled it, but in reality, the kinds of activities she describes would be captured anyway, because most would fall within the remit of the priority illegal harms that all platforms and user-to-user services have to follow. If there were occasions when they did not, being included in category 1 would mean that they would be subject to the additional transparency of terms of service, but the smaller platforms that allow extremist behaviour are likely to have extremely limited terms of service. We would be relying on the priority illegal activity to set the minimum safety standards, which Ofcom would be able to do.
It would also be an area where we would want to move at pace. Even if we wanted to bring in extra risk assessments on terms of service that barely exist, the time it would take to do that would not give a speedy resolution. It is important that in the way Ofcom exercises its duties, it does not just focus on the biggest category 1 platforms but looks at how risk assessments for illegal activity are conducted across a wide range of services in scope, and that it has the resources needed to do that.
Even within category 1, it is important that is done. We often cite TikTok, Instagram and Facebook as the biggest platforms, but I recently spoke to a teacher in a larger secondary school who said that by far the worst platform they have to deal with in terms of abuse, bullying, intimidation, and even sharing of intimate images between children, is Snapchat. We need to ensure that those services get the full scrutiny they should have, because they are operating at the moment well below their stated terms of service, and in contravention of the priority illegal areas of harm.
I do not wish to test the Committee’s patience. I know we need to get the Bill over the line quickly, so I do not wish to delay it by talking over old ground that we covered in the previous Public Bill Committee on clauses that we support. We do support the Government on this clause, but I will make some brief comments because, as we know, clause 115 is important. It lists the enforceable requirements for which failure to comply can trigger enforcement action.
Order. I think the hon. Lady is speaking to clause 115. This is Government amendments 54 and 55 to clause 115. I will call you when we get to that place, which will be very soon, so stay alert.
Apologies, Dame Angela. I got carried away. “Section (Duty not to act against users except in accordance with terms of service) Acting against users only in accordance with terms of service Section (Further duties about terms of service) Terms of service”
Amendments made: 54, in clause 115, page 98, leave out lines 35 and 36.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 6 and 7 (removal of clauses 12 and 13).
Amendment 55, in clause 115, page 99, line 19, at end insert—
—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment ensures that OFCOM are able to use their enforcement powers in Chapter 6 of Part 7 in relation to a breach of any of the new duties imposed by NC3 and NC4.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Thank you, Dame Angela—take 2.
Clause 115 focuses on the enforcement action that may be taken and will be triggered if a platform fails to comply. Given that the enforceable requirements may include, for example, duties to carry out and report on risk assessments and general safety duties, it is a shame that the Government have not seen the merits of going further with these provisions. I point the Minister to the previous Public Bill Committee, where Labour made some sensible suggestions for how to remedy the situation. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have made it abundantly clear that more access to, and availability of, data and information about systems and processes would improve understanding of the online environment.
We cannot and should not rely solely on Ofcom to act as problems arise when they could be spotted earlier by experts somewhere else. We have already heard the Minister outline the immense task that Ofcom has ahead of it to monitor risk assessments and platforms, ensuring that platforms comply and taking action where there is illegal content and a risk to children. It is important that Ofcom has at its disposal all the help it needs.
It would be helpful if there were more transparency about how the enforcement provisions work in practice. We have repeatedly heard that without independent researchers accessing data on relevant harm, platforms will have no real accountability for how they tackle online harm. I hope that the Minister can clarify why, once again, the Government have not seen the merit of encouraging transparency in their approach. It would be extremely valuable and helpful to both the online safety regime and the regulator as a whole, and it would add merit to the clause.
We have talked about the fact that Ofcom will have robust enforcement powers. It can direct companies to take specific steps to come into compliance or to remedy failure to comply, as well as issue fines and apply to the courts for business disruption measures. Indeed, Ofcom can institute criminal proceedings against senior managers who are responsible for compliance with an information notice, when they have failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure the company’s compliance with that notice. That criminal offence will commence two months after Royal Assent.
Ofcom will be required to produce enforcement guidelines, as it does in other areas that it regulates, explaining how it proposes to use its enforcement powers. It is important that Ofcom is open and transparent, and that companies and people using the services understand exactly how to comply. Ofcom will provide those guidelines. People will be able to see who are the users of the services. The pre-emptive work will come from the risk assessments that platforms themselves will need to produce.
We will take a phased approach to bringing the duties under the Bill into effect. Ofcom’s initial focus will be on illegal content, so that the most serious harms can be addressed as soon as possible. When those codes of practice and guidelines come into effect, the hon. Member for Pontypridd will see some of the transparency and openness that she is looking for.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 115, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Review
Amendment made: 56, in clause 155, page 133, line 27, after “Chapter 1” insert “or 2A”.—(Paul Scully.)
Clause 155 is about a review by the Secretary of State of the regulatory framework established by this Bill. This amendment inserts a reference to Chapter 2A, which is the new Chapter expected to be formed by NC3 to NC6.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The report as is obviously has to be laid before Parliament and will form part of the package of parliamentary scrutiny. But, yes, we will consider how we can utilise the expertise of both Houses in post-legislative scrutiny. We will come back on that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 155, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 169
Individuals providing regulated services: liability
Amendment made: 57, in clause 169, page 143, line 15, at end insert—
“(fa) Chapter 2A of Part 4 (terms of service: transparency, accountability and freedom of expression);”.—(Paul Scully.)
Clause 169 is about liability of providers who are individuals. This amendment inserts a reference to Chapter 2A, which is the new Chapter expected to be formed by NC3 to NC6, so that individuals may be jointly and severally liable for the duties imposed by that Chapter.
Clause 169, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 183 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 17
Video-sharing platform services: transitional provision etc
Amendments made: 94, in schedule 17, page 235, line 43, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6 (removal of clause 12).
Amendment 95, in schedule 17, page 236, line 27, at end insert—
“(da) the duties set out in sections (Duty not to act against users except in accordance with terms of service) and (Further duties about terms of service) (terms of service);”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment ensures that services already regulated under Part 4B of the Communications Act 2003 (video-sharing platform services) are not required to comply with the new duties imposed by NC3 and NC4 during the transitional period.
Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Seventeenth schedule to the Bill.
Labour welcomes schedule 17, which the Government introduced on Report. We see this schedule as clarifying exactly how the existing video-sharing platform regime will be repealed and the transitional provisions that will apply to those providers as they transition to the online safety framework. The schedule is fundamentally important for both providers and users, as it establishes the formal requirements of these platforms as we move the requirement to this new legislation.
We welcome the clarification in paragraph 1(1) of the definition of a qualifying video-sharing service. On that point, I would be grateful if the Minister clarified the situation around livestreaming video platforms and whether this schedule would also apply to them. Throughout this Bill Committee, we have heard just how dangerous and harmful live video-sharing platforms can be, so this is an important point to clarify.
I have spoken at length about the importance of capturing the harms on these platforms, particularly in the context of child sexual exploitation being livestreamed online, which, thanks to the brilliant work of International Justice Mission, we know is a significant and widespread issue. I must make reference to the IJM’s findings from its recent White Paper, which highlighted the extent of the issue in the Philippines, which is widely recognised as a source country for livestreamed sexual exploitation of children. It found that traffickers often use cheap Android smartphones with pre-paid cellular data services to communicate with customers and produce and distribute explicit material. To reach the largest possible customer base, they often connect with sexually motivated offenders through everyday technology—the same platforms that the rest of us use to communicate with friends, family and co-workers.
One key issue in assessing the extent of online sexual exploitation of children is that we are entirely dependent on the detection of the crime, but the reality is that most current technologies that are widely used to detect various forms of online sexual exploitation of children are not designed to recognise livestreaming video services. This is an important and prolific issue, so I hope the Minister can assure me that the provisions in the schedule will apply to those platforms too.
We are setting out in schedule 17 how the existing video-sharing platform regime will be repealed in the transitional provisions that apply to these providers as they transition to the online safety framework. My understanding is that it does include livestreaming, but I will obviously write to the hon. Lady if I have got that wrong. I am not sure there is a significant legal effect here. To protect children and treat services fairly while avoiding unnecessary burdens on business, we are maintaining the current user protections in the VSP regime while the online safety framework is being implemented. That approach to transition avoids the duplication of regulation.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 17, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 203
Interpretation: general
It is the functionalities around it that enable the voice conversation to happen.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 203, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 206
Extent
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I would like to welcome the Government’s clarification, particularly as an MP representing a devolved nation within the UK. It is important to clarify the distinction between the jurisdictions, and I welcome that this clause does that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 206 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 207
Commencement and transitional provision
Amendment made: 60, in clause 207, page 173, line 15, leave out “to” and insert “and”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 41 (removal of clause 55).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Labour welcomes clause 207, which outlines the commencement and transitional provisions for the Bill to effectively come into existence. The Minister knows that Labour is concerned about the delays that have repeatedly held up the Bill’s progress, and I need not convince him of the urgent need for it to pass. I think contributions in Committee plus those from colleagues across the House as the Bill has progressed speak for themselves. The Government have repeatedly claimed they are committed to keeping children safe online, but have repeatedly failed to bring forward this legislation. We must now see commitments from the Minister that the Bill, once enacted, will make a difference right away.
Labour has specific concerns shared with stakeholders, from the Age Verification Providers Association to the Internet Watch Foundation, the NSPCC and many more, about the road map going forward. Ofcom’s plan for enforcement already states that it will not begin enforcement on harm to children from user-to-user content under part 3 of the Bill before 2025. Delays to the Bill as well as Ofcom’s somewhat delayed enforcement plans mean that we are concerned that little will change in the immediate future or even in the short term. I know the Minister will stand up and say that if the platforms want to do the right thing, there is nothing stopping them from doing so immediately, but as we have seen, they need convincing to take action when it counts, so I am not convinced that platforms will do the right thing.
If the Government’s argument is that there is nothing to stop platforms taking such actions early, why are we discussing the Bill at all? Platforms have had many years to implement such changes, and the very reason we need this Bill is that they have not been.
Exactly. My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point that goes to the heart of why we are here in the first place. If the platforms were not motivated by commercial interest and we could trust them to do the right thing on keeping children safe and reducing harm on their platforms, we would not require this legislation in the first place. But sadly, we are where we are, which is why it is even more imperative that we get on with the job, that Ofcom is given the tools to act swiftly and tries to reduce the limit of when they come into effect and that this legislation is enacted so that it actually makes a lasting difference.
Ofcom has already been responsible for regulating video-sharing platforms for two years, yet still, despite being in year 3, it is only asking websites to provide a plan as to how they will be compliant. That means the reality is that we can expect little on child protection before 2027-28, which creates a massive gap compared with public expectations of when the Bill will be passed. We raised these concerns last time, and I felt little assurance from the Minister in post last time, so I am wondering whether the current Minister can improve on his predecessor by ensuring a short timeline for when exactly the Bill can be implemented and Ofcom can act.
We all understand the need for the Bill, which my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North just pointed out. That is why we have been supportive in Committee and throughout the passage of the Bill. But the measures that the Bill introduces must come into force as soon as is reasonably possible. Put simply, the industry is ready and users want to be protected online and are ready too. It is just the Government, sadly, and the regulator that would be potentially holding up implementation of the legislation.
The Minister has failed to concede on any of the issues that we have raised in Committee, despite being sympathetic and supportive. His predecessor was also incredibly supportive and sympathetic on everything we raised in Committee, yet failed to take into account a single amendment or issue that we raised. I therefore make a plea to this Minister to at least see the need to press matters and the timescale that is needed here. We have not sought to formally amend this clause, so I seek the Minister’s assurance that this legislation will be dealt with swiftly. I urge him to work with Labour, SNP colleagues and colleagues across the House to ensure that the legislation and the provisions in it are enacted and that there are no further unnecessary delays.
Our intention is absolutely to get this regime operational as soon as possible after Royal Assent. We have to get to Royal Assent first, so I am looking forward to working with all parties in the other House to get the legislation to that point. After that, we have to ensure that the necessary preparations are completed effectively and that service providers understand exactly what is expected of them. To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Warrington North about service providers, the key difference from what happened in the years that led to this legislation being necessary is that they now will know exactly what is expected of them—and it is literally being expected of them, with legislation and with penalties coming down the line. They should not be needing to wait for the day one switch-on. They can be testing and working through things to ensure that the system does work on day one, but they can do that months earlier.
The legislation does require some activity that can be carried out only after Royal Assent, such as public consultation or laying of secondary legislation. The secondary legislation is important. We could have put more stuff in primary legislation, but that would belie the fact that we are trying to make this as flexible as possible, for the reasons that we have talked about. It is so that we do not have to keep coming back time and again for fear of this being out of date almost before we get to implementation in the first place.
However, we are doing things at the moment. Since November 2020, Ofcom has begun regulation of harmful content online through the video-sharing platform regulatory regime. In December 2020, Government published interim codes of practice on terrorist content and activity and sexual exploitation and abuse online. Those will help to bridge the gap until the regulator becomes operational. In June 2021, we published “safety by design” guidance, and information on a one-stop-shop for companies on protecting children online. In July 2021, we published the first Government online media literacy strategy. We do encourage stakeholders, users and families to engage with and help to promote that wealth of material to minimise online harms and the threat of misinformation and disinformation. But clearly, we all want this measure to be on the statute book and implemented as soon as possible. We have talked a lot about child protection, and that is the core of what we are trying to do here.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 207, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
OFCOM’s guidance: content that is harmful to children and user empowerment
“(1) OFCOM must produce guidance for providers of Part 3 services which contains examples of content or kinds of content that OFCOM consider to be, or consider not to be— OFCOM must produce guidance for providers of Category 1 services which contains examples of content or kinds of content that OFCOM consider to be, or consider not to be, content to which section 14(2) applies (see section 14(8A)).
