Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 19th June 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesVictims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Amendments as at 19 June 2025 - (19 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary remarks and reminders for the Committee. I have had requests to allow jackets to be taken off; Members have the Chair’s permission if they wish to do so. All electronic devices should be switched to silent, and no food or drinks are permitted during Committee sittings, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, or alternatively pass on written speaking notes to colleagues in the room. I remind Members to bob if they wish to speak in any debate.
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same, or similar, issues. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the Bill’s existing clauses.
Before I call the Opposition spokesperson, I should say that he has asked to talk more generally in his opening remarks; unusually, because it is the first speech, I will say yes. This is a narrowly drawn Bill with narrowly drawn clauses but, as it is the start of the debate, I will allow discussion to go a little wider.
Clause 1
Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 13 in clause 1, page 1, line 17, at end insert—
“(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim or their family if a victim is deceased.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert—
“(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”
Dr Mullan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and to open the first debate on the Bill in Committee as we begin line-by-line consideration. As you explained, Mr Stringer, I thought it might be useful to list the Bill’s measures to provide a wider context for the amendments as we consider them one by one.
First, the Bill will make provisions relating to victims’ experiences in the administration of justice. Secondly, it will create a statutory power for judges to order offenders to attend their sentencing hearings and, if they do not, to give out sanctions that take place in prison. Thirdly, it will restrict parental responsibility for child sex offenders who are sentenced for four years or more for an offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility. Fourthly, it will expand eligibility for the victim contact scheme, meaning more victims will be able to access it.
Fifthly, the Bill will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers so that they can investigate individual cases in certain circumstances, request information from local authorities and social housing providers, and publish an annual report on compliance with the victims’ code. Sixthly, it will increase flexibility for the Director of Public Prosecutions in appointing Crown prosecutors, and set the rates at which prosecutor costs in private prosecutions can be recovered from central funds. Seventhly, it will amend the time limit within which the Attorney General can refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that it is unduly lenient. Finally, the Bill will amend magistrates court sentencing powers for six either-way offences, bringing them in line with other offences.
The Opposition have not sought to amend, and will not seek to oppose, a number of the Bill’s measures, and I am sure there will be cross-party support for many of them, but we wish to push the Government to go further in other areas.
The first group of amendments relates to the provisions that are meant to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearings. It is important to lay out the value of offenders attending such a hearing. Open and transparent justice is a cornerstone of our legal system. It is often said that it is important not just that justice should be done, but that it is seen to be done.
There is something tangible and direct about an offender being present in court to hear all the elements of the sentencing hearing at first hand, in front of victims and their friends and family, the offender’s own friends and family, and potentially the wider public and the press, who help to share what happens more widely. In particular, victims and their friends and family may want to see it happening. This will often be true of the sentence itself, and the remarks that reflect back some of the impact of a crime, but it will be particularly true for the parts of the sentencing hearing when we hear directly from those affected by a crime.
Victim personal statements, commonly known as victim impact statements, are a crucial reform of our justice system that tries to give a voice to victims and their friends and family. As we will consider later in proceedings, they might not be working as well as they could be, but they remain incredibly important. Many people want to see the offender hearing those statements, and want to know that the offender cannot escape the consequences of their actions or from hearing directly from the people they have impacted. The statements may be read out by the victim themselves or by their friends and family. The authors may or may not be present. We heard evidence from Paula Hudgell from Justice for Victims about the positive impact of victim personal statements in her experience of the judicial system.
I am sure we have all read and heard about recent examples of offenders having derailed the process, escaped accountability and robbed victims and their families of its healing power. In the evidence session the hon. Member for Knowsley spoke about the case of her constituent Olivia Pratt-Korbel, whose killer refused to attend the sentencing, and whose mother Cheryl has campaigned hard to right that wrong for others. I have met and spoken with Ayse Hussein, another member of Justice for Victims, who campaigned for something to be done in memory of her cousin Jan Mustafa. The Minister and I have met and spoken with other campaigners.
Kyle Clifford raped his former partner, Louise Hunt, who was 25, and used a crossbow to shoot both her and her sister Hannah, who was 28, having already fatally stabbed their mother, 61-year-old Carol, at the family home in Bushey. He was given a whole-life order—which I will return to—and refused to attend his sentencing.
As MPs, we know that behind every case reported in the media will be cases that are not. But the experiences of those people are no less important, which is why the previous Government committed to introducing powers to try to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearing. I am pleased that this Government have agreed with that in principle.
Although I welcome the aim, the shadow Justice team have looked afresh at how best to achieve the right outcome and tabled good-faith amendments to make it more likely that we achieve it. The shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I are both committed to never being shackled by historical thinking and approaches when it comes to ensuring that we deliver for victims and their families, and we are doing that in two vital ways.
Amendments 13 and 14 would introduce a duty to consult the victim or their family as part of the enaction of the powers in clauses 1 and 2. I talked earlier about the different people and groups that derive a benefit from the offender attending the sentencing hearing, but of all those with an interest in seeing that happen, victims and their families can be considered the most important. Although the evidence we heard was clear that not every victim would want an offender to be there, and not every victim would want to see force used and risk the disruption of proceedings to make it happen, some would.
The representations we heard from victims groups almost universally supported the idea that the process should involve consultation with victims and their families. All agreed that it would be a welcome reform. Consultation is part and parcel of what the Government do day in, day out; I am sure the Minister has spent many hours reviewing and reading consultation results. The law often requires meaningful consultation before the Government or many arm’s length bodies make significant decisions. As MPs, we all undertake our own consultations, in which we give constituents the chance to let us know their views on something that affects them.
