European Defence Agency Membership Review

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Tuesday 12th February 2013 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am announcing today that following a review of our membership of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the UK will at the present time remain a member of the agency.

In 2010 the UK reviewed its membership of the EDA following the strategic defence and security review. Subsequently, my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), recommended that the UK should remain a member of the EDA with a stocktake after two years.

In consultation across Government, my Department has reassessed the benefits of remaining in the EDA and reviewed progress made by the agency since 2010 against identified shortfalls.

The EDA has made progress in some areas requiring reform, but there is more to be done to improve its operational effectiveness and so the case for continued membership remains finely balanced. Overall, I have concluded that for now the UK should remain a member of the EDA with our continuing membership to be reviewed again in late 2013 in light of progress made during the year.

International Defence Engagement Strategy

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am making a joint statement with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Together we wish to inform the House that the Government are today publishing the “International Defence Engagement Strategy”. Implementing this new strategy will maximise the contribution that defence can make towards the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

The national security strategy and strategic defence and security review (SDSR) in 2010 set out our goal to bring together and use all the instruments of national power in a co-ordinated and coherent manner, ensuring that the sum of our efforts to safeguard our security, extend our influence, and build our prosperity is bigger than its component parts.

The international defence engagement strategy sets out how defence assets and activities fit within this goal, and how they can better contribute to wider Government objectives. It looks out over a horizon of 20 years to identify both the major risks that we will face and opportunities that we will have.

In implementing this strategy we will use our network of defence attachés and other defence representation overseas, together with our diplomatic network and the Defence and Security Organisation of UK Trade & Investment, to ensure that we are developing the right relationships and achieving the right influence for the challenges and opportunities of the future.

On occasion, we will cement these relationships in the form of a treaty, as we did with France in 2010. But the influence we can achieve through defence engagement goes far broader than this. This strategy therefore includes traditional defence diplomacy activity of senior-level visits and international defence training; Ministry of Defence contributions to regional stability, conflict prevention and stabilisation activities; security and non-combat operations; and MOD support for defence and security exports. The scope of this strategy is ambitious and it will be implemented in conjunction with other related Government initiatives, such as the building stability overseas strategy, the Gulf initiative and the emerging powers initiative. The implementation of the international defence engagement strategy will build on existing relationships and on work already under way, but we will also be making some significant advances in the development of our relationships with some states.

We have already taken steps to ensure that we use our defence engagement to promote our values through contributing to the institutional capability of other nations. We will have an accredited non-resident defence attaché for Burma next month and will establish a defence section in our Embassy in Rangoon later this year. The Burmese Government have taken some very positive and welcome steps towards reform which we should assist. The Burmese military continues to play an influential role in government, so we will use military to military dialogue where we can, complementing diplomatic and development efforts, to encourage reform and support democracy. During her meeting with the Prime Minister in June 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi specifically recommended the appointment of a defence attaché to Burma as a key channel for engagement with the Burmese military.

We are increasing our efforts to support security and justice sector reform and capacity building, which contribute to regional peace and security. We will be opening a defence section in our embassy in Libya this year. During the transition in Libya we established a defence advisory team to assist the national transitional council in developing their organisational and planning capacity. This team has remained in place post-conflict, to support the democratically elected General National Congress. The defence section will build on relationships established by them. Also, we have recently established a defence section in Juba in South Sudan. We are working alongside other Government Departments to assist this newly independent state to establish national institutions and implement security and justice reform, contributing to regional security in a relatively unstable region.

Similarly, when the British embassy is opened in Mogadishu this year we will be establishing a defence section there, enabling us to provide a greater focus for our support to the Government of Somalia and to AMISOM, the African Union force in Somalia, as they make progress in driving out al-Shabaab. Importantly, taking advantage of our transition from combat operations in Afghanistan and the resulting increase in available forces, we are exploring innovative ways of using some army capabilities on a wide range of defence engagement tasks and intend to pilot this as the army restructures its adaptable brigades. We will exploit our recent operational experience, develop our capabilities, our cultural understanding and language training, and demonstrate our commitment and support for our allies and partners including the UN, NATO and EU.

We recognise the importance of developing our bilateral relationships with emerging powers—nations we see as growing long-term partners in regional and global defence and security issues. The international defence engagement strategy allows us to focus our efforts, and as examples of this over the last two years we have signed defence co-operation and defence technical arrangements with Japan, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Turkey and Brazil. Supporting our Gulf initiative and security in the middle east region we have intensified defence co-operation across the region and we are increasing our training and exercise activity with Gulf nations throughout 2013.

We are continuing to develop our bilateral relationships more broadly, and have recently signed defence co-operation agreements or memoranda of understanding with Canada, Norway, Denmark and Mongolia. Since the SDSR in October 2010, the UK has signed no fewer than seven new defence treaties and over 50 new memoranda of understanding and other subordinate agreements which contribute to our network of international alliances and partnerships in line with the vision set out in the SDSR. The most recent new agreement is a defence co-operation treaty with Australia, signed in Perth on 18 January 2013. This will see our two nations co-operating on a range of defence-related topics such as cyber security, defence reform, personnel exchanges, equipment and science and technology.

We are deepening our relationships with long-standing allies.

The United States will remain our pre-eminent security partner, and our armed forces continue to work closely together operationally. The UK currently stations over 750 British defence personnel in the US, conducting a broad variety of activities. These include a wide range of senior personnel serving in advisory or command positions in US headquarters. Approximately 200 British officers are on exchange with all four of the US services, developing capability and increasing interoperability. As close allies the US and UK host each other’s forces in order to conduct training, be prepared to forward-deploy when necessary, and in many cases conduct current operations. In November 2012 alone over 500 UK military personnel visited the US to conduct a joint exercise with US counterparts.

We are pursuing a programme of enhanced bilateral defence co-operation, focusing on areas of mutual benefit such as carrier-strike, cyber, space, land forces interoperability, science and technology, defence education, intelligence and the nuclear deterrent. These will be progressed through regular strategic dialogue at the most senior levels, supported by a reorganised British defence staff, United States.

Following our signature of the UK-French defence co-operation treaty in 2010 we have been increasing our bilateral defence activity with France. In spring last year we established the British defence staff in France in Paris. We set up five new strategic exchange officer posts with France in September 2012 and will establish a further five posts by 2015. We are increasing our joint exercises. This was exemplified by the Corsican Lion exercise last October, building towards the final validation of the concept of the combined joint expeditionary force in 2016. Our ambassador in Paris, Sir Peter Ricketts, has been consulted during the preparation of the French livre blanc security review and has offered advice drawing on the UK experience during our 2010 strategic defence and security review (SDSR).

We have rewired the existing defence attaché presence in Europe to establish three “networks” covering the Nordic/Baltic, central Europe and the western Balkans which will enable us to have a more strategic approach. We will also work increasingly closely with our northern European neighbours through the Northern Group of 12 nations established at UK’s initiative in 2010 to improve understanding on common security issues and identify opportunities for enhanced co-operation.

Recognising the importance of international defence engagement to wider Government objectives, on current plans we have reprioritised our existing budgets to dedicate a further £2.5 million in 2012-13 for this purpose. From 2013-14 this reprioritisation will enable a further £3.5 million on top of existing resources to be available to pursue these activities, for the four years of the defence planning cycle.

In such a cross-cutting area of work it is important to ensure that we have clarity of governance. We have therefore established a new high-level defence engagement board which will consult with and take guidance from Foreign and Commonwealth Office and MOD Ministers, the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser, and provide updates to them. It is jointly chaired at director-general level by FCO and MOD, and includes membership from across Whitehall.

We have deposited a copy of the strategy in the Library of the House. It is also available on the FCO and MOD websites.

Defence Equipment Plan

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2013 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am today placing in the Library of the House a summary of the Ministry of Defence’s core equipment plan as promised in my statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, column 261, together with an update on the current analysis of risk in the programme by the Department’s independent Cost Assessment and Assurance Service (CAAS). The equipment plan represents the position as at the conclusion of planning round 2012, and shows the budget for equipment procurement and equipment support for the next 10 years. It also provides details of how the core equipment plan breaks down between different capability areas.

This report covers a budget for new equipment, data systems and equipment support totalling around £160 billion over the next decade. It is, for the first time in recent memory, a plan which is affordable over the whole of that decade.

We have a central contingency provision of £4.8 billion over and above the provisions for risk within individual project budgets, something we have never had before. The report also shows that, in addition to the core equipment plan, we have around £8 billion of additional headroom in the later years of the decade. This will allow us to fund, incrementally and flexibly, a number of additional programmes that are a high priority for defence, as soon as we can be sure that they are affordable. We will do so only at the point when commitment is required to meet the operational requirement and only in accordance with the military assessment of priority at the time, an order defined by operational need, rather than short-term financial pressure.

Today, the National Audit Office (NAO) is also publishing its assessment of the affordability of the MOD’s equipment plan. This independent assessment is something that has never been done before. The report recognises the difficult decisions we have had to take to bring the defence budget into balance and the positive steps we have taken to lay the foundations for continuing stability in the equipment plan. From a culture of endemic over-programming, the NAO report makes it clear that we are now managing our equipment on a more prudent basis.

This first assessment is a foundation on which we intend to build. The assessment of the equipment plan will take place annually so that Parliament will gain ever greater levels of confidence that the MOD equipment plan is affordable and will fulfil our capability requirements.

Deployment to Mali

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on deployment to Mali.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 14 January the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Mark Simmonds), made a statement to the House outlining the UK’s deployment of two C-I7 transport aircraft to provide logistical support to France, as well as a small detachment of technical personnel deployed to Bamako airport to assist with the reception of the C-I7 aircraft. Since that announcement, we have decided to extend our support to the continued provision of one C-I7 in support of the French for a further three months. There are currently about 20 people deployed in Bamako supporting liaison with French forces and, following a French request for additional surveillance support, we have deployed a Sentinel R1 aircraft to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.

EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 17 January to establish an EU military training mission to Mali—EUTM—and work is ongoing to scope that mission. Today in Brussels, representatives from EU member states, including the UK, will meet to discuss the individual member state contributions to the mission. The UK is prepared to contribute up to 40 personnel to the EUTM, either in an HQ or training team role. We do not envisage UK personnel fulfilling a force protection role, and it is quite possible that all 40 personnel will not be required, dependent on the contributions from other member states. I can assure the House that we will not allow UK personnel to deploy on any mission until we are satisfied that adequate force protection arrangements are in place.

Today in Addis Ababa the African Union is hosting a donor conference to discuss how the international community can support the African-led intervention force, AFISMA, in delivering the role that the United Nations Security Council has mandated it to fulfil. The UK will today offer £5 million for two new UN funds to support the strengthening of security in Mali, with £3 million directed to AFISMA and £2 million to activity in Mali that facilitates and supports political processes for building stability. The UK is also prepared to offer up to 200 personnel to provide training to troops from Anglophone west African countries contributing to AFISMA, although the numbers required will be dependent upon the requirements of the AFISMA contributing nations. To establish those requirements, we have deployed a small number of advisers to Anglophone west African countries that are likely to contribute to the AFISMA mission, to assess their needs and to gain situational awareness.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers will provide an update to the House on the outcome of the discussions in Brussels and Addis Ababa at the appropriate moment.

[Mr Baron]

I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, and thank the Secretary of State for his answer.

British involvement in Mali and the wider region is deepening, and it is clearly in everyone’s interests that we do not allow legitimate Governments to fail, particularly when faced with extremists. It is no secret that I opposed our recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, because I fear that one can be drawn into ever-deepening conflicts. Afghanistan illustrated the dangers of being sucked into larger deployments. That mission morphed into something much larger: it changed from a mission to defeat al-Qaeda or deny it the use of Afghanistan to one of nation-building.