(a) primary priority content that is harmful to children, or
(b) priority content that is harmful to children.
(2) Before producing any guidance under this section (including revised or replacement guidance), OFCOM must consult such persons as they consider appropriate.
(3) OFCOM must publish guidance under this section (and any revised or replacement guidance).”—(Paul Scully.)
This new clause requires OFCOM to give guidance to providers in relation to the kinds of content that OFCOM consider to be content that is harmful to children and content relevant to the duty in clause 14(2) (user empowerment).
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Government are committed to empowering adults to have greater control over their online experience, and to protecting children from seeing harmful content online. New clause 1 places a new duty on Ofcom to produce and publish guidance for providers of user-to-user regulated services, in relation to the crucial aims of empowering adults and providers having effective systems and processes in place. The guidance will provide further clarity, including through
“examples of content or kinds of content that OFCOM consider to be…primary priority”
or
“priority content that is harmful to children.”
Ofcom will also have to produce guidance that sets out examples of content that it considers to be relevant to the user empowerment duties, as set out in amendment 15 to clause 14.
It is really important that expert opinion is considered in the development of this guidance, and the new clause places a duty on Ofcom to consult with relevant persons when producing sets of guidance. That will ensure that the views of subject matter experts are reflected appropriately.
Labour is pleased to see the introduction of the new clause, which clarifies the role of Ofcom in delivering guidance to providers about their duties. Specifically, the new clause will require Ofcom to give guidance to providers on the kind of content that Ofcom considers to be harmful to children, or relevant to the user empowerment duty in clause 14. That is a very welcome addition indeed.
Labour remains concerned about exactly how these so-called user empowerment tools will work in practice—we have discussed that at length—and let us face it: we have had little assurance from the Minister on that point. We welcome the new clause, as it clarifies what guidance providers can expect to receive from Ofcom once the Bill is finally enacted. We can all recognise that Ofcom has a colossal task ahead of it—the Minister said so himself—so it is particularly welcome that the guidance will be subject to consultation with those that it deems appropriate. I can hope only that that will include the experts, and the many groups that provided expertise, support and guidance on internet regulation long before the Bill even received its First Reading, a long time ago. There are far too many of those experts and groups to list, but it is fundamental that the experts who often spot online harms before they properly emerge be consulted and included in this process if we are to truly capture the priority harms to children, as the new clause intends.
We also welcome the clarification in subsection (2) that Ofcom will be required to provide “examples of content” that would be considered to be—or not be—harmful. These examples will be key to ensuring that the platforms have nowhere to hide when it comes to deciding what is harmful; there will be no grey area. Ofcom will have the power to show them exact examples of what could be deemed harmful.
We recognise, however, that there is subjectivity to the work that Ofcom will have to do once the Bill passes. On priority content, it is most important that providers are clear about what is and is not acceptable; that is why we welcome the new clause, but we do of course wish that the Government applied the same logic to harm pertaining to adults online.
I am also happy to support new clause 1, but I have a couple of questions. It mentions that “replacement guidance” may be provided, which is important because, as we have said a number of times, things will change, and we will end up with a different online experience; that can happen quickly. I am glad that Ofcom has the ability to refresh and update the guidance.
My question is about timelines. There do not seem to be any timelines in the new clause for when the guidance is required to be published. It is key that the guidance be published before companies and organisations have to comply with it. My preference would be for it to be published as early as possible. There may well need to be more work, and updated versions of the guidance may therefore need to be published, but I would rather companies had an idea of the direction of travel, and what they must comply with, as soon as possible, knowing that it might be tweaked. That would be better than waiting until the guidance was absolutely perfect and definitely the final version, but releasing it just before people had to start complying with it. I would like an assurance that Ofcom will make publishing the guidance a priority, so that there is enough time to ensure compliance. We want the Bill to work; it will not work if people do not know what they have to comply with. Assurance on that would be helpful.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
That was some stretch of procedure, Dame Angela, but we got there in the end. This new clause is about child user empowerment duties. I am really pleased that the Government have user empowerment duties in the Bill—they are a good thing—but I am confused as to why they apply only to adult users, and why children do not deserve the same empowerment rights over what they access online.
In writing the new clause, I pretty much copied clause 14, before there were any amendments to it, and added a couple of extra bits: subsections (8) and (9). In subsection (8), I have included:
“A duty to include in a service features which child users may use or apply if they wish to only encounter content by users they have approved.”
That would go a step further than the verification process and allow users to approve only people who are in their class at school, people with whom they are friends, or even certain people in their class at school, and to not have others on that list. I know that young people playing Fortnite—I have mentioned Fortnite a lot because people play it a lot—or Roblox are contacted by users whom they do not know, and there is no ability for young people to switch off some of the features while still being able to contact their friends. Users can either have no contact from anyone, or they can have a free-for-all. That is not the case for all platforms, but a chunk of them do not let users speak only to people on their friends list, or receive messages only from people on the list.
My proposed subsection (8) would ensure that children could have a “white list” of people who they believe are acceptable, and who they want to be contacted by, and could leave others off the list. That would help tackle not just online child exploitation, but the significant online bullying that teachers and children report. Children have spoken of the harms they experience as a result of people bullying them and causing trouble online; the perpetrators are mainly other children. Children would be able to remove such people from the list and so would not receive any content, messages or comments from those who make their lives more negative.
Subsection (9) is related to subsection (8); it would require a service to include
“features which child users may use or apply if they wish to filter out private messages from—
(a) non-verified users, or
(b) adult users, or
(c) any user other than those on a list approved by the child user.”
Adults looking to exploit children will use private messaging on platforms such as Instagram. Instagram has to know how old its users are, so anybody who is signed up to it will have had to provide it with their date of birth. It is completely reasonable for a child to say, “I want to filter out everything from an adult.” When we talk about children online, we are talking about anybody from zero to 18, which is a very wide age range. Some of those people will be working and paying bills, but will not have access to the empowerment features that adults have access to, because they have not yet reached that magical threshold. Some services may decide to give children access to user empowerment tools, but there is no requirement to. The only requirement in the Bill on user empowerment tools is for adults. That is not fair.
Children should have more control over the online environment. We know how many children feel sad as a result of their interactions online, and how many encounter content online that they wish they had never seen and cannot unsee. We should give them more power over that, and more power to say, “No, I don’t want to see that. I don’t want people I don’t know contacting me. I don’t want to get unsolicited messaged. I don’t want somebody messaging me, pretending that they are my friend or that they go to another school, when they are in fact an adult, and I won’t realise until it is far too late.”
The Bill applies to people of all ages. All of us make pretty crappy decisions sometimes. That includes teenagers, but they also make great decisions. If there was a requirement for them to have these tools, they could choose to make their online experience better. I do not think this was an intentional oversight, or that the Government set out to disadvantage children when they wrote the adult user empowerment clauses. I think they thought that it would be really good to have those clauses in the Bill, in order to give users a measure of autonomy over their time and interactions online. However, they have failed to include the same thing for children. It is a gap.
I appreciate that there are child safety duties, and that there is a much higher bar for platforms that have child users, but children are allowed a level of autonomy; look at the UN convention on the rights of the child. We give children choices and flexibilities; we do not force them to do every single thing they do, all day every day. We recognise that children should be empowered to make decisions where they can.
I know the Government will not accept the provision—I am not an idiot. I have never moved a new clause in Committee that has been accepted, and I am pretty sure that it will not happen today. However, if the Government were to say that they would consider, or even look at the possibility of, adding child user empowerment duties to the Bill, the internet would be a more pleasant place for children. They are going to use it anyway; let us try to improve their online experience even more than the Bill does already.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North has outlined the case for the new clause eloquently and powerfully. She may not press it to a Division, if the Minister can give her assurances, but if she did, she would have the wholehearted support of the Opposition.
We see new clause 8 as complementing the child safety duties in the legislation. We fully welcome provisions that provide children with greater power and autonomy in choosing to avoid exposure to certain types of content. We have concerns about how the provisions would work in practice, but that issue has more to do with the Government’s triple-shield protections than the new clause.
The Opposition support new clause 8 because it aims to provide further protections, in addition to the child safety duties, to fully protect children from harmful content and to empower them. It would empower and enable them to filter out private messages from adults or non-verified users. We also welcome the measures in the new clause that require platforms and service providers to design accessible terms of service. That is absolutely vital to best protect children online, which is why we are all here, and what the legislation was designed for.
The aim of the user empowerment duty is to give adults more control over certain categories of legal content that some users will welcome greater choice over. Those duties also give adult users greater control over who they interact with online, but these provisions are not appropriate for children. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North acknowledged, there are already separate duties on services likely to be accessed by children, in scope of part 3, to undertake comprehensive risk assessments and to comply with safety duties to protect children from harm. That includes requirements to assess how many specific functionalities may facilitate the spread of harmful content, as outlined in clause 10(6)(e), and to protect children from harmful content, including content that has been designated as priority harmful content, by putting in place age-appropriate protections.
As such, children will not need to be provided with tools to control any harmful content they see, as the platform will need to put in place age-appropriate protections. We do not want to give children an option to choose to see content that is harmful to them. The Bill also outlines in clause 11(4)(f) that, where it is proportionate to do so, service providers will be required to take measures in certain areas to meet the child-safety duties. That includes functionalities allowing for control over content that is encountered. It would not be appropriate to require providers to offer children the option to verify their identity, due to the safeguarding and data protection risks that that would pose. Although we expect companies to use technologies such as age assurance to protect children on their service, they would only be used to establish age, not identity.
The new clause would create provisions to enable children to filter out private messages from adults and users who are not on an approved list, but the Bill already contains provisions that address the risks of adults contacting children. There are also requirements on service providers to consider how their service could be used for grooming or child sexual exploitation and abuse, and to apply proportionate measures to mitigate those risks. The service providers already have to assess and mitigate the risks. They have to provide the risk assessment, and within it they could choose to mitigate risk by requiring services to prevent unknown users from contacting children.
For the reasons I have set out, the Bill already provides strong protections for children on services that they are likely to access. I am therefore not able to accept the new clause, and I hope that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North will withdraw it.
I would like to build on the excellent comments from my colleagues and to speak about child sexual abuse material. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Miriam Cates) and for Stone for tabling the amendment. I am very interested in how we can use the excellent provisions in the Bill to keep children safe from child sexual abuse material online. I am sure the Committee is aware of the devastating impact of such material.
Sexual abuse imagery—of girls in particular—is increasingly prevalent. We know that 97% of this material in 2021 showed female children. The Internet Watch Foundation took down a record-breaking 252,000 URLs that had images of children being raped, and seven in 10 of those images were of children aged 11 to 13. Unfortunately, the National Crime Agency estimates that between 550,000 and 850,000 people in the UK are searching for such material on the internet. They are actively looking for it, and at the moment they are able to find it.
My concern is with how we use what is in the Bill already to instil a top-down culture in companies, because this is about culture change in the boardroom, so that safety is considered with every decision. I have read the proceedings from previous sittings, and I recognise that the Government and Ministers have said that we have sufficient provisions to protect children, but I think there is a little bit of a grey area with tech companies.
I want to mention Apple and the update it was planning for quite a few years. There was an update that would have automatically scanned for child sex abuse material. Apple withdrew it following a backlash from encryption and privacy experts, who claimed it would undermine the privacy and security of iCloud users and make people less safe on the internet. Having previously said that it would pause it to improve it, Apple now says that it has stopped it altogether and that it is vastly expanding its end-to-end encryption, even though law enforcement agencies around the world, including our own UK law enforcement agencies, have expressed serious concerns because it makes investigations and prosecution more challenging. All of us are not technical experts. I do not believe that we are in a position to judge how legitimate it is for Apple to have this pause. What we do know is that while there is this pause, the risks for children are still there, proliferating online.
We understand completely that countering this material involves a complicated balance and that the tech giants need to walk a fine line between keeping users safe and keeping their data safe. But the question is this: if Apple and others continue to delay or backtrack, will merely failing to comply with an information request, which is what is in the Bill now, be enough to protect children from harm? Could they delay indefinitely and still be compliant with the Bill? That is what I am keen to hear from the Minister. I would be grateful if he could set out why he thinks that individuals who have the power to prevent the harmful content that has torn apart the lives of so many young people and their families should not face criminal consequences if they fail to do so. Can he reassure us as to how he thinks that the Bill can protect so many children—it is far too many children—from this material online?
Labour supports new clause 9, as liability is an issue that we have repeatedly raised throughout the passage of the Bill—most recently, on Report. As colleagues will be aware, the new clause would introduce criminal liabilities for directors who failed to comply with their duties. This would be an appropriate first step in ensuring a direct relationship between senior management of platforms and companies, and their responsibilities to protect children from significant harm. As we have heard, this measure would drive a more effective culture of awareness and accountability in relation to online safety at the top of and within the entire regulated firm. It would go some way towards ensuring that online safety was at the heart of the governance structures internally. The Bill must go further to actively promote cultural change and put online safety at the forefront of business models; it must ensure that these people are aware that it is about keeping people safe and that that must be at the forefront, over any profit. A robust corporate and senior management liability scheme is needed, and it needs to be one that imposes personal liability on directors when they put children at risk.
