Alex Davies-Jones
Main Page: Alex Davies-Jones (Labour - Pontypridd)Department Debates - View all Alex Davies-Jones's debates with the Cabinet Office
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons Chamber
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
In welcoming this Bill, I am very mindful of the tenacity and courage of the campaigners who got us to this point, both outside and inside this House. They can take some comfort from this Bill today. I trust that it is a Bill that will live up to its promise. As I mentioned in my intervention on the Prime Minister, I trust that it will bring justice to the Chinook families, for example, who have been treated to serial cover-ups in respect of that appalling incident.
However, there are issues with the Bill that I want to probe. It declares in its very first clause that:
“The purpose of this Act is to ensure that public authorities and public officials at all times perform their functions…(a) with candour, transparency and frankness, and (b) in the public interest”.
But will it be at all times? We discover in the Bill that the only criminal sanction applies to those who do not show candour, transparency and frankness to a public inquiry or a public investigation. In many such cases, there would already be the threat of perjury, so where is the commitment to ensure that there is candour at all times?
Jim Allister
If the Minister wants to make an intervention, I am quite happy to take it.
I welcome the hon. and learned Gentleman’s comments, but the Bill literally says that there is a duty of candour “at all times”.
Jim Allister
It does, and then it goes on to tell us in clause 1(2) how it imposes that duty. There are five ways in which it does so. The first is by
“imposing a duty on public authorities and public officials to act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations and imposing criminal liability for breach of that duty”.
That is the only criminal liability that would arise from a breach of the duty of candour. The second way is by imposing an ethical code on public authorities. No criminal offence is committed if someone breaches that ethical code—none whatsoever. The third, fourth and fifth ways, in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), are by
“imposing criminal liability on public authorities and public officials who mislead the public in ways that are seriously improper”,
by
“imposing criminal liability for seriously improper acts by individuals holding public office and for breaches of duties to prevent death or serious injury”,
and by
“making provision about parity at inquiries”
about legal aid.
The Prime Minister told us that the Bill would apply across the whole United Kingdom, but sadly it does not. Clause 24, the extent clause, makes it plain that the last three paragraphs of clause 1, which I have just read out, do not apply to Northern Ireland or to Scotland. The Bill in its entirety applies only to England and Wales, meaning that clause 11, for example—which is an important clause, because it does create a criminal offence, that of misleading the public—does not apply anywhere other than in England and Wales. Why should that be? Why is this Bill not drafted in such a way that those clauses apply to the whole United Kingdom, after which the Assemblies of Scotland and Northern Ireland can deploy the mechanism of legislative consent?
Jim Allister
I disagree. Many, many times in the Stormont Assembly, Bills that were passing through this House, which included measures such as new criminal offences, were subject to a legislative consent motion. That then gave consent to proceed, and that mechanism could equally be used here. My question to the House is this: if this Bill is delivering the duty of candour by the five steps set out in clause 1(2), how can it do that for the whole United Kingdom if three of those steps do not apply throughout the United Kingdom?
This is not a debate about the constitution; it is a debate about the duty of candour. I agree with the hon. and learned Member that the intention is for all nations in the United Kingdom to be bound by this legislation. However, he will be fully aware of the devolved competencies for Scotland and Northern Ireland in this case. We are having positive engagement with both nations, and that is the intention of the Bill. I just remind him to perhaps bring the debate back to exactly what this Bill is about, with the families in the Gallery today.
Jim Allister
I therefore hope that the Minister, when she comes to reply, will indicate that, subject to legislative consent, she will indeed make this Bill apply across the whole United Kingdom, because my constituents are as entitled as anyone else to the same duty of candour that arises elsewhere.
It is a genuine, true privilege to close this Second Reading debate on the Public Office (Accountability) Bill—the Hillsborough law. The introduction of the Bill is a huge achievement, but I echo the Prime Minister when I say that it was not born here in Westminster; it was born out of heartbreak, out of unimaginable loss, out of the tireless courage of those who refused to be silenced. Some of those extraordinary people have been with us today in the Gallery, and to them I simply say, “Thank you. The whole country owes you a debt of gratitude.”
I want to pay particular tribute to Hillsborough Law Now. I pay tribute to Nathan, Pete, Elkan, Deb, Clare and Debbie, whom have all given their time, expertise and passion to this Government to ensure that we deliver the best possible Bill. I pay tribute to the family members who lost loved ones at Hillsborough and met us over the summer, who shared their pain and who have rightly held us to account every single step of the way: Margaret Aspinall, Charlotte Hennessy, Sue Roberts, Steve Kelly, Jenni Hicks and Hilda Hammond.
I also pay tribute to the Members who have stood shoulder to shoulder with the family members: specifically, my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle) and my hon. Friends the Members for Widnes and Halewood (Derek Twigg), for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) and for Knowsley (Anneliese Midgley), as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Alison McGovern)—my very good friend—who chaired the all-party parliamentary group on the Hillsborough disaster for nine years, and is now the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness. I know that it has been significantly painful for her not to be able to speak in this debate, but she is with us tonight, sitting on the Front Bench.
The genesis of this Bill is the fight of the Hillsborough families, but it goes much further. This Bill is for anyone who has experienced an injustice, anyone who has had to fight against the state to be heard, and anyone who has had to demand the truth when it should have been given freely. At its heart, this Bill is shaped by lived experience.
I also want to thank Inquest for its tireless work, and for holding that vital family listening day back in February with families from a range of campaigns. We heard from so many of them personally about why the changes in this Bill are so essential and the real difference that this will make in people’s lives, and why access to legal aid for inquests where the state is an interested person is so vitally important.
I thank the families of Ruth Perry, Matthew Copestick and Connor Sparrowhawk for sharing their experiences with us and highlighting the importance of this. I cannot thank enough Hillsborough Law Now, Grenfell United, the sub-postmasters affected by the Horizon scandal, those affected by the infected blood scandal, Truth About Zane, and, sadly, so many others, for their time, or Inquest for the report that it produced. That has shaped not only this Bill but wider areas of policy, and that is why it is so important that the voices of victims and those with lived experience are at the heart of what we do in government. But this Bill is not only for the major scandals that have scarred our nation and made the news; it is also for individual families—we have heard many of their stories here tonight—and for the ordinary people who find themselves facing the full force of the state alone.
The Prime Minister has already set out why the expansion of legal aid is so important, but I also want to share a story that shows why this Bill is needed so urgently. In September, I had the pleasure of meeting Will Powell, a father who has been fighting for answers for over 30 years, and I am proud that he is with us today. He has been fighting since the death of his son Robbie in 1990. Robbie was just 10 years old when he died of Addison’s disease. After Robbie’s death, it became apparent that doctors had suspected that he had the disease and, without Will’s knowledge, a test to confirm the diagnosis had been requested but not completed. That meant that Robbie did not receive the treatment that could have saved his life. Will and his family have been fighting for the truth ever since. They have been fighting for the truth about what went wrong and why this happened.
Nothing can bring back Robbie, or those we lost as a result of Hillsborough, Grenfell, Horizon or infected blood, but what we can bring is truth. At the heart of every campaign and every struggle is love—love for those who families have lost, love that has become action and love that is determined to make sure that no one else suffers as they have and that there is lasting change.
David Chadwick (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)
I commend the Minister for paying tribute to William Powell, who has campaigned for justice for 35 years for his son, Robbie Powell, who died as a result of medical negligence. William Powell has done so much to secure this legal duty of candour, so it is right that he is acknowledged here in this debate, but he is still waiting for a public inquiry into his son’s death. Can the Minister say whether she believes that this case, which has been described as the worst cover-up in NHS history, meets the conditions for a public inquiry—something that has been called for by the former Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and for introducing me to Will Powell earlier this year. I know that the Secretary of State for Wales has also met Will Powell. However, the hon. Member will know that granting an inquiry is a decision for the Welsh Government, and I know that he is having conversations with the Ministers there.
Every single life lost is someone’s whole world. I am so honoured to bring forward this Bill and to represent the families who have so tirelessly campaigned for it, but as we have heard, this is just the beginning.
I will not, as I have quite a lot to get through.
As a victims Minister, I want to put on record my commitment to continue to listen to and provide a voice for victims. I will do everything in my power to make sure that when this Bill leaves Parliament, it does so as the strongest Bill possible. The Government will bring forward an amendment to make it clear on the face of the Bill that the duty will extend to local authority investigations that are intended to capture the likes of the local grooming gang inquiries, and the Kerslake review into the Manchester Arena attack. We will utilise powers in the Bill to extend the duty to a range of ombudsman investigations, such as those by the Prison and Probation Ombudsman, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman, and the Housing Ombudsman.
I will turn now to the points raised in today’s debate. First of all, I thank all hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their support for this Bill. It is welcome and, as many have said, this Bill is long overdue. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller), raised a number of potential issues with the Bill. She mentioned legal aid and said that the Liberal Democrats would like it to be expanded to those who are survivors, as well as the bereaved. I want to put on record that this is the biggest expansion of legal aid for a generation.
Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)
The Bill provides for parity of representation, and will expand non-means-tested legal aid so that bereaved family members can secure advocacy at inquests where a public authority is an interested person, but it does so, as I understand it, only in England and Wales. Of course, justice is a devolved issue, but can the Minister confirm that, despite months of engagement with the Scottish Government on this UK-wide legislation, the SNP Government have failed to confirm that non-means-tested legal aid will be available in Scotland, resulting in Scots families still relying on charity to gain access to justice—
Order. Interventions need to be short.
I welcome my hon. Friend’s intervention, which gives me the opportunity to address some of the issues concerning devolution that were brought up in the debate. A number of hon. and right hon. Members talked about whether this Bill will apply UK-wide, and I can confirm that the duty of candour provisions will apply UK-wide. However, as hon. and right hon. Members will know, justice is devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, so the legal system does not apply there in the same way that it does in England and Wales, which is why some of the criminal offences do not apply. It is for Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland to request whether this legislation applies to those nations. Conversations have been positive, and we have engaged very closely with our counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland on this point. We hope that these measures will apply UK-wide, but we cannot mandate for other nations that are not in our jurisdiction.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire (Douglas McAllister) made an important point about legal aid. It is for the Scottish Government to determine whether they will apply the same provisions that we are providing for England and Wales. We are providing non-means-tested legal aid for any bereaved person at an inquest where the state is a represented party. It is for Scottish Ministers to determine whether they want to apply the same.
We have had a lot of talk this evening about how long this Bill has been in the making. My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) mentioned that she was proud that it is a Labour Government, in just over our first year in office, who have brought this Bill to the House. The Conservatives had 14 years to do something about this issue, and they failed. The SNP Government in Scotland have had 20 years to do something, and they have failed. It is a Labour Government who have chosen to bring forward this Bill and to do something about this, to ensure that families get parity on legal aid and that a duty of candour applies across all our public services.
A number of speeches this evening addressed protection for whistleblowers. I reaffirm my commitment to hon. Members that the Bill does require all authorities to set out a process to raise concerns, and to ensure that procedures are clear and accessible for whistleblowers. The hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), who is vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group for whistleblowing, requested a meeting with me. I will happily meet her to discuss this matter further, because it is important that we address it.
A number of Members raised the issue of the media, but they will know that that is out of scope of this Bill. This Bill provides a duty of candour for public authorities and public servants. We will ensure that public service broadcasters operate within what they are permitted. However, it is important to note that since the calls for Leveson and Leveson 2 were introduced, the media landscape has drastically and dramatically moved on.
The public do not consume media in the same way any more. The vast majority of the British public consume their media via social media. I am pleased that the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport was on the Front Bench when these issues were raised. She has made a commitment, and she has already met some of the families of victims to discuss what more we can do to tackle disinformation and misinformation, particularly about disasters and issues that arise in public and are then put on social media. I will continue my conversations with her as the Bill progresses to ensure that we address that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders) gave a fantastic speech about how we need to be reasonable, proportionate and fair. I want to assure him that, when it comes to legal aid and the parity of arms that is so integral to the Bill, coroners do have the powers to enforce what is considered reasonable and proportionate under the Bill to ensure that families are not faced with an army of barristers when they have a publicly funded lawyer advocating for them. That is not the intention, and we have put that in the Bill.
A number of hon. Members mentioned the definition of harm, and I want to reassure Members again that there is a very low bar for meeting this test. We have ensured that it does cover mental distress, and that that is not the only measure for a criminal offence. The hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East (Seamus Logan) mentioned those who falsify statistics—crime statistics, for example—where harm would not necessarily come into play. If an officer falsified crime or other statistics to make himself or the police force look better, that would come under the offence of misconduct in public office, so they would be captured in another criminal offence in the Bill.
The right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) talked about something that is very close to my heart. He made an excellent contribution on the need for inquest reform, and inquiry reform more broadly. I wholeheartedly agree with him, as do this Government, which is why the Cabinet Office is taking its time to get this right. It is looking at quite a substantial piece of work, and I will endeavour to keep him updated on it as we are actively developing our proposals.
I hate to have to admit it to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle (Peter Dowd) but I am also a red, so I think it is actually Liverpool 3—Everton 1. I want to reaffirm my commitment to working with him and all Merseyside MPs—in fact, all Members in this House—and the families, as the Bill progresses, to ensure that it is the strongest possible Bill.
There were excellent speeches from my hon. Friends the Members for St Helens North (David Baines), for Liverpool West Derby, for Knowsley and for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker), who have been excellent advocates for the families of the Hillsborough disaster during their tireless campaigning. I am determined to work with all of them as the Bill progresses to ensure that there is no carve-out for the security services. Just to reassure the House, there is no carve-out: the duty of candour applies to everyone, including the security services and including individuals. However, what is different for the security services is the way in which they report such a breach—they must report it to a senior individual within the service to ensure that national security is protected—and I think we have struck the right balance in the Bill. However, I hear the concerns raised in this House, as there have been concerns raised outside it, and I am keen to engage in such conversations to see if there is anything further we can do on this point.
The hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) and the hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sorcha Eastwood) mentioned the Chinook disaster. A commitment has been made to meet Members and families of the victims of the Chinook disaster, and I have made a commitment to be at that meeting to progress those issues.
There were fantastic contributions from Sheffield Members who, as well as the Merseyside MPs, have felt the urgency to bring forward this legislation and the pain of the Hillsborough disaster in their constituencies. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough (Gill Furniss) said she gave birth not long after the Hillsborough disaster, and talked about how it has always stuck with her that her baby was at home while so many parents did not get to bring their children home.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
As a six-year-old, I remember the death of Joe McCarthy, who lived on my road in west London, so it is not just about those who lived in Sheffield or elsewhere. It affected everyone across the country, and this Bill is so important for that reason.
Indeed, and for me that is a fantastic point. This law may bear the name Hillsborough, but it is a Bill for the entire country, and this Government have made that a clear commitment.
A number of hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), the Chair of the Justice Committee, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston, talked about the Independent Public Advocate. As the House will be aware, Cindy Butts has been appointed as the Independent Public Advocate. She is a fantastic individual who has just been appointed to her first role as the IPA, following the horrific attack at Heaton Park synagogue. I am due to meet her later this week to discuss how she has found being stood up for the first time following the introduction of the role in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, and her resource requirements and powers. I will, of course, update the House if we both feel, as the IPA and the Minister, that there is further to go in that respect. I am also due to meet my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston and Lord Wills in the other place to discuss, as the Bill progresses, how we can work together further to look at the role of the IPA.
I also mentioned the national oversight mechanism. Whether the Minister thinks it requires legislation or can be done by Government action, does she support having something that is shared, publicised and known about so that we are not constantly repeating things and we know where inquiries have got to? Will she do that in tandem with the Bill, if it is not part of the Bill?
My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Justice Committee, pre-empts my next point, which is on the national oversight mechanism. Again, a number of right hon. and hon. Members mentioned that. As the Prime Minister stated in his opening remarks, there is a need for accountability here. We are looking at how we can do that. Work is being led by the Cabinet Office on inquest and inquiry reform, and the Ministry of Justice has already done work on ensuring that prevention of future death reports are published. I echo the Prime Minister: we do not feel that the Bill is the necessary vehicle to put in a national oversight mechanism, but we are looking proactively at what we can do to ensure that there is accountability and transparency so that these inquiries are never again left sitting on a shelf, with recommendations ignored or put to one side.
My good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli, and my hon. Friends the Members for Blyth and Ashington (Ian Lavery) and for Cannock Chase (Josh Newbury) mentioned an issue very close to my heart: Orgreave. Hon. Members may know, because I have talked about it with pride, that my father was there on that day. I am the very proud daughter of a miner and nothing has given me more pride than this Government announcing a statutory inquiry into Orgreave, which will be coming forward soon.
When the Bill becomes an Act, it will apply to inquiries that are ongoing. If an inquiry has started or is ongoing, the legislation will come into immediate effect and apply to all inquiries that are under way. I am really looking forward to the recommendations of that inquiry and to the truth we will get, because that, again, is long overdue.
There were concerns regarding the security services and whistleblowers. Hopefully, I have put some of those fears to bed this evening, but I look forward to debating all these issues in detail in Committee. I again extend the offer to meet any hon. Member to ensure that the Bill remains as strong as possible when it finally leaves this place and becomes an Act. I look forward to positive engagement with colleagues across the House.
Finally, the Bill will ensure that no other family will ever have to walk alone. I am immensely proud to commend it to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Public Office (Accountability) Bill:
Committal
The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 11 December 2025.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Question agreed to.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under or by virtue of any other Act out of money so provided.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Question agreed to.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Davies-Jones
Main Page: Alex Davies-Jones (Labour - Pontypridd)Department Debates - View all Alex Davies-Jones's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Deborah Coles, executive director at INQUEST, and Professor Julia Waters.
I do not have any questions. We are short of time, so I would rather allow other members of the Committee to ask questions.
Q
Deborah Coles: Thank you for the question. It has been a long-standing campaign of ours to try and sort out what we perceive is a real inequality of arms. The best way to describe it is that it is a traumatic and distressing process to go through an inquest into the death of your loved one in any event, but to try and navigate those processes without your own individual legal representation, and even be expected to ask questions yourself or rely on the coroner to do so on your behalf, is not only extremely unfair but I think perpetuates the sense that the system is not working to get to the truth and to deliver the answers that you want as a bereaved person about how your loved one died.
I can think of so many examples since INQUEST was set up where families still today talk about the retraumatising nature of the inquest process. What legal representation can do as well is enhance the really important preventive function that an inquest can play in safeguarding lives in the future, but that is only where you have a family with the benefit of a lawyer to explore the areas of concern. In our experience, too often the default of state and corporate lawyers is to try and defend their reputations, to try and narrow the scope of the inquest process, and try and prevent consideration of the very serious issues that need exploring, particularly when we are talking here about how our work is predominantly around state-related deaths, where the state had a duty of care towards somebody. In our experience, it is only through legal representation and where families feel that they can play a meaningful and effective part in the process that the truth can come out.
I will write to you too, Jenni.
Jenni Hicks: Sorry, I am so aware that I only have 10 minutes.
The Chair
Thank you very much for your contribution. We have listened to everything you said and it really has been invaluable.
Jenni Hicks: Can I just say that you have still not answered my question on legal aid?
Tessa Munt
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: That often depends on who makes the allegation and whether it is criminal or conduct related. If it is a criminal matter, it is reported to a police force or the IOPC. If any criminal or conduct matter is reported and it involves a chief constable, it goes to the IOPC under the law. If it is anybody below that level, it goes to the professional standards department in each of the police forces. It is then independently assessed, and given to an investigator, who is trained and accredited, and independent of the people who are complained about and the complainant.
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: Having been consulted on the way through this, having thought about it quite considerably and having spoken to the director general of the IOPC, I think that the drafting at the moment is pitched at the right level, because it says that that harm needs to be of a serious nature. When it comes to setting out harm, it mentions phrases such as “departed significantly from”.
What will the impact of that be from my perspective? I think it will encourage leaders and individual officers to do the right thing. Initially, it may increase the likelihood that a narrative would be corrected earlier. Think back to some of the foundational pillars upon which this legislation rests, and a lot of the narrative that was, let us say, placed in the public domain around Hillsborough—and sometimes around other events where there is knowledge that is known to the police service and is able to be communicated, but which for whatever reason on occasions is not. Sometimes, in my opinion, that does not help with public confidence.
Going back to the question, I think this will encourage the clarification of issues at an earlier stage. But I suppose, on reflection, from a professional perspective, we have to balance some of that with an individual’s potential reluctance to say too much too early. Of course, the public quite rightly have an expectation that facts will be clarified and that information will be shared and placed in the public domain, and that is absolutely the right thing to do. That is the balancing act. It is important that it is pitched at the right level, which in my professional opinion it is. The “harm” is economic, physical or emotional, and I think it says it should be not inconsequential, which is important. On occasion—you will know this from your family perspective—we absolutely do get things wrong, but the legislation is designed to allow us to correct those things fairly expeditiously.
Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: They obviously occur over a period of time. Certainly in my service—I have done over 30 years—they have come in the second half of my service, rather than the first. However, the way that we train them is very explicit: it is done on a values basis through initial training. We recruit and assess new candidates on the basis of values. We do recruit training, which in most forces happens over a period of 20 to 22 weeks, and recruits have a specific input on values-based decision making. We have something called the national decision model, which allows them to think about the consequences and the options they have in making their decisions.
The code of ethics absolutely underpins what we do. It sits in the middle of our decision-making circle. It is trained, really, from day one. I am trying to bring it to life a bit: this sits in the middle of all the specialist public order training, post Hillsborough, for commanders at public events, particularly football, and their accreditation and training. For all our bronze, silver and gold commanders, the code of ethics sits inside the wheel in which we make our decisions. To reinforce the point, the other aspect is that whenever there is a misconduct meeting or hearing for police officers, there is always reference to the code of ethics—the ethical behaviours that are expected of officers and staff.
The third bit of your question was about how we measure this. I would say that we measure it in three ways. The first is the training at the beginning. The second measure is around outcomes from our misconduct proceedings, as well as the proportionality of our misconduct proceedings and how they are used and referred to. The third measure —this is particularly important—is the measure of public opinion. As organisations, we respond to that, and we openly and candidly answer those questions.
In the consultation, we have gone through certain elements in relation to which we have said that, operationally, we may not express candour at certain times: for example, in a live situation in which we lawfully employed the services of, say, an undercover police officer or an undercover officer online; or in a live firearms operation, a live kidnap operation or a product contamination operation. In those cases we may seek to use a little bit of subterfuge to make sure we gain the lawful aim and the right public outcome for the victim at the end of it. Does that explain it?
Tessa Munt
Thank you. I invite you to pass your comments to the Chair in writing at some point, if that is possible, because I do not have time to ask you about that in detail now, but I am very interested in your views.
Richard Miller: I fully agree with what Mr Minnoch has said on that point. The Law Society would also be very happy to provide more detailed views on this issue in due course.
Q
Richard Miller: There are three areas that most need to be covered. First, what is the structure within which legal aid is delivered? We believe that the Bill does not go quite far enough here, in that it provides for legal help—the very lowest level of assistance—to families and it provides for advocacy. In most court proceedings, there is a middle level of legal representation that is provided. We think that level has benefits both for the Government and for the families concerned. For the Government, it provides greater control and greater quality control over the work. For the families—or, more to the point, for the firms representing the families—it means they are able to apply for payments on account in long-running cases, which is crucial to make this an economically viable expansion for firms.
You have to get the structure right in the first place. You then have to build up the capacity and you also have to make it attractive enough overall for lawyers who are not currently doing this work to want to come into it. Those are the three aspects that need to be addressed. Chris, do you want to expand on that a bit?
Chris Minnoch: Thank you, Richard. Minister, it is a very important question. I will start by saying how refreshing it is to come to a session such as this to talk about something positive in relation to the legal aid scheme—a positive expansion—after so many years of giving and submitting evidence to various Committees asking for these sorts of measures to be introduced. I give credit to the campaigning groups that have made this happen and to the Government for taking such a progressive step.
Richard is absolutely right that we have to see the expansion of legal aid in the context of the current civil legal aid system in particular, but you cannot dissociate that from the criminal legal aid system because there is an overlap between the two in terms of who is delivering the service. There are fundamental weaknesses in the sustainability and in the workforce, especially regarding recruitment and retention, that have been recognised by various recent Government-led reviews. There is lots of evidence there and I am sure that, as a Minister, you are fully aware of some of the challenges you face in trying to plug those.
Richard highlighted a really important point about the technical construction of the scheme. We are already in discussions, as is the Law Society, with the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency about how we can improve that structure to make the work as sustainable as possible, and as attractive as possible, both to existing providers and new providers.
There is a really critical element, however, which was raised earlier today in some of the evidence that I heard, about which types of lawyers are best placed to deliver these services. Despite the challenges that the legal aid scheme has faced, particularly in the last 15 years or so, we are really lucky to have a core of incredibly experienced and expert lawyers who carry out this sort of work. Our advice to the Government would be to start there and then look to expand the capacity of those lawyers.
There is an issue around capacity, because inquest work takes such an emotional toll on the lawyers involved. There are elements of vicarious trauma that are involved in these sorts of cases, so it is very difficult for your entire caseload to be inquest work for 100% of your time. There are some natural capacity issues built in, even for lawyers doing that work currently, but those are the organisations—I think one of the earlier witnesses described them as human rights lawyers—where we need to start building up their capacity by making the system as attractive as possible, so that they themselves can recruit and develop the lawyers who can expand this work.
We are also already in talks with the Legal Aid Agency about separating out inquest work from the current categories of legal aid, so it is a separate category of legal aid with its own separate supervisor standards and its own separate accreditation process—those sorts of things. Richard, you might want to address the kind of training, development and accreditation issues arising from that.
Richard Miller: Indeed, yes. We are already having initial discussions with the Legal Aid Agency about what training might be required and whether accreditation would also be worthwhile in this area. The Law Society is well positioned to deliver training at scale, as would be needed here. One thing that we would like to explore is whether there is scope for Government assistance with the cost of that training to ensure that we can get the initial boost to capacity that will be urgently required.
On the question of accreditation, at the moment our preference is not to go that far, because we must be careful not to establish too many barriers to getting that expansion in place first. Down the line, it might be that accreditation would be worthwhile, but initially I think we need to make sure that the training is there and that lawyers are aware of their obligation not to deliver work beyond their competence. That should get the expansion of capacity that we need in the short term that we can then build on.
Q
Richard Miller: That is why we need to be starting those discussions right now, and we are. It is very difficult—it is a bit chicken and egg—because until the work is there, lawyers might not see that now is the time to incur the cost of developing plans to expand into the area. We need to get the legislation in place and be very clear as to when it is coming in, in order for the lawyers to be able to prepare for it.
We can never be absolutely certain, but with a combination of what we are starting to do already and building on the experience of the lawyers who are already working in this field, some of whom have said to us that they believe they can expand fairly quickly to mop up at least some of the additional demand, we can probably get to a tolerable position. It is going to involve work over a prolonged period of time to continue to build capacity, but delaying implementation simply does not help us to address the problem.
Chris Minnoch: To add to that, one of the difficulties with delaying implementation is that—this may come out in a later question from the Committee—the lawyers have a very important role to play in supporting bereaved families at inquests, but they also have a very important role in supporting the inquest itself and the coroner. They will probably play an important role in enabling or assisting the coroner to make determinations around the reasonableness and proportionality of public authority representation. You have heard already today about the extraordinary difficulties that unrepresented bereaved families face in accessing the information they need before the inquest proceedings or an inquiry begins, and that is another role the lawyers can play.
