Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I associate myself and these Benches with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, especially the last part. I will add to that small list of questions to the Minister with regard to China in a moment, but I also recognise the high level of consensus that there is; that the UK requires a FIRS; and that the legislation is sound. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will recall that this House was instrumental in bringing about the scheme that we now have, rather than what had been initially proposed and passed in the House of Commons. That demonstrates the value of all political parties working together for proper scrutiny.

The intention was to have a robust and deliverable scheme that would be targeted, proportionate and effective. I am therefore grateful that there is now a clear date of operation and that it will go live on 1 July. I commend all the work of the officials who are bringing this together. It will be a year since the general election and 18 months after the passage of the legislation, but the key thing is to have it operable, effective and able to be communicated. I would be grateful if the Minister could say a bit more than was in the Statement about how the new scheme will be communicated. It is imperative that it registers those who we require it to register and does not include those who we do not require to be registered, which would clog up the much-valued time of officials. We welcome the regulations that the Government have indicated have been laid and we will carry out proper scrutiny of them.

I am grateful for the announcement about Russia. I will repeat something that I asked for when we considered the national security legislation. These Benches asked the previous Government to proactively update Parliament on a regular basis about not just the level of activities of those seeking to interfere inappropriately in our political and economic systems but the type of activities, which often change, with different methods and ways of seeking to interfere. I hope that the Government might consider this to be beneficial. It has been useful when we have had periodic updates from the head of MI5 about the level of potential interference, but that is after the event. Given that this interference is intended to be towards people such us in Parliament, then as much as we can be informed on a proactive basis, the better.

I repeat the request that my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire asked the Leader of the House previously. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report is still redacted. Given that the Government have decided to put Russia in the enhanced tier, there is no justification for the unredacted report not to be released so that we can be fully aware. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, who had been a significant member of that committee and now chairs it, will have his own views on this. We need to be informed about what the current potential kinds of activities are with regard to Russia. The Leader replied to my noble friend that it was an interesting question to be considered. I hope that the Government have considered it and that the Minister will be able to give a considered answer. If he cannot today, I hope that he will be able to write to me.

Secondly, how will this scheme operate not only within Russian state entities but also their proxies? The legislation is worded in a fine way in order to capture those that will be acting on behalf of Russia, but I hope the Minister will be able to stress that we will be able to capture all those who are acting on behalf of Russia.

Moving on, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, did, to China, these Benches believe that it should be on the enhanced tier. We also believe that the China audit that the Government have carried out should be published in full, not just as a narrative summary. We believe that there should be a human rights and democracy report that is linked with national security legislation, especially as we know that the Chinese state has been acting in an extraterritorial repressive way with regard to residents in this country—especially those from Hong Kong. There are some extremely brave people from Hong Kong whose family members at home are under threat because of unacceptable activities that are carried out here in the UK. We of course know that the proposed embassy will have an enormous hub for intelligence gathering and I therefore hope that the Government will not make a decision on planning before they publish their full China audit and a human rights and democracy report.

As to why it is beneficial, I will again quote the work of the noble Lord, Lord Beamish—maybe he will agree with me on this point. The excellent ISC report on China from July 2023 still gives us very clear signals as to why we should have China recognised within our interference legislation. Paragraph K in the summary of conclusions states:

“In terms of interference, China oversteps the boundary and crosses the line from exerting influence—a legitimate course of action—into interference, in the pursuit of its interests and values at the expense of those of the UK”.


Furthermore, paragraph H states:

“To compound the problem, it is not just the Chinese Intelligence Services: the Chinese Communist Party co-opts every state institution, company and citizen. This ‘whole-of-state’ approach means China can aggressively target the UK, yet the scale of the activity makes it more difficult to detect”.


Both those recommendations are perfectly clear evidence of the justification for China to be put on the enhanced tier. If the Government make the decision not to do so, they have to very clearly state why the committee was wrong and that the levels of interference are not being carried out, because there is no evidence that that level of interference, which was found to be unacceptable, has changed—in fact, it has got worse.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their initial comments and contributions, and for the broad welcome that they have given to the Government’s decision to include Russia in FIRS and yesterday’s announcement by my honourable friend the Member of Parliament for Barnsley North, Dan Jarvis. A number of points have been mentioned and I will try to raise them in my response.

It is important to say that those who have been put under the scheme—both Iran and Russia—should recognise that there is cross-party support in this House, and that national security and the Government’s response to those challenges have the support of the main political parties in this House. As the Security Minister set out yesterday, the FIRS announcement does three things. It helps with transparency, so it will give those two nations currently on the list transparency of foreign state influence in the United Kingdom. Secondly, it provides disruption by giving the police and MI5 a critical new disruptive tool. Thirdly, it gives deterrence for those two nations as a whole.

It is worth putting before the House why Russia has been added to the list. It is not only because of the Salisbury nerve agent attack, espionage, arson, cyberattacks, the spear-phishing of parliamentarians and attacks on emails; the illegal war in Ukraine means that Russia remains a serious state threat and we need to have the provisions of the Act, which had cross-party support, and FIRS put in place today.

It is also important that I take on board again what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, said about the fact that this is coming in now. We came into government on 4 July last year. We wanted to give a three-month notice period for the implementation of a FIRS notice. We have worked with officials—to whom I pay tribute for their hard, consistent work to bring the scheme to fruition—and, from 1 July, both Iran and Russia will fall under the purview of the scheme. That is a good development, and it reflects the Government driving forward that point of view.

The three-month grace period is important. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, mentioned guidance and support. We will shortly publish guidance to explain clearly the requirements of each tier and how to comply with them. We will produce sector guidance for academia, media, business, defence and civil society sectors. The implementation programme is extremely important and is now, I believe, on track.

Two main issues have been raised in addition to that of support, and I will try to address both. First, I will deal with the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised about the Russia report and whether the ISC will publish an unredacted version. I find myself in the strange position of being a Minister talking about a report that I authored as a member of the ISC between 2016 and 2019. Although I have seen the unredacted version because I participated in its production, I have to say, as a Minister of the Crown who has looked at the unredacted version, that it provides highly classified material that would damage the operational capabilities of the intelligence agencies, if published, by revealing targets, methods, sources and operational capabilities. So the Government have no plans to produce an unredacted version. However, that does not take away from the fact that the broad themes of the Russia report, which were highlighted by the committee I sat on over five years ago, are the reasons why the Government took the actions on the FIRS set out yesterday in the House of Commons by my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Minister responsible. That may not satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, but I hope that it clarifies where the Government stand today.

China was mentioned by both the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Purvis of Tweed; they raised legitimate questions about the Government’s view of the country. As I have set out in a previous response on China, and as my honourable friend said yesterday, we will always keep the FIRS under review. However, this Government have been clear that we are taking a long-term, consistent approach to managing UK relations with China. As has been said, we will co-operate when we can on issues of international co-operation and trade; we will compete when we need to on a whole range of issues; and we will challenge where we must, including on issues of national security. There have been times when, because of concerns, we have challenged on issues of national security. However, currently, the Government’s decision, although it is always kept under review, is that Iran and Russia are the two countries to fall under the initial FIRS, which will be operational from 1 July.

A range of issues about human rights and security are raised consistently in Parliamentary Questions and in comments and statements by Members of this House and the other place, including concerns about China. We will continue to keep that under review, but, as of today, Russia and Iran are the two nations that are under the FIRS—I hope that noble Lords can accept that explanation. We will continue to examine, at all times, any threats from any countries. I hope that the decision a few weeks ago to put Iran under the FIRS and the decision this week to put Russia under it are welcome, because those decisions will help protect our country from strategic threats from state actors.

Finally, I remind the House that depending on which tier individuals or nations have been put under, there is a minimum two-year prison sentence for non-registration and there is a maximum five-year prison sentence for those things. That is a severe sentence for individuals who do not comply with the legislation that had cross-party support to pass.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome this Statement. As the Minister has already outlined, the FIRS was one of the key recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia, which both he and I were involved in.

I concur with his statement on why the full, unredacted report cannot be published. I assure the House that this is a long process. We try to put as much as possible into the public domain, but there are certain elements in this work that would help our adversaries if it was produced in public.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is a keen reader of our reports, and I recommend the Iran report, which will be coming out in the next few weeks.

I ask my noble friend the Minister about Russia’s proxies and satellites—Belarus, Chechnya and others. Are the Government thinking of including them in the FIRS as well?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The FIRS we announced yesterday includes the leadership of Russia, political parties that support the leadership of Russia and a number of other state apparatuses, including the security services in Russia. We have and we will, in due course, present to this House and the House of Commons a statutory instrument that sets out in detail the applicability of the FIRS. I hope that my noble friend can wait for that to see the detail of the specific organisations and individuals named under it.

