(1 day, 19 hours ago)
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Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call Sir Iain Duncan Smith, who will speak for about 15 minutes.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I beg to move,
That this House is concerned that serious human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, together with widespread grand corruption, continue to escalate in an increasingly unstable global environment; notes that global human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, commonly known as Magnitsky sanctions, remain an essential mechanism for accountability and redress, yet their implementation by the United Kingdom is inconsistent and insufficient, and lacks oversight; regrets that numerous individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses and corruption remain unsanctioned, that enforcement and transparency around decision-making remains inadequate, and that sanctioned individuals continue to exploit evasion methods while victims receive limited support; further notes the absence of a long-term strategy for the management of frozen assets and a lack of clear criteria for delisting, alongside growing concerns that sanctions are becoming politicised internationally; urges the Government to strengthen the credibility of the Magnitsky sanctions regime through consistent and impartial application, enhanced enforcement, and by ensuring greater Parliamentary oversight and expanded measures to support victims, including developing pathways for compensation; and holds that, relevant to this, those involved in the arbitrary detention of British nationals should face Magnitsky sanctions, including those involved in the detention of Ryan Cornelius, Jagtar Singh Johal and Jimmy Lai.
I rise to speak to the motion in my name, which is supported by 17 hon. and right hon. Members from across the House. As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation, I welcome the advent of the growing use of Magnitsky sanctions as a major development in accountability for human rights abuse and corruption.
These sanctions are named after Sergei Magnitsky, a tax adviser killed in a Russian prison after exposing fraud by Russian Government officials. Magnitsky sanctions freeze perpetrators’ assets and stop them travelling internationally, and they are now used by the UK, the US, the EU and Canada, which together represent over one third of global GDP. In the UK, Magnitsky sanctions stop perpetrators accessing London, the world’s second largest financial centre and the world’s largest luxury property market. Sanctions are most effective when the various jurisdictions work together to close perpetrators off from, and drive them away from, financial markets.
Looking at the comparative picture, the US has sanctioned 608 individuals and entities under its Magnitsky-style regime, though 20 have been delisted. Of those designations, 17 relate to Russia, with one since delisted, and 34 are against China and six against the United Arab Emirates for corruption. By contrast—and this is the point I really want to make—since introducing Magnitsky sanctions in the legislation passed in 2020, the UK has imposed 164 designations under its global human rights regime and 65 under the global anti-corruption regime. That makes a total of 229 Magnitsky-style designations, of which 60 relate to Russia, eight to China and none to the UAE.
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
I apologise for intervening on my right hon. Friend so early on, but he has mentioned Russia several times. He will be aware that there has been much talk about ceasefires, but there is no sign of one yet, because Putin still thinks he is winning in Ukraine. Would he agree with me that, if we really want to compel Putin to stop killing Ukrainians, we need to increase sanctions on the Russian Government, particularly on their hydrocarbons, which means action not just by us and Europe, but further sanctions from the United States?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend. We have a tool here that can be used to drive back those who act badly—in this particular case, against a country illegally invading a neighbouring democratic state—so we should use this ability to sanction those involved and to increase such sanctions dramatically. I know Labour Members will be raising this issue, but they will have noted what he has said.
The UK and the US have imposed extensive additional sanctions on Russian individuals and entities under the Russia-specific sanctions regimes. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) may want to note, those regimes use broader designation grounds and, crucially, do not usually acknowledge an individual’s direct involvement in human rights abuses in Ukraine or elsewhere. That distinction matters, and this should be rectified by the UK Government. The symbolic and moral force of the Magnitsky sanctions is precisely to name perpetrators and link consequences directly to human rights abuses, and that is what sets them apart. In sheer volume, the contrast is stark. The US has imposed well over 5,000 such Russia-related non-Magnitsky designations, and the UK about 2,900. Yet despite this scale, the absence in most cases of any explicit human rights attribution in such regimes means an important opportunity for accountability is being missed.
As a mechanism in the Government’s foreign policy toolkit, Magnitsky sanctions have a huge potential. However, important gaps remain in their implementation, raising serious concerns about their overall effectiveness. There is no publicly available information on the number of Magnitsky sanctions evidence dossiers received by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. However, based on estimates since the inception of the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, the FCDO receives on average about two or three dossiers of evidence per month from civil society organisations, which often identify between three and 15 individuals or entities alleged to be implicated in human rights violations. This means that since July 2020, the FCDO has received evidence on anywhere between 360 and 3,000 alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. In stark contrast, only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under the global human rights regime and global anti-corruption regime, to date.
The limited number of Magnitsky sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. Designations tend to overlook broader command structures, instead focusing on isolated actors, excluding key backers or enablers and failing to adopt when sanctioned entities rebrand. For example, Chen Zhi is one of the many leaders of scam networks with bases in south-east Asia trafficking and torturing vulnerable individuals to compel them to scam citizens here in the UK and abroad. The news that the UK and the US sanctioned some of those responsible is always welcome, but those sanctions fail to target Cambodian Government figures who are themselves implicated in the practice, or who turn a blind eye to those violations.
Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on obtaining the debate and on highlighting how the Magnitsky sanctions could be used more effectively. Could he explain to the House, and for my benefit, what effect, if one applies sanctions to some foreign leader, dictator or person who is in a completely different jurisdiction, does a sanction actually have and how can it be made to bite on the interests of that person so that the sanctions are actually felt by that person?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
It has two effects. First, anything to do with any finance or movement or visitations to the United Kingdom are immediately ruled out and the seizure of financial entities can take place. Secondly, it influences other countries to do the same. America may work with us on that, too. Two of the greatest financial markets are then shut to an individual, who may be part of a Government, thus making it highly difficult for them to operate, or to come and enjoy themselves—a lot of that is done. They become pariahs internationally and that has a huge effect, because it influences what others near them will do when they realise they are about to lose their access to very important areas—cities and financial markets. It has already shown to have had a massive knock-on effect.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House who actually does the research that leads to people being identified for sanctioning, whether there is resistance in such places as the City of London, which no doubt could make enormous financial profits from having illicit money deposited there, and whether such places are incentivised to turn a blind eye when attempts are made to camouflage the real sources of the dirty money flowing in?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
Many groups are doing that research at the moment, some of them private and voluntary organisations, but the Foreign Office itself is meant to be doing it. I am struck by the fact that it does not always check everybody’s backgrounds. The reality is that it must be much more intense and we must start going after these people. The City of London had a bad reputation for dirty money. A lot of that has stopped now as a result of the Russian sanctions. More importantly, individual sanctions also helped to end that. We need to be much more particular about where that money is coming from and how, and who are the individuals who are behind the use of that money. My right hon. Friend is quite right about that.
Several hon. Members rose—
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
If I keep giving way, I will end up losing time. But I will give way.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He is right to bring this issue forward. Some 229 people have designated by the United Kingdom, and 3,000 Russians have been designated after the invasion of Ukraine. However, weak enforcement risks hollowing out the regime. To date, no fines have been imposed for breaches of the UK’s Magnitsky-style sanctions. If this House is serious about protecting life and dignity, we must ensure that these tools are used consistently and enforced credibly. I am often reminded of the example of Jesus Christ, the greatest leader and yet the greatest servant. He protected lives by giving his own. We, as leaders, should echo his example by diligently helping those who cannot help themselves.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The hon. Gentleman is, of course, absolutely right. It is important to get justice and to make sure that others who would be tempted to go down that road realise there will be real penalties to pay.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate on Magnitsky-style sanctions for serious human rights abuses. There are numerous ways that sanctioned individuals have attempted to evade UK authorities, in particular when it comes to cryptocurrencies. Does he agree that co-ordination with our international allies, as well as being at the cutting edge of technology, is key to ensuring that increasingly evasive individuals are brought to heel?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and that is the whole point of today’s debate. My feeling is that this Government and even the previous Government have to a degree dragged their feet. I often say to the Minister, who I know very well—we have debated with each other endlessly—that it seems not to matter who is in government, because the Foreign Office retains its reluctance over many sanctions. He will deny that, of course, because it is his job to do so, but I see him as a very decent individual and he must know in his heart of hearts that there is more that we could do. I will leave that for the moment, until he has the chance to wind up the debate.
Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a perception in my constituency and across the country that the money laundering checks on individual consumers going for a mortgage or buying something expensive such as a car seem to be more stringent than those for the millionaire- billionaire foreign investors who are investing in the City of London?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The whole point of the debate is to ensure that we know where the money comes from, that we know how it has been gained, and that the individuals must pay a penalty if they are involved in what is illegal or inhuman. The key point is that all those matters can be picked out by the Magnitsky sanctions.
I mentioned Myanmar earlier. Despite historically leaning on sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta for its role in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against its civilian population after the 2021 coup, the UK has failed to target the State Security and Peace Commission, the military’s successor to the UK-sanctioned State Administration Council. Without additional sanctions, the State Security and Peace Commission, which was established in an attempt by the military to rebrand itself and rebuild financial ties with international partners, has effectively succeeded in its mission. That is exactly what we should have been tackling through the sanctions available to us, but we have not done so.
Finally, last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. However, no action was taken against their key military and diplomatic backer, the United Arab Emirates, or their chief commander. That highlights a broader, troubling trend: to date, only a fraction of Magnitsky sanctions have ever been applied by the UK Government to perpetrators from countries considered strategic allies of the UK. That is a very important point to make; politics have an awful lot to do with this issue. As reported by REDRESS, several of the most notorious human rights abusers and corrupt actors, including in Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, China, Eritrea, the UAE and Egypt—we have mentioned Russia, too—have not been sanctioned by the UK.
I will now come to some examples of individuals and contexts that remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of involvement in corruption and serious human rights issues. Let me deal now with China. While the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in China’s violent repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from human rights organisations. REDRESS— I know, because I have seen the evidence—previously submitted it to the FCDO, calling for targeted sanctions on the following individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations in Xinjiang.