Surely a Bill about victims—named as it is—should reflect its commitment to delivering for victims and would want wherever possible to orientate its measures to victims. A measure on consultation would do just that. Specifically, the amendments would require consultation on occasions when a judge is minded to make a decision to deny victims and family members the opportunity to see the offender at the sentencing hearing. In that scenario, it is important that victims and family members can at least know for certain that the judge was not ignorant of how important it was to them and how they would feel should the judge decide not to compel the offender’s attendance. They would be able to explain their views to the judge directly. Victim personal statements were introduced to give a voice to victims when determining sentences; we are saying victims should also be given a voice on another important matter.
The proposed change is modest but important. Just like victim personal statements, it would not dictate the outcome—a right to be consulted does not constitute a right to decide—and it would not encroach on judicial independence, as the decision rests with the judge. The pain that can be caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing is profound. Families can feel indirectly silenced, robbed of their moment to see justice done. We should at least ensure that victims are afforded the right to know that decisions about them are not taken without them. The amendments are about respect, participation and dignity. No decision that can have a profound impact on a victim should be taken without first simply speaking to them.
I ask Members of all parties to support our amendments, knowing that doing so will demonstrate a commitment to victims and their families, and ensure that their voices are heard as part of the process, as we seek to ensure that attendance at the sentencing hearing becomes as close to mandatory as we can possibly make it. I know that will be a commitment everybody shares.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
It is an honour to serve under your chairship today, Mr Stringer. I thank the shadow Justice Minister for introducing the amendments he tabled, and the Government appreciate his support of the Bill in principle. The amendments would place a statutory duty on judges to consult victims or their families before deciding whether to use their powers under the measures in clauses 1 and 2 to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing.
I want to stress that victims and their families have been at the forefront of this legislation, and clause 1 will help to ensure that their voices and the impact of the crimes they have suffered are heard and understood by the perpetrators. We anticipate that, in making decisions, judges will take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the wishes and views of the victims and their families. However, mandating a duty to consult victims risks undermining judicial discretion and the ability of judges to make decisions based on the facts in front of them.
Judges will of course consider any representations put to them by the prosecution on behalf of victims and their families, but they must also take into account the safety of prison and court staff, the efficiency and fairness of proceedings and the risks that a disruptive or resistant offender may cause further distress to victims and delays to justice. Retaining judicial discretion in such cases is therefore crucial to ensure that courts can make decisions in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including those of victims and their families. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Mullan
I understand the Minister’s desire to ensure that all the things she listed remain the purview of the judge, which is why the amendment makes it clear that they will. Nothing about consultation removes the judge’s ability to decide the factors that they wish to consider, to hear representation from others and to take in mind the safety and wellbeing of court staff and other people in the court. A duty to consult is simply that: a duty to ensure that victims are taken into account.
I draw the Minister’s attention back to victim personal statements. Prior to them being a statutory requirement, people would have made the same arguments. Of course, the judge would have provided an opportunity to consider what victims had to say, but we were clear that such an opportunity was too important, and that we needed to ensure, on a statutory basis, that the victims and their families had the opportunity to say what they wanted about the impact of the crime. I do not think this is any different. A consultation provision would guarantee that victims have a voice as part of the process, while retaining judicial independence to make the ultimate decision whether someone attends a sentencing hearing.
The Opposition will not withdraw the amendment. We think this issue is important, and I cannot reasonably think that Members will be able to explain to their constituents why they did not want to guarantee that a judge would simply have a conversation with a victim or their family about whether someone should be compelled to attend a sentencing hearing.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 16, in clause 2, page 4, line 24, leave out from “force,” to end of line and insert—
“so long as it is not grossly disproportionate.”
Amendment 23, in clause 1, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“41C Power to restrain and gag a disruptive offender
(1) This section applies where during attendance at a sentencing hearing an offender is disruptive of court proceedings.
(2) The Judge may order the offender to be restrained and gagged to reduce their disruption.
(3) When a Judge is minded not to make an order under subsection (2) and instead remove the offender from the court room they must consult the victim or their family if the victim is deceased.”
Dr Mullan
It is a pleasure to open this further debate on clauses 1 and 2. In our debate on amendments 13 and 14, we considered how we could improve the way a decision is taken. It is disappointing that Labour MPs did not feel they wanted victims and their families to have a statutory right to be heard in relation to that decision. Amendments 15 and 16 relate to how the decision will be enacted.
A decision, no matter how considered, is of little use if the tools to make it a reality are inadequate. In a further clear demonstration of our commitment to bringing renewed thinking to policy, the shadow Secretary of State and I will always seek to ensure that the balance between criminals and the victims and their families is always tipped in favour of the victims and their families, as far as is reasonable.
Members will, I hope, know that legislation that provides legal protections for those who exercise force, as long as it is not grossly disproportionate, has been on our statute books for some time now, via section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
Will the hon. Gentleman explain what “grossly disproportionate” means?
Dr Mullan
I direct the hon. Lady to the statute book and to the case law that has evolved around that phrase. If the courts, this Government or our previous Government did not think it was a meaningful distinction, I do not know why we would have it on the statute book. It was introduced to provide the greatest possible benefit to those using force, in terms of legal protection and understanding that they would not be unfairly or unduly judged as a result. As I said, it has been on the statute book for quite some time. It is a legally recognised phrase, as distinguished from “reasonable force”.
Alex McIntyre
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the short answer for his response to the hon. Member for South Devon is no?
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that people wishing for further clarification of the phrase “grossly disproportionate force” might be advised to consider the guidance on the matter issued by the Crown Prosecution Service?
