Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

92: Clause 76, page 45, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The functions are exercisable only when accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to restrict investigators’ powers of entry, search and seizure to situations when they are accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. When we discussed a previous group on Part 1 that was similar to this, I believe the Minister stated that those using search or other powers would always be accompanied by a police constable, so I suppose I am looking for confirmation that that is the same in this case. If it is, I am curious to know why we really need the powers and why it cannot be left to the police to exercise them.

I have one other, more important question. On the powers in Clause 76, under the DWP powers, new subsection (4)(i) refers to

“section 117 (reasonable use of force)”.

Slightly oddly, I have just discovered that that was not included in the powers for the PFSA, so can the Minister explain why the DWP thinks it needs to be able to use reasonable force when the PFSA did not? I beg to move.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments and questions. I will speak first to Amendment 92. The amendment would undermine the policy intent of this part of the Bill, so we cannot accept it. The DWP leads investigations into social security matters and, as a result, our staff are better positioned to search for items relevant to these investigations—the things that they deal with, such as benefit claim packs or documents related to fraudulent identities. Requiring the police to be present for all DWP search and seizure activity, including investigative tasks related to securing criminal evidence, would erode the anticipated obvious benefits of the measure to both the DWP and the police. Crucially, it would divert the police away from focusing on the crime within our communities that only they can deal with and dealing with the human victims of those crimes.

These powers allow the DWP to apply to a court for warrants to enter a premises, conduct search and seizure and apply for and exercise production orders, with or without the police present. That clarifies the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. They provide the DWP with greater control over its own operations and ensure that police time is not spent undertaking administrative tasks on the DWP’s behalf.

However, I reassure the Committee that safeguards are in place to govern the use of these powers. First and foremost, court approval must be granted for all warrants. The requirements for a DWP warrant application will be as strict as those for a police warrant application. Furthermore, the DWP intends to exercise these powers exclusively in cases involving serious and organised crime. This is not novel. Similar powers are already being used by HMRC, the Food Standards Agency and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which can undertake search and seizure activity without needing to be accompanied by the police.

Amendment 93 would impose unique obligations on the courts that they do not face in respect of other government departments with similar powers. PACE powers do not require the individual exercising them to be appointed by the court and there is no clear reason for the DWP to be any different. DWP-authorised investigators, like others who exercise PACE powers, will be subject to the PACE code of practice relating to search and seizure activity and will be required to follow the same procedures and processes as the police when submitting a warrant application to the court. These are not standards set by the DWP; they are set out in PACE, which all bodies exercising these kinds of law enforcement powers must adhere to. Specialist training must be successfully completed before authorisation is given and only then can an authorised investigator exercise these powers on behalf of the Secretary of State. That approach ensures that the correct responsibilities are attributed to the Secretary of State and the courts.

On the question relating to the PSFA, I am advised that it is not that a constable necessarily has to be present, but somebody with those powers, who may not be a police officer but could be from the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, et cetera. As I said, the police do not always have to be there, if it is not necessary. There will be occasions when it will be necessary. For example, the previous Government published a fraud plan in which they recommended that powers of not only search and seizure but arrest be taken. We have decided not to take those powers, so if there needed to be an arrest, we would need to have police officers with us. If there were a risk of serious violence, again, the police would need to be present, but not otherwise.

On the question of force, the provisions set out in Clause 76 provide powers under PACE to enable DWP serious and organised crime investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items, with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The clause also enables authorised investigators to apply to a judge for an order requiring an individual suspected of social security fraud to provide certain types of sensitive information when relevant to the criminal investigation. It also provides for the use of reasonable force to conduct a search, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to search for materials. The clause provides that these powers can be used by an authorised investigator who is authorised by the Secretary of State.

To be clear, a warrant provides for the powers that can be deployed when that warrant is exercised. Our authorised investigators in DWP will not use reasonable force against people, although they may use it against property, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to retrieve a laptop or other evidence. However, the reason it has to be here is that, when the DWP applies for a warrant, that warrant must cover any activities that may need to be undertaken by either the DWP or the police, so although our investigators will not use reasonable force against people, it may be necessary for the police to do so when they are accompanying the DWP. That is why the legislation is drafted that way. If it were not, police out there on our warrant would not be able to use reasonable force and there may be occasions on which they need to do so. I hope that that clarifies matters for the noble Lord.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Can the Minister explain why the DWP needs that power but the PSFA does not? The two clauses in the Bill are otherwise identical and differ only in respect of the reasonable force element. If the PSFA does not need it, I do not understand why the DWP does.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

As I said, the police might need to be present if we felt there was a risk of any serious violence. If it was felt there might be a need for arrests or, as the noble Viscount has suggested, there was a possible risk of violence, the police would be asked to accompany DWP officers. I have given those assurances, so I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but, I hope, illuminating debate. I have concerns about these police powers being given to civil servants and I do not think I am alone in that respect. I am comforted, to some extent, by the fact that these will be used only in the cases of serious and organised crime. I wonder whether the solution, therefore, is to put that in the Bill and put that safeguard in place, because I think that would comfort most people who have the concerns that we have. Perhaps that is something that the Minister might be willing to discuss between now and Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 92 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 99A to 99C have been tabled, as ever, in the spirit of constructive scrutiny and with the aim of strengthening one of the more significant accountability provisions in the Bill: the independent review process set out in Clause 88.

These amendments are modest, reasonable and necessary. They are not designed to undermine the intention of Clause 88 but quite the opposite: to give that clause the clarity, independence and rigour that an effective review mechanism surely must demand. Fundamentally, they seek to correct the text in the Bill as drafted, as this would not provide for a proper independent review process of the exercise of powers under this part of the Bill. As we have been clear throughout these days in Committee, having a proper, full and independent review mechanism is an essential requirement to balance the powers granted.

Let me begin with Amendment 99A. As currently drafted, new Section 109J, to be inserted by Clause 88, allows the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes, saying in subsection (1):

“The Secretary of State may give the independent person appointed … directions as to the period to be covered by each review under section 109I”.


This, in our view, strikes at the heart of the independence that the clause is meant to enshrine.

If the Secretary of State can determine the scope of the review in such a narrow and discretionary fashion, deciding what is in and what is out, we risk reducing the entire review process to something partial and predetermined. An independent reviewer must have the freedom to examine the full timeline of events, decisions and outcomes as they see fit, not just the periods that a Minister deems relevant. This amendment would remove the power for the Secretary of State to constrain that scope. It would ensure that the independent person can review what needs reviewing, not merely what it is convenient to review.

Further to this, Amendment 99B addresses another area in which we believe the clause falls short of its intended purpose. As present, new Section 109J(3) states:

“The Secretary of State may disclose information to the independent person”.


We do not think this is adequate. For a review to be meaningful, the reviewer must be empowered to access all relevant material. It cannot be left to the Minister to determine what relevant information may or may not be disclosed to the independent person for review. By replacing “may” with “must”, this amendment would impose a basic but essential duty for the Government to co-operate with their own independent review mechanism. This should not be controversial. If the review is to be credible both in substance and perception, the provision of relevant documents, data and records must be a legal obligation, not a voluntary gesture. Our amendment would ensure that the independent reviewer could operate with true independence and without the bias that the discretionary drafting currently in the Bill implies.

We must appreciate that if the Secretary of State can direct the scope and scale of these independent reviews, they cannot truly be called independent. As noble Lords across the Committee will know, the outcome of such a process is only as good as the information that is put into it. I am sure that this Minister would not allow biased information or timeframes or seek to direct the independent reviewer. But, as noble Lords have previously made clear in Committee, we must legislate for the future and future Ministers. This cannot be done on the basis of guarantees alone. I trust the Minister implicitly, but I do not know—indeed, none of us in this Committee knows—that we could always say the same about her successors. It is important that we ensure that this independent review process is independent from day one and there is no risk of it becoming a rubber-stamping body used to sign off favourable reviews on the back of limited information and narrow timeframes.

Finally, Amendment 99C would compel the appointment of independent persons to carry out reviews in England, Wales and Scotland. The Bill in its current form allows the Secretary of State to do so but does not require it. We think that is a mistake. Public sector fraud is not a phenomenon confined to one part of the United Kingdom. If we are serious about building a coherent and credible national response, it follows that there must be consistent independent scrutiny across all three nations. Leaving this to ministerial discretion opens the door to uneven practice and potential political selectivity. By making the appointment of independent reviewers mandatory across the nations, we would create a consistent framework for accountability —one that reflects the devolved landscape while still holding the centre to account.

Taken together, these three amendments seek to reinforce what I believe the Government want to achieve: an independent, well-informed and effective review mechanism. They would ensure that reviews are not unduly limited, that reviewers are not kept in the dark and that all parts of the UK are covered by the same standards of transparency. In short, these amendments would close the gaps that could otherwise turn an accountability provision into an optional exercise. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on their intent and consider how they might help deliver a stronger, fairer and more credible oversight process. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to add my support to the first two amendments in this group. While I agree with removing the discretion of the Secretary of State, Amendment 99A does not say what the period of the review should be. I suggest that it should be the same as the period of the review for the eligibility verification notices, which is annual, and that that is what should be in the Bill. It would be useful to hear from the Minister what the Government are proposing in that respect.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments so powerfully, and with considerable detail, explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I want to cross-reference a couple of things. I was unable to be here for the whole discussion on the last group in this Committee but I came in and heard the Minister reassuring us that there are layers of support in the DWP for identifying the vulnerable and that there is regular vulnerability training.

I have to contrast that with one of my last contributions in this Committee and this Room, talking about the horrendous case of Nicola Green. I try to share as much as I can of what I am doing in the Chamber so that it is available to the world. I have to say that the little parliamentary video of that exchange, with its less-than-ideal lighting—no offence to anyone who is doing their best they can with the television—has, you could reasonably say, gone viral, because there is a flood of comments of people saying what the DWP has done to them. I cannot attest, of course, to the truth of every one of those comments, but there is a profound problem of trust with the DWP.

I fully acknowledge that the Minister, when she was on the Opposition benches, and I have often spoken out strongly on this matter. The Government actually called an inquiry into the DWP’s treatment of disabled people after the EHRC expressed concern that equality had been breached. That is the context in which we are looking at these amendments.

The noble Baroness is calling for people to have a day in court—to be able to have a genuinely independent voice in our greatly respected courts and put the case. If they indeed have committed fraud and can afford the repayments, or it is not a complete error by the DWP, or the DWP is at fault or is not being realistic about how much people need to eat and live, the court will make a ruling. That, surely, is regarded as a basic principle and right in our law.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 102 and 122, which would require the Secretary of State to apply to the court for a direct deduction order—a DDO. I confess that I am struggling a bit to understand the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would be able to make a direct deduction order, as the Bill is drafted. I hope the Minister will be able to help me.

When we discussed the DDOs in relation to Part 1 of the Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, correctly pointed out that a direct deduction order could be made only in circumstances where either there had been a final determination of the amount of the liability by a court or the person concerned had agreed that the amount was payable. I agreed then that that was an important safeguard, as it is a significant restriction on when the DDO process could be used under Part 1. I asked why, if the court was making the determination of liability, we did not just leave the court to determine the way in which it should be repaid, rather than requiring new powers for the Minister to make that decision. The noble Baroness was kind enough to offer to write to me on that, and I very much look forward to receiving her letter.

However, I think the same issue may arise here, except that I am struggling to find the definition of the amount recoverable described in paragraph 1(1) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill. Can the Minister please explain how the amount recoverable is determined, and by whom? Does this part have the same safeguard as Part 1, which is either final court determination or agreement by the person concerned, or is it at the discretion of the Secretary of State? I can see, in Clause 89, that the person must have been convicted of an offence or agreed to pay a penalty. That raises the question: does this DDO regime apply in cases or error, or not? Presumably, in cases of error there will not be a conviction or a penalty, so it does not apply in the case of error, but I am confused.

I cannot find anywhere the amount being determined by a court; that is where I am struggling a bit. If the recoverable amount has not been decided by the court, then the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is likely to be necessary. That is particularly important because, just as it does in Part 1, for understandable reasons, the appeal process to the First-tier Tribunal against a DDO prevents a person appealing with respect to the amount that is recoverable. If that is the case, and the amount recoverable has not been determined by a court, I think there is an issue here.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am proud to support Amendments 102 and 122, which I tabled alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Amendment 102 proposes that the power to make direct deduction orders should rest with the courts following an application from the Secretary of State, rather than allowing the Secretary of State to impose such orders directly. This change would introduce an important layer of judicial oversight, ensuring that deductions from individuals’ bank accounts are made only after careful, independent consideration of the evidence and the circumstances.

Although the Bill includes safeguards such as affordability and vulnerability checks, as enumerated by the Minister, and rights to representation and appeal, placing the final decision in the hands of the court would further strengthen public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of the debt recovery process. Amendment 122 is consequential on this approach, ensuring consistency throughout the Bill. By requiring court approval for direct deduction orders, we uphold the principle that significant intrusions into personal finances should be subject to the highest standards of scrutiny and due process. This is particularly important given the potential for hardship and complexities that can arise in cases involving joint accounts or vulnerable individuals. I hope the Minister can address that when she replies.

These amendments do not seek to undermine the Government’s legitimate efforts to recover public funds lost to fraud or error but rather to ensure that such efforts are always balanced with robust protections for individual rights. I urge fellow noble Lords to support these amendments as a constructive step towards a more transparent and accountable system, and I am very pleased to have signed this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

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So the noble Baroness makes an important point, and I hear it, but the job of this Committee is therefore to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards when we do that to try to make sure that we are protecting those at the heart of this. I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, will be able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Baroness has not answered one question that I had. My understanding from Clause 89 is that these DDO rights—or however one describes them—can be used only where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act or any other enactment, or agrees to pay a penalty under Section 115A of the 1992 Act. Does that mean, therefore, that this does not apply to situations of error and that it is only fraud?

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 77 is, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has just said, slightly different from the others. I thought about degrouping it, but I decided that life was too short.

Amendment 77 would introduce a reasonableness test—a discussion we have had before—so that an authorised officer must “reasonably” consider that it is

“necessary and proportionate to require the specified information”,

rather than just “consider” that it is necessary and proportionate. We have had a number of debates about a reasonableness test as we have gone through the various days in Grand Committee. Ensuring that an authorised officer should “reasonably” consider, rather than just arbitrarily “consider”, is an important safeguard against misuse of these powers.

