Counterterrorism: AI and Facial Recognition

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether the current legal architecture permits the appropriate use of AI and live facial recognition for counterterrorism purposes.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The current legal architecture allows effective use of these technologies, but the Government continue to keep legislation under regular review as threats evolve. The Government are investing a record £141 million in AI technology and automation, including over £11 million on 40 new live facial recognition units. The police reform Bill will complement this by introducing clearer rules and independent oversight for facial recognition, ensuring that its use remains lawful, proportionate and responsible.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his Answer. The Home Office consultation was a welcome recognition of the gaps in the current statutory framework in this area. I welcome the notion that there will be a development of legislation, particularly the police reform Bill, which covers these important technologies. On the proposed legislation, will there be support for behavioural analytics in relation to counterterrorism? I ask because that is a very important tool.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for his question. What we are trying to do in the police reform Bill is respond to the consultation he has mentioned, which closed a few weeks back. We are currently analysing the responses to that consultation, and the intention is to put in place a legal framework that covers all aspects of facial recognition technology, so that there is proper governance, proper accountability, and a clear understanding of what, where and how facial recognition technology can be used. I will ensure that when the Bill is brought forward, my noble and learned friend has an opportunity to reflect on the points that he has made today.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, while I welcome the Government’s approach to this, with the postponement of the EU-UK summit, which was to discuss security issues, from 22 July to another date, I am all the more concerned that the re-establishment of our links to SIS II, the information system which gives real-time information on movements of terrorists around Europe, will now be put off as well. I wonder whether the Minister will update us on what we are doing to try to get ourselves back into what is undoubtedly the best means of dealing with terrorists.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord knows my clear view on this matter: we have to have a very constructive relationship with Europe; the things that we lost due to the Brexit withdrawal need to be examined in detail on the criminal justice front; it is in Europe’s and United Kingdom’s interests to have better access and understanding of who goes where, when and why; and it is the objective of the Government to try to help the European Union and to receive benefits. The summit that was planned for July has been postponed for reasons that are self-evident—because of a change of Prime Minister—but the objective of the Government remains the same.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, artificial intelligence chatbots are already engaged in skilfully targeted radicalisation. They may even be used in attack planning, as in the case of the Windsor Castle crossbow attacker, who was thwarted, fortunately, in his ambition to kill Her late Majesty but was assisted and encouraged throughout by his online “girlfriend”, Sarai. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has suggested that we may need laws against the creation and deployment of computer programs that can be used for such malign purposes. Could the Minister update us as to what the Government are going to do about it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful as always for the expertise that the noble Lord brings to this issue. The independent reviewer did indeed consider, in his annual report, the impact of generative AI on terrorism-related activity. The report concluded that, where AI is intended to be used for terrorist purposes, existing terrorism legislation generally provides sufficient coverage. Nevertheless, we are continuing to look at that. It is an important issue. As the noble Lord knows from our long discussions in the last few days, we have a security Bill and a police reform Bill coming up. We keep those matters under review and, obviously, it is a very fast-moving situation. We need to be ahead of the game for the reasons the noble Lord has mentioned.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the Government have committed substantial resources to live facial recognition technology, but, at present, the police authorisation makes no distinction between the technology being deployed on the high street and for counterterrorism purposes. Will the Minister confirm that the forthcoming framework will establish a distinct statutory authorisation regime for counterterrorism purposes so that we are not leaving both of them to inadequate police superintendent authorisation, as we are at the moment?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness makes a valid point about the difference between terrorism and what I will term other crime. As she knows, facial recognition technology is sometimes used for things such as identifying missing persons who have not been involved in crime at all. There needs to be a clear framework for this. As she knows, the consultation paper raised a number of questions. We are trying to resolve and respond to those and to look at the great analysis that we had in responses. We will bring forward proposals, which she will have an opportunity to test when we bring forward the police reform Bill.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it has been reported that the newly created PoliceAI centre will roll out large-scale pilots in up to 10 police forces to help officers triage, disclose and summarise digital evidence. Can the Minister inform your Lordships’ House as to what impact the police reform Bill, and specifically the proposed mergers of police forces, will have on these plans for a more enhanced role for AI in policing?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

At the moment, as the noble Lord knows, the Government’s policy objective is to reduce the number of police forces. We have asked the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to look at that. Ministers have not yet had his final report with his proposals for the size of police forces. In the police reform Bill, we are trying to establish national responsibilities on crime, counterterrorism, training, and procurement. As part of our consultation, we are looking at what we need to do on a framework for facial recognition technology. As the noble Lord rightly said, we have put in £140 million, including £11 million on 40 new live facial recognition units, and we have looked at retrospective facial recognition. We are trying, in a very long-term plan, to get national capability, better resource and better efficiency for taxpayers, while at the same time recognising, as I know he does, that facial recognition is an extremely important tool for identifying known criminals, people who have broken licence terms and people who are missing, and for intelligence-led policing that can ensure that we know exactly who we are looking for and why.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, this is clearly a very useful technology, but given that it has very wide application, can my noble friend say anything about how we monitor the level of possible misrecognition by these systems?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is an absolutely vital point, as it is with many forms of technology. The old identity parade misidentified some people. ANPR—number plate recognition—occasionally looks at information that does not identify the right number plate. This is technology that is used to support the police. I reassure my noble friend that at the end of it there is always a set of human eyes. Humans determine whether to put a case to the CPS for prosecution and whether the information is correct. But AI, including AI used for facial recognition, means that we are saving the police hours, to the extent that we can potentially deploy an extra 3,000 police officer hours for other purposes. That is because AI can sift out, examine, look at characteristics and determine one, five or even 10 suspects who we might need to have further eyes on. It is important to look at the developments. Ultimately, it is under operational police and political control.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the officials of the House for the speedy turnaround of the amended Bill. It is a tribute to their dexterity that we have managed to turn this round much quicker than I expected, and our thanks go to them. I thank the officials in the Home Office and all the people behind the Bill who have given advice and support to Ministers on this crucial issue, including the security services and others. I particularly thank my private office, the Bill manager and the Bill team, and all the officials who are here.

I thank the Official Opposition for their courtesy, intensive scrutiny of the Bill and alternative suggestions. I say that to them genuinely, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, and to other colleagues who have spoken, particularly in this case the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Alton, who have been very engaged with this Bill.

This Bill has been done for a purpose, which is to allow my right honourable friend the Secretary of State to have the necessary powers to consider how best to act after the determination of state threats. The Bill, as amended, will now return to the House of Commons where it will be further scrutinised, and where I am confident the amendments made in this House will be accepted. I hope that the Bill will then go for speedy consideration for Royal Assent. On Royal Assent, I assure the House that the Home Secretary will take urgent action to examine state threats and, if necessary, bring forward appropriate measures as soon as possible.

It has been a pleasure to take this Bill through the House over two days. There have been some tensions and discussions, but I hope that, at the end of the day, we are agreed as one that the Bill will be a useful tool for the Secretary of State to help protect this country and its citizens from state threats. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I reiterate the thanks of all of us to the Minister and his team, both in the House and in the Home Office, and his Bill team generally, for the enormous help that we have had and for engaging with us. From our point of view, we have achieved some significant improvements to the Bill. We believe that the purpose of Bill, of which the noble Lord spoke, has been achieved with great speed and, generally speaking, in good humour. We are therefore happy that the Bill do now pass.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

In Amendment 2, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has rightly identified how hostile states use media propaganda to spread their influence. We have tabled an amendment criminalising the dissemination of publications related to designated bodies which will be debated in a later group, so we will reserve our comments on this matter for then. Suffice to say that, for now, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, that this is a significant lacuna in the Bill and the Government must rectify it.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and comments and for the broad support for the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

I shall start on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron has raised. This Bill is a result of a Labour manifesto commitment. It is a result of a commission we gave to Jonathan Hall KC to examine these areas in October 2024. He produced a report for the Government which they have examined in detail, and they have given commitments in this House to bring forward legislation at the earliest opportunity. This is the earliest opportunity. In giving time for discussions with the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson and others, I have tried to make sure that we get this Bill right. It has had a fast track, agreed with the Opposition. It was put through the House of Commons in one day. We agreed to have Second Reading in one day and now all remaining stages of the Bill today. I have tried to support the Opposition to achieve their objectives. I have to say to the noble Lord that I have been very clear, open and honest in private conversations about what I can do and what I cannot do. What I have said to him I can do I have tried to do. As we shall see in later amendments, the Government have tried to assist other noble Lords.

I have also been very clear about what I cannot do. What I cannot do are things that dilute or damage the basic principle of this Bill, which is to give my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the power to undertake some designatory actions, which have been called for by His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and others in this House and in other places, against a number of potential state threats. That is why we fast-tracked the Bill: so that this House and others can give powers for the Secretary of State to consider it.

The noble Lord and I get on well—we have friendly discussion; we have discussions inside and outside this House—but I reject wholly his allegations today that we have not engaged on this Bill. It is worth putting that on the record; we have to put these things on the record occasionally.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, raised specific questions on a number of matters. If he will allow, they need reflection and are not material to the amendments before us today, although they are tangential and important. I cannot give him definitive answers today on the four questions that he raised, but I will write to him on them.

A number of noble Lords also raised the national security Bill that is coming up shortly. I refer all those noble Lords to the King’s Speech 2026. The King’s Speech document contains four pages of detail on the national security Bill and about what we intend to do; the gracious Speech has announced that. Again, I cannot give noble Lords a date for its introduction, nor can I go above what has been said in the gracious Speech, but noble Lords need to know clearly that there will be a security Bill and that the gracious Speech’s objectives will be met. I refer noble Lords to that.

I thank my noble friend Lady Hayter for her Amendment 1. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for speaking to that amendment. I hope I can reassure my noble friend that not only was the National Security Act 2023 landmark legislation but it modernised the Government’s approach to dealing with the state threat activities that she mentioned by repealing the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the offences therein and modernising those offences as a whole.

The espionage offence was at Section 1 of the 1911 Act and the espionage activity that it dealt with is now comprehensively dealt with in various offences found in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. These include the espionage offences referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. A number of other offences are in that Act. They protect key locations and key aspects of the state against foreign activity. They include the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. That offence at Section 3 of the Act has already proved invaluable in countering espionage and has led to recent convictions for serious offences in relation to those who acted for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, to which noble Lords have recently referred.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, described China in colourful terms which were echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady D’Souza, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Shinkwin, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, from his experience on the Intelligence and Security Committee. They all raised the issue of China. I am clear on this. China poses a series of threats to the UK in national security terms, from cyber attacks, foreign interference, espionage, democratic institution interference and transnational repression, which are to be condemned. Protecting our security is non-negotiable, but we have to engage with China where there are clear UK global interests. Indeed, this engagement allows us to raise issues of concern—in which we occasionally have common interests.