The Minister knows as well as I do that the benefits of doing so would be strong. We have only to turn to the coroner’s comments in the tragic case of Molly Russell’s death—which I know we are all mindful of as we debate this Bill—to fully understand the damaging impact of viewing harmful content online. I therefore urge the Minister to accept new clause 9, which we wholeheartedly support.
The Government recognise that the intent behind the new clause is to create new criminal offences of non-compliance with selected duties. It would establish a framework for personal criminal offences punishable through fines or imprisonment. It would mean that providers committed a criminal offence if they did not comply with certain duties.
We all want this Bill to be effective. We want it to be on the statute book. It is a question of getting that fine balance right, so that we can properly hold companies to account for the safety of their users. The existing approach to enforcement and senior manager liability strikes the right balance between robust enforcement and deterrent, and ensuring that the UK remains an attractive place to do business. We are confident that the Bill as a whole will bring about the change necessary to ensure that users, especially younger users, are kept safe online.
This new clause tries to criminalise not complying with the Bill’s duties. Exactly what activity would be criminalised is not obvious from the new clause, so it could be difficult for individuals to foresee exactly what type of conduct would constitute an offence. That could lead to unintended consequences, with tech executives driving an over-zealous approach to content take-down for fear of imprisonment, and potentially removing large volumes of innocuous content and so affecting the ability for open debate to take place.
I thank you, too, Dame Angela. I echo the Minister’s sentiments, and thank all the Clerks, the Doorkeepers, the team, and all the stakeholders who have massively contributed, with very short turnarounds, to the scrutiny of this legislation. I have so appreciated all that assistance and expertise, which has helped me, as shadow Minister, to compile our comments on the Bill following the Government’s recommittal of it to Committee, which is an unusual step. Huge thanks to my colleagues who joined us today and in previous sittings, and to colleagues from across the House, and particularly from the SNP, a number of whose amendments we have supported. We look forward to scrutinising the Bill further when it comes back to the House in the new year.
I thank you, Dame Angela, as well as Sir Roger for chairing our debates. Recommittal has been a very odd and unusual process; it has been a bit like groundhog day, discussing things we have discussed previously. I very much appreciate the hard work of departmental and Ofcom staff that went into making this happen, as well as the work of the Clerks, the Doorkeepers, and the team who ensured that we have a room that is not freezing—that has been really helpful.
I thank colleagues from across the House, particularly the Labour Front-Bench spokespeople, who have been incredibly helpful in supporting our amendments. This has been a pretty good-tempered Committee and we have all got on fairly well, even though we have disagreed on a significant number of issues. I am sure we will have those arguments again on Report.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIn that case, I must have been mistaken in thinking that the hon. Member—who has probably said quite a lot of things, which is why his voice is as hoarse as it is—was criticising the former Minister for measures that were agreed in previous Committee sittings.
For me, the current proposals are a really disappointing, retrograde step. They will not protect the most vulnerable people in our communities, including offline—this harm is not just online, but stretches out across all our communities. What happens online does not take place, and stay, in an isolated space; people are influenced by it and take their cues from it. They do not just take their cues from what is said in Parliament; they see misogynists online and think that they can treat people like that. They see horrific abuses of power and extreme pornography and, as we heard from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, take their cues from that. What happens online does not stay online.
My hon. Friend makes an important point about what happens online and its influence on the outside world. We saw that most recently with Kanye West being reinstated to Twitter and allowed to spew his bile and abhorrent views about Jews. That antisemitism had a real-world impact in terms of the rise in antisemitism on the streets, particularly in the US. The direct impact of his being allowed to talk about that online was Jews being harmed in the real world. That is exactly what is happening.
I thank the shadow Minister for that intervention. She is absolutely right. We have had a discussion about terms of reference and terms of service. Not only do most people not actually fully read them or understand them, but they are subject to change. The moment Elon Musk took over Twitter, everything changed. Not only have we got Donald Trump back, but Elon Musk also gave the keys to a mainstream social media platform to Kanye West. We have seen what happened then.
That is the situation the Government will now not shut the door on. That is regrettable. For all the reasons we have heard today, it is really damaging. It is really disappointing that we are not taking the opportunity to lead in this area.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Angela. With your permission, I will take this opportunity to make some broad reflections on the Government’s approach to the new so-called triple-shield protection that we have heard so much about, before coming on to the amendment tabled in my name in the group.
Broadly, Labour is disappointed that the system-level approach to content that is harmful to adults is being stripped from the Bill and replaced with a duty that puts the onus on the user to keep themselves safe. As the Antisemitism Policy Trust among others has argued, the two should be able to work in tandem. The clause allows a user to manage what harmful material they see by requiring the largest or most risky service providers to provide tools to allow a person in effect to reduce their likelihood of encountering, or to alert them to, certain types of material. We have concerns about the overall approach of the Government, but Labour believes that important additions can be made to the list of content where user-empowerment tools must be in place, hence our amendment (a) to Government amendment 15.
In July, in a little-noticed written ministerial statement, the Government produced a prototype list of content that would be harmful to adults. The list included priority content that category 1 services need to address in their terms and conditions; online abuse and harassment—mere disagreement with another’s point of view would not reach the threshold for harmful content, and so would not be covered; circulation of real or manufactured intimate images without the subject’s consent; content promoting self-harm; content promoting eating disorders; legal suicide content; and harmful health content that is demonstrably false, such as urging people to drink bleach to cure cancer.
We have concerns about whether listing those harms in the Bill is the most effective mechanism, mostly because we feel that the list should be more flexible and able to change according to the issues of the day, but it is clear that the Government will continue to pursue this avenue despite some very worrying gaps. With that in mind, will the Minister clarify what exactly underpins that list if there have been no risk assessments? What was the basis for drawing up that specific list? Surely the Government should be implored to publish the research that determined the list, at the very least.
I recognise that the false communications offence has remained in the Bill, but the list in Government amendment 15 is not exhaustive. Without the additions outlined in our amendment (a) to amendment 15, the list will do little to tackle some of the most pressing harm of our time, some of which we have already heard about today.
I am pleased that the list from the written ministerial statement has more or less been reproduced in amendment 15, under subsection (2), but there is a key and unexplained omission that our amendment (a) to it seeks to correct: the absence of the last point, on harmful health content. Amendment (a) seeks to reinsert such important content into the Bill directly. It seems implausible that the Government failed to consider the dangerous harm that health misinformation can have online, especially given that back in July they seemed to have a grasp of its importance by including it in the original list.
We all know that health-related misinformation and disinformation can significantly undermine public health, as we have heard. We only have to cast our minds back to the height of the coronavirus pandemic to remind ourselves of how dangerous the online space was, with anti-vax scepticism being rife. Many groups were impacted, including pregnant women, who received mixed messages about the safety of covid vaccination, causing widespread confusion, fear and inaction. By tabling amendment (a) to amendment 15, we wanted to understand why the Government have dropped that from the list and on what exact grounds.
In addition to harmful health content, our amendment (a) to amendment 15 would also add to the list content that incites hateful extremism and provides false information about climate change, as we have heard. In early written evidence from Carnegie, it outlined how serious the threat of climate change disinformation is to the UK. Malicious actors spreading false information on social media could undermine collective action to combat the threats. At present, the Online Safety Bill is not designed to tackle those threats head on.
We all recognise that social media is an important source of news and information for many people, and evidence is emerging of its role in climate change disinformation. The Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report in 2021 called “The Toxic Ten: How ten fringe publishers fuel 69% of digital climate change denial”, which explores the issue further. Further analysis of activity on Facebook around COP26 undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue demonstrates the scale of the challenge in dealing with climate change misinformation and disinformation. The research compared the levels of engagement generated by reliable, scientific organisations and climate-sceptic actors, and found that posts from the latter frequently received more traction and reach than the former, which is shocking. For example, in the fortnight in which COP26 took place, sceptic content garnered 12 times the level of engagement that authoritative sources did on the platform, and 60% of the sceptic posts analysed could be classified as actively and explicitly attacking efforts to curb climate change, which just goes to show the importance of ensuring that climate change disinformation is also included in the list in Government amendment 15.
Our two amendments—amendment (a) to amendment 15, and amendment (a) to amendment 16 —seek to ensure that the long-standing omission from the Bill of hateful extremism is put right here as a priority. There is increasing concern about extremism leading to violence and death that does not meet the definition for terrorism. The internet and user-to-user services play a central role in the radicalisation process, yet the Online Safety Bill does not cover extremism.
Colleagues may be aware that Sara Khan, the former lead commissioner for countering extremism, provided a definition of extremism for the Government in February 2021, but there has been no response. The issue has been raised repeatedly by Members across the House, including by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), following the tragic murders carried out by a radicalised incel in his constituency.
Amendment (a) to amendment 16 seeks to bring a formal definition of hateful extremism into the Bill and supports amendment (a) to amendment 15. The definition, as proposed by Sara Khan, who was appointed as Britain’s first countering extremism commissioner in 2018, is an important first step in addressing the gaps that social media platforms and providers have left open for harm and radicalisation.
Social media platforms have often been ineffective in removing other hateful extremist content. In November 2020, The Guardian reported that research from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate had uncovered how extremist merchandise had been sold on Facebook and Instagram to help fund neo-Nazi groups. That is just one of a huge number of instances, and it goes some way to suggest that a repeatedly inconsistent and ineffective approach to regulating extremist content is the one favoured by some social media platforms.
I hope that the Minister will seriously consider the amendments and will see the merits in expanding the list in Government amendment 15 to include these additional important harms.
Thank you for chairing the meeting this afternoon, Dame Angela. I agree wholeheartedly with the amendments tabled by the Labour Front-Bench team. It is important that we talk about climate change denial and what we can do to ensure people are not exposed to that harmful conspiracy theory through content. It is also important that we do what we can to ensure that pregnant women, for example, are not told not to take the covid vaccine or that parents are not told not to vaccinate their children against measles, mumps and rubella. We need to do what we can to ensure measures are in place.
I appreciate the list in Government amendment 15, but I have real issues with this idea of a toggle system—of being able to switch off this stuff. Why do the Government think people should have to switch off the promotion of suicide content or content that promotes eating disorders? Why is it acceptable that people should have to make an active choice to switch that content off in order to not see it? People have to make an active choice to tick a box that says, “No, I don’t want to see content that is abusing me because of my religion,” or “No, I don’t want to see content that is abusing me because of my membership of the LGBT community.” We do not want people to have to look through the abuse they are receiving in order to press the right buttons to switch it off. As the hon. Member for Don Valley said, people should be allowed to say what they want online, but the reality is that the extremist content that we have seen published online is radicalising people and bringing them to the point that they are taking physical action against people in the real, offline world as well as taking action online.
I follow, but I do not agree. The categories of content in proposed new subsections (8C) and (8D), introduced by amendment 15, underpin a lot of this. I answered the question in an earlier debate when talking about the commercial impetus. I cannot imagine many mainstream advertisers wanting to advertise with a company that removed from its terms of service the exclusion of racial abuse, misogyny and general abuse. We have seen that commercial impetus really kicking in with certain platforms. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments to the amendments, and I hope that the Opposition will not press them to a vote.
I am grateful for the opportunity to push the Minister further. I asked him whether he could outline where the list in amendment 15 came from. Will he publish the research that led him to compile that specific list of priority harms?
The definitions that we have taken are ones that strike the right balance and have a comparatively high threshold, so that they do not capture challenging and robust discussions on controversial topics.
Amendment 8 agreed to.
Amendments made: 9, in clause 14, page 14, line 5, after “to” insert “effectively”.
This amendment strengthens the duty in this clause by requiring that the systems or processes used to deal with the kinds of content described in subsections (8B) to (8D) (see Amendment 15) should be designed to effectively increase users’ control over such content.
Amendment 10, in clause 14, page 14, line 6, leave out from “encountering” to “the” in line 7 and insert
“content to which subsection (2) applies present on”.
This amendment inserts a reference to the kinds of content now relevant for this clause, instead of referring to priority content that is harmful to adults.
Amendment 11, in clause 14, page 14, line 9, leave out from “to” to end of line 10 and insert
“content present on the service that is a particular kind of content to which subsection (2) applies”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment inserts a reference to the kinds of content now relevant for this clause, instead of referring to priority content that is harmful to adults.
I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 14, page 14, line 12, leave out “made available to” and insert “in operation for”.
This amendment, and Amendment 103, relate to the tools proposed in Clause 14 which will be available for individuals to use on platforms to protect themselves from harm. This amendment specifically forces platforms to have these safety tools “on” by default.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 103, in clause 14, page 14, line 15, leave out “take advantage of” and insert “disapply”.
This amendment relates to Amendment 102.
The amendments relate to the tools proposed in clause 14, which as we know will be available for individuals to use on platforms to protect themselves from harm. As the Minister knows, Labour fundamentally disagrees with that approach, which will place the onus on the user, rather than the platform, to protect themselves from harmful content. It is widely recognised that the purpose of this week’s Committee proceedings is to allow the Government to remove the so-called “legal but harmful” clauses and replace them with the user empowerment tool option. Let us be clear that that goes against the very essence of the Bill, which was created to address the particular way in which social media allows content to be shared, spread and broadcast around the world at speed.
