Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 5th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

I thank the hon. Lady, because I hear exactly the point that she is making. I have asked my Department for the evidence on this issue. If the evidence does point towards worse levels of reoffending and real difficulties for offenders if they are released on a Friday, we will look at that.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

T2. Recent reports emerging from Belgium suggest that the suspect in the alleged terrorist murder of two police officers was a small-time crook who had been radicalised in prison. What steps have been taken to reduce the risk of radicalisation in our own prisons?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Rory Stewart)]

This is a hugely important issue. It is not about identifying people who are in prison for terrorism-related offences but people such as that individual who have been put in prison for other offences and have been radicalised in prison. The challenge is first to identify those individuals, then to work with the security services and the police to really investigate them, then to put the measures in place either to change their behaviour or to separate them from the general population.

Criminal Legal Aid

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 8th May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I declare any interests that I may have as a non-practising solicitor. The criminal justice system in England and Wales faces many significant and structural problems, but placing all the blame on the regulations and tacking the Criminal Bar’s reaction to them at face value will not solve the underlying problems with which we need to contend. Having said that, my initial reaction to the current SI proposals was that, given the barristers’ strike and Opposition party protest in relation to alleged criminal legal aid cuts, I was somewhat surprised to read the impact assessment, which suggests no cuts and an increase spend on legal aid. That aside, the plans are, in themselves, positive and rational. The Minister has given a strong defence of them today, and they shall have my support.

We are tweaking a scheme that was put in place by Labour in 2007. Since then, effective case management has become rightly more of a priority. I can understand the desirability of unbundling the tasks in fee assessment and the key need to address huge increases in the amount of data now available through discovery. The Opposition and the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) are protesting too much. Labour in government repeatedly proposed reform of criminal legal aid and then repeatedly pulled back, instead resorting to fee cuts.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Labour party does not come to this matter with clean hands? In 2007, at a time of rising budgets for health and education, there was never more money for the Bar, even though it needed it. The Opposition’s remarks do not hold up.

[Mr Djanogly]

My hon. Friend is quite right. In fact, many, if not most, of the post-2010 coalition criminal legal aid cuts had been put in place by the losing Labour Administration. Furthermore, during debates on the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, I recall the Labour spokesman saying that we should make required cuts to criminal legal aid, rather than to civil legal aid. Having engaged in the blame game, we could all just leave it at that, but that would be to once again avoid the harsh reality that we all now need to face up to, namely that this country’s criminal legal aid system is not fit for purpose and needs to be totally restructured.

While consultation with legal practitioners is important, we legislators need to be reminded that no significant reform to the legal professions has ever come about from the practitioners themselves. Someone in government, or indeed in opposition, is going to have to make a move on this. I will admit that the previous Labour Government made some useful justice reforms, much of which I had the honour to oppose from the Front Bench and on which we often worked co-operatively. Why are the Opposition not doing the same on criminal legal aid? Rather than just complain about it, why can they not offer an alternative? The hon. Member for Leeds East told us what the Criminal Bar Association wants, but he did not say what he wants or what he believes, and I think he should.

The fundamental problem is that the legal market generally, and criminal law in particular, is totally fragmented, under-capitalised, technologically semi-illiterate and structurally redundant. Criminal practice is characterised by large numbers of barely profitable firms that are all too often unable to properly serve clients through lack of manpower, inability to invest in training of staff and trainees, and a lamentable lack of technology. I recall trying to persuade criminal defence solicitors to take prosecution evidence online rather than in paper bundles, but the resistance was ferocious. Why? Because large numbers of solicitors were running their small practices from their homes and could not afford to invest in the required technology. That type of inefficiency also goes to the Bar, with advocates often getting court papers late, which may have worked for the single lever arch file deposited in times gone by, but with not the online data dump that can now be sent. As has been said this evening, young barristers will often effectively work for nothing, which itself is a barrier to diversity and to poorer people entering the profession. I could go on with such examples at length, but hon. Members will get the picture.

The answer to this situation, without any doubt, will involve consolidation of this fractured nineteenth-century legal services marketplace. Although the number of small firms has slowly reduced in recent times, the most practical way to aid the process would be a larger-scale system of contracting for legal aid work. That would involve fewer but larger practices operating over a larger area, resulting in fewer firms receiving a larger slice of the remaining pie on a single-fee basis. In turn, it would create firms that have the money to invest in training and technology, and with the size and depth required properly to cover the contract areas.

Yes, we have more data than ever before, but charging to read it on a per page basis is simply outdated. Most of the extra data is useless guff from, say, social media. The answer is to have firms of lawyers that are able to invest in the technology now available to sort the wheat from the chaff. That will only come from market consolidation, and a vital aspect of that will be to treat barristers and solicitor equally. If teams of barristers wish to compete for legal aid contracts, they should be free to do so, in the same way as sole-practitioner solicitors band together with other solicitors, or indeed with barristers, to bid for contracts.

The Legal Services Act 2007, brought in by the last Labour Government with Conservative support, provides the necessary mechanism—the alternative business structures—for that to happen. Solicitors and barristers could work together, and the alternative business structures could raise capital and employ non-legal executive managers to run an effective business. We would then start to see a sustainable market taking shape.

I have some sympathy with those who complain that the criminal justice system is creaking at the seams, but rather less sympathy with those who say that the answer is more of the same. We need to face up to the need to change the rules of the game and of the marketplace. The tools and answers are certainly out there if we are prepared to take the required steps.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

When it comes to the opposition to the changes to the graduated fee scheme, the Government are entitled to feel a little perplexed because the changes were discussed with the leadership of the Bar. Francis Fitzgibbon, QC, then chair of the CBA, said that

“the CBA believes that the new scheme is a great improvement on what has gone before, and we should at least give it a cautious welcome as a step in the right direction.”

Secondly, the aim of the changes, to rebalance public funding so it rewards the junior Bar more fairly, is unassailable. On that point, I will support the Government tonight.

It would be a great mistake to misread the message coming from the Bar, because my clear sense is that its protest is not really about the intricacies of these specific provisions. Instead, it reflects years of pent-up anguish and frustration about the state of the criminal defence profession and, indeed, a profound sense of foreboding for its future.

The Bar is in a fragile state and needs decisive support, but it does not lie in the mouth of the Labour Opposition to make criticisms about on that, because I know full well from having been a practitioner at the time that, at a time of rising budgets across the piece in health and education during the late 1990s and in the first decade of the 21st century, Labour failed time after time to put more money into the Bar. In 2003, Tony Blair spoke of the “gravy train” of legal aid. In 2006, Lord Falconer referred to the legal aid bill as being “unsustainable”, and there were further plans to cut it in 2010. One has to consider those remarks with great care.

I wish to make some brief observations in the time available; I wanted to say a lot more but I shall confine myself to this. When considering the amount we spend on justice and legal aid, we should put it in context. Treasury Red Book figures show that total public sector spending for 2018-19 is expected to be £809 billion. The total Ministry of Justice budget is less than £7 billion. To put that in context, more is spent on welfare and pensions in two weeks than is spent on justice, and the amount spent on international aid—about £14 billion—is approximately double the entire justice budget. To put it another way, we spend more on the aid effort in Syria alone than we do on the entire legal aid budget in our country.

There are concerns about where this all heads. There will be difficulties with recruitment and retention, and we cannot have a situation where this is a just a job for posh kids with a private income. There is also a risk of injustice. If people are not available to do the work we require them to do, it will not just be a case of people being convicted when they should not be; there is a danger of people not being convicted if juries take matters into their own hands and decide that they want to deliver their own brand of justice.

I am not suggesting this is easy at all, but I want to make three simple points. First, if the criminal Bar falls over, the cost to the state will increase dramatically. The overheads involved in employing hundreds of barristers in a fully fledged public defender service will be extortionate and unaffordable. Secondly, the culture will change, and people will be far less likely to work after-hours and at the weekend. Thirdly, the sums of money required to secure the criminal Bar are modest. Barristers are not seeking wealth; they are seeking viability.

[Robert Neill]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right on that last point about the motivation of barristers. Does he agree that one of the important qualities that the independent Bar brings, as indeed does an objective solicitor, is precisely that word—objectivity? The objectivity brought by a barrister has been seen in many cases, for example, those where disclosure failures have occurred, and in the willingness to root out what is absolutely necessary, fearlessly, on behalf of a client. That cannot be replicated.

[Alex Chalk]

That objectivity is vital. In the United States, they have dyed-in-the-wool prosecutors. I remember the case of Michael Jackson, with Tom “Mad Dog” Sneddon; all these people do is prosecute. One great value we have in this country is that people prosecute and defend. That level of objectivity is fantastic. It also means that people are incentivised to go the extra mile, because you are only as good as your last brief.

The criminal Bar is precious. This is not about sentiment. This is a flinty-eyed assessment of a real and pressing need. Once this matter is over tonight—I will vote with the Government, because the Opposition’s proposal is, with respect, misconceived—I urge the Government to look again at how the criminal Bar can be supported, as there is a pressing need.

Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Friday 27th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Philip Davies]

That is all very well in theory, and I am pretty sure that that would do the trick in an academic dissertation, but the problem is what we see in the real world time and again. I would be astonished if any Member could not think of an example of a criminal who had committed a serious offence being under-charged and prosecuted for a lesser offence. The reasons for that are numerous, but the biggest one is as follows.

This country supposedly does not have the American system of plea bargaining, but we do in reality. No matter how much the criminal justice system would deny it, we do have that system. The CPS will say that it is going to charge somebody with a serious offence, and the person will say, “I am going to plead not guilty to that.” The defence solicitor or barrister will no doubt then say, “I’ll tell you what, if you charge them with a lesser offence, my client will plead guilty.” So to avoid a trial or to save time or whatever, the CPS, which often feels overstretched, will say, “Oh, go on then. We will charge them for the lesser offence. It will not be the actual offence that they committed, but it will get them a criminal record and get us a guilty plea. It will tidy up our figures, and we will be able to say that we have brought somebody to justice.” The CPS will then consider that a great success. Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the victim of the crime, who presumably is barely even considered in this box-ticking, target-driven agenda, sees the person who committed the offence against them being given a derisory sentence. That is what we see time after time. Anybody who thinks that we do not is not living in the real world, because it happens on a daily basis in the criminal justice system.