I hope I can reassure my noble friend that the espionage activity that she has mentioned in Amendment 1 is covered completely. With those assurances, I hope that she can withdraw her amendment in due course.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

Just before the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, leaves that point—and he will know that I have raised this before—it was one of the points raised in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which identified China as the principal threat when it comes to transnational repression, more than any other state. We puzzled over why, therefore, Iran and Russia are in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, but China is not. I know that the Minister will say, “We continue to look at this”, but will he give us some idea of how long it will take before we get a real answer to that question?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid the noble Lord will have to accept the answer I give him every time he raises this issue, which is that we keep these matters under review. If the Home Secretary believes that the power should be exercised, she will exercise it alongside the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I cannot give him the answer to that question now, for the reasons he knows. I hope he understands that.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 proposes new types of conduct to be treated as foreign power activity. As I understand it, this would supplement but not supplant the existing meaning of Section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 when making designations. I am entirely sympathetic to the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, of making the UK a harder target for transnational repression. He will know it is a matter the Government take seriously and that we continue to make concrete progress, including on the helpful recommendations from the noble Lord’s own committee, the JCHR, and the detailed inquiry. This includes the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, the recent successful prosecutions I referred to a moment ago, the introduction of police training, practical guidance, a national protective security agency and a range of other matters.

Where a person carries out such activity with the intention of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service, it would already fall within the scope of foreign power threat activity. I think that is right and that the link back to the definition that Parliament agreed in passing the National Security Act 2023 is entirely appropriate.

Given the evolving nature of the threat and absence of an internationally agreed definition of transnational repression, we believe the broad approach recommended by the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coupled with the powers in the National Security Act and wider criminal law, is better suited to protecting potential victims. As I have said to the noble Lord outside the Chamber, I am happy to write to him by what I will term close of play in this House, 23 July, with further details of how we will respond on those matters accordingly.

I thank the noble Lord for Amendment 4, which touches on a significant issue. Outside of the Chamber, contrary to the assertions of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, I have tried to meet the objectives and to talk to the noble Lord in a constructive way. The foreign power condition is a core component of existing offences in Part 1 of the National Security Act 2023. I will explain how we will deal with the foreign power condition and its interpretation, which I hope will reassure the noble Lord.

In my view, the foreign power condition can be met. Let me be clear that it is not necessary for a person to be tasked or directed by a foreign power in order for their actions to constitute foreign power threat activity. Under the National Security Act 2023, where a person acts for the purposes of advancing or giving effect to the policy of a foreign power, the foreign power condition can already be satisfied. In intending to promote or fulfil the published policy of another state through their conduct, a person is likely to at least intend to benefit a foreign power. It is important to add that the meaning of foreign power under Section 32 of the National Security Act 2023 is not limited to foreign Governments and their constituent parts. It is broad enough to include a range of agencies, including the type of agency that the noble Lord has mentioned and the governing political party of a foreign Government.

I am happy to put beyond doubt that activities inspired by the policy of a foreign power, including the governing political party of a state, would fall within the current definition of foreign power threat activity in the National Security Act 2023. I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the fact that the National Security Act 2023 was drafted with the intention of capturing the full range of state threat activity. I have looked at the matter extremely carefully and consulted with legal advisers in the Home Office, as well as operational partners. If it helps put the matter beyond doubt for the noble Lord, including for the purpose of interpretation by the courts, I can assure the Committee that interference activity motivated by the policy of the governing party of a state is prosecutable under the National Security Act 2023.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. As he said, it puts it beyond doubt. It would enable that to be referred to in a court of law, should such a prosecution occur. I regard that as very significant progress, and I am grateful to the Minister.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that welcome from the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

I will touch on Amendment 5, from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who—again contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has said— I have tried to engage with a number of times this week, including, at short notice, in discussions across the board. I am trying my best to achieve those objectives.

Amendment 5 seeks to expand the scope of the preparatory conduct offence and the definition of foreign threat activity to incorporate the development of artificial superintelligence. The noble Baroness has a strong point. She is right to identify the risks posed by advanced AI models. As the picture is rapidly evolving, it is vital that the Government step up to this challenge, and we are already trying to do so. We have the AI Security Institute, the most advanced capability of any Government in the world for understanding AI. The National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, is providing world-leading defensive capabilities. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which is currently progressing through Parliament, will strengthen protections, and we are shortly to produce a national cyber action plan setting out the steps that the Government want to take.

However, I recognise that the noble Baroness has made important points, and I will go as far as I can to reassure her on those issues. The Government recognise that the development by foreign powers of highly advanced artificial intelligence systems poses a risk to our cyber security and our national security. We will therefore—I hope this helps the noble Baroness—ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to legislation are necessary to redefine “foreign power threat activity”. Accordingly, we will do that. In response to the points that the noble Baroness has made, it is up to the independent reviewer to consult who they think is necessary, but I anticipate—I hope this is helpful to the noble Baroness—that they may wish to consult with a range of experts, as she has suggested, relating to AI.

My noble friend Lord Beamish is in the Committee today and, while it is a matter for the ISC itself, I am happy that we involve the ISC in that as appropriate. The Government always welcome the views of relevant committees, and I encourage my noble friend Lord Beamish to look at any AI issues if he requires it. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness on the experts that we can bring in, alongside the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation and the ISC examining these important areas. I hope that will help the noble Baroness.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting the Minister in full flow. Can he make the position absolutely clear? He said that, as far as the Government are concerned, on the advice that they have received, Amendment 3 is covered by Section 33 of the 2023 Act. He has put that plainly on the record. Is he also saying that, as far as the Government are concerned, Amendment 5 is covered by Section 18 of the 2023 Act but, if that is not the case and the independent reviewer makes cogent recommendations, the Government will come ready to this House to amend Section 18 of the 2023 Act as necessary? The one thing to remember in the context of the independent reviewer is that the independent reviewer can only tell the Government what he thinks. He cannot amend the law himself. That assurance would be very helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I happily give the noble Lord the assurance that, as I have said, we are trying to ensure that we ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to the legislation, as in the area noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are considered. That will be a formal request, involving the independent reviewer making a judgment about who he wishes to call, and that would undoubtedly include, as suggested by the noble Baroness, independent AI experts. My noble friend Lord Beamish, the chair of the ISC, is in the Chamber today and will have heard what has been said. He has had the discussion and the offer has been made to all parties that they at least submit some evidence as part of that process.

I go back to the genesis of the Bill. The Bill is around because there was a manifesto commitment. There was a request to the independent reviewer and he has come up with suggestions. We have introduced the Bill as part of those suggestions, and we have said in response to other areas that His Majesty’s Opposition have pressed us on that we will consider those matters, but we have to do so as part of other, wider Bills. I am saying to the Committee today that this is a defined Bill with a defined purpose. I am trying to ensure that, having listened to the Committee, and as we will discuss in later amendments—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will finish this sentence, if I may. As we will discuss in later amendments, we have made some changes to help reflect some of the views that have been put to me. Ultimately, that is the position that I am trying to take.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

May I repeat my second question? Will the Minister confirm that it is the Government’s view that Amendment 5 is covered already by Section 18 of the National Security Act 2023?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My view is that there are powers there. However, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I am saying that we will ask the independent reviewer to examine whether we need to make any changes. That is the settlement I am trying to reach today. If there are other points I want to add to that, I will contact the noble Lord by letter or email afterwards. That is the settlement I am trying to put on the record for all parties today, to get this aspect of the Bill agreed and the amendments not pressed.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

The urgency of dealing with the question of AI was emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, of course, by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to whose excellent amendment I am a signatory. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is about to complete a further investigation into AI and human rights. I hope that, along with all the other referrals the Minister is going to make to the independent commissioner, he might ensure that the findings of that Joint Committee, which we anticipate will be published before the Summer Recess, will also be drawn to his attention.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord knows that I always welcome the views of the committee, and I will look at them and reflect on them with colleagues. I can probably give a definitive yes to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on his point; I was hedging my bets, but I think I can give a definitive yes. I hope that helps him in his assessment. I always like to give the House exquisite legal advice on these matters, rather than finding myself having to examine my own comments at a later date. I hope again that, given all the points that have been made, my noble friend will withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not push theirs.

The Committee will notice that I have not spoken to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, or indeed the clause stand part notice from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which were in this group, because they have not spoken to them. With that, I hope that my noble friend will respond accordingly.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I first thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Beamish and Lord Shinkwin, for their support. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who managed to get Jimmy Lai’s name in, which we always appreciate. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his assurance that espionage is covered.

This is a live issue. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, John Lee, has said that overseas activists with bounties on their heads will be “pursued for life”. Activists such as Christopher Mung, Ted Hui, Finn Lau and Nathan Law have all been targeted by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, so what we are asking for is urgent. That is why I support this Bill going as fast as possible and being implemented as quick as possible. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group concern offences relating to the support and assistance of designated bodies. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, has not spoken to his amendments. In this regard, it is worth commenting that these Benches have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind the noble Lord’s amendments—he spoke at Second Reading last week—namely, the fact that a designated body, as a media organ, should not be a potential avenue by which criminals avoid prosecution. It is an issue worthy of consideration. It would be interesting if the Minister could confirm whether the offences proposed by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would already be captured by the Bill as drafted.

Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make it an offence to conceal beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation. Again, we on these Benches support the principle behind this amendment. The use, funnelling or concealment of funds to support a designated body should undoubtedly be an offence that is captured by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide assurances that this will be the case. I look forward to his response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place, but his amendments have been referred to. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that the conduct captured in the amendments is already appropriately provided for by the existing provisions in the Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoken to them, I would have gone into more detail, but that is the principle of the response to date.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 9, which intends to specify the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets related to a designated body, as material assistance. The Government take corruption in all its forms very seriously. We welcome the noble Lord’s focus on this important issue, and the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined.

On the noble Lord’s concerns about beneficial ownership, the Government have a strong record on reducing illicit finance, including working with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to do so. The register of overseas entities requires overseas entities that own UK property to register verified information on their beneficial owners with Companies House and to update that information. The Government also produce an annual progress report to Parliament on Companies House reforms, including updates to the register of overseas entities.

The “Assisting a designated body” offence is not limited to financial benefits; providing access to services is already explicitly covered by subsection (3) of the new Section 17B offence. Establishing or running an arrangement to look after a designated body’s assets is a service. Those who do so professionally are often called trust or company service providers. This reflects that there are no specific financial measures in the Bill but they can be applied in all environments. Therefore, the activity that the amendment seeks to address is already within the scope of the new offence.