Drawing on our lessons in Afghanistan—and, perhaps, on other interventions—will the Government clarify the following points? We need greater clarity on the role of British troops. The Government have said they will not be placed in a combat role, but there are a host of grey areas between combat roles and support roles. What exactly will these advisers do? Will they be involved in logistics or training, or will they advise on strategy? Equally importantly, how will they be protected? Are we deploying troops on the ground to protect these advisers, or are we relying on our French colleagues to provide that protection?

May I also ask the Secretary of State what exactly is the exit strategy? It is very easy to get drawn into these situations, but it is not always clear what the endgame and exit strategy are, and even what the endgame looks like. What are the contingency plans if military progress does not go to plan? Is there talk on the table that we should perhaps be deploying or committing, or be prepared to commit, more troops if the fighting goes badly? At the moment, that is all going well, but the situation can change very quickly.

Finally, what lessons should we learn from United Nations Security Council resolution 2085, which was passed last year and called on local African nations to lead the combat role in defeating these extremists in northern Mali? There was tremendous delay in the implementation of that resolution. What lessons have we learned from that, because we seem to be playing catch-up? On a related but slightly separate issue, what is the international community’s broader strategy on encouraging local forces to play a more proactive role, not only in Mali, but in the wider region, in combating these extremists? These are legitimate questions and the British public and we as a House need to ask them, because there is a real danger of getting drawn into a much larger deployment, particularly if things do not go to plan on the ground.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.

My hon. Friend asked me about the exit strategy. France has made it clear that it envisages a short intervention to stabilise the situation on the ground while the African forces from neighbouring countries and the Malian army deploy to sustain the situation in the longer term. We concur with that strategy. I should say, again, that it is not our intention to deploy combat troops; we are very clear about the risks of mission creep and we have defined very carefully the support that we are willing and able to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.

My hon. Friend referred to UN Security Council resolution 2085 and the time delay in deploying African forces. I think it is well known that the intention was to deploy African forces in support of the Malian authorities later this year, but the situation on the ground has become more urgent, hence the decision by the French to intervene. Some of these forces require equipment and some require additional training, and the response time to the mobilisation envisaged by resolution 2085 has perhaps been longer than we would have liked. The lesson we can learn from that is that if we want local forces to be able to deploy and respond to resolutions of this nature, we may have to take a more proactive role in resourcing them to do so.

On the broader strategy for encouraging local forces to tackle extremism, part of our defence posture, set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010, is to devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to upstream engagement, building capacity in fragile nation states to allow them to deal with early threats to their security, rather than waiting for the situation to degenerate to the point at which it requires outside intervention.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for giving us the opportunity to discuss security in north Africa today, and I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. It is essential that Mali does not become a haven for terrorism, which would allow militants to oppress a people, hold territory, destabilise a region and threaten UK interests. It is therefore vital that the international community enables Mali and its neighbours to defend themselves.

Let me turn to six specific issues. Can the Secretary of State guarantee that no UK personnel will be redeployed to Mali from Afghanistan? What other European allies plan to commit trainers and at what level?

There will be broader worries about mission creep. The UK commitment to Mali has grown from lending the French two transport aircraft to the deployment of perhaps hundreds of troops to the region. It appears clear that Islamists have chosen to abandon population centres and might now melt away across near-non-existent borders. It is possible that they will be able to regroup and return to carry out the type of terror attacks we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. What assessment has the Secretary of State made of the ability and intent of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its associates to do so?

I want the Secretary of State to say more about force protection. If UK trainers are based in Bamako, which has not to date been the centre of violence, that might make them and the capital a target. Our forces will, I assume, be armed, so what will the rules of engagement be? UK trainers might be non-combat, but that does not mean that they are without risk. They are deployed and will need to be protected in a hostile environment, so what security guarantees has he received from French forces about protecting UK trainers as a condition of this deployment from day one?

We all know that lasting stability will be achieved through a political process, so will the Secretary of State outline the strategy to achieve that? In particular, will he give his assessment of whether the Tuareg people will be part of the process?

While we consider the importance of winning hearts and minds in Mali, there is another country where public consent must be retained and that is here in the UK. The public are wary and weary of conflict as a consequence of recent history. There will be worries about mission creep and the safety of UK trainers and it is essential that the Secretary of State allays those fears today.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, although I have to say that there was a little bit of fence sitting. Although we all recognise that the public are wary and weary of conflict, I did not hear a clear indication of whether he supports the actions that the Government propose to take in support of this French mission.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the redeployment of troops from Mali to Afghanistan and I assume he meant Afghanistan to Mali. We are acutely conscious of the primacy of the operation in Afghanistan and the limits of what we have been able to offer the French in this operation are defined largely by the need not to degrade our capabilities in Afghanistan. We are looking all the time at what we can do without impacting on the air bridge or the operation in Afghanistan. As he noted, our initial response was to offer logistical support as that was what was urgently required to get French troops and equipment into Mali. The French ask has evolved to include additional surveillance capability, which we have now provided with the Sentinel R1. Over the next weeks and months the requirement will be for training of the Anglophone African troops who will provide the force in support of the Malian army in due course.

The right hon. Gentleman asked for an assessment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is fair to say that our situational awareness of the Maghreb is not as great as we would like it to be. It is not an area where Britain has had traditional involvement, but we are making strong efforts to obtain awareness of what is going on there. We should not underestimate the potential for terrorist threats to emerge from the Islamic Maghreb, but nor should we overestimate the strength of the Islamists in this region.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked about our forces on the ground in Bamako. Bamako is well to the south of Mali and the problems are in the north. I agree that it is not impossible that Islamists could penetrate the south of the country in small groups, but there are many reasons why it might be difficult for them to operate there. The rules of engagement for British personnel will be on the basis of self-defence when they are based at Bamako. Force protection is provided within the airfield at Bamako by the French forces on the ground. As I said earlier in relation to any UK training mission, we will not allow any UK trainers to deploy until we are satisfied that adequate force protection measures are in place.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the political process, and of course a political process is essential. I envisage that the European Union will be engaged in economic and political development in Mali in the future. The involvement of the Taureg people, of course, is essential to a sustainable and lasting peace in that country.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

May I repeat to my right hon. Friend what I said unavailingly to his five Labour predecessors as Defence Secretary that the more frequently western forces intervene in Muslim countries, the greater will be the spread of jihadism throughout the whole Islamic world and the higher the threat of terrorism in this country?

[Mr Hammond]

I hear my right hon. Friend’s warning loudly and clearly, but of course precisely the problem that we are dealing with is that Mali is not an Islamic country. Mali is a country with a majority Christian population, with a significant Islamic minority. It is a country of two halves geographically, climatically, religiously, culturally and ethnically. That is the challenge, but the solution must be a democratically elected Government in Bamako who effectively represent all parts of that country. That is the long-term aim that we all aspire to achieve.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Our commitment to Mali and the region has grown considerably over the past few days. Notwithstanding the relatively positive news that is coming from the country, no one really believes that the security issues will be addressed in the short term. How long does the right hon. Gentleman envisage the deployments that he is confirming today are likely to be? The relatively small numbers that he is reporting to the House need to be supported by far larger numbers if such an operation is to be sustained. How many people overall will be necessary to sustain the commitment over time?

[Mr Hammond]

I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman’s last point. The numbers that we have outlined are the numbers that we envisage sustaining the Sentinel aircraft based in Dakar, Senegal—about 70 people. That is the requirement to sustain the aircraft there. We have about 20 people on the ground in Bamako. The C-17 we envisage staying for up to three months. We have not set a time limit for the surveillance capability; it will stay for as long as we can provide it without impact on other operations and as long as it is useful. The training mission has not yet been defined, so it would be premature for me to talk about a time scale, but it clearly will be a finite time scale in preparing the African Anglophone nations’ forces for deployment to Mali.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

The liberation of Timbuktu and other towns in the north is, of course, very much to be welcomed, but my right hon. Friend will remember from the precedent of both Iraq and Afghanistan that the liberation of towns and cities is the easy part and that there is every probability that there will be many years of asymmetrical conflict in Mali unless a political solution is achieved. Will he advise the House whether he is having discussions with the Foreign Secretary to ensure that Britain can make a contribution that, in particular, would try to divide the jihadi terrorists from the other local insurgents who do not have international aspirations, thereby making the prospect of ultimate peace that much more foreshortened?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right of course to warn of the prospect of asymmetric conflict. Although it is reassuring that towns such as Timbuktu have been taken by French forces, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that that is equivalent to the defeat of the Islamist forces in the area. They have melted away and will, no doubt, regroup and return in one form or another.

My right hon. and learned Friend is also right in saying that the key strategic imperative is to separate the jihadists from those northern Malian rebels whose discontent with the Government is more secular in nature. There is some evidence that that is already happening and that the presence of Malian Government and French forces in the area will encourage and accelerate that process, but I can assure him that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is acutely aware of the need for rapid political progress, as well as rapid military progress.

[Frank Dobson (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister bear in mind that, whatever the merits of what is presently proposed, the American catastrophe in Vietnam started with the deployment of American troops in a training and advisory capacity?

[Mr Hammond]

I am sure that those lessons have been taken firmly on board and are part of the military folklore that informs decision taking today.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

Although my right hon. Friend may be able to justify in the short term the step change in Britain’s commitment in Mali that he has announced this morning, what account is being taken of the long-term implications of such a commitment, not least if there is success in Mali followed by displacement of al-Qaeda to other more favourable countries in north Africa? How far are we willing to pursue them?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend talks about a step change in Britain’s commitment in Mali. Let me set this in context. In the SDSR, we made it clear that a greater part of Britain’s defence effort in future would be devoted to training, supporting and upskilling local forces in fragile areas, to prevent the breakdown of order in such countries. We are proposing to deploy up to 200 troops in a training role to support four Anglophone countries in west Africa to prepare forces to intervene in Mali. That seems to me to be a very well leveraged use of British forces, British resources and British capability to deliver effect at minimal cost and risk to ourselves.

[Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State has drawn attention to the fact that discussions involving other countries are taking place in Brussels about the commitment that they are prepared to make to Mali. Will he update the House on commitments that have been made thus far by EU neighbours, including countries such as Denmark, and confirm that those discussions also involve countries that are not in the EU, such as Norway and Canada?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman is right; some offers of assistance have already been provided—I have just had a discussion this morning with the Belgian Defence Minister—but it would be better, if he does not mind, to await the completion of the discussion today. I can assure him, as I have already assured Mr Speaker, that one of my colleagues from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will come to update the House as soon as we have the readout from that discussion and the one in Addis Ababa.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) was entirely right to urge on my right hon. Friend extreme caution in this matter. However, does my right hon. Friend not agree that the EU training mission to Somalia is a useful precedent here? That is one of the areas in EU defence that has actually been rather successful, unlike most of the rest of it, and that is therefore a proper course to follow. Will he give us an indication of what the Nigerians intend to do? That is a Christian and Muslim country; it should be able to help out in Mali; and it has well trained troops as well.

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend that the EU training mission in Somalia has been a success. Indeed, I see some similarity between the situation in Somalia and that in Mali. What is required in Mali is military training, economic development support and rule of law and civil governance reform, to help that country to achieve stable and sustainable government in the future. That is something that I believe the EU is well positioned to lead on and to deliver, and we look forward to supporting it in that effort.