Dr Mullan
Absolutely. It surprises me that Members think it is a novel concept when it has been on the statute book for quite some time.
We want to ensure that the individuals tasked with using force to bring offenders to court have the legal protections they need in order to act with confidence. We do not want offenders to think that all they must do is attempt to resist violently in order to escape the outcome sought by the families who have campaigned for a change in the law.
Although the notions of additional time to serve and prison sanctions may change behaviour in some cases, we must reflect on the sort of people we are dealing with and the sentences they serve. We should expect a willingness to offer violence from the sort of person who will barge into a family home and shoot into it without any thought to the family in it, as the perpetrator who killed Olivia Pratt-Korbel did. Do we really think that a man who is willing to violently murder three people with a crossbow, and who is never getting out of prison, would be particularly perturbed by not being able to go to the gym or watch TV? These are the sorts of people we are dealing with, and if we do not make physically forcing attendance our main goal, the Bill risks failing in its aims.
Some victims and families might prefer that someone gets punished if they do not attend, but what many of them will really want is attendance. Our amendment would make it more likely that we achieve that. I urge Members who do not want to look back on a missed opportunity, which will lead to offenders again and again not attending hearings, irrespective of the measures in the Bill, to support the amendment.
It is one thing to bring an offender to court, but we have to consider how they will behave. Amendment 23 would give judges the power to restrain or gag disruptive offenders in the courtroom rather than remove them entirely. Crucially, if a judge is minded not to issue such an order but instead to remove the offender, the amendment provides that they must consult the victim or their family. If offenders learn that all they need to do if they are dragged into court is scream and shout and disrupt proceedings, what do Members think is really going to happen? Is the sort of man who brutally murders two women and stores them in the freezer, as the killer of Jan Mustafa and Henriett Szucs did, and knows that a long sentence awaits him really going to be impacted by a short addition to his custody time?
Alex Brewer (North East Hampshire) (LD)
Does the hon. Member believe that people capable of such violence would be equally violent with a probation officer or a police officer taking them to court?
Dr Mullan
I absolutely believe that people will be violent, which is why we tabled amendment 15 to ensure that officers are able to use the level of force necessary to compel offenders to attend. If we do not do that, what are we going to achieve? The kinds of offenders who have brought this issue to our attention will be more than happy to resist physically. Are we really saying that the purpose of these measures is just to punish people? I do not think it is. I think their purpose is to get people into court for their sentencing hearings. In combination, our amendments would ensure that that happens, or at least make it significant more likely.
Caroline Voaden
We absolutely agree that it is preferable to have the perpetrator in court to face justice and hear their sentence. However, I listened carefully to the evidence of Baroness Newlove, who said that we want to avoid this becoming a spectacle and all about the offender. The sentencing hearing is the moment when the victim hears what sentence the offender will get for the crime that they have been subjected to. It is about the victim, and justice for them; it should not become some circus sideshow for the offender to create havoc in the courtroom. Does the hon. Member agree that there is a point at which it is not beneficial to bring the offender into court to create such a sideshow?
The Chair
Order. I remind hon. Members that interventions should be short and to the point. If Members wish to catch my eye, I do not think they will have any difficulty, but we cannot have interventions turning into speeches.
Dr Mullan
The hon. Member raises an important point. That is why amendment 23 specifically includes a duty to consult victims and their family members on the use of the power. We heard evidence, which I had anticipated, that some victims and their families will not want to see the offender. That is why the judge should consult them and, if that is their clear and settled view, take that into account when making the decision. The point is well made, and that is why our amendment takes that issue into account.
I have spoken directly to several people involved in these types of cases. I mentioned Ayse Hussein from Justice for Victims. She was absolutely clear that even if exercising the power in the amendment meant someone disrupting proceedings and creating a spectacle, as the hon. Member for South Devon described, she would want to see it happen, and there will be many other people who feel the same way. For those who do not, there is no pressure for it to happen. That is why we have said that the judge should speak to people about the power before using it, for the important reasons that the hon. Member gave.
I return to the point that I fear that we will end up worse off because we will have told the public, “We can get these people into court,” but actually the worst offenders will just not come or resist. That is why we need to increase the level of force and ensure that they cannot just make a noise to get out of the whole process. The people on whole-life orders, for example, are some of the worst offenders, who we most want to see in court. They are the ones who would be least bothered by the sanctions, and they would just make a noise in order to not have to be in court.
If we overcome that first hurdle, as a result of our amendments on the use of force, and get offenders into the dock, we also need the power to ensure that they cannot just scream or shout their way out of it. I have to say that I was genuinely shocked by Labour Members’ questioning on this measure during the evidence sessions. Restraint of people through force is practised in a wide variety of settings by a wide variety of people on a regular basis. I have no doubt whatsoever that the practice can be extended to our courts.
As much as I respect the training and expertise of aeroplane crews, I do not consider them to be uniquely qualified in the ability to restrain people in a chair. I urge Members to reflect on any initial resistance that they may have to this measure. Do they sincerely think that what aeroplane crews can achieve up in the air is not achievable in a courtroom? Common sense tells us that this measure is eminently achievable. I was pleased to hear evidence from a senior police officer and a senior staff member of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service—and, indeed, to hear the Minister herself accept—that it is possible in principle. I am confident that the majority of the British public will agree with us, and I wonder how Members who choose to vote against the measure will explain that action to their constituents.