The amendment is unnecessary in a positive way, in that the Bill is already covering this area, and although the noble Lord has drawn specific attention to this matter, I can explicitly confirm the extent of the provisions of the Bill, and we anticipate that a key utility for this power will be to call out and bear down on the very front companies the noble Lord has referred to which are carrying out foreign power threat activities as proxies for hostile powers. If the noble Lord looks at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, he will see that that is very clear. I know he will have looked at those in detail, but I reaffirm for other Members of the Committee that the Explanatory Notes are very clear on that point.

If I may, I will follow up in writing to the noble Lord to give some further detail to him and his colleagues regarding the work that the Government are doing to prevent the misuse of beneficial ownership structures and financing of designated bodies more broadly. When I do that, I will place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of both Houses to ensure that all Members have access to my correspondence in due course. It is a matter for the noble Lord, but I think that we have covered these matters. It was very important that he raised them, but I respectfully ask him not to push his amendment; given that his is the last amendment standing in this group, I hope he will withdraw it and allow us to deal with matters by correspondence.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am very grateful for the assurances and explanations that the Minister has given. I will not press the amendment to a vote now, but I invite him to consider, between now and the introduction of further legislation, whether there is a complete overlap, so that anybody who helps the disguise of assets, perhaps without knowing that the designated body is the beneficiary of that assistance, will be covered by the offence as it stands, because it seems to me that there is a possible lacuna where new legislation would be helpful. If he would add to his assurance by saying that he will at least consider whether there is such a gap, I would be happier in withdrawing my amendment, which I will seek leave to do in any event. I give him an opportunity to respond to that very specific point.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I give the noble Lord the assurance that we will certainly look at those matters, and I will include that in the correspondence that I send him post the consideration of the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am very grateful and, with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and I am delighted to add my support to Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A in her name. The unintended application of the new Sections 17B and 17C to those who carry out humanitarian activities was a danger to which we both spoke at Second Reading, and these amendments go a very long way to laying those concerns to rest.

My own Amendment 17, signed also by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, has similarly been superseded by Amendment 17A, which I tabled yesterday after discussion with the Minister. It appears in the supplementary list and is accompanied by the minor and consequential manuscript Amendment 18B.

Amendment 17A was floated in the Second Reading speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, last Tuesday, tweaked in the note produced by Jonathan Hall KC on Thursday and tabled by me later that day. Three Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation might not be quite as entertaining as the Three Tenors, but we have, I hope, as so often, sung more or less in harmony.

The problem that Amendment 17A seeks to address is the breadth of Section 17C, which prohibits obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Section 17C(3) defines material benefits as including not only

“anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit”,

but additionally, and separately, the unqualified word “information”. The Minister sought to assist by suggesting at Second Reading that the transfer of information was caught by the prohibition only when it possesses

“an inherent value that enriches the recipient”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.]

Although I am as keen on gift horses as the next person, and while I appreciate the helpful spirit in which the Minister’s interpretation was put forward, I must confess that it is not one in which I would feel complete confidence as an advocate.

The starting point of Section 17C is that any receipt of information from or on behalf of a designated body is a criminal offence. Diplomats and other public servants have a defence. There is another defence of reasonable excuse in Section 17C(7), but this operates as a defence only to the charge of retaining the material benefit, not to a charge of obtaining it, accepting it or agreeing to accept it. That is the hole this amendment fills where information is concerned. It protects those who are not diplomats but who none the less have a legitimate interest in soliciting or obtaining information from a designated body.

Those engaged in humanitarian activity will now be protected by Amendment 18A. I mentioned at Second Reading the HALO Trust, which could otherwise have been at risk for asking a designated body where the mines were laid. But Amendment 17A remains vital for those who are neither diplomats nor engaged in humanitarian activity. I spoke at Second Reading of a small number of reputable organisations which enter into dialogue with bodies susceptible to designation for the purposes of conflict prevention and resolution. One of those bodies is the charity Inter Mediate, founded by Jonathan Powell, in which I declare a non-pecuniary interest as chair. Such bodies might be described as humanitarian, in which case they are protected by Amendment 18A. But, in case of any doubt, their ability to engage in such dialogues is safeguarded by Amendment 17A.

There are also foreign correspondents, a number of whom I have engaged with in recent days. In order to inform the public as effectively as possible, some of them routinely speak to sources in and around bodies liable to designation. They do not make it their practice to alert government or anyone else to the fact that they are doing so. While they understand that the Attorney-General has a discretion over whether to bring prosecutions, they point, I am afraid, to the abusive exercise of equivalent discretions elsewhere in the common-law world and ask, in the words of the title of Peter Hennessy’s latest book, “Could it happen here?” Prosecutorial discretion is of course a vital safeguard, but it is no substitute for a clear law that neither penalises reasonable behaviour, nor chills those who are associated with it.

These amendments do not weaken this vital Bill, but they avoid its unintended consequences. They give effect to the Government’s unrealised intention, expressed in the factsheet that accompanied the Bill, to include within it defences for humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms. I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their courteous and helpful engagement.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make.

I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.

I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a journalist, takes information from a designated body, which could be about the location of landmines, for example, that organisation will not fall foul of the new offence at Section 17C. The amendment that the Government are willing to accept in the form of new Section 17C(7A) is intended to reflect that.

Again, I am happy if any other noble Lords wish to contribute to the debate and make any further points, if the House will allow me at the end of the debate to respond to those points. I thought it important to put on record now that there should be no difference between us. Therefore, the debate, I would hope, is about the importance of this subject, rather than the Government being forced into agreeing any particular amendment or not. With that, I will sit down and allow other noble Lords to contribute, but I hope the Government’s position is now clear.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution.

But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already contains an important provision, UK-related activities, so does not come with as much of a risk of inappropriate application as Section 17C. With that, I welcome the Government’s concession on both of these aspects.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is vital to our national security that those who assist bodies designated under this Bill are appropriately and effectively punished. The Terrorism Act 2000 has no prohibited purpose condition analogous to that included in the Bill, which we on these Benches believe could be exploited by potential criminals.

As my noble friend Lord Cameron and I argued at Second Reading, the existence of a prohibited purpose requirement will add a large degree of subjectivity and present further evidential barriers for prosecutors in the majority of cases where offenders have no legitimate defence. This argument was also made by Conservative MPs in the other place. We were told, however, by the Government that they were unable to accept our amendment, that no amendments to this Bill would be accepted and that our only chance of engaging in meaningful dialogue was to wait until the next national security Bill, the date for which is unspecified.

It is in that context that I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A seek to create a defence for the offences of assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. I understand the principle behind these amendments. However, we on these Benches worry that

“for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities”

is a potentially subjective criterion that may be misinterpreted and expanded by the judiciary or exploited by those seeking to harm the interests of the UK. Equally, the inclusion of a “reasonable excuse” defence for the obtaining of material benefit from designated bodies is a cause for concern. The wording is sufficiently broad that it may encompass excuses that are not intended to be captured. Moreover, the Minister has repeatedly resisted amendments with much tighter wording, arguing that the intention was for this Bill to be drawn as narrowly as possible.

Given the perhaps unhelpful manner that the Government have displayed during the passage of the Bill, I was extremely surprised to see these amendments appear on the supplementary Marshalled List last night. The tabling of amendments at the 11th hour, with minor drafting tweaks, would make the reasonable observer conclude that the Government have been involved in the drafting process. However, I struggle to believe that would be the case, given that the Government have told the Official Opposition on multiple occasions that they were unable to make further policy decisions during the interregnum. Indeed, they were so unwavering in this stance that they were unable to accept even amendments that had been confirmed as government policy, such as that on the seizure of passports. Therefore, I look to the Minister to assure the House that there has been no government involvement in the drafting of amendments in this group. Can he confirm that?

I can only reasonably assume that the Government will therefore be unable to accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. If the Government have offered assistance to the Liberal Democrats and are willing to accept the amendments in this group, I have several further questions for the Minister. Why did he inform us that the Government’s hands were tied and that no compromises could be made on the Bill between Second Reading and today? Given that the Conservatives also raised the issue of a defence to the offence of supporting a designated body, why were the Government willing to give preferential treatment and to work with Liberal Democrat Peers, but not the Conservatives? The Government informed us several times that, even with amendments they were sympathetic to, there simply was not enough time to draft them in an acceptable form during the passage of the Bill. Can the Minister now confirm that this was not the case, or did the Home Office increase the capacity of the legislative team over the weekend?

The concerns raised by the amendments in this group are not novel. In the spirit of collaboration, I even wrote to the Minister on 10 June, before Second Reading, outlining the issues on which we wished to work constructively. We were told in no uncertain terms that, on every issue raised, the Government were unable or indeed unwilling to act. The decision therefore to assist in the drafting of amendments that were published the night before Committee is just not satisfactory. It leaves noble Lords with very little time to consider amendments that concern national security and which are an unfortunate attempt at avoiding genuine parliamentary scrutiny. I would be very pleased if the Minister could address these concerns.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

For the avoidance of doubt, I quite like the noble Lord, and we have a good relationship on these matters. I think I have constructive discussions on these matters with both noble Lords opposite. But I want to say to the House that I have been very clear to the noble Lord from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition that there are certain things we can do and there are certain things we cannot. There are some issues we agree with, but not in this Bill, and there are other measures we will return to in future legislation. I have tried to not dilute the central purpose of this Bill, which is to give the Home Secretary a power to designate anybody that she, having taken advice from a range of sources in the Home Office and through agencies, thinks is a threat to the state.

As I have said, the issues the noble Lord has tried to shoehorn into the Bill are ones the Government in part agree with, and we will find a proper mechanism to implement those policies in due course. I did not want to extend the scope of the Bill, nor did I want to put in measures that, in my view, dilute its core purpose. That is why I have not been able to help the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover—and indeed the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—made points about the unintended consequence of humanitarian, journalistic or other agencies being caught. I have tried, privately and at Second Reading, to give assurances that the Bill as drafted would not lead to those unintended consequences.

But it is perfectly reasonable for a Minister, between Second Reading and Committee, to listen to representations that are made and, as has happened, to have my officials and other Ministers in the department meet a range of humanitarian bodies, and to have respected journalists, such as Alex Crawford and Kate Adie, who were mentioned, raise issues with Members of this House where they are concerned about the impact of a particular Bill; and for us as a Government to reflect on those matters and, when amendments are discussed, to agree, potentially, areas where we can accept them. Yes, I accept that they are checked by Home Office lawyers, because this is the law of the land which the Home Office has to implement, but, with due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that that is rejecting the things that he said.