[Mr Dennis Skinner (Bolsover) (Lab)]

Now that the Defence Secretary is talking about sending in troops and weapons, will he bear it in mind that when the intervention took place in Libya—at a very low level, we were told by the Government at the beginning—and when those Benghazi rebels were provided with large numbers of weapons, we found that al-Qaeda and other terrorists in Mali and north Africa were using the same weapons that Britain and other countries had supplied. That is mission creep, and if he is not careful, it will get even worse.

[Mr Hammond]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. I did not refer to weapons. We have talked about troops in a training role. Our preference would be that that training is carried out in the countries that are providing the troops—Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana—and if not, that it is carried out in Bamako. It will not be in the forward regions where the fighting is taking place.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I support the deployment of a Sentinel R1, but may I urge my right hon. Friend to be slightly careful about the use of language? We have already deployed a C-17 to Bamako, and that C-17 has a section of the RAF Regiment within it—for force protection. Force protection personnel are combat troops. They may not be used in combat, but they are combat troops.

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I hear what my hon. Friend says. The C-17 is currently carrying out missions moving equipment and troops from France to Bamako and from Dakar in Senegal and other capitals in the region into Bamako, so its mission is into the country, rather than within the country.

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

After 11 years of warfare in Afghanistan, does the Secretary of State accept that there is no appetite whatever in this country for British troops to be sucked into a new war, a war far away, and a war that could easily escalate? Does he also accept that arising from what he has said today, there should be another statement as quickly as possible next week on what has occurred?

[Mr Hammond]

I have already made a commitment that there will be another statement on the outcome of the meetings today. It may be next week; it may be sooner. As soon as we are in a position to inform the House, we will do so. I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. Of course there is no appetite to be sucked into another war—there never is—but there is an appetite to be safe and secure. There is an appetite to ensure that terrorists cannot establish freedom of movement in an area such as the Sahel in order to attack us in the future. I say again that this appears to me to be a very limited and well-leveraged intervention by Britain in support of the French, who have deployed significant numbers of troops and equipment, and who are doing the heavy lift alongside the Malians. What we are now proposing to do is help to reinforce the English-speaking African countries which have also indicated that they are prepared to contribute forces to deal with this as a regional problem. That is the right way to solve such a problem, and our limited support for it is a highly effective way of Britain leveraging its capabilities.

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

Non-interventionism is in vogue, but does the Secretary of State agree that because of the nature of the UK, our trade routes and our status, we have huge interests across the world, and consequently, that this sort of capacity-building exercise is time and money well spent?

[Mr Hammond]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. I remind her and other hon. Members of the risks to our society and the societies of our allies if we allow areas of ungoverned space to fall under the control of al-Qaeda and its associates and to become a place where they can plan and execute attacks on our interests.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Does the Secretary of State recognise that Mali is in a post-colonial situation and there is great tension between the north and the south, and that the failure of successive Governments in Mali to address the wishes of the Tuareg people has led to this conflict, as has the exploitation of the country’s minerals? Does he not accept that unless there is a political solution to those issues in Mali, western forces will be there for a very long time and we will be sucked into a horrible war from which we will end up ultimately having to make a humiliating retreat?

[Mr Hammond]

I do not accept the last part of the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I of course accept that, for there to be a sustainable peaceful situation in Mali over the longer term, there will have to a political solution to the tensions that exist between the north and the south of the country—tensions that, frankly, were created by a colonial map drawer and were pretty predictable when one looks at the ethnic and religious make-up of that country. But the fact that the regional powers are prepared to deploy in support of the Malian army is something that we should very much celebrate and support. Let there be a regional solution to the short-term problems in Mali, and by all means let us be active and forward-leaning in our support for a long-term political solution to the problem.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I strongly support the Defence Secretary’s announcement today, which I believe to be well judged in every particular. I welcome the fact that other countries in the EU recognise the threat to all of our security that would be represented by ungoverned space in that part of the world, and their willingness to join in this training mission. So long as we are being guaranteed that there is no question of our moving into a combat role, I do not think we should view these or any subsequent requests for practical help as mission creep. We should be willing to make a long-term contribution in west Africa, building up regional capacity so that on future occasions western troops will not be required to move in.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I agree with the sentiments that he expressed. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we have no intention of entering a combat role in Mali. The French have taken the lead and supporting them is the sensible and the right thing to do.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Thirteen years ago I went to Sierra Leone with the Defence Committee and saw British troops and Gurkhas training the Sierra Leonean armed forces. I am therefore very pleased that Sierra Leone is one of the countries that is prepared to take on the African mission, but does not this raise a wider question of long-term co-operation between the European Union and the African Union to make sure that we do not have to have ad hoc intervention forces, which might take a year or maybe longer to establish, but that when necessary we can intervene to preserve democracy and defend people against extremism?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely good point. The EU training mission in Somalia and the support arrangements for the African Union intervention in Somalia have come to work very well, but they took a while to get together at the beginning. Now we are embarking on a new activity on the other side of the continent and we are starting from scratch again. His point is well made. Is there a mechanism by which we can create some standing apparatus to ensure that when the need arises for local or regional intervention, supported by outside expertise and resources, we can provide it quickly and effectively? I am happy to pass on those thoughts to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I welcome the Secretary of State’s reassurances about the very limited commitment in Mali not cutting across our capabilities in Afghanistan, but he well knows that the C-17s play a central role in the air bridge and in our commitment to withdrawing by the end of next year. Is he absolutely certain that there will be no possible diminution in that determination if, for example, the commitment of the C-17s were to be extended beyond the three months to which he is committed?

[Mr Hammond]

The commitment that we have made on the C-17 is for three months and the reason that we have limited it to three months is precisely because we would want at that point to review what impact, if any, any extension beyond that time would have on the air bridge to Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains our principal focus and we will not do anything that will impinge upon success there.

[Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

Nobody welcomes the deployment of British troops abroad, but the UK is right to provide support to France and to the Anglophone west African countries, which, in long run, ought to be giving the security guarantees that are needed in Mali. Will the Secretary of State explain why this is an EU security lead rather than a NATO security lead, what liaison there is between the EU and NATO, and what both bodies are doing to assess where the rebels and their armaments will go next so that we can have a regional response to the crisis?

[Mr Hammond]

My view is that this type of operation, where there is a military component and a much wider dimension within the country—a need to establish the rule of law and proper civil governance, and an ongoing need for economic development assistance—is ideally suited to EU involvement. At the moment, the French operation is a national operation, but the fact that the EU has been prepared to propose a training mission is welcome. There is, as yet, no NATO activity around this operation. It is a French operation first, then an EU and an AFISMA operation.

I should correct something that I said earlier. I said that the majority of Malians were Christians, but in fact the majority of Malians are Muslims. The ethnic split, not the religious split, puts the majority in the south.

[Patrick Mercer (Newark) (Con)]

Things go wrong in war. While I absolutely understand all the rightly cautious points that the Secretary of State has made, what forces are earmarked and what contingency plans are in place for when those things do indeed go wrong?

[Mr Hammond]

We do not expect things to go wrong. We are talking about deploying a small, 200-strong-maximum training force, probably to Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia, and, as I have outlined, we have a very small number of forces on the ground in Bamako. As my hon. Friend would expect, permanent joint headquarters continually makes plans for contingencies, although he would not expect me to outline in detail what those plans are. He will know from his own experience that the military are almost obsessive-compulsive about having contingency plans for every operation that they are engaged in, and I can assure him that they will have contingency plans for this one.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Why have the Government not honoured the pledge that the Foreign Secretary gave me a fortnight ago when he gave a broad assurance that we would discuss in this House, and vote on, whether we deployed soldiers abroad? When the Government decided to go into Helmand province in 2006, they hoped that not a shot would be fired. Then, only two British soldiers had died in combat after five years of warfare; now, the figure is 440. Is not there a grave danger that Mali could turn into another Helmand?

[Mr Hammond]

No, I do not think so. I think that the hon. Gentleman is referring to an answer that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary gave in relation to the use of war powers. The troops that we are talking about deploying will not be used in a combat role, and the war powers issue does not arise. They will be deployed in a training and support role.

[Margot James (Stourbridge) (Con)]

Limited military engagement in a supportive capacity to the French and African forces is a precursor to the nation building that is likely to be required, alongside what has been achieved in Somalia, in order to reduce the Islamist al-Qaeda threat. Does my right hon. Friend agree that compared with Afghanistan, Mali and the wider Sahel region is in Europe’s back yard and is a direct threat to our common security?

[Mr Hammond]

Allowing ungoverned space in Afghanistan would also represent a direct threat to Europe’s security. We know that a significant proportion of the security threats to the UK arise, and have arisen in the past, from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. What is a threat to Europe’s security and Britain’s security is ungoverned space in which terrorists can organise, exercise freedom of movement, and launch attacks. Wherever ungoverned space arises, whether it is in Somalia, the Sahel, or the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, we have to take appropriate action to close it down so that that space becomes properly governed and properly monitored.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Secretary of State kindly for clarifying many of the issues that concern us. There is a great humanitarian crisis developing in Mali, with 230,000 people displaced and 150,000 people having left the country. Will the deployment involve help for the deepening humanitarian crisis and for the infrastructure rebuild?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary is very much engaged with this issue. The deployment that I have talked about today is a training mission, but we are also looking to provide humanitarian support in the short term to deal with the movement of people in response to conflict, and in the longer term as part of an EU initiative to support the development of civil governance and economic development, particularly in the north of the country, thus addressing some of the underlying problems of at least part of this insurgency.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

In this increasingly troubled world, will the Secretary of State reflect on whether it is prudent and in Britain’s interests to cut the size of our armed forces?

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell you my view on that, Mr Speaker. It is prudent to have a balanced defence budget and to be able properly to equip the troops that we have and seek to use to defend this nation’s security. I am afraid that given the state of the defence budget that we inherited from Labour, we have taken the only responsible set of actions that we could take in order to secure Britain’s defence for the future.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

May I support and welcome the steps taken by the Government, which I am sure are welcomed by countries near Mali? The Secretary of State mentioned ungoverned space. One country with a lot of ungoverned space is Yemen, where yesterday eight people were killed in a suicide bomb attack by affiliates of al-Qaeda. If the Government of Yemen request the same support that those other countries near Mali have requested, will our Government be prepared to give them that support?

[Mr Hammond]

We have good relationships with the Government of Yemen and we provide advice and support to them. The President of Yemen was in London a few months ago, and we had very constructive discussions. The action proposed by the AFISMA countries is mandated by a UN Security Council resolution, and the action that we are taking is to support these countries in the discharge of that mandate.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Will the Secretary of State confirm that it has for some time been the intention to provide training in a number of west African countries as a form of upstream engagement? For the clarity of the House, will he elaborate on the differences between AFISMA, Operation Newcombe, and the EU training mission?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. This training support should be seen in the context of our ongoing and very good relations with the Anglophone countries of west Africa, where we already have in place excellent military-to-military relationships and provide some training to them. This is very much a continuation and a stepping up of an activity for which there is established precedent, and I hope that the House will support it on that basis.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State will have seen the report in Friday’s Le Monde about atrocities that have allegedly been committed by Mali Government forces as they have seized back territory. Will he explain why we are not making it an absolute requirement on the Malian Government to investigate and co-operate fully with the International Criminal Court before we give them a single shilling?

[Mr Hammond]

We are making the point very clearly to the Malian Government that if they want to benefit from the support of the United Kingdom and other members of the international community, they must respond swiftly and effectively to the allegations that have been made. The French forces command in Mali is also very focused on the need to address this issue promptly.

[Oliver Colvile (Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend envisage 3 Commando Brigade playing a part in this initiative?

[Mr Hammond]

No.

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

May I press the Secretary of State? Will he tell us more about the relationship between the European Union training mission and the French military mission? Will he also tell us what is happening to the Sentinel security system, which was going to be cut under the strategic defence and security review? Will it be reprieved?