Delaying implementation on the basis of concerns about capacity might actually undermine some of the other elements of the Bill that are central to making it work and to the creation of the culture change that we have heard victims and bereaved families speak about so eloquently.
Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)
Q
Secondly, if a public authority has a team of, for instance, one senior and two juniors, why should a bereaved family be represented by perhaps only one junior counsel? That really would not be parity of arms. The Bill talks about members of bereaved families, but how many members of that family are we talking about? Is it one specific next of kin? We heard evidence earlier from a witness who talked about a divorcing couple. Would they both be granted legal aid?
Chris Minnoch: On your first question, there is an issue around non-means-tested legal aid becoming available and so the case coming into scope at that stage, at the point at which the public authority is appointed as an interested party. Some of our members have expressed concerns that the appointment—the actual point at which an authority becomes an interested party—might be quite late in the process. It could be not when the inquest is opened, but perhaps closer to when the proceedings commence. An awful lot of work needs to be done in the intervening period, and that can last a long time. We are already talking to the Ministry of Justice about whether, although that is currently written into the Bill, it is the best way to determine the point at which non-means-tested legal aid is made available.
Of course, there are other situations in which means-tested legal aid will be made available, particularly when more than one family is involved who want representation, or at least preparation for the inquest rather than the advocacy itself.
At the moment, there is not a cap in respect of the preparation and advocacy aspects of work on inquest cases. That is probably right, because the system is already over-bureaucratic and underpaid. The creation of a cap, or people having to extend the level of legal aid they can access at different points in time in an inquest process, is just going to act as another barrier to ensuring adequate representation.
Parity is a really difficult question. I have been speaking about this to our members who are inquest specialists. One of the points they made, which was slightly surprising to me—I think Richard alluded to this earlier—was that they do not necessarily see parity as being about the number or seniority of the lawyers that represent either side in the inquisitorial process. Because of the completely different role that a bereaved family have in an inquest—as opposed to a public authority—it is probably understandable in many circumstances why a public authority might have a bigger legal team. If the duty of candour works in practice, and if public authorities genuinely want to assist the coroner to carry out their investigations, they may need a larger legal team to assist them properly. I would not say it is as simple as just numbers and seniority.
To build on one of the points mentioned earlier, the reasonableness and proportionality of legal representation will be linked to conduct, to a degree. The assessment by the coroner of whether the public authority’s level of representation is proportionate will very much flow from whether the coroner believes the public authority is acting and following their duty of candour and their duty to assist the investigation, and is being open, frank and transparent. If they are, there will be few concerns about their level of legal representation, but if they are not, there will be big concerns about their level of legal representation, because that will be seen as a mechanism to block rather than comply with their duties. Does that make sense?
Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Davies-Jones
Main Page: Alex Davies-Jones (Labour - Pontypridd)Department Debates - View all Alex Davies-Jones's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Public interest—
“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must define in regulations what constitutes the ‘public interest’ for the purposes of—
(a) Section 1(1)(a),
(b) Schedule 1(8)(b).
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may not be made until a draft has been approved by both Houses.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to define public interest for the purposes of this Act by regulations.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger, on this historic and momentous Bill Committee. With your permission, I will say a few words about just how momentous this is.
Last week, this Committee heard evidence directly from the Hillsborough families about the Bill and what it means to them. I know that the Committee will agree that that was a huge privilege for us. The Bill is of great and national importance to so many people up and down the country, and we will not play politics with this legislation. I hope my colleagues in the Opposition will do the same. What we will do is listen: we will listen to the families, Hillsborough Law Now and the members of this Committee. It is right that they and the Committee push us and challenge us. They have my commitment that if we can find ways to improve the Bill, we will.
Finally, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston. They have each tirelessly campaigned for justice for the Hillsborough families, and played no small part in seeing this legislation brought forward. I am honoured to have them by my side in Committee.
Of course, we have all said this time and again, but we would absolutely not be here without the families. This is for them, and for those who have campaigned tirelessly for so long to seek justice and to ensure that no one ever has to go through what they went through. This is not just for the Hillsborough families, but for anyone who has experienced cover-up or had to fight for the truth, and for the memories of all those who are no longer with us.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. As we consider the clause and new clause 2, I want to be clear that the Opposition recognise the importance of the Bill’s overarching aims. Candour, transparency, frankness and, above all, the requirement that public officials act in the public interest are principles that I am sure Members from all parties support.
As we commented on during evidence sessions about the chief coroner, it would be quite wrong to portray good-faith efforts to ensure that we give due consideration to each and every possible implication of the Bill as in any way not giving due regard to its noble aims, in particular the considerable effort and good intentions of the many campaigners supporting it, including the ones we heard from during the evidence sessions. As the Minister commented, I do not think that anyone could have been anything but deeply moved and reflective on hearing the experiences that the witnesses went through in such appalling circumstances. They were a limited group, but one made up not just of those affected by Hillsborough but those affected by many other scandals in which the state and its bodies covered up and mistreated people.
Ultimately, even if we believe that the Bill could be improved, and we will hold the Government to account for any unintended consequences, we support the Bill and do not expect to oppose it on Third Reading. I hope that that is an important message for the campaigners supporting it. However, we want to probe the Government’s thinking and suggest possible improvements.
Before we come to the specifics of our new clause, I will comment on clause 1 as a whole, as it lays out the core purpose of the Bill and highlights just how far the political class as a whole has to come in delivering candour, and how contentious these matters can be. In the very weeks we have been considering this Bill, with the Government professing to want to drive further improvements in the candour and frankness of accountability, we have been having a heated and highly contested public debate about what constitutes candour and frankness. I raise that debate not to further discuss it in Committee—it would not be appropriate to engage in it for its merits—but just to highlight exactly how contentious such things are. We have a Chancellor who, in my view, has clearly failed to operate with candour and frankness, but I am sure that view is fiercely opposed by other members of the Committee.
Thank you for that further clarification, Sir Roger.
These issues are absolutely live and happening all the time—this week alone, we have seen examples of it—and we need to understand the implications of the Bill. I am far from alone in recognising the difficulty in defining terms such as “candour” and “public interest”. John Coggon, professor of law at the University of Bristol law school, writes:
“The public interest has no single, fixed definition. Even as a technical term of art its sense varies both for being context dependent and for being a question that may be settled by different sorts of institutional actor. It may, for instance, demand consideration of national security, national economic interest, protection of health, maintenance of a justice system, protection of fundamental rights. And determinations may be made by courts, politicians, legislators, executive agencies, and so on. Each can and will bring different forms and ranges of consideration to the process of determining what the public interest demands, and whether those demands are compelling.”
Anyone who has spent any time inside a public body—a police force, a regulator or a Government Department—knows that the public interest can mean very different things to different people. It is shaped by context, role, circumstance and sometimes professional norms. What one official believes to be in the public interest, a Minister, senior civil servant or statutory body might see very differently. That is not mere theory; it is the daily reality of modern governance.
Questions were raised during the evidence sessions about how the public interest might be used inappropriately in defence of an allegation of misconduct in public office. As new clause 2 points to, paragraph 1(8)(b) of schedule 1 specifically allows for the withholding of information in the public interest. Failing in that area could lead to both those we would wish not to be prosecuted being prosecuted and those we want to see prosecuted escaping justice. It is an important area of how the Bill will operate.
I am not so ambitious as to suggest that through the Bill the Committee will be able to create a perfect definition of public interest, but I speak in support of the new clause in an attempt to ensure that the Government recognise that they need to properly engage with that issue if the Bill is to be successful. A definition of the public interest need not be exhaustive, as I have said, but the wide-ranging ramifications of the Bill place an onus on the Government to ensure that the frontline civil servant of any kind has somewhere to look and turn to when wrestling with these matters—a starting point that might help them to structure their thinking and make decisions.
By failing to define the term at all, even in the most basic way, the Bill risks giving us a duty that is challenging to operate for a junior civil servant. It risks more uncertainty about compliance, inconsistency between institutions and even potential litigation where prosecutors or courts are left to decide after the fact what Parliament must have meant. The obvious challenging scenario is when officials need to consider situations where there are competing public interests—national security versus transparency, value for money versus speed of delivery, or personal privacy versus public accountability. Without more assistance for thinking those matters through, how does an official protect themselves from the—possibly criminal—allegation that their judgment call was not in the public interest among competing interests?
The new clause does not attempt to dictate exactly what public interest must mean; it simply requires the Secretary of State to set out a structure or framework in regulations, subject to approval by both Houses. Ultimately, if this legislation is to achieve the cultural change that the Government claim it will, the foundations must be clear and easy to understand. Public officials should not be left purely guessing what Parliament might have meant, or how we expected them to weigh these issues—Parliament should tell them. New clause 2 offers the Government the opportunity to do exactly that, and I hope they will take it.
Clause 1 sets out the purpose of the Bill as a whole to ensure that public authorities and public officials perform their functions at all times with candour, transparency and frankness, and in the public interest. As the clause describes, the Bill sets out those duties in the substantive provisions that follow. The clause does not have any separate legal effect itself; it is designed to set out clearly and simply the intention behind the Bill to assist those who will be subject to it and the general public in their understanding.
I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling new clause 2, which seeks to require the Secretary of State to define exactly what is meant by the term “public interest” in clause 1. Clause 1 is a purpose clause and does not have any legal effect in and of itself, separate from the other provisions in the Bill. It sets out the intention behind the Bill, and how the Bill achieves that intention by describing the relevant provisions.
In this context, acting in the public interest means fulfilling the obligations and duties in the remainder of the Bill that arise from it; it means being candid at inquiries and investigations; and it means that those working for public authorities must adhere to the codes and ethics required by the Bill. In general, “acting in the public interest” is usually not defined in legislation, as the hon. Gentleman said. This is because what is in the public interest will depend on the circumstance and context of that particular situation. Seeking to define what it means might have the effect of narrowing what could be considered to be in the public interest.
In schedule 1, the public interest is referred to in the context of public interest immunity. Public interest immunity is an established concept in law: it is a rule of evidence where documents are withheld if their disclosure would be injurious to the public interest. What is the “public interest” will be dependent on the particular circumstances, and we should not seek to constrain this or undermine a very long-established legal doctrine that is applied by the courts. The Inquiries Act 2005 and other legislation already contain provisions of this kind to ensure that appropriate protections are attached to sensitive information, which the Bill is replicating. I hope that clarifies the purpose of clause 1 and why defining “public interest” would not be appropriate and could actually hinder proceedings.
The Minister rightly describes how tightly the courts consider these matters in detail. As the Bill puts a whole range of very junior civil servants in the firing line, does she at least accept that guidance or materials might be helpful to assist a broader audience in how they approach these issues in their day-to-day work?
I welcome that intervention and the whole purpose of this legislation is to ensure exactly that. Obviously, there will be guidance in the codes of ethics that are produced, and public authorities will probably provide training for their individual public servants who will now be captured by the Bill, if, as I hope, it receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act. I am due to attend a session at the University of Liverpool to look at exactly how we can implement the Bill, should it become legislation and reach the statute book. All of that is being taken into consideration to advise everyone about what is expected of them under the duty of candour. Therefore, I urge the hon. Gentleman not to press new clause 2 to a vote, and I pledge to work with him on exactly that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
This is one of those moments when, should the hon. Gentleman wish to press new clause 2 to a vote, which he may not, it would not be called now; it would be called later in the proceedings, because all new clauses are voted on at the end of the consideration of the Bill.
We come now to amendment 31. This is one of those occasions when we are debating two separate groups of amendments to clause 2. We have the choice: the clause stand part debate can take place now or at the end, but not both. Let us bear that in mind.
Clause 2
Duty of candour and assistance
Tessa Munt
I thank the Minister. Amendment 32 would require public authorities or officials assisting an inquiry, investigation, inquest or independent panel to demonstrate that they have taken steps to ensure that relevant persons can safely disclose information relevant to that investigation. The amendment would require public authorities to take proactive steps to ensure that all relevant officials can safely disclose information. It would strengthen protections for those providing evidence, helping to prevent retaliation or intimidation, and ensure that inquiries and investigations have access to all relevant information for thorough scrutiny of public officials’ decision making.
I thank the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills for tabling these amendments. Amendment 31 seeks to ensure that, under the duty of candour and assistance, an inquiry or investigation, or, as she stated, a review panel, is notified by public authorities and officials of all relevant acts or information, including omissions or failures to act. We agree wholeheartedly, and I reassure the hon. Lady and all members of the Committee that the Bill already achieves the intent of the amendment.
Clause 23 provides definitions for terms used throughout the Bill. It specifies that an
“‘act’ includes an omission or a course of conduct”.
Therefore, in clause 2, “act” is to be read as including any omission or course of conduct that may be relevant, which could include approving the actions of others. To “have information” could include information that a person approved the actions of another person, or had knowledge of them and did not prevent them.
Amendment 42 would place a requirement on public authorities under the duty of candour and assistance to retain all relevant records, including digital records. Again, the Government agree with the intention behind the amendment, and believe that the provisions in the Bill are designed to achieve it in practice. Clause 2(4)(a) requires authorities and officials to provide information likely to be relevant to an inquiry or investigation if requested. They will not meet that obligation if they allow the information to be lost or destroyed when they ought to be providing it. In addition, the individual in charge of an authority has an obligation to take all reasonable steps to secure the authority’s compliance with that duty. That would necessarily involve ensuring that information is accessible within the authority, so that it can meet its obligations under the Bill.
Amendment 32 seeks to ensure that the Bill has adequate safeguards to protect those complying with the duty of candour and assistance. We agree that ensuring that public officials feel safe to disclose information is essential, and several aspects of the Bill speak to that point. The duty of candour and assistance provides appropriate safeguards for the protection of sensitive information and onward disclosure and ensures that officials can feel confident that the information they provide will be handled appropriately.