I have tried to have a focus on the Bill. In my view, the amendments we have accepted give additional certainty. We thought we had that certainty, but requests were made to give that additional certainty and therefore we have done so. There are amendments in this group that we have not accepted and I cannot accept—I am afraid I am a perpetual disappointment to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on his Amendment 22. But, in saying that I cannot accept the amendment he has tabled, I reassure him that the Bill we have crafted is designed to ensure that legitimate activities such as diplomacy and journalism, and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within its offences.

We have to be alive to the risks of creating blanket exemptions, which could easily be exploited by sophisticated state actors. We have genuine concerns that exemptions could create simple loopholes for hostile actors to exploit. Those hostile actors frequently operate behind front organisations and sometimes shell charities, so a general carve-out would allow those bodies to carry out activities under the guise of relief work. I know the noble Lord does not want that, and he will know that that would not be right. There is a risk that legitimate humanitarian organisations are infiltrated by hostile actors, and, again, we must avoid unintended consequences.

However, I have recognised the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I said what I said in my earlier introductory remarks, which do not need repeating. I am grateful to the noble Lords for their thoughtful and constructive amendments. They have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support, and they have meant that we have been able to tighten in many ways the concerns that were raised and address those properly.

I come back to the final point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned. He made some good points; for example, there are things that he said on passports that are important. I agree with him; I have said to him, privately and on the Floor of the House at Second Reading, and I say to him now, that the Government hope they can do those things in this Session of Parliament. But the Bill before us is narrowly defined for a specific purpose, which is one I suspect he supports and which, ultimately, if the Bill can achieve early passage, will be resolved.

In answer to the question on whether the amendments we accept have to go back to the House of Commons, I say yes, that is right, but I am confident they will be agreed. I cannot say when, because I am not the business manager for the House of Commons, but I expect it to be done as soon as possible. If those amendments are accepted here, I have 110% confidence that they will be accepted in the House of Commons. Therefore, the Bill, as amended, with the safeguards that have been sought, can be presented for potential Royal Assent, and the powers that are in it can be exercised by the Home Secretary as a matter of urgency.

I therefore commend the amendments that I have indicated—Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A—to the Committee in support of the noble Lords, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, whether he will allow me to reflect still further on his Amendment 22, as discussed.

--- Later in debate ---

Further, the police should be given some practical powers to act immediately where support of a designated body is being demonstrated. We have already seen so much confusion, but we have been privileged to have the police come and talk to noble Lords. It was pretty obvious, even from things such as “From the river to the sea” and what “jihad” actually means, that we should be giving some practical advice. If the police or the public require a handbook, almost, to explain what “designation” means, then this House has failed. Therefore, the point that my noble friend made is eminently reasonable, and we should pass this amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response.

I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles—who has just spoken—Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn.

As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of publicity.

However—this is where I hope I can offer an explanation to the Committee—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for bodies involved in state threat activity, the situation is different. Foreign intelligence services and their proxies largely operate covertly and discreetly. This means that acts of flag waving and wearing a uniform in allegiance to a designated body are less of a concern. Notwithstanding difficulties that may arise with immunity from prosecution, in the event that a state body is designated, the offence could criminalise, among other things, a visiting military attaché, an embassy worker, or a cultural delegation. This could have profound consequences for diplomatic relations, and, where a designated body is a front company that was previously perceived as legitimate, this strict liability offence might punish those who simply fail to remove that body’s branding. Any need for the offence is especially limited, given that the offence of “supporting a designated body” under new Section 17A is wide enough in scope to capture the same activities. I therefore cannot accept Amendment 20.

I shall comment also on Amendment 21, which relates to a new offence:

“Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body”.


It includes a power for constables to seek the removal of internet-based publications. Again, the amendment replicates Sections 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006, but for designated entities. These offences cover the sale or other dissemination of books or other publications that encourage people to engage in terrorism or provide information that could be useful to terrorists. The Act, as currently constituted, provides a power for police to require the takedown of such material by internet service providers.

Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed to criminalise the dissemination of terrorist publications. It was introduced recognising the significant harm that can be caused. This offence purposely is not dependent on an organisation having been proscribed, recognising that terrorist publications may include publications which include and encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism more broadly. In contrast, this Bill focuses on the strengthening of our response to organisations involved in foreign power threat activities that pose an acute threat to the UK and its interests. The threat from publications in this context is, I would suggest, not the same.

Offences in the National Security Act were specifically designed to target threats from state-linked activity, and that Act contains a number of offences that do not appear in terrorism legislation, including assisting a foreign intelligence service. In addition, this Bill includes offences under new Section 17A if a person

“invites support for, or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of, a designated body, and does so for a prohibited purpose”.

I contend that this offence is wide enough to capture the dissemination of publications where those requirements are met. A replicated offence in this case is not appropriate or required to address the state threats, and, incidentally, it was not recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who cautioned against directly copying these offences. He said:

“There is no evidence that penalising general encouragement of state threat activity is needed to avert harm to national security”.


Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary: it is not recommended by Jonathan Hall and the powers should not be included in the Bill.

The final amendment is one we have discussed on several occasions, including today. Amendment 23 seeks to give effect to Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendation that the police be given the power to seize passports. Whereas Jonathan Hall KC recommended that the power should be available on the basis of suspected foreign power threat activity, as currently exists for terrorism-related activity, this amendment is more limited in its application. Noble Lords will be aware that the Bill before us covers a range of issues, but as to the proposal in this amendment, I have already given a commitment on several occasions to deliver all Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendations in the report that inspired this Bill, including the question of passport seizure, which Amendment 23 seeks to examine. However, I have been clear that, in doing so, the Bill should focus narrowly on the new proscription-like power to tackle state threats, and it is not the right vehicle for this proposal.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 23 covers pages 14 to 26 of the amendment paper, the Marshalled List that is in front of us today. It takes 13 pages to give implementation to the policy objective of banning passports. I suggest that the noble Lord will probably ask me, at some point, why I will not accept his amendment. He has tabled 13 pages full of detailed points, which he suggests will meet the objective, but I cannot necessarily say to the Committee that they do meet that objective.

On Amendment 23, I told the noble Lord that we will achieve the objective he described in our own time, with proper legal facility. The noble Lord shakes his head, or perhaps I should say he looks quizzically at me: I think he will agree with that. I assure him that we want to meet the objective he set, but not in this Bill. I cannot be any clearer than that. I recognise that, at 13 pages, such provisions require detailed policy work, done in concert with key operational partners. While noble Lords have sensibly drawn their inspiration from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is an assumption that all those provisions are fit for the purpose of the state threats context. The detailed policy work needs to be completed, and we need to ensure that we have operational guidance for partners, to be ready on commencement of the legislation. I am afraid the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 does not meet that objective.

I assure the noble Lord that we are not on different pages on this. The Bill is a specific Bill for a specific purpose and, while I agree with its general direction of travel, Amendment 23 is not fit for purpose. I therefore ask the noble Lord not press Amendments 20, 21 or 23, for the reasons I have outlined. However, should he choose to do so, I invite my noble friends to vote against them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers.

If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution.

I suggest that my amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated state threat. Therefore, in line with Jonathan Hall’s recommendation, we should make it an offence to do so.

Amendment 23 concerns the seizure of passports of those suspected of supporting designated bodies, and this amendment has been unequivocally supported by Jonathan Hall, and is already a power which the police possess when combating terrorism. Let us be clear about this: it is not a new police power. It was a direct recommendation of a government-sanctioned review, and the Government have said that they will commit to implementing this policy. There is therefore no good reason to oppose this amendment, nor is there a logical or practical one.

Although the Government have pledged to implement this power in a future Bill, there are three concerns that remain which have not been assuaged by the Minister. First, any such future Bill will not receive Royal Assent before the Summer Recess. This means that those who support the IRGC will be protected from these police powers for a considerable length of time. What is the point of rushing to designate a group before Parliament concludes, but not giving the police force the necessary teeth to operate effectively?

Secondly, as I have made clear, the Government have perhaps acted in bad faith on this Bill. We on these Benches simply cannot wait for an unspecified date to enact a policy that can be accepted today. Thirdly, the Minister has acknowledged that his party is currently undergoing vast leadership changes. What is government policy today may not be government policy tomorrow.

I turn now to Amendment 21. As stated previously, this amendment would close yet another legislative gap in this Bill.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.

Immigration and Asylum: Appeals

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact of replacing immigration judges with adjudicators on the consistency of asylum appeal decisions; what qualifications, if any, adjudicators will be required to have; and what safeguards and accountability mechanisms will be put in place to ensure public confidence in the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his Question. In the Government’s Restoring Order and Control Command Paper, which was published on 17 November 2025, we announced systemic reforms to the appeals system. The Government have provided additional funding to the First-tier Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber to increase capacity, and we remain grateful for the ongoing efforts by the tribunal to clear its backlog. However, its current backlog stands at 151,767, with appeals taking, on average, 61 weeks to resolve across all case types, as of March 2026. The Government will shortly bring forward legislation that will underpin the new independent immigration appeals authority. The new authority will be able to determine appeals in a way that provides justice to appellants, with suitably qualified adjudicators independent of the Executive. Further details of the independent immigration appeals authority will be set out in the near future, including the measures that will be put in place to ensure public confidence in the new authority, as the noble Lord requests.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his Answer. What steps will the Government take, through the recruitment and vetting process, to ensure that adjudicators are genuinely independent and impartial, and to guard against the new authority becoming dominated by individuals who have publicly campaigned in favour of open borders or who have otherwise taken partisan positions on immigration policy?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the House that the backlog stands at over 151,000, but that that has not happened in just the last two years. It is the result of 14 years of individuals not being processed, dealt with or sorted by the noble Lord and his party. To answer his question, as of now, we will ensure that individuals are vetted, that there are strong safeguards in place to ensure high standards, and that those making decisions in the independent appeals authority will be entirely independent of the Executive. He will not have to wait too long because, tomorrow, on 30 June, we will publish a Bill setting out the matters that were trailed in the immigration White Paper in November. The noble Lord’s party will have the opportunity to test that Bill through both Houses of Parliament, and I assure him that that independence is critical and will be maintained.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, there is currently an issue with immigration tribunal judges that will be exacerbated, especially when it comes to public confidence, in that the tribunal judges, and no doubt the adjudicators, are not declaring their interests. We, as parliamentarians, have to declare our financial interests and memberships. It is high time that tribunal judges and adjudicators are made to list their financial interests and any controversial, or even uncontroversial, organisations that they have joined; this would fit within the judicial conduct guidance. At the moment, we do not know whether those judges should be recusing themselves and what interests they have, because they are not declared and they should be on a register, in the same way that ours are.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising that point. If she will allow me, can I reflect on it? The issue is self-evidently important, but I cannot answer her question right now. I will make sure that the appropriate policy Ministers in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice examine those issues in detail.