[Mr Hammond]

To answer the last question first, the ongoing use of Sentinel is not currently funded beyond 2015. It remains one of the candidate programmes for the—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) cackles from the Opposition Front Bench, but he was a Defence Minister in the previous Government who left us with a £38 billion gap between the equipment they had ordered and the budgets available to pay for it. We are having to prioritise and identify the programmes that are most important to maintaining Britain’s national security. Sentinel is a candidate programme for funding after 2015, and we will continue to look at its run-on costs and whether we can justify the investment in them.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I welcome the rounded and proportionate response that my right hon. Friend has outlined. Has the National Security Council asked the Department for International Development, the Foreign Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and other relevant Departments to talk to their French counterparts about how we can flesh out this mission as a whole so that it is not purely a military one?

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I can assure my hon. Friend that DFID and Foreign Office officials and Ministers are in touch with their French counterparts and that there has been a great deal of traffic backwards and forwards between London and Paris over the past 10 days.

[Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State mentioned £5 million being contributed towards United Nations funds. What proportion of that will come from the Ministry of Defence budget and what proportion, if any, will come from DFID budgets? Will he also tell us when we can expect an announcement on what kind of humanitarian assistance the British Government will provide and when?

[Mr Hammond]

I will alert my right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary to the hon. Lady’s last question and ensure that when a further statement is made to the House—I anticipate that it will be made very shortly—that issue will be covered in it.

I am not absolutely certain, but I assume that the £5 million that I referred to will come from the conflict pool, which is a cross-Government, tri-departmental pool of money. If I am wrong about that, I will write to the hon. Lady and place a copy of the letter in the House.

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend has emphasised the issue of ungoverned spaces. Mali is five times the size of the UK, or thereabouts, with a quarter of the population, and Algeria ten times the size with a population three fifths the size of ours. What are his expectations for the proper governance of these vast, empty spaces?

[Mr Hammond]

Governance should not be confused with policing. Proper governance is about a system for bringing the people of the northern part of Mali into the overall governance of the country, making the Tuareg population feel part of the overall structure and having a demonstrably fair system for sharing the nation’s resources and wealth. That will be the key. As my hon. Friend rightly says, the sparsity of population and the vast spaces defy any aspiration to be able to police them in the conventional sense.

[John Cryer (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

If there were ever an example of mission creep, this is it. Further to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), at what point will the Secretary of State test the will of Parliament?

[Mr Hammond]

I do not accept that this is an example of mission creep. What we have done is extremely modest. We are providing strategic air-lift support for a limited period and one surveillance aircraft, operating from a neighbouring, friendly country, and we are now talking about deploying up to 250 troops in a training role, most of which will be carried out in the countries donating the troop forces. I do not consider that to be an escalation of the scale characterised by the hon. Gentleman.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

Given the difficult terrain in Mali and the surrounding area, is the United Kingdom likely to provide drone assistance, as it did in Libya and Afghanistan, either as surveillance or on a front-line basis?

[Mr Hammond]

We currently assess that we could not provide drones or unmanned aerial vehicles of any sort in support of the French campaign in Mali without it having an unacceptable impact on our operations in Afghanistan, so we have declined to do so.

[Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Secretary of State has rightly referred on a number of occasions to the need for political reform, economic development and humanitarian relief, but he will know that people have been saying that Mali has needed that for years and warning that if Mali did not get it, we would have problems with that country. It would be all too easy, after, I hope, a quick military success, for those long-term commitments to be forgotten, so what guarantees can we have that there will indeed be the sustained support that is undoubtedly needed from Britain and the European Union?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. It is an unfortunate fact of life that it is only when countries force themselves to the top of the news agenda, sometimes for completely the wrong reason, that everybody recognises that we have known that there was a problem there for a long time and that we knew what needed to be done, but did not quite do it. I would hope, having now focused on the challenge and seen in Algeria the week before last the potential consequences of allowing terrorist organisations to gain ground in this area, that the EU in particular will have the will and the tenacity to see this through and to do what needs to be done over the medium to longer term.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) is surely right to raise the high human and financial cost of earlier interventions under the previous Government, but there is a danger of seeing everything through the prism of previous experience. I support the Defence Secretary’s commitment today to deploying considerable British military training capabilities alongside allies, with the support of neighbouring countries and with full awareness of the dangers of mission creep in Mali, for the better security of Europe. Does he agree, however, that training in fragile areas comes under the heading of conflict resolution and that it would, therefore, be appropriate for DFID to make a wholesome contribution to the costs of this training mission?

[Mr Hammond]

My ears are always open to any suggestion that anybody else might contribute to activity that otherwise falls on the defence budget, but as I said earlier the funding for this operation will come from the conflict pool and from pooled funds that are available for precisely this type of intervention. This is an arrangement that is working extremely well across Government and is one of the successes of the past couple of years.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Notwithstanding what the Secretary of State has said, he will understand that many will remain concerned about the quick-sand syndrome overtaking these deployments, particularly in the absence of the political and economic engagement developing a more visible and viable profile. He is right to characterise so darkly the terrorist threat, but he must also acknowledge that Malian Government forces face allegations of serious human rights abuses, including recently. How is he proofing those whom he is deploying in a support role against any future suggestion that they will be implicated in supporting such abuses in the future?

[Mr Hammond]

British forces have clear rules of engagement. The forces we have deployed so far will be limited to engagement on the basis of self-defence only if they are attacked. I have already acknowledged our concerns about the allegations that have been made about Malian forces, and I know that our French colleagues have similar concerns and are addressing them with the Malian Government and the Malian forces on the ground. This situation is in a state of flux on the ground. The Malian forces are regrouping. Some of their command and control systems are currently inadequate, but the French are seeking to make a difference on the ground.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

What is the extent of military co-operation between Algeria, Mali and Nigeria? Will the South Africans provide any troops? With America increasingly looking to the Pacific, will European support for an African solution to this problem be enough without substantial American involvement?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

I should tell the House that the United Kingdom has agreed to the use of US bases in the UK for the provision of refuelling support for the French forces, should the US choose to provide it. That is a decision for the US, but we would be comfortable with US aircraft operating from US bases in the UK for that purpose.

Nigeria is committed to providing troops to support the mission in Mali. I do not believe that the Algerians are committed in the same way, but they have an interest in security on the Algerian-Malian border. As far as I am aware, there is no commitment from South Africa.

[Jason McCartney (Colne Valley) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that British forces are deployed on training missions not only in Africa but around the world? Will he also confirm whether the intelligence gathered by the Sentinel aircraft will be used in support of French offensive operations or just to safeguard our troops on their training mission?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the fact that British military training missions are taking place in many countries around the world. British military training is highly sought after by many foreign Governments. It is one way in which we punch above our weight by having a degree of influence on foreign militaries and Governments that we might not otherwise have.

The intelligence output from Sentinel will be deployed principally not for the protection of British forces on the ground, but to deliver intelligence to the French to increase their situational awareness of what is happening over these vast tracts of land.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that an ethical foreign policy means one of muscular enlightenment, and that as a democracy we have a moral duty to intervene where possible to stop extremism and dictatorship, not just for the benefit of the world community, but for the people of individual countries?

[Mr Hammond]

I think that we have an absolute duty to intervene wherever there is a threat to Britain’s national security and the security of Britain’s interests around the world. This is exactly such a case. This is a well-judged, well-leveraged intervention that will deliver efficiently a result that is in Britain’s national interests.

[Roger Williams (Brecon and Radnorshire) (LD)]

I am sure that everyone welcomes the fact that Malian and French troops entered Timbuktu without resistance, preventing further damage to its people and fabric. Nevertheless, the city is in desperate need of support to rebuild its medical and educational facilities and its local economy. Will the Secretary of State ensure that British training and advice are given to Malian and African troops on how best to work with agencies to provide them with security and safety so that they can carry out their work?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary is heavily engaged in activities in Mali. I suspect that many people in this country thought that Timbuktu was a mythical place until it popped up on their television screens three days ago. My hon. Friend talks about an urgent need to rebuild medical and educational facilities. This city has not been occupied by rebel forces for years; they were only there for a few days. However, he is right that there is an urgent need to provide development support to towns and cities in the north of Mali, where the level of economic development is very low. I know that that is a focus of my right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary.

Afghanistan

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on Afghanistan.

Let me once again pay tribute to the brave men and women of our armed forces serving in Afghanistan. Theirs is a difficult and dangerous job; they operate in the most demanding of environments, displaying courage and heroism on a daily basis. Since operations began in 2001, 438 members of our armed forces have made the ultimate sacrifice; 11 since my right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary made the last quarterly statement on Afghanistan on 13 September.

In the face of such sacrifice, we should be in no doubt about why we are operating in Afghanistan. It is for one overriding reason: to protect our national security. Atrocities on the scale of 11 September 2001 must never be allowed to happen again. We seek an Afghanistan able to effectively manage its own security and prevent its territory from being used as a safe haven by international terrorists to plan and launch attacks against the UK and our allies.

That is an objective shared by our coalition partners in the international security assistance force and by the Afghan Government. We in NATO fully support the ambition of the Afghan Government for them to have full security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Our strategies are firmly aligned. The phased process of transition of security responsibility, agreed at the Lisbon summit, is well advanced and on track. In accordance with ISAF planning, by the end of 2013 we expect that UK forces will no longer need to routinely mentor the Afghan national army below brigade level. This is a move up from our current battalion level mentoring, a reflection of rapidly improving Afghan capacity and capability and in line with the Chicago milestone.

As the Prime Minister has just announced, a progressive move to brigade level mentoring will also allow us to make further reductions to our force levels from the 9,000 we will have at the end of this year. Our current planning envisages a reduction to approximately 5,200 by the end of next year. That number is based on current UK military advice and is in line with the NATO strategy agreed at Lisbon and the emerging ISAF planning. It also reflects the real progress being made in Helmand. We will keep this number under review as the ISAF plan firms up and other allies make draw-down decisions in the new year. Let me be clear: this reduction is possible because of the success of the Afghan national security forces in assuming a leading role.

Across many parts of Afghanistan, security is already delivered by the Afghan national security forces. Today, the ANSF has lead security responsibility in areas that are home to three quarters of the population, including each of the 34 provincial capitals and all three districts that make up the UK’s area of operations. Across Afghanistan, the ANSF now leads on more than 80% of conventional operations and carries out 90% of its own training. It sets its own priorities, leads its own planning and conducts and sustains its own operations. By the middle of next year—marking a moment of huge significance for the Afghan people—we expect the ANSF to have lead security responsibility for the whole country.

This national picture is replicated in Helmand. The ANSF is now firmly in charge in the populated areas of central Helmand, increasingly with the ability and confidence to operate independently, and, as the ANA’s confidence in its own ability grows, it is showing an appetite to conduct Afghan intelligence-led raids, and we are focusing our advisory effort accordingly.

The focus of our assistance to the ANSF in Helmand is increasingly switching from company-level activities to mentoring at battalion level. Kandaks from the ANA’s 3/215 Brigade in Nad Ali and Nahr Saraj have already moved to the new model, working alongside the UK-led brigade advisory group, and further kandak advisory teams will be in place shortly. The reaction of the leaders and commanders at all levels in 3/215 Brigade has been one of pride based on self-confidence. Furthermore, this phased transition has allowed the UK-led Task Force Helmand to reduce its footprint significantly, and, since April, nearly 50 permanent British base locations—more than 60% of the pre-April total—have been closed or handed over to the ANSF.