This approach could very well see a two-tier internet system develop, which leaves those of us who choose to utilise the user empowerment tools ignorant of harmful content perpetuated elsewhere for others to see. The tools proposed in clause 14, however, reflect something that we all know to be true: that there is some very harmful content out there for us all to see online. We can all agree that individuals should therefore have access to the appropriate tools to protect themselves. It is also right that providers will be required to ensure that adults have greater choice and control over the content that they see and engage with, but let us be clear that instead of focusing on defining exactly what content is or is not harmful, the Bill should focus on the processes by which harmful content is amplified on social media.
However, we are where we are, and Labour believes that it is better to have the Bill over the line, with a regulator in place with some powers, than simply to do nothing at all. With that in mind, we have tabled the amendment specifically to force platforms to have safety tools on by default. We believe that the user empowerment tools should be on by default and that they must be appropriately visible and easy to use. We must recognise that for people at a point of crisis—if a person is suffering with depressive or suicidal thoughts, or with significant personal isolation, for example—the tools may not be at the forefront of their minds if their mental state is severely impacted.
On a similar point, we must not patronise the public. Labour sees no rational argument why the Government would not support the amendment. We should all assume that if a rational adult is able to easily find and use these user empowerment tools, then they will be easily able to turn them off if they choose to do so.
The Minister knows that I am not in the habit of guessing but, judging from our private conversations, his rebuttal to my points may be because he believes it is not the Government’s role to impose rules directly on platforms, particularly when they impact their functionality. However, for Labour, the existence of harm and the importance of protecting people online tips the balance in favour of turning these user empowerment tools on by default. We see no negative reason why that should not be the case, and we now have a simple amendment that could have a significantly positive impact.
I hope the Minister and colleagues will reflect strongly on these amendments, as we believe they are a reasonable and simple ask of platforms to do the right thing and have the user empowerment tools on by default.
Once again, this is a very smart amendment that I wish I had thought of myself and I am happy to support. The case made by those campaigning for freedom of speech at any cost is about people being able to say what they want to say, no matter how harmful that may be. It is not about requiring me, or anyone else, to read those things—the harmful bile, the holocaust denial or the promotion of suicide that is spouted. It is not freedom of speech to require someone else to see and read such content so I cannot see any potential argument that the Government could come up with against these amendments.
The amendments have nothing to do with freedom of speech or with limiting people’s ability to say whatever they want to say or to promote whatever untruths they want to promote. However, they are about making sure that people are protected and that they are starting from a position of having to opt in if they want to see harmful content. If I want to see content about holocaust denial—I do not want to see that, but if I did—I should have to clearly tick a button that says, “Yes, I am pretty extreme in my views and I want to see things that are abusing people. I want to see that sort of content.” I should have to opt in to be able to see that.
There are a significant number of newspapers out there. I will not even pick up a lot of them because there is so much stuff in them with which I disagree, but I can choose not to pick them up. I do not have that newspaper served to me against my will because I have the opportunity to choose to opt out from buying it. I do not have to go into the supermarket and say, “No, please do not give me that newspaper!” I just do not pick it up. If we put the Government’s proposal on its head and do what has been suggested in the Opposition amendments, everyone would be in a much better position.
In the previous debate, I talked about amendment 15, which brought in a lot of protections against content that encourages and promotes, or provides instruction for, self-harm, suicide or eating disorders, and against content that is abusive or incites hate on the base of race, religion, disability, sex, gender reassignment or sexual orientation. We have also placed a duty on the largest platforms to offer adults the option to filter out unverified users if they so wish. That is a targeted approach that reflects areas where vulnerable users in particular could benefit from having greater choice and control. I come back to the fact that that is the third shield and an extra safety net. A lot of the extremes we have heard about, which have been used as debating points, as important as they are, should very much be wrapped up by the first two shields.
We have a targeted approach, but it is based on choice. It is right that adult users have a choice about what they see online and who they interact with. It is right that this choice lies in the hands of those adults. The Government mandating that these tools be on by default goes against the central aim of users being empowered to choose for themselves whether they want to reduce their engagement with some kinds of legal content.
We have been clear right from the beginning that it is not the Government’s role to say what legal content adults should or should not view online or to incentivise the removal of legal content. That is why we removed the adult legal but harmful duties in the first place. I believe we are striking the right balance between empowering adult users online and protecting freedom of expression. For that reason, I am not able to accept the amendments from the hon. Member for Pontypridd.
It is disappointing that the Government are refusing to back these amendments to place the toggle as “on” by default. It is something that we see as a safety net, as the Minister described. Why would someone have to choose to have the safety net there? If someone does not want it, they can easily take it away. The choice should be that way around, because it is there to protect all of us.
I am sure that, like me, the shadow Minister will be baffled that the Government are against our proposals to have to opt out. Surely this is something that is of key concern to the Government, given that the former MP for Tiverton and Honiton might still be an MP if users had to opt in to watching pornography, rather than being accidentally shown it when innocently searching for tractors?
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. It goes to show the nature of this as a protection for all of us, even MPs, from accessing content that could be harmful to our health or, indeed, profession. Given the nature of the amendment, we feel that this is a safety net that should be available to all. It should be on by default.
I should say that in the spirit of choice, companies can also choose to default it to be switched off in the first place as well.
The Minister makes the point that companies can choose to have it off by default, but we would not need this Bill in the first place if companies did the right thing. Let us be clear: we would not have had to be here debating this for the past five years —for me it has been 12 months—if companies were going to do the right thing and protect people from harmful content online. On that basis, I will push the amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
This is an extremely large grouping so, for the sake of the Committee, I will do my best to keep my comments focused and brief where possible. I begin by addressing Government new clauses 3 and 4 and the consequential amendments.
Government new clause 3 introduces new duties that aim to ensure that the largest or most risky online service providers design systems and processes that ensure they cannot take down or restrict content in a way prevents a person from seeing it without further action by the user, or ban users, except in accordance with their own terms of service, or if the content breaks the law or contravenes the Online Safety Bill regime. This duty is referred to as the duty not to act against users except in accordance with terms of service. In reality, that will mean that the focus remains far too much on the banning, taking down and restriction of content, rather than our considering the systems and processes behind the platforms that perpetuate harm.
Labour has long held the view that the Government have gone down an unhelpful cul-de-sac on free speech. Instead of focusing on defining exactly which content is or is not harmful, the Bill should be focused on the processes by which harmful content is amplified on social media. We must recognise that a person posting a racist slur online that nobody notices, shares or reads is significantly less harmful than a post that can quickly go viral, and can within hours gain millions of views or shares. We have talked a lot in this place about Kanye West and the comments he has made on Twitter in the past few weeks. It is safe to say that a comment by Joe Bloggs in Hackney that glorifies Hitler does not have the same reach or produce the same harm as Kanye West saying exactly the same thing to his 30 million Twitter followers.
Our approach has the benefit of addressing the things that social media companies can control—for example, how content spreads—rather than the things they cannot control, such as what people say online. It reduces the risk to freedom of speech because it tackles how content is shared, rather than relying entirely on taking down harmful content. Government new clause 4 aims to improve the effectiveness of platforms’ terms of service in conjunction with the Government’s new triple shield, which the Committee has heard a lot about, but the reality is they are ultimately seeking to place too much of the burden of protection on extremely flexible and changeable terms of service.
If a provider’s terms of service say that certain types of content are to be taken down or restricted, then providers must run systems and processes to ensure that that can happen. Moreover, people must be able to report breaches easily, through a complaints service that delivers appropriate action, including when the service receives complaints about the provider. This “effectiveness” duty is important but somewhat misguided.
The Government, having dropped some of the “harmful but legal” provisions, seem to expect that if large and risky services—the category 1 platforms—claim to be tackling such material, they must deliver on that promise to the customer and user. This reflects a widespread view that companies may pick and choose how to apply their terms of service, or implement them loosely and interchangeably, as we have heard. Those failings will lead to harm when people encounter things that they would not have thought would be there when they signed up. All the while, service providers that do not fall within category 1 need not enforce their terms of service, or may do so erratically or discriminatorily. That includes search engines, no matter how big.
This large bundle of amendments seems to do little to actually keep people safe online. I have already made my concerns about the Government’s so-called triple shield approach to internet safety clear, so I will not repeat myself. We fundamentally believe that the Government’s approach, which places too much of the onus on the user rather than the platform, is wrong. We therefore cannot support the approach that is taken in the amendments. That being said, the Minister can take some solace from knowing that we see the merits of Government new clause 5, which
“requires OFCOM to give guidance to providers about complying with the duties imposed by NC3 and NC4”.
If this is the avenue that the Government insist on going down, it is absolutely vital that providers are advised by Ofcom on the processes they will be required to take to comply with these new duties.
Amendment 19 agreed to.
Amendment made: 20, in clause 18, page 19, line 33, at end insert
“, and
(b) section (Further duties about terms of service)(5)(a) (reporting of content that terms of service allow to be taken down or restricted).”—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment inserts a signpost to the new provision about content reporting inserted by NC4.
Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Duties about complaints procedures
Amendment made: 21, in clause 19, page 20, line 15, leave out “, (3) or (4)” and insert “or (3)”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment removes a reference to clause 20(4), as that provision is moved to NC4.
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 19, page 20, line 27, leave out from “down” to “and” in line 28 and insert
“or access to it being restricted, or given a lower priority or otherwise becoming less likely to be encountered by other users,”.
NC2 states what is meant by restricting users’ access to content, and this amendment makes a change in line with that, to avoid any implication that downranking is a form of restriction on access to content.
These amendments clarify the meaning of “restricting access to content” and “access to content” for the purposes of the Bill. Restricting access to content is an expression that is used in various provisions across the Bill, such as in new clause 2, under which providers of category 1 services will have a duty to ensure that they remove or restrict access to users’ content only where that is in accordance with their terms of service or another legal obligation. There are other such references in clauses 15, 16 and 17.
The amendments make it clear that the expression
“restricting users’ access to content”
covers cases where a provider prevents a user from accessing content without that user taking a prior step, or where content is temporarily hidden from a user. They also make it clear that this expression does not cover any restrictions that the provider puts in place to enable users to apply user empowerment tools to limit the content that they encounter, or cases where access to content is controlled by another user, rather than by the provider.
The amendments are largely technical, but they do cover things such as down-ranking. Amendment 22 is necessary because the previous wording of this provision wrongly suggested that down-ranking was covered by the expression “restricting access to content”. Down-ranking is the practice of giving content a lower priority on a user’s feed. The Government intend that users should be able to complain if they feel that their content has been inappropriately down-ranked as a result of the use of proactive technology. This amendment ensures consistency.
I hope that the amendments provide clarity as to the meaning of restricting access to content for those affected by the Bill, and assist providers with complying with their duties.
Again, I will keep my comments on clause 19 brief, as we broadly support the intentions behind the clause and the associated measures in the grouping. My hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) spoke at length about this important clause, which relates to the all-important complaints procedures available around social media platforms and companies, in the previous Bill Committee.
During the previous Committee, Labour tabled amendments that would have empowered more individuals to make a complaint about search content in the event of non-compliance. In addition, we wanted an external complaints option for individuals seeking redress. Sadly, all those amendments were voted down by the last Committee, but I must once again press the Minister on those points, particularly in the context of the new amendments that have been tabled.
Without redress for individual complaints, once internal mechanisms have been exhausted, victims of online abuse could be left with no further options. Consumer protections could be compromised and freedom of expression, with which the Government seem to be borderline obsessed, could be infringed for people who feel that their content has been unfairly removed.
Government new clause 2 deals with the meaning of references to
“restricting users’ access to content”,
in particular by excluding restrictions resulting from the use of user empowerment tools as described in clause 14. We see amendments 22 and 59 as important components of new clause 2, and are therefore more than happy to support them. However, I reiterate to the Minister and place on the record once again the importance of introducing an online safety ombudsman, which we feel is crucial to new clause 2. The Joint Committee recommended the introduction of such an ombudsman, who would consider complaints when internal routes of redress had not resulted in resolution, had failed to address risk and had led to significant and demonstrable harm. As new clause 2 relates to restricting users’ access to content, we must also ensure that there is an appropriate channel for complaints if there is an issue that users wish to take up around restrictions in accessing content.
By now, the Minister will be well versed in my thoughts on the Government’s approach, and on the reliance on the user empowerment tool approach more broadly. It is fundamentally an error to pursue a regime that is so content-focused. Despite those points, we see the merits in Government amendments 22 and 59, and in new clause 2, so have not sought to table any further amendments at this stage.
I am slightly confused, and would appreciate a little clarification from the Minister. I understand what new clause 2 means; if the hon. Member for Pontypridd says that she does not want to see content of a certain nature, and I put something of that nature online, I am not being unfairly discriminated against in any way because she has chosen to opt out of receiving that content. I am slightly confused about the downgrading bit.
I know that an awful lot of platforms use downgrading when there is content that they find problematic, or something that they feel is an issue. Rather than taking that content off the platform completely, they may just no longer put it in users’ feeds, for example; they may move it down the priority list, and that may be part of what they already do to keep people safe. I am not trying to criticise what the Government are doing, but I genuinely do not understand whether that downgrading would still be allowed, whether it would be an issue, and whether people could complain about their content being downgraded because the platform was a bit concerned about it, and needed to check it out and work out what was going on, or if it was taken off users’ feeds.