In informing him of that, I also pay tribute to him and his work with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is done behind the scenes and appears only when reports such as the Russia report are published. I know, from spending four and a half years on that committee, that there is a tremendous amount of work going on under the surface all the time to both challenge the security services, Government Ministers and agencies on their performance on security and to make the sorts of recommendations that appeared in the Russia report to date.

I am pleased that my noble friend supports the Government’s position not to seek the publication of the unredacted report. For the reasons he has mentioned, this is about national security, and it is also about themes: The themes of the Russia report were that the Russian state was seeking to undermine UK democracy and be a malevolent actor and, as we have seen in Salisbury and in Ukraine since the Russia report, it is not a player on the international stage that abides by the rules. In producing that report, we have to withhold some aspects. It is welcome that my noble friend supports the Government’s approach to that issue.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the Statement. I broadly welcome it, and I think there is a broad, cross-party consensus on the national security requirements.

When I hear my noble friend talk about threats from Iran and Russia, as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy I can tell him that we looked in great detail at the nature of some of these threats—for example, in regard to ransomware—and produced a report on it.

The question I wanted to ask my noble friend relates to the political tier. I quote from the Statement:

“For the first time, Members of this House will now be able to check whether anyone who seeks to influence them is doing so at the direction of a foreign power”.


I wanted to raise the issue of all-party parliamentary groups, because one of the concerns that has been expressed over the years is that they could be a vehicle for unwanted influences—certainly financially—buying their way in and influencing the way all-party groups operate.

I am the president of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, which is the Parliament’s oldest all-parliamentary party group. I hope the Minister can reassure the House that this scheme will enable it to be absolutely clear that no all-party parliamentary group that operates in this House—or in Parliament generally—is in any way open to the type of foreign influence that this Statement is designed to prevent and that as a result Parliament can have confidence that all-party parliamentary groups will be protected under this scheme to some extent by the work being undertaken, and that when FIRS goes live, we will have this confidence open to view.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his work in this field and for his question. Where the scheme will be of best benefit is that it will allow greater transparency around individuals who may be influenced, in this case by Russia or, as in the previous announcement, by Iran. That gives confidence to parliamentarians particularly. Any individual who is engaged with or supporting an all-party group, in whatever shape and form they do that, will have had to make a declaration about foreign influence before they participate in any activity as a whole. After 1 July, that will be a public matter of record. If they do not declare it and are subsequently found to have such influence, they will be subject to severe penalty, tested by the police, the CPS and the court, and ultimately subject to penalties of potential long terms of imprisonment of up to five years. I hope that will bring a transparency and confidence to all-party groups in the event of individuals believing that such groups are somehow influenced or fronted by organisations which are seeking to do malevolent damage to the UK. It gives transparency and flushes that out. If anybody tries to do that in a secretive way and is found to be doing so, they will face a severe penalty.

[The Earl of Effingham (Con)]

My Lords, exactly as the Statement says, it is our duty to defend the safety and interests of the UK. However, it also says that businesses will have to ensure they understand their obligations and that there must be strong compliance with the scheme. What consultations have taken place with businesses, both large and small to medium-sized, to ensure the process is entirely rigorous but, equally importantly, easy to undertake?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a very important point. We do not want to damage business, trade or engagement with any nation currently under the FIR scheme or potentially under FIR schemes. Currently, there is a significant difficulty with trade with Russia, because of the issue with Ukraine, and rightly so. Ultimately, we have had widespread consultation on this matter. We want to make sure that we do not damage business, but it is important that national security is at the forefront of our thinking. The prime move today is to make sure that malevolent actors do not operate in a non-transparent way, and that if they do, and are found, they will face the full force of United Kingdom law under the cross-party Act that we supported collectively in both Houses.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, this Statement is about the foreign influence registration scheme, which, as the Minister said, is trying to ensure transparency and control of the lobbying influence of certain states in the UK. But this is part of a much larger issue.

The lobbying Act 2014, passed under the coalition Government, is now a decade old. By coincidence, I started today—some time ago—at a round table which was considering a forthcoming report from the Chartered Institute of Public Relations, titled No Rules Britannia? The UK’s Lobbying Laws Exposed on the Global Stage. That report is still under embargo but I do not think institute will mind me sharing a phrase from the foreword, which says that

“the UK’s lobbying laws leave us languishing at the lower end of global governance rankings making it harder to promote our democratic values on the world stage”.

Is the Minister prepared to look at the report when it is released, if I share it with him and his team? He may want to respond later in writing, but are the Government prepared to look seriously at the lobbying Act of 10 years ago to see what needs to be done to bring us up to somewhere near global standards?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. Of course I will look at any report that is produced and share it internally within government. We want to see transparency in lobbying. That is why we are taking measures to ensure that Members of both Houses are transparent in how they operate and about their outside earnings and their declarations. That is part of the Government’s role on transparency.

I will take away what the noble Baroness said about the specific Act and review and respond in due course. The issue that we are dealing with today shines a light on transparency regarding the influence of Russia and Iran, which have been notified under the current FIRS arrangement. That transparency will give confidence for parliamentarians in this House and in the House of Commons about the level of influence on us as Members from any outside body and who is behind any influence. That is a good thing when we are dealing with malevolent state actors, which both those nations are designated as. I hope that the noble Baroness will welcome that.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I know that it is not the done thing for the Front Bench to come back, but I want to come back on a question. The Minister is characteristically very good at answering questions from the Dispatch Box, so I do not mean this as a criticism. In July 2023, the Intelligence and Security Committee found that China was not only seeking to influence but interfering in our internal affairs. Am I to take from the decision not to have China as part of the go-live scheme that the Government have determined that the committee was wrong and that China is not interfering in our political system?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I apologise if I slightly overlooked part of the noble Lord’s question. The Government have not made a judgment on any ISC comment or recommendations. However, we are continually keeping under review every nation in relation to a potential FIRS. We have announced Iran. Yesterday, we announced Russia. All other potential designations are kept under constant review. On China, as I have said in the House before, we co-operate where we can, we challenge where we need to and we ensure that we maintain our national security interests. We will keep that under review, but I cannot give the noble Lord a running commentary on potential FIRS designations. They are not a matter for today, which is about Russia and recommitting to the FIRS declaration on Iran.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, if the House will forgive me for a quick follow-up question, the Minister referred to sector guidance. Will he issue sector guidance relating to Parliament itself?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend raises an interesting point. The sector guidance is to ensure that, as the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, mentioned, we give guidance to academia, business or other sectors. As I envisage guidance for Parliament, there is transparency in that, from 1 July, any individual who seeks to influence Parliament will have to declare any influence that they have from Iran or Russia. If they do not declare it and subsequently are found to have it, they will face the full force of the law and potentially a five-year jail term.

I think that the guidance to Parliament is simply that Parliament can have trust and confidence that all-party groups do not have influence from those nations, unless those individuals declare that influence. If they hide it and it then comes to light, they will be prosecuted. That gives Parliament the confidence that it needs. The sector guidance is meant to be for academia, students, business and other issues. I hope that this reassures my noble friend that this is the general intention of this legislation.

House adjourned at 10.19 pm.

Knife Crime: Stop and Search

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

Stop and search is a fundamental tool for tackling knife crime, but it must be used fairly and effectively. Getting that balance right as part of a basket of measures is critical to this Government’s objective of halving knife crime in 10 years and restoring public trust in the police.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, today the Metropolitan Police has published its stop and search charter, which refers in particular to tensions between the black community and the police. Would the Minister consider urging that the police be equipped with hand-held metal detectors as an efficient and more sensitive method of conducting stop and search?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend raises an important point. The Home Office is working with industry partners, as it has been for a while, to develop the technology to detect from a distance knives concealed on the person. There are trials in place, and phase 1 is expected to be delivered by the end of May this year, resulting in a prototype system that could be used to do exactly what my noble friend says. Chief constables will have to decide on the use of that downstream, but I hope that will be of help to my noble friend. As part of the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Police Race Action Plan, it is looking again at the very point he mentioned—the disproportionate stopping of people from black and minority ethnic communities.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, given that the most serious application of disproportionality is the number of young black men, in particular, who are murdered, what work are the Government doing to ensure that police officers have the confidence to carry out appropriate stop and search?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Stop and search remains a valuable tool. Last year, 14% of stop and searches resulted in an arrest and some 16,000 knives and firearms were found as a result of stop and search, so it is important. However, it is also important that it be done proportionally and that it has the confidence of the whole community. The Police Race Action Plan is looking at committing chief constables to identifying and addressing the disproportionality issues and why they are happening, and at giving proper training and support to police forces to ensure that they deal with stop and search in an effective and proportionate way.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, what the three universities are doing on new technology to help the police so that they do not have to stop and search sounds very interesting and worthwhile, and the results are excellent—at the moment. It is very welcome because it will, we hope, eventually eliminate the need for stop and search, as weapons hidden under clothing will be visible and the police will not have to do anything. However, will police forces be given the additional funding they will need to update and maintain the system and, crucially, to purchase new mobile phones with very good cameras? The Minister will know that this is one of the three key elements of the scheme. They can then get rid of the antiquated mobile phones that most of them are still using.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will know that this year’s police settlement, which was announced in February, finally, has given an extra £1 billion to police forces.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

It is not enough.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness says that it is not enough. I recall being Police Minister and the noble Baroness’s party cutting police resources after I left office. It may not be enough, but it is an extra £1 billion going into policing this year. We are trying to give flexibility. She is right about efficiencies and modernising which is why, again, we are ensuring that, as central government, we organise better purchasing and efficiencies and make better use of resources accordingly.