Although progress on security has been real and meaningful, partnering is not without risk, and the attacks on our forces, including the so-called insider attacks perpetrated by rogue members of the ANSF, remind us how difficult the mission is. We are working at every level to suppress this threat and will do everything that we can to thwart it. We are clear that we will not allow these cowardly attacks to derail our strategy or commitment to the Afghan people.

The insurgents remain committed to conducting a campaign of violence in Afghanistan and continue to represent a threat to the future stability of the country. The ANSF, supported by ISAF where necessary, is taking the fight to the insurgents and pushing them away from the towns, markets, key transport routes and intensively farmed areas towards the rural fringe. As a result, the Afghan-led security plan is increasingly able to focus on disrupting the insurgency in its safe havens.

Although we cannot be complacent, the picture as a whole is of an insurgency weakened. The number of enemy-initiated attacks has fallen by an average of more than 10% in areas that have entered the transition process, so demonstrating that the Afghans are managing their own security. More importantly, the geographical pattern of enemy-initiated attacks shows a significant reduction in impact on the local population. Although our combat mission will be ending in 2014, our clear message to the Afghan people remains one of firm and ongoing commitment.

On the security front, at the Chicago summit in May, the international community agreed to provide funding to support the continued development of the Afghan national security forces in the years after 2014. NATO has agreed the establishment of a new, non-combat mission after transition completes. The UK will support this, including through our role as the lead coalition partner at the new Afghan national army officer academy. That is our baseline commitment, and, as the Prime Minister said earlier, we will consider other options for additional engagement after 2014.

On supporting the Afghan Government as a whole, the Kabul conference in June sent a clear message of regional engagement, and, at the Tokyo conference in July, $4 billion per year was pledged to meet Afghanistan’s essential development needs. The UK’s combined ongoing funding commitments from Chicago and Tokyo are almost £250 million a year. For the value of this support from the international community to be fully realised, however, the Afghan Government will need to address the corruption that remains rampant and could become a very real threat to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. The Afghan Government now need to deliver on their commitments through the Tokyo mutual accountability framework to establish a legal framework for fighting corruption, improve economic and financial management and implement key economic and governance reforms, including on elections.

Democracy is taking hold in Afghanistan—not, of course, in the same shape that we have here in Britain, but Afghan voters can look forward to a future of their choosing, rather than one that is imposed upon them. Afghan women enjoy a level of participation in their society and their politics that few could have dreamed of even half a decade ago. The Department for International Development will continue to provide funding and support to advance this important agenda further. In Helmand, the process of local representation has seen marked improvements. Voter participation in 2012 for district community council elections in the traditionally challenging districts of Sangin, Nahr Saraj and Garmsir has been impressive by comparison with levels in previous presidential and parliamentary elections in the same areas. October’s announcement of the 2014 presidential elections is another important milestone in Afghanistan’s history. Many challenges remain, but an inclusive and transparent electoral process will be a sign of real progress.

Ultimately, the best opportunity for a stable and secure Afghanistan for the long term lies in a political settlement—one that draws in those opponents of the Afghan Government willing to renounce the insurgency and participate in peaceful politics. Any political process will, in the end, require the Afghan Government, the Taliban and other Afghan groups to come together to talk and to compromise. We appreciate how difficult that is for the respective parties, so we are working with our international allies to help to bring all sides together. In particular, the engagement of Pakistan in the process is hugely important. Our aim is to generate confidence and dialogue. Our message to the Taliban is that reconciliation is not surrender; it is an opportunity for all Afghans to sit down together and help to shape their country’s future. Common ground can be found, focused on the need for a strong, independent, economically viable Afghanistan.

The future of Afghanistan can be seen in the increased level of economic activity across the country. Bazaars that had been deserted are re-opening and commercial investment is evident in the towns. Basic public services are available to increasing percentages of the population. Nevertheless, Afghanistan, although rich in culture and natural resources, remains one of the poorest countries in the world—a legacy of 30 years of conflict. Its people are proud and hospitable, yet they have suffered unimaginable brutality and deprivation.

Over the last 11 years, we have been helping to ensure that Afghanistan’s past is not inevitably its future. As we move towards full transition at the end of 2014, it is clear that there remain huge challenges ahead for the Afghan people. Our combat mission is drawing to a close, but our commitment to them is long term. Progress is clear and measurable, and our determination to complete our mission and help Afghanistan to secure its future remains undiminished. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for an advance copy of his quarterly statement. On each occasion when we meet to discuss Afghanistan, we rightly pay tribute to our service personnel and their families. That is even more poignant as we approach Christmas. As we prepare to celebrate Christmas with our families, we remember those in Afghanistan, separated from theirs, and those who have been lost, never to return to their loved ones. They are in the thoughts of us all and in the prayers of many of us.

The commitment to success in Afghanistan runs deep on both sides of the House. Although we on the Opposition Benches will scrutinise Government decisions, we will support the intentions with which they are made. Afghanistan has seen significant, but not irreversible progress. Al-Qaeda has been dispersed; we have overseen elections; the army and police forces are being trained; and a rule of law is developing. However, none of those tasks can be said to be complete. There are immense challenges to overcome. Facilitating free and fair presidential elections, tackling green-on-blue attacks, improving the representativeness of the police and the army, developing an education system and, above all, helping to deliver political reconciliation are all issues that necessitate our commitment up to and beyond 2014.

We all want to see our troops home as soon as possible, and we welcome today’s announcement. However, can the Secretary of State say when he will be able to tell us which units will leave and from which parts of Helmand? We are all concerned about the continuing risk to UK personnel who will remain. Can he tell us whether any force protection capabilities will be drawn down as a consequence of his announcement?

The Secretary of State spoke in general terms. Can he be more specific about how the capacity of those who are departing can be sufficiently replaced by Afghan forces? Can he give the House more details about the capability of Afghan forces specifically? What capacity do they have in providing an airbridge, aerial surveillance and intelligence?

The Secretary of State told us that 3,800 of our forces would leave by the end of next year. Does he currently envisage most of them remaining until the end of the fighting season, and does he expect the UK forces who remain after 2013 to be withdrawn throughout 2014 or to remain until the end of combat operations?

The co-ordination of the military coalition is essential. Can the Secretary of State tell us whether today’s announcement is part of a synchronised international set of announcements? Can he also say whether all those who return from Afghanistan, whether in 2013 or in 2014, will be exempt from any future tranche of compulsory Army redundancies?

Although the focus is rightly on withdrawal, it is also necessary to consider the post-2014 military settlement. The Chief of the General Staff is right to say that our commitment to Afghan institutions must be long-term, but we need more clarity about the nature of that commitment. Will the Secretary of State be more specific about the role of non-combat personnel? Is it his current thinking that our trainers will be embedded with the ANSF, and, if so, who will be responsible for force protection?

The Prime Minister rightly alluded to this earlier, but it is still unclear how many UK forces will remain post-2014 and from which services they will be drawn. When will the Secretary of State be in a position to give us more details abut that, as well as the UK’s equipment legacy to Afghanistan?

We all know that a long-term settlement for Afghanistan will be achieved through politics, not just through military might. There have been reports recently of a road map to peace from Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, outlining plans for talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban early next year. How confident is the Secretary of State that such talks may indeed take place, and does he believe that talks between the Taliban and US officials will recommence in Qatar in the new year? Will he also comment on the significance of Pakistan’s release of 18 Afghan prisoners? Does he feel that it marks a potentially significant shift in the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship?

One of the main measures by which we will judge progress in Afghanistan is the progress of women. Sadly, a recent detailed UN report showed that Afghan women remain frequent victims of abuse. What efforts are the UK Government making to ensure that women’s safety does not deteriorate once ISAF forces have left? In particular, beyond DFID’s efforts, what are the Government doing to sustain the progress that has been made for women in relation to the political process, the police and the judiciary?

As we enter the 12th and penultimate year of UK combat operations in this bloody but unavoidable conflict, there will rightly be lessons and consequences from Afghanistan. The time will also come for us to reflect, as a nation and free from party politics, on how we can mark in a lasting way our commemoration of those who have fallen and those who have been injured. I look forward to hearing from the Secretary of State how NATO can achieve withdrawal while maintaining the stability for which so many Britons have fought so fiercely. We need to get this right. This is our fourth conflict in Afghanistan, and we have no intention of there ever being a fifth.

[Mr Hammond]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments and for the tone in which he made them. I know that he expressed the views of Members in all parts of the House in sending best wishes for Christmas to the members of our service personnel who will be in theatre over the Christmas period. I am grateful for his continued support and for that of the whole Opposition.

The right hon. Gentleman was absolutely right to emphasise the scale of the challenge ahead, and the reversibility of the achievements that have been won. It is for precisely that reason that we are engaged in the ongoing process of building the Afghan national security forces and the institutions of the Afghan state for the long term, and it is for precisely that reason that we have gone out of our way to emphasise the nature of our ongoing commitment to the Afghan people way beyond the end of our combat operations in 2014.

The right hon. Gentleman understandably asked some questions about the draw-down of our forces during 2013. He asked which units would leave and from which parts of Helmand. Owing to our six-monthly rotational pattern in which units are deployed to theatre routinely around March-April and September-October each year, it is less a question of which units will leave than a question of deploying fewer units to replace those that are coming out of theatre at each successive turn of the handle. I expect that there will be some draw-down of numbers next April, a period during the fighting season in which numbers remain constant, and a further draw-down in September-October, towards the end of next year.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about force protection measures. Ours is an integrated force. The 5,200 figure was arrived at through a bottom-up process of military logic and military planning that took account of the shape and scale of the force that will be required to deliver the tasks that we expect to be delivering by the end of 2013.

As for the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces who will increasingly fill the gap as we reduce our numbers, the message is clear. The right hon. Gentleman will have heard it: I know that he has heard the back-to-office reports of returning commanders from Afghanistan. The Prime Minister mentioned it earlier, and I have heard it myself. Everyone talks of the Afghan forces’ increasing confidence, increasing competence and increasing willingness to engage. There has been a step change in the level of what they are able to do.

However, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, at present Afghan forces still depend on ISAF allies for some key enablers: air cover, air support, indirect fire support—they are building a capability of their own in that respect, but it is as yet immature—and, crucially, medical evacuation, which gives the Afghan army high levels of confidence on the battlefield. Over the next two years, we will focus on developing Afghan indigenous capabilities so that they can replace those enablers at the end of our combat involvement.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the international dimension of draw-down. There is an emerging ISAF plan, which is being discussed among the ISAF nations, and today’s announcement is entirely consistent with that plan. Other allies, including the United States of America, will make specific announcements in due course.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the rules on redundancy. Announcements about future tranches of Army redundancy will be made in the new year, and the rules will be set out to be as fair as possible. That means ensuring that the field of redundancy is as wide as possible, while ensuring that those who are about to be deployed on operations, those who are currently deployed and those who have just returned from operations remain exempt. The more widely we set the field, the fairer the process of redundancy selection will be.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the post-2014 non-combat commitment and about embedded training. Those matters have not been decided, beyond the commitment that we have given to take the lead role in running the Afghan national officer training academy. There are a number of things that we could consider doing beyond that, but we have decided that it does not make sense to make firm commitments earlier than we need to, before we see how the situation develops on the ground and before we see what other allies intend to do. We will make announcements to the House in due course, during 2013, as those decisions are made.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked about talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban and between US officials and the Taliban. The Government are working very hard and very diligently. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is routinely engaged in encouraging the process of dialogue, as is the Prime Minister. We know from our own experience over many years that conflicts of this kind invariably have to be settled by means of dialogue and compromise. At the heart of that dialogue and compromise will be a renewed shared understanding of the need for future dialogue and co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I am pleased to say the UK has played a significant role in enhancing that and in ensuring there is genuine engagement with Pakistan in these discussions.