Although my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) is right that the responsibility clearly lies with the CPS to charge people appropriately for the offence they have committed—nobody disagrees with that principle—we know that that does not happen in practice. Therefore, even if the CPS does what it seems to do on a regular basis and charges people for a lesser offence, it is beholden upon us to ensure that the judge or magistrate has an appropriate sentence to give out when the most egregious cases come before the courts. In the example that I just gave, a police officer actually lost a finger but the defendant was charged with assaulting a police officer, and we cannot let it stand that the sentence can be just six months, or even just 12 months.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

In that example, my hon. Friend shines a light on the potential issue here. Under the circumstances that he has indicated, there is no doubt that the defendant should be charged with grievous bodily harm with intent, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. If, under my hon. Friend’s new clause, a defendant is charged with the maximum penalty of 12 months and pleads guilty, they will be entitled to a third off the sentence and would serve only half. In any event, the penalty would therefore be far less than he desires. The real issue here is whether the proper charging decision is made, because that is what makes the material difference to the sentence. This is about the difference between whether someone spends two months or three months in custody.

[Philip Davies]

I am delighted that my hon. Friend seems to be agreeing with amendment 9 and that he thinks that the sentence in the Bill should be more than 12 months, perhaps 24 months. I will take that as support, but I am unsure whether I have accurately deciphered what he was trying to say. However, he is right that the CPS should charge people for the appropriate offence, but the point is that it does not, and I can assure the House that things will be the same after this Bill comes into effect. The CPS will still prosecute people for offences that it knows will get a conviction. When someone goes before the courts for a particular offence, we must ensure that the judge or magistrate has the appropriate sentencing powers to make sure that justice is done properly and is seen to be done properly. At the moment, however, that is not the case.

I wish that my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) was right. I wish that the utopia he describes, in which the CPS accurately prosecutes people for the serious offences that they have committed every single time, was the reality. If that were the case, there would probably be no need for this Bill, but the fact is that the CPS does not do that. We have to deal with the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be. My hon. Friend has much more expertise in the criminal justice system than me—[Interruption.] On the right side of it, obviously. I respect my hon. Friend’s opinion, but debates in this House on justice issues can often resemble a lawyer’s dinner party. Things can be very interesting, but most people in the real world do not really give a stuff about that. They want to know about what is happening on the ground, rather than what the legal profession would like us to think is happening, which are two very different things.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

There are two aspects to the Bill. The first is the offence of common assault, which I think is now drawn in such a way that the courts will be able to circumvent some of the arguments that have thus far been used to prevent any kind of successful prosecution. The second aspect relates to the aggravated offence, and the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we have not included every single offence in the world. If amendment 3 is accepted this morning, I think that we will have included all offences that could relate to emergency workers.

The Minister was right to say that it is important that we take cognisance of the fact that, with this Bill, we are saying that emergency workers are going to be treated slightly differently in law from the rest of the wider public. It is not that I want to create great hierarchies in society, with some people being more important than others; it is that emergency workers are suffering these attacks and assaults because they are emergency workers, and that places a greater onus on us to ensure that they have the protections that they need.

I return to amendment 2 and the question of whether spitting is common assault. The Sentencing Council has in recent years looked at whether spitting increases the culpability and seriousness of the offence, and it removed spitting from each of those categories in 2012. Quite a lot of magistrates and judges have now started to say that this is one of the primary reasons that there has been a deflation in the number of successful prosecutions and in the sentences that are handed down. I regret the fact that spitting was removed by the Sentencing Council and hope that it will revisit that decision in the near future. I hope that the Minister might also be able to say something about how we can ensure that the courts take spitting seriously as a part of common assault offences.

There is an argument that putting the words “including spitting” in the Bill could mean that there is a danger that the courts in other incidents of common assault might say, “Well, it doesn’t include those words, so Parliament intends that not to include spitting.” I am guessing that the Minister may make that argument. If so, I am quite happy to listen to his point. It may well be that we will not need to divide the House on this, but I want to ensure that the courts are clear that common assault could involve merely spitting.

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech, in which he is rightly drawing attention to the heinous act of spitting, which is upsetting and completely unacceptable. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Crown Prosecution Service already can and does charge people with spitting under the offence of common assault. I have prosecuted it myself, and I am aware that there is a case—not ancient—where someone was jailed for 21 weeks for exactly that. We should not gull ourselves into thinking that we do not have that scope already. The key thing is to ensure that this offence is properly prosecuted when it should be.

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is always a delight to have a lawyer in the House, but not too many, eh? [Interruption.] I think I have carried the House with that one.

The hon. Gentleman does, however, make a serious point. I tabled the amendment simply so that we could have this debate and the message goes out completely unambiguously from the House that merely spitting—I use the word “merely” legalistically; in other words, spitting alone—can constitute a common assault. That is true of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and spitting at an emergency worker of any kind should constitute an assault under this Bill.

My other amendment—amendment 3—relates to sexual assault. The major part of the Bill introduces an aggravated offence; that is to say that the Bill lists a series of different offences that, when perpetrated against an emergency worker, will be considered to be aggravated. When I drew up the Bill, I was primarily thinking of physical violence towards emergency workers. But the truth is that, since I have been working on the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax and I have received lots of representations, particularly from health service workers, about the sexual assault of ambulance workers, nurses, mental health nurses, doctors and others. One difficulty, both for the Government and for us, has been that these statistics have never been gathered by NHS Protect, which no longer exists anyway. However, the numbers of such incidents reported by the trade unions working on this matter are quite dramatic, particularly given that the figures show increases.

Since 2012, such incidents are up 143% in the East of England ambulance service; up 40% in London; up 133% in the North West ambulance service; and up 1500% in Northern Ireland. Incidents have increased by 400% in South Central ambulance service since 2013; by 100% in the South East Coast ambulance service since 2015; by 400% in Yorkshire ambulance service since 2013; and by 500% in the West Midlands ambulance service since 2012. I wanted to say that it is true that these are not large numbers, but there have been 238 reported cases of sexual assaults on ambulance workers in the East of England ambulance service. Parliament has to take cognisance of such figures and we have to act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It gives me great pleasure to speak on the Report stage of this Bill. It is a particular pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Michael Tomlinson), who has been a friend of this campaign from the very start. He raised a number of interesting points, and I look forward to hearing Ministers’ response. We have greatly benefited from his legal expertise throughout this process, and I am grateful to him for that. I am grateful to Members across the House who have recognised the role that I have played in initiating this campaign, but it has been a tremendous team effort, and I will thank a number of people on Third Reading.

I rise specifically to speak in support of amendment 3, which would add sexual assault to the list of assault charges in clause 2, so that it would become an aggravating factor within sentencing if sexual assault were inflicted on an emergency service worker. Having started this campaign with the Police Federation following the experience I had with a single-crewed police officer—a tale I have shared in the Chamber on several occasions—one of the deciding factors in broadening the campaign to cover more emergency service workers was having met female paramedics who had been subject to sexual assaults while on duty. That is why I am so keen to see this addition made to the Bill.

A very clear pattern emerged of female paramedics having to deal with male patients who are often under the influence of drugs or alcohol, as we have heard, in towns and city centres and predominantly on Friday and Saturday nights. I am grateful to Stacey Booth, an organiser with GMB—which I must declare is my trade union—from West Yorkshire who introduced me to a number of paramedics who recounted their experiences, which were worryingly similar.

One of those women was Sarah Kelly, who I am delighted has joined us in Parliament this morning, after taking the brave decision to share her story in the hope that it would help us to fix the broken system that has let her down. On some occasions, it was a combination of the patient being under the influence of drugs, alcohol or both, with a diminished capacity to determine right from wrong, and they took advantage of the situation, sexually assaulting a lone female paramedic in the back of an ambulance. On other occasions it was even more sinister: sexual predators, who have fine-tuned this approach, engineer a situation where they are alone in an ambulance with a female paramedic, with the specific aim of sexually assaulting them.

The risk to ambulance staff is heightened because, unlike the police, who have access to a certain degree of information about a person’s previous criminal history prior to attending an incident, the ambulance service does not. I have met female paramedics who have been dispatched to the address of someone who has only recently sexually assaulted them, pending a court appearance, which must be against all safeguarding and legal advice.

Sarah has led the way in Yorkshire, seeking to work with her trade union and her employer, the Yorkshire ambulance service, to implement the necessary changes from a grassroots level—to accurately report and record such attacks, follow up with support and advice in order to secure a conviction and to build up the data required to put protections in place so that unnecessary risks do not have to be taken in future. I commend her efforts. As we have reflected on many times over the course of the Bill’s journey, the reason why we have to go that bit further on protections for emergency service workers is that we are the ones who ask them to run towards danger and persevere with individuals who seek to do them harm, because they simply cannot walk away.

Like other paramedics, Sarah, having been sexually assaulted by the perpetrator, had to continue to persevere with him in the back of the ambulance until they arrived at hospital, first and foremost because he needed medical attention, and she could not walk away or escape him. We owe it to Sarah to make this amendment a reality in law. She is not alone in her experience as a paramedic, nor are paramedics the only emergency service workers to be exposed to this particularly vile manifestation of assault, so I urge all colleagues to lend their support to amendment 3 and add it to the Bill.

I also support amendment 2, to which I have added my name, and I will return more specifically to the hideous act of spitting when I speak to amendments 4, 5 and 6. I am also sympathetic to a great deal of the work done by the hon. Member for Shipley, and I agree with a number of the points that he outlined in his new clauses. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the debate.

[Alex Chalk]

It is such a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch). She is a truly passionate defender of the interests of police officers, and she does that with great skill. I pay tribute to her and to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) and my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies).

I have a few observations, building on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. In his powerful submission he said that it is important that police officers—I know there are some in the Public Gallery—receive justice, and that that justice is not “a sick joke”. However, we must also ensure that we do not inadvertently replace one sick joke with another.

In my experience as a prosecutor, the biggest injustice for police officers was along the following lines. A police officer attends the scene of a serious robbery, for example, and he or she makes an arrest. During the course of that arrest, the defendant spits at the police officer, in an extremely upsetting and unpleasant incident. The defendant is taken to the police station, where he is subsequently charged with robbery and with assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty. The case then comes to court, and the defendant says to the prosecutor, through his solicitor, “Alright. I will plead guilty to the robbery”—that is technically a more serious offence and punishable with life imprisonment—“but do me a favour and drop the offence of assaulting a PC.” A lazy prosecutor—this point was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley—might say, “Oh for goodness’ sake. Let us carve this up. He is going to get a custodial sentence of two to three years for this unpleasant robbery. Is it really worth proceeding with the charge of assaulting a PC?”