Tessa Munt
Can I ask the Minister for clarity? A lot of the proposed legislation seems to deal with when an investigation has been called for or set up. There may be a significant gap between that and when an authority knows that something has gone wrong and that an investigation, inquiry, inquest or independent panel is likely to follow. Is there is a way in which the duties can kick in the moment that somebody recognises that something will come of that rather than when an investigation is called for formally?
There are two versions of the duty of candour: the always-on duty of candour by which every public servant should have to act in their everyday life, and the duty of candour with criminal sanctions attached to it that kicks in when there is an investigation or inquiry. The whole point is that they will work hand-in-hand. The former will prevent the latter—that is the intention. The code of ethics and the guidance that we talked about in an earlier debate will assist, but that will require a significant culture change across the whole public sector; it will not be easy or happen overnight. I am not naive enough to believe that it will be fixed just because we have the legislation. It will take a momentous effort by all of us to ensure that the culture seeps down from the top. That is also the intention behind the implementation, which we will come to later in the debate.
I reassure the hon. Lady that part 2 of the Bill requires public authorities to set out the process for exactly how public officials can raise internal complaints, to promote a culture of internal challenge. It also requires public authorities to set out their whistleblowing procedures, drawing officials’ attention to any legal protections they may benefit from. Although we are sympathetic to the intent behind amendment 32, we do not think that it will provide sufficient clarity on what public authorities would be expected to do to ensure that officials feel safe to disclose information, nor how that would operate as part of their duty of candour and assistance, for which non-compliance entails criminal sanctions.
Given those assurances, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger. I just want to say a few words on this clause about why the duty of candour and assistance is so important, and why it means so much to Hillsborough families, some of whom are my constituents. We heard from a small number of them in the evidence sessions, but there are many more who could have told equally difficult stories about their own experience.
What happened at Hillsborough was a disaster. Nobody who worked for South Yorkshire police left their homes that morning intending to cause it, but the reality is that their gross negligence and inadequate organisation did cause it. Within four and a half months, the public inquiry had identified a loss of police control as the main cause of the disaster. Had our state been operating fully and correctly, we would have recognised that as a country and that would have been the end of the matter. There would have been accountability for those failings, lessons would have been learned, and the families could have grieved for their lost loved ones and moved on with their lives.
Instead, what happened was that the South Yorkshire police, aided and abetted by the West Midlands police, set about telling a story, intent only on deflecting blame for their own failings—even though those failings were then identified within four and a half months. One can understand, perhaps, why a police force faced with that disaster would have wanted to give their side of the story and understanding of what had happened. However, once the public inquiry—within four and a half months—had made findings that excoriated the police response to the disaster, accused a senior officer of telling a disgraceful lie and said in terms that the police would have been better advised to have accepted responsibility rather than sought to put forward a different story that was not credible, one would have expected that there would have been accountability, that the truth would have been accepted by the South Yorkshire police and that there would have been no more attempts to put forward a different narrative.
That did not happen. Instead, the then inquest proceedings—the longest in British legal history at that time, taking over a year—were used in terms by the South Yorkshire police to tell a different story: to put it in the public mind that they had not been at fault, as the public inquiry had clearly found, but that it had been the fans who had attended the match who had been at fault. It had been those who died who had contributed in some way to their own deaths. It had been the survivors of that terrible disaster who had somehow caused the problem. It had been hooliganism and drunkenness—it had been ticketless fans who had forced their way into the grounds.
That is the story that the police told, aided and abetted by the media of the day, some of which behaved disgracefully and suffer for it still on Merseyside, I might say. That story was told repeatedly. It was in every newspaper and all the mini-inquests for over a year of those inquest proceedings. At the end of it, the public perception about what had happened at Hillsborough was completely different from what the public inquiry had found. It was as if the public inquiry had never happened; yet it was right in almost every aspect, and within four and a half months of the disaster.
It is now 36 years since the disaster. In our evidence sessions, we heard from some of the families about the ongoing impact of the lies that were told and the story that has been repeatedly told by South Yorkshire police and those responsible for the disaster, who have been completely unable to accept their culpability. Even as late as the second inquest, they tried again to tell that same discredited story, so the importance of this clause cannot be overemphasised. It gets to the heart of why one might wish to call this a Hillsborough law, even though that is not the Bill’s short title. It might be known colloquially as that, because the fact is that, had those public authorities had the duties provided for in clause 2, there is no way they could have undertaken that campaign of lies, disinformation and propaganda against the wholly innocent families and wholly innocent survivors of that disaster.
It is for that reason that I think it is important that the duty of candour and assistance is an essential part of the Bill. If we enact it and implement it properly without any concerns or problems, that duty is one of the things that will enable us to say that this is a Hillsborough law because, had it been in place at the time, the South Yorkshire or West Midlands police could not have engaged in the disgraceful way that they did, simply to deflect the blame on to anybody else but them—even if that hurt those who had died, the families of those who had died, or the thousands and thousands of survivors. We forget that it was not only my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby who was at the match; thousands of people saw what happened. It was filmed and shown live on TV, so the idea that it could be distorted in the way that it has been—at great public expense and over decades—is a terrible disgrace to the way that our systems work.
If the Bill can put that right, it will have done our whole nation a service, and it will be right to call it a Hillsborough law. It will mean that those families can stop their campaigning and start to grieve and live what is left of their lives. Some 36 years on from what happened, surely they have a right to expect that.
I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East for tabling amendments 18 to 20, which would require public officials and authorities to notify and provide information to any inquiry or investigation within 30 days. The Government agree entirely that public authorities and officials should provide assistance to inquiries and investigations as quickly as possible, and the Bill requires that. Clause 2(6) requires authorities and officials to act “expeditiously” when complying with the obligations placed on them. In some cases, it will be possible for officials and authorities to provide the assistance required within 30 days, but there may be times when it is not.
There will be situations where an inquiry or investigation requires an authority to provide a very large amount of information or data, requiring it to set staff and resources aside to search through potentially thousands of documents and assess their relevance, with all the necessary checks and verification that follow. We think it is important that authorities are given sufficient time to conduct thorough searches and provide accurate information, and that the inquiry or investigation will be best placed to set a reasonable timescale for that.
The duty would also apply to former officials who may have a different job or be retired—or have resigned, as we heard earlier—and there may be situations where it is impossible for them to provide the assistance required within a 30-day time limit. Although I totally agree with the sentiment, a degree of flexibility is therefore important so that we get all the information that inquiries and investigations need. I therefore urge the hon. Member not to press his amendments, but I agree to work with him on a way forward.
I now turn to clause 2. We heard powerfully from my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston exactly why the duty of candour in clause 2 is integral to the Bill. As has been rightly said, this is a Bill for the Hillsborough families, and it will be known colloquially as the Hillsborough law, but it is also a Bill for Ida, for the Grenfell families, for the Manchester Arena families and for anyone who has been wronged by the state.
Today, as well as this Committee, the Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Hillsborough is being published. Within that report, I think there is a recommendation that fully supports the Hillsborough law and says why, because there are officers there who would not have been. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston outlined, history would have been different if those officers had been held to account by clause 2 of the Bill.
I totally agree with my hon. Friend and that is exactly why the Bill is so important and integral. We have all heard the stories—the reality—of what the families, the bereaved and the survivors have been through. No one should ever have to go through that again. The intent behind clause 2 is to do just that: to ensure that no family has to go through the unimaginable again.
Clause 2 sets out the requirements of the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations; in short, what those under the duty need to do. As subsection (1) states:
“Public authorities and public officials must at all times act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations.”
The duty has two stages to it. The first, in clause 2(3), is the requirement for public officials to come forward and make themselves known to an inquiry or investigation if they have reason to believe that their actions or information they hold might be relevant to it. The second, in clause 2(4), is to then provide any assistance that the inquiry or investigation requires.
Clause 2(4) lists the types of assistance that might involve—for example, drawing attention to information that is particularly significant and, for public authorities, to provide a position statement to an inquiry. The head of a public authority may be asked for information and assistance as an individual public official in their own right, where relevant, but subsection (5) places them under an additional obligation. When the authority that they manage is under the duty, they are personally required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that it complies. We believe that that is crucial to the success of the Bill and for the leaders of public authorities to feel personally accountable under the duty.
I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.
The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.
I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.
To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.
Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.
Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.
I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.
We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.
Mr Morrison
I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Tessa Munt
I rise to support amendment 3, proposed by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. I am also a co-signatory of amendment 1, and I thank the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston for her reference to it. I echo the comments that have been made about Primodos and many other things. We have investigations, inquiries, inquests, and independent panels—and no doubt something else will come up at some point. Will the Minister clarify that point and agree that we should have some common language to cover all those things? As has been mentioned, independent panels do come up quite often.
I seek clarity on investigations and inquiries that might be taking place already. My understanding is that the Bill will not affect them, so if someone has something that they want to raise, they will probably need to wait until the Bill has become law. That seems slightly perverse, in that there may be people who want something done within the next six months who are going to have to sit and wait. I would like some clarity on that.
I thank hon. Members for a useful debate getting into the detail the provisions—that is why we have Bill Committees. It would be beneficial for me to clarify exactly how the Bill applies to non-statutory inquiries, as outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston. The duty of candour and assistance will apply to all statutory and non-statutory inquiries and inquests described in schedule 1. Non-statutory inquiries are defined as those caused by a Minister; those that include the delivery of a report with a view to publication; and those that the Minister has confirmed in writing relate to matters of public concern.
This is the first time non-statutory inquiries have been set out in law, but we envisage that this category could include investigations held under other names, such as independent panels, provided the criteria set out are met. Amendment 1 would automatically extend the duty of candour and assistance to independent panels and reviews established by Ministers. The Bill includes a power to extend the duty to other categories of investigations, or to specific investigations via secondary legislation. It is therefore not the case that if an investigation is not covered in the Bill, the duty of candour can never apply.
Tessa Munt
To give an example, if the local authority children’s services department sets up an investigation into something or does one of its serious case reviews—or whatever they are called now—are that organisation, the people within it and the actors in the event that prompted it covered by the duty of candour? Can the Minister be really clear about that?
I am happy to confirm that they will be. They are not currently, but the Government are tabling an amendment to cover that point, and we will come to it later in Committee. Should that amendment be made, the Bill will cover those local authority investigations.
The Cabinet Office is undertaking further work to look at how we reform inquiries. As part of that, we will consider how the different types of inquiries, reviews and investigations could be more clearly defined, and when and how they could best be used. That will inform how the duty is used.
The duty of candour and assistance is a powerful tool to ensure co-operation with investigations, but it would not be useful in all circumstances. Most reviews focus on matters of policy or technical issues— for example, the curriculum and assessment review, the net zero review and the review of the future of women’s football. In those cases, applying the duty would be unnecessary and might risk making reviews more difficult to establish and slower to report. Where the duty is applied, it must be properly monitored and enforced, and therefore frameworks for compliance and the protection of information need to be in place. We must avoid unintentionally impeding or delaying certain types of investigations by introducing unnecessary and unhelpful processes and bureaucracy. We therefore think the Bill strikes the right balance in which investigations it applies to, with the power in the Bill providing us with the tools and flexibility we need to extend the duty where it could be useful.
I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden about how we move forward with her campaign. She has been an incredible and ferocious campaigner for the Primodos families for many years. I have met her and the Primodos families, and I am committed to working with her on a way forward to ensure that the duty of candour can assist.
Amendment 3 is designed to apply the duty of candour and assistance to inquiries that the Secretary of State has designated as local inquiries into grooming gangs. I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. As he will be aware, we are moving at pace to establish a national inquiry into grooming gangs under the Inquiries Act 2005. It will be overseen by an independent commission with statutory powers to compel evidence and testimony so that institutions can be held to account for current and historic failures. The inquiry will be independent of Government and designed to command the confidence of victims and survivors and the wider public.
The Bill already applies the duty to statutory and non-statutory inquiries called by Ministers, including this new inquiry. To strengthen the Bill, we have also tabled an amendment extending the duty to inquiries called by local authorities, and we will debate that shortly. That amendment, combined with the existing provisions in the Bill, will enable the duty to apply to either local or national inquiries into grooming gangs. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.
On amendment 1, I accept the Government’s intention to clarify further how these things will operate. On panels and non-statutory inquiries, although there is sometimes in Government a resistance to public inquiries for the wrong reasons, sometimes it is because they are expensive and time-consuming. The real opportunity for applying the duty of candour more widely is that if we can ensure that non-public inquiries get all the information they need, they are much more likely to be successful, thereby avoiding a future public inquiry with all the associated costs that lawyers make a huge amount of money from.
On amendment 3, although the Minister outlined the future public inquiry, the local inquiries have not been cancelled. There is clearly a view that they must also proceed. I cannot see any reason why we would not want them to proceed on the basis that they are subject to the duty of candour.
I am happy to reassure the shadow Minister that, should the Bill receive Royal Assent, its provisions will apply immediately to ongoing investigations and inquiries. That includes local inquiries, if we pass the amendment that the Government have tabled. We cannot allow that currently, because the Bill has not become law, but once it has done, it will cover existing ongoing inquiries and investigations and those that are yet to commence.
I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 27, line 29, after “applies” insert
“by virtue of this paragraph”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 7.