Last Monday, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, argued against a similar change in Amendment 29, saying:

“In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All ‘public law powers’ must be exercised with


‘reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion’.


Making a Minister’s belief a ‘reasonable’ belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it”.—[Official Report, 9/6/25; col. GC 159.]

The Judge Over Your Shoulder—known by the rather inappropriate acronym JOYS—was a new one on me, so I looked it up. The Government describe this exciting publication as:

“Guidance to help you navigate the legal frameworks within which public bodies, particularly Government, make decisions … Currently in its 6th edition, it is used to communicate with clients on what to expect when working with government lawyers, allowing for effective collaboration and lowering the risk of legal challenge. The guidance is highly regarded across the legal profession”.


Most importantly, it goes on to say:

“The guidance remains a lay person’s guide to Administrative Law”.


So I am afraid that the noble Baroness’s argument does not hold up to scrutiny. The document is not even official guidance for civil servants; it is merely a lay person’s guide, has no legal status whatever and cannot be used as evidence that public law powers must be exercised with reasonableness or rationality. Unless the Minister can come up with something that actually has some legal force on civil servants and Ministers, the need for these reasonableness tests, which we have been debating throughout this Bill, remains.

As I have said before and will keep repeating, the noble Baroness will not always be in her position. While I completely believe that she would ensure that these powers are exercised reasonably, that may not always be the case for future Ministers or future Governments. We need to legislate for the future, not just for the present situation, so safeguards should be on the face of the Bill to be effective. In my view, a requirement to act reasonably is a very important safeguard.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. It was because it said “reasonable grounds” in the first half that the fact that it was missing in the second half—paragraph (b)—stuck out: you have to have reasonable grounds, but then you just have to consider. But my point is more than that. Let us imagine the worst-case scenario, where a future Government decide to go for an all-out DOGE approach to whatever. I have no doubt, as I said, that the noble Baroness and the department at the moment will follow the guidance, et cetera, that she laid out, but that is just guidance and it can be torn up on a whim. If a new Government decide to go all out, there is no reasonableness safeguard; they can just say, “We consider it necessary”, and there does not need to be any reasonableness attached to that. That is the concern. It is not about now; it is about where we might be in a year or five years’ time that worries me.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I see where the noble Lord is going with this and I am happy to pick up the conversation outside. I do not think that the distinction is big enough for it to be a problem, because the reality is that a reasonable suspicion is not just a hunch: it has to be based on an objective test, it requires up-to-date and accurate information and it must be something that an ordinary reasonable person would consider a legitimate cause for suspicion given the same information. So, for information gathering to be legal and justified, the intrusion into a person’s privacy must be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the legislation. We think that that is belt and braces, but I am happy to pick that up with the noble Lord because I think that we want the same thing. The only question is: do we need any more ways of saying it?

Finally, Amendment 79, in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, would require DWP to copy the information notice to all parties, including the subject of the information request. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, has explained the obvious reason why this is the case: since these powers apply only to named individuals about whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, telling somebody at the outset could clearly prejudice the investigation and potentially enable them to conceal or destroy evidence.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I give my wholehearted support to the stand part notices in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer who, as noble Lords might gather, is in the Chamber for the Employment Rights Bill—I should perhaps also be there, but that is why noble Lords have me and not my noble friend Lady Kramer.

The opposition to Clause 74 and Schedule 3 standing part of the Bill is both principled and pragmatic, and would ensure that the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill strikes the right balance between combating fraud and protecting the rights and dignity of individuals. The removal of the requirement for banks to examine claimants’ bank accounts, proposed in both Clause 74 and Schedule 3, would restore a vital safeguard for personal privacy and prevent an unnecessary intrusion into the lives of those who rely on public support. This approach would uphold commitments to civil liberties, ensuring that anti-fraud measures do not come at the expense of fundamental rights, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, on the previous group. I commend my noble friend Lady Kramer’s leadership in recognising that the fight against fraud must never become a pretext for overreach and unwarranted surveillance.

Equally, Amendments 79B and 80, supported by my noble friend Lady Kramer and others, would wisely align eligibility verification safeguards with those already established for suspected fraud and, crucially, would limit the use of such powers to cases where there is genuine suspicion of wrongdoing. These changes will prevent fishing expeditions—I am sure that there will be fishing expeditions—and protect innocent welfare recipients from undue scrutiny.

My own Amendment 89 to Schedule 3 would ensure that the Bill applies only to the benefits explicitly listed and would further clarify and limit the scope of these powers, which could be pretty heavy, providing certainty and reassurance to the public. Together, these amendments would strengthen the Bill, making it more proportionate, transparent and just. I urge your Lordships to support this package, which embodies the best traditions of parliamentary scrutiny and my party’s belief in both fairness and effective government.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I speak to my Amendment 79B and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support for it. It is a very simple amendment that would make the giving of an eligibility verification notice subject to the same safeguard that already applies to all the other information-gathering powers within the Bill—namely, that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that issuing an EVN is necessary and proportionate for the purpose for which it is issued.

The Minister will no doubt have noticed that I have taken the liberty of inserting “reasonably” into the amendment, as we have just been discussing. Otherwise, the wording is aligned with the safeguard in Clause 3(1)(a), in relation to the Cabinet Office Minister requiring information, and to the wording in Clause 72, in relation to the Secretary of State for the DWP requiring information about suspected fraud under new Section 109BZB(1)(b). This safeguard applies everywhere in the Bill whenever the required information relates to suspected fraud. Rather strangely, however, it does not appear in Schedule 3, where there is no suspicion. That seems the wrong way round. Surely it is even more important that the giving of an information notice should be necessary and proportionate in cases where there is no suspicion.

I am assuming that this omission is in fact an oversight and that, given that it appears everywhere else in the Bill, the Minister will simply accept it. If not, she will need to explain why the exercise of these important and intrusive suspicionless information-gathering powers should not have to be, at the very least, necessary and proportionate in the same way as the exercise of the other information-gathering powers have to be. I will take a little bit of convincing, I am afraid.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 80. There is a certain amount of overlap with other amendments not just in this group, obviously, but in other groups. The mysteries of the grouping of amendments are beyond my pay grade, but we are in a situation where we are bound to discuss the same subject again and again—and, I suspect, again. I will read with interest what my noble friend the Minister said in replying to the previous debate. At the conclusion of all these overlapping debates it would be useful to the Committee if she could write a letter explaining how this whole thing fits together.

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It is reasonable for us, as a Committee, to keep pressing—and we no doubt will—as to whether it is appropriate for a Government to use private banks in this particular fashion. No doubt some money will be gained this way, but at what cost?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will jump in quickly before the Minister continues. She has been very helpful in explaining how this is going to work. I should say, as I have before, that I think this is infinitely better than it was when we saw it a year or so ago—I just put that on the record again. However, there are two questions about how it works on which I would like clarification.

First, I think the Minister indicated that the banks would not have to trawl all bank accounts, but I do not think that that is right. The logic must be that the DWP provides the criteria that it wants to look at, which is whether someone is in receipt of benefits and, secondly, whether there is a flag. In order to identify whether they are on benefits, the banks will have to trawl through all the accounts to find that out. That seems a necessary step—they have to spot the indicators in the accounts.

More importantly, though, this is not a one-off exercise under the Bill. They do not just send it once and then go away. The Bill allows for these things to be periodic within 12 months, and they can then be extended. I am interested to understand what the Government intend by “periodic”. Under the way that it is currently written, they could be saying, “I want you send us this data every day—or indeed every hour or minute—for the next 12 months”, and they could then extend it. What is the plan in terms of the periodicity of this?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Let me deal with the noble Lord first, because that will be quick and I am conscious of the time—I have already gone over the 20 minutes. The DWP will tell the banks, “We have a reference number and these are the accounts at your bank into which we pay benefits; please look only at those accounts, not those of anyone else”. I have been saying this all the way along the line, but I have clearly failed to get this across. The noble Lord may recall the previous discussions when we were asked why you could not look at every bank account, and the reason is—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am still not convinced that that is correct. I think that what happens is that there is an indicator that goes with the payment of the benefit, and we are then asking the banks, first, to identify all accounts where that indicator exists—so they have to look at all accounts to identify which those are—and, secondly, for those accounts, whether there are any with an eligibility indicator that is flagged. My reading is that it is in fact quite clear, and it is also clear in the code of conduct and the other stuff.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

In as much as we will say to the banks that we would like them to look at the accounts into which we pay benefits and will give them the reference numbers. Clearly, it is up to the banks how they identify those. I think it unlikely that they will take each bank account, look at it individually and make a decision, but it is up to them. We simply want them to look at those bank accounts and to tell us whether, within those bank accounts, they believe that the particular eligibility indicator that we have given them is correct.

Regarding frequency, we will negotiate that with the banks. The previous Government looked at an earlier iteration of this and ran two proofs of concept to establish that it would work and be effective. We now have to take the powers in order to be able to start doing this. So, we have agreed that we will work with a small number of banks and work out bit-by-bit how this works, bring over information as we can manage it, make sure that the system works, and build up as we go. We will determine from that how often we will need to do that and how it works. That has to be determined; we could not determine that in advance because we need the powers in the Bill to be able to start the process.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is a question of proportionality. Clearly, we already ask the Revenue to tell us how much people earn in order to determine whether or not they meet the earnings criteria for, for example, universal credit. We could simply allow people to tell us, but when we did that, some of them got it wrong; many of them made mistakes; sometimes it changed, and sometimes they deliberately did not tell us. So now, we simply get information directly from the Revenue.

We think that the power is proportionate. Whenever someone compares it to something that feels disproportionate, such as spying or putting bugs in everyone’s houses, I think that we can either claim that this is a mass surveillance power like China would use and then wonder why people are getting paranoid about it, or, while I do my best to be specific about what we are trying to do, we can all try to have a measured conversation about whether or not it is reasonable, while fully accepting that for some people the line will be in a different place than for others for reasons of both philosophy and proportionality. I fully accept that.

I have done the best I can in 25 minutes. On that basis, I urge noble Lords to agree that the clause stand part.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

81: Schedule 3, page 78, line 19, at end insert—
“(9) Before giving a person an eligibility verification notice, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the costs that will be incurred by the person in responding to the eligibility verification notice will be proportionate and reasonable for that person to incur, or the Secretary of State must agree in advance to repay all or some of the costs to the person.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe how the Secretary of State will ensure that they do not impose undue costs on the banks and to what extent the banks will be able to recoup these costs.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that my Amendments 81, 89C and 91 are fairly self-explanatory and that we are getting into more detailed points, which might be easier, rather than points of philosophy.

Amendment 81 relates to the costs that the eligibility verification process will impose on the banks and other financial institutions that must respond to the notices. It is intended to probe how those costs will be treated. We have already had various debates on third-party costs at earlier stages in Grand Committee, but in relation to the DWP clauses around eligibility verification, there is an important difference, which is that, so far, the Government have not made any real attempts to quantify the impact that the EVM process will have on the banks or other financial institutions.

The impact assessment says about the EVM:

“The cost to Data holders has not been estimated at this stage; estimates will be included in a subsequent IA”.


It goes on to give a bit more detail of the impact on third parties, banks and institutions, saying:

“There will be transition costs and on-going costs for businesses. The impact assessment outlines some indicative costs to business, however at this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation. This is because the operational solution for the measure is currently being developed, alongside further engagement with banks. We have committed to work in partnership with banks to develop the most appropriate implementation route. Estimates will be included in a subsequent IA”.


Later, the IA refers to set-up costs to banks of around £41.25 million, although that is not based on any substantive evidence.

The Bill itself is entirely silent on the costs of the eligibility verification regime to banks and other financial institutions, and how they might be treated. As we have discussed, this is not about the impact on the banks alone; it is also about the possibility of the unintended consequence of making banks less willing to provide services to benefit claimants. We had a long debate on that previously, and I shall not repeat the arguments.

Amendment 81 would require the Secretary of State to satisfy themselves that the costs to the banks will be proportionate and reasonable or, where that is not the case, to agree to repay some or all of the costs to the banks. This is not a situation where the costs can be recovered from the fraudster, because there may be no fraudster. The banks will, effectively, be working for the Government in this case, so it is appropriate that the Government should cover any unreasonable costs.

Amendment 91 also looks at the costs of the EVN regime. It would add to the scope of the annual independent review—as an aside I very much welcome that independent review; it is a big step forward in the safeguards around this—so that it would now also report on whether the use of EVNs has been proportionate to the costs incurred both by the department and by third parties such as banks. As I have said, there has been no meaningful attempt yet to evaluate the costs to third parties, particularly because the work is ongoing to work out what those will be, so there must be some mechanism to ensure that the costs are proportionate, and the independent review would be the logical and sensible place to do that.

Amendment 89C is more technical; it is designed to deal with a concern raised with me and others by UK Finance. This concern is that the existence of an eligibility indicator might constitute grounds to suspect fraud and therefore impose obligations on the bank to take actions such as closing or freezing the account or issuing a suspicious activity report under the various obligations that the banks already have. It is worth hearing what the impact assessment has to say in this respect. It says:

“In discussion with the banking sector, the Department has been clear that any data received under this measure should not be seen as indicative of any financial crime. Many claimants will have a legitimate, authorised reason to hold savings in excess of capital benefit rules (disregards for injury compensation, for example) and in many cases, overpayments could have been caused by genuine claimant error. Given this, the Department has been clear that there should be no action to risk claimant bank accounts because of the measure”.


So that sounds good. Part 2 of Schedule 3 already goes some way towards this, but UK Finance has made it clear that it does not see the existing wording in Part 2 of Schedule 3 as adequate, as it covers only the suspicious activity report element. UK Finance agrees that there has been extensive engagement with DWP on this but makes the point that, despite this engagement, there is currently no agreed deconfliction on banks’ financial crime obligations. The amendment simply says that information that results from a EVN should not be treated in that way, and should not of itself be treated by the bank as grounds to suspect fraud. The “of itself” is important there. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, given the industry’s remaining concerns. Why does she disagree with UK Finance on this?

An alternative way of dealing with this concern would be to ensure clear guidance from the FCA, which does not seem to be happening. Why are the Government not simply pressing the FCA for such guidance? Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, does something similar, with reference to conflicts between the Bill and the duty of care that banks owe to their customers, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say in that respect. I beg to move.