All of the following are sanctioned by the US—our ally—but not by the UK. The persons recommended for designations are: Chen Quanguo, party secretary of the Xinjiang Chinese Communist party and the key driver of the policy of genocide; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; Sun Jinlong, former political commissar of the XPCC, who was sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; Peng Jiarui, deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC, sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; and Huo Liujun, former leader of the Public Security Bureau, sanctioned by the US on 9 July 2020. As somebody sanctioned by the Chinese Government myself—like you, Madam Deputy Speaker—for raising the issues of Xinjiang at the time, I think that that is a major omission. These are the key people—close almost to President Xi himself—who, when sanctioned, will really feel it. They are locked out of America, but have not been locked out by us. Will the Minister therefore outline what steps the FCDO will take to ensure that sanctions are consistently applied to all actors involved in human rights abuses and corruption?
Sir Bernard Jenkin
Why is there no transatlantic co-operation on this? What does my right hon. Friend think is the cause of that lack of co-operation ?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I really do not know the answer to that question. All I can say to my hon. Friend is that we act individually and are supposed to co-operate, but that does not always work. We have seen with the Chinese and others that America leads the way and we half follow, or do not follow at all. My concern is that we do not champion such action in the way that we could and should as an upholder of human rights and freedom. This country has a huge record in that area and we need to use it much more.
I am not the only Member of this House to have raised concerns about the relationship between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the activities of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. What is going on in Sudan is brutal, bloody and huge, even in comparison to what is happening in somewhere like Gaza. It is an astonishing abuse of human rights and the value of life. The RSF is responsible for brutal murders, rapes, attacks on hospitals and significant numbers of killings, and yet this organisation has been supported heavily by the UAE. It is said that without the support of the UAE, there would not now be a major war going on in Sudan. There are really big questions to be asked here, because without those arms shipments and other support, there would not be the fighting and terrible consequences that we see in Sudan.
I wish to draw the attention of the Minister to reporting by The New York Times in June last year, which, citing US intelligence sources, references the involvement of Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Deputy President of the UAE, in co-ordination with the RSF and in his role as chair of two charities funding hospitals in Chad that have allegedly been used in the distribution of weapons to the RSF. The investigation further reports that the US envoy to Sudan confronted Sheikh Mansour personally in 2024 about his support for General Hamdan of the RSF. As the ultimate owner of Manchester City football club, Sheikh Mansour is possibly the most high-profile UAE investor in the UK economy. What are we going to do about that? That is a signal and serious problem for us.
Will the Minister confirm that, given the appalling crimes of the RSF, which fall squarely in the purview of the global human rights sanctions scheme, the Department has carried out a full assessment of whether representatives of the UAE Government may meet the criteria for sanctions, given the significant role the UAE is alleged to play in support of the RSF and the substantial influence of the UAE on investments in the UK economy and public life? If such an assessment has not been carried out, will the Minister say whether it is the Government’s intention to do so?
Individuals arbitrarily detained abroad are particularly vulnerable to torture, ill treatment and other serious human rights violations, from the moment they are detained. The Government’s own figures show that in 2024 the FCDO received 186 new allegations of torture and mistreatment from British nationals overseas. Arbitrary detention and related human rights abuses have long-lasting effects on those who experience them; following release, survivors must bear the physical, psychological and socioeconomic toll of their captivity.
This makes it all the more concerning that the list of British nationals currently subject to arbitrary detention abroad is long. I am going to read out the names on it: Jagtar Singh Johal; Ryan Cornelius, whose family are with us today in the Gallery; Jimmy Lai; Nnamdi Kanu; Christian James Michel; Matthew Alexander Pascoe; Ramze Shihab Ahmed al-Rifa’i; Charles Ridley; Mehran Raoof; Craig and Lindsay Foreman; and Ahmed al-Doush. I want to focus on two particular cases that exemplify the FCDO’s reluctance to use Magnitsky sanctions to challenge arbitrary detention: first, Ryan Cornelius; secondly, Jimmy Lai.
A case that underscores the ongoing failure of the UK Government—and, I have to say, that of their predecessor—to effectively employ Magnitsky sanctions to deter and punish those responsible for arbitrarily detaining and mistreating UK nationals is, of course, that of Ryan Cornelius, who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for more than 17 years. I want to mention the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), who has raised this issue on a number of occasions. I congratulate him on his support for the Cornelius family. This arbitrary detention also applies to Charles Ridley, Ryan Cornelius’s business partner, but I will focus today on Ryan.
Unlike the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ryan’s plight has been met with deafening silence, despite well-documented evidence of an unfair trial and the inhumane treatment that has been meted out to him. His detention has been found arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. Ryan’s original 10-year sentence was extended by 20 years at the behest of the Dubai Islamic Bank, which has used his imprisonment as leverage to seize his assets, rendering his family essentially homeless.
The FCDO has been reluctant to engage fully with the detail of Ryan’s case from the very beginning. Even now, Ryan’s family—who, as I said, are with us in the Public Gallery—are repeatedly forced to set out the basic facts of his case at every single meeting with the FCDO or Ministers, despite the fact that they are fully known to them. Despite repeated calls from Ryan’s family and from MPs for sanctions against Dubai officials, the UK Government have taken no action. Not a single individual has been sanctioned for their role in this case.
I urge the Minister to look at imposing targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for Mr Cornelius’s arbitrary detention and asset seizure. I am going to list just eight people who are involved in the board of the Dubai bank: His Excellency Mohammed Al Shaibani; Yahya Saeed Ahmad Nasser Lootah, vice-chairman of the board of directors; Hamad Abdulla Rashed Obaid Al Shamsi, a board member; Ahmad Mohammad Saeed Bin Humaidan, also a board member; Abdul Aziz Ahmed Rahma Mohamed Al Muhairi; Dr Hamad Buamim; Javier Marin Romano; Bader Saeed Abdulla Hareb; and Dr Cigdem Kogar. I offer up the names of these people, all of whom are involved in this case, for the Government to think carefully about taking action. Unfortunately, Ryan’s case appears to be a clear example of economic interests taking precedence over human rights, largely because the UAE is such a major financial investor and trading partner.
I am afraid that that double standard is not limited to Ryan’s case. India—another country with a recent trade deal—continues to hold a British citizen in arbitrary detention without consequences. Jagtar Singh Johal, from Dumbarton, Scotland, was violently arrested in 2017 while in India to get married. He was tortured and has endured eight years of detention, which the UN working group on arbitrary detention has ruled
“lacks legal basis and is arbitrary”.
After lots of hearings—hundreds of them—prosecutors in India have failed to produce credible evidence against Jagtar, and the UK must now use every diplomatic lever to bring him home.
I want to return, finally, to the case of Jimmy Lai. The time has come, surely, for the UK to wield its sanctions authority against the officials responsible for repression in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai’s guilty conviction for “foreign collusion” and “sedition” on 15 December, which paves the way for Hong Kong’s courts to sentence the 78-year-old British citizen to life in prison, is the final straw.
Beijing has trashed the Sino-British joint declaration, crushed the freedoms it promised Hongkongers and the world, and imprisoned nearly 2,000 political prisoners, including Jimmy Lai. I have long called for the Government to hold the Hong Kong authorities to account for their persecution of the pro-democracy campaigner, who is guilty only of performing his duties as publisher of Hong Kong’s Apple Daily newspaper by speaking to diplomats and other overseas officials.
Not a single Hong Kong individual is named on the UK sanctions list, which sets out all the people, entities and vessels sanctioned by Britain. In comparison, the US has sanctioned 11 officials from the top of Hong Kong’s Administration downwards. How is it that this country, which used to administer and run Hong Kong, has not sanctioned a single person in that process? The three judges responsible for Jimmy Lai’s outrageous guilty verdict—Esther Toh, Alex Lee and Susana D’Almada Remedios, two of whom were called to the bar in London—should be immediate targets, as should the prosecutors: Maggie Yang, Anthony Chau, Ivan Cheung, Crystan Chan and Karen Ng Ka-yue.
Despite the clear role that Magnitsky sanctions could play in these cases, the Government do not treat them as a core foreign policy tool for protecting British citizens abroad. They should not be reserved for politically convenient situations but applied consistently, particularly when we have economic leverage over the perpetrating state. The UN special rapporteur on torture has formally recommended the use of Magnitsky sanctions to deter state hostage taking, and survivors themselves have repeatedly called for their use.
I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say, as I think the House wants to get a sense of where the Government are moving on this and whether they intend to increase the level of sanctions or speed them up. If they do so, they will receive my support and, I believe, the support of the Opposition side of the House. These are important moments, and this debate is important.
When this House passed the Magnitsky Act, we did so in good faith. This singular tool would help us in the fight against the abuses of powerful people, particularly in the defence of British citizens who have been wrongly detained and are without the ability to defend themselves. It will help our fight against the powerful people who have control over others who have no redress and no hope for their future.
With the rise of totalitarian states and their satellites, who threaten our very belief in freedom and due process, and who are tearing apart what we call the international rules-based order—such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran—this facility is needed more than ever. Its use is to deter others as much as to punish those who have acted without the law, and such action should be co-ordinated among our allies.
This House has to hold the Government to account—that is our task—and that is what today’s debate is all about. If we do not speak for those languishing under the control of others and the power of powerful states, then who will? I say to the Government simply: this is not parti pris, and nor is it personal; it is an idea that originated here in this place. It is the idea of freedom—freedom of the individual and their protections under the law. For those who carry out the most heinous crimes, there has to be some kind of sanction. The Magnitsky sanction is the best tool that we have. We should surely use it, and use it well, and we must make sure that those out there realise that if they get up to these most disgusting and debilitating acts, they will face a consequence and that consequence will last as long as they do.
Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)
I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important and timely debate. I pay tribute to him for the persistence that he has shown in campaigning on this issue over many years, and for his work in this place helping to make and win the argument for deploying Magnitsky-style sanctions.
I would like to start by welcoming three successes of the Government regarding our sanctions regime: namely, decisive action against Putin’s regime, action against people-smuggling gangsters, and action against kleptocrats the world over. The Government have shown that they are prepared to make bold and decisive use of sanctions to crack down on serious human rights abuses, corruption and breaches of international law.