What should happen in those circumstances? A conscientious and decent prosecutor would speak to the officer and say, “This is what is being proposed. What are your thoughts about it?” If in those circumstances the officer says, “I want justice to be done. I want this individual to have on their record not just that they are a robber, but that they have assaulted a police officer”, it would be wrong for the prosecution not to proceed with that charge and for justice not to be done. A prosecutor should already take into account the feelings of the victims, and I suggest that it would be in breach of their duty as a prosecutor not to proceed in such circumstances, and it would be a failed assessment of the public interest. In my experience, where those decisions have gone wrong and a case has been dropped, police officers rightly feel that their interests have not been taken into account.

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman is speaking specifically about police officers, but there is already an existing offence regarding police officers in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—a rather elderly piece of legislation. However, there is no similar provision for other emergency workers.

[Alex Chalk]

That is absolutely right. I was using that example to make a point, but whether we are talking about a police officer or an emergency worker, if this Bill becomes an Act—I would entirely support that—the principal potential for injustice is not the absence of legislation used to arrest, prosecute and convict an individual; it is where a prosecutor might make the wrong decision to drop a charge because, in an erroneous assessment of the public interest, he or she decides that it is not worth the candle. That is critical.

The second potential area of injustice is wrongful or erroneous charging. The example given was of a police officer who attends the scene of an alleged crime and her finger is bitten off. An offence for that already exists—causing grievous bodily harm with intent—and the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. If the defendant was convicted, Sentencing Council guidelines suggest that he or she should receive between nine and 16 years’ imprisonment.

Why do I make that point? Let us suppose the defendant is inexplicably charged with assaulting a PC—maximum sentence six months. Under the current position, the defendant would plead guilty and those six months would be reduced to four, because a third of the sentence would be docked. He would then serve half that sentence, which is two months. That is the maximum penalty. It is vanishingly rare that anyone ever gets the maximum penalty, but let us suppose someone does in this case and receives two months. Under the new regime, he would have a maximum sentence of 12 months, but we take off four because of the guilty plea, so the sentence is down to eight months. He will then serve four months, which is a bit more.

The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley would make the maximum sentence 24 months, but let us look at what would happen in practice. If the defendant pleads guilty, 24 months is reduced to 16 months, and he will then serve half of that. We must be careful about this. The net effect is simply that the sentence would go from a maximum of two months in custody to eight months, even with my hon. Friend’s amendment. The true area of injustice is not the absence of the offence; it is when a prosecutor makes the daft decision not to charge someone with the appropriate offence. Of course I support the Bill, but we must keep our eye on the real areas of injustice, which are upstream.

Finally, in my experience, police officers, and perhaps, in future, emergency workers, will take umbrage at the fact that if a defendant is convicted of , for example, a robbery, even if the court says, “Right. That’s it. Two years for the robbery and four months for assaulting a PC”, those sentences will invariably run concurrently, and a police officer could be left thinking, “What on earth was the point of that?”

[Chris Bryant]

That is another reason for structuring the Bill in this way. All too often, the courts might have borne in mind the fact that an offence was against an emergency worker when sentencing, but that might be completely unknown to the emergency worker. The mere fact that, because of the Bill that aggravating factor must be stated in court, will be of some comfort to the victims.

[Alex Chalk]

That is why I am prepared to support the Bill. It sends an important signal that I hope police and emergency workers will welcome. It is right that such an offence should be on that person’s record. My simple note of caution is that, in my experience, the areas of injustice come from wrong charging decisions and the wrongful exercise of discretion on the doorsteps of court.

[Michael Tomlinson]

At the start of his speech my hon. Friend mentioned the disgrace of sentencing, which he said was a joke or a scandal or whatever. I want to ask about honesty in sentencing—he is coming on to that point. Can we have honesty in sentencing without having ever more inflation in the sentences that are handed down? My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) might be right in saying that we should have honesty in sentencing, but the net result need not be that people are locked up for an ever longer time. We need better communication about what happens with the examples given of a third of a sentence being knocked off and then another half. If the public understood that, they might well get behind such a measure and support it.

[Alex Chalk]

My hon. Friend makes a valuable point, and we must ensure credibility, understanding of, and basic confidence in the criminal justice system. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley makes a pertinent point about what people feel if someone gets an eight-year sentence but are out in four years, and probably less. I accept that that causes concern, but it cannot seriously be suggested that we in this country are soft on imprisonment. In the United Kingdom we imprison around 95,000 people, but in Germany the figure is closer to 60,000, as it is in France. Of course there is an issue of perception, but it would be a great mistake for the message to go out from this debate that we are soft on imprisonment because nothing could be further from the truth. The UK imprisons more per capita than any other western European country.

The hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) raised a point about sexual offences, and it is appalling to think that an ambulance technician or paramedic who goes to a nightclub, for example, to try to give first-aid to somebody who has been assaulted on a dance floor, might be sexually assaulted. If she has been sexually assaulted—let us be honest, it is probably a “she”—there is an offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that has a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. It would be a very curious case if I, as a prosecutor, were faced with those facts—if a defendant put his hand up an ambulance worker’s skirt in a context where she is trying to provide first aid to an individual—and the CPS then said, “Do you know, we have this new offence, so we are not going to bother with the Sexual Offences Act, section 3, which carries the maximum penalty?” There is a risk that that ambulance worker would say, “What on earth is going on here? Why are they going for the easy option?”

[Chris Bryant]

However, the truth is that now, large numbers of ambulance workers never bother to report an incident because they feel that it will not be taken seriously. All too often, they have a sort of message from society, the law and prosecuting authorities that somehow or other, this is sort of part of their job. That is why it is important that we say, very firmly, “It is not part of their job and there should be prosecutions.”

[Alex Chalk]

We should say it firmly, and if I may say, no one can say it more firmly and eloquently than the hon. Gentleman. That is great, but we have to be chary of using legislation to send a message. I do not have any difficulty with doing it—we are doing that and it is absolutely fine—but there is a risk of one sick joke being replaced by another. I would feel very aggrieved if my daughter, say, was an ambulance worker, and a defendant was charged with what might be perceived to be an easier and lesser offence in circumstances where if the same thing happened, for the sake of argument, to one of the nightclub’s patrons who was not an emergency worker, the defendant might be charged under section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act. We rely on prosecutors using their judgment, and I am sure that they will continue to do so, but my simple point is that this has the greatest scope for injustice, and it should not be allowed to happen.

[Kevin Foster]

I am finding my hon. Friend’s speech very interesting and thought-provoking. Does he agree that Parliament can make its intentions clear on this subject by making this an aggravating factor in the offences that he refers to, and not by looking to incorporate it as such into this offence? Of course, the intention may well be common assault, but this is about making it an aggravating factor in existing sexual offences and not about saying to prosecutors, “You went for this offence when you should have gone for the offence under the 2003 legislation.”

[Alex Chalk]

I take that point entirely.

My final point is about the issue of grievous bodily harm with intent, which most right-thinking people would think is the appropriate offence to charge someone with who had bitten a police officer’s finger, but a middle ground exists between grievous bodily harm with intent and common assault, which currently has a maximum sentence of six months—that is, assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Why do I mention that? As has been intimated, common assault is for offences that leave no mark at all. If any offence leaves a mark that, in the language of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is more than merely transient or trifling—in plain English, that is reddening of the skin—the defendant can be charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, whether the victim is an emergency worker or not, with a maximum penalty of five years. That would mean, once the discount for an early guilty plea is taken off, that someone could be inside for 20 months maximum.

This is my central point: let us support this Bill and let us send out the message that attacks on our emergency workers are heinous, that they are not to be tolerated and that the law should come down like a ton of bricks. However, let us also not forget that getting justice means selecting the offence so that the punishment will fit the crime—

[Holly Lynch]

rose—

[Alex Chalk]

Just before I finish my peroration, I give way to the hon. Lady.

[Holly Lynch]

The hon. Gentleman is making an incredibly powerful speech and raising some really interesting issues. For me, when we are looking at how we can make a difference in this area, our role as legislators means that we are in some ways limited in how we intervene in the other areas of injustice that he has raised. My question to him, using his legal background and expertise, is this: once we have done our bit by amending the legislation—that will go some way to addressing this problem—how do we appropriately intervene to address the other areas of injustice that he also outlined?

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. It would be a very dark day indeed if Members of Parliament in this place were effectively directing independent prosecutors how to exercise their discretion—I know she is not suggesting that for a second—so we have to tread extremely carefully. Ultimately, when a prosecutor decides which charge to choose, they will have to weigh two things: first, sufficiency of evidence—is there sufficient evidence to make it more likely than not that a jury properly directed would convict?—and secondly, is it in the public interest? They have to weigh certain factors in considering the public interest, ranging from the likely sentence at the end of a conviction to protection of the public, and all sorts of things. What we say in this Chamber, however, is capable of forming part of that public interest. If we send the message out that we expect condign punishment, to use a faintly pretentious expression, to be visited on those who assault our emergency workers, that factor can properly be weighed into the mix when prosecutors decide—in the circumstances of the emergency worker who attends the nightclub or the police officer who has their finger bitten off—what offence to choose. The message will ring out from this Chamber that we expect our protectors to be protected.

[Mohammad Yasin (Bedford) (Lab)]

It is a great honour to speak in this important debate and it has been nice to hear legal experts making some very important points.

In March, I received a letter from the Bedfordshire police and crime commissioner explaining why the Bill is so important to protect our emergency workers. In Bedfordshire, a police officer who has been assaulted is contacted by a member of the senior team within 72 hours of the assault. Sadly, such calls are a weekly event. Some 24,000 police officers were assaulted in 2016-17, as were more than 70,000 NHS workers and staff in England alone. Assaults on emergency workers should not be viewed as an occupational hazard. While some judges will add an additional penalty if an assault on an officer is proven in court, that is not automatic. CPS judges have historically viewed an assault in the course of arrest as to some extent just part of the job. We must not tolerate that any longer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I agree entirely with that point, and I am reassured by what the Minister said about seeking to toughen up deterrence in respect of the language contained in an earlier provision in the Bill. In the event that spitting does not cease with immediate effect, we will still have to ensure that we offer those protections relating to dealing with those anxieties, and offering clarity and support. The right hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Stephen Crabb) is quite right: that is what I am looking to see from Ministers today.

