Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Lloyd Hatton Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important and timely debate. I pay tribute to him for the persistence that he has shown in campaigning on this issue over many years, and for his work in this place helping to make and win the argument for deploying Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I would like to start by welcoming three successes of the Government regarding our sanctions regime: namely, decisive action against Putin’s regime, action against people-smuggling gangsters, and action against kleptocrats the world over. The Government have shown that they are prepared to make bold and decisive use of sanctions to crack down on serious human rights abuses, corruption and breaches of international law.

First, I welcome the Government’s sustained tough action against the Kremlin, introducing the largest package of sanctions since the early days of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. I firmly believe that this county must never again act as a safe haven for Russian dirty money, and the City of London must never again be seen to be a secure, out-of-the-way piggy bank for Putin’s cronies to stash their wealth. It is only right that we continue to expose and disrupt every enabler of Russia’s war machine, which has been terrorising the Ukrainian people for close to four years now. That must include ramping up the pressure on Putin’s energy revenues.

The Government’s sanctions measures have also gone a long way toward sinking Russia’s shadow fleet, which we all know is a vital source of funding for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Since the start of the invasion, Russian oil companies have established a shadow fleet of cargo ships charged with transporting sanctioned crude oil to third countries. Those vessels are usually owned by anonymous shell companies to shield the ships from scrutiny and sanctions. The fleet is then used to perform illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers at sea, making it much more difficult to monitor the final destination of Russian crude oil. This decaying and dangerous shadow fleet risks oil spills, which could then cause damage on the UK’s shores—spills that, I remind the House, the British taxpayer would be liable to clean up.

The sanctions designations brought forward by the Government mean that a total of 545 ships have been sanctioned by the UK. Almost half the Russian shadow fleet’s overall capacity has been forced off the seas by sanctions from the UK and our partners, with many ships now dead in the water.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

In support of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, does he agree that it is significant how important even a single ship of this fleet is to the Russian authorities that in desperation yesterday, in a final attempt to stop it being seized, they allowed the Russian flag to be put on one of the vessels, in the hope that that would deter the Americans from gaining control of it? Fortunately, it did not.

[Lloyd Hatton]

I agree with the right hon. Member’s remarks. I think that the actions of the previous Government and this Government to tackle the shadow fleet are starting to bite. The measures are hitting the Kremlin war machine and will slash the revenues that Putin desperately relies upon to continue to wage war in Ukraine.

Secondly, I welcome sanctions against organised criminal gangs that are currently perpetrating the vile trade of people-smuggling. This action by the Government is a world first, and it targets ringleaders, key intermediaries and the suppliers of people-smuggling equipment. The sanctions help to disrupt the flow of money and materials, including by freezing property, bank accounts and other assets. It will help to disrupt a range of different activities—from supplying small boats for smuggling to sourcing fake passports, middlemen facilitating illicit payments, and people-smuggling via lorries and small boats. It also sanctions the very gang leaders themselves. The people-smuggling gangs operating on the English channel are attempting to make a small fortune. It is essential that this Government continue to use sanctions and every lever at our disposal to disrupt and destroy the gangs.

Thirdly, the Government have made innovative use of sanctions against kleptocrats and their enablers. Notably, the Magnitsky-style sanctions deployed against Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president, for corruption and stealing public funds marked a pivotal moment in the fight against kleptocracy in Angola and helped to address long-standing corruption that had hindered development and worsened inequalities in the country. I welcome that action, as I am sure do Members on both sides of the House, but we must now look to deploy similar sanctions against other kleptocrats and those who enable their corrupt dealings.

While all those measures are achievements worth celebrating today, I fear that we are not going quite far or fast enough. Our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions to target human rights abuses has, to date, been a little too timid. Only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under that style of sanction, which contrasts with the nearly 3,000 individuals and entities sanctioned under a single scheme specific to one country: namely, Russia.

As REDRESS and other civil society organisations have shown, too many individuals remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in corruption and serious human rights abuses the world over. Despite high-profile designations, such as the targeting of Isabel dos Santos, the frankly limited number of Magnitsky-style sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. By focusing only on isolated bad actors, such narrow designations overlook key backers or enablers and they fail to adapt when entities rebrand, or disappear and then reappear, simply to sidestep sanctions.

To illustrate the problem, here are just three brief examples that highlight the gap in our use of Magnitsky sanctions, allowing those responsible for egregious human rights violations to act with impunity. For instance, just last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces—the RSF—suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. The civil war in Sudan, as has already been mentioned, is the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis, displacing some 13 million people. There is overwhelming evidence of heinous crimes, mass executions, starvation and the systemic and calculated use of rape as a weapon of war. Evidence compiled by the UN, experts and journalists has shown, as has already been cited, that the UAE and its officials have been secretly supplying weapons to the RSF via neighbouring Chad—a position that the Gulf state denies, but the overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise. Sadly, no action was taken against the RSF’s key military and diplomatic backer, the UAE, or against the chief commander of the RSF.