Some companies, if they think that videos have been uploaded by people who are too young to use the platform, or by a registered child user of the platform, will not serve that content to everybody’s feeds. I will not be able to see something in my TikTok feed that was published by a user who is 13, for example, because there are restrictions on how TikTok deals with and serves that content, in order to provide increased protection and the safety that they want on their services.
Will it still be acceptable for companies to have their own internal downgrading system, in order to keep people safe, when content does not necessarily meet an illegality bar or child safety duty bar? The Minister has not used the phrase “market forces”; I think he said “commercial imperative”, and he has talked a lot about that. Some companies and organisations use downgrading to improve the systems on their site and to improve the user experience on the platform. I would very much appreciate it if the Minister explained whether that will still be the case. If not, will we all have a worse online experience as a result?
I will speak broadly to clause 20, as it is an extremely important clause, before making remarks about the group of Government amendments we have just voted on.
Clause 20 is designed to provide a set of balancing provisions that will require companies to have regard to freedom of expression and privacy when they implement their safety duties. However, as Labour has repeatedly argued, it is important that companies cannot use privacy and free expression as a basis to argue that they can comply with regulations in less substantive ways. That is a genuine fear here.
We all want to see a Bill in place that protects free speech, but that cannot come at the expense of safety online. The situation with regards to content that is harmful to adults has become even murkier with the Government’s attempts to water down the Bill and remove adult risk assessments entirely.
The Minister must acknowledge that there is a balance to be achieved. We all recognise that. The truth is—and this is something that his predecessor, or should I say his predecessor’s predecessor, touched on when we considered this clause in the previous Bill Committee—that at the moment platforms are extremely inconsistent in their approach to getting the balance right. Although Labour is broadly supportive of this clause and the group of amendments, we feel that now is an appropriate time to put on record our concerns over the important balance between safety, transparency and freedom of expression.
Labour has genuine concerns over the future of platforms’ commitment to retaining that balance, particularly if the behaviours following the recent takeover of Twitter by Elon Musk are anything to go by. Since Elon Musk took over ownership of the platform, he has repeatedly used Twitter polls, posted from his personal account, as metrics to determine public opinion on platform policy. The general amnesty policy and the reinstatement of Donald Trump both emerged from such polls.
According to former employees, those polls are not only inaccurate representations of the platform’s user base, but are actually
“designed to be spammed and gamed”.
The polls are magnets for bots and other inauthentic accounts. This approach and the reliance on polls have allowed Elon Musk to enact and dictate his platform’s policy on moderation and freedom of expression. Even if he is genuinely trusting the results of these polls and not gamifying them, they do not accurately represent the user base nor the best practices for confronting disinformation and harm online.
Elon Musk uses the results to claim that “the people have spoken”, but they have not. Research from leading anti-hate organisation the Anti-Defamation League shows that far-right extremists and neo-Nazis encouraged supporters to actively re-join Twitter to vote in these polls. The impacts of platforming neo-Nazis on Twitter do not need to be stated. Such users are explicitly trying to promote violent and hateful agendas, and they were banned initially for that exact reason. The bottom line is that those people were banned in line with Twitter’s terms of service at the time, and they should not be re-platformed just because of the findings of one Twitter poll.
These issues are at the very heart of Labour’s concerns in relation to the Bill—that the duties around freedom of expression and privacy will be different for those at the top of the platforms. We support the clause and the group of amendments, but I hope the Minister will be able to address those concerns in his remarks.
I endorse the general approach set out by the hon. Member for Pontypridd. We do not want to define freedom of speech based on a personal poll carried out on one platform. That is exactly why we are enshrining it in this ground-breaking Bill.
We want to get the balance right. I have talked about the protections for children. We also want to protect adults and give them the power to understand the platforms they are on and the risks involved, while having regard for freedom of expression and privacy. That is a wider approach than one man’s Twitter feed. These clauses are important to ensure that the service providers interpret and implement their safety duties in a proportionate way that limits negative impact on users’ rights to freedom of expression. However, they also have to have regard to the wider definition of freedom of expression, while protecting users, which the rest of the Bill covers in a proportionate way.
This goes to the heart of more than just one person’s Twitter feed, although we could say that that person is an incredibly powerful and influential figure on the platform. In the past 24 hours, Twitter has disbanded its trust and safety council. Members of that council included expert groups working to tackle harassment and child sexual exploitation, and to promote human rights. Does the Minister not feel that the council being disbanded goes to the heart of what we have been debating? It shows how a platform can remove its terms of service or change them at whim in order to prevent harm from being perpetrated on that platform.
I will come back to some of the earlier points. At the end of the day, when platforms change their terms and conditions, which they are free to do, they will be judged by their users and indeed the advertisers from whom they make their money. There are market forces—I will use that phrase as well as “commercial imperative”, to get that one in there—that will drive behaviour. It may be the usability of Facebook, or Twitter’s terms and conditions and the approach of its new owner, that will drive those platforms to alternative users. I am old enough to remember Myspace, CompuServe and AOL, which tried to box people into their walled gardens. What happened to them? Only yesterday, someone from Google was saying that the new artificial intelligence chatbot—ChatGPT—may well disrupt Google. These companies, as big as they are, do not have a right to exist. They have to keep innovating. If they get it wrong, then they get it wrong.
Absolutely. We have captured that in other parts of the Bill, but I wanted to make that specific bit clear because I am not sure whether I understood or answered my hon. Friend’s question correctly at the time.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Record-keeping and review duties
Amendments made: 32, in clause 21, page 23, line 5, leave out “, 10 or 12” and insert “or 10”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6 (removal of clause 12).
Amendment 33, in clause 21, page 23, line 45, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 7 (removal of clause 13).
Amendment 34, in clause 21, page 24, line 6, leave out “section” and insert “sections”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 35.
Amendment 35, in clause 21, page 24, line 6, at end insert—
“, (Duty not to act against users except in accordance with terms of service) and (Further duties about terms of service) (duties about terms of service).”—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment ensures that providers have a duty to review compliance with the duties set out in NC3 and NC4 regularly, and after making any significant change to the design or operation of the service.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Given that there are few changes to this clause from when the Bill was amended in the previous Public Bill Committee, I will be brief. We in the Opposition are clear that record-keeping and review duties on in-scope services make up an important function of the regulatory regime and sit at the very heart of the Online Safety Bill. We must push platforms to transparently report all harms identified and the action taken in response, in line with regulation.
I think we all agree that written records are hugely important. They are important as evidence in cases where Ofcom is considering enforcement action, and a company’s compliance review should be done regularly, especially before they make changes to their service.
The Bill does not intend to place excessive burdens on small and low-risk businesses. As such, clause 21 provides Ofcom with the power to exempt certain types of service from the record-keeping and review duties. However, the details of any exemptions must be published.
To half-answer the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, the measures will be brought to the Lords, but I will endeavour to keep her up to date as best we can so that we can continue the conversation. We have served together on several Bill Committees, including on technical Bills that required us to spend several days in Committee—although they did not come back for re-committal—so I will endeavour to keep her and, indeed, the hon. Member for Pontypridd, up to date with developments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
duties about freedom of expression and privacy
Amendments made: 36, in clause 30, page 31, line 31, after “have” insert “particular”.
This amendment has the result that providers of regulated search services must have particular regard to freedom of expression when deciding on and implementing safety measures and policies.
Amendment 37, in clause 30, page 31, line 34, after “have” insert “particular”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment has the result that providers of regulated search services must have particular regard to users’ privacy when deciding on and implementing safety measures and policies.
Clause 30, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Relationship between duties and codes of practice
Amendments made: 38, in clause 46, page 44, line 27, after “have” insert “particular”.
This amendment has the result that providers of services who take measures other than those recommended in codes of practice in order to comply with safety duties must have particular regard to freedom of expression and users’ privacy.
Amendment 39, in clause 46, page 45, line 12, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 7 (removal of clause 13).
Amendment 40, in clause 46, page 45, line 31, at end insert “, or
(ii) a duty set out in section 14 (user empowerment);”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment has the effect that measures recommended in codes of practice to comply with the duty in clause 14 are relevant to the question of whether a provider is complying with the duties in clause 20(2) and (3) (having regard to freedom of expression and users’ privacy).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I do not wish to repeat myself and test the Committee’s patience, so I will keep my comments brief. As it stands, service providers would be treated as complying with their duties if they had followed the recommended measures set out in the relevant codes of practice, as set out in the Bill. However, providers could take alternative measures to comply, but as I said in previous Committee sittings, Labour remains concerned that the definition of “alternative measures” is far too broad. I would be grateful if the Minister elaborated on his assessment of the instances in which a service provider may seek to comply via alternative measures.
The codes of practice should be, for want of a better phrase, best practice. Labour is concerned that, to avoid the duties, providers may choose to take the “alternative measures” route as an easy way out. We agree that it is important to ensure that providers have a duty with regard to protecting users’ freedom of expression and personal privacy. As we have repeatedly said, the entire Online Safety Bill regime relies on that careful balance being at the forefront. We want to see safety at the forefront, but recognise the importance of freedom of expression and personal privacy, and it is right that those duties are central to the clause. For those reasons, Labour has not sought to amend this part of the Bill, but I want to press the Minister on exactly how he sees this route being used.
It is important that service providers have flexibility, so that the Bill does not disincentivise innovation or force service providers to use measures that might not work for all business models or technological contexts. The tech sector is diverse and dynamic, and it is appropriate that companies can take innovative approaches to fulfilling their duties. In most circumstances, we expect companies to take the measures outlined in Ofcom’s code of practice as the easiest route to compliance. However, where a service provider takes alternative measures, Ofcom must consider whether those measures safeguard users’ privacy and freedom of expression appropriately. Ofcom must also consider whether they extend across all relevant areas of a service mentioned in the illegal content and children’s online safety duties, such as content moderation, staff policies and practices, design of functionalities, algorithms and other features. Ultimately, it will be for Ofcom to determine a company’s compliance with the duties, which are there to ensure users’ safety.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55 disagreed to.
Clause 56
Regulations under sections 54 and 55
Amendments made: 42, in clause 56, page 54, line 40, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41 (removal of clause 55).
Amendment 43, in clause 56, page 54, line 46, leave out “or 55”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41 (removal of clause 55).
Amendment 44, in clause 56, page 55, line 8, leave out “or 55”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41 (removal of clause 55).
Amendment 45, in clause 56, page 55, line 9, leave out
“or adults are to children or adults”
and insert “are to children”.—(Paul Scully.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41 (removal of clause 55).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
As we know, the clause makes provision in relation to the making of regulations designating primary and priority content that is harmful to children, and priority content that is harmful to adults. The Secretary of State may specify a description of content in regulations only if they consider that there is a material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of children or adults in the United Kingdom presented by user-generated or search content of that description, and must consult Ofcom before making such regulations.
In the last Bill Committee, Labour raised concerns that there were no duties that required the Secretary of State to consult others, including expert stakeholders, ahead of making these regulations. That decision cannot be for one person alone. When it comes to managing harmful content, unlike illegal content, we can all agree that it is about implementing systems that prevent people from encountering it, rather than removing it entirely.
The fact that we are here again to discuss what one Secretary of State wanted to put into law, and which another is now seeking to remove before the law has even been introduced, suggests that my hon. Friend’s point about protection and making sure that there are adequate measures within which the Secretary of State must operate is absolutely valid.
I completely agree: we are now on our third Secretary of State, our third Minister and our third Prime Minister since we began considering this iteration of the Bill. It is vital that this does not come down to one person’s ideological beliefs. We have spoken at length about this issue; the hon. Member for Don Valley has spoken about his concerns that Parliament should be sovereign, and should make these decisions. It should not be for one individual or one stakeholder to make these determinations.
We also have issues with the Government’s chosen toggle approach—we see that as problematic. We have debated it at length, but our concerns regarding clause 56 are about the lack of consultation that the Secretary of State of the day, whoever that may be and whatever political party they belong to, will be forced to make before making widespread changes to a regime. I am afraid that those concerns still exist, and are not just held by us, but by stakeholders and by Members of all political persuasions across the House. However, since our proposed amendment was voted down in the previous Bill Committee, nothing has changed. I will spare colleagues from once again hearing my pleas about the importance of consultation when it comes to determining all things related to online safety, but while Labour Members do not formally oppose the clause, we hope that the Minister will address our widespread concerns about the powers of the Secretary of State in his remarks.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s remarks. We have tried to ensure that the Bill is proportionate, inasmuch as the Secretary of State can designate content if there is material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of children in the United Kingdom. The Bill also requires the Secretary of State to consult Ofcom before making regulations on the priority categories of harm.
The Minister has just outlined exactly what our concerns are. He is unable to give an exact number, figure or issue, but that is what the Secretary of State will have to do, without having to consult any stakeholders regarding that issue. There are many eyes on us around the world, with other legislatures looking at us and following suit, so we want the Bill to be world-leading. Many Governments across the world may deem that homosexuality, for example, is of harm to children. Because this piece of legislation creates precedent, a Secretary of State in such a Government could determine that any platform in that country should take down all that content. Does the Minister not see our concerns in that scenario?