[Alex Chalk]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Holly Lynch]

I certainly will—I will return the favour.

[Alex Chalk]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, just at this last moment. What was striking about the point she made was that in the instance that she cited a police officer was given medical advice that there was a risk, yet that medical advice appears, statistically, to run entirely counter to the statistics that were provided by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). So part of resolving this, and giving clear protection and advice to officers, is about ensuring that consistent medical advice is given—does the hon. Lady agree?

[Holly Lynch]

I entirely agree. That goes back to the earlier point that we cannot fix everything through legislation. I agree entirely that where there are shortcomings with this legislative approach, even if we withdraw it, we will not fix the problem. So what alternatives—the hon. Gentleman has rightly reflected on those—do we need to put in place? I am open to any and all suggestions—but without that legislation I am looking for alternatives.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Lucy Frazer]

I am aware of the recent document produced by the Law Society. Of course, it is important that we have professionals at every level, that we have a diverse profession and that we encourage young people to join what is an excellent profession.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

T8. The Government are entitled to feel a little perplexed by the Criminal Bar Association’s hostility to the new graduated fee scheme, given the CBA’s input into that scheme. Be that as it may, will the Minister confirm that the MOJ is prepared to communicate with the CBA to resolve this growing dispute?

[Lucy Frazer]

My hon. Friend is right to say that in putting together this scheme discussions went on for two years with members of the Bar and the MOJ. They were calling for us to implement this scheme, so that is the scheme we have implemented. We are always willing to talk to members of the CBA and the Bar Council. Since I have been appointed, in the past three months, I have met the chairman of the Bar Council twice and the chair of the CBA twice.

Leaving the EU: Justice System

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Thursday 29th March 2018 Westminster Hall

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Ninth Report of the Justice Committee, Session 2016-17, implications of Brexit for the justice system, HC 750, and the Government response, HC 651.

It is a pleasure, Ms Buck, to serve under your chairmanship.

I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this very important issue here in Westminster Hall, and I thank all members of the Select Committee on Justice—both past and present, and many of them are here today—for the input that they made to our report, which of course was initially produced in the 2016-17 Session.

We received the Government response to our report on 1 December last year. I am glad to see the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), in her place today. She has joined the Department since that date, so if I press a little harder on some things than on others, I am sure she will understand that they are not meant in any personal spirit. I think she also understands, from her own experience at the Bar, why there is a great need for more precision and more detail about what is going to happen.

I can perhaps encapsulate the Committee’s concerns following the Government’s response to our report by saying that the response is long on good intentions and on setting out an ambitious vision, but short on specifics and the details of how that ambitious vision will be achieved, and there is a concern that it may not be realistically achievable. The European Parliament’s response earlier this month indicates that it is by no means persuaded that all of the Government’s ambitious ideas for taking this matter forward will be achievable. We need what the Government have set out to be written—or rather painted—in the boldest red ink.

I suspect, given the tenor of the Prime Minister’s Mansion House speech and subsequent events, that we will be pragmatic about some of these issues—indeed, both sides will need to be pragmatic. Because the law depends above all upon certainty, we will have to come to decisions and pragmatic compromises sooner rather than later. My objective in today’s debate is to press the Government further on the need to be more precise and specific about exactly how we will deal with these matters, and also, perhaps, to inject a sense of urgency.

Of course, I ought to refer to my entries in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, although I do not practice law now. There is concern about the economic position of the English legal services sector post-Brexit. We had a debate about that yesterday in Westminster Hall, and I am grateful to the Minister for her response then. I am sure that we will want to discuss that matter further. I will not dwell on it in detail now, but it indicates how we need to be alert and on our guard if we wish to continue to protect the pre-eminence of our English legal system. It certainly enjoys international pre-eminence at the moment—it is the jurisdiction of choice for international commercial litigation and, of course, is regarded as a gold standard in independence, fairness and integrity. As I say, we have to be on our guard in case, post Brexit, other jurisdictions seek to compete with us—legitimately enough, from their point of view—because international commercial litigation, and particularly the variety of international contracts, is a competitive matter.

I notice that there is now an English language and English commercial law court being opened up in Paris. I must say that those of us who have practised in some of the Crown courts on the south-eastern circuit might have found the idea of a brief to go to Paris quite an attractive proposition by comparison to going, say, to Havering magistrates court. However, this is not an entirely jokey matter, because, as was indicated in the debate yesterday—I will not repeat all of my remarks from then—the English legal services sector is a very significant revenue earner for this country. I should say the British legal services sector, of course, as we should not forget Scotland in this regard. But there is a much broader issue here as well, which is encompassed in our report. A number of my hon. Friends want to talk about some of the specific matters in our report, so I will perhaps sketch over some of the broad outlines.

I have indicated our firm view that we need more detail, more precision and a greater sense of urgency. We must have assurance from the Government that legal issues are being entirely mainstreamed into the work of the Brexit negotiations. The Ministry of Justice has helpfully set up a legal services working group, but this is not just about legal services; it is also about the impact upon the judiciary and the operation of the courts, which, ultimately, are perhaps even more significant.

I know that the senior judiciary are extremely alive to this issue and are doing a lot of work on it themselves. However, I submit that, consistent with maintaining the judiciary’s independence, we need to find a means whereby the judiciary’s practical views and experience are genuinely fed in to those who are negotiating, for example, on our future relationship with the European Court of Justice and on how we deal with retained law, which I will come back to in a moment. I have to say that I am not yet convinced, whatever the good intentions and hard work of the Ministry of Justice, that that is fully feeding in to those who are negotiating for us through the Department for Exiting the European Union and in Brussels. The Government need to address that urgently. It seems to the Committee that we need clarity on those key issues of the position vis-à-vis the ECJ and retained law. There is still real concern about the effectiveness and adequacy of the provisions in clause 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill.

It is instructive, perhaps, to look at the evidence of the President of the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale of Richmond, given on 21 March, which is only about a week or so ago, to the Constitution Committee of the other place. In essence, the position is that at the moment, clause 6 gives what on the face of it would appear to be wide discretion in how the British courts will apply and have regard to European Community law once we have left. There is a perfectly understandable precedent, of course—it is perfectly well established that British courts will take into account relevant law from other jurisdictions when it is applicable to the facts and law of the case that they are considering.

However, there is a difficulty. There are phrases in the Bill stating, for example, that a tribunal “may have regard” to European Community law—there are those terms, “may” and “have regard”—but then there is a get-out clause stating that it

“need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so.”

The President of the Supreme Court said that she found that drafting “very unhelpful”. If the President of the Supreme Court says that, the Government ought to sit up, take notice and do something about it.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a really powerful point. Is not the issue here that judges do not want to be dragged into the political arena? Although courts have shown themselves well able to look at other jurisdictions for a potential steer on how to interpret things, when it comes to the EU the process is so overlaid with politics that judges could find themselves accused of becoming, in the phrase that we have heard, “enemies of the people”. We should not be in that field, and judges deserve the protection of knowing exactly what they are required to interpret.

[Robert Neill]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and the importance of that point cannot be overstated. I am absolutely confident that the Minister gets that point entirely, because we saw utterly disgraceful attacks by some of the press upon the judiciary for carrying out their constitutional task. Those words should never have been said, and I am glad to say that the current Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor has made very clear his support for the independence of the judiciary and the respect with which that independence should be treated. I know that the Minister entirely shares that view.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) is quite right. Broad wording on such a political topic lays the judges open to such things, because if they are obliged to act according to the clause that I mentioned—as they will be if it is passed in its current form—they will inevitably run the real risk of being accused of having taken, in effect, political decisions. That is why the President of the Supreme Court spoke in the way she did. She said:

“We don’t think ‘appropriate’ is the right sort of word to address to judges. We don’t do things because they are appropriate, we look at things because they are relevant and helpful. We do not want to be put in the position of appearing to make a political decision about what is and is not appropriate.”

That is exactly the point that my hon. Friend made so powerfully.

I know the clause is being debated in the other place, but as it stands it just does not give judges the protection to which they are legitimately entitled. I hope the Government will address that as a matter of urgency. That is not only the view of the current President of the Supreme Court; it has been echoed by her predecessor, Lord Neuberger, and by the previous Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. That is overwhelming and compelling evidence that there has to be movement on this point. It is time for the Government to do that. I suspect they would find good will across the House if they could find a means of properly addressing those concerns of the judiciary—one has to stress that those are their concerns.

The Attorney General said it was not the Government’s desire to put judges in that position. I entirely accept his good faith in that. He said:

“We will continue to work with them to provide the necessary clarity.”—[Official Report, 22 March 2018; Vol. 638, c. 389.]

That is good, but it has to be translated into legislation that is fit for purpose. We are not at that stage yet, and we need much more clarity. I hope that the Minister will be able to deal with that point and take it back to the Attorney General and those dealing with the Bill.

The issue of how we deal with the ECJ is important, but we also need to be realistic. If we want to continue some of the partnership arrangements we have, there will have to be dispute resolution processes. All the agreements will need an arbitral mechanism. I hope the Government will take on board the strong views of legal practitioners across the country that a desire to displace any role for the ECJ—as opposed to removing “direct jurisdiction”, to use the Prime Minister’s phrase, which is a different concept—may create more difficulties than is worthwhile. There are perhaps some limited areas, such as the interpretation of specific matters of financial services regulation and some matters of data regulation, where there might be sense in making a pragmatic compromise rather than having to set up a number of ad hoc arbitral mechanisms such as tribunals or whatever we might call them. That is a key and pressing issue.

There are other issues that concern the Committee on how we will deal with criminal justice and judicial co-operation. They have already been addressed at some length, and I know other colleagues will deal with them today. The point I stress is that the Prime Minister has already indicated her firm and resolute intention to have an ongoing agreement so that we can share in police and judicial co-operation and security co-operation. She is absolutely right to do that, and I support her in doing so, but we have to be realistic. If we are to benefit from such things as the European criminal records information exchange system, the work of Europol and the information exchange that is so critical to the pursuit of modern crime—whether that is terrorism or organised crime of other kinds—we have to have our data arrangements aligned. That must inevitably mean following the EU27’s data regulation and any jurisprudence that subsequently develops that touches on that. Otherwise, with the best will in the world, the police and security agencies in those EU27 countries, which include some of our most vital partners, will not be able to share information with us lawfully. We do not yet have clarity over how that will be dealt with, and we must have that swiftly.