As I stated previously, the Government have committed to only strengthening this Bill as it moves through Parliament. That is exactly what this group of amendments does. Provision of 2005 Act Extent of application Section 17(1) and (2) (evidence and procedure) Apply only in relation to procedure and conduct of inquiry so far as relating to requirements imposed under the duty of candour and assistance Sections 19 and 20 (restrictions on public access etc) Apply only in relation to restrictions imposed in respect of evidence etc given in compliance with the duty of candour and assistance Section 21(3) to (5) (contents of, and challenges to, notices) Apply to a compliance direction as they apply to a notice under section 21 of the 2005 Act Section 22(1) (privileged information etc) Applies in respect of evidence etc given under the duty of candour and assistance as it applies to evidence etc given under section 21 of the 2005 Act Section 22(2) (public interest immunity) Applies only in relation to evidence or documents that would otherwise be required to be produced under the duty of candour and assistance Section 36 (enforcement by High Court or Court of Session) Applies to a failure to comply etc with a compliance direction as it applies to a failure etc to comply with a notice under section 21 of the 2005 Act.
Before I move on, I want to say how severely disappointed I am that the Opposition pressed the previous amendment to a vote, given my assurances that those types of investigations and inquiries will of course be covered by the Bill. That seemed to fly in the face of the statements at the beginning of the Committee sitting, where we said that we would not play party politics with the Bill. It seems, sadly, that the Opposition do not have the same ambition in mind.
Amendment 7 extends the duty of candour and assistance to apply to local authorities and local authority inquiries into serious incidents called by combined, unitary, borough, county and district councils. We have prepared the amendment with previous local inquiries firmly in mind, such as the Kerslake review into the preparedness for and emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack and local grooming gangs inquiries. It would also cover the Edinburgh tram corruption inquiry mentioned by the Mayor of Greater Manchester in oral evidence.
For the duty to apply, inquiries must relate to matters in the local authority’s area and that are within a local authority’s competence or control. There must also have been a significant risk of causing death or serious physical or psychological harm to one or more persons or substantial economic loss to one or more persons as a result of conduct involving dishonesty, impropriety or a serious breach of ethical or professional standards. That ensures incidents that have caused a significant risk to life or corruption are rightfully brought into scope, with the appropriate threshold in place to avoid unintended pressures and inappropriate use.
The rest of the amendment replicates the provisions set out for statutory and non-statutory inquiries in part 1 and part 2 of schedule 1. Amendments 6 and 4 are consequential on amendment 7.
Amendment 6 agreed to.
Amendment made: 7, in schedule 1, page 30, line 18, at end insert—
“Part 2A
Local authority inquiries
3A (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) a local authority in England has caused an inquiry (however described) to be established,
(b) the terms of reference of the inquiry do not require it to determine any fact, or make any recommendation, that is not wholly or primarily concerned with a local authority matter,
(c) the inquiry’s functions include the delivery of a report to the authority with a view to its publication, and
(d) the authority has given written confirmation to the person leading the inquiry (“the chair”) that it appears to the authority that the inquiry is established in connection with an event or series of events in respect of which the condition in sub-paragraph (2) is met.
(2) The condition is that the event (or series of events) caused, or created a significant risk of causing
(a) death or serious physical or psychological harm, or
(b) substantial economic loss to one or more persons as a result of conduct involving dishonesty, impropriety or a serious breach of ethical or professional standards.
(3) As soon as reasonably practicable after the start of the inquiry, the chair must (subject to sub-paragraph (11)) give a compliance direction—
(a) to a public authority or public official, or
(b) to a person who had a relevant public responsibility in connection with an incident to which the inquiry relates,
if it appears to the chair that the person’s acts are or may be relevant to the inquiry or that they otherwise have information likely to be relevant.
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not limit the power of the chair to give a compliance direction at any other time during the course of the inquiry.
(5) Where a compliance direction is given to a public authority or body within sub-paragraph (3)(b), a compliance direction must also be given to the individual appearing to the chair to be in charge of that authority or body.
(6) A “compliance direction” is a direction to comply with the obligations under the duty of candour and assistance imposed by—
(a) section 2(4), and
(b) in the case of a direction given to an individual under sub-paragraph (5), section 2(5).
(7) A compliance direction—
(a) must be given in writing;
(b) must set out the terms of reference of the inquiry;
(c) may specify particular requirements to be complied with (and for that purpose may specify the form and manner in which, and the period within which, those requirements are to be complied with);
(d) may be varied, supplemented or revoked by the giving of a further direction.
(8) In determining the objectives of the inquiry for the purposes of complying with the duty of candour and assistance under section 2(4), regard is to be had (in particular) to the terms of reference as set out in the compliance direction.
(9) The reference to a report in sub-paragraph (1)(c) is to a report that sets out—
(a) the facts determined by the chair, and
(b) the recommendations of the chair (where the purposes of the inquiry include the making of recommendations).
(10) The provisions of the Inquiries Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) listed in the first column of the Table apply, to the extent specified in the corresponding entry in the second column, to an inquiry in relation to which the duty of candour and assistance applies by virtue of this paragraph as they apply to an inquiry under the 2005 Act—
(11) A compliance direction—
(a) may be given only—
(i) in respect of evidence, documents or other things that are wholly or primarily concerned with a local authority matter, or
(ii) for the purpose of inquiring into something that is wholly or primarily a local authority matter;
(b) may not be given so as to require any evidence, document or other thing to be given, produced or provided by or on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland Minister (including the First Minister and the deputy First Minister acting jointly);
(c) may not be given to a public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning given by section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and a public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this prohibition (but this paragraph otherwise applies to an intelligence service as it applies to other public authorities).
(12) A person ceases to be subject to the duty of candour and assistance when the inquiry to which it relates comes to an end.
(13) In determining when an inquiry established by a local authority comes to an end for the purposes of sub-paragraph (12), section 14 of the Inquiries Act 2005 applies as it applies to an inquiry under that Act as if—
(a) references in that section to the Minister were to the authority, and
(b) subsection (4)(b) of that section were omitted.
(14) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a local authority in England do not include a parish council;
(b) references to a “local authority matter”, in relation to a local authority, are to any matter—
(i) which relates to the area of the authority, and
(ii) in respect of which the authority exercises functions;
(c) “terms of reference”, in relation to an inquiry established by a local authority, means—
(i) the matters to which the inquiry relates;
(ii) any particular matters as to which the chair is to determine the facts;
(iii) whether the chair is to make recommendations;
(iv) any other matters relating to the scope of the inquiry that the local authority may specify;
(d) the reference to a person who had a relevant public responsibility in connection with an incident is to be read in accordance with section 4.
(15) Paragraph 3 applies to a compliance direction given under this paragraph as it applies to a compliance direction given under paragraph 2.”
This amendment extends the duty of candour and assistance, and the related power to give compliance directions, so as to include certain local authority inquiries in England.
I beg to move amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 30, line 33, after “of the” insert “senior”.
This is a drafting refinement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 9 and 10.
Schedule 1.
These three amendments are minor and technical. Government amendments 8 and 9 update schedule 1 to refer to a “senior coroner”, thereby identifying the statutory office for consistency with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and other legislation. Government amendment 10 replaces a reference to this “Schedule” in schedule 1, paragraph 4 with a reference to this “paragraph”. This is a drafting refinement to clarify that the definitions in new paragraph 2A of schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 apply only to that paragraph rather than to the entirety of schedule 5. I commend these amendments to the committee.
Tessa Munt
Might I seek some clarity on what happens with area coroners as opposed to senior coroners?
I can confirm that an area coroner, for the sake of the Bill and under the Coroners Act, is classed as a senior coroner.
Amendment 8 agreed to.
Amendments made: 9, in schedule 1, page 30, line 38, after “to the” insert “senior”.
This is a drafting refinement.
Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 32, line 1, leave out “Schedule” and insert “paragraph”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This is a drafting refinement.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3
Section 2: further provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 works alongside clause 2 in making some more detailed provisions about the operation of the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations to ensure that they are practical, effective and proportionate. Clause 3(2) provides important flexibility for inquiries and investigations to alter or disapply the requirement for public officials and authorities to notify the inquiry or investigation if they have reason to believe they are relevant.
There may be situations where the requirement would be impractical or unhelpful for the inquiry itself. Clearly, it would have been impractical for every single NHS worker involved in the response to the pandemic to notify the covid-19 inquiry of their possible relevance, or an inquiry may wish to hear from those relevant to different subjects at different times and in different stages. Clause 3(3) reinforces clause 2 by requiring public officials and authorities to notify inquiries and investigations of their potential relevance as soon as is reasonably practicable. Subsections (4), (5), and (6) attach some procedure to the duty to make it practical, which schedule 1 builds on.
Inquiries and investigations will specify the assistance they require and what are called compliance directions in schedule 1. These give control to the inquiry or investigation to set out the assistance they actually require, and provide important clarity for those under the duty, so they know exactly what is expected of them. Clause 2 sets an expectation that public authorities will provide a position statement at inquiries. Such statements, made early on in proceedings can help inquiries to identify the key issues to investigate and to home in on the points of contention. In most cases, we expect these to be useful, but subsections (5) and (6) give inquiries the discretion to disapply that requirement if it would be contrary to the efficiency and effectiveness of the inquiry.
Seamus Logan
Could the Minister give an example to the Committee of such a circumstance?
Yes, of course. I have mentioned the covid-19 inquiry—it would have been impractical for every single worker to come forward to an inquiry—but I add that the chair of an inquiry must give reasons, publishing them and outlining why it would not be practical, or not helpful to the inquiry, not to bring forward a position statement.
Subsection (7) is vital to ensure that the duty of candour does not cut across existing laws, such as those on data protection or safeguarding.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Extension of duty to other persons with public responsibilities
Tessa Munt
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 4, line 19, after “authority” insert—
“or any sub-contractor in any chain of provision to a service provider”.
This amendment ensures that any person involved in providing a service to a service provider which was subcontracted will fall under the duty to comply with the duty of candour and assistance to an inquiry or investigation.
I rise briefly to support the amendment and the points made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. It is about not just existing contractual arrangements, but how there might be perverse incentives for people to create different structures if they think that, through contracting or subcontracting, they will escape the accountability under the Bill. I am keen to hear from the Minister.
Probably the example that everyone has in mind is the Post Office scandal. That was a direct contractor, but it could have had subcontractors and so on. When the Post Office was conducting its private investigations, it might have used subcontractors to do some of those investigations. That would not be an unusual step for an organisation to take, so it is important that we get clarity on this issue.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The amendment would apply the duty of candour to subcontractors as well as contractors of a public authority, as has been outlined. In the Bill, we have sought to extend the duty into the private sector in a manner that is proportionate and effective. The focus is, and must be, public authorities and public officials—those whose role is to serve the public. That has to be the starting point. The Bill then extends the obligations of the duty of candour and assistance to private bodies and individuals that either had a statutory health and safety obligation in connection with the incident under investigation or were a contractor to a public authority and, in that capacity, had a significant impact on members of the public in connection with the incident. As we have heard, these provisions are designed to capture the equivalents of Fujitsu in the Post Office inquiry.
I welcome that intervention. As I have stated, if there was a statutory health and safety obligation in connection with an incident under investigation, then, yes, those individuals would be captured by the Bill.
If there had been an investigation or inquiry into that then, yes, it would.
Subcontractors are one or more stages removed. They are responsible to the main or another contractor. Where relevant, we would expect a main contractor to account for the performance and actions of a subcontractor and be candid in doing so. Statutory inquiries and inquests already have the ability to compel evidence from such persons if necessary. Therefore, on balance, we do not think it necessary or proportionate to extend the duty to all subcontractors. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Tessa Munt
If subcontractors get contracted and know that they are working for a local authority or Government body, they just need to pass on that responsibility within the contractual terms. The difficulty comes the moment there is separation between the organisation that is subject to duty of candour and a subcontractor of a subcontractor. It is not difficult—we do these things with payment terms—so I plead with the Minister to make sure that we cover subcontractors. It will not be satisfactory for a subcontractor at tier 1 to speak for a subcontractor at tier 3. It will not happen. It will not be robust enough. I foresee all sorts of slippage, especially when there are whistleblowers two or three tiers down the contract. I plead with the Minister again to reconsider what she is saying.
Secondly, what happens when the senior body—the overarching organisation—is abroad? If I may use an example, Wessex Water—I am not picking on them for any particular reason—is owned by Pennon Group, which I understand is Malaysian. What happens when the head office is abroad?
I am happy to pick up both those points. On the first point, I will work with the hon. Lady to ensure that we find a way forward in terms of ensuring that there is no unintended gap and that we are not missing anything. A balance has to be struck between how far we go in the private sector before we are covering everybody with a duty of candour. However, we can find a way forward here.
That is a hugely important intervention. In Grenfell, many subcontractors did not fall under the scope. It is a real concern that we need to look at before Report to make sure that subcontractors are in scope. This is all about a change of culture. We need a change of culture within the building industry.
I agree. I am committed to working with hon. Members on a way forward.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills about what happens if the head office is abroad, the Bill will provide the inquiry or investigation with the powers to obtain information from an individual wherever they are, even if they have retired, if they have resigned or if they now live abroad.
Tessa Munt
On the basis that we can all work together to make sure that we cover subcontractors, including the different tiers of subcontracting, I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I was going to press it to a vote, but the Minister has assured me that she will try to do something before Report and I recognise that we have support on both sides of the Committee. I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Offence of failing to comply with duty
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, after “objectives” insert:
“or are reckless as to whether it will do so,”.
This is simply a strengthening amendment that has come from the lawyers, and which I hope the Government will take on board. It is worth pointing out that we only have one shot at this. We need to ensure that there is no unfortunate language that perhaps does not allow the Bill to be as strong as we need it to be, so I hope the Government will accept the amendment.
The current wording in clause 5(1) sets the mental element of failing to discharge the duty as intent, and the mental elements of failing to provide the information in the duty as intent or recklessness—being cognisant of the risk and choosing to take it nevertheless. We feel, and I certainly feel, that this is a baseless distinction and an anomaly. The mental element should be the same, and the amendment would rectify that. It is simply a strengthening amendment to make sure that we shut any gaps.