However, I can tell the noble Baroness that we are doing this because the demand for adjudications is far outstripping what we can currently offer. We have around 26,000 additional funded places for sittings this year, so the backlog of over 151,000, which I mentioned earlier, is simply unsustainable. We have to take action on that. The backlog has not just appeared from nowhere; it has appeared through the inaction of the previous Government. We are committed to restoring it and that is what the Bill to be produced tomorrow will begin the process of doing.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, following the last question, I declare my interest: I am supported by the RAMP Project. Can the Minister tell us whether the adjudicators will need to possess specific legal qualifications or accreditation in asylum and human rights law? On the process of getting the adjudicators in place, how long will the training programme take?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are moving at quite a pace. The Bill that establishes the new authority will be published tomorrow and has to make its way through both Houses of Parliament. The principle behind it is that there will be a body that is fully independent of the Government and staffed by professional trained adjudicators, with safeguards to ensure high standards, so that appellants are able to receive impartial and independent redress, as is required under our obligations. We intend still to meet our international obligations as part of this change, which I hope will give comfort to the noble Lord. He will have an opportunity to see the Bill when it is published tomorrow. At some point, this House will have the opportunity to examine it in detail. For the moment, I suggest that he waits for the Bill to be published.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House that there are lawyers on all sides of the House who have spoken on all kinds of immigration measures. Nobody impugns their ability to continue to give legal advice or, indeed, sometimes to sit in judicial office. I agree with my noble friend that there is a crucial need to deal with the backlog. Can he say a little more about the legal qualifications for the new independent adjudicators? That is more important than whether they were once a member of Amnesty International—which, by the way, is a good thing to be.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Bill will be published tomorrow and will establish the framework for the body and examine in detail the issues my noble friend has raised. My right honourable friend who is dealing with these matters is cognisant of the fact that the independent body will be responsible for monitoring qualifications and standards. I am happy to answer questions on that once the Bill has been published. I am not in the position today to be able to do that.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I accept that the Minister is a little frustrated, but this is what happens when you trail things in the media ahead of a Bill being published. He cannot expect people not to have questions. If he does not want questions in advance, he should not do the trailing. In the trailing in the media, it was said that the body the Government are looking to establish will be like the magistracy. The problem in this case is that people often come to asylum decisions with very clear views, either against people claiming asylum or very pro people claiming asylum. If the adjudicators are members of the public, how will the Government guard against them bringing those preconceived ideas to determining these important legal questions?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Lord, as a past Cabinet Minister, has never trailed anything, I trust that he will stand up now and tell me that that is the case. I rest my case. But he raises an important point. The key issue is that all members of the new independent immigration appeals authority will have the required training. Decision-making expertise to make determinations will be part of that process of skills and experience. The body will be established in accordance with the Cabinet Office’s Public Bodies Handbook. We are currently considering accountability and governance structures, including the body’s relationship with Parliament and with the Government. We will safeguard independent decision-making. I return to the trailing: the noble Lord has only 23 hours to wait for the publication of the Bill. I look forward to engaging with him on it in due course.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, picking up on the point about training, can the Minister tell us what support will be available and what training will be offered to the adjudicators around religious literacy? Decisions regarding people’s cases often hinge on claims of religious persecution and involve people who have deeply traumatic pasts. They must, therefore, be well-informed and accurate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is an extremely important point. It is self-evident that we want the individuals who undertake this very serious role to have the required training and support to do it in an effective way. All members of the new independent immigration appeals authority will have the required decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases through a comprehensive training programme and will possess a range of skills and experience. The organisation of that will be down to the new body. The Bill that we are producing tomorrow will establish that body, which is independent of government. The key point I bring the House back to is that we have a backlog of around 151,000. We currently have capacity for around 26,000 extra sittings that we have put in place. It is not possible to end the backlog without significant changes and that is the purpose of this policy.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I quite understand that the Minister cannot give us the details until the Bill is published tomorrow, but he will know that we currently have a body of independent impartial adjudicators who deal with immigration matters. Of course, I understand that we need more of them to deal with the backlog and the delay, but what I do not understand is why, in principle, the Government think that the current arrangements for the appointment of adjudicators are inadequate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I pay tribute to those who are doing this difficult and challenging job. We owe them a debt of support, and this is not critical of the way in which they have approached their role. But given the level of training and support required, and that the time that we can give to get additional judges is not sufficient to be able to meet the objective, we are looking at widening the pool and this is the start of that process. The establishment of the new body will put that revised process in place. We ran a targeted call for evidence from March to May this year and sought input from individuals. We have ensured that the judiciary has been kept fully informed of relevant developments and communications. I am hoping that once the Bill is produced and when it reaches this House—because it will be in the House of Commons first—the noble Lord can put some of those issues to the test.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, as my noble friend knows, in my advancing years I have become more understanding, particularly of those who find themselves, sadly, in opposition. The Front-Bencher opposite clearly got up early this morning to put in this PNQ so that he could have a go and attack the Government. Can my noble friend say what positive proposals the Opposition have put forward for reducing the huge backlog that they created?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I try to be fair when dealing with the Opposition—if possible. In the years up to the general election in 2024, they suppressed the number of activities taking place in this field, they reduced the number of appeals being brought forward, they took action which did not address the backlog, and every action they took created a further backlog, so the 151,000-plus backlog that we have now is entirely the responsibility of the previous Government, including, potentially, the next speaker, who was a Minister in the Home Office. I presume that when he stands up, his first question will be: how do I apologise for the backlog?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

We have a backlog of 151,000 cases. Will the Minister tell us whether it is the plan to transfer the backlog from the First-tier Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber to the new independent authority that is being set up under the Bill? If it is not the proposal to transfer the backlog to the new authority, on the current rate of case resolution, the First-tier Tribunal will still be hearing cases into the 2040s.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has detailed knowledge of this matter because he was responsible for the policies that led to the backlog in the first place. The Bill tomorrow will establish a new body. We are looking at how we merge the new body. There will be a parallel operation for some considerable time, but the purpose of the Bill that will be published tomorrow is to establish a new framework to ensure that the backlog built up when he was a Minister is eradicated. That is the policy objective of the Government.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

If I may add to the questions on training, will the new people working have some training on genuine cases of modern slavery and human trafficking?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, self-evidently, it is important that individuals who make determinations about life-changing matters have the support to understand the reasons why those decisions have to be taken, and the mechanisms of training and support that are required to do that. The noble and learned Baroness raises important points about modern slavery and our international obligations. That is for the Government to determine. I am in the difficult position of not having the Bill until tomorrow, but within it the opportunity for the successor body to develop the types of policies that she has mentioned is one that I would wish to see and encourage.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.

State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.

In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.

The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.

The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.

In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.

The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.

I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.

Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.

The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.

Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.

New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.

There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.

I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.

We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.

In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.

I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.

There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the 24 noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, and I am particularly grateful, if I may say so, for the contributions from the Front Benches of HM loyal Opposition and the Liberal Democrats, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Doocey, who gave broad support to the Bill but raised important questions—as did other noble Lords—which I will seek to respond to during the course of this debate.

I pay tribute also to Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, who contributed to this House right up to very recently. The comments from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were welcome.

I start by reminding the House that this legislation was a manifesto commitment. According to Members today, it is long overdue or has been rushed. I am trying my best to find a happy medium that says that a manifesto commitment was put in place and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall KC to produce a report three or four months after the commitment in the manifesto was ratified by the electorate. We commissioned that report. The report was produced to this Government in May or June last year. We have had time to consider that report. Colleagues in the House will know that last year’s parliamentary Session was very busy and crammed, and we wanted to bring legislation forward at the first opportunity. At the first opportunity, in the gracious Speech, we brought forward this legislation, and we have brought it forward now to give a framework—again I say to the House—for the Home Secretary to be able to act on that framework in very short order if Royal Assent is achieved. So, whether it is rushed or long overdue, I hope the House will have patience that we are trying to do the right thing to deal with severe threats.

I noted particularly that the noble Lord, Lord Pickles, said we had to stay ahead of the threats. I accept that in full. We had my noble friend Lord Beamish speaking from the ISC perspective. My noble friends Lady Gill and Lady Dacres of Lewisham, the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, who speaks with great experience, the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor of Enfield and Lady Verma, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, all pointed to the important fact that the director-general of MI5 has said to the Government, the House and the public that state threats have increased by 35%. So we need to take action, we understand we need to take action and we need to do it in a way that maintains the cohesion of the community, as the noble Baroness has said.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that his personal experience is one that should not be acceptable to society as a whole. His grandchildren should not fear walking to school or face barriers that my grandchildren do not face just because, although we were both born in the same city, we have different cultural and religious backgrounds. His grandchildren should not face threats for those reasons. The impacts on individuals should be in our minds in all that we do to progress this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, reminded us of the freedoms for which our grandparents and great-grandparents fought; they are important in all that we do.

A number of major issues have been raised; I will try to deal with each in turn. They include the IRGC, self-evidently, as well as issues with other nations; the preparatory act issue; the prohibited purpose issue; uniforms and insignia; the humanitarian issue, which a lot of noble Lords have spoken to in detail; the issue of a review; and a series of other issues that I will try to touch on if time allows.

The House has tempted me to talk about individual nations: China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. I will explain to the House again that the Bill is a framework through which the Home Secretary can take action, on advice, via the affirmative resolution procedure—to go to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—for designation of any particular body.

The IRGC has been mentioned, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Beamish, Lord Barrow, Lord Walney and Lord Alton of Liverpool, as well as by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey, Lady Neville-Jones, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Verma. I understand those concerns. That is why we have put sanctions on the IRGC and taken a range of measures against IRGC members already. However, the powers under this Bill are a framework for the Home Secretary to look at the significant implications that this will have for national security and for foreign policy. Parliament should set a framework about how these powers are used.

I say to all those who have raised the IRGC in particular that the Government understand that absolutely but, if the Bill receives Royal Assent, the framework will be for the Home Secretary to determine how and when this power is used. Again, I come back to the point that there will be an affirmative instrument in the event of any designation being proposed, but I will not comment on the IRGC in particular. As I have explained privately to both Front-Benchers, the hybridity of this Bill, with the IRGC included, would damage early on its capability to take these matters forward. I hope that we can look at the power in the Bill without, at the moment, looking at how it will be used.