There is also the issue of civil and family justice co-operation. I mentioned the importance of the civil sector, but we have to ensure that we have a firm arrangement for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. That is certainly important for the commercial litigation sector, but it applies to all contractual arrangements. If someone has a contract, they want to be able to sue if it is breached. There needs to be a remedy that can realistically be enforced. We must have more clarity on that. As I have observed on more than one occasion, there are literally thousands of UK citizens—as it happens, most of them are mothers—who benefit from the ability to have maintenance payments enforced against former partners now living in other EU jurisdiction countries. It is unconscionable that those people, working hard under difficult circumstances, would lose the ability to have those payments enforced by a simple blanket mechanism. Warm words are not enough. That needs to be sorted out before we finally leave, whether that is in transition or the end state.

I hope that is a sufficient overview of some of our areas of concern and why we are pressing the Government on them. I look forward to the Minister’s response and the other contributions from colleagues on some of the other specific areas of this important debate, which I have no doubt the Justice Committee will return to in the coming weeks and months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck, and to follow the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). When it comes to the implications of Brexit, it is fair to say that the impact on the justice system is not always at the top of everyone’s list of priorities. It might even be thought of as a niche issue, but it is absolutely crucial. If I could do one thing today, it would be to emphasise that the justice system—the legal structures and arrangements that we have—underpin vital aspects of our democracy, the strength of our economy and the credibility of our institutions, including our own Parliament. It safeguards the rights of citizens and the balance of our constitution. When we discuss this issue, it is important to acknowledge that it resonates far more widely than might initially be perceived.

I will take a few moments to build on the remarks made by the right hon. Member for Delyn (David Hanson), but will preface that with one point. One of the striking things in my experience on the Justice Committee is the extent to which it has been possible to act in a truly cross-party way, which is of itself an acknowledgment that these issues are not party political and have the wider impact that I referred to.

Before moving on to the issue of crime and security, I want to echo the remarks made by the Committee Chair, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), about interpretation of retained law. It is important to make the point that judges are rightly nervous about being dragged into the political arena. We take it for granted that judges interpret the law without fear or favour. Typically in this country, they do not get into the papers as they do in other countries, and that is exactly the way we want to keep it, but we must recognise the reality of the situation. If there is a case in which a judge of the Supreme Court decides to pray in aid European case law, that will be perceived to be a far more political decision than it would have been perceived previously. People will say, “That’s it. Here we go. These judges are intending to thwart the will of the people and keep us in the European Union via the back door.” I completely understand that judges are rightly wary of being perceived in that light. It is incumbent on the Government to give them all possible clarity and guidance so they can say, “This is a matter for Parliament. Parliament has given us this guidance. If you want it changed, speak to your MP.” That is appropriate and fair.

Many, including our Committee and the Bar Council, have called for crime and policing and the wider issue of the justice system to be given a separate negotiating track. Those issues are of such importance that, in the words of the Bar Council, they cannot be bargained away like a lamb quota. They are of such significance to our democracy and our economy that they ought to be given priority. The rule of law, access to justice and crime and policing measures are not trifling matters.

It is important to recognise that our Prime Minister, when she was Home Secretary, recognised the importance of the European arrest warrant. After all, in 2014, when she was Home Secretary, she exercised the UK’s right, which was secured at Lisbon in 2007, to leave and then rejoin selected justice and home affairs measures. She said that losing access

“would risk harmful individuals walking free and escaping justice, and would seriously harm the capability of our law enforcement agencies to keep the public safe”.

In our country, the National Crime Agency said that leaving the EAW would pose a huge public protection risk to the UK. It has been broadly effective.

Although I entirely accept that the British Government’s intention is to replicate the EAW—I suspect the EU will want to do the same—complexities will arise. One very obvious example that people discuss is that many countries in the European Union have constitutional bars on extraditing their own citizens to non-EU countries. How will we deal with that? I am sure there is a way through it, but it must be discussed. The right hon. Member for Delyn ably made the point that we cannot leave that sort of thing to the last moment, because that will lead to criminals going free and justice being evaded.

Through the European Criminal Records Information Exchange System—ECRIS—the UK exchanges tens of thousands of pieces of information about criminal convictions each year. The second-generation Schengen Information System—SIS II—gives the UK real-time access to all European arrest warrants and other alerts on matters including missing persons. The point is that that has real-life implications. To give an example from September 2017—in fact, the Government’s own example—a prolific sex offender fled the UK on bail, was arrested in France after a road traffic collision, gave a fake name, but was arrested on a SIS II alert that had been entered by UK law enforcement. No wonder the National Crime Agency says that

“loss of access to SIS II would seriously inhibit the UK’s ability to identify and arrest people who pose a threat to public safety”.

It described it as a game-changer for UK law enforcement.

I am sure we will be able to negotiate an arrangement with SIS II but, lest we forget, it applies to only 26 EU member states and four non-EU Schengen countries—Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland—all of which have different, separate and nuanced arrangements. It is not straightforward. Of course, the EU will need to be flexible here. If ever there were a requirement to think flexibly to make something work, this is it. The EU will need to take account of the UK’s historic role in setting up some of these arrangements, developing the databases, supporting them, and contributing enormously to that crucial information.

The big stumbling block that we will have to deal with is the issue of access to data—the so-called adequacy decision. Unless we can solve that and satisfy the European Union that we can have an arrangement that allows that data to be shared, that will be the pillar of the future arrangement. If that pillar is in place, we will have difficulties. Lest we forget, any arrangement we agree with the European Union could get referred to the European Court of Justice, which could strike it down. It is critical that we give this matter early attention. If we do not, there is a danger to justice and of criminals going free. That is why it must be given the most urgent priority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lucy Frazer]

I very much understand the need for certainty and the importance of those clauses in contracts. There should be a level of legal certainty, because those contracts will be respected in the implementation period. Furthermore, as was stated—I cannot remember by whom—we can sign up to The Hague convention unilaterally. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham said in yesterday’s debate, that convention is not the gold standard, because certain types of jurisdiction clauses are not included. However, many are, and it should give business a level of certainty.

The Committee also referred to legal services. It is important that we recognise the value of that sector to jobs and our economy, and the fact that it underpins our financial services sector. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) identified many important points about the mutual recognition of qualifications. The Prime Minister has recognised that, too. She said

“it would make sense to continue to recognise each other’s qualifications in the future.”

That has been specifically recognised in relation to our agreement on citizens’ rights. Those citizens who remain have every right to continue to practise as they do at the moment.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst rightly identified that the European Parliament might say that what we are putting forward is unachievable. In any negotiation, I would not expect the other party and those who will be confirming the agreement to lie down and say they accept everything the UK puts forward. We must remember that it is a negotiation.

My hon. Friend mentioned competition from other jurisdictions and the Paris court. That is an important point, but we must remember that the UK is expanding its judicial offering. We have interests in Europe and in Britain as part of the EU, but recently we have also seen judicial co-operation and members of the Bar helping to establish courts in Dubai, Qatar and Kazakhstan. We can continue to thrive in those centres outside the EU.

My hon. Friend made an important point about feeding into DExEU. He can be assured that our negotiators at the Ministry of Justice are party to the teams, negotiating alongside DExEU in matters that affect justice. He should also be assured that we are discussing these important issues at ministerial level—I have had discussions with my counterpart in DExEU.

In relation to clause 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Lord Keen, who took the debate in the House of Lords, said clearly that the Government have heard the views expressed by Members of the House of Lords, and that we will return to that point.

The right hon. Member for Delyn (David Hanson), the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham made important points on cross-border security, including that, as a matter of principle, crime does not respect borders, and that many measures, including the European arrest warrant, are critical to our security. I was asked for a timetable. First, we were agreeing separation—budget and citizens’ rights—and have done so. Secondly, we were to agree an implementation period, and we have done that. We are now turning to the matters of the future partnership deal and security.

We want an ambitious deal. There are many examples of international agreements between Europol and other third countries, such as the US, but like both the right hon. Member for Delyn and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, I believe these matters will be solved because it is in the interests not just of us and our citizens but of other citizens.

[Alex Chalk]

We would all be interested to know whether those matters will be considered at the outset, potentially separately from other matters, or whether they will be thrown into the mix as something potentially to be bargained away.

[Lucy Frazer]

My hon. Friend should not assume that those points have not yet been considered. We are moving from an EU perspective to discuss these issues, and they will be considered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lucy Frazer]

I expect that the deal, of which that will form part, will be put to Parliament.

My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Victoria Prentis) rightly identified the importance of mutual enforcement and the mechanism to secure our future relationship. She asked for specifics in relation to the future relationship. The Government are looking at a number of options and are confident that an option will work. There are examples out there that other countries have used, and we would like a bespoke arrangement that works for our country.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham made an important point about the independence and integrity of our judges. I agree that it is not for them to make political decisions in exercising their independent function as the judiciary. As a barrister, I regularly referred to foreign law—I am sure he has, too—in support of points I made in courts for a number of years to support or distinguish cases. That is not an unusual feature of what goes on in our tribunals.

[Alex Chalk]

My hon. and learned Friend is being generous with her time. The reality, however, is that looking to the High Court of Australia for interpretive guidance is entirely different from looking to the European Court of Justice in the post-Brexit context. One is not political and the other potentially is. The court of public opinion is a concern. That distinction must be taken into account.

[Lucy Frazer]

I understand the point, which my hon. Friend makes articulately. He is right that judges need guidance, and as I said the Government are looking at clause 6 as the Bill goes through the House.

My hon. Friend asked whether justice should be considered separately. The chairman of the Bar Council raised that point with me and with the Secretary of State. I understand and agree on the importance of the justice deal, which he reiterated throughout his speech.

The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) made an important point about children. I hope she will be pleased that, in the European Council guidelines on 23 March, the EU specifically stated that it is interested in considering judicial co-operation in matrimonial parental responsibility. Hon. Members have made important contributions on an important matter, and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to answer them.

