Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 19th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, when you are trying to solve a problem, it is best to try to understand the root causes of the problem and then resolve those causes—diagnose and treat the disease, not the symptoms. That is why I have repeatedly asked the Minister why she believes UK pension funds have been so reluctant to invest in so-called UK productive assets. I know she gets frustrated with me asking this question regularly, but she has never answered it. She always responds, as she did again on 11 March, by explaining what the symptom is: that UK pension funds invest a much lower proportion in UK productive assets than international comparators. She is right, and, as noble the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, just pointed out, I do not think any of us disagree with that, but that does not answer the fundamental question. Why are UK assets apparently so unattractive to UK pension funds? What are the barriers to investment that we need to remove?

The Minister has often told us that the mandation power is just a backstop to the voluntary Mansion House agreement and probably will not be used. That is precisely the problem. It does not need to be used; its very existence is, in effect, mandation. As the Times pointed out so clearly on Saturday:

“A voluntary agreement … ceases to be voluntary … if it is underwritten by the promise of compulsion”.


Even if the power is not used, it still creates a fiduciary duty problem: the trustees are still, in effect, being forced to act in a way that they might not believe to be in the best interests of members, but they will not even have the defence of ,“We were only following orders”, if it turns out badly. The Minister has never given an adequate response to the question of who should bear the risk if the government-mandated assets result in poor performance.

On 11 March, the Minister said:

“This power does not direct schemes into specific assets or projects. What it does is set a broad framework aligned with the industry’s own voluntary commitments under the Mansion House Accord. Trustees retain full discretion over individual investment selection and the balance between asset classes”.—[Official Report, 11/3/26; col. 279.]


But that is not what the Bill says. What it actually does is give the Government power to require that an undefined and unlimited percentage is invested in qualifying assets, which are defined as

“an asset of a prescribed description”.

I stress that it says “an asset”, not just a class of assets.

There is no limit in the Bill on what those assets can be, except that they cannot be listed on a recognised exchange. Contrary to what the Minister has told us, specific assets or projects can be prescribed. Nor does the Bill require them to be in the UK; they can be anywhere in the world. The first regulations to define the asset allocation are subject to the affirmative procedure, but after that, any future Government can prescribe any asset, anywhere in the world, on any percentage, under the negative procedure.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, a scheme can apply for an exemption, but it is an incredibly high hurdle. A scheme must prove that the asset allocation requirement would cause

“material financial detriment to members”.

That is extraordinary—not just that it is “not in members’ interests”, but “material financial detriment”.

Contrary to the Minister’s assurances, this unlimited mandation power can be used to direct trustees to invest in classes of assets or specific assets. It fundamentally undermines the fiduciary duty of pension trustees. This dangerous power must be removed from the Bill. Instead, the Government should, as I said at the beginning, focus their efforts on identifying and removing the underlying barriers to UK investment.

[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in this mini-debate in full support of this amendment. I am extremely concerned about the principle of government directing any form of investment. I do not think any Government have a strong record on making investments, and to compel pension funds to make such investments would be incredibly dangerous. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, has so wisely said, we are setting ourselves a very dangerous precedent here that we will all—as people who want to retire at some point—live to regret.

My second point is a technical one, which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, touched on but is worth exploring slightly further: namely, the description of what a directed investment is. What is a UK investment—the sort of thing we would be told we have to invest in? Is it a company where the headquarters is domiciled in London, or that employs a certain number of people, or that does a certain thing in the UK specifically related to certain asset classes?

The reality is that you will have enormous problems if you try to force money into certain parts of the economy. You will get crowding out and excess price. An example could be to force these pension funds to invest in infrastructure. You would have a crowding out of other investments into infrastructure projects that would be mispriced, and that would create problems when it came to trying to generate returns. We should be very careful about that. Prescription over investment is one of the worst things a Government can possibly do, and I think we should acknowledge that in this House.

As has been mentioned, why are we talking about forcing people to buy things that other people do not wish to buy when we should be trying to create an economy that people want to invest in? I call upon the Minister to put that as the priority, rather than trying to force people to do things they do not wish to do, which will cause enormous problems in the long term.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

It depends on how the market is structured. The decision-makers here are employers. Let us look at what happened under the Mansion House Compact, the predecessor of the accord, brokered under the previous Government. The words were that

“‘too much focus on cost’ remains the key barrier”.

In other words, we have a market in the employment sector where the focus has been for too long on cost, not value. The noble Lord shakes his head, but we have heard this from around the House. Indeed, in Committee many people who do not agree with this power accepted the underlying diagnosis, and that is the basis on which the Government are proceeding.

The Government want the industry to invest in the full range of assets. One of the reasons, I suspect, that the Mansion House Accord is moving together is to make sure that it is clear that the market is going in that direction. That is the problem, we think: there is a risk of a failure of collective action. The accord is a commitment. The power gives providers assurance that the whole market will move so that they will not then be in a position where somebody faces a competitive advantage by reverting back to focusing on cost and not on value.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

As I understand the noble Baroness’s argument, the focus on cost is the problem. This Bill solves that with the value-for-money framework, so why do we also need the mandation power?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

This all comes as a package. A lot of attention is focused on this particular reserve power, but in fact it is the combination of all the elements of the Bill that we discussed in some detail in Committee over recent weeks: the question of the investment in scale, the need for the value-for-money framework, the need for the option to consolidate small pots. All these things come together to create the conditions in which this will work. This reserve power is to address a particular question, the risk of collective failure. I fully accept that the noble Lord does not agree with it, but I want at least to have the opportunity to make the argument as to why the Government are proposing to do it in this way.

The Mansion House Accord represents a voluntary commitment by 17 of the UK’s largest DC pension providers to invest 10% of their default funds in private markets, at least half of that in the UK, by 2030. We continue to be encouraged by progress, but the risk of a collective action failure in this market has long been recognised. As I said, individual providers face strong commercial incentives to keep costs low and to defer action until others move first. The reserve power exists as a backstop to ensure that if voluntary progress stalls, the Government have the means to act. Its presence in the Bill sends a clear signal that the commitment to change is underpinned by more than good intentions, and it helps to give each provider confidence that the rest of the market will move too.

At earlier stages we discussed a range of issues around safeguards and other things, which I thought would come up in later groups but that will obviously depend on what happens next. First, the power is time limited. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, thinks this power will outlive us all. I hope it does not, because if it has not been used by the end of 2035 it falls away, so I very much hope that it will not outlive the noble Baroness and me, although obviously we are in the Lord’s hands: should we be called home, what can we do? If it has not been used by 2035, it falls away. If it has been used, any percentage requirements in place cannot be increased beyond that date.

Secondly, the Bill establishes a savers’ interest test. Pension providers will be able to apply for an exemption from the targets where they can show that meeting them would cause material financial detriment to their members. Thirdly, the Government must consult and publish a report on the expected impacts, both on savers and on growth, before exercising the power for the first time, and a post-implementation review must follow within five years. Finally, the regulations implementing any requirements will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so Parliament would have its say.

I will respond to some specific questions. There was a question about how to define UK assets. This would be done in regulations were the power ever to be used. Consideration would have to be given to the characteristics of different asset classes. The Mansion House Accord is accompanied by some high-level guidance on how a UK investment should be identified within each of the different asset classes. That asset class by asset class approach to establishing the location is also the one that the FCA has taken as it consults on the upcoming value-for-money disclosure requirements, which will require firms to provide UK overseas asset allocation split. If the Government ever came to exercise these powers, we would expect similarly to take an asset class by asset class approach.

Questions were raised about a future Government and how this might be used. The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, prayed in aid the European Convention on Human Rights, and I commend her on that. First, on the question on property rights, this applies to default schemes and people can choose to opt out, but she raises a relevant point. Obviously I hope there will never be one, but if there ever were a Government of a different persuasion, were they to seek to use it in a way beyond what is here, I think they would run into problems. This Government have made it quite clear, in Committee in this House and in the other House, that the purpose of the power is to assure good outcomes for savers and the economy, recognising diversification benefits and the potential for higher returns. It is not an instrument for channelling investment into pet projects or specific companies.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, quoted me on this point. It was marvellous—“What he said” is what I would say. That is the Government’s view, and I have spoken about the various safeguards, but even if a future Government wanted to use these powers to do something either much broader or much more specific, of course they would have to abide by established principles of public law, including the requirement for Ministers to act rationally, ensuring procedural fairness and compatibility with ECHR rights when making secondary legislation.

The Government are under no illusions about the significance of this power. It is a substantial intervention and, if we ever found the need to use it, we would have to proceed with great care. I understand the strength of feeling on this. These powers, alongside the scale provisions, the value-for-money framework and the consolidation measures, are a package. Together, they are designed to deliver a step change in outcomes for millions of pension savers. If we remove the reserve power, we remove the mechanism that gives the rest of this framework its teeth when it comes to investment diversification.

For a long time, successive Governments have recognised the need to channel pension capital into productive assets. Auto-enrolment has brought millions more people into saving. We now have a responsibility to ensure that those savings are put to work properly to deliver better long-term returns. But the question before us is whether the Bill should contain the backstop at all. In the Government’s view, the answer is yes. Without it, the voluntary commitments made by the industry would rest on good faith alone. The experience of previous attempts to shift investment patterns in this market suggest that that, on its own, may not be enough. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

Pension Schemes: Ministerial Powers

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

There is a short and a long answer. The short answer is no. The long answer is that the Government have made it abundantly clear, because I have done it myself many times in Committee, what the purpose of the reserve power is: to backstop the Mansion House and trust commitments. My honourable friend the Pensions Minister and I have made it clear—he said it again this morning at a pensions conference—that we would make absolutely sure that the Government’s intention simply to backstop those agreements was there in the Bill. That is what the legislation is for, but I need to correct something in particular. This power does not direct schemes into specific assets or projects. What it does is set a broad framework aligned with the industry’s own voluntary commitments under the Mansion House Accord. Trustees retain full discretion over individual investment selection and the balance between asset classes. The role of a pension trustee has always been to exercise judgment, subject to constraints, and nothing in these provisions changes that.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister perhaps tell us why she thinks pension funds are not currently investing, or have not been investing, in the types of assets that she would like them to? I ask that question because surely the better way forward is to understand what is stopping them doing so and fixing that problem, rather than telling them to do something they do not wish to do.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I have said this many times in Committee, as the noble Lord knows, but I am delighted to explain again for the benefit of the whole House. I have just explained what the Government believe the challenge is. By international standards, we are really very low in aiming for 10%. Canadian schemes invest 11% in infrastructure alone. The evidence is clear that investing a small proportion of funds in the context of a diversified portfolio brings better returns for savers over the long run. The aim is to get better returns for savers. There is too much short-termism in our markets at the moment, and the view of the Government—as well as the evidence that seems to be out there—is that this is because we are seen as competing on cost, rather than on return or value. It is much easier to pitch to an employer on that basis. If we make it clear that the whole industry is going in this direction, then we believe that that will be the case. The choices will still be there, the safeguards are still in place, and we believe that this will be in the interests of savers across the long term.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sharkey sends his apologies; he is at a funeral and will read Hansard with great attention. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for supporting me on Amendment 167. I think it is the first time in 15 years that I have degrouped an amendment to stand by itself, but I can see no other way to ensure a clear answer from the Government: will they put their money where their mouth is?