The second issue, which was raised by the Opposition Front Bench in particular and which I understand, was about the preparatory conduct offence. I argue that this additional offence is not needed. Preparatory conduct is an offence in the existing National Security Act under Section 18, and that offence applies to specific offences, including spying, espionage, entering a prohibited place for a prejudicial purpose and sabotage. It also covers acts of violence, serious risk and issues impacting on members of the public in the UK. I argue that such an offence is not needed in this Bill. We may end up having a debate in Committee on that but I just want to say that to the noble Lords.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned the prohibited purpose test in his opening remarks. It had been suggested that this test, which applies to the support offence in new Section 17A, is unnecessary and should be removed. I reiterate that doing so would criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid activity. The inclusion of this test reflects that there will be occasions—even though we might not like it—where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity. That will be so whether it is a British diplomat or an NGO delivering humanitarian aid. To remove that would, in my view, be very difficult and challenging. Again, we may revisit that in Committee, but I hope that we can accept those arguments for the moment.

There has also been a question about overseas activity. It was suggested the Bill does not go far enough in the support offence as it applies to overseas activity. It is claimed that the offence should reapply to assisting a designated body in any activity overseas. Again, we can reflect on this in the next few days, but I suggest that such an amendment would be unnecessary. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, touched on this. I will come back to his point in a moment, but new Section 17B, to be introduced by Clause 2, will make it an offence to “assist a designated body” in its overseas activity where those activities are

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

To give a concrete example, a UK person assisting a designated body in its efforts to disrupt the military supply chain of an ally would commit an offence, because the ally is still an ally; that is the key necessary test. Similarly, the Bill already deals with those who are inspired by state actors to commit self-directed acts. That is because the offences at new Sections 17A and 17B do not require there to be any direction or tasking from a designated body, only an intention to support that body.

The fourth issue that has been raised is the important issue of criminalising the wearing of uniforms and insignia. We asked Jonathan Hall KC to review this area of legislation. His report, which was independently produced, made it clear why it was necessary to take a different approach for state bodies. It would impact on legitimate engagement with a designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. Like it or not, that is the reality of the world at large. We have instead crafted the support offence to ensure that it would capture conduct that was calculated to advance the harmful activities of the designated body. This would include the use of insignia and publication of images to support the designated body where the person wears, displays or publishes for a purpose that is prejudicial to the UK—again, that key legal test.

In touching on that area, I return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, about passport seizure. We are committed to legislating on that. We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament.

A number of noble Lords mentioned humanitarian aid. I will focus on that in detail as it is an important issue. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Barrow, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised these issues. I assure noble Lords that we have crafted the Bill to ensure that legitimate activities, such as diplomacy and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within the offences. The key test here is that support for a designated body or overseas activities by the body must be

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Our officials have already talked with a number of NGOs. Ministers will meet with the Red Cross very shortly to listen to its concerns and we are satisfied that the tests in the Bill properly protect legitimate humanitarian assistance. The noble Baronesses, Lady Helic, Lady D’Souza, Lady Northover and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, all raised this issue.

I will try to help the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, by covering Pepper v Hart. Receipt of information by an aid worker would not be criminalised by this Bill. “Information” in the Bill does not mean any information, as is clear from the preceding words. It has to possess an inherent value that enriches the recipient. I am happy to make a Pepper v Hart statement that new Section 17C does not apply. Likewise, I am happy to confirm that new Sections 17A and 17B will not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid, as that is not contrary to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, there is a legal backstop on this, in that the security decisions on those prosecutions are ultimately taken by the Attorney-General in these areas.

I also do not want to create a blanket exemption that could be easily exploited by state actors. That is an important issue. I have a genuine concern that exemptions could potentially create a relatively simple loophole for hostile actors to exploit, but I reassure all those who have spoken on this issue that it is not the intention of the Bill to criminalise the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and that is not the effect of the offences as drafted. This was clearly set out by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the other House last week, and we will of course look at this in detail.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

When is the Minister intending to meet the Red Cross?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that.

The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points.

The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition, which allows the existing National Security Act offences to apply to activity linked to designated bodies, not just to foreign states.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, continues, correctly, to chew at my ankles about the issue of transnational repression. I would argue that the Bill will make it easier to achieve prosecutions where there is a designated body, such as a proxy organisation, involved in transnational repression. We will continue, as I said yesterday in our Statement, to try to tackle transnational repression in a number of ways.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister.

My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety.

The question of—I use this phrase guardedly—“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”—I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them.

My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have already committed to tackling all forms of economic crime, including the misuse of crypto assets. All UK crypto asset firms are now required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority to comply with money-laundering legislation. We have also strengthened law enforcement through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and we are now going to go further with the introduction of further measures, including the Financial Conduct Authority delivering a new crypto asset regulatory regime, UK crypto asset firms being required to conduct due diligence and the financial services Bill 2026 introducing targeted powers to allow more crypto asset recovery powers.

I am trying to cover all the points that noble Lords have mentioned in the time available, and I hope I have done so, but I will read Hansard and, if there are further points, I will respond to them. What I want to do, and this is the key point, is get the Bill through to Royal Assent so the Home Secretary can determine how she uses its powers to deal with the issues that have been raised on the Floor of the House today. That is an important measure. I want to ensure that, between now and next Tuesday, we deal with those points and get a consensus to pass the Bill, make it an Act, get it to His Majesty the King to give Royal Assent and then, as a matter of some urgency, determine how we tackle the many threats that are facing this country at the moment.

I thank noble Lords for their engagement and the expertise that they have brought to this debate today. Ultimately, I commend the Bill for Second Reading, and I hope that the House will support it tonight.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 22nd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, following the sentencing of Peter Wai and Bill Yuen for assisting a foreign intelligence service, what plans they have to (1) protect Hong Kongers in the United Kingdom from transnational repression; and (2) to review the status, privileges and immunities of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her Question. I assure her that any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the United Kingdom will not be tolerated. This trial has shown that anyone working to assist a foreign state to undermine our security will face the full force of the law. The Foreign Secretary has also made it clear to the Chinese Government and directly to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office that this activity is unacceptable and clearly counterproductive to our relationship.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that Answer, but given that one of those convicted under the National Security Act for spying on pro-democracy activists was an immigration officer and special constable, himself sentenced to 10 years, can my noble friend assure me that his Government will take greater steps to ensure that no such agents are working under such a guise? Can he also assure me that the Government are taking all possible action to protect Hong Kong citizens living in the UK, especially those with a bounty on their head, from harassment or even worse from the Chinese Government?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As my noble friend indicated, the two individuals concerned received significant prison sentences of eight years and 10 years for their offences. Immediately following the arrest, officials in the Home Office took steps to bolster protections across Home Office systems. This has included further strengthening access management and monitoring of systems, expanding the use of enhanced integrity checks and reviewing conflicts of interest policies. In addition, the Prime Minister set out to the House in April that Sir Adrian Fulford will undertake a review of national security vetting, which will report in due course.

My noble friend asked about Hong Kongers generally and transnational repression. The Government take the safety of individuals who may be at risk from transnational repression extremely seriously. We have recently updated GOV.UK guidance on transnational repression for individuals, and counterterrorism policing in particular has rolled out training across all UK police forces, including upskilling of 999 call handlers to improve front-line identification and response.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I welcome what the Minister just said about the updating of some of the guidelines but will he return to the report that the Joint Committee on Human Rights published exactly 10 months ago, which called for the highest enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme to apply to the Chinese Communist Party regime, along with Russia and Iran, but also raised concerns about people such as Chloe Cheung, a young woman from Hong Kong who has a 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty on her head? Surely, given what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said about the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, this is a relic from the past and it is high time that this spy hub was simply closed down.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has raised the foreign influence registration scheme. That was introduced less than a year ago. As he knows, we have designated initial nations accordingly. It is still a relatively new tool. We have not made any final decisions as to whether we will place other countries on the enhanced tier, but we keep that under close review at all times. The noble Lord would not expect me to announce any further reviews to this House at this time, but we will announce any changes to Parliament in the usual way. It is not acceptable for individuals to have bounties placed on their heads, and the Government, as I said, take the safety of individuals who may be at risk extremely seriously, and there is always support when there are threats tailored to specific circumstances, such as those that the noble Lord mentions.

The noble Lord has looked at the Hong Kong trade office. The purpose of that office is to promote trade with the Hong Kong special administrative region. It is a legitimate activity, which may continue. However, as has been shown in this case, where people conduct state threat activity we will hold them to account. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary summoned the Chinese ambassador on 8 May and explained that the behaviour was unacceptable, and we will continue to take action when required.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I hear what the Minister says. However, these convictions do not come in isolation; they follow a series of recent incidents involving alleged Chinese state-linked activity in the UK, including espionage prosecutions and reports of surveillance directed at dissidents and members of the Hong Kong community. At what point do the Government conclude that these incidents represent not isolated events but a systematic challenge to the United Kingdom’s national security, requiring perhaps a more robust response than has so far been forthcoming?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With due respect to the noble Lord, we will take action, where required, against the Chinese authorities. We assess that China poses a significant threat in a number of areas, from cyber attacks to foreign interference, espionage targeting our democratic institutions and transnational repression, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. We are also alive to the fact that there are common areas of interest with the Chinese Government on the international stage. China still presents the UK with opportunities as the world’s second-largest economy and the UK’s current third-largest trading partner. It is not inconsistent to challenge at the same time as examining where British interests lie as a whole.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness said, Peter Wai was a UK Border Force officer and a special constable, but it has also been reported that he was a director of a private security company. A third defendant, Matthew Trickett, who died before the trial, was an immigration officer and a director of a different security company. It seems to me that it is a conflict of interest to be both an immigration officer and running a private security company. Can the Minister explain what is now going on to make sure that we do not have these conflicts of interest in our important Border Force employees?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has mentioned an important point. The former Security Minister, my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis—who held the post until he was appointed Defence Secretary a couple of weeks ago—commissioned Home Office officials to undertake a thorough examination of whether there is a case for further regulation of the sector under the Private Security Industry Act. Those working in private investigation do important work, but their specialist skill sets make them attractive targets for foreign states to exploit.

As I mentioned, we have bolstered our robust security vetting regime, which will protect assets and information as a top priority for government, and we have commissioned Sir Adrian Fulford to undertake a review of the vetting issues. I await his recommendations; it is important we have consideration of those things. I say again that eight- and 10-year sentences show that the National Security Act is working and that there are significant penalties for those who dare cross the legitimate line of their employment.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, will the Minister agree that the Question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, reveals the other side of the coin in relation to a resident of Hong Kong who is a United Kingdom citizen, who has been “convicted” under the Chinese national security legislation—namely, Jimmy Lai? When was the last time that either the Minister’s department, or, if more relevant, the Foreign Office, let the Chinese ambassador in London or the Chinese Government in Beijing know that his improper incarceration is offensive and will have some bearing on the status of the Hong Kong trade office here in London?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the question. As I mentioned in my initial replies, to my knowledge, the Foreign Secretary last had contact with the Chinese authorities through the embassy on 8 May, when she made significant representations. It is the role of the Foreign Secretary to make representations in relation to prisoners elsewhere. I will go back to the Foreign Office to inquire whether there has been further contact since 8 May, but that is my understanding of the last contact.