I will deal briefly with how someone might be gagged —that is to say, silenced—by giving a simple example. I only need to do so briefly, because it really is a very simple matter. In August 2018, a US judge, John Russo, asked for a robber, Frank Williams, to be silenced after he refused to be silent and continued to disrupt the court’s proceedings despite being issued with 12 warnings. Based on their questioning during our evidence sessions, I know that Members struggle to conceive of how that might be done, so I will alleviate their concerns and tell them how it was done: they just placed some tape over his mouth. The US legal system is quite clear about the legal right for an offender to be restrained and gagged. Members can, should they wish, look up the relevant rulings in the US judicial system.
Ruth Jones (Newport West and Islwyn) (Lab)
I am struggling to see how a piece of tape can silence somebody. Somebody with respiratory conditions, or whatever, might even suffocate as a result. Has the hon. Gentleman considered the medical reasons for not gagging somebody?
Dr Mullan
Absolutely, and it would be for the judge to decide in all circumstances whether it is appropriate. I will be happy after this sitting to send the footage from that case, and the evidence of someone successfully being gagged by having tape placed over their mouth. This is really simple stuff that is being done in other parts of the world and I do not understand why Members find it so difficult to understand.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
The hon. Member is clearly suggesting using physical restraining techniques in a court setting. Does he agree that those techniques could be used in any other part of court proceedings, including, perhaps, during the trial itself? We would be setting a precedent for our system here. It would not just be about sentencing; you are arguing that we can use physical restraint, including gagging, within the court setting, which is not currently what we do in our courts.
The Chair
Order. Let me lay down some ground rules. Can we try to stick to parliamentary language? In this case, “you” means me, and I am not arguing anything.
Dr Mullan
If the hon. Member wants to suggest where else such restraint might benefit victims and their families, I will absolutely support his case if I think it is legitimate. As I have said, my focus and the balance I want to strike is, as far as possible, in favour of victims and their families, and it is not about overly concerning ourselves, outside of clear medical reasons, with the rights and wellbeing of the criminal, who at this point has been convicted. This is not rocket science. Putting a bit of tape over someone’s mouth is effective. It is done in other countries. I really do not see why Members find it so difficult to understand.
Earlier, I touched on the matter of victims’ and their families’ views about this measure. I have heard directly from family members of victims who accept that this sort of approach could be disruptive but still support it. I mentioned Ayse Hussein from Justice for Victims. Another member of Justice for Victims, Katie Brett, suffered the loss of her sister Sasha, who was raped, stabbed more than 100 times and had her body set on fire by her killer. Katie would have wanted him to be restrained and gagged, if that was what it took.
I could go on, but I think that the point is made. I am, of course, mindful that not everyone will feel that the way that we have included in our amendment the requirement to consult victims and their families is appropriate, given earlier votes against that approach. However, I think that our amendments, in combination, will provide an effective measure that balances what some victims will want against what other victims may not want.
Members will have to decide who they want to get behind: the kind of people who seem to feel uncomfortable about restraining and putting tape over the mouths of rapists, child abusers and murderers; or victims and their families who want to see that done. The choice is clear, and we on the Opposition Benches are clear what measure we will support.
Alex Davies-Jones
Amendments 15 and 16 would change the circumstances in which force may be used to bring an offender to court. They would effectively extend those circumstances to situations in which disproportionate—but not grossly disproportionate—force is required to secure attendance.
Based on the debate we have had, it might be beneficial if I explain how the system currently works. The use of force by prison officers is currently justified, and therefore lawful, only if it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. We are quite deliberately legislating to permit the use of lawful force, which is a test that is well understood and used throughout the criminal justice system. I remind hon. Members that the previous Government used the same test in their attempt to get this measure passed.
Prison and prisoner escort staff are trained to employ the lawful use of force and are experienced in making judgments about the circumstances in which the use of force is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. They are also trained in the use of existing approved techniques for moving reluctant or resistant prisoners safely around the prison and court estate. In recent cases, such as that of Nicholas Prosper, we have seen how they effectively employ the same techniques to restrain offenders and bring them to court to hear justice being done.
Clearly defined boundaries for the use of force, which are well understood by custody officers, ensure that escorting staff are not subject to unreasonable or unmitigated risks when bringing offenders to court. Where it is deemed unsafe or unreasonable to use force, prisons will discuss with courts how best to proceed. Where attendance is considered necessary, the court can consider making a direction for the offender to appear via live video link. That option is more manageable for the prison to enforce and minimises the potential for impactful disruption to proceedings, which can, as we have heard, lead to a spectacle in the court.
An offender who is deemed too violent or disruptive to attend court in person or by live link would, under these measures, be found in contempt of court and subject to a further prison sentence or other punishment. We are going further than the previous Government and ensuring that, where offenders do not take responsibility and face victims’ families, they are punished.
Offenders should not be forced to attend court if it would risk the safety of custody officers or court users, or disrupt proceedings, causing undue distress and further delay to victims and their families. Our measures strike the right balance in requiring that the use of force must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary, ensuring the safety of all court users and minimum disruption to court proceedings.
Amendment 23 would give judges the power to order a disruptive offender to be restrained and gagged in court during their sentencing hearing. It would also introduce a duty on the court to consult victims or their families before making a decision to have the offender removed from the hearing instead. The Government appreciate that an offender’s refusal to attend their sentencing hearing, or their disruptive behaviour during that hearing, can cause anger and upset for victims and their families, and we heard that during the evidence sessions. That is why the measures in the Bill reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearings and behave appropriately in court. They give judges the powers they need to do what is right in each individual case.