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. My question is about force protection. As all the ISAF countries begin to draw down, they will have concerns about force protection, including how to protect increasingly isolated units. What is being done to reduce the isolation of ISAF units and to share possible force protection measures across ISAF countries and the Afghan national security forces?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend is right to draw attention to that question, as the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) also did. As we draw down, force protection will be one of the key determinants of the shape of the force and the scale of draw-down that is possible. As my right hon. Friend suggests, there will be co-ordination across ISAF, including sharing force protection arrangements as the force gets smaller. I should also draw my right hon. Friend’s attention to what I said earlier about the reduction of the UK footprint in Helmand. That is significant and has significant implications for force protection. We are now servicing 32 UK locations in Helmand province, as opposed to more than 80 UK locations just nine months ago. That has led to a significant reduction in both the logistics challenge and the force protection challenge.

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

When military action was first taken in Afghanistan some 11 years ago, the purpose was rightly to remove, after 9/11, al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, and that was accomplished fairly quickly. I welcome the troop reduction, but does the Secretary of State accept that a military victory of any kind over the Taliban is totally out of the question—it has not come about so far, and it is not going to come about in the next two years—and that the future of Afghanistan will have to be decided by Afghans, even including some Taliban members, who are totally opposed to that obnoxious organisation?

[Mr Hammond]

To my surprise, I largely agree with the hon. Gentleman. He is right that the initial challenge was to defeat al-Qaeda and deny it the space to organise in Afghanistan, and that has been achieved. He is also right that military means alone will not solve the problem in Afghanistan, and I do not think anyone in this Government or the previous Administration has suggested that. In the end there has to be compromise and dialogue, and a process that draws into civil society what we might call the soft part of the insurgency, which is willing to renounce insurgent activity and engage in political dialogue. Our experience in the United Kingdom and around the world clearly suggests that that is the way sustainably to end these kinds of enduring conflict. If we want an enduring peace in Afghanistan, it will need to involve all sections of Afghan society and all strands of political opinion.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

May I also express my admiration for, and gratitude to, those who have served and who are serving in Afghanistan? Like other Members, I was reassured by what my right hon. Friend said about force protection, as it is axiomatic that land forces are at their most vulnerable at the time of withdrawal, but a further area of protection needs to be addressed. Will there be proper protection of equipment, to minimise opportunities for it to be used by insurgents or others with malign intentions towards the Government of Afghanistan?

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his remarks. I should have said in relation to force protection that the transition from company-level to battalion-level and then to brigade-level mentoring and advising will make the force protection challenge much easier by reducing the daily footprint of contact with Afghan forces and the Afghan population. We intend to recuperate to the UK large amounts of equipment, as we are planning to use much of it in the construction of our future Army plans, Future Force 2020, but we will, of course, ensure that any equipment that is not required back in the UK is either properly and formally gifted to the Afghan national security forces or the militaries of friendly neighbouring countries, or is appropriately destroyed.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Out of which budget will the cost of repatriating and reintegrating equipment come? Will it come out of the £160-billion core equipment budget?

[Mr Hammond]

That is a good question. Our arrangements with the Treasury are that equipment that has been purchased as urgent operational requirements from the special reserve may be repatriated into core without any charge to the defence budget, but the cost of physically recuperating that equipment will be met from the core defence budget. In respect of armoured vehicles that have been purchased as UORs, therefore, the Army will have to decide whether it is cost-effective to bring that equipment back and overhaul and re-equip it for future service, or whether it is more appropriate to abandon it and devote the money saved to purchase new equipment.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister both rightly referred to the importance of maintaining a post-2014 commitment in Afghanistan. One of the ways that we might most appropriately manifest that is by maintaining Camp Bastion, which has been specially built for its purpose. Indeed, a huge amount of money has been invested in it. That would not only send a signal to the Afghan population and Government; it would also provide a useful strategic asset in what is an important and turbulent area of the world.

[Mr Hammond]

The United States is currently considering where to retain strategic bases in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and my understanding is that it is highly likely—although not yet absolutely certain—that it will choose to continue to occupy Camp Bastion.

[Mr John Denham (Southampton, Itchen) (Lab)]

A few weeks ago in the House of Commons there was the first ever meeting of the UK’s Hazara community. As the Secretary of State knows, the Hazaras are a Shi’a minority who have suffered considerable oppression in Afghanistan, going back at least as far as the first British war there, but in particular under the Taliban regime. The Secretary of State has rightly talked about the need for a political solution, but may I urge him and his fellow Ministers from other Departments to ensure that the interests of the minority Hazara community are not lost in the rush to achieve a political settlement?

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that question, and I will ensure that his concerns about the Hazara community are drawn to the Foreign Secretary’s attention. There is a significant number of minority communities in Afghanistan—it is a fragmented society—and one of the challenges will be to design a future solution that is coherent and promotes having a strong central Government but also respects the many different minority communities in the country.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

What does my right hon. Friend mean when he refers to mentoring at kandak or battalion level? Does that mean our soldiers and officers will not venture out on patrol, but will remain with the headquarters element and therefore will not be as exposed as in the past?

[Mr Hammond]

Not necessarily: some of the kandak-level advisory activity may well involve moving with the battalion headquarters element, and if the battalion commanders are moving outside their bases, on some occasions the advisory team may move with them. This is a flexible construct, however, and things will depend on how individual commanders prefer to work and how their kandak advisory teams find it most constructive to work with them. There is a large degree of discretion.

[Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson (Lagan Valley) (DUP)]

Although of course it is right to press ahead with dialogue with the Taliban, it is also prudent to keep an eye on what they are doing as regards the ongoing conflict. What are our military doing to build the intelligence gathering capacity of the ANSF in advance of withdrawal?

[Mr Hammond]

That is a very good question. It is probably fair to characterise ISAF as having had rather poor human intelligence capability and having relied on very sophisticated electronic and other technological intelligence gathering. We will not be able to replicate in the ANSF a similar level of high-tech intelligence gathering, but I am pretty confident that what the ANSF will lack in that regard will be more than made up for by its human intelligence capability. Members of the ANSF have an intuitive understanding of what is going on in local communities that gives them a touch and feel for the local area that ISAF troops, however long they stay there, will never have.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

Given what my right hon. Friend has said about the inherent risks of reversibility in the security situation, what plans are in place if there is a significant change in what is anticipated over the next couple of years so that, if there is not the training and leadership capability among the Afghan population, we have the flexibility to implement different plans and that our hard-won gains are not lost by the end of 2014?

[Mr Hammond]

Of course, we retain flexibility in our plans, but I would not wish to mislead my hon. Friend: our clear intention is to end our combat operations by the end of 2014, along with the rest of our ISAF partners. By setting that clear target, we have set the Afghans a target and all the evidence is that they are stepping up to the plate with alacrity and delivering on—indeed, exceeding—our expectations of their ability to respond to that challenge.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

As Pakistan has a key role to play in any peaceful solution for Afghanistan and the Secretary of State has mentioned increased engagement, what evidence does he have of reduced involvement from certain sources in Pakistan, particularly the security services, in helping and sheltering insurgents and the Taliban?

[Mr Hammond]

As the hon. Gentleman knows and as we have discussed in this House before, the situation in Pakistan, particularly in the federally administered tribal areas, is extremely complex, as is the engagement of the Pakistani intelligence agency in activities there. We are seeing a clear political direction from the Pakistani civilian Government towards engagement and constructive working with the international community and Afghan partners, but we are also seeing a clear indication that the military are now thinking hard about where Pakistan’s long-term interests lie. They know that there are only two years left of ISAF combat presence in which to sort this out and they are engaging with international partners and the Afghans in a much more constructive way than we have seen for many years.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

The Secretary of State quite rightly says that the relationship between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban will be central to any peace, which we all hope will include respect for the rights of girls such as Malala Yousafzai, who is surely one of the bravest teenagers in the world. Does the Secretary of State detect any lasting shift in Pakistani public and political opinion and in attitudes towards the Taliban following on from her extraordinary example?

[Mr Hammond]

I think that the answer to that must be yes, that has had an impact on Pakistani public opinion. There is also evidence that the Taliban is moderating some of its more extreme views because it recognises that they are costing it popularity with the population.

[Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

I was in Afghanistan three weeks ago as president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I concur that the Afghan national army is capable, well led and well equipped. It is essential that it remains under political control, however, and as President Karzai will step down early in 2014 and a new president will be elected, will the Secretary of State reassure me that our Government and those of our ISAF allies will give as much attention to the political transition as to the security transition?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Clearly, maintaining political control of the Afghan national army is crucial. I see little sign that it is becoming politicised and it operates effectively as a military force, but the Afghan Ministry of Defence is a weak institution. One area that we are considering for UK engagement beyond 2014 is the provision of support at senior level to the Afghan Ministry of Defence.

[Patrick Mercer (Newark) (Con)]

Will the Secretary of State assure me that he will not listen to the requests from the Opposition to provide yet further details about our tactical deployments and tactical draw-down? Our enemies already know too much about when we are withdrawing, how many troops we are withdrawing and in what numbers. Giving units, equipments and other important details would, I suggest, help our enemies and not hinder them.

[Mr Hammond]

As I have already said, I cannot at the moment give the details of which units will be in theatre in future. We make no secret about units being deployed—we make routine announcements on which units will be deployed to theatre—but I completely agree with my hon. Friend that a public discussion about which capabilities we will retain and withdraw and about when we will do that would not be helpful.

[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

I, too, was able to visit Afghanistan with colleagues from the Defence Committee, as the Secretary of State will know, and we saw much of the progress he has described. However, we identified one particular issue on which I would like him to make an observation: the detention of prisoners at Bastion and the difficulties in transferring them into the Afghan justice system. I understand that two of them are charged with the murder of British troops. Will he comment on how that process is progressing?

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to update the House on the detention situation, which is an important aspect of our operations. We suspended transfers into the Afghan justice system earlier this year because of concerns about the potential for the mistreatment of prisoners in National Directorate of Security facilities. Over a period of months, a significant number of steps were taken to increase our oversight of what happens to transferred prisoners. We were hoping to recommence transfers in the autumn, but two things happened. First, in a case that is being heard in the High Court in London, an injunction was granted against us, preventing further transfers into the Afghan system without the permission of the High Court. Secondly, new and classified information came to my attention that led me to make a decision to continue as a matter of policy to suspend transfers into the Afghan system. That means that we are holding significant numbers of detainees who are to be charged in the Afghan judicial system but cannot, for reasons of policy and legal impediment, be transferred into the Afghan system at present. We are improving and increasing the size of the detention facility at Bastion to reflect the fact that those people will be held in larger numbers and for longer periods.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

People across Wiltshire, to where many of these soldiers will return, will strongly welcome the announcement about what is effectively the beginning of the end of our combat involvement in Afghanistan. It is very welcome indeed. Does the Secretary of State agree that the success of our withdrawal will be judged by two kinds of Afghan confidence? First, they must be confident that they can do the job, which increasingly seems to be the case, and secondly they must be confident that we will not cut and run—that we are not leaving them to it, but that we will keep an eye on what happens and stand ready, as my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen) said, to intervene again should that become necessary in the years to come.

[Mr Hammond]

As the Prime Minister has repeatedly made clear and I have emphasised again today, although our combat mission will be coming to an end, our commitment to the Afghan people will be enduring and is underpinned by a firm commitment of more than £250 million a year of military aid support and development aid.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

Mohammed Hottak is a former Afghani interpreter who lives in Leicester. It took him years to get his asylum case processed, and his wife and children have still not joined him. He and other interpreters risk their lives to support our country. Why are the Afghani interpreters being treated differently from those who helped us in Iraq?