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I hope that that has answered noble Lords’ questions, and that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and for their support for my amendments. We tabled these cost amendments primarily because we do not know what the costs are but we know that things will evolve in the future, and therefore it seems sensible that the independent reviewer should at the very least have a look at that. The Minister used the word “could”, but I would still like that to be “should”. We may well come back to that point at a later date.

The Minister mentioned that, when we are sending an EVN in, we are not requiring the banks to look into the data that is being provided to the DWP. That is naive. I do not think that any bank will ever just trawl through, pull a load of data out and send it up without checking it, because there are liabilities here to the banks. If they send a load of stuff up that is incorrect and people suffer as a result, guess who will end up getting it in the neck? It will be the bank that provided the incorrect data. It comes back to the debate we had earlier on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, about who is liable. That is slightly naive; there are genuine, real costs here. The banks will be required to review, check and make sure that what they are providing does not cause them problems with their customers, hence the questions on breach of duty of care.

With respect to Amendment 89C—the UK Finance amendment, if we want to call it that—the Minister said that she would try to persuade me. I need to look at what she said more closely to see whether I have been persuaded. However, to be brutally honest, it is not me she needs to persuade—it is UK Finance. I urge her to have further discussions with UK Finance as soon as possible on this matter, because it seems that it is still exercising financial institutions and the industry. There is a lot in the impact assessment to say that they should not have a problem with this, and the Minister has given an explanation as to why she does not think they should, but they are still worried about it, so the department and the Minister still have work to do to make sure that UK Finance is comfortable. If it is uncomfortable, that is not a good way to start this relationship.

The Minister said that the job of the FCA was not to endorse government guidance, and I agree, but that is not what I was asking. The FCA should provide guidance to the industry that says, “If you provide this information, it does or does not have this effect”. It is for the FCA to give guidance in that respect, rather than endorsing what government guidance says. It ought to be proactive. To be honest, it should be involved in this process to make sure that it is happy that this does not cause a problem to the industry, and give guidance to the industry accordingly. Again, I hope that that discussion is going on.

I touch, finally, on the debanking issue, because it has been raised. It is a bit of a misnomer. The bigger concern to me is not that people’s bank accounts will be withdrawn—that is unlikely. More likely is that banks will become less willing to provide future bank accounts. It is not active debanking, but a slow erosion of willingness to provide services to particular groups of people. We have seen for ourselves as PEPs that banks do not like to provide us services as a result of the PEP rules. It will not be any different here. If we make it more difficult and expensive to provide accounts, it will slowly erode over time. It is not debanking in the sense of the closing down of Nigel Farage’s bank account approach, but more the erosion that I worry about.

Having said all that, I think that we will come back to one or two of these issues at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 81 withdrawn.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 89ZA in this group—I still do not understand the numbering system that the Public Bill Office uses.

Before I move on to that, I want to make a couple of comments on the two amendments that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, just raised. I have to say that I am a bit cautious about Amendment 82, because if you tell everybody what the eligibility indications are, it becomes very easy to avoid them. There is also a massive, gaping loophole in the Bill, which is that it covers only one bank at a time. I do not know—I would be quite interested to understand from the noble Baroness—whether, having received data from individual banks, the DWP will be amalgamating and therefore will be able to track the sort of concept that, if you have £8,000 in this bank account and £8,000 in that bank account, that puts you up to the £16,000 that would trigger the eligibility indicator. But there is a gaping hole there and, if you publish everything you are looking for, it makes it so much easier to get around it. So I am a little cautious about that one.

I am much more sympathetic to at least the spirit behind Amendment 88. We had a long debate the other day around the issues of machine learning, bias, stereotyping and generalisation creeping into decision-making processes, and there is more to do in this Bill around the safeguards around the use of automated decision-making. I know that the noble Baroness will talk about the code of practice, but that is very specific. It requires a human element only where the decision could impact on benefit eligibility. So it does not include stepping into the next phase of an intrusive investigation using the powers in Clause 72, for example. So, whether or not Amendment 88 is the right way to go, there is definitely more that we need to think about in terms of safeguards around the use of algorithmic or machine learning—or AI or whatever—trawling through this, and a number of amendments later cover the same ground a bit.

Amendment 89ZA is very simple. It simply says that applicants for benefits should be informed at the time of their application that information relating to their bank accounts may be provided to the Secretary of State, and that people who are already in receipt of benefits are informed within three months of the commencement of the Bill.

The information-gathering powers that this Bill creates are a significant step, and are carried out without any suspicion of fraud, so it must be appropriate and fair that people are informed that their bank account information may be provided to the department. I cannot actually see any reason for not accepting this one; it would improve transparency and also make those who are considering fraud think twice if they are being told that their bank account details could be accessed. In fact, I mean “provided”, because technically they are not accessed but provided.

As a general principle, as set out in our data protection laws, people have the right to know where their data is going and how it is being used, and I really cannot see any reason why this situation should be any different.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak broadly in support of Amendment 82 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. This amendment goes to the heart of something that we should all be able to agree on: that the public have a right to know the rules by which they may be judged and that those tasked with making assessments, such as banks, should not be left to act on unclear or unpublished guidance.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the eligibility indicators that banks are expected to use when checking their customers’ accounts under the new regime. In plain terms, it asks the Government to set out clearly, before these provisions are enforced, what criteria are being used to determine eligibility. This chimes with the opening remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is difficult to see how a system of such potential consequence to individuals and to financial institutions alike can be implemented fairly, if the basis on which it operates is not published and understood in advance.

We have heard throughout the debates on this Bill about the need to balance effective fraud prevention with the protection of individual rights, proper due process, and clarity for institutions involved. Amendment 82 speaks directly to that balance. If banks are to play a front-line role in identifying accounts or individuals under suspicion, they must be given unambiguous and publicly available guidance to avoid the risk of overreach, error or unjustified intrusion. We cannot have a system where accounts are flagged or actions taken on the basis of indicators that are withheld from public view. That would be both untransparent and unjust.

We should not legislate for a regime that affects people’s access to their financial resources or that places duties on banks to act in quasi-investigative ways, without knowing exactly how those judgments are to be made. This is not a wrecking amendment—it does not oppose the broader framework of the Bill. It merely insists that, before new powers are exercised, the public and partners involved in delivery know the criteria. That is not too much to ask. In fact, it is the very least we should expect in a system rooted in fairness and good governance. Again, this echoes the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

To pick up on remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is a balance to be struck between not giving too much away in the interest of transparency so that fraudsters are given fuel to manipulate the system. Can the Minister say where that balance should be struck, as balance there must be?

Similarly, I speak in support of Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I believe it represents a sensible and timely addition to the schedule. As we have discussed throughout the passage of this Bill, the use of data and automated decision-making, particularly through algorithms, is becoming an increasingly central feature of fraud detection and eligibility verification. That in itself is not a problem; it is a reflection of the complexity and scale of modern fraud threats. But it also means that we need clear and consistent standards for how these tools are developed, deployed and scrutinised. The cautionary tale from the Netherlands, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is very much noted. I am sure that the Committee has noted it.

This amendment goes to the heart of the need for standards. By requiring the code of practice to include mechanisms for the scrutiny of algorithms used by those in receipt of eligibility verification notices, typically banks, it creates a shared framework for oversight. This is particularly important when algorithms are applied across several discrete institutions, each of which may have slightly different internal systems, standards or even risk profiles. Without a common baseline, we risk inconsistency, a lack of accountability and potential harm to individuals through opaque or poorly calibrated processes.

Moreover, new sub-paragraph (g) proposed in this amendment rightly extends that principle of scrutiny to the powers themselves, and we must also be willing to assess whether they are effective and 100% secure in their specified and sole objective. We must also be willing to assess whether they are proportionate to the outcomes that they set out to deliver. In short, this is a practical amendment rooted in the principles of clarity, consistency and continuous improvement—perhaps part of the test and learn. It does not obstruct the Government’s goals; it helps to make them more credible and accountable, we believe.

I express my support for Amendment 89ZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, which I believe strikes a careful and important balance between transparency, accountability and the effective operation of the powers contained in this schedule. At its core, this amendment does something quite simple but significant: it ensures that individuals applying for or receiving relevant benefits are clearly informed—that is, in writing—that information relating to their bank accounts may, under certain circumstances, be shared with the Secretary of State. This is a matter of basic transparency and fairness. I note that this is being proposed at the time the benefit is applied for, and I might describe it—perhaps putting words into the mouth of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—as part of an induction process when one applies for any benefit in scope. In other words, fair warning is given that a benefit that comes from the taxpayers’ pocket has responsibilities attached to it. Perhaps this should also be placed in the code of practice, and I ask that question of the Minister.

If we are to entrust public authorities with powers of this magnitude—which allow for sensitive financial data to be accessed without the individual’s active consent—surely it is right that we also commit to informing individuals of the possibility that those powers might be used. This is not about compromising investigations or alerting fraudsters in advance; it is about ensuring that people understand the system that they are entering and can act responsibly and lawfully within it. Providing this information up front reinforces personal responsibility. As I said earlier, it says clearly to the individual, “If you are claiming public money, there is a legitimate expectation that your eligibility may be subject to verification”. It allows claimants to know the rules of engagement in advance, and it ensures that they cannot claim later to have been caught unawares.

At the same time, I recognise, and I think the noble Lord does as well—I hope he does—that this amendment must not inadvertently encourage more sophisticated methods of deception. It is a fine line to walk, and this chimes with my earlier question to the Minister. We must not turn transparency into a user manual for fraud, but I believe that this amendment is framed carefully enough to avoid that risk. It does not disclose when, how or under what criteria information will be requested—only that it may be. That is, I believe, a proportionate step. Ultimately, this amendment supports the legitimacy of the wider regime, and I therefore support it and hope that the Government will see it as a constructive addition to the schedule.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 88, I asked about the cross-comparison with datasets from different banks; this goes to the point that the Minister has just been making about it being easy to commit fraud. To what extent will data from bank A be amalgamated with data from bank B to discover whether, when combined, there is an eligibility indicator flag?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

An EVN can be used only in relation to the bank account into which the benefit is paid. Therefore, that would be a specific bank account in a specific bank. Of course, the DWP’s authorised investigators have and use a range of sources where they have a suspicion of fraud, and there is a range of mechanisms out there to look at what other information can be gathered in order to make that judgment. I can see that I have not hit on what the noble Lord was asking for.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In the situation where there would be a suspicion of fraud, you have bank A—actually, I suppose it would not have provided the information, would it?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Exactly.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have just answered my own question.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I apologise for jumping up and down. This is the confusion I have in relation to this area: if you are a fraudster and you are watching this Committee very carefully, as the Minister indicated they are doing—I am sympathetic to the idea that I am perhaps being naive in publishing, “Here you are, fraudsters, this is what you should do”—it seems to me that what you would do is set up multiple bank accounts. In fact, I think it was the Minister for Transformation, Andrew Western MP, who conceded

“that we will not have full sight of somebody’s accounts if they bank with more than one institution”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Committee, 6/3/25; col. 237.]

So it seems to me that the fraudsters are over there playing the system.

This is a Bill that gives enormous powers, about which I worry. It seems that the eligibility criteria should be known in order for them to be accountable. I do not want to be naive, but the people who actually need the eligibility criteria are those people who might, by error, breach the eligibility criteria, but also, democracy requires it because we need to know how to hold this legislation to account. The fraudsters—the people who are deliberately going out of their way to rip off the welfare system—already know how to play this, if that makes any sense. Even as I was tabling the amendment, I was aware of the fact that I am not saying, “Let’s give the game away completely”; however, we cannot just say, “We can’t tell you anything in case the fraudsters find out”, when there are real loopholes here that the fraudsters are going to exploit anyway.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Just to be clear, this measure is attacking both fraud and error. It looks at overpayments, whatever the source. It is simply one tool among many that is available to the DWP and which will help produce a source of information, which will help to identify incorrect overpayments. Having got that information, the DWP will use the full range of powers and the information available to it. If any fraudsters are sitting down on a quiet Monday afternoon and watching this Committee, they should be warned: the DWP has lots of sources of information; it will investigate them; and it successfully prosecutes many people for fraud. The DWP will use this and other powers to pursue what is there. However, this measure alone has been scored by the OBR to save up to £940 million over the next five years. No single measure will be foolproof alone; it will play its part alongside a range of measures and processes to help root out fraud.

I will have to write to my noble friend Lord Sikka on the Cayman Islands. I do not have them at the back of my mind at the moment, I am afraid, but I will let him know if there is an issue over there.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I fully accept that there is a line between giving all details in public and tackling fraud. We have given out a lot of information and a lot of protections here, and we have found ways of making sure that there is oversight. One reason for having oversight is that there are things that we will never be able to put out in public; it is important that somebody has scrutiny and can report to Parliament, independent of the department, on how these powers are being used. We would hope that that picks up the remaining areas of concern.

I turn to Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I will address in turn the two points that it raises. The first is the requirement for the code of practice to include information about the ways in which scrutiny can be applied to the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts, for the purposes of the eligibility verification measure. This is not a matter for a code of practice. The criteria that financial institutions must use to identify relevant accounts are described in paragraph 1(2)(b) of new Schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Accounts must simply meet two tests in order for information to be shared by the financial institution with the DWP: first, the account must receive a relevant benefit payment or be linked to that account; and, secondly, the account in question must meet the criteria that the DWP sets out in the eligibility verification notice. Financial institutions operate in many ways. It must be for each individual financial institution to determine how it identifies relevant accounts.

The key point here is that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where those two tests have been met. It is a data-requiring power; we are not asking banks to do anything more than that. Again, I remind the Committee that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. No decisions will be taken using EVM data alone; decisions about entitlement will be made only once the DWP has made further inquiries.

On that point, the Bill does not introduce any new use of automated decision-making. The DWP will examine data received from banks under the new power, alongside other data received, to determine whether there has been an incorrect overpayment. As is set out in our personal information charter, which is publicly available, the DWP uses automated processing in some decision-making to help us deliver efficient services. The DWP will not make any decision that has significant effect based solely on automated processing unless the law allows this, and claimants will be informed if we make any such decision.