The Committee has discussed qualified assets and, while I do not intend to repeat the discussion, I hope that everyone understands how high risk a portfolio of such assets is. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, in January, titled its look at the private equity markets as Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. Some 75% of firms invested in by venture capital fail. Complex infrastructure is both high risk and illiquid; we can think HS2, the Elizabeth Line—four years delayed and £4 billion over budget—and Hinkley Point, which seems to run out of money time after time. If someone with a substantial pension wants to invest in such assets, that is fine with me, but the Mansion House Compact —or accord, I do not care which terminology is used—covers only auto-enrolment default fund pension schemes. These are vehicles for those with the narrowest shoulders, with low incomes, small pensions and little financial knowledge. The downside risk for them means poverty.

The Government have assured us, and those pension savers with the narrowest shoulders, that under the Mansion House Compact, and by putting 10% of their pensions into qualified assets, they will be winners—to quote the Minister on the first day in Committee:

“with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement”.—[Official Report, 12/1/26; col. GC 205.]

No warning of the downside was mentioned and clearly, to the Minister, the downside does not seriously exist. I challenge that. I am always very wary of promises of low-risk, high-return investments.

The Government have argued that the Mansion House Compact, combined with the provisions in this Bill, brings great benefits because risk can in effect be eliminated by the structures that have been introduced and the use of large providers. I want to challenge some of those shibboleths. Large providers have explained to me that they can enhance pensions and use qualified assets safely through lifestyle investing, where more is invested into high-risk assets early in the life of the pension, switching later to low-risk investments. If I lose £100 in the first year that I save in a pension, the loss is compounded through the life of the pension and I will have thousands less to get me through retirement. If I lose £100 the day before my pension matures, I lose £100. Early losses are never made up by later gains because they in no way enhance the performance of other assets in the portfolio. If you lose on A, there is no sudden guarantee that you will gain on B. Lifestyle investment is a marketing tool to sell schemes to the financially anxious.

The Government and the Minister argue that the risks in qualified assets can be mitigated away through diversification. For a fund fully invested in good-quality assets, such as the FTSE 100 or the S&P 500, I see the argument for diversification to manage risk, but diversification loses its effectiveness in high-risk portfolios, as everyone should have learned from the collateralised debt obligation scandal that triggered the financial crisis in 2008. Let me illustrate with an extreme example. I go to the casino, maybe several casinos. I play the slot machine, roulette and blackjack. I am beautifully diversified. But we all know that I will still lose my money.

The Government’s case that pensioners with the narrowest shoulders should be 10% invested in qualified assets really depends on assumptions that it makes about asset allocation. The argument is that the pension companies involved would employ the best experts to pick winners among those qualified assets. Some experts are better than others, though I note that they all will find statistics and present them to show that they have the Midas touch.

I note the analysis of the Government Actuary’s Department, which shows that over time and on average—that is a key word—virtually every model portfolio tested delivers similar results. But there is a catch, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, pointed out last week—the GAD’s conclusion underscored its uncertainty. It said that

“there is considerable uncertainty, particularly with the assumptions for projected future investment returns”.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, also quoted from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which made the point even more forcefully. I could not work out what the mean looked like when I looked at that work done by the government department. Obviously, the mean really matters because an average can be made up of a few big winners and a lot of small losers. It is the losers in the high stakes game of qualified assets that worry me.

I am not attempting to stop the Mansion House Compact and the Government’s plan to put 10% of the assets of auto-enrolment default funds into qualified assets even though they are unlisted, opaque, high-risk and illiquid. My amendment would simply require the Government to provide a safety net for those who are in no position to live with the downside in these investments.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, last week said that

“the inevitable corollary of mandation”,

which is where he was focused,

“is responsibility for the outcome”.—[Official Report, 26/1/26; col. GC 284.]

But I regard the Mansion House Compact as very much a government-driven agreement designed by the industry to head off even more coercive action and so I think that the same principle applies: “responsibility for the outcome”.

My amendment is simple:

“Upon the individual becoming entitled to receive retirement benefits under the scheme, the trustees or managers must obtain an actuarial assessment of—


(a) the net investment return attributable to the qualifying assets held within the default arrangement over the period during which the individual’s rights were so invested, and


(b) the net investment return that would have been achieved over the same period had those assets instead been invested in a prescribed benchmark fund”.


In the amendment, benchmark fund

“means a diversified, low-cost equity index fund of a description specified in regulations”.

If the benchmark fund would have performed better, the Government make up the difference to the pensioner. The calculation, despite what the Minister said, is very simple, requires no new data and can be crafted straightforwardly. Pension schemes would just code it into their normal reporting.

If the Minister and the Government are right, and investment in qualified assets, as structured under the Mansion House Compact and in this Bill, benefits and does not harm pensioners in auto-enrolment default schemes—those people I described at the beginning with the narrowest shoulders and least able to take risk—it costs the Government absolutely nothing to sign up to this protection provision. If the Government believe their own words, accepting my amendment means taking no risk at all for the Government or taxpayer. My amendment only costs the Government money if they are wrong in the promises that they are making. The amendment would certainly give peace of mind to the poorest pensioners and strengthen their confidence to save and to invest.

We all want auto-enrolment to better serve low earners, but that requires shaping policy around the capacity of low earners to take risk. I ask the Government to put their money where their mouth is and provide the pension value protection described in my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being able to be here last week for Amendment 142. I am grateful that the Minister responded to it regardless of that. I have added my name to Amendment 167. I will try to be very brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained it with her usual clarity, and the amendment covers some of the same ground that we debated in the last group—although it attacks the problem from the other direction.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, before I start, I apologise to the Grand Committee for failing to be here to speak a previous amendment. It was unavoidable, unfortunately. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for stepping into the breach. I have had an exciting afternoon moving from R&R to pension schemes. I apologise that I am afraid I am going to be in the same position next week, so it will not be me speaking to my Amendment 119. Anyway, there we go.

I speak in support of Amendments 111, 161 and 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. To be honest, I support all the amendments in this group that seek to remove the asset allocation mandation powers, which is probably the most controversial part of the Bill. The trustees or managers of pension schemes have an obligation to act in the best interests of scheme members. That is their fiduciary duty. It is not their job to carry out government policy and they should not be forced to act in a way that they may believe is not in the best interests of scheme members. That is the clear implication of mandation. If the assets that the Government wish to mandate are so suitable or attractive for the relevant scheme, the trustees would presumably already be investing in them. If mandation is required to force trustees to invest in such assets, it implies that they have decided that they are not suitable assets for the scheme. That drives a coach and horses through the whole fiduciary principle. As we will come to in a later group, personally I would feel very uncomfortable about taking up a trustee role in such circumstances.

It begs a range of questions. Who will be liable if the mandated assets perform poorly? The Bill is silent on this. Why should scheme members take a hit because of government policy? Are the trustees liable for any below-par performance? Why do the Government feel they know better than professional managers and trustees? I do not see any evidence at all that the Government are a better manager of investments. Who will decide on the asset allocation, and based on what criteria? There is nothing in Bill that sets out the purpose or criteria for the asset allocation: just some examples, including private equity, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, mentioned, which will be looked at in a different group. All the Bill says specifically is that the allocation may not include securities listed on a recognised exchange. How will the impact be measured and reported? The Bill does require the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the expected impacts on scheme members and UK economic growth, but there are no reporting requirements on the actual outcomes.

Surely it would be better to try to understand why pension schemes are not currently investing in these so-called productive assets. What are the barriers to them doing so? That is not a rhetorical question; I would very much like to hear why the Minister thinks this has not been happening. What is, or has been, stopping the pension schemes investing in those assets they believe are so desirable? Surely, the better answer must be to try to remove those barriers, to make the assets more investable, rather than mandating, perhaps by refining regulation or adjusting tax—Gordon Brown’s dividend tax raid has, I am sure, quite a lot to do with this—or taking whatever other actions may be required to remove or reduce the identified barriers. Mandation is, frankly, the lazy option. We should identify and deal with the root causes if we want a sustainable solution.

The Government say they do not intend to use the mandation powers and, in some ways, that is worse than using them. The powers are there as a stick in the background, to force trustees to invest as they want, but without giving the trustees any of the protections that might exist if they could at least show they were acting as required by law. In any case, as a matter of principle, Governments should never take powers that they have no intention of using. This mandation power drives a coach and horses through the fundamental fiduciary duties of trustees. The Government say they do not intend to use it; it should be removed.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I echo the words of noble colleagues in the Committee about the dangers of the Government mandating any particular asset allocation, especially the concerns about mandating what is the highest risk and the highest cost end of the equity spectrum at a time when we are aware that pension schemes have probably been too risk-averse and are trying to row back from that.

What is interesting, in the context of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is that I was instrumental in setting up the Myners review in 1999, which reported in 2001, under the then Labour Administration. As Chancellor, Gordon Brown’s particular concern was about why pension funds do not invest much in private equity or venture capital. That was the remit of the review. The conclusions it reached were that we needed to remove the investment barriers, to change legislation, to encourage more asset diversification, to have more transparency and to address the short-term thinking driven by actuarial standards—at the time, it was the minimum funding requirement, which was far weaker than the regime established under the Pensions Regulator in 2004.