[Mr Hammond]

Locally employed civilians include interpreters, but the question goes much wider than interpreters. We are currently looking very carefully at how we are going to make appropriate provision to support locally employed civilians as we draw down and eventually end our combat mission. We have a clear commitment to treat them fairly and appropriately, and to ensure their safety and security beyond the term of their employment with Her Majesty’s Government. I cannot comment on an individual’s specific case, but I am confident that as we get nearer to the end of our combat involvement in Afghanistan, further statements will be made about our detailed policy towards locally employed civilians; I believe we currently have about 3,500 of them.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

A few moments ago, the Secretary of State gave a very important answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), when he confirmed, for, I think, the first time by a British Minister, that our American allies are thinking of retaining at least one strategic base in the region. Given that we face the threat of the return of al-Qaeda to Afghanistan and the destabilisation of Pakistan by the Pakistani Taliban—with their nuclear arsenal to be borne in mind—is it not extremely important that somebody has a fallback plan, based on the use of strategic bases, even if it is not us?

[Mr Hammond]

When any of my colleagues stands up and says that I have said something that no Minister has said before, my heart sinks, but I think on this occasion I am okay.

I would not be so presumptuous as to speak for the United States, but my current understanding is that US planning very likely envisages the retention of Camp Bastion. Of course, any remaining footprint in Afghanistan—strategic base or otherwise—depends on the agreement of the Afghan Government, and as my hon. Friend knows, negotiations are under way between the United States and the Government of Afghanistan about a long-term strategic partnership agreement.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Can the Secretary of State tell us exactly how much money has been spent by the UK in the Afghan operation over the past 11 years—[Interruption.] It is not a joke. Can he also tell us what the comparative figures are for poverty among the ordinary people of Afghanistan now and 11 years ago?

[Mr Hammond]

On the first part of the question, I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman off the top of my head what the total expenditure has been since the beginning of the operation in 2001, but I am happy to write to him to give him those numbers. I think they have been published, but I am very happy to write to him and place a copy in the Library.

On the hon. Gentleman’s second point about poverty, Afghanistan is still a very poor country, but its economy has been growing, and although it is of course relative, there is a strong sense in Afghanistan of growing prosperity. People are able to get their goods to market; if they farm their produce, they can actually sell it. There is investment in towns and cities, and the economy has been growing at 9% a year for the last few years. Those are positive signs for ordinary Afghan people, and the progress that has been made in moving the combat—the insurgency—out of the populated centres is crucial in restoring confidence in the local economy and allowing it to thrive and prosper.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that Defence Equipment and Support is based in my constituency. Will he join me in paying tribute to DES for all the work it has done over the entire deployment, making sure that we have the right kit and the right people in the right place at the right time? Will he give us an assurance that DES will have all the resources it needs as the draw-down begins to take place, so that equipment and personnel can be brought back efficiently and on time?

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to join my hon. Friend in paying tribute to Defence Equipment and Support, and in particular to draw attention to the extremely efficient way in which the UOR process has worked throughout both this conflict and the Iraq conflict before it. Resources will of course be available for the recovery of our personnel and equipment, and a huge logistic operation is beginning to get under way—reopening the reverse lines of communication both through the northern stans and Pakistan—to bring that vast amount of equipment out of theatre.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I welcome the news that more troops are to be swiftly withdrawn, but I want to go back to the question put by the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) about Afghan interpreters. They are worried that they will be sent back to Afghanistan and killed, and interpreters still serving UK troops in Afghanistan fear for their lives as more British troops leave. Can the Secretary of State assure us that he will let us know as soon as he can whether a scheme similar to that in Iraq will be properly extended to Afghanistan? Legal proceedings are about to be mounted on behalf of those people, who fear that their lives are at risk.

[Mr Hammond]

As the hon. Lady says, legal proceedings are about to be instigated—we understand—so obviously it would be improper for me to say anything about them. This is a big and complicated issue. A large number of people are involved and not all of them are interpreters, who usually are quite highly educated. There are also large numbers of locally employed staff in other capacities. As I said, we are very much focused on the problem and we must have a properly thought-through and coherent approach. I give the hon. Lady an undertaking on behalf of the Government that once we have a clear plan we will announce it to the House.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

This is a landmark statement, which signals the beginning of a long draw-down in a very difficult war. Difficult questions will need to be answered as to why it has taken us so long to get to where we are today. Peace is by no means guaranteed. Does the Secretary of State agree that the welcome advances in security must be matched by improvements to governance and economic development if Najibullah is not to be repeated?

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend. In particular, progress has to be made on the endemic corruption that still exists in Afghan society and throughout the Afghan economy, if the progress already made is to be built on.

Perhaps I could take this opportunity to tell the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) that I have become aware—by magic—that the net additional cost of military operations since 2001 is estimated as £17.4 billion to date.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. The murder in Pakistan of six aid workers delivering vital polio treatment shocked us all. Can he assure the House that there will be military protection for medical aid workers in Afghanistan to ensure that the polio inoculations and medical treatment that are so important for children and adults can be maintained?

[Mr Hammond]

The responsibility for protecting Afghan local health services will be primarily for the Afghan police and military, but I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman that we were all shocked by the reminder of the primitiveness of some of the Taliban doctrine, and that they would attack people for providing vaccination against life-threatening diseases. That is the scale of the challenge we are dealing with.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I welcome the statement, but as the Secretary of State knows, some Members of the House have long held the view that we were fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country, as we strayed from the original mission. Will he confirm that ISAF is now conducting non-conditional talks with the Taliban? Until fairly recently, the American position was that they would only talk to the Taliban if the Taliban laid down their arms and accepted the constitution. The Americans were living in never-never land. Has the position on those talks changed?

[Mr Hammond]

I think it would be wrong to characterise the discussions as ISAF discussions. There are discussions that the Afghan Government have indicated a willingness to enter into, which are conditional on an acceptance of the Afghan constitution. That is the position of the Afghan Government. There are also discussions, which have been widely reported, between US officials and Taliban representatives, which do not have the same preconditions attached to them.

[Andy Sawford (Corby) (Lab/Co-op)]

This year, Corby lost one of its sons, Grenadier Guard James Ashworth, who died in a grenade attack in Helmand. In paying tribute to James and all the soldiers from Corby who served in the past and will serve in the future in Afghanistan, may I ask the Secretary of State to say what assessment he has made of the increased risks to the 5,500 servicemen and women who will be in Helmand in 2014?

[Mr Hammond]

Our current estimate of the opening number in 2014 is 5,200. We do not think there will be an increased risk to them. There are balancing factors to consider. On the one hand, we will be mentoring and advising at a higher level of command; that will imply a lower footprint, fewer bases and fewer patrols going outside the wire. On the other hand, we will be drawing down, and drawing down and evacuating equipment is by its nature a complex and risk-based business. But I think overall we would not expect the total amount of risk to increase during the draw-down, taking those two factors together.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

On our recent Defence Committee visit to Afghanistan it was impossible not to be deeply impressed with the progress made, and my right hon. Friend’s statement is extremely welcome. May I put it to him that pivotal to our successful operation in Malaya and also, arguably, Northern Ireland was the offer of a genuine amnesty to those who laid down their arms, and that the current amnesty on offer, which does not even extend to drug-dealing activities, is not really the right route to get the softer element of the Taliban to negotiate?

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend that reintegration of people who have been opposed to the regime and, indeed, active supporters of the insurgency is an essential part of a stable future for Afghanistan. A substantial reintegration programme is under way, as he knows. Thousands of low-level Taliban fighters who have abandoned the insurgency have been reintegrated into Afghan society and that process will need to continue if we are to deliver stability in the future.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Having visited Helmand two years ago, I want to add my own tribute to the fantastic work of our armed forces, having seen that at first hand. I recently spoke to personnel serving in Afghanistan who fear leaving the forces, fear looking for a job, and fear the cuts to support to people on low incomes. Increasing numbers of veterans who have served in Afghanistan are turning to the Royal British Legion and other forces’ charities for advice and often emergency support. What is the Secretary of State doing to support those charities to serve our very brave veterans in their lives after they leave the forces?

[Mr Hammond]

Of course we support the service charities; they are a very important part of the overall service family. But the hon. Gentleman does not do our armed forces and the people who serve in them any service by painting that very bleak picture of their prospects after service. The truth is that over 90% of people leaving the armed forces who are looking for work have found work within three months and over 95% within six months. That is a good result. We can continue to do better; we can continue to deliver additional support, and the recent appointment of a transition tsar by the Prime Minister to support service people leaving the forces and to help them in the process of getting into work and establishing a new home is a very important contribution to that. It is basically a good news story, not a bad news story.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I join other Members in congratulating the Secretary of State on making a very difficult, very courageous, correct decision to draw down troops so rapidly. May I ask him to remain open to the possibility that, depending on US decisions in January, we look at this as being only the minimum amount we withdraw, and to remain open to the possibility of withdrawing significantly more?

[Mr Hammond]

I have announced that our current planning sees numbers going down to about 5,200 by the end of 2013. That planning is of course based on certain assumptions about what the rest of our ISAF partners are doing, and about what the ANSF will be doing. We believe that those assumptions are robust, but if it turns out during the course of 2013 that things turn out differently, of course we retain the flexibility to look again at our plans.

[Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

Given that combat missions will continue to 2014, as the Defence Secretary has said, will he ensure, in the light of green-on-blue attacks and other reasons, that all soldiers are equipped with sidearms for force and individual protection? Like many, I have constituents in Afghanistan, and some who are going there, and they and their families would be slightly less tense if all soldiers were equipped with sidearms, which would also act as a deterrent.

[Mr Hammond]

Without getting into the technicalities, I do not think I can give the hon. Gentleman the commitment that all soldiers will be equipped with sidearms, but I can tell him that current orders require all soldiers to carry a weapon at all times when they are anywhere in contact with Afghans, and if they are in a circumstance where they cannot carry a weapon, a so-called guardian angel system is in place where armed troops overwatch them during any period where they are necessarily unarmed, such as during sports activities.

[Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)]

One of the legacies we can give to those who have paid so much in sacrifice for our mission in Afghanistan is the long-term stability of the nation. In its economic stability, are we doing everything we can to make sure that the wealth of natural resources that my right hon. Friend mentioned is exploited to the best benefit of the people of Afghanistan, not those from outside?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the long-term stability of Afghanistan depends on its economic development and a key part of its economic development will be the successful exploitation of its mineral wealth. Mineral wealth cannot be taken offshore to Dubai; it sits in the ground, and as long as the wealth of Afghanistan is in Afghanistan, local people will invest in Afghanistan and the future of the country. There are all sorts of international efforts, including many supported by the UK’s DFID funding, to ensure the development and exploitation of that mineral wealth for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

The withdrawal is of course very welcome, but why has the Secretary of State disregarded the alarming fact that in the past 12 months, $900 million has been stolen from the bank of Afghanistan by Government corruption, and that £4.5 billion has been smuggled out of that country, much of it to Dubai, to tart up the boltholes that the politicians have prepared to flee to in 2015? Does he think that the Afghan army will give their allegiance to a corrupt Government, to the Northern Alliance or to the Taliban?

[Mr Hammond]

I am not ignoring those facts. I have acknowledged that the Afghan Government will have to do much more about corruption if Afghanistan is to have a viable future. All our activity, through DFID and other channels, is to secure sustainable development in Afghanistan, which will encourage people to retain their wealth in Afghanistan, but I do not dissent from the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion that there is wholesale corruption and that significant amounts of money have been illegally expatriated from the country. He is of course right.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fuels much of the illegal hard drug trade on the streets of Britain. What progress is being made, and will be made, to reduce the reliance of the Afghan economy on poppy cultivation, while also ensuring that the livelihood of many poor farmers is not endangered?