[The Lord Bishop of Leicester]

My Lords, while I am not aware that there was any religious element to the incidents referred to, we know that many Hong Kongers have come to this country seeking religious freedom and, indeed, many thousands have joined our churches. Can the Minister give reassurance to those people that the freedom of religion and belief will be honoured here?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I certainly will give the right reverend Prelate the assurance that freedom of religion and expression is essential in the United Kingdom. Residents of this country should know that, whatever nationality they have, the Government take the safety of individuals extremely seriously; that we will not tolerate transnational repression; that we will use legislation to take action where it has surfaced; that the prison sentences, in this case for espionage, of eight and 10 years are significant; and that we keep all matters, such as the foreign influence registration scheme and all the other measures we have, under continuous review.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister talks about things that are unacceptable and will not be tolerated, but the Chinese Communist Party is using the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office as a tool for its repressive activities. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred to it as a relic of a time when it was a valid trade and economic office. The two front men have recently been caught, but there is a whole apparatus behind them. Why is the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office still being allowed to exist as a smokescreen for those repressive activities?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office exists to promote trade with the Hong Kong special administrative region, and that is a legitimate activity. If there are allegations of criminality, or where there is proven criminality, the Government will take action, as has been the case with the two individuals who are now serving time in prison for their crimes. I can only reiterate that we take this matter seriously. The Foreign Secretary summoned the Chinese ambassador on 8 May. She explained quite clearly that that behaviour is unacceptable. We will continue to monitor it and, if need be, take action.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I raised the issue of the new proposed Japanese super-embassy—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

—sorry, the Chinese super-embassy—on 29 January 2025 and articulated the very serious concerns that a number of us had about the efficacy of the decision to let that go ahead. The Minister will know that since then, there are still very considerable concerns about the impact of the embassy with respect to financial infrastructure near the City of London. Despite that, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, Steve Reed, allowed it. Is the Minister in a position to tell the House whether his view is that the Government will now resile from contesting the judicial review brought by the Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association and scrap the decision to build the new super-embassy, which is a threat to our national security?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The security services were involved throughout in the advice given to independent authorities on the development of the embassy. The Secretary of State has taken his decision. The decision stands, but we are confident that the merger of embassies into one super-embassy and the advice we have taken from the security services mitigate against the threats that the noble Lord is concerned about.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

When it came to recent so-called spyware lawsuits, various Governments tried to claim state immunity. Can the Minister just update the House on the Government’s view on this?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If proof is given and the state is taking action, the Government will consider what action we will take against that state. We have a number of potential tools at our disposal. The FIRS is one tool, which we can always examine and keep under review. The state threats Bill will be before the House tomorrow. When that is passed in due course, we will consider what action we can take. Our security services advise Ministers on every occasion about what the threats are and what action we can take. As has been proved in this case, the National Security Act provides a vehicle to take action against individuals who have committed offences. The two individuals are spending eight and 10 years in prison as a result of that action. We will not take any action that undermines the security of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I have not yet heard an answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on conflict of interest. Is it acceptable for a Crown servant—an immigration officer, a Border Force employee—to be a director of a private security firm? If not, will it now be stopped?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I appreciate the way in which the noble Lord has put that question. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, we are keeping all matters under review. We have commissioned Sir Adrian Fulford to look at vetting. Let us wait for the responses to that review. They are very important points. We will reflect on them at all times, but I have set out to the House what I can today in response to my noble friend’s Private Notice Question.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights with the noble Lord, Lord Alton. In our report on transnational repression, published some 10 months ago, one of the recommendations was that those perceiving themselves to be the victims of transnational repression should have access to a dedicated reporting mechanism. The Government indicated that they were favourable to that, but we have not heard any further on what progress has been made. Perhaps the Minister could update the House.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have had a number of requests on that matter. We have considered carefully, in conjunction with counterterrorism police, how best to encourage reporting and ensure that reports are received and treated seriously. The existing functions have been found by the counterterrorism police to be effective and efficient. We are looking at how we can improve the training and support of call handlers and particularly trained officers dealing with crime reporting on a 24/7 basis. Translators and language support are embedded within the existing reporting mechanisms. We will keep things under review but, in essence, we are meeting the objectives of the review that the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Alton of Liverpool, requested.

Grooming Gangs: Independent Inquiry

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 22nd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords—

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for the confusion—it is one of those days.

First, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to her new role. I wish her every success in holding the Government to account and raising those issues. I hope that she enjoys the new role and does it as successfully as possible. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her report and for her continued interest and comments on this.

The central point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, has raised is around the ethnicity and nationality of grooming gang offenders. She is right that we have not yet got a reliable picture, because the underlying data has been incomplete and inconsistent. That is why the former Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley, has written to all chief constables setting clear expectation that suspect ethnicity data must be recorded. But the noble Baroness is right that we need to do more, and that is why we will legislate to mandate collection as soon as possible. The police reform White Paper that we published in January said that we would set out our intention to create a framework to mandate data, and this will be taken forward through the upcoming police reform Bill. I cannot give an introduction date for the police reform Bill, but when it comes—it has been announced for this Session of Parliament—that will be done as part of the Bill’s proposals.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, drew attention to the fact that victims may have had convictions for underage prostitution quashed yet they still remain criminalised for offences such as drug possession, which have been forced on them by their abusers. Will the Minister commit to broadening the Government’s approach to quashing convictions so that survivors are no longer haunted by criminal records that are a direct product of the despicable abuse and exploitation they have already suffered?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness has a very strong point. It is horrific that the law has historically treated children, including victims of grooming, as capable of being child prostitutes when they were and are sexually exploited children. We have already legislated to introduce a disregard scheme for those who were cautioned or convicted of on-street prostitution offences as children, and we have also invested £100 million to tackle child sexual abuse. The independent Criminal Cases Review Commission recently referred its first grooming gang case to the courts. That is an important step, and obviously we will keep all these matters under review.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, many of those convicted under the provisions of the grooming gangs were actually taxi drivers, and yet they are a category of people who have to pass all sorts of checks before they are able to pick up—particularly vulnerable young women. How did they escape those checks and how were they allowed to perpetrate these crimes over such a long period?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is an important point. I do not know the answer to why that was the case specifically, but it is an important point that people who are providing licensed taxi services are sufficiently vetted and have that level of scrutiny to ensure that they are appropriate people to undertake those roles. We have established, as the noble Baroness knows, the grooming gang inquiry under our noble friend Lady Longfield. That is currently working its way through its work and objectives, and I have no doubt that the type of issue that the noble Baroness has raised will be examined as part of that inquiry.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised a very important question to do with the quashing of convictions, and I am delighted and very proud that the Government are dealing with the quashing of convictions for prostitution. However, there are other offences which, in the view of many people, need to be quashed, because they are having a blighting effect on the future lives of these young people. I would be grateful if my noble friend could tell me that the Government are going to look at wider quashing of offences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is an important issue that has been raised. I can give my noble friend the assurance that we will keep that matter under review. We have taken initial action in response to the initial inquiry, and we will continue to look at it in future.

Referring back to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I may say that the Department for Transport will legislate to address the important issues raised in the report, tackling the inconsistent standards of taxi and private hire vehicles. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 includes the provision to set those national standards. I apologise for not giving her that answer immediately—it is not my direct brief—but I hope that helps the House.

[Baroness Benjamin (LD)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Benjamin (LD)]

My Lords, in 2011 or 2012, I asked a Question on behalf of Barnardo’s—and I declare an interest as vice-president—about child sexual exploitation and how children were encouraged by their abusers to delete the evidence on their mobile phones that could lead to prosecution and that the children were not believed by the authorities. What provisions are in place today to collect such evidence that could prosecute evil perpetrators of child sexual abuse?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The point the noble Baroness has made is extremely important. In the 14 or 15 years since she asked that Question, the police’s ability to collect information and to analyse data in a way that can lead to prosecution has significantly improved. There is a range of mechanisms now where deleted data can be recovered. If there is an evidential trail, that can be looked at. I have just taken note of a range of government reviews about how we can manage and use particularly AI to improve the analysis of information, so that the manual element is still there at the end but there is a great deal of consideration of how we can collect that information and analyse it in a much better way. So I hope that, since she asked that Question, the situation has improved.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, this yet another inquiry is long overdue; I think we all accept that, but we understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Longfield, is committed to ensuring that it works as well as it can. Does the Minister agree that it is incredibly important, for social cohesion and for public confidence in our justice system, that the first public servants who were involved over that very long period a long time ago will be called to give evidence and to provide statements? Does she have the statutory powers to do that in the way that the inquiry is currently framed?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The terms of reference for the inquiry are set out and the scope of the inquiry has been developed, and included in that are legal obligations to protect relevant information that was used by responsible individuals at the time. The conduct of the inquiry, with due respect, is a matter for my noble friend Lady Longfield to establish. It is not for Government to set out the terms of the inquiry. I have every confidence that she will address the issues that matter to this House. Self-evidently, the noble Baroness has raised an important issue to ensure that those who participated in issues that cause failings have an opportunity to explain and are held to account.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that some of the most vulnerable young people are those who are in care. Too often, we see young people put in care homes many hundreds of miles away from where their kinship relationships are, making them even more vulnerable. Will the Minster say what can be done to stop the practice of young people being moved to the poorest parts of the country, to the cheapest care homes, where they are made the most vulnerable of all?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is an important point. It is not directly within my gift to be able to answer that question, but I will make inquiries with my colleagues in the Department for Education for the right reverend Prelate. Whether people are moved to a poor area or a wealthy area, the issue of child sexual abuse is unacceptable, and the purpose of government policy is to ensure that sufficient safeguards are put in place, that criminal sanctions are there to be used, that the preventative measures that we have talked about today already are developed, and that the lessons from the inquiry conducted by my noble friend Lady Longfield are implemented as a matter of urgency. I will reflect on what he said, but the important point is that child sexual abuse is unacceptable wherever it comes from.

Transnational Marriage Abandonment

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Thursday 18th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, and I declare an interest as CEO of Muslim Women’s Network UK.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government monitor data on applications under the transnational marriage abandonment route and publish quarterly data on GOV.UK under the “Settlement VDA” section. The latest data shows 82 applications in 2024 and 69 in 2025. Transnational marriage abuse behaviours are covered by a number of existing offences. As part of our work to tackle violence against women and girls, we are working with policing partners so that perpetrators are pursued and victims are protected.