So this is not a new issue, but there was no consideration at that time of forcing pension schemes to invest in just this one asset class. The barriers still exist. In an environment where pension schemes have been encouraged, for many years, to think that the right way forward is to invest by reducing or controlling risk and to look for low cost, it is clear that the private equity situation would not fit with those categories. Therefore, I urge the Government to think again about mandating this one area of the investment market, when there are so many other areas that a diversified portfolio could benefit from, leaving the field open for the trustees to decide which area is best for their scheme.

I am particularly concerned that, as has been said in relation to previous groups, private equity and venture capital have had a really good run. We may be driving pension schemes to buy this particular asset class at a time when we know that private equity funds are trying to set up continuation vehicles—or continuation of continuation vehicles—because they cannot sell the underlying investments at reasonable or profitable prices and are desperately looking for pools of assets to support those investments, made some time ago, which would not necessarily be of benefit to members in the long run.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is about five years since we last saw a Pension Schemes Bill in this House, and it is good to see so many familiar faces, albeit sitting in different places in the Chamber. It is also good to be welcoming some new faces to our small band of pension enthusiasts, and I am particularly looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady White of Tufnell Park.

This is a big Bill, and there is a lot in it, much of which is to be welcomed and is not particularly controversial. I am going to restrict my comments to two areas of the Bill, one of which I think we will hear quite a lot about.

First, I understand and agree with the reasons and the desire to consolidate small dormant pension pots, but I have some concerns about the details. We are all aware of the problem of lost pensions, whereby a person has forgotten about a pension, perhaps from a long-ago short period of employment. This is one of the problems that the much-delayed pensions dashboard is designed to solve. Compulsorily moving a small pot from one provider to another risks increasing that problem: it will be much more difficult to track down a pension that you dimly remember if it has been moved, perhaps with any correspondence having been sent to an out-of-date address.

The definition of “dormant” is also slightly concerning: a pension pot will be considered dormant if no contributions have been made into the pot during the last 12 months and the individual has taken no steps to confirm or alter the way the pension pot is invested. I have a couple of pension pots that would be considered dormant under that definition, but that is simply because I am happy with the choices I made in the past; I would not consider them to be dormant. In the opposite direction, £1,000 seems a rather low definition of small, although I see it can be changed by regulation.

I am not clear when the Secretary of State intends to make the relevant regulations, but to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, I would suggest that it should not be done until the first pensions dashboard is fully operational and accessible to the public. As I understand it, that will not be until late 2027. Perhaps the Minister could provide a brief update on that. Also, there should be a clear requirement that any such transfer, carried out in a situation where no response has been received from the individual, should be clearly flagged on the dashboard to help people track them down.

The second issue I want to raise is more important. Here, I fear that a trend is beginning to emerge already—and that, most unusually, I am going to find myself in disagreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. This is the power for the Government to mandate the asset allocation of a master trust or group personal pension scheme. Pension schemes should be managed for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustees have a fiduciary duty to that effect. The Government mandating that a proportion—and there is no limit to this in the Bill—should be directed into types of assets and locations chosen by them rides a coach and horses through that principle. Who will be liable if such investments are not suitable or go badly wrong? I do not see any indemnification of trustees here. What makes the Government think that they know better than a professional qualified pension manager as to what is best for scheme members? The track record of government investing is not stellar, to say the least.

Of course, the reason for this is to push more pension funds into UK assets, often described as “productive assets”. Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I have that in inverted commas here, but even that makes little sense in this respect. Let us look at the sorts of assets that the Bill refers to. The first is private equity. Now, private equity may be a good place for a pension fund to put some of its money. Over time, returns have generally exceeded public markets and bonds, primarily because of the use of leverage, but I would love to understand why the Government think this would be a good thing for the country.

What private equity does is buy existing assets, then leverage them up with high levels of debt, thereby gearing up the possible returns that can be made on normal levels of growth. That reduces the corporation tax payable by the company because debt interest is tax-deductible, and the debt is often located in overseas low-tax jurisdictions. Typically, then, overheads and costs are reduced as far as they can be to make the company appear more profitable for sale after three to five years, and that often has the effect of reducing investment in the company and often leads to job reductions.

So where is the benefit to the country from this? If noble Lords do not believe me, I give them Thames Water, left underinvested and indebted by Macquarie, which took out billions in the process, or Debenhams, where the three private equity owners collected £1.2 billion of dividends financed by debt and property sales that left the company to go bust. Others we could mention would be Southern Cross Healthcare and Silentnight, where, ironically, pensioners also lost out, and we have the current anti-competitive situation with veterinary practices. Of course, this is a generalisation, and there are exceptions, but the idea that PE generates growth is doubtful at best—venture capital, development capital, growth capital, yes; PE, not so much. Why do the Government think it would be a good idea to force pension funds to invest in private equity?

Amazingly, the Bill does not actually set out that allocations must be made into UK assets. The wording is drafted so widely that the only assets globally that cannot be prescribed are assets listed on a recognised exchange; nor does it set any limits to what percentage should be allocated into the assets the Government prescribe. In theory, 100% could be allocated. The only safeguard in the Bill—contrary to the Minister’s comment that there are many safeguards—is that the Secretary of State must review the effects of any such regulation within five years of the regulations coming into force. We should note that this is not an independent review; it is a review by the Secretary of State, the very person who made the regulations. That does not fill me with huge confidence. Anyway, if things have gone wrong after five years, what can be done? Is the Secretary of State to be liable for the losses that scheme members have incurred because of the Government overriding the fiduciary duty?

We are an outlier in terms of our pension funds investing in their own country’s productive assets, especially when compared with countries such as Canada and Australia, so I understand why the Government wish to change that, but the way to achieve that is first to understand why it is not happening now. I would be interested to hear from the Minister why she thinks that is. I suspect it is down to a number of issues, including demographic issues, the attractiveness of our markets versus others, regulation, taxation—Gordon Brown’s dividend stealth tax has a lot to answer for—and, I am sure, others. The better solution, surely, is to identify and deal with the barriers that exist to make UK productive assets a more attractive investment prospect, not to take the frankly lazy and inefficient route of mandating without addressing the underlying reasons. Neither Canada nor Australia mandates. Rather, they promote domestic investment in infrastructure and projects through collaboration, not by forcing specific allocations. We should learn from those examples.

The Minister has been clear that the Government do not expect to use this mandation power. This raises a wider point of principle, one that the Minister and I have debated in other contexts in the past, which is that the Government should not give themselves powers that they do not intend to use. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, there is a tendency to use them regardless at some point, even if it is another Government who use them. This is becoming a bit of a trend, and one that I feel should be strongly resisted. There are two potential solutions to this part of the Bill. Either we need to clarify the whole fiduciary duty principle and improve safeguards, or we should remove the power altogether, and I must say that I favour the latter.

With that, I look forward to working with Members from all around the House, as ever, and the Minister on the Bill. In the meantime, I wish everyone a very happy Christmas.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have just heard, Motions C, E and F relate to amendments that I tabled on Report, and which the House very generously supported.

I will start with Motion C, which relates to Amendment 43. This would have broadened the scope of the independent review of the use of the eligibility verification notice process powers to consider the costs to the banking industry and the potential impact on vulnerable people. I regret that the Government did not feel able to accept that, and I am very grateful to those in the other place who supported the amendment so passionately, including quite a number on the Government’s own Benches.

However, I thank the Minister for the assurances she has given, especially in relation to the publication of a revised impact assessment, and her offer of the opportunity to meet with the independent reviewer once they have been appointed. I also take comfort from the point made by the Minister in the other place, repeated just now by the Minister, that the amendment the Government made on Report, which requires that the use of EVM powers be necessary and proportionate, will potentially allow the independent reviewer to consider impacts on vulnerable people if concerns arise. Therefore, while I would have preferred that my amendment be accepted, on the basis of these assurances I will not push it further.

Turning to Motion E, this Lords amendment would have made it clear that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone could not constitute reasonable suspicion, and that no action to suspend or change a benefit or utilise the extensive investigation powers that the Bill creates could be taken unless the information had first been reviewed by a suitably qualified person. This has been made even more important when we read about how HMRC has behaved recently in respect of child benefit. HMRC used incomplete travel information and stopped paying benefit solely on the basis of that information, unfairly impacting up to 23,500 people. That is a tangible example of how information used in isolation, without proper checks or review, can cause real and unfair harm. It is essential, therefore, that EVM information alone should not be used to take decisions that may have a serious impact on someone who may be entirely innocent, and that all decisions should be reviewed by a person so that we do not see something similar happening at DWP.

Although they do not accept the original amendment, the Government have tabled amendments 84A and 84B, which get us most of the way there. The authorised officer or the Secretary of State must have regard to all the information they have, including, importantly,

“information that is not EVM information”.

Some concerns have been raised in the other place and outside about what would happen if the only information the DWP had was EVM information. The Minister touched on that, but it would be helpful if she could comment a bit further when she winds up. Is there any situation where, because EVM information is the only information the department has, that could be the only basis for a decision?

Otherwise, these amendments in lieu substantially cover the concerns that were raised in this House, especially when we also take account of the Government amendments passed by this House on Report that restrict the use of the EVM process so that it may only be used to assist in identifying incorrect payments. I thank the Minister for her continuing constructive engagement in trying to meet the concerns raised by this House, and I urge noble Lords to accept Amendments 84A and 84B in lieu, and to support Motion E.

Finally, I turn to Motion F. The Bill grants a number of police powers to DWP officials, including the power to use reasonable force. The original Amendment 97 would have restricted the use of reasonable force by DWP officials to force against items and property—the example we have been given many times is breaking into a filing cabinet—rather than allowing force against people.

Again, I am grateful to the Minister for the Government amendments in lieu. These, in effect, turn the amendment around. Rather than taking the general power to use reasonable force but then restricting it to items and property, as the original amendment did, the amendments in lieu removed the general power to use reasonable force but introduce a bespoke power for DWP officials to use reasonable force only against items and property. Ultimately, that is very much the same thing.

I am pleased that the amendments in lieu retain the oversight of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, which is an important safeguard. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement on this, I urge noble Lords to accept the amendments in lieu and support Motion F.