I sincerely thank my hon. Friend for his amendment, which seeks to lower the mental standard threshold from intent to include recklessness for the purposes of the offence of failing to comply with the duty. Recklessness already applies to breaches of the obligations in clause 2(4) and (5), so the amendment would extend the application of recklessness to obligations in clause 2(3). As the Committee has heard, under clause 2(3), those whose acts or information may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation are obliged to make themselves known to the chair. We think there is uncertainty about what recklessness in this context would actually mean and therefore do not think it right for there to be uncertainty about the test for a criminal offence.
Conversely, it is straightforward and clear for the test to be that an individual or authority intends to impede the work of the inquiry or investigation by failing to make it known that they might be relevant. Once an individual or authority has received a compliance direction from the inquiry or investigation specifying the assistance that is required—the second stage of the duty—they will then know clearly what is required of them, so the test for the offence becomes either intention or recklessness. Recklessness in that context makes sense. I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment, although I am happy to meet him to discuss these concerns.
I rise briefly to emphasise some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and urge the Minister to consider whether more can be done in that respect. The lesson of Hillsborough is that the organisations at fault set about using every pound they had available to defend themselves—and we will hear more in the IOPC report, to be published later today.
Those senior offices who made decisions to use the public money that they had in that way simply elongated and lengthened the amount of agony and pain. A corporate fine against an organisation may not be enough to deter that kind of behaviour, so I urge the Minister to consider what more might be done in terms of command responsibility.
I thank all hon. Members for tabling these amendments and for today’s debate. As we heard on Thursday, command responsibility is a priority for change and accountability, and I therefore hope I will be able to provide further clarity as to how our Bill ensures clear accountability right at the top. Hillsborough families were clear that there must be individual accountability, with those who have engaged in state cover-ups held responsible. Our Bill clearly delivers that.
Any individual who commits a duty of candour offence can be prosecuted. That includes chief executives or the equivalent. If a public authority breaches its duty of candour or misleads the public, anyone in a management position who consented or connived with that breach can also be prosecuted. As such, amendment 27 would duplicate the provisions in schedule 3(3). Given that clarification, I ask the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw the amendment.
Our Bill is consistent with the approach taken in other legislation, including the Bribery Act 2010 and the Fraud Act 2006, where personal liability for offences committed by a corporate body relies on consent or connivance. Anyone in charge of a public authority has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their authority complies with the duty of candour and assistance. If they fail to do so, they will face prosecution.
Amendments 33, 34, 44 and 45 would hold the chief executive personally responsible for offences committed by the public authority even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed, and even if—in the case of amendments 33 and 44—they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the organisation’s compliance with the duty of candour. We do not believe that that is the intention of the amendments, and we do not think it fair to attach criminal responsibility in that way. We intend the duties to apply widely. For example, we plan to extend the duty of candour and assistance to NHS investigations. It would not be reasonable or realistic to expect the chief executive of an NHS trust to be across every single detail of every response in any investigation into an incident at that trust. Instead, we would expect them to have systems in place to ensure that the authority is complying, which is precisely what the Bill requires them to do.
Seamus Logan
To build on my point to the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby, the issue here is that the criminal responsibility focuses the mind of the person with command responsibility. It requires that person—the chief executive or otherwise—to ensure full compliance. That is the point.
I totally agree. I am absolutely reassured that the Bill, as drafted, does just that. It ensures that there is criminal liability on the head of a public authority to ensure that everything is covered. However, as I have already stated, when something goes wrong in an NHS setting and we know that something has gone wrong but are unable to find out exactly what, despite the head of that NHS trust having all the procedures in place for applying the duty of candour, it would not be fair or reasonable to put criminal sanctions on the head of that NHS executive.
Tessa Munt
Is not the point that, as the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East said, it focuses the mind of chief executives and very senior officers in an organisation if there is the possibility of punishment—of criminal sanction and imprisonment? I take the point made earlier about a fine probably being of absolutely no consequence to an organisation. So often we have heard that what people who have been offended against, in whatever way, really seek is a swift apology and acceptance that something has gone wrong. That is going to come from the duty of candour, but we need to have a sanction available against chief executives and senior officers so that they focus on making sure that their organisations comply and act in an appropriate way.
I genuinely do not think that we have crossed wires here. The intention of the Bill is the same as that of the amendments; it is just about how we are doing this. Our approach holds the heads of authorities and the heads of all public organisations accountable for the things that they can reasonably be expected to do or not do. There is no exemption here: it is about whether they have done it or not, and about what is reasonably to be expected of them. We are confident that such accountability, as drafted in the Bill, will drive positive cultural change. The amendments in this group would unintentionally have the potential to criminalise a chief executive even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed and they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the compliance of the organisation. We can find no precedence for such an approach and are deeply concerned that it could have a chilling effect on recruiting public sector leaders.
I reassure the Committee that the Bill ensures accountability right at the top. I am happy to share further information with the Committee, setting that out exactly as it is, and I urge the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw amendment 27.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Davies-Jones
Main Page: Alex Davies-Jones (Labour - Pontypridd)Department Debates - View all Alex Davies-Jones's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI think the Minister can hear the concern from Members on both sides of the Committee that this will not be as effective if there is no individual responsibility, and if those who have done wrong can hide behind the corporate wall and ride off into the sunset with their full pensions, with no accountability or justice. Once the Minister listens to the evidence, and certainly the response of the families today, hopefully we can reflect on whether we feel this is a loophole that could be utilised by those who are responsible. It is our responsibility in this place to shut that down. I hope the Minister will listen to and reflect on what we have said today, and meet me after this sitting.
We talk about focusing minds. The Bill will clearly focus minds, because a chief executive can face criminal prosecution and potentially prison if they are not candid, if they consent or connive with someone not being candid, or if they fail to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the authority is candid. Those are three different and distinct routes to criminal prosecution that will sharply focus minds. We need to hold senior individuals to account for things that they can actually do. Clearly, they cannot personally verify the accuracy of potentially hundreds of thousands of documents.
The whole Bill is about creating a new culture and accountability. Whenever an individual fails in their duty, they should be held accountable—whoever they are—and that can carry up to two years’ imprisonment. It is a privilege to see you in the Chair, Mr Dowd, but in this morning’s session, before you were in the Chair, I said that this entire Bill Committee is about listening. It is about listening to the families, campaigners and those who have come before, and considering all the work they have done to get us to this place. It is about listening to them with regard to what it means for the Bill to be a Hillsborough law.
I have listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and other Committee members today, and I am committed to meeting him and finding a way forward. If there are genuine concerns regarding command responsibility, and Members feel that we are not going far enough, I am committed to listening and working with my hon. Friend on a way forward.
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
I am delighted that the Minister is listening; that is helpful. I would be grateful if she could consider my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle and me to be part of the discussions with the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby. That would save me a great deal of trouble in quoting the questions from the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston in our evidence session last week. I was intending to read out a good deal of the further comments from Hillsborough Law Now and Pete Weatherby in my summing up. I do not know whether the Minister is up for this, but it might be helpful to invite that particular gentleman.
Tessa Munt
I am delighted to hear that he will be part of that discussion, because I think he has a good grip on everything, and it saves me reading the Minister a page and a half of his comments today.
Tessa Munt
I am sure the Minister has seen them, but I was going to quote them none the less. I have mentioned the Office for Budget Responsibility, which I know is an organisation with fewer than 100 people. There we have somebody—regardless of the fact that, I am sure, he is not all over the emails and all the rest of it; the work that his office does with his employees, those who work with him and so on—who took what might be considered an incredibly honourable stance and resigned his position over something that happened in the last week. That is absolutely laudable. He is an illustration of how command is absolutely at the centre of this issue.
I totally agree that there should be responsibility and accountability at the top of any organisation. We are not doubting that; that is the intention of the Bill. Does the hon. Lady believe that the head of the OBR should have potentially been subject to criminal sanctions in that instance? Resigning is one thing; going to prison for up to two years is very different.
Tessa Munt
No, but it might be difficult to quantify. There certainly was no danger of anyone losing their life or being very seriously injured, and I presume we would not be looking for whistleblowers in his organisation, because he has taken responsibility. I take the point, but he has done the right thing in that situation. Will the Minister clarify something that I raised earlier: what will happen with people who resign—by resigning, the head of the OBR has avoided any chance of going in front of the Treasury Committee today—and those who have retired? It is clear that people can remove themselves from the framework, currently. Does the Minister have something to say about that?
I believe that I stated this earlier, but should an official inquiry or investigation be called, the head of the OBR, who has now resigned, or the head of any organisation—we are speaking in hypotheticals here—who was involved in an inquiry or investigation and had resigned, retired or moved abroad would be compelled to come to give evidence under the duty of candour. They would not be excused.
Clause 5 sets out the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour and assistance, as set out in clauses 2 to 4 of the Bill, so that the duty has bite. The offence is intended to provide a powerful deterrent effect to drive culture change. As I set out when covering clause 2, the duty has two stages: first, the requirement for public authorities and officials to make themselves known to an inquiry or investigation if their acts or information may be relevant; secondly, the requirement to provide any assistance as specified in a compliance direction from that inquiry or investigation. There is also a requirement for the public official in charge of the authority to take all reasonable steps to secure that the authority complies with the duty.
Clause 5 provides that an individual or authority
“commits an offence if…they fail to comply with the duty”
In relation to the first stage of the duty, the duty to notify, they must have intended to impede the inquiry or investigation by that failure. As for the second stage, the duty to comply with a compliance direction, they must have either intended to impede the inquiry or investigation or been reckless as to whether they would do so.
The intention and recklessness threshold also applies in relation to any breach of the duty on leaders of authorities that fail to put in measures to secure compliance with the duty by the authority and its officers. We have made this distinction in tests between the two stages because, in relation to the duty to notify, we do not want to criminalise someone for genuinely being unaware of an inquiry or investigation. Clause 5(2) sets out the penalties for those convicted of the offence, either on summary conviction at a magistrates court or on indictment at a Crown court. In the latter, the maximum prison sentence for this offence is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Security and intelligence information
Seamus Logan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. We have had an excellent debate on command responsibility, and I am heartened to see a very positive outcome from that discussion.
Clause 6 is separate and distinct because it applies to the intelligence services. We heard evidence about the provisions in clause 6 in the evidence session, as well as at a useful special meeting that some Committee members attended with two heads and a deputy head of the three intelligence services. As the shadow Minister pointed out, the evidence from that special meeting and the evidence session has highlighted that there are potentially some contradictory views. Nevertheless, my problem with clause 6(2)(a) is that it is basically a get-out clause; it allows the head of an intelligence service to opt out of the overall duty of candour where that would, according to the Bill, contravene the Official Secrets Act 1989.
I understand that there are special circumstances regarding the intelligence services, as was ably described to us by Sir Ken McCallum, when he said, “I don’t know who all my agents are, and I am not sure that I know all of their activities.” That is fair enough; one can readily understand why that might be the case. Nevertheless, there should be no overall escape clause for the intelligence services. Having said that, I understand that there will be circumstances in which it is necessary to maintain secrecy about certain aspects of what the intelligence services do.
My amendment would give a role to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is a Committee of the House, by requiring the head of an intelligence service, in these specific circumstances, to make a report to the ISC on what the exception is. In even more exceptional circumstances, I understand that the ISC can also communicate with the Prime Minister alone—it has no obligation to do anything else.
I believe that that sensible mechanism would give us confidence, in drafting the Bill, that there is no get-out clause. Critically, it would also restore trust even within our intelligence community on how it operates. We do not need to go back over all the evidence that we heard from an employee of the BBC, for example. I hope the Minister can take on board the thrust of what I am saying in the amendment, and perhaps she can even see fit to endorse it.
I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. I will respond to amendment 21 and the other amendments in turn, before moving to the question that clause 6 stand part of the Bill.
As the hon. Gentleman stated, amendment 21 would ensure that when clause 2(3) of the duty applies to the intelligence services, the head of the intelligence service must give the Intelligence and Security Committee a summary of any relevant acts or information. The Government have taken his points on board, and we are actively considering options to be introduced on Report. I commit to continuing to engage with him, other Committee members and external stakeholders to make sure that we find a way forward that is fit for the Bill and fit for protecting national security.
Seamus Logan
I thank the Minister for that. Given she has said that we will see an amendment on Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)
Yes, sorry. In the last evidence session, we discussed a very similar situation when we heard from both Pete Weatherby and Daniel De Simone, one of whom is a KC trying to get to the truth through his work in the courts, and another of whom is a journalist trying to expose the truth, particularly around the Agent X story. We are not looking for a change to the Official Secrets Act or its operation. We simply want the Bill to encompass the security services explicitly.
There is a list of public authorities on the Bill. The security services are not on there, which begs the question, why? I thank the Minister for saying that further work will be done on that and that she will be engaging with all Members across the House before Report. On that basis, we are happy to withdraw the amendments.
I welcome the withdrawal of the amendments. We had a discussion earlier about why we have not listed organisations in the Bill. We did not want it to be an exhaustive list and to miss an organisation out unintentionally, which could lead them to think that the Bill does not apply to it. We have been extremely clear that intelligence services are covered by this Bill, including clause 6. I reaffirm that to reassure the hon. Gentleman.
Clause 6 sets out that the duties in the Bill apply to the intelligence services, but it requires that proper arrangements and protections are in place to safeguard national security. As subsection (2) states, the obligation in clause 2(3) for a person to notify the inquiry or investigation does not apply to
“a person who works for an intelligence service”,
or where doing so would result in the release of security or intelligence information.
To be clear, inquiries and investigations are able to demand assistance and information from the intelligence services under the obligation in clause 2(4), but appropriate arrangements need to be in place for an inquiry or investigation to receive that sensitive information, as is the norm now. Individuals revealing acts or information outside of those arrangements could be detrimental to national security, as I am sure all hon. Members would agree.