[The Lord Bishop of Southwark]

Can the Minister outline whether more activity is possible on prevention and a public health approach to knife crime, as has been attempted in Glasgow? Examples include schools programmes and after-school youth provision—programmes that tackle the multivalent factors that can lead to violence.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The right reverend Prelate makes an important point. The Government committed in their manifesto to the creation of a young futures programme to provide safe space and support to people who are vulnerable to knife crime, and that includes a range of measures. When people are at accident and emergency, at youth clubs or in school and are seen to be vulnerable, they can be referred to the youth futures programme and youth futures hubs, which will support those individuals to turn away from knife crime and have the life skills to improve their condition.

[Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill (Lab)]

Online retailers and re-sellers are getting around the law to supply these weapons to young people. Can the Minister outline what the Government are doing to prevent the supply of weapons, which has to happen if we are to stop knife crime at source?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. In the Crime and Policing Bill, which is before the House of Commons but will be reaching this House very shortly, there are strong measures to restrict the sale of knives online and to provide particularly strong penalties for the illegal sale of knives, including a new online police co-ordination hub to take action against illegal knife and weapon content. My noble friend will know that on 27 March, the Government announced a ban on ninja swords. I will be bringing before this House, in short order, a Commons statutory instrument to ensure that we have a surrender scheme, and then, if approved by this House, a complete ban on ninja swords from 1 August 2025.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register—my current interests, anyway. Has the Minister asked the Metropolitan Police why its new stop and search charter does nothing to address the disproportionate number of black people being stopped and searched, and if not, will he?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an important point. In preparing for this Question, I asked about the disproportionality rates. I fully expected the Metropolitan Police and others to have the highest disproportionality rates, but, interestingly, some of the UK’s rural forces have the highest rates. It is really important that we look at the figures, which show that a particular force, which I will not name, has a disproportionality rate of 9.4, compared with the Met’s 3.1 figure. It is a really interesting table of statistics. Having asked for that information, I want to drill down with my colleague, the Police Minister, into which forces are underperforming in having a higher disproportionality rate, and look at how we can provide support and take action to understand why that is happening and what we can do to rectify it.

[Baroness Sanderson of Welton (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sanderson of Welton (Con)]

My Lords, are the Government in discussion with the police about the use of Section 60 powers—which, I should say, were extended under a previous Government? The HMIC’s last report on stop and search, in 2021, found that of all the Section 60 searches done in the previous year, only 3.7% found a weapon. Do such low find rates justify the damage that Section 60 searches cause to community relations?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for making that very interesting point. There were 5,145 stop and searches under suspicionless Section 60 powers last year, which fell between the jurisdiction of both Governments. That was a 20% increase on the previous year but represents just 3% of the 150,000 stop and searches that have been conducted. It is a very valid point and one that I will take away and look at in detail.

[Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale (Lab)]

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that Glasgow’s Violence Reduction Unit, established by our Justice Minister in Scotland, Cathy Jamieson, in 2005, had a combination of tougher action by the police and the courts, alongside the action referred to earlier on education and health and other areas? It has had remarkable success, so can lessons from that be learned elsewhere in the United Kingdom? Is my noble friend willing to come to Glasgow to meet those who still work in that unit to learn from some of those lessons?

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very happy to take up my noble friend’s suggestion, when time allows. As he knows, that mixture of education, youth hubs, wider support for parents and an understanding of the reasons why people are involved in knife culture is really important. Equally, this Government are focused on online sales and how we can take action to give the police better support, including the use of the new technology I mentioned earlier. A whole raft of measures is contributing to the Government’s commitment to halve knife crime over a distinct period. That is a really important point, and I will certainly look at lessons elsewhere to help inform the Government.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Stop and search is a vital tool for stopping those intent on causing death, injury and fear in our communities, and I can personally vouch for that. Policing response, and the successful detection of crime, is of course based on responding to local intelligence and victim statements. However, as we know, evidence suggests that the use of stop and search can negatively affect the relationship between police and ethnic minority communities, which is of course damaging. Can the Minister outline how the Government are working with the police—I am particularly thinking of training issues—and communities to strengthen trust and make sure that stop and search does not come at the cost of community confidence?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to His Majesty’s Opposition’s spokesperson. It is important that stop and search, as with policing generally, has the confidence of the communities being policed. The Government have made a commitment to increase the number of neighbourhood police officers and to make them front line, and to have that front-facing community engagement through neighbourhood policing over the next few years. There will be an additional 11,000 to 12,000—possibly even 13,000—neighbourhood police officers by the end of this Parliament, which is a key commitment to ensure that we have community engagement at a local level.

Apple: Advanced Data Protection Service

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am chair of Big Brother Watch.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

This Government take privacy very seriously. We have a long-standing position of protecting privacy while ensuring that action can be taken against child sexual abusers and terrorists. I cannot comment on operational matters today, including neither confirming nor denying the existence of any notices. This has been the long-standing position of successive UK Governments for reasons of national security.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Once again, the Home Office has demonstrated its disdain for the privacy and digital security of British citizens and companies. Strong encryption is essential to protect our data and our commerce from attack by organised crime and rogue states. Any weakness inserted into encryption for the benefit of the authorities is also available to those who would do us harm—yet that is precisely what the Government are demanding from Apple. Can the Minister please explain why the Home Office wants to make Apple’s British customers the most at risk in the world of being hacked?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I know the noble Lord has long had an interest in these matters, because we served together some nine or 10 years ago on the Investigatory Powers Act. But he has to understand that, today, I cannot comment on operational matters relating to any issue, including neither confirming nor denying the existence of any notices. That is standard government procedure, and I cannot comment upon it. I know that I will, I am afraid, disappoint the noble Lord, but that is the answer I have to give him.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

The fact that Apple has withdrawn this level of encryption from the UK is in the public domain, even if the noble Lord does not wish to comment on whether a notice has been issued. Can he comment on the fact that, for whatever reason, Apple has withdrawn that level of encryption from the UK? It is reported in the United States newspapers that it is because of a technical capability notice issued by the United Kingdom Government. Has this come up, in any sense, in discussions His Majesty’s Government have had with the United States Government in relation to both trade arrangements that might exist between us in the immediate future and our ambition to be an AI superpower in the near future?

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises issues that I know he has an interest in. Decisions made by Apple are a matter for Apple, and the removal of any features is a matter for Apple. Again, for reasons of national security I cannot confirm or deny any conversations that we have had or any issues that are undertaken.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand that my noble friend cannot comment, obviously, on any notice issued to Apple in this regard, but what he could, I am sure, comment on is the nature of the assessment made by His Majesty’s Government of whether or not such a notice might be issued. Can he confirm that the consideration will include a trade-off between the general weakening of security and the position of confidentiality, against the gains that will be obtained by the security services in any opportunity to de-encrypt materials? In so doing, can he comment on whether or not such an assessment also looks at what other capabilities the security services may have in respect of individuals on whom they wish to obtain information?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend makes interesting points. The Government take privacy very seriously and have a strong reputation internationally for protecting human rights. Access to data can happen only under specific circumstances and with strict safeguards, and it is taken, when it can be taken, against child sexual abusers or terrorists. I come back to the point that I cannot comment on the operational issues relating to points made in this House today, including neither confirming nor denying the existence of any notices, and that is the position that I will have to advise the House of during the course of this Question.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I understand the Government’s concern with their own privacy and secrecy, less so that of family group chats and journalists’ WhatsApp messages. To avoid that, does the Minister acknowledge that it is not possible for Apple to open doors to all its customers’ data and ensure that only the police and intelligence services walk through, when it is obvious that criminals, foreign adversaries and others would exploit that weakness? Also, at a time when the Government are seeking to establish the UK as a leading hub for innovation and technology, does the Minister agree that it would be baffling if the Home Office were to squander that advantage by trying to bully tech companies into undermining their users’ privacy, security, civil liberties and free speech?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Investigatory Powers Act, on which I served during its legislative passage with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, contains robust safeguards. It contains independent oversight to protect privacy and ensure that data is obtained only on an exceptional basis and only when necessary and proportionate to do so. That is the only answer I can give the noble Baroness today. I cannot comment on the operational issues or on the case she has mentioned in relation to Apple. I cannot confirm or deny any notices, and I have to stick to that position today for the House and for national security issues.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I acknowledge that the Home Office has already said, as has been endorsed today by the Minister, that it does not comment on operational matters, but it has been widely reported that this decision by Apple was taken in response to a government demand to view users’ encrypted data both in the UK and abroad. Of course it is right that the Government act to keep people safe, but they must do so while respecting people’s privacy. Can the Minister comment on how the Government intend to engage with Apple and other tech companies going forward to make sure that future discussions on security do not result in another unproductive breakdown of relations?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government take privacy extremely seriously. We have a strong international reputation for privacy, and we continue to work with companies to ensure that privacy is respected, but I cannot comment on the issue the noble Lord has mentioned concerning any ongoing issues or operational matters. I cannot confirm or deny any notices, and I will, I am afraid, have to repeat that again for the House today.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