With these amendments and the others that have been proposed, the safeguards around the use of the significant new powers that the Bill will give to the Cabinet Office and DWP have been strengthened. This is a very good example of how this House can improve legislation. I thank all noble Lords from all sides of the House who have been so supportive and constructive throughout the process, and particularly the Ministers, for their always constructive engagement throughout, which has allowed us to make real improvements to the Bill. It now achieves a better balance between achieving what is intended—to reduce fraud and error—while being fairer and better protecting vulnerable people.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her constructive approach. It has not always answered all the questions but it has gone a long way towards that. I put on record our thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for his constructive initiatives on which some of these amendments are based, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for all the informative stuff that has come from her.

I will speak first to Motion C. The Lords amendment was agreed upon by this Chamber to ensure that the impacts of this legislation on the most vulnerable in society are properly considered by the Secretary of State. While I stress that the Government have been forthcoming in offering compromise solutions, it is disappointing that they did not offer any real alternative solution. I was pleased to see the Liberal Democrat Benches in the other place push this issue to a vote and was disappointed that neither Labour nor the Conservatives supported this amendment. Disappointing as this is, I appreciate that the Government and Parliament have made their mind up on the issue and I am not going to break ranks and push a vote on it.

The Bill introduces an independent review on the use of eligibility verification powers. This Lords amendment expands the scope of the review to ensure that the costs are proportionate, to consider whether the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers in Schedule 3B has had any adverse effect on vulnerable people, and to consider the ability of benefits claimants to access banking services. As noble Lords know, we on these Benches supported the Lords amendment. The Government have, sadly, disagreed, saying that it is not appropriate to make further provision about reviews relating to eligibility verification measures. While it is disappointing that the Government have not looked to be as constructive as we would like them to be, it is clear that we are unlikely to make further progress on this than that which we have reached. On that basis, I do not intend to challenge the Commons response.

I turn to Motion E. The use of reasonable force— a point I raised a lot at earlier stages—lies at the heart of guaranteeing civil liberties for all citizens and ensuring that no innocent party is treated unfairly and without cause. The original Lords amendment would have prevented authorised officers using force against a person during entry, search and seizure. I am pleased that the amendment in lieu continues this principle, while explicitly outlining that it is only constables who are trained in the proportional use of force who will be able to use reasonable force in respect of persons. We spoke about force on filing cabinets, but it is persons we are really concerned about.

We on the Liberal Democrat Benches will therefore support the Government’s amendments in lieu, but we will continue to make sure that the powers granted in this legislation relating to the use of force are used proportionately. We will carefully scrutinise the independent review that has been promised on the exercise of the functions, including the reasonable use of force, which the Secretary of State must commission and later publish. I hope the Minister will give us some idea of when that is going to be published. Any assurance the Minister can give the House on this independent review and when it will come will be very much appreciated.

On that basis, we welcome the constructive comments that the Government have made and the points that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made in introducing these amendments. We do not intend to press further on these issues.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks. I will make a short reflection on our discussions on Report and in Committee. I speak for my noble friend Lady Finn in so doing. Despite the technical title, this is an important Bill, as the noble Baroness said. It addresses one of the most serious problems that public authorities face. Based on the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s methodology, fraud and error cost the taxpayer £55 billion to £81 billion in 2023-24. The Bill has sought to address this problem, at least in part, through the provision of extensive powers to officials in the DWP and the Cabinet Office. It is largely these that we have discussed over the past few months.

I am proud of the work that this House has done in scrutinising the Bill, identifying issues and problems, and working in the genuine spirit of collaboration to make it better, fairer and more effective. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lady Sherlock, for the way they have engaged with Members from across the House. They have listened to concerns, shown genuine willingness to make improvements and demonstrated what responsible government should look like. I firmly believe that the Bill before us is stronger and more balanced than the one first introduced to this House. There is more to be done and areas for further improvement, but we have reflected this in our amendments. The changes that have been made are indeed welcome, and we look forward to ping-pong when it comes. I am also grateful to the noble Baronesses for following up on commitments swiftly, not least for providing the now famous flow charts, which have been genuinely useful to us and, I hope, their departments.

I thank other noble Lords for their engagement with this Bill and their support of our amendments both in Committee and on Report. We have sought to address what we see to be serious shortcomings in the Bill on questions of oversight, accountability, proportionality and fairness. I am thankful to noble Lords who supported us in the Divisions that we called. The amendments we have passed in this place advocate for greater oversight, clearer lines of accountability and a PSFA that can actively pursue fraud. I believe that these are important changes that make the Bill more effective and fairer.

I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their support of our amendments, and I certainly do not forget the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I thank them for their support on some of our proposals. I look forward with interest to seeing how the arrangement with the PSFA, the DWP and the banks evolves and becomes effective. We accept that it is test and learn. It is vital that the legislation to seal the agreement becomes effective in combating fraud.

Finally, I thank the officials who have worked so hard from the government side to enable this process to happen. I know from my time as a Minister that we rely on our officials for a great deal; indeed, it is often to them who we turn for advice and support. I also know that their work is often not credited because they are not visible in the way that we are during debates. I therefore thank officials from the DWP, the Cabinet Office, the PSFA and the Ministers’ private offices who have worked hard to support them and, indirectly, all of us in the discussions we have had on the Bill. Noble Lords from across the House should recognise them and their work. I pay particular tribute to and thank my assistant, Oliver Bramley, for his sterling work during this period.

I urge the Government to meet this House on the amendments that it has added to the Bill, given the extensive discussions and strong cross-party support that they command from across the House. The Bill that we return to the Commons is a better one and I urge the Government to use this opportunity to make these changes permanent.

Finally, we all leave the Bill with certain expressions ringing in our ears, such as “test and learn”, which I alluded to earlier, but particularly the tongue-twister “eligibility verification measure”. I think I can just still say that.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill is important, creating a wide range of powers for the Cabinet Office and DWP to deal with fraud and error. Until recently, it received very little attention in this House, being in Grand Committee. A small group of noble Lords have worked on it as it has gone through the stages in this House and it has been a great pleasure to work with all of them, across all parties.

I want to repeat what I said before: first, that the Bill as introduced was a much better Bill than its previous incarnation under the last Government. I am extremely grateful to both Ministers for that; they listened and acted on the concerns raised at that time and reflected many of them in the Bill as it was tabled originally. The same is true of the opposition team; I think they also heard those concerns, and it has been a pleasure that they have been so supportive of many of the changes made to strengthen the safeguards around the powers.

Equally, the engagement from the Ministers and their officials has been exemplary throughout the passage of the Bill. It has been a very good example of how this House works best and I am very grateful to all of them. They have been not only extremely generous with their time but very constructive in their engagement. Documents, such as the draft code of practice, have been published in good time, which I think most noble Lords would agree is not always the case. The detailed document that showed how the Bill would work alongside other legislation was a lot of work for somebody but incredibly helpful in enabling all of us to understand this better. As the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, just said, special mention is merited for whoever produced the famous flowcharts.

I am also grateful to all those who supported me in my efforts to strengthen the safeguards around these new powers, in particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and others. Having said that, we were not able to find agreement on everything, as we saw on Tuesday. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, that I remain keen to see whether we can find a constructive solution to those remaining issues that would work for us all. I stand ready to work with her and her team to that end before we get into ping-pong. I am not trying to thwart the intent of the Bill and have tried throughout to reflect as closely as possible what the Government say they really need. I really hope that we can find something mutually agreeable during the next stages.

[The Lord Bishop of Leicester]

My Lords, I support this Bill and add my thanks to all those who have engaged so thoroughly in its detail. It has been an important learning experience for me in the processes of your Lordships’ House, an experience that I hope I can bring to bear on other business in this place.

In addition, I want to speak briefly to the amendments brought forward on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, myself and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. Unfortunately, neither the noble Lord nor the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, are in their place today; they have asked me to speak on their behalf. We did not push our amendment to a Division because of the assurances given to us by the Minister, and I thank her for those assurances given on Report with regard to overpayment, in particular the commitments to review communications with those with debts and to explore ways of improving the clarity and timing of those communications. Therefore, is the Minister prepared to either write to the whole House or commit to giving a Written Statement to Parliament, setting out the outcome of this review in due course?

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. The amendments concern the crucial questions of ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the extensive investigatory and enforcement powers granted under the Bill. The Bill sets out to create a powerful investigatory body with wide authority, but the lines of accountability are unclear.

The first of my amendments roots the exercise of the powers provided for in this part of the Bill firmly within the framework of the Act itself. It makes it clear that investigatory and enforcement powers under Clauses 3, 7, 17 and 38—covering information notices, entry and seizure powers, direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders—may not be exercised except as expressly provided for in this clause. This is a vital safeguard. It ensures that these powers cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes beyond those envisaged by Parliament. In essence, it ties the use of such powers to the functions and objectives clearly defined elsewhere in the Bill, preventing mission creep, ensuring accountability and anchoring their use in clear statutory purpose.

The second amendment, which is closely related, builds on that principle of restraint by setting out a clear system of authorisation, accountability and record-keeping. It would require that the most serious powers—those involving access to personal financial information, entry and search of premises, or the recovery of large sums of money—can be exercised only with explicit ministerial approval. This is not just bureaucracy; it is responsibility. It makes Ministers answerable for the exercise of powers in their name.

Other powers of a lesser nature would require sign-off at senior Civil Service level or above, ensuring that every exercise of authority is subject to appropriate scrutiny and senior oversight. In addition, the PSFA would be required to maintain a register recording each use of these powers—the date and nature of the action, the official or Minister who authorised it, and the justification for doing so. That register would then be laid before Parliament annually.

If we are to give such considerable powers to civil servants acting on behalf of Ministers, we must be absolutely certain that there are clear lines of responsibility and clear records of decision-making. Without those, we risk creating a dangerous vacuum of accountability. Let us be clear: the significant new powers which the Bill grants to officials are not to be taken lightly. They go to the heart of personal privacy, financial autonomy and, potentially, due process.