[Mr Hammond]

This is a perennial challenge in any country where narcotics cultivation is a core part of the economy—to develop sustainable alternative forms of economic activity that provide a livelihood for peasant farmers which can compete with the returns available from narcotics. That is a big challenge for the Afghan Government. We are putting a lot of investment into helping them with that challenge and counter-narcotics will be a continuing strand of our involvement with Afghanistan well beyond the end of our combat operations in 2014.

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

May I press the Secretary of State to say whether Afghanistan campaign returners will be subject to compulsory redundancy?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman asks the question in the abstract—[Interruption.] It is not a yes or no question at all. At the time when redundancy decisions are made, a defined group of people will be excluded from consideration. That will be people deployed on operations, people preparing to deploy on operations, and people recovering on leave after operations, but I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman, as the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) asked me to do, that anyone who is now or at any time in the future deployed in Afghanistan will not be eligible for redundancy. That would reduce the field eligible for selection to a tiny number and would be most unfair.

[Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)]

I welcome the ongoing United Kingdom commitment to give £250 million a year for development in Afghanistan. This represents about 10% of the pledged total. Does my right hon. Friend have confidence that the remaining 90% will be found and that the United Kingdom will not be left to pick up the difference?

[Mr Hammond]

I think my hon. Friend might be confusing two things. There are, rather unhelpfully, two separate 4 billions here. There is £4 billion of development aid that was pledged at Tokyo, and there is $4 billion a year of support for the ANSF, of which the United Kingdom has committed about $100 million—around £70 million. We are confident that these sums will be found and that they will be available to the Afghans on an ongoing basis. We have set out our commitment and we do not intend to change from that position.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

Like many hon. Members in the Chamber, I represent several families who have lost their loved ones in Afghanistan over the past decade. That felt like a very optimistic statement from the Secretary of State on the progress we have made. I am a little more sceptical about what it has cost us in human life and treasure for the progress we have made. We would all agree that a political solution is necessary to resolve the conflict, but what assurances can the Secretary of State give us that when we reach that political solution with our draw-down forces, we will be able to maintain the safety of all those Afghans who have been our allies over the past decade, and we will not leave them to the mercy of the elements of the Taliban that we wish to draw into the future government of Afghanistan?

[Mr Hammond]

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has visited Afghanistan, but many of his colleagues have. It is not a perfect democracy and it never will be. It will not be the case that the Afghan Government will control every inch of their territory after 2014. There will be messy compromises in some parts of the country. Some will not be under the control of the central Government, and some of the behaviours will not be behaviours of the type that we would put up with here or in any European country, but any of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues who have been there will tell him that the lives of ordinary Afghans are immeasurably better today than they were five or six years ago, and that is the standard by which we should measure our involvement.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

The Secretary of State said that the civilian Government in Pakistan are fully committed to engagement and a stable Afghanistan. He will know that there are general elections in Pakistan in March—that is, three months away. Have there been discussions with other political parties to see whether they are committed to the same process of engagement and a stable Afghanistan?

[Mr Hammond]

To be honest, I cannot answer my hon. Friend’s question. It would be usual for our local post to have some degree of contact with non-Government parties, but as he has asked the question, I am happy to interrogate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on this and to write to him and put a copy of my letter in the Library.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

Recent events have given rise to fears that some of the advances that have been achieved for women and girls in the region, particularly in education, might be lost. One of the ways to protect women and girls is to embed attitudes towards education for women in those who will be serving in the security forces. Can the Secretary of State confirm that that is being done and is being given priority?

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her question because she highlights a dilemma: how do we at one and the same time say that the Afghans must be responsible for determining their future, and that we want their future to look, in this respect, like this—with women and girls remaining engaged in society? She is absolutely right that embedding a change in culture is the way to do it. That is one reason why the Prime Minister has, from the outset, been so determined that a significant part of our commitment post-2014 will be in the form of taking the lead in the Afghan national officer training academy, which will allow us to shape the cultural awareness training that officer cadets receive and that will filter down through the Afghan forces. The hon. Lady is right. DFID will go on investing in this agenda and the military commitment that we have made to the Afghan military will allow us to ensure that we are able to influence cultural attitudes within the security forces.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

I associate myself with the tributes that have been paid already, and I want to mention specifically 16 Air Assault Brigade, many of whose members have been deployed four times. The Secretary of State’s statement says: “Although our combat mission will be ending in 2014, our clear message to the Afghan people remains one of firm and ongoing commitment.” Without giving specific numbers, can he state whether there will be a significant British troop presence in Afghanistan in May 2015?

[Mr Hammond]

As the hon. Gentleman is aware, we have made two firm commitments. We will support the ongoing non-combat NATO mission and we will support the Afghan national officer academy. Together those commitments will amount to a small number of hundreds of personnel. Beyond that, we are considering the options available to us. We do not need to make firm decisions yet and the National Security Council is clearly of the view that we should not make firm decisions before we need to do so. I can tell him that in May 2015 there will almost certainly still be a small number of logisticians dismantling the last of our equipment and returning it to the UK.

[Glyn Davies (Montgomeryshire) (Con)]

During the years of British involvement in combat in Afghanistan, a huge number of young men and women have lost their lives or been seriously injured, including very many Welsh young men and women. There can be no greater tribute or memorial to all those people and their families than a lasting, secure, stable Afghanistan. Will my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that he will be as committed to securing that stable, peaceful Afghanistan after 2014 as the British Government have been to combat up until that date?

[Mr Hammond]

I can give my hon. Friend that commitment. We are committed to sticking with the Afghan people beyond 2014 because it is the right thing to do by them, because it is the right way to protect our national security, and because it is the right way to honour the memory of all those who have given their lives and made such enormous sacrifice over the past 11 years.

UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 18 May 2011, my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) made an oral statement to the House, Official Report column 351 and published “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine Initial Gate Parliamentary Report”. Since then my ministerial colleagues and I have undertaken to provide an annual update on the programme. As we reach the end of 2012, I have today published “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2012 Update to Parliament” and a copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

Defence Reform Report

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

My noble friend Lord Levene of Portsoken has conducted the first annual review of implementation of his defence reform report recommendations of June 2011, and has written to me setting out his conclusions.

I welcome Lord Levene’s recognition of the strong progress made to date in implementing his recommendations, and his confidence that the delivery of the majority of them will be achieved in time to transition to a new operating model for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in April 2013.

Some of the key changes of defence reform are already complete, such as strengthened top-level decision making and the focus on strategic direction from a newly-constituted Defence Board, which I chair. The Joint Forces Command has been established and its first commander appointed. Many other recommendations are on track for delivery by April 2013 with the implementation of the new delegated financial and military capability operating model: this will strengthen accountability and give the Service Chiefs much greater freedom to manage their resources and plan for future capability.

A few recommendations will take longer to complete. I acknowledge that there is more to do in some areas, such as development of the whole force concept and the delivery of improved management information, and I value Lord Levene’s continued interest and focus on these important changes.

I am placing a copy of Lord Levene’s letter in the Library of the House, together with the MOD’s summary of progress against the 53 defence reform recommendations.

HMS Audacious

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I wish to inform the House that the Ministry of Defence has signed a contract, worth approximately £1.2 billion, with BAE Systems Maritime-Submarines to deliver HMS Audacious, the fourth submarine in the Astute submarine class.

This contract covers the remaining elements of design and build work on HMS Audacious. In addition to the contract for HMS Audacious, contracted work on other boats of the class now includes: boat 5 (named HMS Anson) where £646 million is currently committed; boat 6 where £498 million is currently committed; and boat 7, where £328 million is currently committed.

The Astute class submarines are the most powerful and advanced attack submarines ever built for the Royal Navy. Lessons learned during work on the first three submarines in the class, HMS Astute, Ambush and Artful, will lead to further improvements in Audacious’s capability and performance, and to financial savings.

The UK has a world-class submarine-building industry in Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria, sustaining around 5,000 BAE Systems Maritime-Submarine’s jobs across the UK. Of these, the Astute programme supports over 3,000 jobs at the company. It also supports thousands of highly skilled jobs through around 400 suppliers across the UK submarine supply chain.

Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

The armed forces covenant is the expression of the moral obligation the Government and the nation owe to the armed forces community—those who serve, whether regular or reserve, their families; and veterans and their families. The Armed Forces Act 2011 enshrines the principles of the covenant in law, and places an obligation on the Defence Secretary to report to Parliament each year on the effects of membership of the armed forces on serving personnel, veterans and their families.

The Government are today publishing the first annual report to be produced under this legislation. The report addresses seven specific groups within the armed forces community, recording what we have done since the last report in 2011 and what we plan to do. It covers the full scope of the covenant, including the fields of health care, education, housing and the operation of inquests.

In the report, I have considered the two key principles: that those who serve in the armed forces, whether regular or reserve, those who have served in the past, and their families, should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services as a consequence of that service; and that special consideration is appropriate in some cases, especially for those who have given the most, such as the injured and bereaved. Since the coalition Government came to office in 2010, we have:

Doubled the operational allowance for service personnel who deploy on operations overseas, such as in Afghanistan.

Launched the community covenant, supported by a £30 million community covenant grant scheme.

Implemented a range of improvements in mental health care, including an additional 50 mental health professionals conducting outreach work with veterans in England, a 24-hour helpline and a support and advice website.

Specifically over the last 12 months, we have:

Doubled council tax relief again, for those serving on operations overseas, to around £600 for an average six-month tour.

Altered the schools admissions code to allow all schools in England to allocate a place in advance of a service family arriving in the area, and to enable infant schools in England to admit service children over the class size of 30.

Opened the £17 million Jubilee rehabilitation complex at the Headley Court defence rehabilitation centre and announced the investment of a further £5 million to refurbish wards and accommodation.

Launched a new defence discount service, which for the first time offers a privilege card entitling members of the armed forces community to a range of discounts on goods and services.

Transferred £35 million from fines levied on the banks for attempting to manipulate the LIBOR interest rate to the Ministry of Defence for use in supporting the armed forces community, mainly through service charities.

Looking forward to the year ahead, this Government will among other things:

Increase the service pupil premium to £300 from April 2013, and extend its scope to children of service personnel who have died in service;

Fully disregard war pension or other guaranteed income payments through the armed forces compensation scheme in calculating entitlement to universal credit, when it is launched in 2013; and

Invest a further £131 million to purchase new service family accommodation to become available for use in 2013.

The report has been compiled in consultation with the covenant reference group, which brings together representatives from Government Departments; the devolved Governments in Scotland and Wales; and from external members, including the three families federations, the Confederation of Service Charities, the Royal British Legion, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families’ Association, the War Widows’ Association and Professor Hew Strachan.

Observations on the annual report by the external members of the covenant reference group are published as part of the report itself. Their observations are broadly supportive, but highlight a number of areas where work remains to be done. The Government will take careful note of these and will work to address them during the period leading to the next annual report. We are very grateful to the external members for their continued involvement and assistance.

MOD Annual Report and Accounts

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am today publishing the Ministry of Defence’s annual report and accounts 2011-12. It provides a comprehensive overview of the Department’s financial performance for the year, together with data on some specific areas of non-financial performance, including factual information on the Department’s progress against structural reform and business plan priorities. This year we have laid the annual report and accounts later than planned and we expect to lay next year’s annual report and accounts before the summer recess. Copies will be available online from the MOD’s website at:

www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceFor/Researchers/