First, I welcome the Government’s sustained tough action against the Kremlin, introducing the largest package of sanctions since the early days of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. I firmly believe that this county must never again act as a safe haven for Russian dirty money, and the City of London must never again be seen to be a secure, out-of-the-way piggy bank for Putin’s cronies to stash their wealth. It is only right that we continue to expose and disrupt every enabler of Russia’s war machine, which has been terrorising the Ukrainian people for close to four years now. That must include ramping up the pressure on Putin’s energy revenues.
The Government’s sanctions measures have also gone a long way toward sinking Russia’s shadow fleet, which we all know is a vital source of funding for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Since the start of the invasion, Russian oil companies have established a shadow fleet of cargo ships charged with transporting sanctioned crude oil to third countries. Those vessels are usually owned by anonymous shell companies to shield the ships from scrutiny and sanctions. The fleet is then used to perform illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers at sea, making it much more difficult to monitor the final destination of Russian crude oil. This decaying and dangerous shadow fleet risks oil spills, which could then cause damage on the UK’s shores—spills that, I remind the House, the British taxpayer would be liable to clean up.
The sanctions designations brought forward by the Government mean that a total of 545 ships have been sanctioned by the UK. Almost half the Russian shadow fleet’s overall capacity has been forced off the seas by sanctions from the UK and our partners, with many ships now dead in the water.
Sir Julian Lewis
In support of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, does he agree that it is significant how important even a single ship of this fleet is to the Russian authorities that in desperation yesterday, in a final attempt to stop it being seized, they allowed the Russian flag to be put on one of the vessels, in the hope that that would deter the Americans from gaining control of it? Fortunately, it did not.
Lloyd Hatton
I agree with the right hon. Member’s remarks. I think that the actions of the previous Government and this Government to tackle the shadow fleet are starting to bite. The measures are hitting the Kremlin war machine and will slash the revenues that Putin desperately relies upon to continue to wage war in Ukraine.
Secondly, I welcome sanctions against organised criminal gangs that are currently perpetrating the vile trade of people-smuggling. This action by the Government is a world first, and it targets ringleaders, key intermediaries and the suppliers of people-smuggling equipment. The sanctions help to disrupt the flow of money and materials, including by freezing property, bank accounts and other assets. It will help to disrupt a range of different activities—from supplying small boats for smuggling to sourcing fake passports, middlemen facilitating illicit payments, and people-smuggling via lorries and small boats. It also sanctions the very gang leaders themselves. The people-smuggling gangs operating on the English channel are attempting to make a small fortune. It is essential that this Government continue to use sanctions and every lever at our disposal to disrupt and destroy the gangs.
Thirdly, the Government have made innovative use of sanctions against kleptocrats and their enablers. Notably, the Magnitsky-style sanctions deployed against Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president, for corruption and stealing public funds marked a pivotal moment in the fight against kleptocracy in Angola and helped to address long-standing corruption that had hindered development and worsened inequalities in the country. I welcome that action, as I am sure do Members on both sides of the House, but we must now look to deploy similar sanctions against other kleptocrats and those who enable their corrupt dealings.
While all those measures are achievements worth celebrating today, I fear that we are not going quite far or fast enough. Our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions to target human rights abuses has, to date, been a little too timid. Only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under that style of sanction, which contrasts with the nearly 3,000 individuals and entities sanctioned under a single scheme specific to one country: namely, Russia.
As REDRESS and other civil society organisations have shown, too many individuals remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in corruption and serious human rights abuses the world over. Despite high-profile designations, such as the targeting of Isabel dos Santos, the frankly limited number of Magnitsky-style sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. By focusing only on isolated bad actors, such narrow designations overlook key backers or enablers and they fail to adapt when entities rebrand, or disappear and then reappear, simply to sidestep sanctions.
To illustrate the problem, here are just three brief examples that highlight the gap in our use of Magnitsky sanctions, allowing those responsible for egregious human rights violations to act with impunity. For instance, just last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces—the RSF—suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. The civil war in Sudan, as has already been mentioned, is the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis, displacing some 13 million people. There is overwhelming evidence of heinous crimes, mass executions, starvation and the systemic and calculated use of rape as a weapon of war. Evidence compiled by the UN, experts and journalists has shown, as has already been cited, that the UAE and its officials have been secretly supplying weapons to the RSF via neighbouring Chad—a position that the Gulf state denies, but the overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise. Sadly, no action was taken against the RSF’s key military and diplomatic backer, the UAE, or against the chief commander of the RSF.
Similarly, the narrow scope of sanctions designations in Georgia also undermines our response to the human rights crisis currently under way. Georgia is increasingly finding itself subject to authoritarian rule. Since the highly disputed election in 2024, during which the Georgian Dream party claimed victory, there has been an escalation in the crackdown on protests and on independent media, including widespread violence and human rights abuses. The Georgian Dream party has now captured almost all Government branches and institutions. It has used its new-found power to aggressively suppress protests and all scrutiny of its actions, including hundreds of reports of arbitrary detention and even torture.
Although the UK has rightly sanctioned some of those responsible for violent attacks against journalists and protesters, key members of the pro-Russia elite were sadly absent from those designations. They include Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Dream party, who was sanctioned by the Biden Administration in the United States for undermining democratic processes simply for the benefit of the Kremlin. The UK has yet to take the same steps in relation to Georgia, so will the Minister make decisive use of sanctions to crack down on the abuses, which only benefit the Russian Government and are entirely at the expense of the Georgian people?
Finally, although the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in the deadly repression of Uyghur Muslims in China in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from REDRESS and other human rights organisations, which identified the broader command structure behind the violent atrocities committed against the Uyghur people in China. We cannot continue to ignore the calls, already put forward today, for sanctions on senior Chinese officials, who must include the Chinese Communist party secretary in Xinjiang, who is considered the architect behind the human rights abuses committed.
Those three cases all show how limiting our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions undermines their effectiveness. Sanctions are a key tool in our armoury to crack down on the most egregious human rights abuses, but narrow designation overlooks the key backers or enablers of the worst atrocities.
Underpinning our sanctions with strong enforcement is also critical to their impact. We know that sanctions are only as strong as the enforcement behind them. In last year’s cross-Government review of sanctions, the Government rightly recognised that there are gaps in the UK’s sanctions implementation and enforcement, which they are seeking to address through new measures to increase the deterrent effect of sanctions and enhance our ability to take robust action against those who choose to break the rules.
Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)
The hon. Member is making an excellent contribution to the debate. The Treasury Committee heard evidence last year about the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. It appeared to me that it is far too small for the job that it has to do, especially compared with equivalents overseas in the US and Europe. Does he think that part of the solution is also funding OFSI properly, so it can be proactive in its monitoring of sanctions, and not only reactive?
Lloyd Hatton
I believe that proper resourcing of OFSI is essential. Similarly, other bodies and authorities that fight economic crime must be properly resourced so that they can do their job properly.
Three further changes are needed to ensure that there are effective instruments for challenging human rights abuses. First, to free sanctioned assets, we need to be able to identify their ownership. If we cannot follow ownership of assets through corporate and trust structures, which are often complex and involve secretive offshore havens, many of our designations will inevitably seep through the cracks and our enforcement will turn into nothing more than a game of whack-a-mole.
Ensuring that we can follow the money is therefore a priority and that must include the UK’s overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation found that since February 2022, over a quarter of all suspected sanctions breaches were made using intermediary jurisdictions, including the British Virgin Islands and Guernsey. That is deeply concerning, as the very jurisdictions that are enabling sanctions evasion are dragging their feet on important corporate transparency measures that would help us to follow the money in their backyards. Transparency at home and abroad is essential if sanctions are to be enforced effectively. That means ending all tolerance of secrecy in our overseas territories and Crown dependencies, which we all know have provided shelter for dirty money for far too long.
Secondly, we must strengthen the policing of sanctions evasion with a clear focus on networks and professional enablers. Reports from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation have found that it is almost certain that lawyers, estate agents and associated property service firms based right here in the UK have helped clients to evade and avoid asset freezes, seemingly undermining our efforts from within. Some companies and enablers with a high risk appetite are willing to provide services to sanctioned high net worth individuals, allowing them to maintain their property empire and sidestep sanctions altogether. Infamously, the oligarch and former owner of Chelsea FC, one Roman Abramovich, was reportedly able to transfer his extensive property empire and a fleet of super-yachts, helicopters and jets to his children just weeks before being sanctioned here in the UK.
Despite the vast scale of sanctions evasion, enforcement by authorities in the UK in response to violations has been too weak in recent years. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has imposed just three fines for violations of the UK’s Russia sanctions regime in the past year, totalling a measly £622,750. That is an utterly damning figure and shows that we are bringing a water pistol to a knife fight when it comes to enforcing our sanctions measures. Worse still, OFSI has not imposed any fines at all for breaches of Magnitsky-style sanctions.
I know that the Government are planning to scale up our capability to target the professional enabler network. In the recently published anti-corruption strategy, which I wholeheartedly welcome, Ministers were right to commit to expanding the use of sanctions against professional enablers. Given the UK’s world-leading role as a professional services provider, such a measure is essential if we are to begin to impose serious constraints on sanctioned individuals. A professional services ban, for example, would be an effective way to start to tackle kleptocrats and human rights abusers. Many of those individuals might not own an asset in the UK or even plan to travel here, but they rely on UK-based professional services, such as a legal firm and a bank. That simple measure would block wrongdoers from enjoying access to our large professional services sector in the UK.
Finally, I remain concerned that there is a real lack of publicly available data about enforcement capacity, actions and impact, which will undermine Parliament’s ability to scrutinise sanctions enforcement and better understand whether they are working. Without a credible public picture of what is actually frozen, how can Parliament judge the effectiveness of sanctions and whether enablers may simply be assuming that enforcement in the UK is patchy at best? I ask Ministers to look closely and carefully at these proposals to improve data transparency, strengthen our ability to identify ownership and boost the policing of the enablers of sanctions evasion.
Magnitsky-style sanctions remain one of the most useful tools at the Government’s disposal to hold perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and corruption to account. The effective use of these sanctions sends a clear message that the UK will not act as a safe haven for dirty money belonging to kleptocrats or human rights abusers. However, the effectiveness of sanctions depends not on their existence alone, but on the political will to use them fully, consistently and credibly. At a time when, unfortunately, the United States sometimes appears reluctant to deploy these tools with the necessary resolve, the United Kingdom has a clear responsibility to step forward and work with a broad coalition of allies and partners to effectively deploy Magnitsky-style sanctions.