Under this amendment, certain especially intrusive powers, such as requiring the disclosure of personal financial records, applying for search and seizure warrants or imposing deduction orders of over £10,000, would require explicit approval from a Minister of the Crown. This would ensure that decisions with the potential to impact individuals’ lives in a profound way are not taken in isolation by junior officials, because if something goes wrong or those powers are misused or abused, it will not be the officials who are hauled before Select Committees or public inquiries—it is the Minister for the Cabinet Office who will be called upon to account for actions taken in his or her name, of which they may have had absolutely no knowledge. It is therefore vital that the Minister is satisfied that the action is justified and is willing to stand behind that decision if challenged. This line of accountability is crucial for proper oversight; it also protects the Minister.

We have seen through painful and enduring examples such as the Horizon scandal what happens when the chain of accountability between operational decision-makers and Ministers is allowed to break down. Victims are left without recourse, officials retreat into anonymity and Ministers are left to apologise for decisions they did not make and could not have prevented. We should learn from that experience. We should ensure that the exercise of coercive state powers, particularly powers as sensitive as these, is traceable, reviewable and ultimately answerable to Parliament.

These amendments were well received and supported by noble Lords across the House in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name, and other noble Lords who supported these proposals. These amendments protect the Minister, the department and individuals who may be subject to these powers. They ensure that no power is used without proper authorisation, that every use is recorded, and that Parliament can see each year how these powers have been exercised and by whom. We support the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud and error in the public sector, but we must always remember that power without responsibility breeds mistrust. This is not an abstract constitutional point. It is a matter of basic fairness, good governance and trust in public administration.

For those reasons, this amendment is of vital importance. It provides the clear lines of authority and accountability that must underpin any responsible use of the significant powers in the Bill. The Government may say that safeguards already exist, but those safeguards are internal, opaque and unenforceable by Parliament. We are proposing a statutory framework for oversight that gives Ministers clarity, Parliament visibility and the public reassurance that power is being exercised carefully, lawfully and transparently. This amendment is not about obstructing the Government’s aims; it is about protecting them and protecting the integrity of the system we are building. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill creates a wide range of unprecedented and intrusive powers for both the Cabinet Office and the DWP. Throughout the course of the Bill—and in its previous incarnation under the last Government—my focus has been on trying to ensure that these powers are restricted to what is actually required for the purposes of dealing with fraud against the public sector and that there are appropriate and strong safeguards against overreach and overuse of these powers.

I recognise and acknowledge that the Government have introduced a lot of safeguards into the Bill compared to those we had when we were discussing similar measures under the aborted Data Protection and Digital Information Bill last year. This is a much better Bill, but it still introduces a wide range of new powers, and, while better, there are still areas where the safeguards should be improved. In particular, when creating powers of this nature, it is important that the safeguards should be in the Bill and not left to codes of practice or internal departmental rules, both of which can be changed without scrutiny. We will come back to that theme several times later today.

These two amendments cover the police powers that the Bill would give to the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. I have serious doubts as to whether it is genuinely necessary to give search, entry and seizure police powers to civil servants anyway, but if we are to do so, it is essential that there are very robust safeguards around their use.

--- Later in debate ---

I look to the Minister to provide reassurance by committing to greater transparency over exactly what the eligibility indicators would require the banks to identify through the use of algorithms. These are modest proposals and, despite assurances, I do not think that I have as yet been reassured.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group relates to the measures in the Bill which would give the DWP the ability to require banks and other financial institutions to trawl all accounts that they hold to identify and provide information on accounts that have received certain benefits and which meet certain criteria as defined by DWP, all without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This is done by means of an eligibility verification notice, which can require periodic reporting—the noble Baroness did not mention this when she described it. For example, it could be daily, although there has been no clarity from the department or the Minister yet as to the periods that are intended. I should reiterate at this point: this is a much better Bill, and the safeguards are much greater than the last time we saw these clauses, but there is more to go.

I would like to make one other little correction to the noble Baroness on her example of universal credit. Her example was that the eligibility criterion that would be provided by DWP to the banks would be £16,000, because that is the limit. In fact, it could be a much lower number, because under the Bill:

“The eligibility indicators may be criteria to be met by a single account or by”


a number of “accounts combined”. For the universal credit example it might be £10,000 or £8,000, or something of that nature. In that situation, it is even more likely that eligibility indicators would be flagged for innocent people, but that is just a wrinkle within the Bill.

I think many of us are nervous about the introduction of what is effectively the suspicionless trawling of benefit recipients’ accounts, even with the safeguards that are there. However, I understand and have an awful lot of sympathy for the need to reduce fraud and error, and the need for the department to have the tools to do that. Amendment 45A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others, would—as I think we are about to hear—remove the provision altogether. My approach in this group and the next has been to seek to strengthen the safeguards that surround the use of the powers rather than to remove them altogether.

To that end, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 49, which the noble Baroness has already alluded to. I am grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support. It is very simple: it requires that the Secretary of State may issue an eligibility verification notice only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so for the purposes set out in the Bill. It was quite surprising that this basic safeguard was not already in the Bill, because the same wording already appears in relation to all the other powers it creates. I had assumed that this was a drafting error or oversight, as I cannot imagine any reason why it should not be there in relation to these powers.

I am very pleased to say that, since I tabled Amendment 49, the Minister has tabled Amendment 48, which she has mentioned. That amendment does much the same thing, although it does not restrict the necessity and proportionality to the purposes of the Bill. That is regrettable, but I can live with the Minister’s version and I am grateful to her for doing this following the constructive discussions we have had on a range of issues throughout the process, for which we are very grateful.

The Minister’s other amendments also introduce small but useful tweaks to the safeguards, although I am not sure I would go as far as she does on their effect. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement, I will not move Amendment 49, but I should be clear that I do not believe that Amendment 48 and the others she has tabled remove the need for the changes we will discuss in the next group. We will have those discussions then, and I will obviously reflect on what she has said in the meantime.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has amendments in this and other groups, several of which I have signed, to try to ameliorate or provide safeguards for some of the most intrusive elements of the current draft of the Bill. I also have great sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, around the issue of transparency, which is very evidently absent from most of the Bill. I will support those individuals if they press their amendments.

My Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A, in contrast to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are not nuanced. They would simply remove Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3, in effect eliminating the requirement for banks to look into claimants’ bank accounts. They would destroy the principle that the Bill establishes: that a group of people, defined by the common characteristic that they are in receipt of benefits, should have a more limited right to privacy and data protection than the rest of the community.

I am also very concerned when banks become investigative agents of the state. I regard these as lines we simply should not cross. I know that the Minister does not share that view and is very content that those in receipt of benefits should be under a level of surveillance that is considered inappropriate for the rest of the community. To her credit, she has limited some of the most abusive features of the Bill that we received from the Commons, but she still asserts the underlying principle.

I also realise that this is very much a paving Bill for the intrusions that will follow the introduction of the digital ID. That scheme provides the tools that enable the state to carve out for surveillance any variety of groups of people whom it deems unworthy of sharing the general rights accorded under the law. I have tabled what are killer amendments, in effect, because the public need to know what exactly is at stake and what line has been crossed. I will not press my amendments, but I am also determined that the issues will not be quietly tidied away.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

52: Schedule 3, page 80, line 26, at end insert—
“Reasonable suspicion and appropriate review of EVM information
5A (1) The existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion for the purpose of section 109BZB (1)(a) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.(2) Before taking any action to amend or suspend any benefit payments, or exercising the powers in Clause 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, the EVM information must first have been reviewed by a person with appropriate seniority and experience authorised by the Secretary of State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to clarify explicitly that the existence of an Eligibility Indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and that before taking action to amend a benefit or undertake intrusive investigations, the information must have been reviewed by a suitable person.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, during the debate on the previous group, I mentioned that the two amendments in this group are designed to strengthen the safeguards around the use of the eligibility verification powers that are created by the Bill. I am once again grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support.

Amendment 52 deals with how the bank account data that is provided by the banks may be used. The Bill requires banks to carry out a trawl of all accounts they hold to identify any that are in receipt of specified benefits and then to test those against criteria that will be provided by the DWP. If they meet those criteria, this raises a flag called an “eligibility indicator”, details of which must be provided to the DWP, along with certain other limited information, in a format to be decided by the DWP. The trawl can be required on a periodic basis. It could be, for example, daily—we do not yet know. No suspicion is required; this is simply a trawling operation of all bank accounts.

This raises two important issues. First, the existence of an eligibility indicator will presumably trigger action by the DWP. At the moment, there is nothing in the Bill that decides what that action could be. Clause 73 creates a range of very intrusive investigatory powers to investigate if an authorised officer of the DWP has reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. Reasonable grounds for suspicion are not defined. Could the mere existence of an eligibility indicator constitute such grounds? There is nothing in the Bill to say that it cannot. I do not think that the amendments that were referred to in the last group by the Minister and which say the eligibility indicator can be used only to assist in identifying fraud or error solve this issue.

Secondly, and similarly, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent action being taken to suspend or alter a benefit payment in the event that an eligibility indicator is flagged. As we have heard, there are many innocent reasons why an eligibility indicator may exist. Indeed, as I have said, the eligibility indicator can be set at a level which would not indicate fraud at all—for example, £8,000 for a universal credit situation. The existence of an eligibility indicator does not indicate any guilt.

The Minister has told us the department will not treat an eligibility indicator as reasonable grounds for suspicion, but there is nothing in the Bill to define that. The draft code of practice that we have been provided with says that a benefit cannot be altered just because of the existence of an eligibility indicator, but that is only a code, which can be changed at will by this or any future Government without scrutiny. Furthermore, it is not known how much data will be sent to the DWP by the banks under the EVM process but, presumably, it is going to be substantial. It is clear that it will be processed electronically, and there is nothing in the Bill to prevent this process from becoming fully automated, including the decision-making. The DWP has made it publicly very clear that it is rolling out AI processes generally, which may be more efficient, but, in my view, any decisions need to be subject to human review.

In Committee, we heard about the Netherlands child benefits scandal, which was caused by automated decision-making—and interestingly, it eventually led to a Government falling. The Minister has been clear, and the draft code is also fairly clear, that the information will be reviewed by a person before any action, such as an amendment to or suspension of benefits, can be taken. But it is only in the code, and this could be changed without scrutiny.