I was about to come on to the fact that the Secretary of State would be required to consult Ofcom before making regulations on the priority categories of harm. Indeed Ofcom, just like the Secretary of State, speaks to and engages with a number of stakeholders on this issue to gain a deeper understanding. Regulations designating priority harms would be made under the draft affirmative resolution procedure, but there is also provision for the Secretary of State to use the made affirmative resolution procedure in urgent scenarios, and this would be an urgent scenario. It is about getting the balance right.
As we know, this clause requires providers of relevant services to publish annual transparency reports and sets out Ofcom’s powers in relation to those reports. The information set out in transparency reports is intended to help users to understand the steps that providers are taking to help keep them safe and to provide Ofcom with the information required to hold them to account.
These duties on regulated services are very welcome indeed. Labour has long held the view that mandatory transparency reporting and reporting mechanisms are vital to hold platforms to account, and to understand the true nature of how online harm is driven and perpetuated on the internet.
I will reiterate the points that were made in previous Committee sittings about our concerns about the regularity of these transparency reports. I note that, sadly, those reports remain unchanged and therefore they will only have to be submitted to Ofcom annually. It is important that the Minister truly considers the rapid rate at which the online world can change and develop, so I urge him to reconsider this point and to make these reports a biannual occurrence. Labour firmly believes that increasing the frequency of the transparency reports will ensure that platforms and services remain on the pulse, and are forced to be aware of and act on emergent risks. In turn, that would compel Ofcom to do the same in its role as an industry regulator.
I must also put on the record some of our concerns about subsections (12) and (13), which state that the Secretary of State of the day could amend by regulation the frequency of the transparency reporting, having consulted Ofcom first. I hope that the Minister can reassure us that this approach will not result in our ending up in a position where, perhaps because of Ofcom’s incredible workload, transparency reporting becomes even less frequent than an annual occurrence. We need to see more transparency, not less, so I really hope that he can reassure me on this particular point.
Does my hon. Friend agree that transparency should be at the heart of this Bill and that the Government have missed an opportunity to accelerate the inclusion of a provision in the Bill, namely the requirement to give researchers and academics access to platform data? Data access must be prioritised in the Bill and without such prioritisation the UK will fall behind the rest of Europe in safety, research and innovation. The accessibility and transparency of that data from a research perspective are really important.
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. We both made the point at length in previous sittings of the Committee about the need to ensure transparency, access to the data, and access to reporting for academics, civil society and researchers.
That also goes to the point that it is not for this Committee or this Minister—it is not in his gift—to determine something that we have all discussed in this place at length, which is the potential requirement for a standalone Committee specifically to consider online harm. Such a Committee would look at whether this legislation is actively doing what we need it to do, whether it needs to be reviewed, whether it could look at the annual reports from Ofcom to determine the length and breadth of harm on the internet, and whether or not this legislation is actually having an impact. That all goes to the heart of transparency, openness and the review that we have been talking about.
I want to go further and raise concerns about how public the reports will be, as we have touched on. The Government claim that their so-called triple shield approach will give users of platforms and services more power and knowledge to understand the harms that they may discover online. That is in direct contradiction to the Bill’s current approach, which does not provide any clarity about exactly how the transparency reports will be made available to the public. In short, we feel that the Government are missing a significant opportunity. We have heard many warnings about what can happen when platforms are able to hide behind a veil of secrecy. I need only point to the revelations of whistleblowers, including Frances Haugen, to highlight the importance of that point.
As the Bill stands, once Ofcom has issued a notice, companies will have to produce a transparency report that
“must…be published in the manner and by the date specified in the notice”.
I want to press the Minister on that and ask him to clarify the wording. We are keen for the reports to be published publicly and in an accessible way, so that users, civil society, researchers and anyone else who wants to see them can make sense of them. The information contained in the transparency reports is critical to analysing trends and harms, so I hope that the Minister will clarify those points in his response.
Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government are to achieve their objective—which we all share—for the Bill to be world-leading legislation, we cannot rely on whistleblowers to tell us what is really going on in the online space? That is why transparency is vital. This is the perfect opportunity to provide that transparency, so that we can do some proper research into what is going on out there. We cannot rely on whistleblowers to give us such information.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We want the Bill to work. We have always wanted the Bill to work. We want it to achieve its aim of keeping children, adults and everyone who uses the internet safe from the harms that are perpetuated there. If there is no transparency, how will we know that the platforms are breaking the rules covertly, and whether they are hiding content and getting round the rules? That is what they do; we know it, because we have heard it from whistleblowers, but we cannot rely on whistleblowers alone to highlight exactly what happens behind the closed doors of the platforms.
We need the transparency and the reports to be made public, so that we can see whether the legislation is working. If that does not happen, although we have waited five years, we will need another piece of legislation to fix it. We know that the Bill is not perfect, and the Minister knows that—he has said so himself—but, ultimately, we need to know that it works. If it does not, we have a responsibility as legislators to put something in place that does. Transparency is the only way in which we will figure that out.
I want to add to the brilliant points made by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, in particular on the continually changing nature of market forces, which the Minister himself referenced. We want innovation. We want the tech companies to innovate—preferably ones in the UK—but we do not want to be playing catch-up as we are now, making legislation retrospectively to right wrongs that have taken place because our legislative process has been too slow to deal with the technological changes and the changes in social media, in apps, and with how we access data and communicate with one another online. The bare minimum is a biannual report.
Within six months, if a new piece of technology comes up, it does not simply stay with one app or platform; that technology will be leapfrogged by others. Such technological advances can take place at a very rapid pace. The transparency aspect is important, because people should have a right to know what they are using and whether it is safe. We as policy makers should have a right to know clearly whether the legislation that we have introduced, or the legislation that we want to amend or update, is effective.
If we look at any other approach that we take to protect the health and safety of the people in our country—the people we all represent in our constituencies —we always say that prevention is better than cure. At the moment, without transparency and without researchers being able to update the information we need to see, we will constantly be playing catch-up with digital tech.
The amendments to schedule 8 confirm that references to relevant content, consumer content and regulated user-generated content have the same meaning as established by other provisions of the Bill. Again, that ensures consistency, which will, in turn, support Ofcom in requiring providers of category 1 services to give details in their annual transparency reports of their compliance with the new transparency, accountability and freedom of expression duties.
I will keep my comments on this grouping brief, because I have already raised our concerns and our overarching priority in terms of transparency reports in the previous debate, which was good one, with all Members highlighting the need for transparency and reporting in the Bill. With the Chair’s permission, I will make some brief comments on Government amendment 72 before addressing Government amendments 73 and 75.
It will come as no surprise to the Minister that amendment 72, which defines relevant content for the purposes of schedule 8, has a key omission—specifying priority content harmful to adults. For reasons we have covered at length, we think that it is a gross mistake on the Government’s side to attempt to water down the Bill in this way. If the Minister is serious about keeping adults safe online, he must reconsider this approach. However, we are happy to see amendments 73 and 75, which define consumer content and regulated user-generated content. It is important for all of us—whether we are politicians, researchers, academics, civil society, stakeholders, platforms, users or anyone else—that these definitions are in the Bill so that, when it is passed, it can be applied properly and at pace. That is why we have not sought to amend this grouping.
I must press the Minister to respond on the issues around relevant content as outlined in amendment 72. We greatly feel that more needs to be done to address this type of content and its harm to adults, so I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s assessment of how exactly these transparency reports will report back on this type of harm, given its absence in this group of amendments and the lack of a definition.
I am pleased to see the list included and the number of things that Ofcom can ask for more information on. I have a specific question about amendment 75. Amendment 75 talks about regulated user-generated content and says it has the same meaning as it does in the interpretation of part 3 under clause 50. The Minister may or may not know that there are concerns about clause 50(5), which relates to
“One-to-one live aural communications”.
One-to-one live aural communications are exempted. I understand that that is because the Government do not believe that telephony services, for example, should be part of the Online Safety Bill—that is a pretty reasonable position for them to take. However, allowing one-to-one live aural communications not to be regulated means that if someone is using voice chat in Fortnite, for example, and there are only two people on the team that they are on, or if someone is using voice chat in Discord and there are only two people online on the channel at that time, that is completely unregulated and not taken into account by the Bill.
I know that that is not the intention of the Bill, which is intended to cover user-generated content online. The exemption is purely in place for telephony services, but it is far wider than the Government intend it to be. With the advent of more and more people using virtual reality technology, for example, we will have more and more aural communication between just two people, and that needs to be regulated by the Bill. We cannot just allow a free-for-all.
If we have child protection duties, for example, they need to apply to all user-generated content and not exempt it specifically because it is a live, one-to-one aural communication. Children are still at significant risk from this type of communication. The Government have put this exemption in because they consider such communication to be analogous to telephony services, but it is not. It is analogous to telephony services if we are talking about a voice call on Skype, WhatsApp or Signal—those are voice calls, just like telephone services—but we are talking about a voice chat that people can have with people who they do not know, whose phone number they do not know and who they have no sort of relationship with.
Some of the Discord servers are pretty horrendous, and some of the channels are created by social media influencers or people who have pretty extreme views in some cases. We could end up with a case where the Discord server and its chat functions are regulated, but if aural communication or a voice chat is happening on that server, and there are only two people online because it is 3 o’clock in the morning where most of the people live and lots of them are asleep, that would be exempted. That is not the intention of the Bill, but the Government have not yet fixed this. So I will make one more plea to the Government: will they please fix this unintended loophole, so that it does not exist? It is difficult to do, but it needs to be done, and I would appreciate it if the Minister could take that into consideration.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe hon. Lady makes an excellent point. This is not about mandating that platforms stop doing these things; it is about ensuring that they take this issue into account and that they agree—or that we as legislators agree—with the Royal College of Psychiatrists that we have a responsibility to tackle it. We have a responsibility to ask Ofcom to tackle it with platforms.
This comes back to the fact that we do not have a user advocacy panel, and groups representing children are not able to bring emerging issues forward adequately and effectively. Because of the many other inadequacies in the Bill, that is even more important than it was. I assume the Minister will not accept my amendment—that generally does not happen in Bill Committees—but if he does not, it would be helpful if he could give Ofcom some sort of direction of travel so that it knows it should take this issue into consideration when it deals with platforms. Ofcom should be talking to platforms about habit-forming features and considering the addictive nature of these things; it should be doing what it can to protect children. This threat has emerged only in recent years, and things will not get any better unless we take action.
It is a privilege to see you back in the Chair for round 2 of the Bill Committee, Sir Roger. It feels slightly like déjà vu to return to line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, which, as you said, Sir Roger, is quite unusual and unprecedented. Seeing this Bill through Committee is the Christmas gift that keeps on giving. Sequels are rarely better than the original, but we will give it a go. I have made no secret of my plans, and my thoughts on the Minister’s plans, to bring forward significant changes to the Bill, which has already been long delayed. I am grateful that, as we progress through Committee, I will have the opportunity to put on record once again some of Labour’s long-held concerns with the direction of the Bill.
I will touch briefly on clause 11 specifically before addressing the amendments to the clause. Clause 11 covers safety duties to protect children, and it is a key part of the Bill—indeed, it is the key reason many of us have taken a keen interest in online safety more widely. Many of us, on both sides of the House, have been united in our frustrations with the business models of platform providers and search engines, which have paid little regard to the safety of children over the years in which the internet has expanded rapidly.
That is why Labour has worked with the Government. We want to see the legislation get over the line, and we recognise—as I have said in Committee previously—that the world is watching, so we need to get this right. The previous Minister characterised the social media platforms and providers as entirely driven by finance, but safety must be the No. 1 priority. Labour believes that that must apply to both adults and children, but that is an issue for debate on a subsequent clause, so I will keep my comments on this clause brief.
The clause and Government amendments 1, 2 and 3 address the thorny issue of age assurance measures. Labour has been clear that we have concerns that the Government are relying heavily on the ability of social media companies to distinguish between adults and children, but age verification processes remain fairly complex, and that clearly needs addressing. Indeed, Ofcom’s own research found that a third of children have false social media accounts aged over 18. This is an area we certainly need to get right.
I am grateful to the many stakeholders, charities and groups working in this area. There are far too many to mention, but a special shout-out should go to Iain Corby from the Age Verification Providers Association, along with colleagues at the Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation and Barnardo’s, and the esteemed John Carr. They have all provided extremely useful briefings for my team and me as we have attempted to unpick this extremely complicated part of the Bill.
We accept that there are effective age checks out there, and many have substantial anti-evasion mechanisms, but it is the frustrating reality that this is the road the Government have decided to go down. As we have repeatedly placed on the record, the Government should have retained the “legal but harmful” provisions that were promised in the earlier iteration of the Bill. Despite that, we are where we are.
I will therefore put on the record some brief comments on the range of amendments on this clause. First, with your permission, Sir Roger, I will speak to amendments 98, 99—
Order. No, you cannot. I am sorry. I am perfectly willing to allow—the hon. Lady has already done this—a stand part debate at the start of a group of selections, rather than at the end, but she cannot have it both ways. I equally understand the desire of an Opposition Front Bencher to make some opening remarks, which is perfectly in order. With respect, however, you may not then go through all the other amendments. We are dealing now with amendment 98. If the hon. Lady can confine her remarks to that at this stage, that would be helpful.
Of course, Sir Roger. Without addressing the other amendments, I would like us to move away from the overly content-focused approach that the Government seem intent on taking in the Bill more widely. I will leave my comments there on the SNP amendment, but we support our SNP colleagues on it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger.