Leaving the EU: Legal Services

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Wednesday 28th March 2018 Westminster Hall

[Robert Neill]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. At the moment, the UK is the jurisdiction of choice for the majority of commercial law contracts, litigation that follows from them, and commercial law arbitration, but we cannot take that for granted. A number of English language commercial courts that apply UK law have already been established elsewhere in the world. As I understand it, another is proposed in Amsterdam, which would clearly have an impact once we leave the EU. Mutual recognition of judgments is one of the UK legal sector’s key asks, and he anticipated with great timeliness that I was about to move on to what the Law Society, the Bar Council, the City of London Corporation, TheCityUK and others in the sector are looking for from the Government to maintain the position of UK legal services once we leave the EU.

The legal services sector’s key priorities are as follows. First, EU27 legal providers should be permitted to provide services in the UK, and vice versa—UK legal providers should be able to provide services in the EU27—on the basis of mutual recognition of regulatory regimes. That would enable European lawyers based in London firms and UK lawyers based in the EU27 to continue to advise and represent their clients.

Secondly, the UK and the EU27 should continue automatic mutual recognition of legal qualifications gained before and during—and after, I submit—the UK’s exit from the EU. That ought to be part of the agreement we seek. Otherwise, we would be in the perverse position that an English lawyer who, like me, is also qualified in the Republic of Ireland—I am a member of the Irish Bar—was able to continue to practise in the EU27 using their Irish qualification but not their English qualification. That is why there has been a considerable increase in the number of English solicitors being admitted to the Law Society of Ireland and English barristers seeking to be called to the Irish Bar. It would be much more sensible to retain those people in the UK as part of a mutual deal with our EU partners.

Thirdly, as my hon. Friend said, it is critical that UK court judgments can continue to be enforced in the courts of the EU27. That obviously applies to commercial law, but it also impacts maintenance payments, for example. Let us say that the partner from whom a UK national is having difficulty getting support for their child is an EU national who is living back in the EU27. Maintenance payments, like a judgment in the largest commercial litigation, can currently be enforced in any EU27 court and implemented by the authorities of any EU27 member state by virtue of our membership of the EU. One regulation covers the whole lot. It is important that we seek to preserve that arrangement. It would be extremely complicated if we had to enter into arrangements with individual EU member states, so we must try to do it en bloc.

It is also to the benefit of the EU27 to have the judgments of their courts recognised and enforced in the UK. There would be mutual advantage to preserving that arrangement, and it is most important that that is done without any break in continuity. Contracts of all manners are being entered into that, in all likelihood, will run beyond the date on which we leave the European Union. It is essential that people can enter into such contracts with sufficient certainty that they will be enforceable throughout the transition period and in the end state after we leave.

It is suggested that, as well as seeking the broadest possible deal with the European Union on that, the UK should consider re-signing The Hague convention as an independent party. I suggest that the two are complementary—it is not either/or. We are currently a party to that convention by virtue of our membership of the EU, but that will no longer be the case once we leave. I ask the Minister to take on board the concern that, in the negotiations, we should seek a waiver from the EU to allow us to re-sign as an independent party prior to Brexit so that there is no delay in ratification.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful case, and I entirely agree with him about The Hague convention, but does he agree that the great prize would be replicating the provisions of the recast Brussels I regulation, which derives from EU regulation 1215/2012? That is the gold standard. It is the best option, and The Hague convention is very much a fall-back provision.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. It is also a pleasure to hear the debate brought about by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and the contributions made by the other members of the Justice Committee. That Committee is doing a huge amount of work to ensure that the issues that matter in our justice system are brought to the forefront and to Ministers to ensure that we have the best possible justice system going forward.

Today, as always, my hon. Friend highlighted important issues that affect us in relation to Brexit. Like him, I acknowledge the important work done by our legal services sector. By reference to points similar to his, there are four key points. The first is jobs, and the legal services sector is the source of many jobs. As he rightly mentioned, it employs well over 300,000 people.

Secondly, the sector contributes significantly to our economy: £24 billion every year. As my hon. Friend highlighted, that money is brought in by not just the legal services sector but its interdependency and relationship with the financial services sector. He mentioned TheCityUK, whose CEO, Miles Celic, highlighted that very point. He said:

“The UK-based legal services sector forms an integral and crucial part of the wider financial and related professional services ecosystem which makes the UK a truly globally-leading international financial centre.”

The legal services sector does not only those things but so much more. It supports people when they are most vulnerable. Many lawyers give up their time to support others for free through the Bar Pro Bono Unit and LawWorks, and I was pleased to see the launch in 2014 of the UK collaborative plan for pro bono, with more than 40 firms committing 325,000 hours a year to support the most vulnerable.

Our sector is so successful because we have outstanding professionals. We have a well-established system of law and a first-class judiciary, whose expertise and impartiality is recognised throughout the world. For those reasons, my hon. Friend is right to say that we need to protect this sector post Brexit, and we are doing that in a number of ways.

My hon. Friends the Members for Henley (John Howell), for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), and for Bromley and Chislehurst referred to the importance of mutual recognition and the enforcement of judgments. I hope that in our withdrawal agreement we will soon reach an agreement on the protection of and mutual recognition of judgments, and on separation for cases that are pending and currently before the courts.

[Alex Chalk]

I am encouraged to hear that. Some of the evidence presented to the inquiry stressed that if we get such an agreement right, there is a great opportunity for a springboard, particularly in east Asia, where there is a lot of work that British lawyers can seek to win. However, that will require that sound foundation of mutual recognition of judgments, and mutual enforceability.

[Lucy Frazer]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and it is important to give certainty to the legal services sector, so that they can advise their clients accordingly. My point was about the withdrawal agreement and what will happen to cases that are already pending before the court. The second stage of our negotiation was about implementation, and we have given businesses legal certainty by ensuring that our current arrangements will continue to apply during the implementation period. We are starting to negotiate and come to an arrangement on what will happen in future after we leave the EU.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham was right when he mentioned the gold standard and the Brussels regulation, and my hon. Friend the Member for Henley was correct to identify the importance of the Hague convention. Both those things are important, and we hope to secure the Hague convention as a minimum. It is right to ensure that there will be no gap before we rejoin that convention, and we are pressing to secure that. Our ambition and aim is to negotiate as hard as possible and ensure arrangements and protections in future that are similar to those we currently have.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst raised the important question of legal services, the right of citizens to practise here and abroad, and the mutual recognition of qualifications. Again, on separation, as part of the withdrawal agreement we have agreed that any lawyers within the scope of the citizens’ rights agreement who have become part of the host profession in the member state should remain recognised and able to practise. Last week we agreed the terms of the implementation period, in which we will have the same rules as now. Therefore, rules on market access will continue, including on the provision of services and establishments for lawyers. The Government are keen to ensure a good deal for the legal services sector in future.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

May I just make a tiny bit more progress?

As the Government’s position has shifted, they have come up with a written ministerial statement, which seems accurately to reflect the right direction of travel. But the difficulty is that clause 9 is entirely incompatible with what the Government have set out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

It would indeed be a remarkable outcome. Certainly, I think that Parliament ought to have a say. Those reasons highlight the difficulty of clause 9. There are other difficulties with the Bill, but clause 9 really has it.

I want to bring my remarks to an end, and I simply say that I do want the Government to listen. The opportunity is here for them to accept the amendment and then to come back on Report and explain themselves further or to tidy the amendment up, and I will listen and try constructively to help them if, indeed, any of this power is needed, but I am not prepared to sign off clause 9 in its present form.

The one merit of amendment 7—I tailored it very carefully and I tried quite deliberately to avoid the no-deal scenario, which is a very legitimate issue, but it is not what I went for—is that I wanted to make sure that these powers could not be used to pre-empt a statute that we should probably be considering this time next year. It is plainly wrong, and if it is to be departed from, the Government have to provide a credible reason for it.

[Alex Chalk]

May I ask my right hon. and learned Friend about a point I am struggling with and that others may be struggling with, too? On the one hand, given that the Government have conceded that there will need to be a statute to implement any agreement, it is difficult, for me at any rate, to see what the point is of clause 9, and Parliament should not legislate in vain. That is point one. On the other hand is the key point not that we will get a vote on that statute, so does this really matter? That is the part I am struggling with, and I would very much welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s views.

[Mr Grieve]

I think that this does matter. If I understand the reason why the Government want this power, it is that, at the time when we may be considering the next statute, they will also be pushing through this House statutory instruments setting up structures for our departure from the EU that may be, or that we might consider to be, at variance with what we need in the fresh statute that we are considering. I think that that is a form of constitutional chaos, actually. I cannot see how it produces any clarity at all. For that reason—a reason of good process—this is a mistaken course of action, particularly because it is not necessary.

We have heard the argument, “We’re going to run out of time in leaving the EU.” I simply repeat what I have said previously. I realise that this is hugely objected to by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends because they are so fixated on getting us out. The article 50 mechanism provides for a sensible structure to enable us to leave smoothly, yet for reasons that I do not understand, the aim of some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seems to be to mess it up as much as possible. There is the famous amendment 381, for example, which we are going to come back to next week and which I have already indicated I will not support under any circumstances whatsoever. If we actually stick to a sensible process, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), then we will get the right answers. As I say, if the Government are to justify keeping clause 9, they have to provide us with chapter and verse—and they simply have not done so. I have asked, and I have not had it.

In those circumstances, the only proper course of action—I say this with the greatest reluctance—is that I am going to have to vote for my amendment, and, if necessary, if it is not passed, I will vote against clause 9, because without my amendment, clause 9 becomes a really very worrying tool of Executive power that does not appear to have any reasonable presence in this legislation. Apart from on HS2, I do not think that I have ever rebelled against the Government in my 20 and a half years in this House. I do find it quite entertaining that some who criticise me for speaking my mind on this matter are individuals who appear to have exercised the luxury of rebellion on many, many occasions. But that said, there is a time for everybody to stand up and be counted. As Churchill said, “He is good party man—he puts the party before himself and the country before his party.” And that is what I intend to do.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

There is a range of support for early legal help, as I have already detailed—£100 million of support—and that can be online or telephone support, but also representation. Since 2015 we have invested £5 million in the litigants in person strategy. There is a range of support available, but of course we can review this in the round through the review.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

We are a nation of laws, but we must be one nation too, with access to justice for people from all backgrounds. Does my hon. Friend agree that, post the LASPO review, the most careful thought should be given to bolstering legal aid resources so that we can have early advice and assistance for all?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield]

I was not about to go on to that, but clearly I am now. The hon. Gentleman knows that the charter was not binding when it was first adopted in 2000. It was made legally binding by the Lisbon treaty of 2007, which entered into force in 2009. It has, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, increased in significance, and the rights that it contains have become more visible and correspondingly more effective. Labour supported the charter then, and we support it now, because it has enhanced and improved European human rights protection, and by doing so it has significantly developed the quality of human rights protection in the UK. The wider point that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) makes is not relevant to the issue under discussion.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

The charter applies only when national authorities are implementing EU law. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that if it is retained, it risks creating a confusing inconsistency by giving citizens powerful rights to strike down some pieces of legislation, but not others? Is it not a case of doing either the whole thing, or nothing at all?