I think that all of us in this Chamber trust the Minister completely, but she will not always be the Minister, however much we might wish that were the case. Indeed, it is even possible that this Government will not always be the Government. But this law will remain the law. A future Government may be less scrupulous about how benefit recipients are treated. The Bill, left unamended, would open the possibility that eligibility indicators, regardless of innocence, could lead to deeply intrusive actions or unfair financial impacts, potentially on a fully automated basis.

All Amendment 52 does is to make it clear that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and it would make it a requirement that a suitably experienced person must have reviewed the information before any action to use intrusive powers against a benefit recipient or to amend or suspend payments is taken. I believe that is what the Government intend, so I really do not understand why there is a problem with accepting the amendment. It does not add any onerous obligations; it simply clarifies the situation that we are being told is the case.

Amendment 67 considers the impact and potential unintended consequences of these powers. The Government have included an independent review process in the use of the eligibility verification powers, which is a very welcome and important safeguard and a genuinely excellent addition since we last saw the Bill. But as it stands, the scope of that review is very limited. It covers only that the exercise of the powers has been in accordance with the Bill and the code of practice, that the persons who have been issued with eligibility notices have complied, and that it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. The independent reviewer cannot look at any other impacts the policy might have.

In Committee, we spent a lot of time debating the costs that the Bill will impose on the banks, but no meaningful attempt has been made to quantify those yet. To quote from the impact assessment:

“At this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation because the operational solution for the measure is still being developed”.


We really need to make sure that the costs are proportional. All that Amendment 67 adds is a review of the costs of the policy to the scope of the independent review to ensure they are reasonable and proportional to the benefits.

We heard a lot about the fears of the impacts these new powers might have on disabled people and other vulnerable people, as well as the concern that imposing these onerous duties on the banks might reduce the willingness of the banks to provide banking services to those in receipt of benefits. As politically exposed persons, this is a subject that most of us here have personal experience of. We have seen how the banks behave when additional burdens are put on them in respect of a particular group of people. There is no reason to believe that that could not be the same in this situation. But the Bill includes nothing at all in relation to potential unintended consequences. Amendment 67 adds consideration of those potential unintended consequences to the scope of the independent review.

Finally, the amendment gives the independent reviewer the opportunity to confirm that they have received all the information that they require. This is now a bit of a formality, following the welcome government amendment that we debated last week, which changed “may provide information” to become “must”, but it was subject to a reasonably required caveat. There is still a possibility of disagreement between the reviewer and the department as to what information they might reasonably require. This just allows the reviewer to flag that they have not got what they think they need, which I think is a useful but not onerous safeguard.

These proposed eligibility verification powers are extremely intrusive, so they really must be subject to robust safeguards, which these two relatively simple amendments seek to strengthen. Unless I hear something unexpected from the Minister—and I shall listen to her very carefully—I am minded to seek the opinion of the House when the time comes. I beg to move.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, there are moments when you hear a speech on a subject of which you are in general support that brings home very clearly the key issues; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, produced that speech just now.

It is extremely dangerous for us to put ourselves in the hands of AI. It is particularly dangerous to put those who are vulnerable into the hands of AI. Indeed, I find it offensive when people who are able to appreciate things particularly well think it all right for others to be subject to automatic operations. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—the Government recognise this matter, which is why it is in the advice, though why is it not in the Bill?—is a very important issue for this House.

I do not think it acceptable to have circumstances increased where vulnerable people are subject to “the system”, which is why I want to say just a word about it. It seems to me that one reason why democracy is so much under threat is because so many people feel themselves to be under threat by the system. The system is an alien thing. Well, if you do not want it to be alien, you have to make sure that it is at least human and not merely a machine.

There is another reason; it is one that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, gave delicately and politely but effectively. There are some pretty nasty people in this country who are, at the moment, blaming most things on groups of people whom they dislike, whether it is because of their race, because of their position or, in a sense, because they think that they just do not matter. It is always possible that such people get into power. I do not want those people to have a chance to use legislation that we—we are decent people, I hope—have passed. That is why I have come to speak on this particular amendment: in these months and years, we have to stand up on every occasion and recognise the damage that is done in a system where people like that get power. You have only to look across the Atlantic to see what happens when those who build up antagonism against groups get power and use legislation that was meant to be different in order to ensure the ends that they have in mind.

I beg the Minister to recognise that all we want is the guidance in the law. If we have that, she need not worry. I say that as somebody who has a history, as a Minister of some 16 years, of always being very tough on fraud and always believing that people should not get what they do not deserve, do not need and should not have, because that is very damaging to those who do need it. That is why I do not like it: it puts them in so difficult a position. I beg her simply to make sure that, when we do not have Ministers of the standing and quality that she has shown, they cannot use the law for improper purposes.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, it is in the Bill. The requirement for reasonable suspicion for exercising powers under Clause 109BZB is set out in that clause. The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not necessarily mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences. It does not even necessarily mean that a benefit has been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3B on eligibility verification makes clear that eligibility indicators only indicate that a benefit

“may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid”.

The eligibility indicators in an eligibility verification notice must be criteria which indicate that the specified relevant benefit may have been or may be incorrectly paid.

The legislation therefore clearly reflects that EVM information will have to be considered alongside all other relevant information before further steps are taken. As I have said, DWP is required to consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. This is about not just this but about existing legislation and powers. I hope that my position on that is clear and that the government amendments in the previous group have helped to make it clearer.

Amendment 52 also requires that the information be reviewed by an appropriately senior person. We do not know exactly what the definition is of a senior person. However, it is an established legal principle that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that officials are suitably trained and experienced to take decisions on their behalf. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press it.

Amendment 67 would add three additional requirements to the role that the EVM independent reviewer will be required to undertake. Government Amendments 68 and 69, spoken to in an early group by my noble friend Lady Anderson, addressed paragraph (f) of that requirement by requiring the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent reviewer where it is “reasonably required”. In case there are any concerns about that, we foresee a close working relationship between DWP and the independent EVM reviewer, where DWP gives the reviewer the information that it needs.

However, the government amendment makes it even clearer that we are committed to providing necessary information. If necessary, DWP could ask the reviewer to demonstrate why a certain piece of information is necessary for the purposes of their review, by reference to the scope of the review and the matter that it has to cover, as set out in legislation. If the independent reviewer then demonstrates that the information is necessary for them to carry out their review, the legislation is clear that DWP must provide it.

On paragraph (d) of this amendment regarding costs incurred by business, this is a matter the Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping costs associated with this measure proportionate and to a minimum. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is well aware, over the passage of the Bill we have worked very closely with UK Finance to improve the Bill and our draft codes of practice. At a recent meeting with Ministers, UK Finance welcomed this extensive engagement, which it feels has significantly strengthened the Bill. It indicated that it was not calling for further legislative change.

Crucially, I do not regard this amendment as necessary because the independent reviewer must already assess the measure’s effectiveness. Financial institutions receiving an EVN have the right to appeal a notice that is unduly onerous. We have committed to provide a further impact assessment 12 months after Royal Assent.

Paragraph (e) of the amendment would require the independent reviewer to include within their annual report any adverse effect that the EVN may have on vulnerable persons’ or benefit claimants’ access to banking services. I assure the noble Lord and the House that protecting DWP customers, especially those who are vulnerable, is very much a priority for this Government. However, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.

First, there is no reason for individuals to lose access to banking services solely because of information shared under EVM. We have been clear that information does not imply any wrongdoing. The Bill makes provision to exempt financial institutions from returning suspicious activity reports in certain circumstances if the information that they have is only the result of an EVM match. We are working with the FCA to prevent any unintended consequences. Secondly, as I have indicated, this measure simply provides a source of data that feeds into the long-standing processes in DWP, where layers of support and specialist staff already exist to ensure that those who are vulnerable or have complex needs get the right support. Thirdly, this measure will help our customers, including those who are vulnerable. It will help us to spot genuine errors in claims early, help us to take steps to correct these and prevent large overpayments and debts building up that are recoverable.

I hope that the arguments which I have put out there have been enough to persuade the House on why we should move ahead. I beg the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his generous words, and the Minister for her fulsome response. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about allowing people to get away with fraud, I want to make it really clear that I do not want people to get away with fraud. I am as keen as anyone to make sure that fraud and error are reduced. Please do not take away from this that I am soft on fraud. I hope my track record on fraud is well known within this House.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

67: Clause 76, page 44, line 32, at end insert—
“(d) the costs incurred by the Secretary of State and by those who have received eligibility verification notices have been reasonable and proportionate,(e) the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers under Schedule 3B has had any adverse affect on vulnerable people or on the ability of benefit claimants to access banking services, and(f) the independent person has been provided such information as they consider necessary to carry out the review.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to expand the scope of the independent review of the use of the eligibility verification powers to ensure that the costs are proportionate and any unintended adverse consequences are identified.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness had to say on Amendment 67. All it would do is add scope to the independent reviewer to cover the costs of this policy, to make sure that they are reasonable and proportionate and that any unintended consequences are identified.

I will make just a couple of points. The noble Baroness mentioned UK Finance. I acknowledge that she and the department have had a lot of constructive discussions with UK Finance during this process, and that it is broadly happy with the Bill. However, it is not at all sure what the costs are, because we still do not know exactly what it is being asked to do. So UK Finance supports including a review of the costs in the Bill.

The debanking point is not to do with an eligibility indicator causing someone to be debanked; it is because the Bill creates onerous obligations that relate to benefit providers. As I have said before, as we know as PEPs ourselves, where banks have to follow onerous rules or suffer onerous provisions, there is a risk that they decide not to provide services to people related to those onerous activities. We have seen that with the PEP situation; I know myself that it has been very difficult. This point is slightly different from the one the noble Baroness described, but it is important that the costs be reviewed to make sure they are proportionate and reasonable and that any unintended consequences are identified by the independent reviewer. So I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

75: Clause 77, page 46, leave out line 6
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the ability for DWP authorised investigators in England and Wales to use reasonable force when exercising their powers of entry, search or seizure under PACE 1984. If reasonable force is needed, it remains a matter for the police.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise: noble Lords are going to get fed up with hearing me, but this is the last of it. Amendments 75 to 77 relate to the new police powers that the Bill confers on DWP staff. Once again, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support on this. I am also very grateful to the organisation Justice for its help and briefings on this matter.