Similarly, the narrow scope of sanctions designations in Georgia also undermines our response to the human rights crisis currently under way. Georgia is increasingly finding itself subject to authoritarian rule. Since the highly disputed election in 2024, during which the Georgian Dream party claimed victory, there has been an escalation in the crackdown on protests and on independent media, including widespread violence and human rights abuses. The Georgian Dream party has now captured almost all Government branches and institutions. It has used its new-found power to aggressively suppress protests and all scrutiny of its actions, including hundreds of reports of arbitrary detention and even torture.

Although the UK has rightly sanctioned some of those responsible for violent attacks against journalists and protesters, key members of the pro-Russia elite were sadly absent from those designations. They include Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Dream party, who was sanctioned by the Biden Administration in the United States for undermining democratic processes simply for the benefit of the Kremlin. The UK has yet to take the same steps in relation to Georgia, so will the Minister make decisive use of sanctions to crack down on the abuses, which only benefit the Russian Government and are entirely at the expense of the Georgian people?

Finally, although the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in the deadly repression of Uyghur Muslims in China in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from REDRESS and other human rights organisations, which identified the broader command structure behind the violent atrocities committed against the Uyghur people in China. We cannot continue to ignore the calls, already put forward today, for sanctions on senior Chinese officials, who must include the Chinese Communist party secretary in Xinjiang, who is considered the architect behind the human rights abuses committed.

Those three cases all show how limiting our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions undermines their effectiveness. Sanctions are a key tool in our armoury to crack down on the most egregious human rights abuses, but narrow designation overlooks the key backers or enablers of the worst atrocities.

Underpinning our sanctions with strong enforcement is also critical to their impact. We know that sanctions are only as strong as the enforcement behind them. In last year’s cross-Government review of sanctions, the Government rightly recognised that there are gaps in the UK’s sanctions implementation and enforcement, which they are seeking to address through new measures to increase the deterrent effect of sanctions and enhance our ability to take robust action against those who choose to break the rules.

[Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an excellent contribution to the debate. The Treasury Committee heard evidence last year about the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. It appeared to me that it is far too small for the job that it has to do, especially compared with equivalents overseas in the US and Europe. Does he think that part of the solution is also funding OFSI properly, so it can be proactive in its monitoring of sanctions, and not only reactive?

[Lloyd Hatton]

I believe that proper resourcing of OFSI is essential. Similarly, other bodies and authorities that fight economic crime must be properly resourced so that they can do their job properly.

Three further changes are needed to ensure that there are effective instruments for challenging human rights abuses. First, to free sanctioned assets, we need to be able to identify their ownership. If we cannot follow ownership of assets through corporate and trust structures, which are often complex and involve secretive offshore havens, many of our designations will inevitably seep through the cracks and our enforcement will turn into nothing more than a game of whack-a-mole.

Ensuring that we can follow the money is therefore a priority and that must include the UK’s overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation found that since February 2022, over a quarter of all suspected sanctions breaches were made using intermediary jurisdictions, including the British Virgin Islands and Guernsey. That is deeply concerning, as the very jurisdictions that are enabling sanctions evasion are dragging their feet on important corporate transparency measures that would help us to follow the money in their backyards. Transparency at home and abroad is essential if sanctions are to be enforced effectively. That means ending all tolerance of secrecy in our overseas territories and Crown dependencies, which we all know have provided shelter for dirty money for far too long.

Secondly, we must strengthen the policing of sanctions evasion with a clear focus on networks and professional enablers. Reports from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation have found that it is almost certain that lawyers, estate agents and associated property service firms based right here in the UK have helped clients to evade and avoid asset freezes, seemingly undermining our efforts from within. Some companies and enablers with a high risk appetite are willing to provide services to sanctioned high net worth individuals, allowing them to maintain their property empire and sidestep sanctions altogether. Infamously, the oligarch and former owner of Chelsea FC, one Roman Abramovich, was reportedly able to transfer his extensive property empire and a fleet of super-yachts, helicopters and jets to his children just weeks before being sanctioned here in the UK.