On a non-operational matter, can the Minister confirm that all decisions of the kind that have been mentioned will routinely be referred to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal so that it can decide whether government decisions were proportionate or disproportionate?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

All proceedings will be referred to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and the decision whether to hold the discussion in public or private is for the tribunal. Those matters will be examined and any judgments on any issue at any time will be made by the tribunal. I hope that is a non-controversial matter for the noble Lord.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

Does my noble friend the Minister agree that while encryption gives great security, if you add a journalist to the distribution list you lose that security?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can only say that to my knowledge, that is a matter for another nation and not this one, and not this Home Office.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, further on a non-operational matter, are the Government always clear that their actions conform to the judgment of Podchasov v Russia by the European Court of Human Rights last February? It held that weakening end-to-end encryption or creating back doors could not be justified. Therefore, the Government could be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to privacy. Are the Government happy to be in the same boat as Russia as regards individual rights and encryption?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that Russia and this UK Government are so far apart that there is no correlation between the two under any circumstances. In fact, we will also once again publicly condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia. That is how far apart we are on these matters.

Access to data happens only under specific circumstances and with strict safeguards, so that robust action can be taken against child sex abusers and terrorists. That is the position of the Government. If any data is accessed, it is accessed by the Investigatory Powers Act for the tribunal, and under strict regulation, for the purposes of stopping bad people doing bad things.

UK Resettlement Scheme 2025

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Thursday 27th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, and in doing so I draw attention to my interest that I am supported by the RAMP organisation.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The United Kingdom works closely with the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, to determine the appropriate quota in any given year. We are focusing on the delivery of existing commitments, and we will continue to work with the UNHCR on an appropriate quota for 2025.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. This is a safe and legal route, but, unfortunately, there are few people in the queue. The queue sometimes lasts five to seven years, and so, quite clearly, the United Nations authorities need time to prepare people to come here in waiting for that length of time. What they are doing in that queue, of course, is not going for routes that are dangerous—crossing the channel and so forth—so, given the importance of reducing the number of people who come via irregular routes, what assessment have the Government made of trying to make these allocations to the United Nations not sporadically but in a regular format with multi-year assessments?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The UK Government continue to discuss on a yearly basis with the UNHCR what the requirements and pressures are. As the noble Lord will know, both the previous Government and this Government have given safe and legal routes to around 680,000 people in the past 10 years alone. We are continuing to work with the agency and we are looking at that for next year—in my original Answer to the noble Lord, I said that we are looking at potential quotas for 2025. He makes an interesting suggestion for certainty, but we need to examine the requests of the UNHCR, what their demands on us are and how we can potentially accommodate any or all of those requests.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I had the honour of being the Minister responsible for the conduct of the Bosnian resettlement programme in 1996 under the auspices of the United Nations. Although I can see the merit of a quota, I hope that the Government will have enough flexibility in such schemes to allow for the changes that take place across the world and the pressures that arise from different places at different times.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a very important point. He will be aware that, three and a half years ago, for example, nobody would have suggested that we would have the number of Ukrainian individuals on temporary placement in the United Kingdom because of the pressures of the illegal war by the Russians in Ukraine. Therefore, that flexibility needs to be maintained. What we are saying is that we are in constant discussion with the UNHCR and we want to meet our legal obligations. The 680,000 people in the past 10 years show that we are. The noble Lord makes a valid point that we do not know what may happen in the future which may cause challenges for the United Kingdom and indeed for the UNHCR.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister knows from my question yesterday, the Home Office scores all in-country migration costs as official development assistance. At the end of this Parliament, that level will be halved by this Labour Government, which have also chosen to make a policy decision to continue to score in-country migration costs as 100% aid, but they are not proposing to reduce that level in relation to the overall pot of aid. Why?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes his point again. We have set out our position on overseas aid through, and prior to, the Statement yesterday. We are setting out our position in relation to the UNHCR and the potential help and support that we can give now. We will address many of the points that the noble Lord has alluded to in a future immigration White Paper, which will be presented to this House and to the House of Commons in due course. We will debate this issue in due course. I think that we are meeting our obligations, and we will still, through our colleagues in the Foreign Office, support overseas aid and do so in an effective way, but that debate will undoubtedly continue.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The United Kingdom has a proud history of providing protection for those who genuinely need it through our safe and legal routes. I am sure that the Minister will agree with me that we need to make sure that, when we commit to helping refugees, we have the capacity to support them, not only in housing but in schooling and healthcare too. It is right, however, that this support is given only if it does not disadvantage the taxpayers in this country who fund these services. I therefore ask the Minister: what other specific limited resources, besides suitable accommodation, does his department consider before allowing people using the UK resettlement scheme to move to the UK? How do this Government ensure that their commitment to support those using the scheme does not disadvantage the UK taxpayer?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an important point that is absolutely vital. Individuals who come here as a part of our international obligations put pressure on public services, and that needs to be taken into account in relation to the issues on which we are in discussion with the UNHCR. The noble Lord mentioned housing, transport, medical services and education; they are all considerations. That is why, to go back to the point by the noble Lord, Lord German, and indeed the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the Government are assessing on an annual basis with the UNHCR what assistance and support we can provide for refugees coming to this country. We want to meet our obligations, but we need to do so in a way that allows us to provide the required services in support. That is why I cannot give a figure to the noble Lord, Lord German, and why I welcome the flexibility mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. It is an issue that noble Lords will continue to press me on, rightly, but this is important for the sustainability of the UK taxpayer as well as our international obligations.

[Lord Sahota (Lab)]

My Lords, in secondary legislation the Government claim that India is a safe country for refugees to be returned to. Are the Government absolutely sure about that, given India’s human rights record?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are guided by the requests that come to the United Kingdom from the UNHCR, and we will consider whatever requests it wishes to bring forward for the United Kingdom. My noble friend will appreciate that, at the moment, I do not think we have had any requests from the UNHCR in relation to India but, again, it is a matter for the agency, in discussion with us, to look at which countries it believes are generating refugees who need help and support. When it does that, the assessment is passed on to countries such as the United Kingdom to see where, how and if we can help; we stand ready to do so if, when and however we can.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

It is obviously a bit early to say, but it is possible that positive developments in Syria, and possibly even in Sudan, may lead some who are here as asylum seekers to want to go home. Will the Government assist them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government have been and are currently—as the noble Lord will be aware from previous questions—looking at how we can assist with voluntary returns to countries that are now deemed safe for people who have come seeking asylum or refugee status in the United Kingdom. The situation in Syria is particularly fluid, which is why we have put a pause on some of the challenges that we are facing there at the moment in making some assessments. The noble Lord makes an important point, and we want to ensure, in all cases, that if people can return to their country of origin, they do so if that country of origin remains safe for them. The reason they are here now is because they were refugees from a regime; if that regime changes and stability comes forward then, self-evidently, the UK Government would want those individuals to return home should they wish to.

[The Earl of Clancarty (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister will recall our meeting last year concerning the ongoing concerns of EU citizens trying to settle in this country. At some stage, can we have an update on progress that has been made in that area?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Yes, I will examine where we are post that meeting that we had with the noble Earl, and I will respond to him as a matter of some urgency.