Chapter 2 of Part 2 creates powers of search, entry and seizure by authorised DWP staff, effectively giving civil servants the same powers as police officers. This is similar to the powers conferred on the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority that we have debated previously, but with one very important difference: unlike the PSFA powers, these DWP powers would allow DWP-authorised officers to use reasonable force against benefit claimants when exercising their new entry, search and seizure powers. This would make it lawful for a DWP officer—not a police officer, but a civil servant—to enter your home, seize your belongings and forcibly hold you down while doing so. Let us be clear: this power of force is being sought to be used against benefit recipients, a section of the population, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that is recognised to be more vulnerable and to live with disabilities at a higher rate than the population at large.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help but I will try to manage for now. To open a filing cabinet or to open a device without the consent of the owner requires using reasonable force. I fully accept that he does not think that the DWP should have any of those powers. I hope he will bear with me and allow me to move through the arguments to make a case as to why I think it is necessary. If I cannot persuade him then I accept that, and he will go into the other Division Lobby, but I hope he will allow me to explain why I think this is necessary and proportionate.

One of the risks of the approach that has been taken to try to limit the use of reasonable force as set out by PACE is that it could have the unintended consequence of removing an authorised investigator’s common-law right to self-defence—for example, if they were physically threatened during a search and seizure activity. Clearly, the safety of our authorised investigators is paramount and they, like anyone else, must have the right to defend themselves if threatened. We will of course take a number of steps to ensure staff members’ safety. That includes conducting risk assessments on application for the warrant and during the search and seizure activity itself, and equipping staff with critical safety equipment and protective clothing.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about training. All DWP-authorised investigators will be required to complete training to the equivalent standard of the police before they can use these PACE powers. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that money will be made available to pay for that. We will not expect people to use these powers if they have not had appropriate training. That was a good question and I am pleased to answer it. In addition, DWP criminal investigators undertake investigative training as part of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. All staff must have training to industry standards before they can be considered even for authorised investigator status. That will ensure that staff are benchmarked to the same standard.

The DWP will not have the power of arrest. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that the previous Government’s fraud plan, including the version put out in 2024, when he was standing where I am, proposed not only the powers we have here but that DWP staff should have the powers of arrest. We decided that was not appropriate but, as I have said, we do think that the power to have reasonable force against property is reasonable. We have taken what I think is a proportionate view. In the situation described, where the DWP arrives at premises but the police are not there and its staff find their entry is obstructed, the policy will be that they should remove themselves from any potential danger and request police presence.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also mentioned oversight. We will be commissioning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to inspect the use and effectiveness of these powers in England and Wales and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland to do so there. These inspections can focus on any part of the end-to-end criminal investigation and their reports will be published by the Secretary of State. In addition, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will be responsible for reviewing any serious incidents or complaints in relation to these powers in England and Wales, with the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner responsible in Scotland.

While I am here, two other questions were asked on the IOPC. In one, I think the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the IOPC regs were a Henry VIII power. I am advised that they are not, because they do not seek to amend or repeal primary legislation. The proposed amendments to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act are contained in the Bill itself. On the question of funding, the DWP has secured the necessary agreements with the IOPC and will continue to work closely and in partnership with it to ensure that its needs are considered, including financial arrangements. The regulations will make provision as to payment for this service and permit the lawful disclosure of sensitive files and information relating to the exercise of the functions and powers. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.

On the other questions that have been mentioned, just to be clear, the drafting in Schedule 4 for Scotland is intended to clarify that force cannot be used to compel individuals to provide information when required to do so by a court protection order. This mirrors PACE as it applies in England and Wales. On the exercise of reasonable force when executing search warrants, the provisions in the Bill both in Scotland and in England and Wales are comparable. I hope that reassures noble Lords who think that we think that people in Scotland are less dangerous than people in England and Wales. I can assure them that is not the case.

Noble Lords asked about the difference between the PSFA and the DWP. Primarily, this is a matter of scale. A tailored approach has been adopted by the DWP and the PSFA. The PSFA is likely to do a smaller number of investigations; the scale at which the DWP operates would be a very different use of police resource than it would be in the case of the PSFA. Therefore, we think it is appropriate.

Finally, I think somebody—I am sorry, I have forgotten which noble Lord this was—asked whether we would use this provision against vulnerable people, benefit claimants being vulnerable. Again, another form of reassurance is that the law requires any warrant application to include information about any vulnerable individuals who may be present on the premises. As a result, the DWP has to conduct risk assessments before even applying to the court.

I understand the comments that have been made. I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that our proposals are proportionate. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for giving us the benefit of his real-life experience on this and the very powerful example of how this can go wrong.

I confess that I am not persuaded of the need for DWP officers to have the ability to use reasonable force and I am tempted to go down the route the noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggests of removing it altogether. However, I want to be constructive. I do not want to ruin the Bill, so I think I can live with a situation where the Bill tries to mirror what the Minister has said the powers will be used for and limit it to that. If she thinks there are unintended consequences from that, those can be fixed at a later stage, at Third Reading. I make the point now that it is outrageous that Third Reading is in less than two days’ time from now, on Thursday. That is not the way we do things in this House. It does not give us time to sit down and try to work things out. I put it on record that it is just wrong.

I was slightly confused by one thing the Minister said. She described a situation where the police are there throughout as a waste of police time, when they could be off dealing with real crime, but just the sentence before she told us that this will be used only in cases of sophisticated high-value fraud. Is that not real crime? I confess that I am a bit confused by that.

Anyway, nothing I have heard has changed my view about the ability to use reasonable force against people being appropriate for DWP officials, particularly if the police are likely to be there all along anyway. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75, but I will, when the time comes, test the opinion of the House on Amendment 76.

Amendment 75 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

76: Schedule 4, page 94, line 11, at end insert—
“(4A) Section 117 (reasonable use of force) is to be read as if at the end there were inserted—“(2) Authorised investigators exercising powers under section 109D may only use reasonable force, if necessary, against items and property, not against persons.(3) Nothing in subsection (2) restricts the power of a police constable to use reasonable force, if necessary, when exercising powers under section 109D Social Security Administration Act 1992.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prohibit DWP authorised officers from using force against people during the exercise of their entry, search and seizure powers, reflecting the policy intention in the Explanatory notes to the Bill. It preserves their power to use force against things – such as locked filing cabinets – and preserves police use of force, if necessary, under a DWP warrant.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I beg to move.

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I turn to Amendment 88, which would require the independent reviewer not only to assess how the powers under this Bill are being exercised but to report explicitly on expenditure and recovery, and to provide Parliament with a cost-benefit assessment of the operation of the Act. These measures are not intended to frustrate the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud; we have reflected this in giving the Government five years to get set up and running before an initial report is required. Amendment 88 strengthens that ambition by ensuring that it can be demonstrated beyond doubt that the policies are working. This is paramount to any democracy, and I hope that the Minister recognises the importance of this in her response. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I rise very briefly to support these three amendments, particularly Amendment 87, which relates to whether the independent reviewer “may” or “must” be given information. I thought we had that debate some time ago. The Minister tabled amendments for other parts of the Bill which reflected that, saying that they “must” be given information they reasonably require. I was not terribly happy with “reasonably require”; none the less, it seems very odd that this one is different and remains a “may”. My first reaction was that this must be an oversight, but apparently it may not be. I would love to understand why this is different for this clause, but not for the rest of it.

Amendment 86 is also important because, while the Bill creates the independent review process, it does not include when and over what period—that is to be added later, which somewhat undermines the independent review. It is rather unusual; I do not think I have ever seen a Bill which does not establish, on the face of it, when a review must be, or at least the latest time it can be issued. I really think it ought to. With that, I support these amendments.

Jobs Market

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, given the levels of inactivity due to health over which the noble Viscount’s Government presided, that is a brave question, but let me answer it none the less. This Government are not simply waiting for the review. The Timms review is looking specifically at PIP which, as the noble Viscount knows, is a benefit that applies in and out of work. As I have told the House before, this Government have looked carefully at three things. One is what happens to people who are on benefits. This House backed the Government in making the difficult choice to change the incentives so that for new people coming in, we would reduce by about half the extra amount of money you get on universal credit. The second is to invest up to £1 billion over the scorecard in making sure we give people the support they need. People out there want to get jobs, and we have to help them. Finally, we have invited Charlie Mayfield to produce a report looking at employers. Every time someone loses a job, it can be an £8,000 loss to the employer from lost productivity. We are investing in all three of those things.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Baker of Dorking (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

We will hear from the Cross Benches next.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The Minister quite rightly mentioned young people and the importance of opportunities for them, but there seems to be increasing evidence that entry-level opportunities are reducing and that it is becoming more difficult for young people to take that all-important first step into work. So can the Minister explain why the Government are still insisting on pushing through a change to employment law that their own impact assessment says will actually make it harder for young people to find a job?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are making a significant investment in young people. I assume the noble Lord is referring to employer national insurance.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Day one unfair dismissal rights.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

We have to have a level playing field in employment rights. We are investing in supporting young people with a youth guarantee. For young people who are intensively looking for work, there should be no fourth alternative to education, training or a job. To put our money where our mouth is, we have announced that we will give young people who have spent 18 months looking for a job on universal credit a guaranteed job. Young people should be out there either earning or learning; we will make sure they can.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too rise very briefly. A number of us have raised this scandal throughout Committee and the Minister has rightly said, “Well, there’s an independent review, I really can’t comment until we get the findings”. I say, “If we can’t comment until we get the findings of the independent review, the Government shouldn’t be taking money from the carers. That would seem obvious to me. Let’s wait until we’ve got the findings of the independent review”.

However, this speaks to the moral dilemma that was very well articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. It is something that has been troubling many of us throughout Committee: the Bill fails to distinguish between the ways people are treated for error and for fraud. Through no fault of their own, they end up in some instances being criminalised and certainly subject to some quite severe powers. That has always felt morally unjustifiable.

