Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Judith Cummins Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Phil Brickell]

My hon. Friend is quite right about the spheres of influence that Russia seeks to exert across central and eastern Europe.

Ivanishvili could be sanctioned under any number of our regimes—Magnitsky, global anti-corruption or even the Russian sanctions regime given his reported links to the Kremlin and his blatant kowtowing to Moscow. Just this morning, I was made aware that Georgian Dream has increased state financing for the Kulevi oil refinery, which Reuters has reported received its first shipment of Russian oil last October. The refinery itself is linked to Vladimir Alekseev, first deputy chief of Russia’s GRU. That seems to be an obvious route for sanctions violations, and I hope it will be added to Ivanishvili’s rap sheet. I know the Minister will be unable to comment on individual cases, but can he at least confirm that Ivanishvili’s supposed status as too big to fail due to his alleged personal importance to the Georgian economy does not preclude him from being sanctioned by this country?

I will come to the United States later, but our allies across the Atlantic sanctioned Ivanishvili on 27 December 2024 for undermining democratic processes on behalf of, or for the benefit of, Russia. I certainly do not suggest that we follow the US in every aspect of foreign policy, but it is correct in applying that designation. Sanctioning cronies and underlings can make an impact, but let us be clear that the fish rots from the head. My fear is that our silence on Ivanishvili sends the wrong message to would-be kleptocrats around the world.

Let me turn to Hong Kong and the ongoing repression there, which is of keen interest to me and the valued community of Hongkongers across my Bolton West constituency. The dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms is unacceptable. Since the imposition of the national security law, we have seen the systematic criminalisation of dissent: independent media shut down, civil society organisations dissolved, elected opposition figures jailed, and fundamental freedoms erased in all but name. This is textbook human rights abuse.

The case of Jimmy Lai, who has already been mentioned, symbolises that injustice—a point I was reminded of by constituents of mine who used to work with him back in Hong Kong. As a British national, a publisher and a peaceful advocate of democracy, Jimmy Lai has been imprisoned for years for exercising rights that we regard in this place as fundamental. He now faces the prospect of spending the rest of his life behind bars under a law designed to silence free speech, not to deliver justice. Of course, I welcomed the Foreign Secretary’s strong condemnation of Jimmy Lai’s sham trial last month, but words alone do not protect political prisoners. If Magnitsky sanctions are to retain any credibility, they must be used against those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and for the persecution of individuals such as Jimmy Lai. That includes officials who designed, implemented and enforced the national security law and those who have overseen its use to crush free expression and political participation.

That brings me to a wider point. We are entering a period in which the United States cannot always be relied on to apply evidence-based sanctions. In that context, the UK cannot simply wait for Washington to lead. We must be prepared to act where the United States will not. We should also not be afraid, as critical friends, to point out where the US gets it wrong. I asked the Minister earlier this week at the Foreign Affairs Committee for his response to Trump’s sanctioning of two British citizens for seeking to, as Secretary Rubio sees it, “coerce” American tech platforms into suppressing free speech. Does the Minister agree that that is dangerous nonsense?

That brings me to my second theme: enforcement. Increasing designations alone is not enough. Sanctions without enforcement are no sanction at all; they are just suggestions. We now have a vast and complex sanctions architecture—Magnitsky sanctions, Russia sanctions and anti-corruption sanctions. Since Putin’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, we have had a massive boost in our own sanctions capacity and seen a huge undertaking in the private sector to keep up, yet enforcement in the UK remains worryingly weak.

We know that sanctions are being evaded. We heard earlier about Roman Abramovich reportedly transferring his UK property empire to his children just weeks before being sanctioned—the very same individual who is now being represented by the Conservative shadow Attorney General over a dispute with the Jersey Government on the source of his wealth. As my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) outlined forensically, if the Opposition are serious about standing by Ukraine, they cannot have him as their top Law Officer, serving in the other place and attending shadow Cabinet meetings. It is simply incredible. Does the Minister agree that Lord Wolfson’s position in the shadow Cabinet and attendance of those meetings is now completely untenable?