[Paul Blomfield]

I will come on to this point, but the charter is key to ensuring that retained law is treated properly and that the same rights of enforcement continue in the future. Without the charter, those rights are significantly diminished and access to them is diminished.

Let me proceed with the point I was making about how the charter goes wider than the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights, which I hope I am right in saying the Government accept. As other Members have already pointed out, it was the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union who relied on the charter in the case he brought before the High Court in 2015, against the then Home Secretary and now Prime Minister, when he was worried that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 would impact on MPs’ ability to communicate with constituents confidentially. He cited the charter, and his lawyers argued that it went beyond the European convention on human rights and granted further protection. He relied on the charter precisely because it provided greater human rights protection than was provided for by UK law and even by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

Despite this, the Government have not indicated which decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union under the charter they disagree with. Moreover, the explanatory notes to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill justify the decision to exclude the charter from retained EU law by saying:

“The Charter did not create new rights, but rather codified rights and principles which already existed in EU law. By converting the EU acquis into UK law, those underlying rights and principles will also be converted into UK law, as provided for in this Bill.”

If that were the case, it would be fine, but it is clearly not the case.

Drawing on existing rights, the charter set out a new framework for human rights protection under EU law. The rights contained in the charter may have existed in EU law for decades—the Government are relying on that point—but that is not enough. The whole point of the charter was that nobody could verify those rights or their sources, and as the lawyers among us will know, identifying the source of a right is imperative in securing effective recourse. In his speech, will the Minister therefore clarify whether the Government have succeeded, where others have not, in comprehensively identifying every single source of these rights? If not, how do they plan to uphold the same level of protections for these rights once we have left the European Union, because a right without effective recourse is rendered effectively meaningless?

By compiling and codifying these rights in a single document, the charter in effect created new rights and certainly created new protections. In short, the charter is the most effective key to unlocking vital rights, and to fail to transpose it and make it operable in UK law is to lock away those rights and deny UK citizens the key to accessing them.

On the data protection point on which the Secretary of State relied—my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) raises it in his amendment 151, which we support—the right to data protection exists in various documents, such as directives and regulations, but it was only by virtue of the charter creating the expressed right to data protection in article 8 that we were given the right to be forgotten.

The rights extended by the charter are not only data protection rights. Such rights start in article 1, which includes the right to human dignity. This does not exist as an enforceable right in common law or statute law applicable to retained law post-Brexit. Will the Minister, when he responds, explain how this right will be enforced after exit day if the charter is not retained?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

It is a pleasure to be able to say a few words this evening. May I say what a pleasure it has been to listen to this debate, which has been a paradigmatic example of what a Committee debate should be? It is not about the principles of whether we supported leave or remain; it is about ensuring that the legislation is in the best possible shape, because that is our job.

I want to confine my remarks to two areas. First, I will talk about amendments 139 and 302, tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) respectively, regarding the right to seek Francovich damages post-Brexit; and then I will turn to the charter. On the first issue, it is axiomatic that, if the acts of the state that caused loss took place at a time when a remedy was available, it would be wrong for that remedy to be ripped away unilaterally. It is a principle of British law that past acts or omissions must be considered in the context of the law as it applied at the time. I have heard gratefully the Solicitor General’s suggestion that he might be looking again at the matter. I respectfully suggest that that would be warmly welcomed across the House.

I turn to the charter. I want to explain why I think—despite the fact that I supported remain and I do not resile from a single argument that I made—that the Government are right not to seek to retain the charter, and why to do so would create inconsistency and confusion. I speak as someone who values human rights and who has argued forcefully in favour of remaining part of the European convention on human rights. Indeed, I have said that to leave that would be a catastrophic mistake, and I am delighted that doing so has been taken off the table.

So why do I speak as I do? Before I explain that, I will set out why we must accept that the charter does add rights and it would be wrong to consider it inconsequential, although that is not dispositive. The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) suggested that it was of no more legal effect than The Beano. That is not correct. Although it is true that there is some duplication, as compared with the ECHR, there are four ways in which the charter adds rights.

First, the charter creates some substantive new rights, which some have referred to as third category rights, including the right to dignity, the right to protection of personal data, the right to conscientious objection and guarantees on bioethics and independence for disabled people. Secondly, the charter widens the scope of existing rights in English law. One example is the right to a fair trial, which exists under article 6. The charter extends that right beyond the mere determination of civil rights and obligations and criminal charges to cover, for example, immigration cases, such as the ZZ case. Thirdly, it creates a new right to invoke the charter in respect of anyone with an interest. That is, of course, far broader than the convention. Fourthly, and most importantly, whereas breaches of the ECHR can lead only to a declaration of incompatibility, action in the case of a breach of the charter is far more muscular, because it allows the charter to take precedence over UK law and, effectively, disapply it.

Having set out all that, why am I not arguing in favour of retaining the charter? The simple reason can be summed up in one word: inconsistency. There is already an inconsistency in the law. A litigant in a case involving the implementation of EU law—that is, of course, the only category of litigation to which the charter applies—is armed with a powerful legal sword, which he can use to strike down the law. But when it comes to UK-derived law, no such legal sword exists, so the scope for absurdity becomes clear. Suppose the state were to pass a law that was a clear affront to human rights. Suppose it wanted to detain suspects without charge for six months or bring back the stocks, in breach of article 4 on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or article 3 on slavery. In those circumstances, all the litigant could do would be to try to persuade the court to make a declaration of incompatibility; the law could not be struck down. Yet if the UK sought to enforce a law regarding personal data, it could be disapplied. Would that not create a bizarre inconsistency? Such an inconsistency already exists, by the way, but I suggest that it would become more egregious and more difficult to sustain post Brexit.

[Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)]

I am following my hon. Friend’s arguments very carefully, and I am very pleased to hear him setting out why the rights he is talking about will be protected after we leave the EU. Does he agree that such inconsistencies will only further the interests of lawyers, rather than our constituents, after we leave the EU?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

This is about not furthering the rights of lawyers, but about how we as a House ensure that there is a corpus of law that is consistent, serves the interests of our constituents and can be considered in an intelligible and consistent way.

My view is that the remedy for this inconsistency is not for us to bring in the charter lock, stock and barrel to apply to all law. We could do that, but it would not work because it would create great confusion respecting the existing European convention on human rights, which is of course incorporated into English law and British law. Instead, the time has come—not today and not tomorrow, but at some time in the near future—to look at granting British citizens a corpus of rights to sit alongside the ECHR, as a written constitution, as it were, that extends the Human Rights Act and allows citizens to apply their rights against any law in this country. The logical next stage is to have what is in effect a written constitution.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

As a matter of fact, my hon. Friend and I may be the only two Government Members who believe in having a written constitution. I thought I was the only one—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There are three of us. I am very grateful. [Hon. Members: “Four.”] Let us not count. In any event, the number is small.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, in the interim, it would be a good step if the rights we identify, as a result of the Government’s analysis, as coming out of the charter—the third category rights—should in due course, although not of course in this Bill, be added to the Human Rights Act in a way that at least enables such a degree of entrenchment?

[Alex Chalk]

That is exactly right. I, respectfully, completely agree with my right hon. Friend. What has been such a benefit of this debate is that we have identified a third category of rights that Members on both sides of the House recognise there is a real public benefit in adding to the corpus of rights enjoyed by the British people. I entirely agree that we should look at whether they can be added pro tem to the Human Rights Act.

My fundamental point is that, if we are inching our way towards a written constitution, retaining the charter, which is in effect a proto-constitution, on the basis of an amendment debated for just a few hours in this Chamber is entirely the wrong way to go about it. For that reason and that reason alone, I am supporting the Government.

[Mr Simon Clarke]

I rise to support the Bill, particularly in opposition to amendments 8 and 46, as well as new clause 16.

I want to establish from the outset that I am not in any way cavalier about the concept or the subject of human rights. They underpin a free and just society, and all parliamentarians should be vigilant in their defence. Today’s debate underscores the significance of that. However, to quote Oxford’s Professor Richard Ekins:

“There is a fundamental difference between human rights and human rights law. The Charter is one way to attempt to protect human rights, a poorly framed and…inept way at that.”

Contrary to what the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) said, I do not need the charter of fundamental rights to be proud of my country.

There are a number of reasons why I believe the incorporation of the charter of fundamental rights into our law would be the wrong thing to do. The first concerns the scope of the charter’s application. Article 51 states:

“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union…and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”

Needless to say, once we leave the Union, we will not be a member state. As has been observed, many of the charter rights are necessarily contingent on our EU membership, and still more are directed not towards member states, but the Union institutions and their policies. We have already touched on that, and I will not dwell on it further.

Let us follow the logic that we should incorporate the charter into UK law. How would this work? There seem to be two possible scenarios. First, if we were to approximate the charter’s original application, we could amend it in such a way that it applied solely to retained EU law. That is the substance of the amendments. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) has pointed out, that would lead to the bizarre situation whereby some parts of UK law would be subject to a different human rights regime. That is a recipe for confusion and disaster. Alternatively, we can amend the charter so that it increases its scope to cover all UK laws and institutions. I would hazard a guess that that is not exactly what our constituents were thinking of when they voted for Brexit.

Notwithstanding that basic point, either route would further complicate the relationship between the charter and the Human Rights Act. All transposed EU law will become subject to the Human Rights Act on transposition anyway, and having two parallel and perhaps in places contradictory constitutional Acts covering precisely the same issues in the same sphere of application would serve to undermine, rather than uphold, the rule of law. That is because charter rights, most seriously social rights, are so flexible and contested that they are vulnerable to a near infinite number of interpretations, which is precisely the problem.