I turn to the second issue in this amendment. It would require the code of practice to contain information about measures that would enable scrutiny of the effectiveness of the EVM. This is, again, an important issue but not one for the code of practice. However, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that we must assess how effective the EVM is; that is why, under Clause 75, the independent overseer of the measure must consider the extent to which the exercise of the power has been effective in helping to identify incorrect payments of relevant benefits.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 89ZA, which raises the issue of informing claimants that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of information about their relevant accounts with the DWP. Let me take a moment to update the Committee on the ways in which the DWP will inform claimants and relevant account holders about the measure; I hope that this will reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The DWP has a personal information charter that sets out how it uses and stores personal information. It is publicly available, and claimants are explicitly directed to it at all times when the DWP requests their personal data. We will update the DWP personal information charter to make it clear that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of their personal information; that commitment is made clear in the draft code of practice, which noble Lords have seen.

This amendment suggests that we should inform claimants either at the start of their claim or within three months of the EVM becoming operational. Our approach of updating the personal information charter means that customers are much more regularly informed about the EVM; this is because claimants are regularly directed to the document throughout their claim. For the benefit of the Committee, I can confirm that claimants are explicitly directed to it in all DWP claim forms; in change of circumstance and uprating letters; in recorded telephone messages; in DWP agents’ telephony scripts; on digital online services; and in other products where the DWP collects personal data. As noble Lords will know, the draft code of practice, which will be publicly consulted on, makes clear that all those who hold a personal account into which a relevant benefit is paid should be aware that information about them and their relevant accounts may be shared by a financial institution with the DWP if the eligibility indicators specified in an EVN are met.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There is a big difference between pointing someone towards a data protection statement—let us be brutally honest: how many of us have ever read one?—and telling people that their bank account details can be provided to the DWP as a result of having this particular benefit. Nobody has ever read a data protection statement, and I do not suppose that they ever will.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

84: Schedule 3, page 80, line 26, at end insert—
“Reasonable grounds for suspicion
5A The existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion for the purpose of section 109BZB (1)(a) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that an authorised person would need more evidence than the existence of an eligibility indicator alone before exercising more intrusive investigations.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 84 and 85 attempt to strengthen important safeguards around the use of information that is gained through an EVM. The Minister has quite rightly said that the scope of the information the banks can provide in response to an EVM is tightly limited. She is right, and that is a very significant improvement to the previous incarnation of the Bill. As currently framed, the only information that can be provided to the Secretary of State by the bank is specified details about the account, such as sort code and account number; specified details about the account holder, such as name and date of birth; and specified details about how the account meets the eligibility indicators. It is also clear in the Bill that transaction data or special category data may not be provided. So far, so good and, as I said, it is a great improvement.

But there is another important potential loophole here. Clause 72 gives the Secretary of State the power to require much more intrusive information if the Secretary of State

“has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed, is committing or intends to commit a DWP offence”.

So, if the existence of an eligibility indicator alone would meet the threshold of “reasonable grounds to suspect”, then the tightly drawn restrictions on the data that banks can provide under an EVM become somewhat meaningless. It will just move on to the next phase almost automatically. We have had a lot of discussion around automation, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that given the volumes of data that will be provided over time, it seems extremely likely that it will—in fact, it is extremely unlikely that it will not—be processed automatically by the DWP, which will choose which ones to investigate more deeply. We have heard about the human elements and will come on to those in the second amendment in this group. but the code of practice does not cover the transfer from EVM to Clause 72’s more intrusive data searching.

Nothing in the code of practice or the Bill would prevent this eligibility indicator being used as reasonable grounds to suspect and, therefore, the Clause 72 provision being triggered with no other safeguard. There may be many reasons why the existence of an eligibility indicator might be entirely innocent. The impact assessment and the noble Baroness have given the example of authorised disregards and genuine error—and genuine error on the part of both the individual and the department. So it seems that, before exercising the robust and intrusive powers under Clause 72, much more should be required, or at least more should be required, than just the existence of an eligibility indicator alone, and I stress “alone”. That is what Amendment 84 tries to achieve, and I think this is probably in line with what the noble Baroness intends, so I hope that this or something like it will be acceptable.

The second amendment, Amendment 85, deals with another critically important safeguard. In response to various concerns raised about the use of algorithms, algorithmic processing, the use of AI and so on, the noble Baroness has stated very clearly that information must be reviewed by a human person before action is taken, and a previous group discussed how bias and stereotyping can creep into automated systems—I will not repeat that. But again, the human element—the human review—does not appear anywhere in the Bill. There is a reference to human decision-making in paragraph 4.31 of the draft code of practice:

“No data source is perfect or infallible. That is why in fraud and error, a human will make any final decisions that affect benefit entitlement, and any indications of potential fraud or error will be looked at comprehensively”.


But this does not set out any level of seniority or qualification, and it covers only final decisions that affect benefit entitlements and not, for example, decisions to affect the intrusive investigative powers that Amendment 84 is looking at. More importantly, the code of conduct can be changed at will by the department; there is no parliamentary oversight or what have you.

As I have said before, I do not doubt the noble Baroness’s intentions in this respect, but the Bill will outlast her tenure and indeed her party’s tenure. Future Governments or Ministers may not have vulnerable people’s interests at heart in the same way that she does. Imagine a future Government applying a DOGE-style approach to this.

The requirement for any decision to be taken by a suitably qualified and senior human is such an important safeguard that I believe it must be in the Bill and not left to the whim of any future Government who might wish to simply automate the whole process—and they could do that: they just change the code of conduct. The issue is not about decisions that affect benefit entitlement alone; as I say, appropriate human review should cover also the use of the more intrusive powers under Clause 72, and the code of conduct does not cover that at all.

I am very happy to discuss the wording, but the principle of suitably qualified and senior human review before decisions are taken is, for me, one of the key safeguards. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to look sympathetically at this amendment, especially as all it does, I think, is to codify what she has consistently said will be the case. I beg to move.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I very strongly support everything that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has said on these two amendments. They are some of the most important amendments that have been debated today because they go to a very fundamental principle. The power in Clause 72, with the new Section 109BZB, is quite significant, and we need to have limits to the exercise of this power in the Bill, both as regards the reasonable grounds—that is Amendment 84—and as regards the human decision-maker. I will not repeat the noble Lord’s reasons because I thought he put his case so compellingly, but I am very much in favour.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate for their support on this. I welcome the clear statement from the noble Baroness that she agrees—which is a very good start—that the eligibility indicator in itself would not be reasonable grounds. I need to go back and carefully read what she said to understand exactly what is guidance, what is code, what is Bill, et cetera. But I am reassured by a lot of what she says.

I suppose my caution still comes back to this point: my worry is not with the noble Baroness but with a Government in five or 10 years’ time of a rather different hue and with slightly less squeamishness, shall we say, about some of this stuff. Are these safeguards robust? We are giving substantial new powers to the department, therefore these safeguards need to be robust and not changeable at will by a future Government. That is what I want to dig into and understand a bit better when I go back into this. So we may come back to this, and I hope we will discuss it further between now and Report. But, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 84 withdrawn.

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[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, there are three amendments in this group. Amendments 91A and 91B are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. All three seek to strengthen the review into the impact of eligibility verification on vulnerable persons. I will just speak to my Amendment 90.

Amendment 90 seeks to clarify whether the Government will take account of the views of recipients of the benefits in question in any independent review and suggests that this would be best achieved by ensuring that at least 50% of the review body is elected by benefit claimants. The proposed review under the Bill is welcome, even though it creates another quango. One difficulty is that regulators and reviewers are all too often appointed to advance political aims and objectives rather than serve the people. One needs to look no further than regulators of water and energy—the Independent Water Commission is currently reviewing the water industry, but its terms of reference exclude consideration of public ownership of water, even though that is favoured by many, including those who are experiencing high customer bills and sewage floating in rivers at the bottom of their gardens. I am seeking the representation of the people directly affected.

All too often, Governments claim that regulatory and review functions are best carried out by individuals with some experience of the field. None has more experience of the field than benefit claimants—after all, they are directly impacted. They will know the frustrations of answering 243 questions to apply for pension credit; they will also be subjected to financial surveillance and may be concerned about that. They are also affected by the DWP’s errors, including erroneous prosecutions, as we heard earlier. They have direct experience of that, and are therefore eminently qualified to directly participate in the review process.

This Bill refers to an independent review by a reviewer, but that reviewer will essentially be a political appointee. The review team is unlikely to include benefit claimants or someone experiencing hardship due to benefit cuts, confusing DWP forms or inconsistent application of DWP rules. Such a person and his or her team are unlikely to be able to bring the daily experiences of benefit claimants into the review. It is vital that the experience of the people on the receiving end of this legislation is brought directly into the review—their words and their worldview, not filtered through what was heard by somebody on some regulatory body or review commission. Quite often, there are cosmetic consultations or token discussions with the affected people. That is not really appropriate here.

Amendment 90 would empower benefit claimants and enable them to elect individuals to carry their worldviews into any review. The person so elected would be accountable to the claimants, whereas the proposed reviewer would not be accountable to any benefit claimant. There is absolutely nothing that they can do about it—they cannot force that person to consider their worldviews deeply. I fully appreciate that extending democracy may well be a contentious issue, even in Parliament, and that empowering people may well be contrary to some government department’s policies. Nevertheless, I would like to see greater representation of benefit claimants in any review that is carried out under the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 91A and 91B in my name in the group, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support in this.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, just said, these two amendments are designed to expand the scope of the independent review and the powers of the independent reviewer. I was very pleased to see the introduction of an independent review around the EVN powers; it adds an important safeguard. But as drafted, the scope of the review is quite limited, covering only whether the exercise of the powers has complied with Schedule 3B and with the code of practice, and whether it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. It does not cover any of the other impacts that the exercise of the powers might have beyond that; we talked in the previous group about the costs, for example.

We have previously discussed and raised concerns about the effects that the Bill could have on vulnerable people, so I will not repeat those again—we have had quite a lot of debates around it. However, the possibility of those impacts on vulnerable people is both real and important, so it should be considered once those powers are in force, and, frankly, the obvious place for that is the independent review. So Amendment 91A would simply add an assessment of the impact on vulnerable persons to the scope of the independent review.

Amendment 91B is about the powers of the independent reviewer to obtain information. As it stands at the moment, they have no information-gathering powers. All the Bill says is that the Secretary of State “may” disclose information to the independent reviewer, and that is not good enough. For the independent review to be meaningful, the reviewer must have the legal ability to obtain all the information that he or she considers necessary to carry out the review. That is what Amendment 91 attempts to achieve: to allow the independent reviewer to request whatever they feel necessary to carry out the review, and to put a requirement for the Secretary of State to disclose what is requested. I rather hope that neither of those is particularly controversial as amendments go.

Just generally, I should say that these are the last amendments that I have tabled, which may relieve the Minister, so I just wanted to say that I hope that she accepts the spirit in which all of them have been put forward. I accept that the Bill is much less concerning than its predecessor was, and I hope that she sees the amendments as generally constructive, aimed primarily at ensuring that the safeguards against misuse of these powers are both robust and, importantly, permanent. I will be very happy to meet with her between now and Report to see whether we can find common ground on some of them.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, it is another sort of spirit that I want at the moment.

I am pleased to welcome these thoughtful amendments, which significantly enhance the transparency, accountability and fairness of the Bill. Amendment 90 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to ensure that the voices and experiences of benefit recipients are taken into account in any independent review of eligibility verification measures. This is a vital step in building trust and legitimacy for these new powers, ensuring that those most affected have a say in how the system is reviewed and improved. Listening to recipients will provide invaluable insights, helping to identify unintended consequences and ensuring that the system remains responsive and humane.

Similarly, Amendments 91A and 91B are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friend Lady Kramer, who is busy in the Chamber on the Employment Rights Bill, where I should have been. These are crucial safeguards. Amendment 91A requires that the independent review specifically considers the impact of eligibility verification on vulnerable persons, ensuring that our most at-risk citizens are not overlooked or disproportionately affected. Amendment 91B strengthens the review process by obliging the Secretary of State to disclose all information reasonably requested by the independent reviewer rather than leaving disclosure to ministerial discretion. These changes will create a more vigorous and effective oversight regime, fostering public confidence that the powers are being exercised justly and transparently. I support these amendments.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Finn, particularly on Amendment 60A, because as we go through this process it feels as though the Government are trying to be judge and jury on whether the existence of an order should apply at all. I am conscious that it is important that the Government be allowed to get on and have this more straightforward way of collecting money that they are due, but it strikes me as pretty draconian that the question of whether a debt exists cannot be challenged—it cannot go for review. I appreciate we are debating the amendment, but I say by the way, in reference to the Explanatory Notes for Clause 34 on the process for review, that the legislation does not point to the fact that it is supposed to go to a higher-grade person; I am sure that it will be set out in guidance, which I hope will have statutory standing. It strikes me as odd that, having not been able to even challenge whether the order should exist, you cannot go to a tribunal about it, either. Ministers will know that I wish that parts of the Bill would go further in trying to get money back from people in a variety of ways, but in this area I do not agree with the approach of the Government and certainly agree with that of my noble friend.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this group, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, proved the other day, Amendment 60A is not necessary because Clause 12 sets out clearly that these orders can be used only where there has been a final determination of the amount owing by the court or where it has been agreed.

However, I support Amendment 61A. Frankly, it is becoming a bit of a weakness in an awful lot of areas that the impact assessments that come with legislation are regularly quite poor. It is incredibly important that, when we make regulations that will have impacts on people, we understand what those impacts are.

I have one other question that I probably should have dealt with by means of an amendment, but I have only just spotted something. Why are regulations made under Clauses 37(2)(c) to (f) subject to the negative procedure and not the affirmative procedure?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, raise important considerations about procedural fairness and transparency in the implementation of the Bill. Amendment 60A, which would allow applicants to request a review into the existence or value of the payable amount, would provide a valuable safeguard, ensuring that individuals have an accessible means to challenge decisions where there might be uncertainty or dispute. This aligns well with the principle of natural justice and could help prevent errors going uncorrected.

Amendments 61A and 61B focus on the mechanisms surrounding direct deduction orders, emphasising the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight. Requiring an impact assessment to accompany any changes to the processing of these orders, as proposed in Amendment 61A, would encourage transparency about the potential costs and effects on banks’ operational capacity. Similarly, Amendment 61B’s provision that consultation outcomes must be laid before Parliament prior to implementation would ensure democratic scrutiny. Together, these amendments would contribute to a more open and considered approach, balancing the efficient recovery of public funds with the need for oversight and due process, and I support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, all these amendments pertain to deduction from earnings orders—or DEOs, as I shall refer to them from here. DEOs are a mechanism by which the PSFA can instruct an employer to make deductions from the liable person’s salary in order to recover the money owed as a result of fraud or error. This power can be exercised only after the amount owed has been agreed by the liable person, a court or tribunal, or if the penalty appeal period has lapsed or an appeal has been finally determined. People can avoid their employers being contacted if they simply engage with us and pay what they owe.