Subsection (3) places a requirement on the heads of the intelligence services to put in place internal arrangements to ensure that those who work for the service comply with the requirements to record any acts or any information that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation. They must inform the service if they hold such information that is not already available to it. That ensures that the services have all the information they need to discharge their obligations under the duty as an authority. However, as I have already stated, I am committed to working with hon. Members, external stakeholders and the UK intelligence services to make sure that we have as a robust Bill as possible that fulfils the aims, objectives and intentions of us all.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Transitional provision in relation to this Chapter
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause provides that the duty of candour and assistance will apply to inquiries and investigations that are already ongoing at the time of commencement, as well as those that start afterwards. It may be necessary to set out further transitional provisions in the commencement regulations to ensure that ongoing inquiries and investigations can make effective use of the duty and are not delayed or forced to repeat stages by its procedural requirements if they are already far advanced.
Clause 8 sets out the meaning of key terms used in this chapter of the Bill, which deals with the duty of candour and assistance. Specifically, it defines “inquiry” as meaning
“an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005”
and a non-statutory inquiry meaning where
“paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 applies”.
Subsection (1) defines the terms “investigations”, “position statement”, “public official” and “public authority”, and references the appropriate Act or schedule from where the definitions are drawn. Clause 8(2) defines what the individual “in charge” of a public authority means. Clause 8(3) then defines “chief executive” as meaning an
“individual working for the authority who…is responsible under the immediate authority of the board of directors for the general functions of the authority.”
The clause is essential for allowing us and any future readers to interpret the key terms used throughout the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendment made: 4, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, at end insert—
“, or
(c) an inquiry to which paragraph 3A of that Schedule applies (local authority inquiries);”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 7.
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Expected standards of ethical conduct
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. As we all heard last Thursday, true cultural change is a key part of implementing the Hillsborough law, and the professional duty of candour required by clause 9 is at the heart of that. Amendments 46 to 48 admirably seek to strengthen the duties imposed on public authorities to promote ethical conduct and adopt a code of ethical conduct.
As my hon. Friend will be aware, clause 9 places a duty on public authorities to promote and maintain high standards of ethical behaviour and conduct. Professional duties of candour will be tailored to the specific sector to which they apply, making them meaningful to staff and responsive to the needs of those who use that organisation’s services. While I am grateful to my hon. Friend for suggesting these amendments, we believe that our drafting achieves the same purpose as the proposed amendments and is sufficiently clear and robust.
Amendment 49 seeks to require public authorities to consult with recognised trade unions on the creation and maintenance of a code of ethics. I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting the issue of trade union engagement. I am a proud trade unionist myself—I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests relating to the unions that I am a member of. I agree that if a code of ethics is to be truly successful, it is important that those working for the authority and their representatives, including trade unions, should have a proper opportunity to contribute to its development.
However, given the complexity and diversity of arrangements across the public sector, the Government’s view is that it would not be advisable to prescribe standard procedural arrangements for all public authorities in this Bill. Many organisations already have an existing code of conduct or a code of ethics. These exist in different forms and may have different underpinnings and links to other organisational governance arrangements. For example, the civil service code forms part of civil service contracts, and the code of ethics in policing is produced by the College of Policing, which does not directly employ individual officers.
Adapting and adopting a code of ethics will require different processes of development, engagement and consultation for each organisation and sector. This is not a one-size-fits-all approach, nor should it be. Public sector employees and employers will have existing arrangements and consultation with trade unions. Creating a specific requirement in the Bill could create confusion and usurp the existing processes and relationship arrangements between public authorities and their trade unions. I am keen to work with my hon. Friend to consider how we can encourage employees and their representatives to be engaged in the processes of developing the codes. In fact, we are already in discussions with trade unions on how we can best include them in the process through consultation and guidance to ensure that we have the most robust practices. With those assurances, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.
Mr Morrison
We spoke this morning about the issues dealt with by amendment 43, but to clarify, WhatsApp messages formed a big part of the evidence in the recent covid inquiry—it seemed to be government by WhatsApp at the time—and yet many of them seem to have disappeared. The amendment would provide an extra way of ensuring that public authorities and those responsible are keeping proper records and preventing that from happening again.
New clause 3 would prevent the deliberate concealment of evidence that could obstruct investigations, hinder fact-finding and undermine public trust. I would like the Committee to consider the element of public trust here. How people perceive what happens in this place, and in the organisations and public authorities that surround us and the power structures that are there, is vital to the legitimacy that we have and that those public authorities also have. By criminalising such conduct, the clause would reinforce the obligation on public authorities and officials to maintain and safeguard records, ensuring that inquiries and inquests can access all the information necessary to understand what happened and hold the responsible parties to account. This is a way to make sure that the truth can be found in those areas and hopefully ensure that WhatsApp messages are not deleted in future.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.
However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.
Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.
On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.
Tessa Munt
I know that we dealt with this matter earlier, but I again put on the record my concerns about subcontractors in tiers 1, 2 and 3, who often hold key information. We need to find some way to make sure that they are within the scope of this provision.
I recognise that concern, which I share, and we are looking at that in terms of the passage of the Bill. As I have stated, the duty would be on the public authority, official or subcontractor to disclose all the information to the chair of the inquiry or investigation.
Perhaps the point the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills was making was that the Minister referred to a separate piece of legislation, the Public Records Act 1958, and I am not sure that that legislation includes things like contractors and subcontractors.
The information provided to the inquiry would be covered and, as per the provisions of this Bill, subcontractors would be caught under the duty of candour and would have to disclose any relevant information, as per the information disclosed in that Act. I hope that clarifies it.
Tessa Munt
How helpful has the existing law been in relation to the covid inquiry, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle mentioned? I am not sure that has quite got to the base of everything. Does the Minister have any suggestions about improving the Bill to be explicit about what we expect?
Again, I totally agree with the policy intention. If the Bill had become an Act when the covid inquiry was under way, might that inquiry have carried things out differently, or provided information in a new way or in a new light? We cannot answer that. All I can say is that the purpose and intention of the Bill is to ensure that any inquiries or investigations seek the whole truth and that all information is disclosed so that we are never put in that position again. That is the intention of the Bill, and we have made sure it is as robust as possible to provide for that.
I can understand why Members might feel a certain amount of scepticism about the idea that an obligation to try to remember disappearing messages might be adequate. I do not know how many messages other Committee members send, but I think we have all got into the habit of sending rather a lot. Could there not be an arrangement, either in the code of ethics or in the policies and procedures of organisations, to make sure that people do not use WhatsApp for official business? We could also make sure that whatever chat people do use—it might be an internal arrangement—messages are properly kept and we therefore do not have to rely on dodgy memories of disappearing messages to make sure that messages are preserved for any future inquiry.
My right hon. Friend makes a very important point: it is for each individual organisation to determine the policies and procedures for their record keeping. It might be wholly appropriate for one organisation, if it has a small number of employees, to use a WhatsApp group, but we would expect records to be kept appropriately and for employees not to turn on disappearing messages. That would be part of the terms and conditions in the guidance and practices for the employees.
It would be for each different organisation to determine what is right and appropriate. It is not for Government to tell any organisation how to run its business or manage its employees. However, we have set out the bare minimum that is expected: the Bill makes it explicitly clear that records of any information relevant to an inquiry or investigation should be kept, and that such information should be disclosed to the inquiry or investigation if requested.
Seamus Logan
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 9, page 8, line 12, leave out “may” insert “must”.
I am aware that we have debated amendment 48, although perhaps not as fully as I would have liked. In the interests of getting our business done within the time available, I decided not to intervene in that debate. However, I believe that the particular change in amendment 24 is necessary. Where amendment 48 spoke to the duty of candour, amendment 24 speaks to the code of ethics.
There are legal minds in the room that are much better informed and trained on legal definitions than my own, but amendment 24 addresses the need to replace “may” with “must” in the code of ethics, as opposed to the duty of candour. I believe this is important given my experience in the health service, where there is a responsibility on individuals to report child abuse, or where a colleague might clearly be able to see that a surgeon carrying out procedures is repeatedly doing something injurious or harmful. By replacing the word “may” with “must”, we place a responsibility on anyone to blow the whistle on those particular issues.
In my working life I have experience, as might others present, of consultants who suppressed information relating to child abuse. We certainly heard similar evidence about surgeons during our evidence session. Colleagues will be able to think of many such examples, which is why it is important that the amendment replaces “may” with “must”.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling his amendment. The Government believe it is imperative to have policies and processes in place to enable officials and public servants to speak up when they see that something is wrong. If we are to address the culture change that we have heard about a hundred times, it is important to have that in place. That is why the Bill requires all public authorities to set out how a person can raise concerns if they think their colleagues are not acting in accordance with the code, and the process for making a protected disclosure, also known as whistleblowing.
The amendment would require individuals to take a particular course of action. This risks cutting across established disciplinary and whistleblowing regimes, with potentially significant implications for employees. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are working across Government with the Department for Business and Trade on how we reform whistleblowing more generally, and as the Bill progresses we will be looking quite carefully at whistleblowing and protections for individuals. However, we do not think the amendment would have the intended consequences, and it might cause us more issues, so I request that the hon. Gentleman withdraw it.
Seamus Logan
I thank the Minister for that response, but I am at a loss to know how the responsibility suggested by the amendment would cut across any existing code of ethical conduct. If the legislation simply stated that the person who works for the authority must take steps if they believe that another person who works for the authority has failed to act in accordance with the code, I fail to see how that would cut across any existing procedures. It would simply make the provision more robust by saying “You must take that step” rather than “You may take that step”. That is what the amendment calls for; perhaps the Minister might like to expand on why she wishes me to withdraw it.
I will happily come back to the hon. Gentleman. Say, for example, that someone in the police force believes that a colleague is not acting in accordance with the code of ethics, but that individual may not be privy to the details of an undercover operation that their colleague is aware of and they are cutting across existing provisions in the police force. If that individual had to do as the hon. Gentleman intends with his amendment, they could hinder the investigation or cause unintended consequences.
With the Bill, we are saying that there must be a way of reporting. Every public organisation must have that built in but, as we have discussed, a one-size-fits-all approach does not work across all public sector authorities. What will work in the NHS will not work in the police or for probation. This all has to fit the specific authority. Therefore, there has to be a mechanism for reporting, but we are not designating a specific one.
Seamus Logan
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, which is helpful. Perhaps when the Minister and I, and others, meet to discuss other matters, we might explore this in more detail. If the Minister is willing to accept that, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Seamus Logan
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Tessa Munt
I rise to speak to amendment 26, which has some similarities with what the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby just outlined. I am extremely keen to ensure that people are really clear about what they have to do when they wish to report. This relates to clause 9(5)(c) as well.
As has been mentioned, the Employment Rights Act 1996 tends to guide people towards the employment tribunal if something has happened. Currently, if something has gone wrong, that is where people can end up. As I mentioned last week, my understanding is that the employment tribunal has a backlog of 47,000 cases. My sense is that when the Bill comes into effect, which will not be very long, there will be masses more people who find themselves guided by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 to head for the employment tribunal, which does not seem to be an adequate place for people to deal with their complaints.
The employment tribunal is for those who are considered to be a worker, be that an employee or somebody acting in a voluntary capacity. Amendment 26 would require a public authority’s code of ethical conduct to include information on the person to whom someone can make a protected disclosure—what we know as whistleblowing —and how the person would be protected against detriment. It is incredibly important that the code of ethical conduct sets out clearly how individuals can make a protected disclosure and the protections available to them.
The amendment would strengthen the whistleblowing safeguards by providing staff with clear guidance on the safe reporting of wrongdoing. It should address some of the gaps in protection without creating a specific outside body. I have already spoken to the Minister about the idea of an office of the whistleblower; I understand that is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is really important that whistleblowers can come forward with confidence while remaining within the statutory framework, and that they have somewhere safe to go.
I thank Members for raising those important points. We discussed whistleblowers and the protections needed for them a lot in the oral evidence sessions. It is essential that if there is wrongdoing in an organisation, those working for the organisation can come forward and raise the alarm, and be confident that they will be protected when doing so.
Through the Bill, public authorities will be required to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct, and their leaders will be held accountable for that. In doing so, leaders must ensure that their authority’s code of ethics contains information about any whistleblowing policies or procedures.
Tessa Munt
Does the Minister accept that a huge number of authorities, bodies and organisations may not, whether wittingly or not, recognise somebody as a whistleblower? There is a real danger in people believing that they are whistleblowing and that they will have protection, yet the companies not recording them as whistleblowing incidents. How does the Minister see that working?
The hon. Lady has pre-empted my next comments. The Bill will ensure that workers who are protected against retaliation by an employer for blowing the whistle about wrongdoing—known formally as making a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996—are more aware of their rights.
We believe that certain elements of the amendments are unnecessary. For example, while we are absolutely sympathetic to its aims, amendment 26 would require employers to provide information on prescribed persons that is already online, on gov.uk. The amendments could also introduce confusion—
And that is the very confusion the hon. Lady mentioned. If she lets me finish my point, I will give way.
Amendment 50, for example, may lead some people who work for a public authority, but are not workers, to believe that their disclosure may qualify for whistleblowing protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996. We do not wish to cause that confusion. I point the hon. Lady to our work on whistleblowers across Government, which will of course inform work on the passage of this Bill.
Tessa Munt
I want to mention the huge number of occasions when I dealt with constituents and others, when people have been—I would say—entrapped into signing non-disclosure agreements or NDAs, which mean they feel that they cannot talk to anyone. They even fear talking to their MP. It is not clear to whom they can speak, and part of my desire is to ensure that each authority—I am not saying that the Minister should say what should be disclosed and to whom; this is for every organisation—should have someone identified. They should make public that safe place or safe person to whom anyone can report, be they in or outside the authority—that comes under the next subsection, I accept—as workers or employees. This business of NDAs needs to be sorted out once and for all, because it is pervasive and incredibly destructive.