I know that the Government, and almost all Members of the House, are serious about defending human rights, tackling corruption and upholding the rules-based international order, but to achieve that we must ensure that Magnitsky-style sanctions are not only a symbolic gesture, but sharp, effective instruments used to hold bad actors to account and speak truth to power. As has already been said, in an age of global uncertainty, with rogue states and corrupt individuals wishing to operate with impunity, that is exactly the type of leadership that this moment demands.
Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)
I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for bringing forward this important debate on the effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions for serious human rights abuses. They are tools that reflect our values as a country that is meant to defend human rights and the rule of law.
Under the UK’s autonomous sanctions framework, which is built on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and reinforced by subsequent legislation, the global human rights sanction regime allows us to target individuals and entities responsible for gross violations of human rights, including with asset freezes and travel bans. Magnitsky sanctions have been used against perpetrators of egregious abuses in multiple contexts, from Russian officials linked to the death of Sergei Magnitsky to those implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and military leaders in Myanmar. However, today’s debate also requires us to consider the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools in the face of major crises.
Multiple authoritative assessments, particularly from REDRESS and UK parliamentary evidence submissions, highlight several areas where the UK Magnitsky sanctions regime has failed to act effectively. Evidence shows that the UK has not replicated the majority of Magnitsky sanctions imposed by partner jurisdictions across the US, Canada and the EU. Only 14% of global Magnitsky designations are listed under the UK Magnitsky regime and another 17% appear under other UK regimes, meaning that 69% of perpetrators sanctioned abroad are not sanctioned by the UK at all. Of the unsanctioned cases, 71% were designated by the US, 27% by Canada and 2% by the EU, yet the UK has not followed suit.
The gap means that the UK is failing to act against individuals already identified as human rights abusers or corrupt actors by close allies. The UK has received at least 15 detailed evidence packages from NGOs such as REDRESS documenting alleged human rights abuses or corruption in many of the countries that were referenced by previous speakers, including China, Sudan, Uganda, Bangladesh, Venezuela and others. In many of those cases, the US has already sanctioned the perpetrators, but the UK has failed to act in almost all of them.
On the use of the legal powers available, according to parliamentary evidence, since September 2021 the UK has sanctioned only three individuals under its Magnitsky human rights regime, compared with 105 designations in the preceding period under the previous Foreign Secretary. That reflects a significant slowdown and a lack of strategic direction. There is also poor co-ordination with our allies in the US, the EU and other sanctioning partners. The recommendations from the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation stressed that the UK’s unilateral approach weakens the effectiveness of sanctions. The UK has failed to systematically sanction individuals already targeted by partners, co-ordinate multilateral actions to target corrupt networks instead of isolated individuals, or match the scale and frequency of designation by allies.
Magnitsky sanctions have been used against the egregious abuses that I have mentioned. However, today’s debate requires us to reflect on the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools. In recent months, the United Kingdom has taken steps to sanction two Israeli Government Ministers over their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those designations, made alongside partners including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, include travel bans and asset freezes and were justified by the Foreign Office as necessary responses to genocide and serious abuses of human rights. Moreover, the UK has suspended trade negotiations with Israel in response to its ongoing military offensive in Gaza and related violence in the west bank and has applied sanctions against settlers and settler organisations linked to violence against the Palestinian communities.
The scale and scope of action by the UK Government has not been sufficient, and we have failed to reflect our obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to ensure that civilians do not suffer, particularly in the light of provisional measures from the International Court of Justice ordering the protection of civilians in Gaza and actions directed at ending grave human rights violations in Gaza and the west bank. The sheer scale of suffering in Gaza, including from the blockade’s effect on civilians and the risk of mass starvation, must prompt far stronger measures, ranging from broader sanctions and trade restrictions to the enforcement of legal obligations to prevent atrocities.
Instead, we see 37 NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Rescue Committee, ousted and banned from providing aid across the west bank and Gaza with impunity. That is despite nearly 1.9 million displaced Gazans being vulnerable to shortages of tents, shelter materials, medical assistance, clean water and sanitation support during winter, and we still refuse to go further on sanctions and punishment for Israel’s actions. At the same time, the UK Government have stressed their continued support for Israel’s security while the Israeli Government expand illegal settlements deeper and deeper into Palestinian territory. We have recognised the state of Palestine, which is a welcome step, but we must follow that up by fulfilling our obligations under that recognition to the Palestinian people.
All that illustrates an essential point: Magnitsky-style sanctions are neither symbolic nor irrelevant, but their effectiveness depends on consistent, principled application, rigorous enforcement and alignment with broader obligations and foreign policy goals. Targeted sanctions are most effective when they clearly align with international law, with evidence and with credible human rights concerns, when they are co-ordinated with international partners to avoid loopholes and politicisation, and when they are part of a broader strategy that includes diplomacy, humanitarian advocacy and engagement with multilateral justice mechanisms. Used in isolation, sanctions risk being dismissed as gestures rather than being seen as instruments of accountability. Used in co-ordination with wider action, they can contribute meaningfully to deterrence, pressure for change and justice for victims.
The United Kingdom should make principal use of Magnitsky sanctions wherever there is credible evidence of human rights abuses—be it in Russia, the middle east, Sudan, Myanmar or elsewhere—but they must also be prepared to act boldly and consistently, in line with international law when confronted with mass civilian suffering anywhere on the globe. Our inconsistent approach to human rights, and the protection of so-called allies, condemns us all to an unsafe world in which might is right and wrongdoing is never corrected. In the same stroke of a pen, we shame our enemies and sign away the human rights that we like to proclaim are sacrosanct. We must ensure that our sanctions regime is not just a statement of values but a tool that genuinely contributes to accountability, justice and the prevention of atrocities. I commend the motion to the House.
Joe Powell (Kensington and Bayswater) (Lab)
I join colleagues in congratulating the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing the debate. As he rightly said, an effective sanctions regime is an increasingly important foreign policy and defence tool. Having worked on international anti-corruption and open government efforts for over a decade before I came to this place, I know that they can make a real impact. I agree with him that such a regime includes the threat of sanctions, as well as their execution.
Like others, I am pleased that the Government have introduced over 900 new sanctions against individuals, entities and ships under the Russia sanctions regime, and over 60 designations under human rights and anti-corruption specifically. I know how seriously the Minister takes this tool, and I sincerely thank him and his officials for their complex work. I believe that the UK’s ambition on sanctions is at the edge of global leadership. That means that we must continually look for ways to make the system more effective, and I will suggest a couple of areas in which we might do so.
One obvious area, in which I know the Government are working hard, is the transparency of asset ownership across jurisdictions. If we want sanctions to work, we need to know where the assets are, and transparency is an important prerequisite for effective targeting. To give one example, approximately 40% of the foreign-owned properties in Kensington and Chelsea are controlled by trusts. Through sanctions, our borough has one of the highest numbers of frozen properties. Trusts are not automatically included in the foreign-owned property register, and although information can now be made available on request, the lack of open data makes it harder to track real ownership. I know that the Government are considering that matter.
Similarly, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) mentioned, the long-standing effort to bring in transparent beneficial ownership registers to the UK overseas territories and Crown dependencies would enable better tracking of assets under the control of sanctioned individuals. I support the Government review of asset and beneficial ownership in the UK, which is being carried out by anti-corruption champion Baroness Hodge, as part of the anti-corruption strategy, to identify vulnerabilities in that area. I hope that her recommendations can support our sanctions regime to be more effective.
International data sharing on this issue is important. The illicit finance summit is coming up in May. Will the Minister outline whether sanctions policy, and international co-operation around it, will be on the agenda?
On scope, we may benefit from looking more closely at how the two Magnitsky-style regimes interact, particularly in terms of corruption related to abuse of function, trading in influence and illicit enrichment, which bridge human rights and corruption. I hope that the Minister will keep under close review the potential effectiveness of sanctions relating to Georgia. I have met representatives of Georgian civil society, which has been calling for the UK to expand our sanctions further, including to Mr Ivanishvili and his top officials.
For sanctions to be effective, they have to bite, and enforcement is critical. I welcome the Government’s approach of working multilaterally with allies to maximise effectiveness. However, it is also important that we look closer to home. Roman Abramovich is a former resident of Kensington and Chelsea, and still owns frozen property in my constituency. As the House will no doubt be aware, he was sanctioned in March 2022, and his UK assets were frozen. In May 2022, he sold Chelsea football club under an agreement that the sale proceeds would be used for humanitarian need in Ukraine. It is shameful that, almost four years later, that money has still not been released. I strongly welcome the Prime Minister’s leadership in issuing a licence last month to release the money within 90 days, and in making a commitment to taking legal action if necessary.
This is a case of profound national and international importance—and a test of whether our sanctions have the bite that they need. Although I welcome the cross-party spirit with which the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green approached the debate, I find it astonishing that such a serious conflict of interest has now emerged at the top of the Conservative party. Sir Bill Browder—the man who spearheaded the global campaign for Magnitsky sanctions—has asked how it is possible that the shadow Attorney General can
“moonlight as the attorney for a Russian oligarch who is trying to wiggle out of a £2.5 billion deal to aid victims of the war in Ukraine that he made with the UK Government? Back in the day that was called a ‘conflict of interest’”.
I agree with Sir Bill, and I suspect the right hon. Gentleman has sympathy with that point, too.
The detail matters here. Yesterday, Lord Wolfson published a letter saying that the Prime Minister got his facts wrong, and that he was not advising Mr Abramovich on UK sanctions or the proceeds of Chelsea FC. First, the Prime Minister did not in fact say that Lord Wolfson is advising Roman Abramovich on UK sanctions and the proceeds of sale of Chelsea FC. The Prime Minister did say, however, that Lord Wolfson is advising Mr Abramovich. That is true, as both Lord Wolfson and the Opposition spokesperson have now confirmed. The record should, in my view, be corrected.