DEOs are an established mechanism used by the courts, the DWP, the Child Maintenance Service and some local authorities. We have sought to emulate best practice and established processes to make it straightforward for the employers that have to implement them. There are safeguards for the liable person, such as a protected earnings amount of 60% and the requirement for deductions to be affordable and fair, as set out in Clause 41.

Before an order is made, the liable person will have the opportunity to make representation on the proposed terms. Amendment 61C would create an obligation for the PSFA to provide the reasoning behind its decision to proceed with a DEO following these representations. Amendment 61D would create a similar obligation for the PSFA to demonstrate that it has taken the liable person’s wider circumstances into account when determining the level of affordable and fair deductions. Both these amendments are duplicative as the PSFA would be doing this anyway, as a matter of good public law. As I outlined previously, guidance will also be published detailing what information will be supplied to the liable person as part of the wider decision-making processes.

Amendment 61E would limit the regulation-making powers in Clause 41(7) to establishing affordability considerations. We have striven to put as much detail into the Bill as possible, but there are elements where it is valuable to have a degree of flexibility so that further conditions or restrictions can be added to the measures to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes. This amendment would severely limit the Government’s ability to adapt to these changes and impact the efficacy of this recovery method, thus potentially reducing the money lost to fraud that could be recovered in the future.

Amendment 61F would require that the PSFA consults with employers on the level of admin costs that they can charge the liable person for implementing a DEO. There are standard charges of £1 per deduction period allowed by the courts and other organisations that use DEOs. It is not for the PSFA to set up a different regime single-handedly, as it will be following established processes already used across government. If it is felt that changes to this charge should be made, they would need to be done in conjunction with the other bodies.

Amendments 62A and 62B would prevent a suspended DEO from being restarted after 24 months. We discussed the same matter on Monday, in relation to direct deduction orders. I confirm that I am still reflecting on the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which also apply to DEOs, and I am having meetings with officials on them. It is important that the PSFA has discretion in how it can react to individual circumstances counterbalanced against its duty to recover money lost to fraud and error in the most appropriate way. There is a balance to be struck and I shall report back on my reflections in due course.

Finally, Amendment 62C would require that, when the PSFA revokes a DEO, it provides the reasoning to both the liable person and their employer. In practice, this would be shared with the liable person as a matter of good public law to safeguard the public law duty of fairness in decision-making for the individuals subject to the orders. However, there are serious privacy considerations that could be undermined by providing such information to the employer. Upon the establishment of a DEO, the employer is not told anything about the DEO other than what is to be deducted from the liable person’s salary. This is the only information of relevance to the employer. Any other information would be a breach of privacy.

Regarding some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I think it would be helpful to your Lordships if I assist them with some more information on safeguards. Regarding the safeguards in place for the use of DEOs, including preventing hardship, the Public Sector Fraud Authority has committed to the following safeguards: vulnerability assessments, maximum deduction amounts, opportunities for representation, reviews and appeals, and the ability to notify a change of circumstances. The PSFA will continue to utilise best practice from across government.

On the question of who determines the amount of debt owed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s investigation will calculate the debt owed to the Government as a result of fraud or error following an investigation into suspected fraud. The liable person will be notified of the recoverable amount. If they do not agree, a firm and final determination will be sought by a court or tribunal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked what is meant by “among other things” in Clause 41. Clause 41(6) gives the Minister powers to

“make further provision about the calculation of amounts to be deducted”

in respect of DEOs. To be clear, to make further provision would not allow the Minister to qualify or change the provision, only to add specific conditions or restrictions that can be taken into account when calculating the amount to be deducted. As given as an example in Clause 41(7), the key consideration will be hardship and defining what constitutes hardship. It is important that the definition of hardship is not fixed, as what constitutes hardship today may look very different in, say, 10 years’ time.

The term “among other things” could also include other items that can be taken into account when calculating DEOs that are not so immediately obvious. For example, the regulations could be used in allowing for a different deduction rate around the Christmas period, when the liable person might have other outgoings that would not be reasonably foreseeable when the order was first given.

I hope that goes some way to assuring noble Lords about our safeguards and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I listened to the Minister, and I listened to her the other day on the same subjects regarding DDOs. A question occurs. In many cases, the amount owed is set by the court. Why, then, does the court not decide how that amount should be repaid? Why do we have to go through all these processes and decisions by the departments rather than the court?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a very interesting point, on which I will have to reflect and come back to him, if that is okay.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

75A: Clause 70, page 37, line 32, at end insert—
““reasonable grounds” do not include generalisations or stereotypes of certain categories of people, for example that members of a particular social group are more likely to be involved in fraudulent activity than others, irrespective of whether they are made through entirely automated, partially automated, or non-automated processes;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Lord Vaux of Harrowden, clarifies that people cannot be investigated for fraud based on stereotypes and generalisations, be this through the use of algorithms, human assessment, or a combination.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have been debating Part 1, which gives substantial powers to the Cabinet Office when the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, and we are about to kick off on Part 2, which gives substantial powers to the DWP. Those include police-style powers to enter private premises, search them and seize property, as well as powers to demand information. Those are potentially very intrusive powers, so it is essential that they can be exercised only when it is genuinely appropriate to do so.

The two amendments in this group cover both Parts 1 and 2, and they provide essential clarification as to how the DWP and PSFA should interpret the legal threshold for most of the investigative powers in the Bill, which is the requirement to have “reasonable grounds” of suspicion of fraud.

The amendments are intended to ensure that, when the DWP and PSFA are exercising their investigative powers under this Bill, reasonable grounds do not include generalisations or stereotypes of certain categories of people—for example, that members of a particular social group are more likely to be involved in fraudulent activity than others. Investment in data analytics and other emerging technologies, such as AI, for fraud risk detection is inevitably, and probably rightly, increasing. The Government have signalled their intention to turbocharge AI and to mainline AI into the veins of the nation, including the public sector.

The Government are, as we speak, trying to pass the Data (Use and Access) Bill, which would repeal the current ban on automated decision-making and profiling of individuals. The DWP has invested heavily in artificial intelligence, widening its scope last year to include use of a machine-learning tool to identify fraud in universal credit advances applications, and it intends to develop further models. This is despite a warning from the Auditor-General in 2023 of

“an inherent risk that the algorithms are biased towards selecting claims for review from certain vulnerable people or groups with protected characteristics”.

The DWP admitted that its,

“ability to test for unfair impacts across protected characteristics is currently limited”.

There are real concerns about the inaccuracy of algorithms, particularly when such inaccuracy is discriminatory, when mistakes disproportionately impact a certain group of people. It is well evidenced that machine-learning algorithms can learn to discriminate in a way that no democratic society would wish to incorporate into any reasonable decision-making process about individuals. An internal DWP fairness analysis of the universal credit payments algorithm, which was published only due to a freedom of information request, has revealed a “statistical significant outcome disparity” according to people’s age, disability, marital status and nationality.

This is not just a theoretical concern. Recent real-life experiences in both the Netherlands and Sweden should provide a real warning for us, and are clear evidence that we must have robust safeguards in place. Machine-learning algorithms used in the Netherlands’ child tax credit scandal learned to profile those with dual nationality and low income as being suspects for fraud. From 2015 to 2019, the authorities penalised families over suspicion of fraud based on the system’s risk indicators. Tens of thousands of families, often with lower incomes or belonging to ethnic minorities, were pushed into poverty. Some victims committed suicide. More than a thousand children were taken into foster care. The scandal ultimately led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister, Mark Rutte.

In Sweden in 2024, an investigation found that the machine-learning system used by the country’s social insurance agency is disproportionately flagging certain groups for further investigation over social benefits fraud, including women, individuals with foreign backgrounds, low-income earners and people without university degrees. Once cases are flagged, fraud investigators have the power to trawl through a person’s social media accounts, obtain data from institutions and even interview an individual’s neighbours as part of their investigations.

The two amendments that I have tabled are based on paragraph 2.2 of Code A to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, in relation to police stop and search powers, which states that:

“Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more likely to be involved in criminal activity”.


These amendments would not reduce the ability of departments to go after fraud. Indeed, I argue that by ensuring that the reasonable suspicion is genuine, rather than based on stereotypes, they should improve the targeting of investigations and therefore make the investigations more effective, not less so.

The Bill extends substantial intrusive powers to the Cabinet Office, the PFSA and the DWP, and those powers must be subject to robust safeguards in the Bill. The use of “generalisations or stereotypes”, whether through automated systems or otherwise, should never be seen as grounds for reasonable suspicion. I hope the Minister will see the need for these safeguards in that context, just as they are needed and exist in relation to stop and search powers. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and to speak in favour of Amendments 75A and 79A, to which I have attached my name and which noble Lords will see have rather broad support in political terms—perhaps not the broadest I have ever seen but it is certainly up there. I must also pay tribute to Justice, a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation that is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists, which has been most determined in ensuring that these issues are raised in this Bill, in this context.

I have already addressed these issues in the Chamber in a number of amendments to the Employment Rights Bill that I tabled and spoke to. I am not going to repeat all that I said there, but I cross-reference those amendments. If noble Lords want to find out more about this issue, there is an excellent book by the researcher Shannon Vallor, The AI Mirror, which is a useful metaphor for understanding the risks whereby we live in a biased society in which those biases risk being reflected back to us and magnified by the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms. That is very much what these two amendments seek to address.

The noble Lord has already given us two international examples of where using AI, algorithms, stereotypes and generalisations in investigations has gone horribly wrong. I have to add a third example, which is the infamous case in Australia of “Robodebt”. That was an automated debt recovery and assessment programme, from the rough equivalent of the DWP, that was exercised in Australia. There was controversy before and through its implementation, and it was an unmitigated disaster. I point the Minister and others to the fact that there was a Royal Commission in Australia which said the programme had been

“a costly failure of public administration in both human and economic terms”.

I note that the House of Representatives in Australia passed a public apology to the huge number of people who were affected.

In a way, I argue that these amendments are a protection for the Government, that this will be written into law: there is a stop that says, “No, we cannot allow things to run out of control in the way we have seen in so many international examples”. I think these are truly important amendments. I hope we might hear positive things from the Minister but, if not, we are going to have to keep pursuing these issues, right across the spectrum. I was very taken: Hansard will not record the tone of voice in which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the Government wish “to mainline AI”, but it is important to note that a concerning approach is being taken by the Government to the whole issue of artificial so-called intelligence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

The noble Baroness will be very aware that we now have several days of Committee before us on stage 2 of the Bill, and I look forward to discussing this and many issues with her as the Committee stage progresses.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but informative debate. I seem to be getting a bit of a track record. I thought my previous record was managing to get an amendment signed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I might even have surpassed that with this one. I am not sure quite what that says.

I am partially reassured by what the Minister has said, and obviously I am sure that she and her team will follow the safeguards that she has talked about. But those safeguards are not in statutes. For example, she talked about decisions being taken only by humans in relation to putting out information requests. That is not the case. The code of conduct refers only to decisions that will affect benefits, not the information request side of things, and it is only in the code of conduct, which can be changed at will. I am uncomfortable here.

We are talking, particularly with the eligibility verification process, about very large amounts of data, potentially on 9.9 million people. Who knows how many will flag up eligibility indicators? But without a shadow of doubt, the department will be using some form of algorithmic or AI tool to decide which of those are the ones the department wants to concentrate on. If that is the case, that is where the bias can creep in. If bias creeps into the algorithm or the machine learning tool and comes up to a person, it is easy to say “computer said yes” or “computer said no” and not to question the data coming to you.

I am not totally comfortable that there really are the safeguards at the moment. We are going to come to the human interaction at a later stage of the debate, so I will not go further into that. To be honest, I suspect that the Netherlands, Sweden and Australia probably had similar safeguards. They did not work. I cannot say for certain, but most departments believe that they are doing the right thing and that the safeguards are working. But they did not in those cases, and real problems were caused to vulnerable people.

I will withdraw the amendment but this is something that we will definitely come back to. Just in passing, I also welcome the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, to the right side of the fence with us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 75A withdrawn.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 15th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I think was rather underplaying her expertise in her comments. There is a certain level of déjà vu about this Bill, as has been mentioned. Many of us spent a lot of time debating its predecessor, under the previous Government, and it is nice to see at least some of the band getting back together.

I acknowledge that this reincarnation has been significantly improved from the last version, and the changes go a long way towards dealing with many of the issues that Members from across the House raised last time round. I hope that my desire to clamp down on fraud is well known, and I completely understand the need to try to reduce the roughly £10 billion in annual losses to fraud and error that arise in the social security system. So I broadly support the strengthening of the powers set out in Part 1, although I share some of the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.

I cannot help but suspect that concentrating on the capabilities and competence of the agencies that should be investigating and recovering fraud losses would be likely to achieve more. The utter uselessness of the National Investigation Service in recovering Covid fraud losses is a good example. It seems to have cost more to run than it has recovered, and I note from today’s Times that it is about to be closed down.

Most of my comments will concentrate on Part 2, which relates to the social security aspects. First, there is the question of the proportionality of the measures. I have been struggling to understand the impact assessment; like most of these things, it is an awful lot of pages and not a lot of information—it really is time the Government got their act together on impact assessments. As I understand it, the measures will initially raise less than £180 million a year, rising to £500 million after 2030. I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm the actual number, if I have got that wrong. Set against that are the direct costs to the department of around £42 million per year, and the costs that the measures will impose on the banks that will have to provide the information, which the impact assessment makes no attempt to quantify. Can the Minister provide any update on what those costs are expected to be and whether the banks will be reimbursed for them?

That net recovery is a very small proportion of the estimated losses: 2% to 5% recovery is a very small return when set against the imposition of what is a very intrusive power that will force banks to scan all their accounts for benefit payments and eligibility indicators. It is worth pointing out that this scanning requirement is not a one-off; it is potentially effectively continuous for periods of up to 12 months, which can be extended as and when. Let us be clear that, while the banks will provide information to the DWP only on those accounts and connected accounts which meet the criteria set out, in order to achieve that the banks will have to scan all accounts to find the information. The Government already have significant powers. What assessment have they undertaken of what could be achieved if those existing powers were used more effectively?