When I worked for my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), he would cite a quote from Montesquieu that was absolutely on point:

“Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power…If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator.”

Where we fail to legislate the judiciary fill the gaps. Rights creep has been a key objection from our constituents for many years, and rightly so. In at least two cases, British judges have gone beyond ECJ case law, relying on the charter to disapply Acts of Parliament. In Benkharbouche, parts of the State Immunity Act 1978 which protected embassies from immunity against employment law claims were set aside. In Vidal-Hall, part of the Data Protection Act 1998 was overridden, overturning a limitation on what damages could be recovered. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) said, this is properly a matter for the House to determine. The ECJ itself has overruled parts of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 by reference to the charter—a decision that puts the application of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 in serious doubt. That is not a small point. The process of striking down legislation under the charter goes far beyond the scope of the Human Rights Act, which allows the courts to make a declaration of incompatibility where there is a need to do so.

There is one final reason why we should resist charter incorporation, which is that to do so would probably be superfluous. We have heard from Ministers, who have struck a notably conciliatory tone, that the Government will provide detailed analysis of how each charter right will be addressed in a memorandum that is due on 5 December. If we are to go on to address what has been referred to as the third category of rights—rights that are not listed in the European convention on human rights and which are not rendered redundant by our leaving the EU—this process should be led by the elected House of Commons. That may very well be the right thing to do, but it is clear to everyone that retaining the charter is not the right vehicle by which to do it.

Lest we forget, the British public had no idea that the charter would evolve in the way that it has. Protocol 30 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union states that

“the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or principles”.

We have heard about The Beano, and about former Attorney-General Peter Goldsmith, who said in June 2004:

“The Charter is a consolidation of existing rights...It is not a mine for new human rights in this country.”

Crucially, in 2008, on Second Reading of the EU (Amendment) Bill that ratified the Lisbon treaty, David Miliband, told the House:

“The treaty records existing rights rather than creating new ones. A new legally binding protocol guarantees that nothing in the charter extends the ability of any court to strike down UK law”.—[Official Report, 21 January 2008; Vol. 470, c. 1250.]

Our constituents were given an inaccurate prospectus of how the charter would evolve, although I accept it was made in good faith at the time. In the light of that, my position is very clear that the charter should not be incorporated into our law to go on evolving in that way according to the whims of unelected judges.

Tonight we have an opportunity to reassert one final time what this House has been told for the best part of 18 years: the rights under which we live should have their origin in this House and, ultimately, in the British people, under whose authority we serve.

Dangerous Driving involving Death: Sentencing

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 17th October 2017 Westminster Hall

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kevin Brennan]

I will give way briefly, but I want to give the Minister a chance to respond.

[Alex Chalk]

The Sentencing Council does important and valuable work, but does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that in some of its guidelines—for the sake of argument, let us say assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which the maximum is five years—the range that the Sentencing Council imposes for the most heinous offence stops well short of the maximum, effectively sending a steer to the judges that says, “Don’t ever sentence for the maximum”? Does he agree that that is a concern?

[Kevin Brennan]

I do, and I think that there are similar concerns in relation to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. I do not advocate not having proper guidelines—we want consistency in sentencing—but it sometimes seems to victims that the sentence they are told the perpetrator is likely to get is a bit of a fiction, and that the tariff actually served is nothing like the maximum, even in a case such as the one I have discussed, in which there are horrific aggravating factors. Can the Minister address the questions posed by Sophie Taylor’s case about the frequency and circumstances in which a maximum sentence is given?

I want to make it clear that this is not about revenge; it is about justice. In the case that I am discussing, sentencing guidelines led to an outcome that outraged not only the victims’ families but the wider community. The Government need to be clearer about what they are doing to deter such crime. Knowing that a life sentence is a real possibility would be a start, as would increasing the likelihood of getting caught by funding the police properly; that is a vital part of it. The prospect that sentences could be increased on appeal when judges are too lenient is also important. I understand that out of 713 such requests in recent years, 136 have resulted in longer sentences, but not one has been for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving.

Sophie Taylor’s death was a horrible tragedy. Nothing will relieve her family’s loss. However, the perception that justice was not done because the maximum sentence is unreachable adds another burden for them to bear.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Dominic Raab)]

It is a great pleasure, as ever, to speak under your doughty chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I begin in the customary manner by congratulating the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) on securing this debate on sentencing for causing death by dangerous driving offences. I know that many colleagues here will have dealt with tragic cases in their constituencies; we have heard, movingly, of a couple of them. Those who have had that misfortune will know that reckless driving ruins lives and devastates families, whether the culprit is racing, talking on a mobile phone or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

The hon. Gentleman has championed this cause tenaciously since the tragic case in the summer of 2016 in which Michael Wheeler and Melissa Pesticcio started a car chase that, as he described, left Sophie Taylor dead and her passenger Joshua Deguara seriously injured. I extend my deepest sympathies to Sophie’s mother Jackie, whom the hon. Member for Cardiff West described, and to Sophie’s wider family and friends. I cannot begin to imagine their loss. The technical and legal changes that we are making will not bring her back, but these reforms must try to deliver some reassurance and solace, through a greater sense that justice is being done. I also pay tribute to Joshua Deguara and his family, whose suffering has been immense. The case highlights the need for reform.

Thomas Crowther, QC, the Cardiff Crown court judge in the case of Sophie Taylor, said that

“that shattering of two families was completely avoidable. It was caused by…the self-righteous and jealous rage”

of the defendants, who were

“chasing her down to frighten her and teach her a lesson”.

The court sentenced Michael Wheeler to seven and a half years in prison and Melissa Pesticcio to six and a half years.

Such cases are far too common. The reforms that we have announced this week will come too late for the families of Kris Jarvis, John Morland and James Gilbey, to name the victims of just a few of the tragedies that have struck me as I have worked on proposals for reform. The hon. Members for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer) and for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves) gave moving accounts of tragedies in their constituencies; I pay tribute to them and extend my sympathies and condolences to the families. I appreciate the frustration and anguish that they must feel. I met Major Gilbey, James’s father, last week. It is right to pay tribute to his courage and strength, and to all the families who have campaigned for a change in the law. Numerous colleagues across the House have also raised cases with me and my predecessors at the Ministry of Justice.

We recognise that the law has too often prevented judges from handing down sufficiently long sentences for the very worst cases of dangerous driving, bearing in mind the severity of the harm and the anguish of the victims’ families. We have looked at the evidence, and now is the time to change the law. Although we cannot bring back lost loved ones, we can make sure that justice is done. Yesterday, we published our response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to causing death and serious injury. The consultation, which closed earlier this year, received more than 9,000 submissions with different views on the offences and penalties. That shows the widespread public interest in reform and the concern about how the law has operated.

Based on the evidence, we propose three specific changes to the law. I hope the hon. Member for Cardiff West will welcome them, but I will also try to address his specific points. Even more importantly, I hope the changes will give the victims and the wider public a stronger sense that justice is being done. All three proposals received overwhelming support in the consultation.

First, we propose to increase the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life imprisonment. We want the courts to have additional powers to deal with the most serious cases in which life is lost. In 2016, the average sentence for causing death by dangerous driving was five years. In the last two years, three sentences of longer than 10 years have been imposed. That makes the case that those sentences are not attracting the level of seriousness that the hon. Member for Cardiff West and the Government think is due.

In answer to the hon. Gentleman, the point of the change is to send an unequivocal, crystal-clear message to the courts that they can and should impose a higher sentence—a life sentence—for the very worst cases. It is for the Sentencing Council to decide whether new guidelines are needed on this sentence or on any of the others that I will mention. He is right to mention that the ULS—unduly lenient sentences—scheme applies to those cases and that they will therefore be referred to the Court of Appeal if the Attorney General so decides. He rightly acknowledges that as politicians, we cannot and should not interfere with individual decision making, as opposed to the sentencing framework that applies in such cases.

In very serious cases in which there are multiple victims, in which the offender has previous convictions or in which their behaviour is particularly reckless and culpable—as in some of the cases described by the hon. Members for St Helens South and Whiston and for Lewisham West and Penge—offenders will face a maximum life sentence. The effect of that change is twofold. Offenders who receive a life sentence will serve a minimum period in prison and will be released only when the Parole Board considers it safe. For offenders who do not merit a life sentence, the court will have the power to impose a determinate sentence of any length. That will empower the courts to reflect the full severity of the worst offending and its devastating impact on victims and their families.

[Alex Chalk]

The Minister speaks about sending a powerful message. A powerful message is sent to the Sentencing Council too. Does he agree that for offences such as stalking, for which the maximum sentence has been doubled, that message has been reflected to a large extent in the Sentencing Council’s most recently published guidelines?

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is right. I remember his tenacious campaign on that subject from my early days as a Justice Minister. As well as empowering the courts, the change sends a message that will have an effect, right through the system, on the raw power available to a sentencing court. It will have a knock-on effect on the Sentencing Council and its ability to assess and consider whether further guidelines need to be provided. At the appeal level, there is also the ULS scheme.

In the time available, I will address the other key proposals. The second proposal is to raise the maximum penalty for the separate offence of causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs. We recognise that although the driving in such cases may not amount to dangerous driving, the overall seriousness of the offence is the same, because of the combination of careless driving and the irresponsible decision to get behind the wheel under the influence of drink or drugs. Again, for the worst cases, we propose that the maximum sentence be life imprisonment.

Our third proposal will close a gap in the law. At the moment, if a driver who is driving carelessly injures another road user, passenger or pedestrian, the maximum penalty is a fine, even if the incident results in the victim being left with serious, debilitating or permanent injuries. The case that particularly struck me was that of Sophie Wilkinson, who was left in a coma with a life-changing set of injuries after a horror crash in 2007. We need the criminal law to cover careless driving that results in such severe harm and injury, so we will introduce a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. That offence will carry a custodial penalty and will sit alongside the existing offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving.

Those are the three key areas of reform that we plan to implement as soon as parliamentary time allows. We will incorporate any further changes that emerge from the review of cycling safety announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport last month, so that we have a consistent overarching framework for sentencing people who kill or cause serious injury on our roads. I am grateful for the time and effort that so many people, including the hon. Member for Cardiff West and the campaigning families, put into their responses to the consultation. No punishment in these cases can make up for the loss of a loved one, but we can make sure that justice is properly done.