Secondly, Lord Wolfson’s letter omitted the most crucial piece of new information released by the Opposition spokesperson yesterday, which is that the shadow Attorney General has now recused himself from advising the Leader of the Opposition and shadow Ministers on Ukraine and Russia. Quite apart from whether someone can be an effective shadow Attorney General when they are unable to provide legal advice on the most important issues facing this country—Ukraine’s security guarantees to name but one—this recusal raises serious questions. Does it include efforts to tackle the Russian shadow fleet, including the military action yesterday? Does it include sanctions policy and enforcement? Does it include tax policy? The BBC reports that Abramovich could owe the UK up to £1 billion in tax after a botched attempt to avoid tax on hedge fund investments via shell companies in the British Virgin Islands.
Thirdly, it is naive in the extreme to think it possible to separate the various legal cases that Mr Abramovich is engaged in and which affect UK national interests. According to The Times, Abramovich’s own representatives say that £1.4 billion of the proceeds from the sale of Chelsea cannot be released to a charitable foundation until legal proceedings brought by the Jersey Government are concluded. I would welcome clarification from the shadow Minister and the Minister on whether they consider that the ongoing litigation, and Mr Abramovich’s position on its connection to the transfer of the Chelsea FC proceeds, conflicts with the ability to transfer that money speedily?
Fourthly, there has been a concerted effort to conflate the vital principle of the right to legal representation and the prevention of conflicts of interest. I absolutely support the right to legal counsel of people I may find disreputable or worse, including sanctioned individuals—that is the basis of a strong legal system—but it is a choice to serve as shadow Attorney General, and it is a choice to represent a sanctioned Russian oligarch in the Jersey case. My view is that those two roles are incompatible. By recusing himself from giving the Conservative party legal advice on Ukraine and Russia, Lord Wolfson has himself confirmed that, in his view, it is not possible give that advice while being paid to represent Roman Abramovich, and that, given the choice, being paid to represent Roman Abramovich is more important to him than fulfilling his duties as shadow Attorney General. He could have made the opposite choice, but he did not.
I want our sanctions regime to be as effective as possible. I know that the Government are committed to continuing to learn and adapt as that regime evolves. I hope—I really mean this—that the Leader of the Opposition will clear up the mess that has been created and restore the cross-party consensus that is in our national interest.
Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)
I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this debate and for being a doughty champion for British citizens unfairly imprisoned abroad. Colleagues have already made clear that Magnitsky sanctions are not an abstract policy instrument but a really powerful tool, so for me the debate is really about whether we are prepared to use that tool fully and consistently on behalf of our citizens.
It is worth reminding ourselves of how this all began. We call these measures Magnitsky sanctions for a reason: a young man, Sergei Magnitsky, paid with his life for exposing corruption. He left behind an irrefutable paper trail that shows us exactly how authoritarian injustice works.
Sergei was a Russian tax lawyer—not an activist or a dissident—but he uncovered fraud of extraordinary scale involving the theft of millions of dollars carried out by state officials in Russia using the very institutions meant to uphold the law. He did what the law demanded of him: he documented it, testified and trusted that evidence would matter. Instead, the state turned on him. He was arrested by the very officials he had implicated and placed in pre-trial detention, where punishment begins long before guilt is even alleged.
What sets Sergei apart, and why we still speak his name, is what he did next. Even as his world narrowed to concrete walls and iron doors, he documented everything, with over 450 complaints, petitions and diary entries written by hand, often without a table, sometimes in freezing cells, under conditions designed to break the human spirit. In a letter to his lawyer in August 2009, he said:
“Justice, under such conditions turns into the process of grinding human meat for prisons and camps.”
That phrase was not rhetoric; it is a description of a system where detention itself becomes the punishment and where exhaustion, humiliation and neglect replace the rule of law.
Sergei was moved repeatedly between cells—often at night—and deprived of sleep, but he still refused to withdraw his testimony or plead guilty, so his conditions worsened. He was placed in cells flooded with raw sewage. He slept in his coat because the windows had no glass. Rats ran freely at night across the prison.
Fatally, Sergei was denied medical treatment. Despite a diagnosis of pancreatitis and escalating pain, and despite written pleas, verbal pleas and petitions to judges, prosecutors and officials, his requests were ignored. One official told him plainly that he would get help only after release and that nobody was obliged to provide it to him in detention.
Sergei’s last note asked when the ultrasound prescribed months earlier would finally be done. It never was. On 16 November 2009 he died on a prison floor after being restrained, isolated and denied emergency care: clearly a gross breach of human rights. Even then in death, the system denied responsibility. That is why Magnitsky sanctions exist: because Sergei and the incredible campaign of Sir Bill Browder showed us that truth outlives prison walls and that accountability has to cross borders.
Why does this matter today? We are seeing the same injustice applied to the case of Ryan Cornelius, not in Moscow but in Dubai. The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green talked a little about Ryan’s case. He was arrested in 2008 and convicted of fraud in 2010, but the sentence that he received—harsh as it was—had an end date, and he had served it. But just weeks before his scheduled release it was extended by a further 20 years using a law introduced after his original conviction, with no proper hearing and no meaningful right of appeal. That is not justice; that detention is leverage. The parallels with Sergei are stark.
Like Sergei, Ryan was arbitrarily detained, according to the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention. Like Sergei, he has been denied due process. Like Sergei, he has been punished for refusing to concede or comply. Like Sergei, he has endured degrading prison conditions and inadequate medical care during a serious bout of tuberculosis.
But unlike Sergei—this should trouble the House deeply—Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen. The UN has ruled his detention arbitrary, and experts have raised the alarm. His family, some of whom are in the Gallery, have campaigned for years; some of them have lost everything. Members from parties across the House have spoken up, yet Ryan remains in prison. If Magnitsky sanctions are not relevant in this case, we must really ask ourselves: what are they for? I am grateful that we have heard some of the names relating to Dubai Islamic bank. I hope that the Government will take them away and think carefully about use of the powers that we have, which seem wholly appropriate in this instance.
What does the House want from the Magnitsky sanctions regime? I am grateful that several hon. Members have made these points. We want them to be more than just symbolic; we want them to be consistent, ambitious and principled. We have been honest about where our use of these sanctions has fallen short. On that, I am grateful in particular to my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton). Since we introduced the regime, we have designated 229 individuals and entities under it. While these measures have had a meaningful impact in some cases, overall we have applied them in a limited and inconsistent way. We know that the FCDO has received dossiers and evidence from civil society organisations in their hundreds—potentially thousands—implicating perpetrators, but only a small number have been sanctioned.
The contrast has already been made with the UK’s response to Russia’s invasion. I do not want to denigrate that response, because the Minister in particular and his colleagues have worked incredibly hard on that, and I give credit where credit is due. However, it demonstrates that where there is a political will, we do act at scale. That is what we want to see in other cases as well.
The inconsistency is particularly evident in cases involving UK strategic partners or trade allies, and in relation to conflict-related sexual violence, despite the UK's preventing sexual violence in conflict initiative. There is also a clear failure to use the regime robustly in response to British nationals arbitrarily detained abroad, such as Ryan Conelius.
Beyond designation decisions, weak enforcement is further undermining the regime. To date, no fines have been imposed for breaches of Magnitsky sanctions. Reports indicate widespread evasion involving professional enablers, opaque corporate structures and overseas territories, as has been capably pointed out. In addition, there is no obligation for the Government to report to Parliament on the use of these sanctions. I believe that should change.
The UK lacks a strategy for managing frozen assets and ensuring that sanctions contribute to justice for victims and survivors. Funds can remain untouched for years, losing value while survivors receive no reparations. I think here particularly of the family of Ryan Cornelius; his wife Heather is effectively homeless as a result of the circumstances she faces. At present, all the proceeds flow back to the Treasury rather than to those harmed by the underlying violations. Let us use these sanctions ambitiously, consistently and appropriately in combination with other mechanisms if they are effective in upholding human rights, tackling illicit finance and preventing this country from becoming a haven for war criminals and kleptocrats.
Sergei Magnitsky showed us what courage looks like when the law collapses. Ryan Cornelius reminds us what happens when we hesitate to act. Sanctions are not about vengeance; they are about drawing a line and saying that no official, no banker and no judge is beyond accountability when they participate in grave injustice. If we honour Sergei’s legacy, we must be prepared to act with the same clarity he showed even when it is uncomfortable or inconvenient, especially when one of our own is still paying the price.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important debate and I am pleased to see the Minister in his place. He has already heard plenty from colleagues in the Chamber on sanctions, and I hope that today’s debate will provide further food for thought.
Effective sanctions regimes for human rights violations and corruption speak to who we are as a nation—a nation that stands up for the rule of law, that respects international law and that says, “Wherever and whoever you are, if you persecute individuals, plunder your country’s resources or embezzle from your own people, there will be consequences.” The reason we are having this debate today to my mind is not to call for some shiny new instrument to hold the world’s criminals and the corrupt to account; rather it is to call for better use of the world-leading tools that we already have to deny the human rights abusers and kleptocrats access to our financial system, professional services and property market.
I want to focus on two particular threats: first, what I see as the inconsistent and inadequate use of Magnitsky sanctions against serious human rights abusers, particularly in Georgia and Hong Kong; and secondly, the failure to enforce sanctions properly, allowing evasion, secrecy and professional enablers to undermine the entire regime.
Let me begin with Georgia, because Georgia is a country that should be moving closer to Europe, not sliding backwards into authoritarianism for the benefit of Moscow. Yet since the highly disputed parliamentary election of 26 October 2024, that is exactly what we have seen: all branches of government and state institutions now captured by Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream party; civic space crushed; independent media and civil society organisations targeted under a new foreign agent law—legislation that comes straight out of the Kremlin playbook; and peaceful protests met time and again with violence.
The UK has rightly sanctioned some individuals responsible for violent attacks on journalists and protesters, and that is very much welcome, but as the Minister knows, I do not feel it is enough. The omissions are glaring. Most notably, the UK has failed to sanction Bidzina Ivanishvili, the individual widely regarded as exercising decisive influence over Georgia’s political direction.