Asylum Hotels and Illegal Channel Crossings

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister claims that this is an entirely inherited issue, the Government have, since taking office nine months ago, put up an additional 8,500 illegal immigrants in hotels, and the number of small boat crossings since 1 January 2025 is up 37.5% on the same period last year. These are shocking numbers that are careering in the wrong direction, and the taxpayer is picking up the tab while the Government fail in their election promise. Can the Minister say what new, concrete steps the Government are taking to deter those who are currently on the cusp of crossing the channel? How do they intend to terminate the use of hotels in housing illegal immigrants without reducing the number of homes that should be prioritised for British citizens and those who have travelled to the UK legally?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I just remind him that, in 2016, there were no hotels in use; in 2023, there were 400. We have a manifesto commitment to end the use of hotels. That is because his Government failed in their process, did not manage asylum claims properly, allowed small boat crossings to increase and wasted £700 million on a Rwanda scheme which deterred nobody. We will have some discussions and lessons from that, but let us look at what we are doing. Between the general election on 4 July and 31 January this year, we have removed 19,000 failed asylum seekers, increased enforced returns by 24%, increased illegal working arrests by 38%, removed 2,591 foreign national offenders and had the four biggest return charter flights in the history of return charter flights. I hope I can look forward to his co-operation to pick up the mess that he left behind.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest in that I am supported by the RAMP organisation. I know that the Minister accepts that hotels are unsuitable accommodation and that there are other forms of accommodation which should be provided. I have two questions about how to do that, one of which is about reducing the numbers of people who are waiting to have their cases heard. First, can he tell us what efforts are being made to ensure that individuals can have their appeals heard in a timely way, with adequate legal representation, so that correct decisions are taken when they are first heard rather than having to go through many following steps? Secondly, we could remove this problem by allowing people to work and pay for their own accommodation, so have the Government assessed allowing people who are being kept in this long queue the opportunity to work?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The real opportunity we are trying to take is to reduce the asylum backlog in the first place. If people claim asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom, from whatever source, we have a duty to assess that asylum claim. Sadly, the previous Government allowed that asylum claim backlog to balloon. We have tried to put in place 1,000 extra staff—funded by the resource that we have saved from scrapping the Rwanda scheme, which deterred nobody—who are now doing the very things that the noble Lord mentioned: reducing the asylum backlog and making sure that we deal with asylum claims. Those who are here can then go on to work and to provide their own accommodation. But there are also those who are not here, including the 19,000 we have removed between 4 July and 31 January, because we are speeding up asylum claims.

[Lord Laming (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister assure the House that in this movement out of hotels, which I understand, unaccompanied immigrant children in particular will be protected and not lost, as we have lost so many already? We do not want to lose any more.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an extremely valid point. I know he has a long-standing interest in safeguarding and that he has raised previously with me and others the children who went missing under the previous regime. We intend to ensure that we put in place proper safeguarding measures with the local county council, and that we now assess those children on arrival to make sure that they are safeguarded properly.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the tone with which he always discusses these very thorny questions in your Lordships’ House. Does he agree that a convention refugee, once designated as such by the authorities, was never illegal, and that we should not be demonising these most desperate people, who were not deterred by the Rwanda scheme because of the appalling treatment that they faced back home?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. We intend to uphold and keep to our international obligations.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this Government have decided to continue the practice of scoring 100% of in-country migration costs as official development assistance. In the Statement made by the Chancellor today, that overall figure is being cut by half a billion pounds in this coming year, and then by £4.8 billion next year. However, the Government are seeking to protect the Home Office costs of scoring ODA, which means that there will be profiting in this country as a result of the protection and the cuts elsewhere. Can the Minister say what is the level of private sector profiting scored as official development assistance which this Government are protecting?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises an interesting question. I will, as ever, examine that in detail and get back to him with a specific figure, which I do not have in front of me. The Government are undertaking a reprioritisation of resource to tackle this issue. As we have said, that means ending the Rwanda scheme, putting in place a proper Border Force through the immigration Bill, if passed, and ensuring that there are additional staff to speed up the asylum backlog. This will ensure that people are assessed properly and quickly, that those who have a right to claim asylum in this country are accepted and that those who do not are returned to a place of safety.

[The Lord Bishop of Sheffield]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the patron of ASSIST Sheffield, a charity which supports refugees and asylum seekers in our city of sanctuary. What consideration has the Minister given to the introduction of a guardianship scheme, such as the one piloted in Scotland, to provide specialist support to unaccompanied children seeking asylum—not least given their acute vulnerability if accommodated in hotels?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As with those of the noble Lord, Lord Laming, I take on board the points that the right reverend Prelate makes. It is important that we ensure that children who arrive here unaccompanied are safeguarded. That has been a failure in the past and it must be prevented now. I will examine with my colleagues in ministerial office with direct responsibility for these issues how best we can ensure safeguarding. I will report back in writing to the right reverend Prelate and the noble Lord.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I return to the question of the noble Lord, Lord German, about employment rights. The ban on these migrants working dates, in its current form, from about 2002 and was tightened a bit in 2005. Prima facie, the rise in claims since then suggests that it has not worked very well. There may be other factors, but it certainly has not deterred all the illegal migration. In the spirit of saving money, instead of banning them from working, might Ministers look at banning asylum seekers from claiming benefits—at least for four, five, 10 years or whatever—as a more effective and much cheaper deterrent?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Lord visits the Library and asks which benefits migrants receive, he will find that the Government have a responsibility to pay certain amounts of resource for upkeep but it is not a question of access to a benefits system. We are trying to ensure that we assess those individuals extremely quickly. If he is interested in illegal working then, as I mentioned earlier, we have increased visits and working arrests for those who have slipped into the country and are now working here illegally by 38%.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, everybody—with one or two exceptions—knows that the Government inherited an incredible mess. Are we satisfied that we are doing everything we can to ensure maximum co-operation with the French and with Interpol in catching the people traffickers? Secondly, surely in anything but the very short term we must have wider international co-operation, particularly with our EU friends, to deal with the problem of asylum seekers in a more sensible and balanced manner.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has met her French, Belgian and Dutch counterparts and is looking at a group which we have named, imaginatively, the “Calais group” to see how we can act on these issues. That co-operation has led to increased convictions and arrests of people traffickers and will do so further. There are discussions with the German Government to see what we can do downstream about some of the equipment that is being supplied in Germany. When the immigration Bill comes before this House, noble Lords will recognise that there are measures in it which further criminalise those gangs and give further powers to the state to take assets from criminals who are people trafficking.

Female Genital Mutilation

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the prevalence of female genital mutilation nationally.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

Female genital mutilation is an abhorrent crime. The Home Office concluded a feasibility study in 2024 to examine how to produce robust prevalence estimates for FGM; we are now considering the next steps. We monitor data on FGM cases from the police, the National Health Service and the Ministry of Justice. Of the 2,755 honour-based abuse offences recorded by the police in the year ending March 2024, 111 were FGM related. However, the hidden nature of FGM can make it challenging to quantify.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord for that Answer. Although the biggest battle to eliminate FGM lies in sub-Saharan Africa, as the figures show, we cannot afford to be complacent in this country. Does the Minister agree that, although education is by far the best way to effect culture change, we still need the rule of law as a deterrent? Is the Minister at all concerned that between 2014 and 2024 we have had only two convictions for FGM? Furthermore, will the Home Office possibly agree to a request by Nimco Ali’s Five Foundation—she, of course, is a survivor—to update the 2014 estimate, thus informing policy going forward on ending FGM in the UK and helping signpost where survivors can get medical or psychological support?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, who has a long history of tackling this issue in legislation and bringing it before the House. He deserves credit for the work he has done to date. He mentioned a couple of key issues. We agree that the prosecution rate needs to be examined. The College of Policing has recently sent out further authorised professional practice notes to police forces and we recently confirmed £13.1 million of funding for a new centre to tackle violence against women and girls, which will help look at a range of issues, of which FGM will be one. He is also right that we need to look at the prevalence of FGM. The feasibility study I mentioned in my initial Answer looks at how we can record and understand better the level of crime being committed. One of the key things we are doing is looking at that study and what needs to be undertaken. I and colleagues will bring forward measures to this House and to the House of Commons in due course, of which support for survivors is key.

[Lord Dobbs (Con)]

My Lords, I believe that the figures for female genital mutilation reported by the National Health Service are considerably greater than the figures the Minister just gave us. This has been going on for years—not just under this Government, but year after year. Thousands of people are being mutilated in this way, usually children. Yet I think there have been not two but three convictions for this crime in all these years—thousands of cases and three convictions. Does this not have the stench of the Rotherham grooming scandal? Why is it so difficult to get justice in this country?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The figures from NHS England, which I have before me, show that between April 2024 to June 2024, 985 new cases of women and girls with FGM were recorded by the NHS, with around 2,175 cases in total during these three months. He is right that there is, in my view, an underreporting of FGM and a need to up the level of prosecution when evidence is submitted. The purpose of the study that was commissioned and undertaken was to look at how we both better record and translate recording into prosecution. He is right that the prosecution level is too low. That is why the College of Policing is issuing guidance to police forces on how they can record information to put forward to the Crown Prosecution Service to ensure that those prosecutions take place.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, are there not serious issues in these investigations that the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, quite rightly pointed out? Obviously, many of the mutilations are arranged by parents, which means that the children may have to give evidence against their parents. The people who carry out the cutting are abroad, which means that they are beyond our ability to investigate, although various operations have been carried out at Heathrow to try to get these girls when they are travelling; some have been successful.