Decisions on the use of restraints to manage offender behaviour are a matter for prison officers and prison escort staff. They will make decisions about the use of force depending on the circumstances of each individual case. The use of force must be reasonable, necessary and proportionate, and restrained prisoners must be brought to court using approved techniques in our prison system for moving individuals safely. Gagging prisoners is not an approved technique in our prison system and is unlikely to be considered a lawful use of force in these circumstances. Its use may in fact increase the risk of violence or disruption to the point where officers would have no choice but to remove the offender from court. Amendment 23 is therefore unlikely to achieve its intended outcomes.
We will not allow offenders to achieve the outcomes they intend of continuing to traumatise victims and families or disrupting proceedings, by not attending court or causing a circus or spectacle. Should a judge deem it necessary, the offender will be removed and the judge can add an additional sanction to punish them properly. Forcing disruptive prisoners to remain in court at any cost would jeopardise officer safety and delay proceedings and could cause unnecessary distress for victims and their families. Is that what the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle intends with his amendments? They are unlikely to achieve the intended objective of the Bill, which is to ensure that offenders face up to their crimes and hear the impact of their actions on victims and their families. A more productive and realistic approach would be to punish the offender for disobeying the order to attend their hearing and failing to show any respect for victims and their families or the court.
The measures in the Bill were produced in consultation with families; they asked for them and we listened. Our measures give judges the option to punish any adult offender who, following an attendance order, becomes disruptive in court and is removed from the hearing, by ordering up to two additional years in prison, an unlimited fine and/or the imposition of numerous potential prison sanctions. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw his amendment because of the risk of unintended consequences and the prevention of justice for victims and their families.
Dr Mullan
I thank the Minister for her response. She says that judges will have the powers they need. As I think I clearly explained, those powers might be helpful in some circumstances, but for the very worst offenders—the kind that have been in the news and have caused us to think more clearly about this issue, in particular those on whole-life orders, for whom a sentence extension means nothing—
Alex Davies-Jones
I implore the hon. Gentleman, in his efforts to ensure that offenders face families and justice, to explain why none of the additional measures that he proposes were in the previous Government’s Bill.
Dr Mullan
As I have said very clearly, I am a shadow Justice Minister now, and the new shadow Secretary of State and I make justice policy. I am not afraid to go further than previous Governments, and I will not be restrained by what they did. I did not make those previous policies; it was not my decision how they were enacted. I am confident that the public will respond positively to our attempts to go even further on these measures.
As I was saying, the worst offenders, who are in our minds when we consider these offences—those on a whole-life order, for example—do not care about a custody extension because they cannot have one. They are never getting out of prison, so they are never paying a fine. The Minister listed examples of sanctions, which included not being able to watch TV or go to the gym. Do we really think those are the sorts of measures that will have hardened, violent criminals quaking in their boots? I do not think they are.
The Minister said the measures in the Bill were developed in consultation with victims. I have absolutely no doubt that victims will welcome them—the sanctions, prison time extensions and fines. They are all welcome sanctions and will be appropriate for a whole range of victims, but some of the very same victims that she consulted—I spoke to two of them—would also welcome a further strengthening of the measures. If all a criminal has to do to get out of being in court is make noise—that is literally the test we are putting before ourselves today—there will be very many of them who are happy to do that in order to ensure that they do not have to face the accountability of the system.
The Minister talked about what is legal now. We are legislating—we are making the law—so it is up to us what is legal. We can make the decision that something is legal. I have given a concrete example of another jurisdiction where the sort of restraint that we propose is used successfully—it has not been tried and found not to work; it is used successfully. There is absolutely no reason not to assume that we can make it a success in certain situations in this country.
Our amendment 23 would not compel the judge to act—there is no compulsion. The judge would remain able to decide, but they would be given the clear power to act in this way if they think it is appropriate in all the circumstances. I am confident in the validity of the amendment and the positive impact it would have on victims and family members who were willing to see it used and felt that the potential disruption to the court proceedings was a price worth paying.
As the HMPPS staff member and the police officer we heard evidence from attested to, such a change in policy would take training and resource. Of course, we would expect the Government to develop training in support of the enactment of the measure. A lack of such training right now is no reason not to make the power available to judges.
I am conscious of the time, and the fact that we might wish to push this measure to a vote at a further stage, so I will not seek a Division today. However, we remain convinced of the legitimacy of this measure and will ensure that it is voted on at a later stage so that the public can understand which side Government Members are on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I just want to say a few words about the provisions in this Bill on attending sentencing hearings and related prison sanctions, because this issue is incredibly personal to me. I do not think we would be sitting in this Committee today, with this Bill in our hands, without my constituents Cheryl Korbel and Antonia Elverson, who have fought hard to make this happen.
Many of us will know Cheryl’s story: just quickly, for the record, her nine-year-old daughter, Olivia Pratt-Korbel, was tragically shot and killed in their own home in 2022. As if that was not horrific enough, the man who killed her, Thomas Cashman, did not turn up to court and did not attend that sentencing hearing, which meant that Cheryl did not get to read her victim impact statement out to him. There was confusion at the court; she did not know what was happening, and it came very late in the day. This has been a source of pain, because she felt out of control and that she had a lack of agency.
In my first surgery, Antonia and Cheryl came in and told me about their case, and I have had the pleasure and the privilege of supporting them. I want to thank the Government and put on record today that I have been in every meeting with them, with the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and this Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd. That was not just consultation; it was Antonia and Cheryl’s suggestion about sanctions and attending the sentencing hearing that put this measure in the Bill. I thank the Government for listening to and acting for people. I know that there were other families on the frontline who were listened to as well.
This measure is because of those family members, and I pay tribute to them. This is what a Government can do when they really listen to people and act in that reality. That is why we have this Bill today.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for that powerful speech. I place on the record my thanks to her and her constituents for all of the brilliant work that they have done in ensuring this measure becomes law, and to ensure that no other families have to face what her constituents and, sadly, many other families have had to face.