Lloyd Hatton
Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the current situation in Georgia is not dissimilar to what we have seen in other central and eastern European countries and beyond, where Russia seeks to have greater political influence and control and has mission creep? Unless countries such as the United Kingdom push back against that early, Russia will continue to infringe and extend its tentacles into political life in countries such as Georgia?
Phil Brickell
My hon. Friend is quite right about the spheres of influence that Russia seeks to exert across central and eastern Europe.
Ivanishvili could be sanctioned under any number of our regimes—Magnitsky, global anti-corruption or even the Russian sanctions regime given his reported links to the Kremlin and his blatant kowtowing to Moscow. Just this morning, I was made aware that Georgian Dream has increased state financing for the Kulevi oil refinery, which Reuters has reported received its first shipment of Russian oil last October. The refinery itself is linked to Vladimir Alekseev, first deputy chief of Russia’s GRU. That seems to be an obvious route for sanctions violations, and I hope it will be added to Ivanishvili’s rap sheet. I know the Minister will be unable to comment on individual cases, but can he at least confirm that Ivanishvili’s supposed status as too big to fail due to his alleged personal importance to the Georgian economy does not preclude him from being sanctioned by this country?
I will come to the United States later, but our allies across the Atlantic sanctioned Ivanishvili on 27 December 2024 for undermining democratic processes on behalf of, or for the benefit of, Russia. I certainly do not suggest that we follow the US in every aspect of foreign policy, but it is correct in applying that designation. Sanctioning cronies and underlings can make an impact, but let us be clear that the fish rots from the head. My fear is that our silence on Ivanishvili sends the wrong message to would-be kleptocrats around the world.
Let me turn to Hong Kong and the ongoing repression there, which is of keen interest to me and the valued community of Hongkongers across my Bolton West constituency. The dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms is unacceptable. Since the imposition of the national security law, we have seen the systematic criminalisation of dissent: independent media shut down, civil society organisations dissolved, elected opposition figures jailed, and fundamental freedoms erased in all but name. This is textbook human rights abuse.
The case of Jimmy Lai, who has already been mentioned, symbolises that injustice—a point I was reminded of by constituents of mine who used to work with him back in Hong Kong. As a British national, a publisher and a peaceful advocate of democracy, Jimmy Lai has been imprisoned for years for exercising rights that we regard in this place as fundamental. He now faces the prospect of spending the rest of his life behind bars under a law designed to silence free speech, not to deliver justice. Of course, I welcomed the Foreign Secretary’s strong condemnation of Jimmy Lai’s sham trial last month, but words alone do not protect political prisoners. If Magnitsky sanctions are to retain any credibility, they must be used against those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and for the persecution of individuals such as Jimmy Lai. That includes officials who designed, implemented and enforced the national security law and those who have overseen its use to crush free expression and political participation.
That brings me to a wider point. We are entering a period in which the United States cannot always be relied on to apply evidence-based sanctions. In that context, the UK cannot simply wait for Washington to lead. We must be prepared to act where the United States will not. We should also not be afraid, as critical friends, to point out where the US gets it wrong. I asked the Minister earlier this week at the Foreign Affairs Committee for his response to Trump’s sanctioning of two British citizens for seeking to, as Secretary Rubio sees it, “coerce” American tech platforms into suppressing free speech. Does the Minister agree that that is dangerous nonsense?
That brings me to my second theme: enforcement. Increasing designations alone is not enough. Sanctions without enforcement are no sanction at all; they are just suggestions. We now have a vast and complex sanctions architecture—Magnitsky sanctions, Russia sanctions and anti-corruption sanctions. Since Putin’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, we have had a massive boost in our own sanctions capacity and seen a huge undertaking in the private sector to keep up, yet enforcement in the UK remains worryingly weak.
We know that sanctions are being evaded. We heard earlier about Roman Abramovich reportedly transferring his UK property empire to his children just weeks before being sanctioned—the very same individual who is now being represented by the Conservative shadow Attorney General over a dispute with the Jersey Government on the source of his wealth. As my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) outlined forensically, if the Opposition are serious about standing by Ukraine, they cannot have him as their top Law Officer, serving in the other place and attending shadow Cabinet meetings. It is simply incredible. Does the Minister agree that Lord Wolfson’s position in the shadow Cabinet and attendance of those meetings is now completely untenable?
The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has concluded that it is “almost certain” that UK lawyers, estate agents and property service firms have helped clients evade asset freezes. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) outlined, in the past year OFSI has imposed just three fines for breaches of the UK’s sanctions regime, totalling just over £622,000. That is a rounding error compared with the scale of wealth at stake, and it is simply not a credible deterrent. All the while, there have been no breaches of Magnitsky sanctions in the past year.
This issue is acute in the British overseas territories, where low policing capacity and high financial secrecy create ideal conditions for sanctions evasion. There have been some laudable efforts in the OTs to enforce sanctions. However, I have too often been made aware of civil society organisations submitting detailed evidence of Magnitsky sanctions breaches in the overseas territories but receiving no meaningful response at all from those jurisdictions. Will the Minister assure me today that he will ensure that British overseas territories that receive such detailed allegations will act on them?
We must tackle head-on the scourge of corporate secrecy in offshore financial centres linked to the UK. If we are to ensure that our sanctions bite as much as possible, there is an urgent need for those overseas territories that continue to drag their feet—including the British Virgin Islands—to finally adopt fully public registers of beneficial ownership, as they have promised time and again but failed to deliver. As an interim step, the Minister will agree that individuals with a legitimate interest, including journalists and civil society, must have meaningful access to beneficial ownership information. Without that transparency, asset freezes cannot be enforced effectively. I look forward to the update on this issue promised earlier this year in the Government’s new anti-corruption strategy, but can the Minister provide any further information on timelines—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. I encourage the hon. Gentleman to bring his remarks to a conclusion, because we have another debate to follow, and we still have the Front-Bench spokespeople to come.
Phil Brickell
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Transparency is the name of the game here, so will the Minister confirm whether his Department has looked at publishing comprehensive data on assets frozen within UK jurisdictions, broken down by asset class, including assets held by individuals, state- owned enterprises and states themselves? The reason I ask is simple: Parliament cannot assess the effectiveness of our regimes if it cannot see the full picture.
Let me end with this. Magnitsky sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to defend human rights, but they work only if they are used consistently, enforced rigorously and connected clearly to accountability and reparations. If the UK wants to be a global champion of human rights, it must stop being a safe haven for those who abuse them and start ensuring that sanctions mean something on paper and in practice.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
I thank and congratulate the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this important debate. I seem to remember that he once referred to himself as a “quiet man”, but he has had a loud voice on this issue. I also congratulate the other excellent speakers we have heard today. The hon. Members for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton), for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) and for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) took us on a journey through different territories, spaces and countries, and reminded us of the history of the important name that we associate with the kind of sanctions we are talking about.
We are living through a period marked by rising authoritarianism, escalating human rights abuses, and the increasing use of corruption and repression as tools of state power. In that context, Magnitsky-style sanctions are among the most powerful instruments in our armoury to uphold human rights, defend international law and promote democracy. Their strength lies in the fact that they target perpetrators, not populations, and individuals, not states, holding those responsible to account without inflicting further humanitarian harm on civilians—at least they do when they are working at their best. Magnitsky sanctions were designed to establish both legitimacy and intent. As Members have noted, they include asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on financial transactions, aimed directly at individuals who violate international law or commit serious human rights abuses. Their purpose is to reduce the humanitarian costs associated with blanket sanctions, to draw a clear line between civilians and abusers, and to provide a mechanism for accountability where domestic justice systems very often fail.
When used consistently and in co-ordination with our democratic allies, these sanctions carry real power. They deter future abuses, impose reputational and financial consequences, and challenge the assumption among perpetrators that they can act with impunity. Yet despite their importance, the United Kingdom’s current approach is, I contend, still falling short, and in so doing it is undermining the very purpose of the sanctions. Application remains inconsistent, enforcement is insufficient, as we have heard, and transparency and oversight are often inadequate. Sanctions retain their power only when they are applied coherently, consistently and with the political will to enforce them.
The Liberal Democrats believe that Magnitsky sanctions remain essential, yet too many individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses and corruption remain unsanctioned. Even where sanctions are imposed, those targeted continue to exploit evasion methods. Delays, gaps and selective application fundamentally weaken deterrence and erode confidence in that regime. We have consistently argued that the UK must be prepared to act decisively, rather than hesitating or allowing political convenience to override principle. On human rights and the rule of law, the United Kingdom must be a leader, not a follower.
A key weakness lies in how Magnitsky sanctions are operationalised. There is no clear, strategic approach to when and how the powers are used, leading to narrow and often selective application that ultimately undermines deterrence. Structural complexity has discouraged bold action, and weakened the overall effectiveness of the Magnitsky regime in the UK. That problem is compounded by a lack of alignment with our allies. A significant number of individuals sanctioned by partners such as the United States, the European Union and Canada are not mirrored by the UK, reducing the collective impact of co-ordinated action. In fact, in 2022 the UK failed to replicate 69% of global Magnitsky designations. Let me be clear: these sanctions will not serve their intended purpose without close international co-ordination.
Moreover, unlike the United States, the UK does not operate under a single, clearly defined Magnitsky Act. Instead, our framework risks producing narrower and less transparent criteria for designation, particularly in cases involving serious human rights abuses and grand corruption. If we are serious about accountability, we must be bolder, clearer and more decisive in how we use these powers. That is why the Liberal Democrats would prioritise the defence of democracy and the promotion of human rights globally, deepen co-ordination of sanctions policy with our democratic allies—particularly in relation to Russia—and strengthen economic crime legislation to close loopholes that allow sanctioned individuals to evade accountability. Sanctions must be backed by rigorous enforcement and tougher vetting of major investments, or they simply will not work.
That principle applies just as strongly to the protection of British nationals overseas. Arbitrary detention is not diplomacy; it is coercion. That is why, as well as appointing a dedicated envoy for arbitrary detention, Magnitsky sanctions must be a tool for enforcement, ensuring that hostage-taking carries a personal cost to those who seek to perpetrate it. Looking ahead, the future development of the UK’s sanctions policy must be genuinely joined up across Government. Only a whole-of-Government approach can ensure effective enforcement, close loopholes and maintain both the credibility and the moral authority of our sanctions regime.