I worry that the health service is not recording all the data. I understand why: of course, we want patients to get care if they have had a terrible medical episode after one of these cutting episodes, or if they have subsequent medical problems. We need the data to see how big the problem is. I suspect, as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, indicated, that it is far bigger than we know. The medical profession, I suspect, has the data for adults as well, because women need treatment later and it will be obvious what happened in earlier life. The Minister mentioned the study, but perhaps he could say a little more about how he intends to get that data.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The study we have commissioned is looking at what needs to be done to collect further data. We are looking at establishing a pilot scheme to look at the health service, the police, the Ministry of Justice and other data collection points to ensure we get the proper picture of FGM instances.

The noble Lord is right that many women and children are transported abroad for this. I am sure he will be aware that Operation Limelight is an ongoing operation to target inbound and outbound traffic to and from countries with a high prevalence of FGM. It is both raising awareness about the crime and following up where leads are in place to ensure that people do not leave the country for that trafficking purpose.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I disagree with the previous questioner: the NHS data is extraordinarily helpful. It says that, of the known cases, less than 9% are adults and all the rest are children, but by the first time they are seen in the NHS, 98.9% are adults and aged over 18. What is the Home Office doing, along with the NHS, to ensure that word is out in the various communities—not just the Muslim community—that perpetrate FGM? It is important that those two services are joined up.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right. One of the key things we need to do is ensure that those people who perpetrate FGM and encourage others to do so are held to account. That is why I again point to the prosecution figures and to the information collected by the National Health Service, because, again, someone only goes to the National Health Service when they have already been offended against. Those are both important issues, and the purpose of the policy study we are undertaking is to gather more information. Again, it is important that we have a proper definition of FGM and honour-based abuse. We are currently looking at that with other government departments to come to some conclusions in, I hope, the relatively near future.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, girls born in the UK in communities where FGM is commonplace face severe injury, long-term health complications and sometimes even death because of this abuse. As many have highlighted, it is almost impossible to detect because of the burden on victims to report it. I therefore ask the Minister: what specific steps have the Government taken to reach out to women in those communities where FGM is prevalent? How are Ministers working to safeguard women and girls and to effect a cultural change to ensure that this dangerous and illegal practice is stopped?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. First of all, this is a crime. As it is a crime, if it is reported it will be acted on, and if evidence is collected the CPS will prosecute. We need to ensure that we increase the level of prosecutions. The noble Lord asked about the help we are giving to people who may be involved. This is not a political point, because his Government supported it as well, but the Home Office has for many years funded Karma Nirvana’s national helpline. We have committed £215,000 for this current year, 2024-25; obviously, we continue to look at that support. It is important that people come forward and report FGM to the health service and the police. If they do so, we need to look at how we can improve those prosecution rates to make sure that offenders are brought to justice.

[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

My Lords, I will ask directly about the situation with the NHS and reconstructive surgery. At the moment, the NHS will offer labiaplasty to people so that they end up with a Barbie vagina, but women who have had FGM who come before the NHS and want that critical surgery end up having to go to France or Germany to have this done. I am a patron of the Vavengers, which has funded this. Could the Minister please clarify the NHS’s position on this life-changing surgery for women who have been victims of this vile practice?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that question. The specific responsibilities of the National Health Service are wider than my brief on the issues before us today, but it is important that we examine them. I will look at what the current policies are in discussion with Health Minister colleagues, and I will write to the noble Baroness in due course.

Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 21 January be approved.

Relevant document: 16th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument). Considered in Grand Committee on 17 March.

Motion agreed.

Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025.

Relevant document: 16th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, this legislation represents part of the Government’s ambition to use new technologies to significantly improve public services. There are four principal functions that will enable us to fulfil our commitments to transition from physical to digital documentation and to make full use of the biometric information that we collect during visa applications and at the border. If noble Lords will allow me, I shall outline what those changes are.

These regulations will allow: first, a new power at the border to enrol and retain biometric information from people arriving in the UK; secondly, for visa applications, measures to support the transition from physical biometric immigration documents to digital immigration status in the form of an eVisa for everyone who applies for a visa to come to the UK, including visitors; and, thirdly, the extension of the standard fingerprint retention period beyond 15 years for people who abscond from immigration bail and become uncontactable. Lastly, the instrument prevents abuse of the statelessness route.

I will take each of those changes in turn, starting with the changes at the border. The legislation will introduce crucial new border powers to expand the circumstances in which we can enrol biometric information from everyone at the UK border and retain it for non-British citizens. Biometric information plays a crucial role in our immigration system. It is an effective and efficient way of checking and confirming the identities of all arrivals to the UK, as well as the immigration status of foreign nationals who come into or live in the UK. This instrument will enhance current Border Force powers to refuse or cancel permission to enter the UK, and will empower officers to take robust action against non-British or non-Irish citizens who deliberately evade the requirement to provide their biometric information on arrival.

We are continually striving to improve how people cross the UK border, ensuring that we maximise passenger flow while maintaining security. We want to utilise biometric information further to trial new identity-verification and facial comparison technologies, known as contactless travel, in order both to build a border that can efficiently withstand future pressures and to ensure that our border remains secure. I know that noble Lords will share in that objective.

Contactless travel could enable a person to enter the UK without the need to routinely produce their passport at the border. Instead, we would compare the facial image of a person arriving in the UK with the biometric information that we hold from either their UK passport or their immigration application. Coupled with this, our universal permission to travel will prevent those without authorisation boarding a flight, ship or train to the UK; of course, everyone arriving in the UK will still need to travel with their passport and be prepared to present it at the border.

We are not alone in trialling new facial comparison capabilities. Other countries, such as the USA and Australia, are looking at introducing biometrically enabled automated border systems to improve passenger flow and maintain security. This instrument will ensure that we do not fall behind.

Our plan for contactless travel’s future use at the UK border is ambitious. However, as noble Lords would expect, we will take a cautious approach to the introduction of new border technology. These regulations do not commit the Government to introducing any new technology, so we can take the time to ensure that we get this system right. Our first step will be initially to test contactless travel on British citizens only, and we will move to further implementation only if this is a success. Our ambition is to start this trial by the end of this year, and we plan to announce further details shortly.

Looking now to the rollout of eVisas, the Government are pursuing an ambitious digital programme to modernise public services, including our visa system. These changes enable the UK to deliver a fair and firm immigration system that not only works in the national interest but is in line with the modern digital age. Businesses and customers alike expect a prompt and user-friendly experience in their transactions. I hope this instrument will enhance their experience by further supporting the transition from physical to online evidence of immigration status in the form of eVisas. Over time, physical and paper-based products and services will be replaced with accessible, straightforward digital products and services. Our overall aim is to ensure that people will have a secure and seamless digital journey when they interact with the UK’s immigration system. To support this, we stopped issuing biometric residence permits and cards on 1 November 2024.

Noble Lords will know that an eVisa is an online record of a person’s immigration permission in the UK and any conditions that might apply. It can be viewed by logging into the “view and prove” service using a UK Visas and Immigration account. As of 27 February 2025, more than 4 million people had created a UKVI account to access their eVisa, with a daily increase in this number as many more create accounts. Our aim is to ensure that the rollout of eVisas will improve foreign nationals’ experience of our border system, because eVisas are secure and cannot be stolen, lost, or tampered with, unlike physical documents. The fact that they can be accessed at almost any time and anywhere will give people with a valid immigration status in the UK an easy way to evidence their status and identity.

With the transition from physical cards to eVisas, the requirement for holders of physical immigration documents with settled status to apply for a replacement at least every 10 years has been eliminated. This is because an eVisa does not expire in the same way that a physical document would. This digital approach to our border and immigration system will streamline processes for people making applications or updating their details.

However, we acknowledge that a person’s personal information may change over time. In particular, facial images change as people age, so this instrument allows us to require eVisa holders to update their facial photographs at least once every 10 years. This mirrors the requirement we have for UK passports. I noticed from discussions of this that my passport is nine and a half years old now and coming to the end of its useful life, and I will have to update my passport shortly, as I would with an eVisa. It also mirrors what happens with driving licences. Having up-to-date images on eVisas will enable third parties, such as employers, to conduct their checks easily. Where an eVisa holder fails to update their photo within the required time, this instrument enables us to restrict their ability to share their status for verification. I emphasise that these sanctions will apply only to those who refuse to comply with the requirements, not those who are unable to.

We are particularly committed to preventing undue burdens on older people. We have drawn from the Windrush generation’s experiences. As older people are less likely to need to prove their immigration status in the UK, we will not require people aged over 70 to update their facial image or create a UKVI account. We will, however, encourage them to do so for their own convenience should they so wish.

Finally, we are now focusing on the change to our biometric retention approach for immigration absconders. The regulations clarify government powers to use and retain biometric information obtained from persons who abscond from immigration bail and avoid contact with the Home Office or the police beyond the standard 15-year retention period. This change will ensure that the person can be identified if they are encountered on a later occasion.

I will also briefly mention the statelessness route. This legislation closes a previous gap that enabled some people to avoid providing their biometrics. We now set out provisions that will ensure that we can capture biometric information from people who apply to stay in the UK as a stateless person. People who fail to enrol their biometrics as required without a reasonable excuse may have their application rejected or refused.