I will speak to both clauses 1 and 2 at the same time, as they are very much linked. In recent years, as we have heard, several murderers—most recently Lucy Letby and Kyle Clifford—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings. That causes victims’ families significant further distress. It can be seen as a final insult, denying the families the opportunity to see the full administration of justice for their loved ones and allowing offenders to avoid having to hear and confront the consequences of their horrific crimes. The provisions in clause 1 and 2 recognise the impact that such behaviour has on victims and their families in compounding their trauma.
Clause 1 inserts proposed new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Proposed new section 41A introduces an express statutory power for the Crown court to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that an offender who refuses to attend their hearing without reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court, meaning that adult offenders are liable for an additional two years’ custody and/or an unlimited fine, or, in the case of a child offender, a maximum penalty of £2,500. That also applies to offenders who, following an order to attend, commit contempt by misbehaving or disrupting the proceedings and are removed as a result.
Proposed new section 41A makes it clear that, for adult offenders, reasonable force, where necessary and proportionate, can be used to give effect to the court’s order to deliver them for their sentencing hearing. The final decision on whether to use reasonable force will remain with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for this purpose, in line with existing policy.
The second part of clause 1, proposed new section 41B, goes further than ever before by introducing a new power for Crown court judges also to impose prison sanctions on any adult offender who is subject to an attendance order and commits a contempt of court by refusing, without reasonable excuse, to attend their sentencing hearing, or who attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct. That can be instead of or alongside any other punishment imposed by the court.
Dr Mullan
Does the Minister accept that, unamended, this measure will simply require an offender to make a lot of noise in order to get out of all the things that she is saying about them actually being at the hearing? Sanctions are there, but in terms of them actually being at the hearing, all they will have to do is make some noise.
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome that intervention, but I disagree with the hon. Member. We have seen most recently cases in which offenders have been brought to court despite their reluctance. The prison officers and court staff have been able to get them there with the use of reasonable force. Then they have started to disrupt proceedings, but once the judge has explained to them some of the measures that are available currently—not these sanctions, because we have not yet made this law, but those measures that are currently available—that has resulted in the sentencing hearing being allowed to go ahead. What the hon. Member says is not always the case.
Alex Davies-Jones
We need to be careful on what we deem as noise. If, as we have heard in the Committee’s evidence sessions, an offender is beginning to make the sentencing hearing a spectacle or a circus and that is causing more distress to the victims and their families and preventing the course of justice, the judge will have the power to remove the offender from the court. However, with our new measures, the judge will have the power to impose these sanctions on them in prison, issue the unlimited fine and impose more time in prison. That will still be a measure even if they attend, cause a spectacle and have to be removed. They will be punished, and that will be explained to them if they continue to carry on.
I go back to the Armed Forces Act and the effect that these new measures will also have on service courts, because that is important. We need to remember that justice is done in a number of courts in our country and not just in the Crown court. Offenders before service courts who commit a contempt are liable for a fine or 28 days’ service custody—or, alternatively, the offence may be considered by a civilian court for the purposes of contempt of court proceedings. Where an offender is ordered to attend a service court from prison, but fails to do so or—as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle said—attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct, they may similarly receive a prison sanctions order.
I recognise that these provisions may not guarantee that every offender will attend their sentencing hearing when so ordered or that they will not create a spectacle during the sentencing hearing. However, these measures reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearing and behave appropriately. We need to ensure that justice is seen to be done by victims, their families and the wider public, to create trust in our justice system. The measures will ensure that offenders are appropriately punished for failing to do that. Judges will retain the discretion to make decisions based on the facts of the case in front of them. I therefore urge that clauses 1 and 2 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces
Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert—
“(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”—(Dr Mullan.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Brewer
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 3, page 6, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert—
“for a serious sexual offence committed against a child.”
This amendment would extend the provision of restricting parental responsibility where a parent is sentenced for a serious sexual offence committed against a child, regardless of whether it is their child or on the length of sentence handed down.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 17, in clause 3, page 6, line 1, leave out
“of 4 years or more”
This amendment would ensure that where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence the court would be under a duty to make a prohibited steps order.
Amendment 18, in clause 3, page 6, line 2, leave out
“for whom the offender has parental responsibility.”
This amendment would ensure the court was under a duty to make a prohibited steps order where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence against a child, whether or not that child was one for which they had parental responsibility.
Amendment 8, in clause 3, page 6, line 43, at end insert—
“10CA Duty to consider make prohibited steps order where serious sexual offence committed against any child
(1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (‘the offender’) to a term of imprisonment or detention of less than 4 years, for a serious sexual offence committed against any child.
(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility.
(3) A prohibited steps order must be made if the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to children of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences.
(4) In making that assessment, the court—
(a) must take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of the offence,
(b) may take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted by a court anywhere in the world,
(c) may take into account any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of which any of the offences mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) forms part, and
(d) may take into account any information about the offender which is before it.
(5) The reference in subsection (4)(b) to a conviction by a court includes a reference to—
(a) a conviction of an offence in—
(i) any proceedings under the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (whether before a court-martial or any other court or person authorised under any of those Acts to award a punishment in respect of any offence), or
(ii) any proceedings before a Standing Civilian Court;
where ‘conviction’ includes the recording of a finding that a charge in respect of the offence has been proved), and
(b) a conviction of—
(i) a service offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006, or
(ii) an SDA offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions etc) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1059),
where ‘conviction’ includes anything that under section 376(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 is to be treated as a conviction).