It would be much better to prevent fraud and error in the first place, rather than after the event. Is the Minister satisfied that the DWP is doing everything reasonable to that effect? Levels of fraud and error seem extremely high. Surely there is more we could do up front, which might remove the need for some of these changes. A redesign of benefits and claim processes, such as removing cliff edges—the carer’s allowance is a good example of that—or making the process clearer and easier could go a long way to reducing claimant error. For example, we know that the pension credit forms are so long that they put people off even applying.

Then there is the philosophical question of carrying out blanket surveillance without suspicion. This raises the danger of making benefit claimants feel like second-class citizens and spied on, and that we inherently distrust them. Disability groups have already raised this concern, and today’s report from the Work and Pensions Select Committee reinforces it. According to its chair:

“We heard evidence that the process … of engaging with the DWP … too often led to mental distress … Deep-rooted cultural change of the DWP is desperately needed to rebuild trust”.


It is quite hard to see how the measures in this Bill will contribute to rebuilding that trust. Another philosophical question is whether it is right to treat fraud and error in the same way, particularly when the error is by the DWP and not by the claimant.

The Minister rightly referred to some of the new safeguards that have been introduced into this incarnation of the Bill, and I will probe a few of them. A number of codes of practice must be issued under the Bill before actions can be taken. I was going to ask, “When can we see those?”, but I am very grateful that the Minister has confirmed that we will see them before Committee. Instead, I just ask: can they be sent directly to those of us taking part in this debate, and as soon as possible before Committee, so that we have time to digest them?

The Minister has explained that only very restricted information can be requested from the banks, and I agree that that is a significant step forward from what we had before. However, that could be undermined by the enhanced investigatory power clauses, which will allow much more intrusive information to be to be obtained if DWP has reasonable grounds for suspicion that a person has committed an offence. Does the existence of an eligibility indicator under the verification processes constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion? If that is the case, it would drive a coach and horses through the safeguard of restricting the information in the first place.

Related to that, what are the consequences of an eligibility indicator being raised? What further investigations need to be carried out before, for example, a benefit is put on hold? I have heard a number of times—it was repeated earlier—that a human must be involved in any such decisions, but I can find nothing that says that in the Bill. Can the Minister point me to where that is? I have also heard nothing about what level of human interaction that will constitute and what level of seniority and qualification is required.

I also welcome the introduction of the independent reviews of the exercise of these new functions. However, the provisions for these independent reviews are somewhat lacking: they do not set out the timings, they are very limited in scope and there is no definition of what would constitute an “independent person”. In particular, the independent reviewer will not be required to opine on the proportionality of the powers and their use, which is a very serious omission. I am sure that we will revert to those matters later in the process.

The eligibility verification rights are limited to three specific benefits—universal credit, employment and support allowance, and pension credit—which, again, is another improvement on the previous version. I was quite surprised by the inclusion of the last one, as the main issue with pension credit is that it is woefully under claimed, rather than there being too much money being paid out. I am interested to understand why that was included. Those three can be added to by regulation, so are there any plans for them to be added to?

There is also an obvious loophole in the eligibility verification process, because it applies only to linked accounts within each single bank. A fraudulent claimant can easily avoid that by having accounts in different banks. Does that mean that deliberate fraud is unlikely, in practice, to be identified under this Bill? That would somewhat reduce its point. Has that loophole been taken into account when calculating the expected savings?

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned, the banking industry has also raised some concerns about the Bill, including—among other things—potential conflicts with its existing financial crime duties; possible tensions between the Bill and firms’ existing consumer duty and vulnerability guidance; the diversion of resources from wider economic crime capacity; and issues around safeguards for bulk data access. I would be interested to understand what meetings the Minister has had with organisations such as UK Finance to ensure that such concerns have been, and will be, addressed.

There are lots of other matters that I could raise, but given the time, I will raise just one more: the driving licence disqualification clauses. That seems extremely arbitrary, so I would like to understand more about the logic that was applied to that and what other measures might have been considered.

I acknowledge that the Bill has been greatly improved from its previous incarnation, but quite a lot of issues remain. The Minister has been generous with her time and, as always, constructive in her approach, so I very much look forward to further discussions and debates as we go through the next stages, as well as to the maiden speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman.

Welfare Reform

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I think we all applaud the desire to get people off benefits and into work, but to do that we need jobs and we need employers who are willing to take those people. I hope the noble Baroness will not mind my quoting from the impact assessment that accompanies the Employment Rights Bill in relation to day 1 unfair dismissal rights. It states that

“there is evidence that the policy could negatively impact on hiring rates. For example, employers may be slower to take on workers due to the liability and increased protections”—

and I stress this last bit—

“particularly for those that are seen as riskier hires”.

Does the noble Baroness agree that that seems to be in direct conflict with the desire to bring people into work, and does she think it is a good idea?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. I have real confidence in this. The noble Lord may know that in January we published the terms of reference for the Keep Britain Working review, a review headed by the former chair of John Lewis, Sir Charlie Mayfield, who is looking at ways in which we can make workplaces more receptive and more able to take on people who have health conditions and disabilities. It could include all kinds of ways in which we can support them. We want to remove the barriers to employers doing that.

We already know that this is the case: reasonable adjustments are often talked about as a way of doing it. The noble Lord may think that these difficult hires. In fact, it is estimated that, on average, employers could save between £5,000 and £11,000 for every employee they prevent from falling out of work. So having an inclusive workplace is not a “nice to have”: it is not an extra. It is a way of making sure that we protect those who are currently working. There are significant numbers of people at the moment who are working but have a condition, and hundreds of thousands of them fall out of work every year. Our system is trying to work with employers to protect those who are already in work, but we have lots of employers really engaged with us in jobcentres, in the work we are doing and in building relationships. People want to do this. We can do this.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd April 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. Although we probably come from very different positions on the role of the state, I agree with virtually everything that he said. I apologise for popping up at this late stage of proceedings on the Bill but, as someone with a long-standing concern about social security matters, I was shocked by the inclusion of these powers and want to add my support to those opposing them and, should this opposition prove unsuccessful, to the very sensible set of recommendations made by my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

The Child Poverty Action Group, of which I am honorary president, and Z2K warn that the stakes are high for claimants, as getting caught up in an error and fraud investigation can lead to the wrongful suspension and/or termination of their benefits. They give some horrendous examples of where this has happened. I will read just one: “A claimant with severe mental health problems whose main carer had recently passed away had his UC suspended in October 2023 by the UC case review when he was unable to obtain and upload bank statements on request. The suspension continued for four months and he was unable to pay for food, electricity or heating. When he was referred for benefits advice and his welfare rights adviser contacted the UC case review team, she was told that claims under review are randomly chosen and they are not targeted in any way”. This is someone with mental health problems left without any money; this could become the norm under this proposal.

The briefing from the CPAG and Z2K also cites the perspective of Changing Realities—families with experience in claiming low-income benefits. One warns that

“it will put folk off claiming altogether”.

I always remember, when I worked at the CPAG, getting a phone call from a woman who started by saying, “Please don’t think I’m a scrounger”. I am afraid that is still very much how people often feel about claiming benefits. Treating all social security recipients as potentially fraudulent can but increase the stigma associated with claiming. Amendment 219 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka is highly pertinent here. The point has already been made, but how would we feel if we knew that our bank accounts could well be scrutinised for potential tax evasion? I realise that I should declare an interest: as a pensioner, ultimately my bank account will be trawled, but that is down the line. Underlying this is a double standard that has operated year after year in social security and tax fraud.

The CPAG and Z2K also warn that some of the most marginalised people in our society could get caught up in these speculative searches. Given this, can the Minister explain why—I believe this is still the case—there is no equalities impact assessment for these provisions? Disabled people’s organisations are very worried about the likely implications for their members, such as in the case of disabled people who set up bank accounts to pay for their social care. They warn of the potential mental health impact as existing mental distress and trauma could be exacerbated by the knowledge that they are under surveillance—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.

The Government state that they

“are confident that the power is proportionate and would operate in a way that it only brings in data on DWP claimants, and specifically those claimants where there is a reasonable suspicion that something is wrong within their claim”.

Given the evidence of people already being wrongfully targeted for fraud and the strongly expressed view of organisations such as Justice, as well as the Information Commissioner, that the measures are disproportionate and therefore arguably unlawful, can the Minister say on what evidence that confidence is based? Given this confidence, I hope that the Government will accept without demur Amendments 220 to 222 in the next group from my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

Picking up what my noble friend Lord Sikka said, what is the breakdown between suspected fraud and error? It is not helpful that they are always talked about as though they are one and the same thing. The Government have argued that one reason the power is necessary is to provide the tools to enable the DWP to

“minimise the impact of genuine mistakes that can lead to debt”.

Try telling that to recipients of carer’s allowance who have been charged with fraud as a result of genuine mistakes relating to the earnings threshold. The fact that the DWP already has the information and power it needs to act to ensure that debts do not accrue in this situation, yet in countless cases has not used it until the point where very large sums may be owing, does not instil confidence, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.

On Amendment 303, which relates to Amendment 230, one of the criticisms of these provisions has been the lack of consultation. Has the Social Security Advisory Committee been consulted? If so, what was its response; if not, why not?

In conclusion, I support the opposition to Clause 128 and Schedule 11 standing part of the Bill, but so long as they do stand part, I hope very much that the Minister will take seriously the amendments in the name of my noble friend in this group and the next two.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was also too late to put my name to these stand part notices for Clause 128 and Schedule 11. There must have been a stampede towards the Public Bill Office, meaning that some of us failed to make it.

At Second Reading, I described Clause 128 as “draconian”. Having dug into the subject further, I think that was an understatement. Data protection is a rather dry subject and, as the debates throughout this Committee stage have shown, it does not generate a lot of excitement. We data protection enthusiasts are a fairly select group, but it is nice to see a few new faces here today.

The Bill runs to 289 pages and is called the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Nothing in that name suggests that around 20 pages of it relate, in effect, to giving the Government unlimited access to the bank accounts of large swathes of the population without suspicion of any wrongdoing—20 pages is larger than many Bills. I wonder what the reaction in this Committee and the other place might have been if those 20 pages had been introduced as a stand-alone Bill—called, perhaps, the government right to access bank account information Bill. I suspect that we might have had a few more people in this Room. It feels as if this draconian clause is being hidden in the depths of a Bill that the Government perhaps felt would not generate much interest. It is particularly concerning that it was dropped into the Bill at the last minute in the other place and has not, therefore, received scrutiny there either. This sort of draconian power deserves much more scrutiny than on day 6 in Committee in the Moses Room.

I hope that my desire to stamp out fraud is well known—indeed, I think I can probably describe myself as rather boring on the subject—so I have a lot of sympathy for the Government’s underlying intention here. However, a right to require banks to carry out suspicionless surveillance over the bank accounts of anybody who receives pretty much any kind of benefit, directly or indirectly, is a huge intrusion into privacy and feels completely disproportionate. Others have covered the detail eloquently, so I just want to ask a number of questions of the Minister—I see that we have had a viscount swap at this stage.

I have been trying to work out exactly which accounts could be covered by this requirement. Schedule 11 is not the easiest document to read. It seems clear that if, for example, I am a landlord receiving rent directly from the benefit system on behalf of a tenant, the account of mine that receives the money would be covered, as would any other account in my name. However, would it also catch, for example, a joint account with my wife? I think it would. Would it catch a business account or an account for a charity where I am a signatory, a director or a trustee? I am not sure from reading it, I am afraid. Can the noble Minister clarify that?

Once received, the information provided by the banks may be used

“for the purposes of, or for any purposes connected with, the exercise of departmental functions”.

That seems extremely broad, and I cannot find anything at all setting out for how long the information can be retained. Again, can the Minister clarify that?

As well as being a data protection enthusiast, I am also an impact assessment nerd. I have been trying to work out from the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill—without much success—how much money the Government anticipate recovering as a result of these proposed rights, as well as the cost to the banks, the department and any other parties in carrying out these orders. The impact assessment is rather impenetrable—I cannot find anything in it that covers these costs—so I would be grateful if the Minister could say what they are and on what assumptions those numbers are based.

The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, mentioned unintended consequences. I echo his points: this is really important. Putting additional onerous obligations on banks may make them decide that it is too difficult to provide accounts to those in receipt of benefits. Access to bank accounts for vulnerable people is already an issue, and any incentive to make that worse is a real problem. As the noble Lord pointed out, we have a good example of that with PEPs. All of us have, I suspect, experienced finding it at least difficult to open an account. Some of us have had accounts refused or even closed simply because we have made it difficult for the banks to act for us. The same risk applies to landlords. Why would a landlord want to receive money from housing benefits directly when it will mean that all of his bank accounts and linked accounts will be looked at? He will simply say no. We are therefore reducing the pool of potential accommodation available to housing benefit claimants.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Buscombe (Con)]

I am sorry; I have spent a lot of time listening to others, and a lot of it has been slightly interesting to listen to, I have to say.

The measure will not enable the DWP to access any accounts, and the DWP will not be able to use this measure to check what claimants are spending. The DWP can request information only where there is a link between the DWP, the third party and the benefit claimant or recipient of a payment, and will receive only minimum information on those cases where potential fraud and error are signalled. Once received, the DWP will look at each case individually through its business-as-usual processes and by using existing powers. That work will carefully be undertaken by a human and no automated decisions will be made. That is a really interesting and important point in terms of this measure. I now turn to my noble friend.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, but could she point out where those restrictions actually are in the Bill? It says that an account information notice can include

“the names of the holders … other specified information relating to the holders … and … such further information in connection with those accounts as may be specified”.

It basically allows the DWP to ask for any information relating to those accounts. I do not see the restrictions that she has just spoken about.