The Liberal Democrats are clear about what that means in practice. Sanctions must target the individuals responsible for human rights abuses, not just states. Economic crime legislation must be strengthened to prevent evasion. Magnitsky sanctions must be used proactively, not reluctantly, as they so often appear to be used now. Arms export controls must reflect our human rights obligations, and asset freezing and seizure must be used to stop the flow of dirty money through our financial system.
That clarity must be reflected in our response to events around the world. In Hong Kong, a territory that has been mentioned several times during the debate, the Liberal Democrats want to see Magnitsky sanctions imposed on those responsible for the erosion of freedoms and the unacceptable targeting of pro-democracy activists, including those here in the United Kingdom. The arrest warrants recently issued by Beijing are disgraceful attempts to interfere in our democracy, and they must be met with actions that befit the words that are so often spoken in this place and elsewhere.
The same boldness is required in response to Russia. We must work with our European partners to seize and repurpose frozen Russian assets, up to £30 billion of which are held in the UK, and direct them towards humanitarian, financial and military support for Ukraine. Sanctions that are not enforced do not constrain aggression, but enable it.
That consistency must be extended to Israel too. The Liberal Democrats were the first major UK-wide party to call for a full ban on military exports to Israel, and we continue to demand sanctions against Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Cabinet Ministers for their conduct in Gaza. International law must apply to everyone, without exception, and that includes senior figures in the UAE for their personal and institutional support for the still unfolding atrocities in Sudan.
In conclusion, Magnitsky sanctions are undoubtedly a powerful tool, but they cannot be deployed only when politically convenient. If the United Kingdom is to retain credibility on the world stage, our sanctions regime must be principled, consistent and enforced with resolve. Only then can it serve its true purpose: accountability for abusers, justice for victims and the defence of the values we claim to uphold.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing the debate. He has long been a determined and principled advocate for human rights, and it is entirely fitting that he brought this important issue before the House for debate. I thank Members from across House for their many contributions.
The debate is not about whether Magnitsky-style sanctions are justified—they are—but about whether they are being used as effectively as they should be, and whether the Government are doing enough to ensure that they deliver real consequences for those responsible for the gravest human rights violations.
The UK has one of the most developed autonomous sanctions regimes in the world. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, introduced by the last Conservative Government, gives Ministers the power to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses and corruption. That framework was designed to give the UK the ability to act decisively, in co-ordination with allies and without delay. Ministers spoke of a regime capable of reaching from Xinjiang to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and to the persecution of the Rohingya. Those ambitions were right, but the test is how the regime is applied in practice, because sanctions that are slow, inconsistently applied or weakly enforced do not deter abusers; they signal hesitation.
Much of today’s debate has understandably focused on Russia, and rightly so. Since launching its illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been responsible for widespread and systematic abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UK’s response has been significant. It was under the last Conservative Government that the framework for these measures was put in place; as a result, around £28.7 billion in Russian-linked assets have been frozen, but freezing assets is only part of the picture. How is this sanctions regime being enforced? How many investigations has the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation opened in the last year? How many enforcement actions have been taken, and how many penalties have been imposed? Without visible and credible enforcement, there is a real risk that sanctions become something that can be managed, worked around or even absorbed as a cost of doing business.
Several Members have raised the issue of Russia’s so-called shadow fleet—the vessels and networks used to evade sanctions and to continue exporting oil. The Government have sanctioned a number of ships, which is welcome, but, as others have said, the shadow fleet is consistently adapting. It relies on complex ownership structures, opaque insurance arrangements and ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure origin and destination. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), has made clear from this Dispatch Box, enforcement needs to be relentless, not only identifying vessels but targeting the wider networks that enable this activity.
That brings me to a recent example that raises important questions about enforcement. Recent reporting has suggested that sanctioned Russian crude oil was delivered to a refinery part-owned by Lakshmi Mittal, a UK-resident businessman, using vessels that had already been blacklisted by western authorities. Those shipments reportedly involved ship-to-ship transfers and other practices commonly associated with sanctions evasion. Those reports may ultimately lead to enforcement action, and I have written to the director of OFSI to seek clarification, but they underline a wider point: if sanctions are to be effective, they must follow all those involved in enabling sanction busting, not just the ships themselves. That includes those who benefit from, facilitate, finance, or fail to exercise proper oversight over, the continued flow of Russian oil revenues.
When credible concerns are raised about potential sanctions circumvention involving UK-linked individuals or businesses, there must be confidence that those concerns are examined rigorously and without hesitation. Does the Minister know whether OFSI is actively assessing the activity reported in connection with Mr Mittal’s refinery? How does OFSI approach cases where supply chains are deliberately complex, span multiple jurisdictions and are designed to obscure accountability? How are the Government ensuring that enforcement action keeps pace with increasingly sophisticated attempts to evade sanctions in the energy sector?
It is also reasonable to ask whether the Government are prepared to apply the same level of scrutiny where individuals with UK links hold influential positions, such as directorships in major international institutions, banks and multinational companies, while also being connected to sectors implicating Russian energy flows. Can the Minister confirm that no individual, however prominent, and no corporate structure, however complex, is treated as being beyond scrutiny? Sanctions must be applied consistently and without exception, because their credibility depends on it.
Magnitsky-style sanctions were never intended to apply to Russia alone; they were designed to target serious human rights abuses wherever they occur, so let me turn to a number of other areas. First, there is Sudan, which has been mentioned today. We welcome the sanctions already imposed on individuals associated with the RSF, but the situation on the ground remains dire. Civilians continue to suffer, particularly in Darfur, so what more is being done? Are further designations under active consideration? How are sanctions being used alongside diplomatic efforts at the UN and with regional partners to press for a ceasefire and accountability?
Secondly, let me turn to people smuggling and human trafficking. These crimes, which have been mentioned today, involve exploitation, violence and abuse on a large scale, often facilitated by corruption and financial secrecy. In 2025 alone, more than 41,000 illegal migrants crossed the channel in small boats—nearly 5,000 more than in the previous year. Have the Government considered whether Magnitsky-style sanctions could be used more systematically against the leaders of those criminal networks, particularly where there is evidence of corruption or serious human rights abuse? What assessment has been made of that option?
There are a number of long-standing and deeply concerning situations in which Magnitsky sanctions remain highly relevant. In Hong Kong and China, the UK has sanctioned some officials for abuses in Xinjiang and for undermining rights and freedoms. That was the right decision, but serious concerns remain; for instance, not a single Chinese or Hong Kong official has been sanctioned in connection with the dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms, despite more than 200,000 Hongkongers relocating to the UK. The recent guilty verdict against Jimmy Lai is a stark reminder of the continued assault on the rule of law, press freedom and judicial independence in Hong Kong. Are the Government actively considering Magnitsky-style sanctions against Chinese Communist party officials involved in that case, including those responsible for political interference in the judicial system?
I also ask the Minister what action is being taken against those responsible for placing bounties on the heads of activists—including individuals now living here in the UK—in acts of clear transnational repression. The US has already sanctioned officials linked to those bounties; why has the UK not followed suit? More broadly, these issues sit alongside growing concerns about foreign influence and intimidation here in the UK, including through the proposed Chinese super-embassy in London, and the need for the effective implementation of the foreign influence registration scheme. How confident is the Minister that the UK’s sanctions policy, its approach to foreign influence, and its response to transnational repression are properly aligned?
Turning briefly to Iran, as we have seen, the regime’s response to peaceful protest has been brutal. Arbitrary detention, torture and executions continue, so what further steps are being taken to sanction those responsible for repression, and how is the UK working with partners to ensure that Iranian officials involved in those abuses cannot move or hide assets abroad? In Myanmar, nearly four years after the coup, the military junta continues to carry out widespread abuses against civilians, so are additional designations being prepared, and how is the UK ensuring that sanctions remain targeted, relevant and effective over time?
Finally, I turn briefly to Venezuela, where decisive action taken by the US against the Maduro regime has once again underlined the seriousness of the human rights and democratic crisis facing that country. Against that backdrop, can the Minister set out clearly the Government’s current approach to Venezuela sanctions, how human rights considerations are being reflected in policy, and whether Magnitsky-style sanctions remain firmly on the table?
Joe Powell
Would the shadow Minister consider briefly responding to my question about whether she thinks it is appropriate for the shadow Attorney General to be simultaneously advising shadow Ministers and a sanctioned Russian oligarch?
Wendy Morton
I am happy to respond. I refer the hon. Gentleman and his colleague who also raised that question, the hon. Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), to a letter that Lord Wolfson, the shadow Attorney General, has published. That letter sets out the position very clearly.
Returning to the subject of the debate, when we step back, a clear pattern emerges: sanctions only work if they are enforced rigorously, applied consistently and backed by the political will to follow the evidence wherever it leads. As such, I will close with a few final questions for the Minister. How are the Government strengthening enforcement against sanctions evasion, particularly in complex sectors such as energy and shipping, and where do they see as the next priority for designations? What steps are being taken to improve transparency and accountability to Parliament? If sanctions are to serve their purpose, they must be more than symbolic; they must be enforced, credible and consistent. That is what victims of human rights abuses deserve, and that is what the UK’s reputation as a serious and principled actor on the world stage requires.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
Let me start by thanking the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this debate. He always speaks with conviction and passion; he has been absolutely consistent on these issues for a very long time, and I recognise his leadership as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation. We fully support him and every colleague in this House who stands up for our values and has been sanctioned as a result—including your colleague the hon. Member for Sussex Weald (Ms Ghani), Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am grateful for all the contributions today, which have been constructively critical. I assure the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and all Members that our teams will take the individual cases raised seriously, and I will try my best in the time available to respond to all the key points.
I emphasise from the start that I share the ambition of Members across this House. I take on board the challenge—indeed, I made many similar points in opposition on these issues in similar debates. I emphasise to colleagues the extraordinary work of the officials at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and of other teams across Government who work on these issues. I have to be honest: resource is finite, but we have invested substantially and we will continue to do so. We have set ambitious targets, including on enforcement, which I will come to, but I pay tribute to those people and recognise that they have been awarded for that work within the Department, and rightly so. That work is having a genuine impact, because sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to protect our security and advance our foreign policy, including in the areas described today.