(6) The order must be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.
(7) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—
(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,
(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or
(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.
(8) Further, the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—in respect of any child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility—the Court is of the opinion that—
(a) the removal of parental responsibility is not in the best interests of that child; and
(b) there is no significant risk to that particular child of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences.
(9) For the purposes of subsection (8), each child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility must be considered separately.
(10) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if—
(a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or
(b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more, but see section 10D.
(11) Sections 1, 10 and 16 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.
(12) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.
(13) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.
(14) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.
(15) In this section ‘serious sexual offence’ shall have the same meaning as that in s.10C.
(16) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.”
New clause 13—Restricting parental responsibility of certain offenders—
“After section 10B of the Children Act 1989 insert—
‘10CA Duty to make prohibited steps order where serious sexual or violent offence committed
(1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (“the offender”) to a life sentence, or a term of imprisonment or detention of 10 years or more, for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for a child.
(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility.
(3) The order must—
(a) specify that no step of any kind which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child may be taken by the offender with respect to the child without the consent of the High Court or the family court, and
(b) be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.
(4) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—
(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,
(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or
(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.
(5) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if—
(a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or
(b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more,
but see section 10D.
(6) Sections 1, 7 and 11 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.
(7) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.
(8) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.
(9) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.
(10) In this section—
“life sentence” means a sentence of imprisonment, detention or custody for life, or during His Majesty’s pleasure;
“serious sexual offence” means an offence listed in Schedule ZA1;
“violent offence” means an offence of homicide, assault or robbery.
(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.’”
Alex Brewer
It is very clear that a child of a sex offender is at risk, regardless of whether the sex offender has committed that offence against their own child or another child. The amendment would seek to broaden the provisions for removing parental responsibility from children of sex offenders.
I would like to share some of my professional experience. I used to work in a domestic abuse charity, where I ran a women’s refuge and had safeguarding responsibility for the families that have fled violent and often sexual abuse. There were numerous occasions when we had to facilitate parental contact by enabling a mother and her children to meet the perpetrator of that abuse, which was court mandated, even though they had fled that abuse, supposedly to a position of safety. As a person with safeguarding responsibility, that puts professionals in an impossible situation, but that is nothing compared with the position in which it places the parents, who have to take their child to a position that is desperately unsafe.
We would seek to broaden the measures in clause 3 so that somebody who is convicted of a serious sexual offence, regardless of the length of the sentence and of who that sexual offence was committed against, would not have parental responsibility for their children. If they have been convicted of a serious sexual offence against any child, their own child is at risk. At the moment, the children of sex offenders are at more risk than other children in society. We believe this is a very important measure, and it needs appropriate resource allocated to it.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of our amendments 17 and 18. As has been said, the Bill currently requires prohibited steps orders, which remove parental responsibility, only for those receiving custodial sentences of four years or more, and only if they have parental responsibility for the victims of those offences. In the evidence session earlier this week, the witnesses were absolutely clear that this provision, as currently drafted, is too narrow.
Amendment 17 seeks to widen the court’s duty to protect children from those convicted of serious sexual offences. It would move the threshold and ensure that anyone imprisoned for a sexual offence triggers the court’s duty to protect children by considering a prohibited steps order. We believe that is a more appropriate line to draw for this measure, which is essentially when an offence reaches a level of seriousness that hits the custodial threshold.
Amendment 18 is of even more vital importance, and it was also strongly supported by the witnesses in their evidence. It would close a troubling loophole in clause 3—although I am not sure whether “loophole” accurately describes it; it is an enormous omission. At present, the duty to make a prohibited steps order applies only when the child victim is someone for whom the offender has parental responsibility. That is an unacceptable narrowing of protection, and the logic of this measure is indefensible.
The Government believe that it is right to remove parental responsibility for someone who is convicted of a very serious sexual offence against a child, but only if it is against their own child or a child for whom they have parental responsibility. That makes no sense, and it is no surprise that the witnesses were universally against it. Amendment 18 would ensure that anyone convicted of a sexual offence against a child that is serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence is subject to a prohibited steps order, regardless. Again, I ask Members to think about how they might explain their position on this amendment to their constituents.
Amendment 24, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, is essentially aiming for the same outcome, but perhaps we have a slightly different interpretation of where we place the threshold. Amendment 24 specifies “serious sexual offence”, while we have used the custodial limit as the trigger in attempting to achieve the same outcome. It is something that we could commit to looking at in future stages of the Bill, if we can secure a better understanding of how we distinguish between serious and non-serious offences.
We are sympathetic to the Liberal Democrat aims, and I think we have a shared aim on not just the threshold, but particularly the fact that this measure will be enacted only when the child who has been the subject of the crime is one for whom the person has parental responsibility. I do not see the logic in drawing the line in the way that the Government have, separate to any questions about the level of severity.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments: amendment 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato); amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde); and new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove.
Amendments 17 and 24 seek to remove the four-year custodial threshold for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility. The restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious and far-reaching measure. It must be applied with care and in a manner that is a legally robust, while also protecting the most vulnerable. The requirement for a four-year custodial sentence provides a defined marker of seriousness.
This thresholds aligns with existing sentencing frameworks. Section 244ZA and schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 specify a list of serious offences, including child sexual offences, that are considered serious enough to warrant that the offender must serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than the standard half when they are sentenced. The amendment would lower this threshold and require the Crown court to make the prohibited steps order when the offender is sentenced for any period of imprisonment or detention.
I want to be clear that any offence against a child is unacceptable and one of the most heinous crimes in society. Restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious step and not a decision to be taken lightly. That predetermined marker of seriousness ensures that any order made by the Crown court happens automatically only where the offender has committed serious and grave offences against a child who they are supposed to look after.