Despite the vast scale of sanctions evasion, enforcement by authorities in the UK in response to violations has been too weak in recent years. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has imposed just three fines for violations of the UK’s Russia sanctions regime in the past year, totalling a measly £622,750. That is an utterly damning figure and shows that we are bringing a water pistol to a knife fight when it comes to enforcing our sanctions measures. Worse still, OFSI has not imposed any fines at all for breaches of Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I know that the Government are planning to scale up our capability to target the professional enabler network. In the recently published anti-corruption strategy, which I wholeheartedly welcome, Ministers were right to commit to expanding the use of sanctions against professional enablers. Given the UK’s world-leading role as a professional services provider, such a measure is essential if we are to begin to impose serious constraints on sanctioned individuals. A professional services ban, for example, would be an effective way to start to tackle kleptocrats and human rights abusers. Many of those individuals might not own an asset in the UK or even plan to travel here, but they rely on UK-based professional services, such as a legal firm and a bank. That simple measure would block wrongdoers from enjoying access to our large professional services sector in the UK.

Finally, I remain concerned that there is a real lack of publicly available data about enforcement capacity, actions and impact, which will undermine Parliament’s ability to scrutinise sanctions enforcement and better understand whether they are working. Without a credible public picture of what is actually frozen, how can Parliament judge the effectiveness of sanctions and whether enablers may simply be assuming that enforcement in the UK is patchy at best? I ask Ministers to look closely and carefully at these proposals to improve data transparency, strengthen our ability to identify ownership and boost the policing of the enablers of sanctions evasion.

Magnitsky-style sanctions remain one of the most useful tools at the Government’s disposal to hold perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and corruption to account. The effective use of these sanctions sends a clear message that the UK will not act as a safe haven for dirty money belonging to kleptocrats or human rights abusers. However, the effectiveness of sanctions depends not on their existence alone, but on the political will to use them fully, consistently and credibly. At a time when, unfortunately, the United States sometimes appears reluctant to deploy these tools with the necessary resolve, the United Kingdom has a clear responsibility to step forward and work with a broad coalition of allies and partners to effectively deploy Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I know that the Government, and almost all Members of the House, are serious about defending human rights, tackling corruption and upholding the rules-based international order, but to achieve that we must ensure that Magnitsky-style sanctions are not only a symbolic gesture, but sharp, effective instruments used to hold bad actors to account and speak truth to power. As has already been said, in an age of global uncertainty, with rogue states and corrupt individuals wishing to operate with impunity, that is exactly the type of leadership that this moment demands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important debate and I am pleased to see the Minister in his place. He has already heard plenty from colleagues in the Chamber on sanctions, and I hope that today’s debate will provide further food for thought.

Effective sanctions regimes for human rights violations and corruption speak to who we are as a nation—a nation that stands up for the rule of law, that respects international law and that says, “Wherever and whoever you are, if you persecute individuals, plunder your country’s resources or embezzle from your own people, there will be consequences.” The reason we are having this debate today to my mind is not to call for some shiny new instrument to hold the world’s criminals and the corrupt to account; rather it is to call for better use of the world-leading tools that we already have to deny the human rights abusers and kleptocrats access to our financial system, professional services and property market.

I want to focus on two particular threats: first, what I see as the inconsistent and inadequate use of Magnitsky sanctions against serious human rights abusers, particularly in Georgia and Hong Kong; and secondly, the failure to enforce sanctions properly, allowing evasion, secrecy and professional enablers to undermine the entire regime.

Let me begin with Georgia, because Georgia is a country that should be moving closer to Europe, not sliding backwards into authoritarianism for the benefit of Moscow. Yet since the highly disputed parliamentary election of 26 October 2024, that is exactly what we have seen: all branches of government and state institutions now captured by Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream party; civic space crushed; independent media and civil society organisations targeted under a new foreign agent law—legislation that comes straight out of the Kremlin playbook; and peaceful protests met time and again with violence.

The UK has rightly sanctioned some individuals responsible for violent attacks on journalists and protesters, and that is very much welcome, but as the Minister knows, I do not feel it is enough. The omissions are glaring. Most notably, the UK has failed to sanction Bidzina Ivanishvili, the individual widely regarded as exercising decisive influence over Georgia’s political direction.

[Lloyd Hatton]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the current situation in Georgia is not dissimilar to what we have seen in other central and eastern European countries and beyond, where Russia seeks to have greater political influence and control and has mission creep? Unless countries such as the United Kingdom push back against that early, Russia will continue to infringe and extend its tentacles into political life in countries such as Georgia?

[Phil Brickell]

My hon. Friend is quite right about the spheres of influence that Russia seeks to exert across central and eastern Europe.

Ivanishvili could be sanctioned under any number of our regimes—Magnitsky, global anti-corruption or even the Russian sanctions regime given his reported links to the Kremlin and his blatant kowtowing to Moscow. Just this morning, I was made aware that Georgian Dream has increased state financing for the Kulevi oil refinery, which Reuters has reported received its first shipment of Russian oil last October. The refinery itself is linked to Vladimir Alekseev, first deputy chief of Russia’s GRU. That seems to be an obvious route for sanctions violations, and I hope it will be added to Ivanishvili’s rap sheet. I know the Minister will be unable to comment on individual cases, but can he at least confirm that Ivanishvili’s supposed status as too big to fail due to his alleged personal importance to the Georgian economy does not preclude him from being sanctioned by this country?