The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has concluded that it is “almost certain” that UK lawyers, estate agents and property service firms have helped clients evade asset freezes. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) outlined, in the past year OFSI has imposed just three fines for breaches of the UK’s sanctions regime, totalling just over £622,000. That is a rounding error compared with the scale of wealth at stake, and it is simply not a credible deterrent. All the while, there have been no breaches of Magnitsky sanctions in the past year.

This issue is acute in the British overseas territories, where low policing capacity and high financial secrecy create ideal conditions for sanctions evasion. There have been some laudable efforts in the OTs to enforce sanctions. However, I have too often been made aware of civil society organisations submitting detailed evidence of Magnitsky sanctions breaches in the overseas territories but receiving no meaningful response at all from those jurisdictions. Will the Minister assure me today that he will ensure that British overseas territories that receive such detailed allegations will act on them?

We must tackle head-on the scourge of corporate secrecy in offshore financial centres linked to the UK. If we are to ensure that our sanctions bite as much as possible, there is an urgent need for those overseas territories that continue to drag their feet—including the British Virgin Islands—to finally adopt fully public registers of beneficial ownership, as they have promised time and again but failed to deliver. As an interim step, the Minister will agree that individuals with a legitimate interest, including journalists and civil society, must have meaningful access to beneficial ownership information. Without that transparency, asset freezes cannot be enforced effectively. I look forward to the update on this issue promised earlier this year in the Government’s new anti-corruption strategy, but can the Minister provide any further information on timelines—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. I encourage the hon. Gentleman to bring his remarks to a conclusion, because we have another debate to follow, and we still have the Front-Bench spokespeople to come.

[Phil Brickell]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Transparency is the name of the game here, so will the Minister confirm whether his Department has looked at publishing comprehensive data on assets frozen within UK jurisdictions, broken down by asset class, including assets held by individuals, state- owned enterprises and states themselves? The reason I ask is simple: Parliament cannot assess the effectiveness of our regimes if it cannot see the full picture.

Let me end with this. Magnitsky sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to defend human rights, but they work only if they are used consistently, enforced rigorously and connected clearly to accountability and reparations. If the UK wants to be a global champion of human rights, it must stop being a safe haven for those who abuse them and start ensuring that sanctions mean something on paper and in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the importance of reporting to Parliament, and I can assure him that I have been scrutinised in this place many times. I have sent a letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to Lord Ricketts in the other place, to set out the full detail of all the work we have done. I am committed to reporting regularly to Parliament on these issues; indeed, I have held private meetings with many Members from across the House to discuss their concerns, and I am absolutely committed to continuing to do that.

On the issue of enforcement, I think some of the criticism was somewhat unwarranted. This is an issue that I have regularly championed. I agree with the principles of what colleagues have said, but I point out that in November the National Crime Agency announced that, based on the intelligence it gained in Operation Destabilise, it supported international law enforcement partners in seizing $24 million and over €2.6 million from Russian money laundering networks with links to drugs and organised crime. There have been over 128 arrests as a result of that operation alone, with over £25 million seized in cash and cryptocurrency—another issue that has been mentioned. In 2025 alone, OFSI issued four major civil monetary penalties, totalling over £900,000—I think some of the figures Members have used are not quite accurate—and for its part, HMRC concluded a £1.1 million compound settlement for trade sanctions breaches in May.

The shadow Minister asked for figures. I am happy to write to her with further details, but to give one example, OTSI has received reports or referrals about 146 potential breaches of sanctions and it has a number of investigations under way. I do not want to comment on them, but I do want to assure hon. Members that we take all the considerations they have raised very seriously. Sanctions, including Magnitsky-related sanctions, are an important tool, and we will continue to look at all such possibilities. I welcome the challenge, and we will continue to rigorously pursue not only the designation of such regimes, but, crucially, the enforcement that makes the difference.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call Sir Iain Duncan Smith to wind up very quickly.