These changes are a fair and efficient way to maintain robust border control. I thank noble Lords for their attention and support in advancing these measures. This measure passed the House of Commons recently. Together, we are building a digitally driven immigration and border system that is fair and fit for the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the significance of these regulations in the context of the Government’s broader efforts to modernise the immigration and border control systems. The introduction of biometric data collection, along with the transition towards a contactless border system, represents a significant step forward in ensuring the security and efficiency of our borders. Although His Majesty’s Official Opposition do not object to the instrument in principle, we believe that it is essential to scrutinise its provisions carefully to ensure that they deliver the intended outcomes.

Let us consider the impact of these measures. The regulations, as outlined, facilitate the collection of biometric data from all entry clearance applicants, with a specific requirement for facial images to be updated every 10 years. Additionally, the retention period for certain biometric data has been extended, and new sanctions have been introduced for non-compliance. The aim, of course, is to ensure that the system remains accurate, secure and consistent, and I believe it is imperative that we continue to assess how effectively these measures meet their stated objectives.

The Government’s shift towards contactless border control is a key aspect of these regulations. Through allowing biometric checks upon arrival at the UK border, the legislation seeks to streamline the border process, reduce queuing times and improve identity verification. The use of biometric data at eGates and primary control points is intended to facilitate smoother passenger flows. Although the intentions behind these measures are clear, we must consider their practical implications.

His Majesty’s Official Opposition acknowledge the necessity of biometric data retention as a key aspect of modernising border control. However, it is important to note that there are several concerns, particularly regarding the adequacy of the measures in fully realising the vision of a contactless border system, so there is particular interest in the practical challenges of implementing such a system.

Questions have been raised about whether the current data retention period and infrastructure are sufficient to handle the demands of a fully digitalised border. The increased reliance on biometric data also raises important questions about the system’s progression and effectiveness as it evolves. As we continue to expand the use of biometric information, it is crucial that the infrastructure that is in place can support the necessary technological advancements without introducing new vulnerabilities.

Additionally, there is a call for greater clarity on enforcement mechanisms. The growing importance of biometric data in identity verification processes necessitates robust compliance measures. Concerns have been raised about whether the current sanctions for non-compliance are adequate to address potential risks, such as fraudulent activity or failure to adhere to biometric requirements. These are important considerations, and it is vital that any enforcement measures are proportionate, fair and effective in securing compliance.

I have several key questions for the Minister. First, how do these measures address concerns regarding the progression of infrastructure and enforcement as biometric data becomes a central element of the border control process? Furthermore, given the move towards a fully contactless border system, how will these advancements integrate into our existing security frameworks to ensure that security, privacy and compliance are maintained? On biometric data retention, does the Minister believe that the 15-year retention period is adequate to support a robust and sustainable database that aligns with the Government’s vision for a contactless border system? Can he clarify the timeline for testing contactless travel for British citizens, including the duration and expected sample size of the trial? Additionally, what steps are being taken to integrate biometric data with other data sources to enhance security and improve efficiency at the border? How feasible is this integration within the current system?

We acknowledge the Government’s efforts to modernise and improve our border control system. The introduction of biometric data collection and the move towards contactless border control are necessary steps in ensuring that our immigration processes are secure and efficient. However, it is equally important that we consider the practical implications of these changes, particularly with regard to data retention, infrastructure, enforcement and integration. I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister on the points that I have raised.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his contribution and broad support for the regulations. I assure him that the purpose of these regulations and the direction of travel—which, again, the previous Government supported—is to ensure, first, that we have effective border control, secondly, that we make it fit for the modern age and, thirdly, that we do so in a way that helps support the individual to maintain their privacy while having biometric information for UK and other citizens in the longer term to ensure that we can control our borders effectively.

These regulations form part of the wider commitment to harness new emerging technologies radically to improve our public services and border processes. This is part of the evolution of how we manage our border. We are bringing forward legislation today to allow us to transform existing identity verification capabilities. This will ensure that our border remains secure and will enhance our ability to identify imposters, people traffickers and others who try to undertake criminal acts at our border.

The enhanced facial recognition capability provided through these regulations will also allow us further to develop new identity verification technologies, including to trial contactless travel at the UK border. It is an ongoing process. Capturing and maintaining biometric information will support border control and the crucial investigative work of police and law enforcement agencies that keep the UK safe.

The noble Lord mentioned sanctions for non-compliance with the requirements. The changes are intended to encourage status holders to update their biographical information and facial image on their UKVI account at least once every 10 years, as I mentioned, without requiring them to make an application to replace their immigration document. That is to make it simpler and easier for individuals to ensure that their status is correct. They will be told about the steps they need to undertake to enable them to generate a share code. In most circumstances this will simply require them to upload new facial images, which should take no longer than a few minutes to complete.

The new sanction is introduced to reflect the move to eVisas. That will allow the Secretary of State to prevent the user creating a share code to enable third-party checks of their status until they comply with the requirements of the regulations. In a sense, this will put a stop to that level of potential fraud; it will also reduce the need to impose more stringent sanctions, such as civil penalties or immigration sanctions. Again, I hope that is part of the process to ensure that this system works effectively.

As I mentioned at the beginning, we are beginning to trial this system for British citizens. It will develop in due course, but I hope that I have been able to answer the noble Lord’s questions. If he has any further points, I will certainly take interventions, but if not, I commend these regulations to the Grand Committee.

Motion agreed.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill be now read a third time.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have it in command from His Majesty the King to acquaint the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, has consented to place his interest, so far as it is affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, this Bill has its genesis in the evening of 22 May 2017 in the Manchester Arena, where more than 1,000 people were injured and 22 were killed in a terror attack—the sole responsibility of the terrorist involved. This Bill is a tribute to those victims and to the victims of other terrorist attacks. They will never ever be forgotten.

Noble Lords will be aware, of course, of the campaigning work of Figen Murray and her team. We would not be here today without her and her team, and I give them my thanks. This Bill will now be known as Martyn’s law in memory of Figen’s son, Martyn, who died in that Manchester terror attack. I also pay tribute to the security and intelligence services, law enforcement and others, who work day in and day out to protect this country from the ongoing threat of terrorism, and to the first responders who are on the front line, if and when the worst happens.

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debates on the Bill. They have been astute and considered, and I am deeply grateful for their scrutiny. I hope that we have had a collaborative, constructive approach to this Bill, and it is important that such legislation on terrorism has cross-party support across this House and the House of Commons. I am proud to be one of the Ministers who have brought this to fruition on behalf of the Government.

I thank Minister Dan Jarvis, who led the Bill in the House of Commons, and my noble friends Lady Anderson and Lord Moraes, the Whips on the Government Benches who have worked to tight timetables. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower—and his colleagues, the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Cameron of Lochiel—as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for their leadership on the Benches opposite.

I thank the policy, legal and Bill teams in the Home Office, which have worked under the previous Government and this Government; their tireless work has made this Bill possible. I also thank the team at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for drafting the Bill. I extend my deep and perpetual gratitude to the parliamentary staff, doorkeepers, clerks and others for their professionalism and their continued support for the Bill and your Lordships’ House.

This Bill will help save lives. As it leaves this House now, I look forward to its final passage in the House of Commons soon and its continuance to Royal Assent in due course. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the Bill forward for Third Reading. I express my gratitude to all noble Lords for their diligent scrutiny and contributions throughout the Bill’s progression.

I also extend my sincere thanks, once again, to Figen Murray—together with her team, as the Minister mentioned—whose tireless campaigning has been instrumental in ensuring that we make progress on stronger protection for premises. Without her dedication, the Bill would not have progressed as it has.

I am pleased that we had the opportunity for a thorough debate around the important issues contained in the Bill both in Committee and on Report. On Report, several crucial issues were raised; foremost among them was the concern that the Bill should not place an undue burden on smaller businesses and voluntary organisations. Indeed, I still have some concerns about that, and its eventual effect remains to be seen. We heard compelling arguments from my noble friends Lord Udny- Lister, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord De Mauley about the challenges faced by small enterprises, charities, events and community groups, particularly in implementing the necessary security measures without excessive financial or administrative strain.

Similarly, concerns were voiced regarding the potential impact on volunteers and organisations in the cultural, sporting and heritage sectors. We heard from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester on the potential issues for hundreds of church communities and how they will be affected. These discussions underscored the necessity of ensuring that the provisions of the Bill are not only effective but proportionate and pragmatic in their application. While I am disappointed that the Government felt unable to support amendments that sought to protect smaller businesses and volunteers, we acknowledge the importance of moving forward with a Bill that still represents a significant step forward in our collective security.