We impose sanctions to isolate those responsible, to restrict their ability to act and to change their behaviour, as well as to send deterrent and other messages beyond those we target. However, sanctions must be focused, enforceable, legally sound and backed by the right resources and credible evidence. We maintain the integrity of our regime through the strictest interpretation and the solidity of the evidence underpinning sanctions. I want colleagues to understand that, because it is important for the functioning of the regime as a whole.
Since this Government came in, we have set ambitious targets on sanctions, and we have introduced more than 1,000 new sanctions designations against individuals, entities and ships. We have laid 15 new statutory instruments before Parliament, including to create a new regime on irregular migration, to which the shadow Minister referred. We have already designated 32 individuals and entities under that. We have played a leading role in the snapback of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Those are just some of the examples showing that sanctions are not just symbolic gestures, but practical tools that are tightly focused and have a meaningful impact.
The UK covers Magnitsky-style sanctions under two regimes: the global human rights regime and the global anti-corruption regime. Under this Government, we have delivered more than 60 designations under those regimes. In 2025, we sanctioned 29 individuals and entities under the global human rights regime, going after scam centres in Cambodia and targets in Sri Lanka, Georgia and the west bank. Many colleagues have raised those areas and issues.
We have also delivered 164 sanctions taking action on human rights violations, war atrocities and gender-based violence. We have imposed sanctions on individuals, entities and organisations responsible for supporting or inciting violence against Palestinian communities in the west bank. In June 2025, we sanctioned the Israeli Government Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich in their personal capacities, in response to their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian communities. I mentioned the Cambodian scam centre package, which froze 20 UK properties worth more than £125 million, directly disrupting criminal activity in the heart of London. That activity impacted on British citizens on our streets, but was also linked to global corruption networks.
In November 2024, under the global anti-corruption regime, we sanctioned three notorious kleptocrats who had siphoned wealth from their countries, along with their enablers, including family and financial fixers. We froze more than £150 million in UK assets and sent a strong signal of support to Angola and other countries. We targeted an illicit gold network centred on a Kenyan-British smuggler who was using corruption to move gold out of southern Africa. In April 2025, we sanctioned corrupt officials and judges in Georgia and Guatemala and a pro-Russian network in Moldova, exposing their activities and supporting democracy and the rule of law.
Magnitsky sanctions are not our only tool. We also have the wider geographic regimes. Just in December, we sanctioned nine individuals and entities under the Syria regulations for abuses committed under the Assad regime and during last year’s coastal violence. We have to ensure that sanctions are robust, legally sound and evidence-based and that they stand up to the most robust scrutiny, and I am sure that colleagues understand why.
Russia has been highlighted by many Members today. We have taken concerted action on that front, and it is making a significant difference. Last year, we sanctioned more than 700 individuals, entities and ships under the Russian regime. We were the first G7 country to sanction all four Russian oil majors. The US followed suit, and that has had a direct impact: Russia’s oil revenues have dropped to their lowest level since the invasion began. I know that there is strong support across at least the majority of the House on those issues, and I have listed off the many other Magnitsky sanctions designation packages.
I am conscious of the time, and I will try to respond to some of the points that have been raised. It is worth making the point that often there are similarities between the different regimes. We co-ordinate very closely with partners, particularly the European Union, the United States, Canada and others. We try to bring the weight of the world to bear on these issues at crucial times, but I emphasise to colleagues that the legal bases for our sanctions regimes are different. There are different legal and judicial processes, and that is why there are often differences. Because of where nexuses of individuals and entities are, there are also often differences in where our sanctions can have the biggest impact. Sometimes that is what underpins what otherwise appears to be incongruity between regimes, but we always try to bring them together.
The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green specifically mentioned the Cambodian scam centres and Chen Zhi. I emphasise that Cambodia arrested Chen Zhi and extradited him to China this week, and that the National Bank of Cambodia liquidated Prince Bank on 8 January, so there has been a significant impact as a result of that package. Obviously, the sanctions are only one part of the response to these networks; there are other measures that countries can choose to take in response to very serious allegations.
A lot of questions have rightly been raised about Sudan and the work that the Government are doing on that issue. The Foreign Secretary, the Minister for Africa and I place a great deal of importance on that, and building a consensus on ending that horrific war is a core part of the Government’s diplomatic efforts, including with other regional partners and the UAE. The Foreign Secretary is in regular contact with the Emirati Foreign Minister, and the Prime Minister has also spoken to his counterpart. We will continue to use all necessary means to bring an end to the war in Sudan, which is having a devastating impact on its citizens.
A number of colleagues have asked questions about Hong Kong. Of course, we call on Beijing to repeal Hong Kong’s national security law. We are closely monitoring the situation there, and we keep sanctions under close review. I am not going to speculate on future designations, for obvious reasons, but particular cases have been raised. The case of Jimmy Lai remains an utmost priority. Diplomats continue to press for consular access, and they attended his trial. The Prime Minister has raised Mr Lai’s case directly with President Xi, and we are in close contact with his family and representatives. Of course, we want to make sure that he receives proper treatment, and we are deeply concerned about some of the allegations made about his treatment in prison.
On the case of Ryan Cornelius, I want to acknowledge that his family have been in Parliament today. We continue to support them and, indeed, the family of Charles Ridley as well. The former Foreign Secretary raised their cases with the UAE Foreign Minister last year, and I understand that he and the Minister for the Middle East, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), met the families in September. We support their clemency applications, and of course we raise those and other cases with appropriate authorities at the right time.
Jagtar Singh Johal’s case has also been mentioned. We continue to raise serious concerns about that with the Government of India at every possible opportunity.
We have not stopped our Myanmar sanctions. Since the coup, we have sanctioned 25 individuals and 39 entities.
Very important concerns have been raised about Roman Abramovich and Chelsea football club’s assets. I draw colleagues’ attention to what we have said on that, and to the Prime Minister’s action on the licence.
Colleagues have also expressed strong concerns about the shadow Attorney General. As the Prime Minister set out yesterday, the Conservatives have some very serious questions to answer on this issue, which is completely unfathomable to me and deeply disappointing.
On the question of enforcement—
Stephen Doughty
The hon. Gentleman mentions the importance of reporting to Parliament, and I can assure him that I have been scrutinised in this place many times. I have sent a letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to Lord Ricketts in the other place, to set out the full detail of all the work we have done. I am committed to reporting regularly to Parliament on these issues; indeed, I have held private meetings with many Members from across the House to discuss their concerns, and I am absolutely committed to continuing to do that.
On the issue of enforcement, I think some of the criticism was somewhat unwarranted. This is an issue that I have regularly championed. I agree with the principles of what colleagues have said, but I point out that in November the National Crime Agency announced that, based on the intelligence it gained in Operation Destabilise, it supported international law enforcement partners in seizing $24 million and over €2.6 million from Russian money laundering networks with links to drugs and organised crime. There have been over 128 arrests as a result of that operation alone, with over £25 million seized in cash and cryptocurrency—another issue that has been mentioned. In 2025 alone, OFSI issued four major civil monetary penalties, totalling over £900,000—I think some of the figures Members have used are not quite accurate—and for its part, HMRC concluded a £1.1 million compound settlement for trade sanctions breaches in May.
The shadow Minister asked for figures. I am happy to write to her with further details, but to give one example, OTSI has received reports or referrals about 146 potential breaches of sanctions and it has a number of investigations under way. I do not want to comment on them, but I do want to assure hon. Members that we take all the considerations they have raised very seriously. Sanctions, including Magnitsky-related sanctions, are an important tool, and we will continue to look at all such possibilities. I welcome the challenge, and we will continue to rigorously pursue not only the designation of such regimes, but, crucially, the enforcement that makes the difference.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I call Sir Iain Duncan Smith to wind up very quickly.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I will indeed be very quick, Madam Deputy Speaker. I thank the hon. Members for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton), for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) and for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), who all made speeches, for their support in this debate.
In winding up, I have some points on which I want to press the Government. First, why not have an annual report? I simply raise that as a question, because it would stop us having to bid for a Backbench Business debate, and—who knows—we may even mean we get more Members to attend.
I would raise questions about Sudan and the UAE, because the fact is that they are now complicit in the most brutal of murders, rapes and everything else. I would couple that with the holding of Ryan Cornelius as a hostage—and I call him a hostage—whose family have been without him for 17 years and are in penury as a result. Surely this gives us the opportunity to say that, unless he is released, we will put sanctions on individuals at the bank and elsewhere, which would certainly be very helpful.
It is the same with Jimmy Lai. It is now time for us to say that the country that used to administer Hong Kong can no longer put up with the trashing of the Sino-British agreement, the terrible behaviour over legal systems and, basically, the ending of English common law in the territory.
Those are some of the issues, but many others were raised. I must say that I have the highest regard for the Minister, as he knows. We have spoken endlessly about different aspects of this, and I take him as a very honest individual. I hope he will take these points back to the Foreign Office and say that we have done well, but we could do an awful lot more.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House is concerned that serious human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, together with widespread grand corruption, continue to escalate in an increasingly unstable global environment; notes that global human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, commonly known as Magnitsky sanctions, remain an essential mechanism for accountability and redress, yet their implementation by the United Kingdom is inconsistent and insufficient, and lacks oversight; regrets that numerous individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses and corruption remain unsanctioned, that enforcement and transparency around decision-making remains inadequate, and that sanctioned individuals continue to exploit evasion methods while victims receive limited support; further notes the absence of a long-term strategy for the management of frozen assets and a lack of clear criteria for delisting, alongside growing concerns that sanctions are becoming politicised internationally; urges the Government to strengthen the credibility of the Magnitsky sanctions regime through consistent and impartial application, enhanced enforcement, and by ensuring greater Parliamentary oversight and expanded measures to support victims, including developing pathways for compensation; and holds that, relevant to this, those involved in the arbitrary detention of British nationals should face Magnitsky sanctions, including those involved in the detention of Ryan Cornelius, Jagtar Singh Johal and Jimmy Lai.