I will come to the United States later, but our allies across the Atlantic sanctioned Ivanishvili on 27 December 2024 for undermining democratic processes on behalf of, or for the benefit of, Russia. I certainly do not suggest that we follow the US in every aspect of foreign policy, but it is correct in applying that designation. Sanctioning cronies and underlings can make an impact, but let us be clear that the fish rots from the head. My fear is that our silence on Ivanishvili sends the wrong message to would-be kleptocrats around the world.

Let me turn to Hong Kong and the ongoing repression there, which is of keen interest to me and the valued community of Hongkongers across my Bolton West constituency. The dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms is unacceptable. Since the imposition of the national security law, we have seen the systematic criminalisation of dissent: independent media shut down, civil society organisations dissolved, elected opposition figures jailed, and fundamental freedoms erased in all but name. This is textbook human rights abuse.

The case of Jimmy Lai, who has already been mentioned, symbolises that injustice—a point I was reminded of by constituents of mine who used to work with him back in Hong Kong. As a British national, a publisher and a peaceful advocate of democracy, Jimmy Lai has been imprisoned for years for exercising rights that we regard in this place as fundamental. He now faces the prospect of spending the rest of his life behind bars under a law designed to silence free speech, not to deliver justice. Of course, I welcomed the Foreign Secretary’s strong condemnation of Jimmy Lai’s sham trial last month, but words alone do not protect political prisoners. If Magnitsky sanctions are to retain any credibility, they must be used against those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and for the persecution of individuals such as Jimmy Lai. That includes officials who designed, implemented and enforced the national security law and those who have overseen its use to crush free expression and political participation.

That brings me to a wider point. We are entering a period in which the United States cannot always be relied on to apply evidence-based sanctions. In that context, the UK cannot simply wait for Washington to lead. We must be prepared to act where the United States will not. We should also not be afraid, as critical friends, to point out where the US gets it wrong. I asked the Minister earlier this week at the Foreign Affairs Committee for his response to Trump’s sanctioning of two British citizens for seeking to, as Secretary Rubio sees it, “coerce” American tech platforms into suppressing free speech. Does the Minister agree that that is dangerous nonsense?

That brings me to my second theme: enforcement. Increasing designations alone is not enough. Sanctions without enforcement are no sanction at all; they are just suggestions. We now have a vast and complex sanctions architecture—Magnitsky sanctions, Russia sanctions and anti-corruption sanctions. Since Putin’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, we have had a massive boost in our own sanctions capacity and seen a huge undertaking in the private sector to keep up, yet enforcement in the UK remains worryingly weak.

We know that sanctions are being evaded. We heard earlier about Roman Abramovich reportedly transferring his UK property empire to his children just weeks before being sanctioned—the very same individual who is now being represented by the Conservative shadow Attorney General over a dispute with the Jersey Government on the source of his wealth. As my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) outlined forensically, if the Opposition are serious about standing by Ukraine, they cannot have him as their top Law Officer, serving in the other place and attending shadow Cabinet meetings. It is simply incredible. Does the Minister agree that Lord Wolfson’s position in the shadow Cabinet and attendance of those meetings is now completely untenable?

The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has concluded that it is “almost certain” that UK lawyers, estate agents and property service firms have helped clients evade asset freezes. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) outlined, in the past year OFSI has imposed just three fines for breaches of the UK’s sanctions regime, totalling just over £622,000. That is a rounding error compared with the scale of wealth at stake, and it is simply not a credible deterrent. All the while, there have been no breaches of Magnitsky sanctions in the past year.

This issue is acute in the British overseas territories, where low policing capacity and high financial secrecy create ideal conditions for sanctions evasion. There have been some laudable efforts in the OTs to enforce sanctions. However, I have too often been made aware of civil society organisations submitting detailed evidence of Magnitsky sanctions breaches in the overseas territories but receiving no meaningful response at all from those jurisdictions. Will the Minister assure me today that he will ensure that British overseas territories that receive such detailed allegations will act on them?

We must tackle head-on the scourge of corporate secrecy in offshore financial centres linked to the UK. If we are to ensure that our sanctions bite as much as possible, there is an urgent need for those overseas territories that continue to drag their feet—including the British Virgin Islands—to finally adopt fully public registers of beneficial ownership, as they have promised time and again but failed to deliver. As an interim step, the Minister will agree that individuals with a legitimate interest, including journalists and civil society, must have meaningful access to beneficial ownership information. Without that transparency, asset freezes cannot be enforced effectively. I look forward to the update on this issue promised earlier this year in the Government’s new anti-corruption strategy, but can the Minister provide any further information on timelines—