[Baroness Buscombe (Con)]

It is important that my noble friend answers that question. The point is that if we find—I am sorry, I still speak as if I am involved with it, which I am not, but I promise noble Lords that I have spent so much time in this area. If the DWP finds that there is a link that needs pursuing then that obviously has to be opened up to some degree to find what is going on. Remember, the most important thing about this is that the right people get the right benefits. That is what the Government are trying to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

To address another misconception, it is not a surveillance or investigations power, as was alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This measure does not meet the legal definition of surveillance, as the data gathering will be neither covert nor the purpose of an investigation. This is solely a data-gathering power that will help us to check whether individuals appear to meet the eligibility rules for the benefit that they are receiving. This should not be confused with powers that the DWP already holds under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to investigate individual cases where there is a suspicion of criminality.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting, but can the Minister show us in the Bill where those restrictions on the information that can be requested reside? As I read it, as I mentioned to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, paragraph 2(1) of new Schedule 3B, as inserted by Schedule 11 of the Bill, is pretty wide when it refers to

“names of holders … other specified information relating to the holders … and … such further information in connection with those accounts as may be specified”.

So it appears that the DWP can ask for whatever it wants, rather than what the Minister just described.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

That is a fair challenge and I will certainly be coming on to that. I have in my speech some remarks and a much more limited reassurance for the noble Lord.

It is only when there is a signal of potential fraud or error that the DWP may undertake a further review, using our business-as-usual processes and existing powers—an important point. DWP will not share any personal information with third parties under this power, and only very limited data on accounts that indicate a potential risk of fraud or error will be shared with DWP in order to identify a claimant on our system. As I said earlier, I will say more about the limited aspects of this later in my remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Yes, I am aware of that. I think the noble Lord was alluding to the point about proportionality. I listened carefully and took note of that, but do not entirely agree with it. I hope that I can provide further reassurances, if not now then in the coming days and weeks. The point is that there is no other reasonable way to independently verify claimants’ eligibility for the payment that they are receiving.

I turn to the amendments raised, starting with the stand part notice from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. They and my noble friend Lord Kamall, who is not in his place, interestingly, all made their case for removing the clause, of which I am well aware. However, for the reasons that I just set out, this clause should stand part of the Bill.

In raising her questions, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made some comparisons with HMRC. There are appropriate safeguards in place for this data-gathering power, which will be included in the code of practice. The safeguards for this measure will be equivalent to those in place for the similar HMRC power which Parliament approved in the Finance Act 2011.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

When might we see the code of practice? It would be extremely helpful to see it before Report, as that might short-cut some of these discussions.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I will need to get back to the noble Lord on that, but perhaps can reassure him that it is already being worked on. You can imagine that, because of the sensitivity of these powers, we are working very carefully on this and making sure that it will be fit for purpose.

--- Later in debate ---

The Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, quoted a survey from 2023 on the public’s views of these powers. I point out that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, said on the last group, we have recently heard a great deal about how recipients of carer’s allowance have been absolutely hammered by its cliff-edge nature and the way that the DWP has been chasing them. I suggest to the Minister that, after all those revelations, public views might have changed quite a lot.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was not intending to speak on this group, but another question occurs to me. We have been assuming throughout this that we are talking about requests of information to banks, but the Bill actually says that:

“The Secretary of State may give an account information notice to a person of a prescribed description”.


Could the Minister explain what that is?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I would of course much prefer Clause 128 not to stand part, but we were just privileged by a master class from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. She talked about these being probing amendments, but I do not think that I have seen a schedule so expertly sliced and diced before. If those are probing, they are pretty lethal. I agree with so many of those elements. If we are to have provisions, those are the kinds of additions that we would want and the questions that we would want to ask about them. I very much hope that the Minister has lots of answers, especially for the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but also for the other noble lords who have spoken.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am not sure I agree with that. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness, as I tried to on the previous group. Using our test and learn process, which is already under way working closely with the banks, bringing them along with us and them bringing us along with them—there is a good relationship there—we are working through these important matters.

The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is important, as is that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Again, it is important to give those reassurances. They will be forthcoming, and that is all part of our test and learn process, which I hope provides some reassurance.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I want to be absolutely clear on this point, because I am still not totally sure I am—I raised this the first time around on the last group. If I, as a landlord, have been paid rent as housing benefit directly, my accounts are caught. If I am a trustee of a charity and a cosignatory on a bank account, is the Minister saying that that charity’s account will be caught or not? I want to be absolutely crystal clear on that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

This is part of the filtering discussions that are already taking place at the moment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Under the terms of the Bill, would this allow that to be caught?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Yes it would. Landlords are in scope. We will filter this through in terms of the business as usual. If we receive any information—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

How many accounts of “signalling” already exist in the current backlog in the business-as-usual version? What kind of investment will it take when you supercharge these powers and get many more tens of thousands of signals?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will add to the Minister’s grief. He has talked a number of times about the limited information that will be provided to the DWP, but that is not what the Bill says. The Bill refers to

“such further information in connection with those accounts as may be specified”.

There is no limitation in the Bill to the information that the DWP can request from the bank—assuming that it is a bank, after my previous question. I am struggling to understand how we get from that to “limited”.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Right. A number of questions have been asked. I am not sure that I can give too much more clarity—only that I will go back to what I said on the first group in terms of the limited nature of what we are trying to do. I was very clear about its limited nature, I think.

This leads on to the numbers that noble Lords are asking me about. Of course, I cannot give that figure, as we do not honestly know it. Until we move forward on bringing the measure in, we will not know it. What is certain is that we need this power to be able to gain the limited data that we need. When we receive the data, it may be the case that we need to follow up. I am sure that we will not need to follow up in the vast majority of cases but we must have this power.

To the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I say this: this measure is for UK accounts only. I hope that that is also helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

This is the problem. We have been talking about limited information, a limited nature and the limited things that we will look at, but that is not what the Bill says. We need to think seriously about how we should limit the rights in the Bill to match the requirements of the DWP. At the moment, there seems to be a huge gap.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

That point is very much noted. I will certainly take it back. Clearly, we need to provide greater reassurance on the limits and scope, as well as on what we are trying to do. I regret that I am not able to give those answers in full to the Committee now but I hope that, today, I have already taken us further forward than we were before we started. That is quite an important point to make.

I shall touch on the benefits that are in scope of this measure, a point that was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. I think the noble Baroness wishes to restrict the power to working-age benefits, but pension-age benefits are not immune to fraud and error—I wanted to address that—and it is our duty to ensure that these benefits are paid correctly and in line with the benefit eligibility rules that Parliament has previously agreed. Every payment that the DWP makes has eligibility criteria to it. Parliament has considered these criteria in the passage of the relevant social security legislation, and the Government have a responsibility to check that payments are being made in line with those rules so that taxpayers’ money is spent responsibly.

State Pensions: Canada Free Trade Agreement

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Wednesday 18th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Yes, I can certainly give some reassurance on that to my noble friend. She may know that the policy has been challenged in the courts, and the Government’s long-standing position has been upheld by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in 2005, as well as the European Court of Human Rights in 2008, following a further challenge.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this goes way beyond Canada. Does the Minister agree that people who have worked and paid national insurance all their lives have earned their state pension? Can he therefore answer the earlier question, which he did not really answer: why, if you choose in retirement to go and live somewhere else, should you not receive what you have earned in full and on the same basis as anybody else?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

This issue goes back to what has happened in the past. The distribution of reciprocal agreements with countries is based on historic ties with those countries and the levels of labour and people mobility flows at the time that the agreements were concluded. We therefore very much have to look back at that, but I reiterate that we have no plans to include this in current or future free trade agreements. I also say to the noble Lord that, as he will know, if we look at the overseas territories, for instance, due to past, historic arrangements, Bermuda, Gibraltar and the sovereign base areas of Cyprus are included, but the rest are not.

Pensions Dashboards (Amendment) Regulations 2023

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Wednesday 12th July 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is obviously deeply regrettable that the pensions dashboard has been delayed—again, I should probably say. If it is not ready, a delay to the connection is obviously necessary, so there is not an awful lot to be said about the regulations themselves. As we have just heard, the Explanatory Memorandum is less than fulsome on the reasons or the implications, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee pointed out in its rather critical report, so I want to ask a few questions. I have not been able to attend some of the briefing sessions that the Minister has organised, so I apologise if I am covering what was said at some of those, but it might be worth having it on the record anyway.

What is the reason for the delay? The Explanatory Memorandum and the Minister talked about insufficient testing,

“more work … to set up adequate support for industry … and … to finalise … supporting guidance and standards”.

However, those are not reasons; they are not what has caused the delay. Delays of this nature are typically caused by inadequate scoping at the outset—we got it wrong at the beginning—by changes to the scope along the way, or by some combination of the two. Which is it? Who is responsible? What action has been taken to make those responsible for the delays accountable? If the team needs to be strengthened, has that happened?

The other possibility is simply that the dashboard was overcomplicated from the outset, which I think was what the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee may have been alluding to. Are we sure that we are not gold-plating it? Are we reinventing the wheel here? For example, have we taken advantage of the experience of open banking? We could have piggybacked on that.

Is a third-party supplier involved? If so, who and what responsibility does it have for the delay? Are there penalty clauses in the contract? If a third-party supplier is not involved, is it sensible for us to try to do a project of this size entirely in-house?

The EM is very quiet on the cost implications. What was the forecast development cost? I am talking about not the overall costs of the dashboard over 10 years but the development cost. What is it now? How much has it cost to date? How much is still to be spent? Who will cover any increase—industry, government, taxpayer? How will that work?

When large software projects of this nature go wrong, they tend to keep going wrong. I come from a software world, so I have experience here. What comfort can the Minister provide that this really will be the final delay and that we are now properly on top of the project?

At the time of the Act that enabled the dashboard, we had a lot of debate about the creation of other, privately created dashboards, and there was a lot of agreement around the Room at the time that the Money and Pensions Service dashboard should be the first to be run. I agreed with that but, given the delays, perhaps we want to think about it again. What other dashboards is the Minister aware of being developed? Are any at a sufficient stage of development that it might be quicker or cheaper for the Money and Pensions Service to consider partnering with them?

Finally, can the Minister provide any forecast of when the dashboard will become available to the public?

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for so clearly setting out the purpose of the regulations. I enjoyed the reference of the noble Lord, Lord Young, to his previous contribution in the debate on this issue, which was well made. My position is that it is not disappointing that the Government’s enthusiasm for such an early launch has been tempered; I always considered that it would be a very complex project and I am delighted that there is now a much greater focus on the complexities and ensuring what is delivered. I never really wanted it delivered two years ago because I did not think that it would be well delivered then. It needs to be well delivered, because of the scale that it covers.

These regulations replace the pension schemes staging profile, staging deadlines and connection window with a single common deadline for connection of 31 October 2026. I want to reflect on the guidance to schemes on a new connection staging timetable.

The DWP’s description of the purpose of that guidance has varied according to which document is read—there is not an absolute consistency. The documentation ranges between encouraging schemes to meet the new timetable to threats of a breach of the regulations if they do not, and “having regard to” the guidance is a concept that is a little unclear. Can the Minister clarify what exactly is the status of that guidance and when a breach—and a breach of what in regulation terms—would be triggered?

I will move on to an issue that we probably have not debated a great deal in previous discussions of the dashboard. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the monitoring and review of this legislation, saying that the approach to be adopted is

“to put in place a multi-strand evaluation strategy, the details of which are being explored”.

This strategy will

“ensure the critical success factors can be successfully tested with learning helping to further develop dashboards over time”.

The plans include research into dashboard usage, outcomes from that usage and information provided by providers. However, I cannot see any reference to key pensions public policy outcomes in those critical success factors. I did not see them when the previous regulations came with the Explanatory Memorandum and I cannot see them now.

To take it at its most basic, if, for example, as a result of dashboard usage, greater numbers of people took out more of their pension savings in their 50s or early 60s, is that a success because they have engaged, or undesirable because more people will have a lower income when they get to state retirement age? We have to be very clear what are the public policy aspirations we are seeking from that greater usage. Clearly, it is not set out, as far as I can see, in the critical success factors and the multistranded evaluation strategy—although I recognise that that is work in progress. Will any of those critical success factors identified in the Explanatory Memorandum be benchmarked against desired public policy outcomes over the long term?

Staying with that concept, what long term do we want as the outcome—not only from dashboards but a whole range of other things, although dashboards are before us today? Yesterday we saw eight papers on pensions, including analysis, consultations and consultation responses, all published in one go. I cannot let that moment pass without asking the simple question of the Minister: was any consideration given to how those eight papers and sets of proposals would impact on the multistrand evaluation strategy for the dashboard? I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer that today but it is an important question that needs answering.

For me, the decision by the department and the FCA to proceed with a gross investment performance metric in the proposed VFM framework, as announced yesterday, rather than net of all costs and charges, together with the continued dithering by the FCA over the transparency of costs and charges value reporting in decumulation products, is a backward step which does not resonate with the pension savers’ interest and informed decision-making. That was a deeply disappointing element of that VFM framework to read. We know from the FCA’s own findings that a wide range of charges are applied in the decumulation market, which should be rigorously assessed in a joint FCA/DWP/VFM framework. That has just been sidestepped.

Yesterday, the Chancellor referred positively to the Australian supers, but I point out that they have a tough regulatory requirement to report investment returns net of fees. If the Government are going to promote private market investment, where charges are higher, transparency of returns net of fees is essential if the saver is not to end up paying back the excess returns to the industry. The link to the evaluation strategy and the dashboard is: what information will be provided, what influences on behaviour are we expecting and how will that produce better outcomes? I must admit that, when I read that VFM framework, I thought it disappointing and rather contradicted the idea that members using the dashboard will make more informed decisions. I did not want the moment to pass without making that point.

Pensions Dashboards Regulations 2022

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

The Minister has been extremely helpful in facilitating meetings between the DWP, the dashboard programme and interested Members of this House. Would it be possible for her to facilitate a meeting with the FCA and the dashboard programme so that we can raise our concerns?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as I said all those years ago when we were discussing what is now the Pension Schemes Act, I also greatly support the concept of the introduction of pension dashboards. I am probably one of the people the Minister referred to who has that dusty box under the stairs, so I welcome this SI in principle. I have a few questions that I would be grateful if she could answer. Unfortunately, I was unable to attend the briefing that she kindly arranged, so I apologise if some of these questions were dealt with then, but there is probably no harm in the answers being on the record.

First, like the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, I agree that the six-month notice period makes sense. I hear what the Minister said about progress in creating the dashboards, but she has not said when she expects the public to be able to access them. The year is probably broad enough, but it would be interesting to understand when we think these dashboards, or at least the first dashboard, will be available.