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, transnational marriage abandonment has devastating consequences. It separates mothers from their children—a form of gender-based abuse. Australia has made it illegal, so perpetrators who abandon their wives and children abroad are charged with exit trafficking. Will the Government bring in similar legislation? At present, perpetrators are not held accountable, and it has been going on for decades. My father abandoned me, my mother and my brother abroad, and it took us years to get back. It is still going on, so please can the Minister give this serious thought?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s personal experience and her commitment to resolve these matters. The Government are keeping all matters under review, but, in essence, we are looking at prevention through existing legislation. In January 2024—this would have helped the noble Baroness in her circumstances—we expanded the victim of domestic abuse category to include transnational marriage so that individuals can apply to the United Kingdom, without a fee, and get these matters treated quickly. As I said in my Answer, a large number of people have taken this route: there have been some 203 applications since 31 January, and we encourage others to do so.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, women and children who are repatriated often rely mainly on charities. What support do British embassies give, and will they help with repatriation to lift the burden on charities?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is an important matter. Without repeating myself, let me say that we have waived the fees that would be expected in normal applications for victims of transnational abuse. That is a big commitment. Obviously, there are other costs, and the individual or charities can potentially cover them, but the Government’s contribution is to say that, if you are a victim of transnational abuse, you will not have to pay the expected fee that would normally need to be paid for consideration, which is around £3,200. That is a significant government contribution.

[Lord Sahota (Lab)]

My Lords, in recent months, I came across a very strange case in my community. A couple who had lived here for about three or four years had a child, and they were working and paying their taxes and so on. They then went on holiday to India and took their child with them. On their way back, they were told at the airport that they could enter the country, but their child could not, so they had to take their child back to India and leave them with their parents before coming back. Is that government policy?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I would be grateful if my noble friend would write to me with the specifics of that case. I cannot comment on the reasons why any particular entry was refused at that time. Self-evidently, the Government want to see families reunited, and I am not aware of the circumstances of that case. That is not transnational abuse in the way in which the noble Baroness raised it, which is a deliberate act of malicious behaviour. This may be an issue that I will have to investigate, and I am happy to do so.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, just two nights ago in Parliament, there was a two and a half-hour session organised by one of the all-party parliamentary groups at which a number of women and girls gave evidence. Evidence that was given by Professor Javaid Rehman and Professor Mariz Tadros is germane to my noble friend’s Question, and I hope that the Minister might be willing to meet both those reputable academics to talk about some of these associated issues as part of the review that he has said is under way.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am always happy to meet when possible external bodies via Members of this House, and I will ensure that is arranged accordingly.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, a recurring feature of these cases is that the victim’s passport is taken by the perpetrator before or during travel, leaving them unable to return to the UK independently. Improperly obtaining another person’s passport is already a criminal offence under Section 4 of the Identity Documents Act 2010. Can the Minister say how many prosecutions have been brought for that offence in the context of transnational marriage abandonment cases and whether the Government will issue clearer guidance to the CPS on charging this offence in such circumstances?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. One of the main causes of transnational abuse is where the passport is taken from the person so they cannot travel. We have tried through the new visa route to ensure that issue can be addressed locally so that travel can happen—free of the fees, as I mentioned to the noble Baroness a moment ago.

One problem we have—and I encountered it in preparing for this Question—is that some offences, for example of passport theft, will not be broken down in relation to the number of individuals who have had their passport stolen in the context that the noble Lord mentioned. We need to examine that as an issue. I cannot give him figures now, and I suspect I will not be able to do so in writing for that reason, but he raises an important point, and we need to get the whole picture of how transnational abuse works.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Can I raise with the Minister another group of very disadvantaged women: those who come from overseas to marry somebody in this country? They go through a religious marriage, very often a nikah, but they never have their marriage registered. The husband then abandons them, and they have no right to remain in this country. That seems to me an issue which the Government ought to consider.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, in the context of transnational abuse, passport theft, abandonment abroad or abandonment in this country are issues where we have those potential difficulties. We are trying to ensure that we treat the individuals—almost always women and children—as victims and not as people who need to be tested by the state as to their validity to stay. That is why the transnational visa route we introduced in January 2024, which was not there before, is an important measure to help support those individuals.

Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) (Amendment) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 14 May be approved.

Considered in Grand Committee on 15 June.

Motion agreed.

State of Extremism Report

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they intend to identify individuals, groups, organisations, businesses or bodies in the annual State of Extremism report they committed to publishing in Protecting What Matters, published on 9 March.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Answer to the noble Lord is yes. Where necessary and proportionate, the report will include examples of those propagating extremism and where they have been disrupted.

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

That is an extremely welcome Answer. Does the Minister not agree that the antisemitism emergency is being driven not only by hostile states but by hostile non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas and their agents here? Is it therefore not essential, as he says, that the report names them to ensure that they have no access to public money, government platforms and—this is extremely important—engagement with public services such as the police? Is it not vital that they be isolated and shunned?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is vital that those spreading extremism are tackled in every form by the state and by other parties. The Home Office will publish, as the noble Lord knows, the landmark state of extremism report by the end of this calendar year. We are delivering a fundamental reset of how we counter extremism and want to make sure that we have the tools, capabilities and partnerships to match the scale of that threat. The report itself will cover not just government action but the available support and powers on disruption, particularly relating to case studies.

[Baroness Uddin (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have recently learned about and am deeply concerned by the Prevent programme, which has a voluntary participation clause. Can the Minister explain the criteria being used to identify young Muslim people, in particular, who are deemed fit to be “trained”? How are the Government ensuring that young Muslim people are not targeted and profiled, and that this practice is not forced down their and their families’ throats, as happened with young Black people during the stop and search period, which was a shameful time for many families and particularly for institutions?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The purpose of government policy and of Prevent is not to colour all Muslims as being related to extremist activity. The purpose of Prevent is to help identify those individuals who are vulnerable and at risk. That identification is done by social workers, support workers, police and other agencies. If an individual is vulnerable, the idea of Prevent is to help them have defences against that vulnerability so that they do not get drawn into extremism. The Muslim community as a whole should have nothing to fear from that process.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. The issue of how to tackle extremism while preserving the right to freedom of expression falls squarely within the terms of reference of the review carried out at the request of the Home Secretary by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which examined hate crime and public order legislation. Can the Minister tell us what has become of that review, and when it is likely to be placed in the Library so we can all read it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The review has been received by the Home Secretary. We are examining its contents, and we intend to publish it before the Summer Recess.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the proposals outlined in Protecting What Matters, namely, to tackle the abuse of charitable status for the purpose of promoting violence and hatred. However, phrases in the extremism definition such as creating a “permissive environment” for the destruction of “fundamental rights” are quite vague. If applied without further elaboration this could, as the charitable sector has warned, have the effect of chilling lawful advocacy, campaigning and community involvement. What progress is being made in producing and consulting on these proposals? Will the Government ensure that the thresholds are clear and understandable when they emerge, so that we all know where we are?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the quotes mentioned by the noble Lord, I bow to his significant experience in managing these issues and I will certainly look at his comments. On the commitments set out in the proposals, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is looking at strengthening the Charity Commission’s powers to tackle extremist and terrorist exploitation in the charitable sector. There will be consultation and development of further powers on persistent misconduct, while ensuring that the power to close a charity exists and that the focus is on extremism rather than any other issue.

[Lord Mohammed of Tinsley (LD)]

My Lords, given the recent incidents in Southampton and Belfast—in which individuals who appeared to belong to either the Black or the Asian community were particularly targeted for no reason other than what they looked like—does the Minister agree that social cohesion must now be a national priority if we are to tackle extremism in all its forms?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Absolutely. I condemn the incident in Belfast—an individual has now been charged, but I cannot comment further—and the actions that were taken in Southampton. People have the right to protest, but they must do so in a way that does not damage businesses, the community or police officers who are trying to protect the public at large. On 9 March the Government published a social cohesion action plan, Protecting What Matters, which sets out a number of points on our efforts to build social cohesion. We accept that we must do that, in order to ensure that everybody in our society has the right to live their lives and conduct their business free from political violence and extremist intervention.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the Protecting What Matters document says that

“we must be clear that we are a society built on shared values”.

Do the Government accept that Britain is about far more than just shared values? Social cohesion relies upon a shared sense of belonging and a common culture. This requires those who move to Britain to integrate into our society and live according to British cultural practices. What further action will the Government take to ensure that cultural integration is one of the foremost aims of their strategy?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I happen to believe that some of the cultural differences are things we should be celebrating. I value living in a culturally diverse community, and I aim for a society where we can all live our own lives, live our own religions and enjoy our cultures, but have a shared ownership of being within the United Kingdom state. That is our objective—one that I hope the whole House shares.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend will recognise that an increasing number of the subjects of interest, in both the right-wing space and the Islamic space, being investigated by the security services are individuals under the age of 16. What more can be done to tackle the radicalisation of individuals, which is mainly done online?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend makes a very important point, and it is extremely important that we challenge the poison of online extremism that sometimes occurs. Existing legislation, particularly the Online Safety Act, empowers Ofcom to order the taking down of material that is damaging or extremist, and significant fines can be levied. However, we need to further examine how the online space is used to radicalise people, particularly those who, very often in their own bedrooms, are looking at such material, being sucked into an extremist pit—be it the right, Islamic extremism, or any other form of extremism—and groomed, in a sense, to undertake further activities. This is an extremely important issue that is difficult to challenge, but it is one the Government need to address.

[Lord Woolley of Woodford (CB)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, when she talks about the importance of extremism criteria. How can we ensure objectivity and avoid politicisation of the term? In this House and the other House, we have seen the political winds propagating the false notion of two-tier policing, which is really divisive. Equally, in this House and the other House, we have heard politicians calling for more Black stop and search, when we are already disproportionately targeted. So criteria are important, and I urge the Minister to ensure objectivity in, and not the politicisation of, the process.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government do not accept the principle of two-tier policing: policing should be done according to the circumstances that a police officer faces. This is not about two-tier policing. We have embedded across government the 2024 definition of extremism and engagement principles to ensure a consistent understanding of extremism, and we are updating the 2024 engagement principles to ensure that public bodies understand that issue in a proper and effective way.

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

My Lords, I will give the Minister a case study that he has previously referred to. In university campuses, student union committees get elected on a platform of antisemitism, Holocaust denial and insisting on the sacking of a Jewish professor of economics. Does the Minister agree that, while antisemitism has no place in universities, it is alive and kicking in universities? What can be done to hold universities to account?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Through the Department for Education and Home Office activity, we have given significant support to universities to help root out antisemitism in particular and extremism in general. The noble Lord raises a really important issue, and as some of this is not within my direct gift, I will drop him a note, but the point he makes is absolutely valid.