Being online can be a hugely positive experience for children and young people, but we recognise the challenge of habit-forming behaviour or designed addiction to some digital services. The Bill as drafted, however, would already deliver the intent of the amendment from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. If service providers identify in their risk assessment that habit-forming or addictive-behaviour risks cause significant harm to an appreciable number of children on a service, the Bill will require them to put in place measures to mitigate and manage that risk under clause 11(2)(a).
To meet the child safety risk assessment duties under clause 10, services must assess the risk of harm to children from the different ways in which the service is used; the impact of such use; the level of risk of harm to children; how the design and operation of the service may increase the risks identified; and the functionalities that facilitate the presence or dissemination of content of harm to children. The definition of “functionality” at clause 200 already includes an expression of a view on content, such as applying a “like” or “dislike” button, as at subsection (2)(f)(i).
The Bill’s key objective, above everything else, is the safety of young people online. That is why the strongest protections in the Bill are for children. Providers of services that are likely to be accessed by children will need to provide safety measures to protect child users from harmful content, such as pornography, and from behaviour such as bullying. We expect companies to use age verification technologies to prevent children from accessing services that pose the highest risk of harm to them, and age assurance technologies and other measures to provide children with an age-appropriate experience.
The previous version of the Bill already focused on protecting children, but the Government are clear that the Bill must do more to achieve that and to ensure that the requirements on providers are as clear as possible. That is why we are strengthening the Bill and clarifying the responsibilities of providers to provide age-appropriate protections for children online. We are making it explicit that providers may need to use age assurance to identify the age of their users in order to meet the child safety duties for user-to-user services.
The Bill already set out that age assurance may be required to protect children from harmful content and activity, as part of meeting the duty in clause 11(3), but the Bill will now clarify that it may also be needed to meet the wider duty in subsection (2) to
“mitigate and manage the risks of harm to children”
and to manage
“the impact of harm to children”
on such services. That is important so that only children who are old enough are able to use functionalities on a service that poses a risk of harm to younger children. The changes will also ensure that children are signposted to support that is appropriate to their age if they have experienced harm. For those reasons, I recommend that the Committee accepts the amendments.
I have a few questions regarding amendments 1 to 3, which as I mentioned relate to the thorny issue of age verification and age assurance, and I hope the Minister can clarify some of them.
We are unclear about why, in subsection (3)(a), the Government have retained the phrase
“for example, by using age verification, or another means of age assurance”.
Can that difference in wording be taken as confirmation that the Government want harder forms of age verification for primary priority content? The Minister will be aware that many in the sector are unclear about what that harder form of age verification may look like, so some clarity would be useful for all of us in the room and for those watching.
In addition, we would like to clarify the Minister’s understanding of the distinction between age verification and age assurance. They are very different concepts in reality, so we would appreciate it if he could be clear, particularly when we consider the different types of harm that the Bill will address and protect people from, how that will be achieved and what technology will be required for different types of platform and content. I look forward to clarity from the Minister on that point.
That is a good point. In essence, age verification is the hard access to a service. Age assurance ensures that the person who uses the service is the same person whose age was verified. Someone could use their parent’s debit card or something like that, so it is not necessarily the same person using the service right the way through. If we are to protect children, in particular, we have to ensure that we know there is a child at the other end whom we can protect from the harm that they may see.
On the different technologies, we are clear that our approach to age assurance or verification is not technology-specific. Why? Because otherwise the Bill would be out of date within around six months. By the time the legislation was fully implemented it would clearly be out of date. That is why it is incumbent on the companies to be clear about the technology and processes they use. That information will be kept up to date, and Ofcom can then look at it.
What I am saying is that the clause does not actually allow that middle step. It does not explicitly say that somebody could be stopped from accessing private messaging. The only options are being banned from certain content, or being banned from the entire platform.
I absolutely recognise the hard work that Ofcom has done, and I recognise that it will work very hard to ensure that risks are mitigated, but the amendment ensures what the Minister intended with this legislation. I am not convinced that he intended there to be just the two options that I outlined. I think he intended something more in line with what I am suggesting in the amendment. It would be very helpful if the Minister explicitly said something in this Committee that makes it clear that Ofcom has the power to say to platforms, “Your risk assessment says that there is a real risk from private messaging”—or from livestreaming—“so why don’t you turn that off for all users under 18?” Ofcom should be able to do that.
Could the Minister be clear that that is the direction of travel he is hoping and intending that Ofcom will take? If he could be clear on that, and will recognise that the clause could have been slightly better written to ensure Ofcom had that power, I would be quite happy to not push the amendment to a vote. Will the Minister be clear about the direction he hopes will be taken?
I rise to support my SNP colleagues’ amendments 99, and 96 and 97, just as I supported amendment 98. The amendments are sensible and will ensure that service providers are empowered to take action to mitigate harms done through their services. In particular, we support amendment 99, which makes it clear that a service should be required to have the tools available to allow it to block access to parts of its service, if that is proportionate.
Amendments 96 and 97 would ensure that private messaging and livestreaming features were brought into scope, and that platforms and services could block access to them when that was proportionate, with the aim of protecting children, which is the ultimate aim of the Bill. Those are incredibly important points to raise.
In previous iterations of the Bill Committee, Labour too tabled a number of amendments to do with platforms’ responsibilities for livestreaming. I expressed concerns about how easy it is for platforms to host live content, and about how ready they were to screen that content for harm, illegal or not. I am therefore pleased to support our SNP colleagues. The amendments are sensible, will empower platforms and will keep children safe.
Clause 12 is extremely important because it outlines the platforms’ duties in relation to keeping adults safe online. The Government’s attempts to remove the clause through an amendment that thankfully has not been selected are absolutely shocking. In addressing Government amendments 18, 23, 24, 25, 32, 33 and 39, I must ask the Minister: exactly how will this Bill do anything to keep adults safe online?
In the original clause 12, companies had to assess the risk of harm to adults and the original clause 13 outlined the means by which providers had to report these assessments back to Ofcom. This block of Government amendments will make it impossible for any of us—whether that is users of a platform or service, researchers or civil society experts—to understand the problems that arise on these platforms. Labour has repeatedly warned the Government that this Bill does not go far enough to consider the business models and product design of platforms and service providers that contribute to harm online. By tabling this group of amendments, the Government are once again making it incredibly difficult to fully understand the role of product design in perpetuating harm online.
We are not alone in our concerns. Colleagues from Carnegie UK Trust, who are a source of expertise to hon. Members across the House when it comes to internet regulation, have raised their concerns over this grouping of amendments too. They have raised specific concerns about the removal of the transparency obligation, which Labour has heavily pushed for in previous Bill Committees.
Previously, service providers had been required to inform customers of the harms their risk assessment had detected, but the removal of this risk assessment means that users and consumers will not have the information to assess the nature or risk on the platform. The Minister may point to the Government’s approach in relation to the new content duties in platforms’ and providers’ terms of service, but we know that there are risks arising from the fact that there is no minimum content specified for the terms of service for adults, although of course all providers will have to comply with the illegal content duties.
This approach, like the entire Bill, is already overly complex—that is widely recognised by colleagues across the House and is the view of many stakeholders too. In tabling this group of amendments, the Minister is showing his ignorance. Does he really think that all vulnerabilities to harm online simply disappear at the age of 18? By pushing these amendments, which seek to remove these protections from harmful but legal content to adults, the Minister is, in effect, suggesting that adults are not susceptible to harm and therefore risk assessments are simply not required. That is an extremely narrow-minded view to take, so I must push the Minister further. Does he recognise that many young, and older, adults are still highly likely to be impacted by suicide and self-harm messaging, eating disorder content, disinformation and abuse, which will all be untouched by these amendments?
Labour has been clear throughout the passage of the Bill that we need to see more, not less, transparency and protection from online harm for all of us—whether adults or children. These risk assessments are absolutely critical to the success of the Online Safety Bill and I cannot think of a good reason why the Minister would not support users in being able to make an assessment about their own safety online.
We have supported the passage of the Bill, as we know that keeping people safe online is a priority for us all and we know that the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. The Government have made some progress towards keeping children safe, but they clearly do not consider it their responsibility to do the same for adults. Ultimately, platforms should be required to protect everyone: it does not matter whether they are a 17-year-old who falls short of being legally deemed an adult in this country, an 18-year-old or even an 80-year-old. Ultimately, we should all have the same protections and these risk assessments are critical to the online safety regime as a whole. That is why we cannot support these amendments. The Government have got this very wrong and we have genuine concerns that this wholesale approach will undermine how far the Bill will go to truly tackling harm online.
I will also make comments on clause 55 and the other associated amendments. I will keep my comments brief, as the Minister is already aware of my significant concerns over his Department’s intention to remove adult safety duties more widely. In the previous Bill Committee, Labour made it clear that it supports, and thinks it most important, that the Bill should clarify specific content that is deemed to be harmful to adults. We have repeatedly raised concerns about missing harms, including health misinformation and disinformation, but really this group of amendments, once again, will touch on widespread concerns that the Government’s new approach will see adults online worse off. The Government’s removal of the “legal but harmful” sections of the Online Safety Bill is a major weakening—not a strengthening—of the Bill. Does the Minister recognise that the only people celebrating these decisions will be the executives of big tech firms, and online abusers? Does he agree that this delay shows that the Government have bowed to vested interests over keeping users and consumers safe?
Labour is not alone in having these concerns. We are all pleased to see that child safety duties are still present in the Bill, but the NSPCC, among others, is concerned about the knock-on implications that may introduce new risks to children. Without adult safety duties in place, children will be at greater risk of harm if platforms do not identify and protect them as children. In effect, these plans will now place a significant greater burden on platforms to protect children than adults. As the Bill currently stands, there is a significant risk of splintering user protections that can expose children to adult-only spaces and harmful content, while forming grooming pathways for offenders, too.
The reality is that these proposals to deal with harms online for adults rely on the regulator ensuring that social media companies enforce their own terms and conditions. We already know and have heard that that can have an extremely damaging impact for online safety more widely, and we have only to consider the very obvious and well-reported case study involving Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter to really get a sense of how damaging that approach is likely to be.
In late November, Twitter stopped taking action against tweets in violation of coronavirus rules. The company had suspended at least 11,000 accounts under that policy, which was designed to remove accounts posting demonstrably false or misleading content relating to covid-19 that could lead to harm. The company operated a five-strike policy, and the impact on public health around the world of removing that policy will likely be tangible. The situation also raises questions about the platform’s other misinformation policies. As of December 2022, they remain active, but for how long remains unclear.
Does the Minister recognise that as soon as they are inconvenient, platforms will simply change their terms and conditions, and terms of service? We know that simply holding platforms to account for their terms and conditions will not constitute robust enough regulation to deal with the threat that these platforms present, and I must press the Minister further on this point.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I share her deep concerns about the removal of these clauses. The Government have taken this tricky issue of the concept of “legal but harmful”—it is a tricky issue; we all acknowledge that—and have removed it from the Bill altogether. I do not think that is the answer. My hon. Friend makes an excellent point about children becoming 18; the day after they become 18, they are suddenly open to lots more harmful and dangerous content. Does she also share my concern about the risks of people being drawn towards extremism, as well as disinformation and misinformation?
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. This is not just about misinformation and disinformation; it is about leading people to really extreme, vile content on the internet. As we all know, that is a rabbit warren. That situation does not change as soon as a 17-year-old turns 18 on their 18th birthday—that they are then exempt when it comes to seeing this horrendous content. The rules need to be there to protect all of us.
As we have heard, terms and conditions can change overnight. Stakeholders have raised the concern that, if faced with a clearer focus on their terms of service, platforms and providers may choose to make their terms of service shorter, in an attempt to cut out harmful material that, if left undealt with, they may be held liable for.
In addition, the fact that there is no minimum requirement in the regime means that companies have complete freedom to set terms of service for adults, which may not reflect the risks to adults on that service. At present, service providers do not even have to include terms of service in relation to the list of harmful content proposed by the Government for the user empowerment duties—an area we will come on to in more detail shortly as we address clause 14. The Government’s approach and overreliance on terms of service, which as we know can be so susceptible to rapid change, is the wrong approach. For that reason, we cannot support these amendments.
I would just say, finally, that none of us was happy with the term “legal but harmful”. It was a phrase we all disliked, and it did not encapsulate exactly what the content is or includes. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater is not the way to tackle that situation. My hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Spen is right that this is a tricky area, and it is difficult to get it right. We need to protect free speech, which is sacrosanct, but we also need to recognise that there are so many users on the internet who do not have access to free speech as a result of being piled on or shouted down. Their free speech needs to be protected too. We believe that the clauses as they stand in the Bill go some way to making the Bill a meaningful piece of legislation. I urge the Minister not to strip them out, to do the right thing and to keep them in the Bill.
Throughout the consideration of the Bill, I have been clear that I do not want it to end up simply being the keep MPs safe on Twitter Bill. That is not what it should be about. I did not mean that we should therefore take out everything that protects adults; what I meant was that we need to have a big focus on protecting children in the Bill, which thankfully we still do. For all our concerns about the issues and inadequacies of the Bill, it will go some way to providing better protections for children online. But saying that it should not be the keep MPs safe on Twitter Bill does not mean that it should not keep MPs safe on Twitter.