The hon. Lady will be aware of the work we are doing on NDAs in the Victims and Courts Bill and the Employment Rights Bill. A lot of work is happening across Government on how we can protect individuals who are being forced to sign NDAs or those who feel unable to come forward and whistleblow. That work is being done holistically and is led by the Department for Business and Trade. I am happy to discuss her concerns more broadly in Committee, during the passage of the Bill, and outside the Committee.
I am happy to discuss our broader work on this and how we move forward on whistleblowers with the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills outside the Committee Room.
I am filled with confidence by the Minister’s response on whistleblowers. I know that she will be taking this seriously, because it goes to the heart of changing the culture of organisations that have failed us time and time again. This whistleblowers element is extremely important. I am happy to hear that Minister is up for engaging with us across the Benches to strengthen these provisions, which is desperately needed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Seamus Logan
Amendment 25 has already been covered in our discussions about “may” or “must”, and I am happy to take that discussion into further meetings with the Minister.
I thank both hon. Members for tabling the amendments in this group; I will respond to each in turn.
First, amendment 28 would require there to be a standard template for a code of ethics. The Government recognise the importance of supporting public authorities to develop their codes of ethical conduct, and we commit to doing so. Clause 10 confers a power on the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments to issue guidance that authorities will be required to have regard to when drawing up codes for their organisations.
The newly established Ethics and Integrity Commission will in time also have a role in supporting public bodies by making toolkits, best practice and guidance available for public sector bodies. Although we envisage that standard templates will be useful, as I have already said, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. We wish to retain the flexibility to allow each individual organisation and sector to consider what would work best for them, but support will of course be available for them in doing so.
Amendment 25 would require a public authority to modify its code for specified circumstances or for specified people who work for the authority. I want to reassure Members that clause 9(7) provides for public authorities to specify that their code may apply with modifications in specified circumstances or to people of a specified description who work for the authority.
The intention of clause 9(7) is to enable authorities to reflect different expectations or obligations that apply to different groups of employees—for example, a school’s code of conduct may apply differently to teachers and janitorial staff. It could also reflect different processes that apply in different situations, for example, in an emergency situation compared with everyday business as usual. The Government’s view is that it should be for the authority to determine whether and how it uses that flexibility, noting that it must set out the reasons for doing so—that is important. We do not think that authorities should be required to do so, which is what the effect of amendment 25 would be.
Amendment 23 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that adequate funding is available to public authorities to provide training to their officials on compliance with the code of ethical conduct. I again want to assure hon. and right hon. Members that the Government have an ambitious plan for the implementation of the Bill. The Bill is just one part of the puzzle; it needs to be implemented fully, workably and effectively. It is just part and start of the culture change that we want to see in public sector organisations. The plans will of course include training for public servants, as well as oversight of the codes themselves.
A number of public sector organisations are already working on cultural or leadership programmes, and implementation of the Bill may be undertaken alongside or as part of existing initiatives to ensure that the code is seen as central to driving change in the organisation’s culture on a sustainable basis. The Bill requires public authorities to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct among those who work for the authority. The duty ensures public authorities will be accountable, while allowing flexibility for the practical arrangements that each authority might put in place. I hope that assures the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East, and I am happy to work with him and others on the implementation of the Bill as it goes forward.
Finally, new clause 4 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent report setting out whether and how public authorities have complied with the duty of assistance and candour. The Government agree that it is essential that the duties in the Bill are properly upheld and enforced. That is why the Government are ensuring independent oversight of implementation of the Bill’s provisions. The Government have committed to commissioning an annual independent assessment report to ensure that public bodies are complaint with the codes of ethics requirement in the Bill. That report will make clear which parts of the public sector are rising to the challenge and which are failing to do so. We will not be afraid to name and shame who is abiding and who is not.
Compliance with the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations can, sadly, be judged only by the inquiry or investigation itself. They are responsible for monitoring compliance with the legal duty and for taking enforcement action, such as referring the case for criminal proceedings if necessary. I would like to assure all Committee members that the Government are absolutely committed to ensuring effective implementation of all the measures in the Bill and to achieving the cultural change that is so desperately needed. I therefore urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.
Tessa Munt
I am glad to hear what the Minister has to say. Sunlight is the best disinfectant; if anyone in the public can track through their complaint to something that is published on annual basis—I assume the Minister means annual—that will give people a lot more confidence that this being taken incredibly seriously.
Tessa Munt
I thank the Minister for her contribution. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Seamus Logan
In light of the Minister’s clarification, I am happy to withdraw amendment 25. However, with regard to amendment 23, I am still unclear as to what exactly the Minister is saying. Is she indicating that beyond the passage of the Bill there will be further clarifications to public bodies as to what training requirements there might be, and that resources will flow from that?
I am happy to get back to the hon. Gentleman—but yes, essentially. We will need to look at how we implement the Bill once it becomes an Act—hopefully it will become an Act—and at the requirements that will come from that. I will happily have those discussions with him and every other public authority on how best we do that. Should other resources be needed, that is something that the Government will consider.
Seamus Logan
Given the proceedings today are a matter of record, I am happy to withdraw amendment 23.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
To ensure that public sector culture changes for the better, clause 9 introduces a new duty on public authorities to promote and take steps to maintain high standards of ethical conduct at all times by people who work for the authority. This means acting in accordance with the seven principles of public life, known as the Nolan principles: honesty, integrity, objectivity, accountability, selflessness, openness and leadership.
Under the Bill, all public authorities will be required to adopt a code of ethical conduct. This will ensure comprehensive coverage across the public sector. It will not be enough to simply have a code; authorities will be legally required to publish their codes and take active steps to make their staff aware of the code, and the consequences of failing to comply with it.
Clause 9(4) and (5) set out minimum standards that all codes must meet. Each code must establish a professional duty of candour, and an expectation that those working for the authority will act with candour at all times. Professional duties of candour will be tailored to the sectors to which they apply; they will be meaningful to staff and responsive to the needs of those who use an organisation’s services. The code must set out the practical ways in which ethical standards should be upheld and the disciplinary consequences of failing to act in accordance with the code. This will ensure that the code acts as an aspirational document, setting out best practice, but also as an effective deterrent against unethical behaviour.
Ensuring there are routes where individuals can raise concerns about public institutions is essential for ensuring that issues are identified and addressed as early as possible. Clause 9(5) requires an authority’s code to set out: how staff can raise concerns if they think their colleagues are not acting in accordance with the code; how staff can make protected disclosures, including any whistleblowing policies; and a clear process for external complaints about the conduct of the authority or those working for it.
Recognising the diversity of the public sector, the Bill includes some flexibilities. A code can provide for its standards to apply differently in specific circumstances or to specific groups of people, but it must set out reasons for doing so. For example, it may not be appropriate to apply all of the same standards to doctors as to the cleaning staff in an NHS trust. The Bill allows a public authority to adopt a code produced by another body. For example, schools can adopt a code published by the Department for Education, or local authorities can adopt codes from the Local Government Association. This is to ensure consistency across sectors and will minimise the burdens on smaller organisations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Non-statutory inquiries
I rise to speak to amendments 55 and 58 to 60, which would strengthen command responsibility. On amendment 55, schedule 2(5) appears to mean that responsibility for the actions of a Government Department is corporate only, and there is an exclusion for civil servants exercising their functions wholly outside the UK. Surely responsibility should lie with the chief executive of the Department, usually the Secretary of State, which I feel that amendment 55 would achieve.
Amendments 59 and 60 would once again strengthen the command responsibility. The purpose of deeming what was done by an office holder as being done by a Department itself is unclear. If those words are simply intended to avoid putting command responsibility on a Minister for the actions of their Department, with respect to the compliance with the duty of candour and assistance, it potentially goes too far.
Schedule 2(3)(6) excludes civil servants from inclusion as public officials if they exercise all their functions outside the UK. I do not see the reason for this exception, and I am seeking some clarification through amendments 59 and 60. I have also tabled amendment 58 for similar reasons to those I have stated for amending schedule 2(5), which would delete sub-paragraphs (3)(d) and (2).
I again thank my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. I hope that I will provide him with some clarification and assurances on exactly why we have adopted this approach in our drafting. The provisions that amendment 55 would amend are typical in legislation. They provide that actions legally done by the Crown or the holder of a particular office, such as a Secretary of State, can be attributed to a Government Department.
The definition of a “public official” in schedule 2(3) includes an individual who
“holds office under a public authority”.
By removing the explicit reference to the holder of a particular office, the amended paragraph would actually, and no doubt unintentionally, narrow the scope of what can be attributed to a Government Department. Only actions that are strictly acts of the Crown could then be attributed to a Government Department for the purposes of the duty of candour provisions and associated offence, as well as the misleading the public offence, not those done legally in the name of the Secretary of State. In our view, this would actually weaken the Bill, and I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw amendment 55.
Amendments 58 to 60 seek to apply the duty of candour and assistance, along with the misconduct in public office offences in part 3, to staff employed on local contracts overseas, including consular staff at embassies. My hon. Friend is correct to note that there are two examples of this exclusion in the Bill, one from the definition of “public official” in relation to the duty of candour, and one from the definition of “civil servant” in relation to part 3. They exclude what are known as country-based staff. These are, for example, locally engaged staff who are employed by an embassy or consulate generally to do administrative or support work, such as site maintenance.
While employed by the embassy or equivalent, these individuals are subject to the laws of the country in which they live, and they are supervised by United Kingdom civil servants who are subject to all parts of the Bill. In excluding locally employed staff from the provisions in the Bill, the Bill follows all precedented approaches relating to these staff, such as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. To take a different approach would be a significant and unprecedented change. I hope my hon. Friend understands that clarification and is content not to press amendments 58 to 60 to a vote.
I turn to schedule 2 and clause 10. Many of the Bill’s substantive provisions apply to a public authority or public official. Schedule 2 defines those terms for the purposes of part 2 of the Bill. There are different definitions of “public authority” for different parts of the Bill, and I appreciate that this can be confusing, so I hope to clarify why. Part 2 of the schedule sets out the definitions of “public authority” and “public official” for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public. These are broad definitions that are intended to capture anyone, including private companies, who exercises a public function.
Paragraph (2)(4) sets out that there are express reservations for the courts, Parliament and the devolved legislatures, reflecting long-standing constitutional conventions of self-regulation and independence. The north-south bodies established under the Good Friday agreement are also excluded to avoid capturing officials in the Irish Government.
Tessa Munt
In the interests of clarity, will the Minister explain whether the intelligence and security services are now captured by the list in part 2? Will she also explain what happens to regular or reserve forces when they are abroad, when they might be subject to devices such as the court martial? Those are two very specific things.
I am happy to clarify both those points, and I assure the hon. Lady that they are captured in this part of the Bill.
“Public official” is defined in schedule 2 as all of those who work for a public authority or hold office under a public authority—including those that the hon. Lady mentioned—and individuals who hold a relevant public office. That is defined to include offices that are established in legislation or by Ministers, where the UK or devolved Government are wholly or mainly constituted by appointment made by the Crown or Ministers, and they exercise functions of a public nature. Former public officials are also included in that—for example, retired civil servants and those who have resigned from the service. There are various exclusions, such as for individuals acting in a judicial capacity, non-executive elected members of a local authority who operate executive arrangements, and those in the private service of the Crown.
Part 3 of the schedule sets out the definition of “public authority” for the provisions on standards of ethical conduct, including the requirement to adopt a code of ethics. That definition of “public authority” is limited to the core public authorities, those commonly understood to be part of the state. The definition includes a list of named public authorities. That includes Government Departments, the devolved Governments, the armed forces, the police, local authorities, NHS bodies, schools, and any bodies that are both established by Ministers of the Crown and are wholly or mainly constituted by public appointments. That is intended to capture the wide range of arm’s length and other public bodies. The definition does, however, include the same exclusions for Parliament, the courts and those north-south bodies that were previously mentioned.
Tessa Munt
I again seek clarity. Are non-executive directors of an NHS trust, for example—who might be party to all sorts of information—within the scope of the Bill? I would also like to check whether school governors—and schools that are academies sometimes use different names, such as “partners”—are also picked up in the list.
Yes, I can confirm that. Those provisions of the Bill contain a power to allow the definition to also be extended by secondary legislation to private companies that exercise specified public functions. That would allow the code of ethics provisions to be extended to specified high-risk public functions by secondary legislation—for example, in privately run prisons.
Finally, I turn to clause 10, which provides that guidance can be issued by the national authority if it wishes to do so, for the purposes of chapter 2, which relates to the standards of ethical conduct. That means that the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments can issue guidance on how public authorities can fulfil their duty to maintain high standards of ethical conduct, including in drafting and adopting their codes of ethical conduct.
Clause 9 sets out minimum standards in law that all codes must legally meet. We have the option to use guidance under clause 10 to set out best practice in each of those areas, encouraging authorities to consider what arrangements they can put in place to ensure that the highest standards of ethical conduct are in place. However, as we have already discussed, given the diversity of the public sector, there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and any guidance that is issued will allow each authority to consider how those requirements in the Bill can best be implemented to serve them in a way that best suits them and the needs of their organisations and sectors. All public authorities will be legally required to have regard to the guidance.
UK Ministers will be responsible for guidance for UK and England-only bodies, and the devolved Governments will have powers to issue guidance that relates exclusively to devolved matters. That is to reflect the devolution settlement, and it ensures that the devolved Governments can provide guidance to the public authorities to which they are responsible and—speaking as a Member of Parliament for a devolved area—also that they could potentially also be bilingual, as they would have to be to comply in Wales.
We intend to work closely with our devolved colleagues on the development of any such guidance, and I again put on record my thanks to all the devolved Governments for their collaborative and collegiate approach to working with us on the Bill to ensure that we have a unified approach.