The SI enables the establishment of dashboards additional to the MaPS dashboard. Things have obviously moved on a bit since we were discussing the then Pension Schemes Bill, so could the Minister give us some idea of how much genuine interest there has in fact been in creating other dashboards? Is she aware of any being worked on at the moment? There is not very much in this SI to incentivise the creation of private dashboards, nor anything that sets out who would be allowed to do so or how they might generate revenue. I understand that that will be covered by the FCA consultation she referred to. Under this SI, all they will have to do is meet the dashboard requirements.

We had many discussions in previous debates around the use of dashboards for selling advertising, transacting, et cetera. The SI is silent on those matters. I would be interested to know whether the Government’s thinking has evolved since our previous discussions. Perhaps the Minister can let us know. She mentioned in her opening speech the dashboard not allowing transactions, but I think that relates only to the MaPS dashboard. I am not sure whether she intended that to mean private dashboards; perhaps she might clarify that. For example, is there anything that would prevent a large pension provider or a consolidator creating a dashboard and then using it to encourage users to transfer, perhaps from a smaller provider, to its products or services? Does the Minister agree that there might be a conflict of interest, or even a competition issue, in that sort of situation?

That leads on to the use of the data by the dashboard provider. I was not clear from the SI what was allowed in that respect. Regulation 9 seems relevant, but I am not sure I fully understood it. As an example, could a dashboard provider—perhaps a big tech company such as Google or Meta—create a dashboard and use the data it holds or acquires to target advertising for competing products? If that is or will be possible, that would worry me. It would be a really serious fraud risk. We need safeguards over who is allowed to create dashboards and the way that revenue will be generated from them. The SI is silent on that.

I also have some questions on the impact assessment. Some surprisingly big numbers are there, with a wide range of outcomes. The best-estimate case comes out at a convenient figure of £30 million positive, just about breaking even. Am I being slightly cynical to think that has been slightly massaged or managed? The net present values for the first 10 years range from a worst case of £1.016 billion negative to a best case of £1.220 billion positive. Frankly, all that says to me is that there is still a very high level of uncertainty about the actual costs and benefits of the dashboards. It is also true that the bulk of the cost will fall on the industry and the benefits, which are less tangible, will go to members. To what extent is it expected that these costs, which are somewhere in the region of £700 million to £1.6 billion if the impact assessment is to be believed, will be passed on to pension funds? What impact will that have on pensioners? In particular, one has to assume that the cost will be higher as a percentage of funds for smaller funds, as the level of bureaucracy is similar with a smaller amount of money to spread it across, so what impact is expected, particularly on smaller funds and their beneficiaries? Is any support anticipated by the Government?

Related to the impact assessment, despite the expected annual cost being approximately £100 million a year, which is 20 times the statutory guidance level of £5 million, the Government have decided not to include a review clause in this SI. Instead, they have opted for what they call a multi-strand monitoring and evaluation strategy, which is subject only to ministerial review and approval. That is regrettable, and I am not even sure what a multi-strand monitoring and evaluation strategy actually is. Can the Minister put on record what form she expects that multi-strand monitoring and evaluation strategy to take, when and how often it will happen, and what will be reported publicly or to Parliament?

The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s report makes it clear that

“the system has not been fully worked out yet and will remain under development for some time.”

Can the Minister give us some insight about what further developments are still to come, what further SIs she expects to bring to us and when, and whether they might cover some of the matters that I have mentioned?

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am happy to take part in this debate. I need publicly to declare an interest as a fellow of the Institute of Actuaries, albeit non-practising. A dashboard is a very good thing, and we want to see it introduced. In truth, my perfect pension system would be one in which you never have to think about it until you retire, and we could dispense with dashboards, but we are not in that space, we have to have a dashboard, and this is the dashboard we have.

As I say, I welcome it. I was involved 25 years ago in discussions about an early progenitor of what we have. At that time it was just too difficult, but with the development of digital capabilities, it has now become a practical reality, and I look forward to it becoming a useful tool for people as they plan for their retirement. Noble Lords can probably tell from my tone of voice that I am heading towards a “but”, but I want to do that emphasising my gratitude for all the work that has been done by the department, the officials and the Pensions Dashboards Programme, as we call it now, although I rather wish they had not adopted the word “ecosystem”.

The regulations before us have to be judged in terms of what the objectives are. What are we having a dashboard for? The starting point was to connect people with their pensions. There was a lack of connection and the figures we have had of the orphan pots are truly staggering and concerning, so any step towards avoiding that problem is to be welcomed. Obviously, people want to know what they have got in those pots. That is straightforward and should be done.

Then we move on to a further stage, of people’s likely income in retirement. This is where things start to get sticky, because the point of telling people that likely income in retirement is as a “prompt for necessary action”—which I think are the words used on the PDP website. The Minister, whom I should have thanked for her detailed and helpful introduction, used the term “informed decisions”—so that people can take decisions commensurate with their retirement aims. I think the model people have in mind is that you look at your pension statement, you think that it is not enough, so you start saving more money. In that sense, it is inevitably and inherently a sales tool. That is one of the problems we face in setting up a dashboard that works in people’s interests.

A point that I have made consistently in discussions about a dashboard is that it has to have the state pension there, but an equally valid—in my view, more important—conclusion that you can draw from your pension statement, if you think your pension is not good enough, is “Well, I’ve got to start campaigning for a better state pension”.

I am going to look in particular, on the basis of that, at what Schedule 3 calls the “value data”. The regulations lead via the 2013 regulations to AS TM1 from the FRC. That is Actuarial Standard Technical Memorandum 1 from the Financial Reporting Council. A new version of that will come into effect from 1 October next year. I picked that up at the very useful meeting that we had with Ministers, but the first DAP for the larger schemes is supposed to be from 31 August 2023, or it could be earlier, which is before we have the new technical memorandum. The whole point of achieving this technical memorandum—it is spelled out in the work that has been undertaken—is that the previous version was not good enough for the dashboard statements. We had to have the new technical memorandum because the old one simply did not work. People could do it on all sorts of bases. You would have a consolidated statement with several figures which could all be calculated on a different basis and were not comparable. So we came up with this new technical memorandum which requires schemes to do it on a standardised basis.

I think it is important when you do that to understand what you are really getting. Is this really an estimate of people’s likely retirement income? I think we need to hesitate before encouraging people to place too much confidence in that understanding of what these figures will be. They will be figures calculated on the basis of a single, predefined set of assumptions. The technical memorandum is well within the bounds of plausibility. It is not necessarily the technical memorandum I would have come up with if I had had to decide, but I cannot point to it and say it is nonsense or misleading. However, it is important to understand that it is only one among a range of possible views of the future, and we are misleading people if we give them any idea that this is what is going to happen. I think it is fair to say that the figure you are presented with is probably the least likely figure of all possible outcomes.

Just as an aside, it is also important that this will be a government-endorsed figure. Make no mistake: the ordinary person seeing this on their pension statement, knowing that this dashboard has been legislated for by the Government, will see an implicit government guarantee for that figure. There is no way of avoiding that. That is what will happen. Government Ministers can say for all they are worth, “No, we are just facilitating this; it is not our figure”. If, over time, these figures turn out to be woefully positive, the Government will be held to account. A similar disaster happened with endowment mortgages, and we saw what happened there. People believe the figures they are given, are gravely disappointed when they do not appear and look for reimbursement.

Pensions Regulator (Employer Resources Test) Regulations 2021

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Monday 6th September 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her clear explanation of these regulations. I welcome them, but I would like to raise one or two questions which seek some clarity.

The Pension Schemes Act 2021 gave the regulator new moral hazard powers with the introduction of two new criminal offences and by extending the flexibility available to the regulator to make connected parties such as group companies and directors liable for pension scheme deficits, and make payments to a scheme, by issuing a contribution notice. The Act introduces two new tests for imposing contribution notices: when the regulator considers that an act or failure to act materially reduces the employer debt likely to be recovered if a Section 75 debt has fallen due immediately after an insolvency event or reduces the resources of the employer in a manner which was material when compared to the debt in the pension scheme—the employer resources test, which is the subject of these regulations.

They set out that employer resources test for assessing whether a relevant act or failure to act reduced the value of the employer’s resources and whether that reduction was materially relevant to the pension scheme’s debt. I read in detail that the employer resources will be assessed through the pre-Act normalised annual profit before tax measure, under which non-recurring or exceptional items are removed, and then the impact of the act or failure to act on that profit is determined. If that impact is material, the regulator can start to build its case for a contribution notice. Indeed, it is a measure akin to the employer’s ability to support the scheme. The measure is sometimes used in the preparation of an employer covenant analysis undertaken for trustees.

For the record, as it is not clear, can the Minister say how dividends, including payments within a group of companies, will be treated in the normalised annual profit before tax measure and in the assessment of material detriment? That certainly proved a controversial issue of concern during scrutiny of the Pension Schemes Act 2021, and it is not clear—certainly not to me—how those will be considered under the new test. From a pension scheme member’s point of view, if the resources of the employer sponsoring the scheme are weakened through transferring assets or dividends, leveraging more debt or some other reason, the employer basically may be less good for the money and pension benefits will be less secure. They will look to the cavalry at the regulator to come over the hill and issue a contribution notice, and they need to have the confidence that that will actually be done with more focus, positivity and speed of action than the past has demonstrated.

In their response to the consultation published on 29 June, the Government set out their reasoning for the employer resources test. In summary, it said that, in the majority of past contribution notice cases, the regulator faced

“difficulty in forecasting the medium and long-term performance of a business for the purposes of the … ‘material detriment test’.”

This is because it had to extrapolate from an employer-related act into the future, with the uncertainty and challenges that causes evidentially. Indeed, trustees can experience exactly those similar difficulties in trying to assess those implications for the employer covenant, because there is no industry consensus on how to value the employer covenant. Therefore, the employer resources test removes the need to forecast how the employer might or might not have performed in the absence of that act and assesses the impact on a snapshot basis. So it is quicker, sharper and more efficient.

However, the regulator still will not be able to issue a contribution notice if a party can show that they meet the conditions for a statutory defence and can provide reasonable excuse. The three premises are that they gave prior consideration to the test and to the extent that the failure or failure to act would reduce the value of the employer’s resources in a material way; that they took all reasonable steps to mitigate any such detrimental impact; and that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the act would not detrimentally affect in a material way the likelihood of the scheme members receiving their benefits.

I sighed a little because, even after applying the employer resources test, the regulator still has to conclude that it would be reasonable to impose a contribution notice, taking into account all relevant factors including the extent of any mitigation provided and a broader assessment of the employer’s strength. I just wonder whether we are going to face a potentially long and drawn-out process, which the employer resources test was intended to remove, in the way in which the defence arguments can be applied and whether the Government’s intention of deploying an employer resources test as a quick and efficient snapshot—rather than on a holistic basis—could be undermined.

I ask the Minister: what powers or processes are relied on to prevent the statutory defence conditions undermining the policy intention to have a quick and efficient employer resources test? Is it the intention to issue fuller guidance on how measures to mitigate the detrimental impact on pension schemes of an act or failure to act will be assessed as to whether they are sufficient to meet the statutory defence? These are the kind of realities that trustees will need to understand and employers will need to know.

Just as a concluding line, poor behaviour affects not only the value of members’ benefits paid but, as the Pension Protection Fund is funded by a levy, it affects those businesses which abide by the rules but end up bearing the costs and subsidising those businesses which seek to avoid their pension liabilities. Good employers and trustees or members have an interest in these new regulations working efficiently.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it seems like quite a long time ago that we were last in this Room. In fact, I think the last time I spoke in this Room was in the discussion on pension schemes, so it is nice to see a lot of old faces. There is a nice feeling of déjà vu about it. These regulations are reassuringly brief, so I will try to keep my comments equally brief, if I can.

First, I was a bit confused by the name of this, which refers to an employer resources test, that test being profit before tax. Profit before tax is not a measure of a company’s resources. It is a backward-looking measure of a company’s profitability. I question the comments in the Explanatory Memorandum that

“profit before tax … is less subjective than other options”.

Notoriously, profit before tax can be made to be whatever one wants it to be. A cash-flow measure would be an altogether less subjective, more objective measure. Profit before tax also does not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has said, take account of other forms of leakage of resources out of the company, be they dividends, share buybacks or massive capital expenditure. It is perfectly possible for a company to be highly profitable and highly indebted at the same time and therefore to have very low levels of employer resources.

I was a bit confused by the title, and would therefore like to add my name, as it were, to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, about why the Government did not go down the holistic route of looking at multiple measures that give a full picture of the employer resources rather than this one very narrow picture which is only a backward snapshot.

I have two other questions that relate to the discussions we had at the time of the Pension Schemes Bill. This instrument is obviously relevant to the subject of dividends that companies with deficits pay. The noble Baroness will remember that we had quite a lot of discussions about that back then. Indeed, the Minister at the time agreed that the Government would keep the question of dividend payments by companies in deficit under review.

I have two questions. First, can the Minister explain what assessment the Government have made of the impact that these regulations might have on the ability of companies to pay dividends? There has been some speculation in the press that it might significantly depress the payment of dividends by companies, something which on the whole is a good thing, but there could be situations where that could be a negative. Secondly, I would welcome confirmation from the Minister that the Government are still keeping under review the question of payment of dividends by companies that have deficits, as they promised.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I am glad that it was an accountant who made the comment that profits can be whatever you want them to be, which was my concern. However, I am struggling to grasp what role this is playing. In some ways, I suspect that we could overengineer the definition of “resources” and make it very complicated. There are strong arguments for keeping it as simple as possible so that the regulator can take a holistic view. This is what I understood the process to be. My guess is that the regulations will enable the regulator to do what we always thought it could do in the first place, and it tripped over some regulatory legal point. There are strong arguments in favour of keeping it simple and leaving it essentially to the judgment of the regulator.

Whenever I mention the regulator, I have to add my qualification that of course it does not represent scheme members in any way. It does not have the accumulated knowledge of unions and employers who actually do the business of agreeing pension schemes. I have questions about the Pensions Regulator but the ideal should be a Pensions Regulator that knows the field and can apply the test proportionately.

I have one specific question. I have no idea what this means. Regulation 4(8) says that

“the Regulator must take into account all relevant information in its possession”.

Well, yes, it is not going to take into account information that is not in its possession. However, it goes on to use the word “verification”. I am not sure what “verification” is doing in that paragraph.