I understand how we have got to this situation. What I cannot understand is the Minister’s being willing to stand up there and say, “We can’t have these clauses because they are a risk to freedom of speech.” Why are they in the Bill in the first place if they are such a big risk to freedom of speech? If the Government’s No. 1 priority is making sure that we do not have these clauses, why did they put them in it? Why did it go through pre-legislative scrutiny? Why were they in the draft Bill? Why were they in the Bill? Why did they agree with them in Committee? Why did they agree with them on Report? Why have we ended up in a situation where, suddenly, there is a massive epiphany that they are a threat to freedom of speech and therefore we cannot possibly have them?
What is it that people want to say that they will be banned from saying as a result of this Bill? What is it that freedom of speech campaigners are so desperate to want to say online? Do they want to promote self-harm on platforms? Is that what people want to do? Is that what freedom of speech campaigners are out for? They are now allowed to do that a result of the Bill.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We have all heard from organisations and individuals who have had their lives destroyed as a result of “legal but harmful”—I don’t have a better phrase for it—content online and of being radicalised by being driven deeper and deeper into blacker and blacker Discord servers, for example, that are getting further and further right wing.
A number of the people who are radicalised—who are committing terror attacks, or being referred to the Prevent programme because they are at risk of committing terror attacks—are not so much on the far-right levels of extremism any more, or those with incredible levels of religious extremism, but are in a situation where they have got mixed up or unclear ideological drivers. It is not the same situation as it was before, because people are being radicalised by the stuff that they find online. They are being radicalised into situations where they “must do something”—they “must take some action”—because of the culture change in society.
The hon. Member is making a powerful point. Just a few weeks ago, I asked the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, at the Dispatch Box, whether the horrendous and horrific content that led a man to shoot and kill five people in Keyham—in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard)—would be allowed to remain and perpetuate online as a result of the removal of these clauses from the Bill. I did not get a substantial answer then, but we all know that the answer is yes.
That is the thing: this Bill is supposed to be the Online Safety Bill. It is supposed to be about protecting people from the harm that can be done to them by others. It is also supposed to be about protecting people from that radicalisation and that harm that they can end up in. It is supposed to make a difference. It is supposed to be game changer and a world leader.
Although, absolutely, I recognise the importance of the child-safety duties in the clauses and the change that that will have, when people turn 18 they do not suddenly become different humans. They do not wake up on their 18th birthday as a different person from the one that they were before. They should not have to go from that level of protection, prior to 18, to being immediately exposed to comments and content encouraging them to self-harm, and to all of the negative things that we know are present online.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman talks about the wider use of screens and screen time, and that is why Ofcom’s media literacy programme, and DCMS’s media literacy strategy—
That is because we have a detailed strategy that tackles many of these issues. Again, none of this is perfect, and as I have said, the Government are working in tandem with the platforms, and with parents and education bodies, to make sure we get that bit right. The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight that as a big issue.
I talked about harmful communications, recognising that we could leave a potential gap in the criminal law. The Government have also decided not to repeal existing communications offences in the Malicious Communications Act 1988, or those under section 127(1) of the Communications Act 2003. That will ensure that victims of domestic abuse or other extremely harmful communications will still be robustly protected by the criminal law. Along with planned changes to the harmful communications offence, we are making a number of additional changes to the Bill—that will come later, Mr Speaker, and I will not tread too much into that, as it includes the removal of the adult safety duties, often referred to as the legal but harmful provision. The amended Bill offers adults a triple shield of protection that requires platforms to remove illegal content and material that violates their terms and conditions, and gives adults user controls to help them avoid seeing certain types of content.
The Bill’s key objective, above everything else, is the safety of children online, and we will be making a number of changes to strengthen the Bill’s existing protections for children. We will make sure that we expect platforms to use age assurance technology when identifying the age of their users, and we will also require platforms with minimum age restrictions to explain in their terms of service what measures they have in place to prevent access to those below their minimum age, and enforce those measures consistently. We are planning to name the Children’s Commissioner as a statutory consultee for Ofcom in its development of the codes of practice, ensuring that children’s views and needs are represented.
That is the Children’s Commissioner for England, specifically because they have particular reserved duties for the whole of the UK. None the less, Ofcom must also have regard to a wider range of voices, which can easily include the other Children’s Commissioners.
It is an absolute pleasure to be back in the Chamber to respond on behalf of the Opposition to this incredibly important piece of legislation on its long overdue second day on Report. It certainly has not been an easy ride so far: I am sure that Bill Committee colleagues across the House agree that unpicking and making sense of this unnecessarily complicated Bill has been anything but straightforward.
We should all be incredibly grateful and are all indebted to the many individuals, charities, organisations and families who have worked so hard to bring online safety to the forefront for us all. Today is a particularly important day, as we are joined in the Public Gallery by a number of families who have lost children in connection with online harms. They include Lorin LaFave, Ian Russell, Andy and Judy Thomas, Amanda and Stuart Stephens and Ruth Moss. I sincerely hope that this debate will do justice to their incredible hard work and commitment in the most exceptionally difficult of circumstances.
It may be a drop in the ocean to the likes of Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg—these multibillionaires who are taking over social media and using it as their personal plaything. They are not going to listen to fines; the only way they are going to listen, sit up and take notice is if criminal liability puts their neck on the line and makes them answer for some of the huge failures of which they are aware.
The right hon. and learned Member mentions that he shares the sentiment of the amendment but feels it could be wrong. We have an opportunity here to put things right and put responsibility where it belongs: with the tech companies, the platforms and the managers responsible. In a similar way to what happens in the financial sector or in health and safety regulation, it is vital that people be held responsible for issues on their platforms. We feel that criminal liability will make that happen.
May I intervene on a point of fact? The hon. Lady says that fines are a drop in the ocean. The turnover of Google is $69 billion; 10% of that is just shy of $7 billion. That is not a drop in the ocean, even to Elon Musk.
We are looking at putting people on the line. It needs to be something that people actually care about. Money does not matter to these people, as we have seen with the likes of Google, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg; what matters to them is actually being held to account. Money may matter to Government Members, but it will be criminal liability that causes people to sit up, listen and take responsibility.
While I am not generally in the habit of predicting the Minister’s response or indeed his motives—although my job would be a hell of a lot easier if I did—I am confident that he will try to peddle the line that it was the Government who introduced director liability for compliance failures in an earlier draft of the Bill. Let me be crystal clear in making this point, because it is important. The Bill, in its current form, makes individuals at the top of companies personally liable only when a platform fails to supply information to Ofcom, which misses the point entirely. Directors must be held personally liable when safety duties are breached. That really is quite simple, and I am confident that it would be effective in tackling harm online much more widely.
We also support new clause 28, which seeks to establish an advocacy body to represent the interests of children online. It is intended to deal with a glaring omission from the Bill, which means that children who experience online sexual abuse will receive fewer statutory user advocacy protections than users of a post office or even passengers on a bus. The Minister must know that that is wrong and, given his Government’s so-called commitment to protecting children, I hope he will carefully consider a new clause which is supported by Members on both sides of the House as well as the brilliant National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. In rejecting new clause 28, the Government would be denying vulnerable children a strong, authoritative voice to represent them directly, so I am keen to hear the Minister’s justification for doing so, if that is indeed his plan.
Members will have noted the bundle of amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) relating to Labour’s concerns about the unnecessary powers to overrule Ofcom that the Bill, as currently drafted, gives the Secretary of State of the day. During Committee evidence sessions, we heard from Will Perrin of the Carnegie UK Trust, who, as Members will know, is an incredibly knowledgeable voice when it comes to internet regulation. He expressed concern about the fact that, in comparison with other regulatory frameworks such as those in place for advertising, the Bill
“goes a little too far in introducing a range of powers for the Secretary of State to interfere with Ofcom’s day-to-day doing of its business.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 26 May 2022; c. 117.]
Labour shares that concern. Ofcom must be truly independent if it is to be an effective regulator. Surely we have to trust it to undertake logical processes, rooted in evidence, to arrive at decisions once this regime is finally up and running. It is therefore hard to understand how the Government can justify direct interference, and I hope that the Minister will seriously consider amendments 23 to 30, 32, and 35 to 41.
Before I address Labour’s main concerns about the Government’s proposed changes to the Bill, I want to record our support for new clauses 29 and 30, which seek to bring media literacy duties back into the scope of the Bill. As we all know, media literacy is the first line of defence when it comes to protecting ourselves against false information online. Prevention is always better than cure. Whether it is a question of viral conspiracy theories or Russian disinformation, Labour fears that the Government’s approach to internet regulation will create a two-tier internet, leaving some more vulnerable than others.
However, I am sorry to say that the gaps in this Bill do not stop there. I was pleased to see that my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) had tabled new clause 54, which asks the Government to formally consider the impact that the use of virtual private networks will have on Ofcom’s ability to enforce its powers. This touches on the issue of future-proofing, which Labour has raised repeatedly in debates on the Bill. As we have heard from a number of Members, the tech industry is evolving rapidly, with concepts such as the metaverse changing the way in which we will all interact with the internet in the future. When the Bill was first introduced, TikTok was not even a platform. I hope the Minister can reassure us that the Bill will be flexible enough to deal with those challenges head-on; after all, we have waited far too long.
That brings me to what Labour considers to be an incredible overturn by the Government relating to amendment 239, which seeks to remove the new offence of harmful communications from the Bill entirely. As Members will know, the communications offence was designed by the Law Commission with the intention of introducing a criminal threshold for the most dangerous online harms. Indeed, in Committee it was welcome to hear the then Minister—the present Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp)—being so positive about the Government’s consultation with the commission. In relation to clause 151, which concerns the communications offences, he even said:
“The Law Commission is the expert in this kind of thing…and it is right that, by and large, we follow its expert advice in framing these offences, unless there is a very good reason not to. That is what we have done—we have followed the Law Commission’s advice, as we would be expected to do.” ––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2022; c. 558.]
Less than six months down the line, we are seeing yet another U-turn from this Government, who are doing precisely the opposite of what was promised.
Removing these communications offences from the Bill will have real-life consequences. It will mean that harmful online trends such as hoax bomb threats, abusive social media pile-ons and fake news such as encouraging people to drink bleach to cure covid will be allowed to spread online without any consequence.
No Jewish person should have to log online and see Hitler worship, but what we have seen in recent weeks from Kanye West has been nothing short of disgusting, from him saying “I love Hitler” to inciting online pile-ons against Jewish people, and this is magnified by the sheer number of his followers, with Jews actually being attacked on the streets in the US. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government’s decision to drop the “legal but harmful” measures from the Bill will allow this deeply offensive and troubling behaviour to continue?
I thank my hon. Friend for that important and powerful intervention. Let us be clear: everything that Kanye West said online is completely abhorrent and has no place in our society. It is not for any of us to glorify Hitler and his comments or praise him for the work he did; that is absolutely abhorrent and it should never be online. Sadly, however, that is exactly the type of legal but harmful content that will now be allowed to proliferate online because of the Government’s swathes of changes to the Bill, meaning that that would be allowed to be seen by everybody. Kanye West has 30 million followers online. His followers will be able to look at, share, research and glorify that content without any consequence to that content being freely available online.
Further to that point, it is not just that some of the content will be deeply offensive to the Jewish community; it could also harm wider society. Some further examples of postings that would be considered legal but harmful are likening vaccination efforts to Nazi death camps and alleging that NHS nurses should stand trial for genocide. Does my hon. Friend not agree that the changes the Government are now proposing will lead to enormous and very damaging impacts right through society?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. I am keen to bring this back into scope before Mr Speaker chastises us any further, but she is right to say that this will have a direct real-world impact. This is what happens when we focus on content rather than directly on the platforms and the algorithms on the platforms proliferating this content. That is where the focus needs to be. It is the algorithms that share and amplify this content to these many followers time and again that need to be tackled, rather than the content itself. That is what we have been pleading with the Government to concentrate on, but here we are in this mess.
We are pleased that the Government have taken on board Labour’s policy to criminalise certain behaviours—including the encouragement of self-harm, sharing people’s intimate images without their consent, and controlling or coercive behaviours—but we believe that the communications offences more widely should remain in order to tackle dangerous online harms at their root. We have worked consistently to get this Bill over the line and we have reached out to do so. It has been subject to far too many delays and it is on the Government’s hands that we are again facing substantial delays, when internet regulation has never been more sorely needed. I know that the Minister knows that, and I sincerely hope he will take our concerns seriously. I reach out to him again across the Dispatch Box, and look forward to working with him and challenging him further where required as the Bill progresses. I look forward to getting the Bill on to the statute book.
I call the Chair of the Select Committee.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe are fully committed to the media Bill, as we have already said and as the hon. Member knows. It has not actually been delayed; it was announced in the Queen’s Speech for this Session.
The Government are making an absolute mess of the Online Safety Bill. After years of inaction, we now know that they plan once again to delay the Bill from progressing. Their approach will supposedly give adults greater choice online, but it does absolutely nothing to tackle the harmful content at its root. Can the Secretary of State confirm whether the abhorrent yet legal extreme content that led a man to shoot and kill five people in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) would still be available to view and share freely online under the terms of the Bill?
Not a single clause in this Bill is actually changing—in relation to children, it is being strengthened. In relation to illegal content, of course that content is still being taken down, as the hon. Member would know if she read the stuff that we have published. We are also introducing a triple shield of defence, which was lacking before, and we have made the promotion of self-harm and intimate image abuse an offence, while also protecting free speech and free choice. It is important that the Opposition remember that making a Bill stronger is not watering down.