We also welcome the Government’s clarification on the Henry VIII powers contained in the Bill, an issue of legitimate concern that was rightly debated in detail. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for bringing amendments to refine these provisions. I commend the Minister on engaging seriously with these concerns and ensuring that the necessary clarifications were made. This is precisely the kind of constructive scrutiny in your Lordships’ House that strengthens legislation, and I am grateful to all who participated in this process.

I thank my noble friends Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Sandhurst for their support on the Bill. I must also mention our support team on this side, Henry Mitson and Max McGiffen.

As we move towards the implementation of the Bill, it is vital that those affected by its provisions—businesses, charities, local authorities and venue operators —receive clear guidance and support. The effectiveness of this legislation will be determined not by the words on the page alone but by how well it is put into practice. Adequate resources, training and advice must be provided to ensure that compliance is achievable and that security measures are implemented effectively without unnecessary complexity or confusion. To that end, a watchful eye will be kept on the performance of the Security Industry Authority.

Furthermore, we must continue to evaluate the impact of these measures once they are in force. Security threats evolve, and our responses must remain adaptable. I hope that the Government will remain open to reviewing and, if necessary, refining the legislation in the future to ensure that it continues to meet the needs of those it seeks to protect.

In conclusion, the Bill represents a significant and necessary step in our ongoing efforts to protect the public from the scourge of terrorism. While no legislation can eliminate it entirely, we have a duty to take every reasonable measure to mitigate threats and to ensure that venues and public spaces are as prepared as possible. The Bill is a tribute to those who have tragically lost their lives to terrorism, and a testament to our resolve that we will do all we can to prevent future tragedies.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, the discussions we have had both in this Chamber and beyond have been deeply thoughtful and constructive, motivated by a shared desire to protect the public while ensuring that the measures we introduce are both proportionate and workable.

However, I remain very concerned about the potential impact of this legislation on volunteers and volunteer-run organisations and on their enthusiasm to take up the mantle to run those vital village halls and community centres that we heard so much about during the passage of the Bill.

I am very grateful to the Minister for his assurance that the Government will keep the matter under review. I think it is incumbent on us all to ensure that the burdens imposed by this legislation on very small businesses and community enterprises are closely monitored and that, in the event that it has the adverse impact I fear, the matter can come back before the House for examination.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the comments from noble Lords. The Bill now goes to the House of Commons with government amendments and amendments the Government have supported, and I look forward to a speedy passage to Royal Assent.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Migrants: Indefinite Leave to Remain

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strathcarron]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the number of migrants expected to apply for indefinite leave to remain over the course of the Parliament, and of the related cost.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

Some 162,000 migrants were granted settlement in the year ending December 2024. The Government intend to produce a White Paper later this year on migration policy and will tackle high net migration by taking a different approach, linking migration and broader labour market policies together.

[Lord Strathcarron (Con)]

I thank the Minister for the reply. Using ONS and OBR data, it is possible to project that over 800,000 recent migrants could apply for ILR over the course of this Parliament. Some 54% of those are on non-work visas, and those on work visas are predominantly non-net tax contributors. Furthermore, each ILR migrant will have full claim to all benefits, and the right to bring in more dependants on non-work family visas. Does the Minister agree that the coming societal and fiscal impacts are simply unsustainable? Will the Government consider revising the current five-year eligibility rules while there is still time to do so?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The five-year eligibility rule is currently in place, as the noble Lord has mentioned. I have to say to him that I am a sort of hors d’oeuvre ahead of the main course, which will be the net migration White Paper, which will be published very shortly and will address what we need to do in this Parliament in respect of net migration, skills development, producing local skills here and tackling illegal migration. I hope that the noble Lord will bear with me: there will be examination of all those issues in the White Paper, which will be before this House in relatively short order.

[Lord Hardie (CB)]

My son-in-law, Jair, came to this country more than 20 years ago. Since his arrival here and his obtaining right to remain, he has been permanently employed in various capacities, including as an assistant in a school for deaf children. Latterly, since he obtained UK citizenship 16 years ago, he has been serving as a police officer in Scotland. He has never been a financial burden on the state. Does the Minister agree that, in considering the cost mentioned in the Question, it is also essential to include the benefits that such migrants bring to our society in providing essential public services and giving us practical examples of the benefits of cultural diversity?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I absolutely agree with the noble and learned Lord. We need to value those individuals who come here legally and via legal migration routes. They make a contribution to our society and fulfil many employment roles. They pay their taxes, put a range of cultural improvements into our society and help to improve the mix as a whole. However, I think that the noble and learned Lord will still recognise, to go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Strathcarron, that that needs to be managed and examined. That is what the White Paper will do: examine the potential pressures and issues. But I want to emphasise that those who are here are welcome and contribute to our society positively.

[Lord Sahota (Lab)]

My Lords, there are some 175,000 Ukrainian migrants in this country, who arrived more than three years ago and are running out of their three years’ leave to stay. What is their status now?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government have recently issued a statement revising and extending the Ukrainian scheme, and anybody who is here currently under that Ukrainian scheme will have been notified of the requirements under that. Their status will be regularised as long as the illegal occupation and invasion of Ukraine by the Russian state pertains.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

What progress has been made in closing asylum hotels, in line with the Government’s manifesto commitment? How will the Government ensure that those granted indefinite leave to remain contribute to the economy, rather than becoming dependent on state support?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government have closed a certain number of asylum hotels—it is in the low teens at the moment. The Government have a commitment to closing such hotels because they are a waste of taxpayers’ resource, and there are better ways to manage what we inherited from the previous Government. Since July, we have removed 19,000 people with no legal right to remain in the United Kingdom. Of those, 5,100 were enforced returns and, since July, we have also tackled 5,400-plus visits on illegal working, and we are improving the situation with removal of foreign national offenders. There is a record that the noble Lord has to defend, and we are trying to unpick that record—and those hotels are his legacy. We will meet our manifesto commitment during this Parliament.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, are the Government satisfied that UKVI is providing good or, at any rate, reasonable service to applicants for indefinite leave? If you are paying the standard fees rather than for priority or super-priority service, is that one of the services for which you have to provide your credit card details and pay to hold on the phone, listening to a robot—possibly telling you that “Your call is very important to us”—before getting a formulaic and uninformative reply about the progress of your application?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope that that is not the experience—and if it is, I hope that the noble Baroness will send me details of the specifics of the experience that she relates. The Home Office does not make a profit from applications; where the fee is higher than the estimated unit cost, there is no profit element. The Home Office keeps all fees under review, and it is its principle to ensure that those who have a potential legal right to apply to stay in the United Kingdom have the facility to do so in a simple and effective way. I hope that the noble Baroness will supply me with the information if there is a specific case to which she wishes to refer.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, might my noble friend talk with his boss, the Home Secretary—I ought to declare an interest, because I am still involved with higher education—on whether we could in the White Paper at least discuss the critical issue of not getting into the farcical position of trying desperately to recruit full-time higher education students from across the world and then counting them in the net migration figures?

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend tempts me to go into the main course rather than the hors d’oeuvre, which is today’s Question. I cannot trail for him matters that may or may not be in the immigration/net migration White Paper that we will produce in the very near future. We are intending to look at the inheritance that we had from the previous Government but also at the economic needs and training needs of the United Kingdom and how we can upskill the UK workforce, as well as at the impact of net migration students on university places—and the points that the noble Lord, Lord Strathcarron, mentioned. I hope that my noble friend can have patience, as that will be before this House in relatively short order.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

The Minister will have seen the letter that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has sent to his right honourable friend the Home Secretary about the plight and fate of those children who went missing from asylum accommodation, overseen by the Home Office at the time. What can he tell us about the numbers still involved, their plight or fate, and what more is being done to identify their whereabouts?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his question. It is a priority for the Government to track down and provide safeguarding measures for those children who went missing under the regime of the previous Government. There are approximately 80 to 90 for whom we do not have records of where they are now. It is priority to understand where they are. The responsibility for that lies not just with the Home Office but with local authorities, such as Kent, which had initial responsibility and now has responsibility for safeguarding issues. It is a priority to find them, and I shall update the noble Lord in due course.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, will the Government’s White Paper abandon the doctrine proclaimed by Tony Blair, and to which subsequent Conservative Ministers, sadly, succumbed, that mass immigration is necessary to promote growth in this country, given that in the ensuing 20 years we have had the highest rate of immigration in our history and the lowest rate of growth? Will they go back and look at the record of Mrs Thatcher—

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I spent most of the period from 1979 to 1990 trying to make sure that Mrs Thatcher was not in office, I cannot really give much comfort to the noble Lord on his request to endorse the policies she undertook. He will have to wait for the migration White Paper that will be coming shortly. Among its key aspects—I can give him a slight taster—will be the ability to develop homegrown skills, to look at skill shortages, and to look at how we upskill individuals to fill those vacancies. I very much value the people who, historically, over many years, before Mrs Thatcher and beyond, have come to the United Kingdom to work and to make their lives. They are valued members of our community, but we need also to look at how they can upskill to meet future challenges.