Another point this raises is that, although we constantly say that the moral case for this is that the money must be reclaimed, many instances of error seem to be due to errors made by the DWP, yet there is never any clarity about how, morally, it might be asked to pay. I am not suggesting that it pays financially, but if we are saying that those who make an error must pay, I do not understand why the DWP has not, as part of the Bill, made it clear which errors made by the department or state bodies the public will be able to hold them to account for when they are made. The scandal of the carers has cut through with the public: people know about it and are discussing it, and they in no way think that these people are welfare scroungers, frauds or doing anything wrong. So I urge the Government in this instance to be very clear that they will not act, as this amendment rightly argues, at least until the inquiry has brought its conclusions into the public arena.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope to be even more brief. I have sympathy for this amendment, but it is backward-looking, as it relates to situations that have already happened. We also need to stop them happening in the future. These problems have arisen because of a very badly designed benefit. It has a cliff-edge threshold. Cliff-edge thresholds will always be the ones that cause problems, so I really hope that we learn the lessons from this situation and stop applying cliff-edge thresholds to benefits. It does not work and is almost guaranteed to create problems of this nature.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments are well intentioned—an expression I believe I used in the last group, but I mean it. I want to acknowledge from the outset that they speak to a principle that I believe we can all support: the importance of integrating independent expert advice into the policy and operational decisions that we take, especially in areas where there have been clear signs that something has gone wrong.

The ongoing concerns around carer’s allowance overpayments are a case in point. The issue has rightly attracted attention, both inside and outside the House, in particular last year, and I believe that the decision to commission an independent review is right. Where there are systemic weaknesses, whether in communication, process or oversight, they must be identified and addressed, and we should absolutely be willing to listen to expert recommendations to improve how the DWP operates in the future.

I want to recognise the principle behind these amendments: it would be wrong to ignore serious and credible concerns raised by carers, campaigners and the public. They deserve answers and a process that ensures that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. That is why the review matters, and I hope we will all welcome it when it reports. I add to the questions raised earlier about the timing and when it will come.

However, that brings me to the core of my hesitation with these amendments. Although they stem from an entirely legitimate concern, I fear that they may go too far in how they propose to respond to it. Amendment 124, as laid out eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, would delay all recovery of carer’s allowance overpayments until the independent review had concluded and, crucially, all its recommendations had been implemented. Amendment 127 goes even further, effectively delaying the entire Act until those recommendations have been acted on.

I am not sure that this is a workable or proportionate course of action. We must remember that the review currently under way is, as I understand it, largely focused—this is an important point—on prevention. It asks how overpayments were allowed to happen in the first place, what lessons can be drawn and how the department can ensure that this does not recur. That is vital, but it is a forward-looking exercise: it is about improving systems going forward, not about deciding whether an overpayment that has already been identified should be recovered. The Minister might want to comment on my assessment of the review.

To put it plainly, if an overpayment has been made and the department has established this through due process, that money is owed to the public purse. The review likely will not and should not change that fundamental fact. We should not conflate the need to prevent future errors with the obligation to recover public funds that have already been incorrectly distributed. We are talking about money that could and should be supporting others in genuine need—to further a theme I made in the last group. While it is essential that recovery processes are fair and humane, it is also important that the recovery duty is not unduly delayed.

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If the DWP makes any decisions based on automated processing of personal data without meaningful human involvement which have legal or similarly significant effects on individuals, it must do so with specific safeguards in place, as per the UK’s data protection framework. When collecting personal data, the DWP must tell data subjects whether it uses any automated decision-making, with meaningful information about the logic involved and the significance and envisaged consequence for the data subject. Further safeguards, which apply after a relevant decision is taken, are set out—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Am I not right in thinking that that is about to change under the new Data (Use and Access) Act?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I was just about to get to that point, if the noble Lord will bear with me. Further safeguards, which apply after a relevant decision is taken, are set out in data protection law, to be amended by Section 80 of the Data (Use and Access) Act. These include providing individuals with information about significant decisions made about them and the opportunity to make representations and obtain human intervention on the decision.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised international comparisons and Australia. To be clear, the use of machine learning has led to legal action internationally, primarily because there were concerns about automated decision-making. That is not the case here, so I hope that reassures her.

This is not for this Bill and not for now, but the Committee has raised the fact that as, over time, AI will clearly be used a lot across government and the private sector, it is important that the Government make sure that all the right safeguards are in place. The DWP is leading the way on this, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is leading several programmes of work to utilise the opportunities of AI and ensure that it is used safely. For example, the algorithmic transparency recording standard is a standardised way for public sector organisations to publish information about how and why they are using algorithmic tools. It is mandatory across central government for algorithmic tools that have a significant influence on a decision-making process with public effect or directly interact with the general public. The Government Digital Service is currently implementing the mandatory rollout of the ATRS in government departments and arm’s-length bodies.

Work is going on in this broad space, but I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that the current law and the provisions in this Bill give the noble Baroness reason to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

We have had this discussion a few times, but does the Minister accept that most if not all of the safeguards she has talked about exist not in law but in the codes, guidance and internal rules of the DWP? They could be changed at will by a future Government less robust in looking after people’s safeguards. Would it not be sensible to put something into the Bill to future-proof these safeguards? My concern is not what is happening now but what could happen in future.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope I have made the case, in speaking to the amendment that we have been discussing, that the law already provides those protections—or it will do so when the provisions of the data Act are implemented, if those changes have not already been made. For my money, we could not have been clearer that the Bill creates no new automated decision-making powers. DWP and fraud and error decisions are always made by humans. There is a debate to be had, broadly for the future, which is where the work being done by DSIT is really important. That is where protections across government to future-proof things need to be brought in—not in this Bill, which does not introduce any new automated decision-making powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 126 would require a thorough assessment of the impact of the Bill on people facing financial exclusion. While the Bill’s intent to safeguard public money and tackle fraud is clear and necessary, we must not overlook the reality that those who are financially excluded are often among the most vulnerable in our society.

Financial exclusion can mean lacking access to basic banking services, credit or affordable financial products, which in turn imposes additional costs and barriers on those least able to bear them. Without a clear understanding of how the Bill’s provisions, such as new powers to access bank account information or recover debts, affect this group, we risk compounding their disadvantage and inadvertently causing hardship to those the social security system is meant to support. An independent assessment as proposed in this amendment would ensure that the implementation of the Bill does not create unintended consequences, and they would indeed be unintended for individuals already struggling to access financial services. It will provide Parliament with vital evidence of whether the Bill’s measures are proportionate and fair and whether additional safeguards or support are required for those at risk of exclusion.

This is about not weakening our response to fraud but ensuring that our actions are just and do not undermine the financial resilience of those who are most at risk of falling through the cracks. I know that the Minister and others mean well, but I urge the Committee to support this amendment, which guarantees that our efforts to protect public funds do not come at the expense of the most financially vulnerable in our communities. It is a balance. We need to be very careful that in stopping fraud we do not push people in vulnerable communities further down into debt and disappointment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I add my support at least to the intentions behind this amendment. We have had a number of discussions in Committee on the potential impact of layering costs and bureaucracy on financial services providers that relate to a particular class of people. In doing that, we risk incentivising those providers to stop providing services to that class of people—in this case, benefit recipients—and thereby potentially increasing financial exclusion.

The intention behind this amendment is right and I support adding it to the scope of the independent reviewer. However, I was not totally clear whether this applies to the whole Bill or just to Part 1, because it refers to the independent reviewer under Clause 64(1), which relates only to Part 1. This should relate to the whole Bill on a cumulative basis, because the cumulative impact of all the elements of this Bill may lead to greater changes in the behaviour of financial services companies than the sum of the individual changes themselves. We need to find a way of making sure that this covers the whole Bill and the cumulative impact.

Secondly, the amendment would require only a one-off report after 12 months. I am not sure that that would be sufficient. If there are impacts, as I fear there could be, they are likely to accumulate over time as banks decide that this is more difficult and therefore stop providing services. As we have talked about before, this is a question not of active debanking but more likely of stopping providing services over time. If we are to review this, we need to look at the impact more periodically—not necessarily annually, but over a longer period. I support the intention, but the amendment may need tweaking as it stands.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 126, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, which would require an independent assessment of the impact of this Bill on those at risk of financial exclusion and, crucially, ensure that the findings of that assessment are made public and laid before Parliament.

The principle behind this amendment is very important. We have heard throughout the Committee’s deliberations from me, my noble friend Lady Finn and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about the real and pressing risk that some of the measures in this Bill could unintentionally deepen financial exclusion. As we have said several times, there is a risk that banks are made to feel concerned about their customers if they are subject to an EVN, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has powerfully expressed previously and now, that banks could be deterred from taking on customers who are in receipt of benefits in the first place as a pre-emptive measure against the additional workload that this could demand.

As we do not yet have clarity from the Government about when and how often notices and demands will be made of banks, everyone is currently in the dark about how much of an additional workload this will mean for financial institutions. It is therefore entirely feasible that these institutions, which are, as we always need to remember, designed and operated to make money, could simply choose not to take the risks, impacting people who have not necessarily done anything wrong in the process. If we empower government to work more closely with banks to verify eligibility, recover funds and issue deductions, we must be equally mindful of the unintended consequences for those who sit at the margins of our financial system.

We appreciate that this amendment does not seek to obstruct or weaken the Bill. Quite the opposite—it offers the Government a constructive, concrete mechanism for assessing whether our enforcement framework is functioning in a way that is fair, proportionate and inclusive. This is an important measure, and I am sure that noble Lords across the Committee who have raised concerns about this issue will be somewhat reassured if the Government commit to undertaking a review as set out in this amendment.

We have heard Ministers reassure us that these powers will be used carefully and that the risk of harm is low. This amendment provides an opportunity to put those assurances to the test—not through speculation, but through evidence. Twelve months after this Bill is enacted, the independent reviewer would be tasked with producing a report examining the extent to which the measures we have passed are having an adverse impact on those already struggling to access or maintain financial stability.

In conclusion, this is not a burdensome ask; it is a safeguard. It would ensure that, as we work to strengthen our systems against fraud, we do not inadvertently erect new barriers for those who are financially vulnerable already. It would give the House and the other place the opportunity to revisit and respond to those findings, if and when action is needed. I therefore urge the Minister to consider this proposal seriously and to work with colleagues to ensure that the fight against fraud does not come at the cost of fairness or financial exclusion.