Dr Mullan
The Minister has a wealth of colleagues around her who are covering these issues, including—as I understand it—the Home Office Minister responsible for safeguarding, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). What does this Minister say to the Home Office Minister about her previous position that a provision of the kind that the Government have drafted was too narrow? Has this Minister spoken to her colleague about that, and does her colleague personally agree with the measure as currently drafted by the Government?
Alex Davies-Jones
The hon. Gentleman will know, having been in Government before the election, how Government collective responsibility and consultation with other Government Departments work. The safeguarding Minister and I are responsible for the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, which commits to halving it within a decade. Of course, the family courts are playing an integral role in that, and we seek to build on it. I will talk more about that shortly. Where we need to go further, this Government will.
We have used the statutory framework because it reflects the Government’s view that the offences are exceptionally serious. It is therefore appropriate that the same threshold be used to determine when an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility should apply. I understand and appreciate the rationale but, because there are existing processes to seek the restriction of parental responsibility, it is essential that there is a threshold and a clear marker for it to happen automatically.
Alex Brewer
There are mechanisms in place, but they put undue onus on the non-offending parent. Does the Minister agree that the onus should be shifted to the offending parent?
Alex Davies-Jones
I agree that the current situation in the family courts is difficult, and it can be traumatic for parents who are seeking to have a parental order removed. That is why we have taken the measure in the Bill. It is a new approach, through which we seek to remove parental responsibility on automatic conviction in the Crown court. As I said in oral evidence, this is not something we do lightly, but we feel that it is necessary in order to protect offenders’ and perpetrators’ own children from the most serious offences. I am happy to work with the hon. Member for North East Hampshire to consider what further work we can do to reform the family courts. The Department is working closely on that, and we know we need to get it right in order to protect all children from these crimes, whether or not restrictions to parental responsibility are sought via the family courts or automatically, with this measure, in the Crown court.
Amendments 18, 24 and 8 seek to expand the circumstances in which the Crown court should make a prohibited steps order to include cases in which the offences were committed against any child. Again, it is important to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families. Those affected have my deepest sympathies, and it is they who we must have in our minds when we debate the measure.
The current provision is carefully targeted. It ensures that automatic restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibility apply only when there is a direct and recognised relationship between the offender and the child victims. Our focus on offenders who have committed a serious child sexual abuse offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility is based on a desire to tackle the cases involving child sexual abuse with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. This is, as I have already said, a novel and untested change to the law, and the response from perpetrators is unpredictable. We know that perpetrators often seek to use the family courts, as we have already heard, to further traumatise victims, and they could therefore seek to appeal the removal of responsibility.
Caroline Voaden
Does the Minister agree that somebody who has been convicted of a serious child sexual offence against a child for whom they do not have parental responsibility still poses a danger to their own child?
Alex Davies-Jones
I agree with that point. It is important that we recognise, as I have stated, that there are other measures to remove a person’s parental responsibility for their own child through the family courts. I stress that this is a novel approach. We need to look at the justice system as a whole; we cannot consider our various courts in isolation. The measure being carried out in the Crown court could make an impact on the delays that exist in the family courts, thanks to the backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. I do not wish to exacerbate that, or to traumatise any other children and families who are going through the family courts, by further increasing that backlog. For that reason, we wish to keep the measure quite small and novel, as it is untested at present; however, once we have seen how it works, there is the possibility perhaps to go further in the future.
Dr Mullan
We all recognise that this is a novel measure. I do not think that anyone is suggesting introducing a blanket measure. For example, we have used the custodial threshold as a narrowing measure and the Liberal Democrats have used a serious sexual offence as a narrowing measure. The Minister is talking about the balance that needs to be struck, but surely the balance is not being struck correctly when the decision is that only a child for whom someone has parental responsibility brings this measure into scope. Surely that is not the right balance, despite the weighing exercise that I appreciate the Minister has to undertake.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is important to note that a line does need to be drawn, as the hon. Member has recognised; there does have to be a balance. In the previous Government’s version of the Bill, there was a different threshold, which was child rape of any child. We have changed that.; in this version, the measure is any child sexual offence where there is four years or more in custody, but only of the offender’s own child. As a Government, we have determined that as the necessary threshold. That is different from the previous Government’s threshold, which was only child rape. I think that recognises the difficulty in drawing a balance here.
We need to take a more limited approach for the time being, especially initially, to ensure that, as I have already said, the family court is not overwhelmed by endless appeals from perpetrators causing even more traumatisation to victims, and especially children. This is essential so that other victims and families with cases in the family court are not detrimentally impacted.
Our intention with clause 3 is to tackle the cases with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. That is why we have chosen to focus the measure in the way that we have. It is important that we properly understand the impact any additional family court proceedings will have on the children and families involved. The cohort in scope of this measure is at the highest risk of immediate harm from the perpetrator, which is why we have chosen to focus on that cohort. This does not prevent an application being made to the family court for parental responsibility to be restricted in other circumstances, as is already available.
Amendment 8 suggests using the Crown court to gather evidence on the best interests of the child and the level of risk the offender poses to the child. Doing so would place a significant new burden on the criminal court, meaning less capacity to hear criminal cases and even longer waiting times for those seeking justice. The proper forum for that consideration to happen is the family court, where the judge can hear from all relevant professionals and have access to any necessary reports before making a decision that will always be based on the best interests of the children involved.
We are already going further than the previous Government did with their Criminal Justice Bill. Those proposals were limited to child rape; our measure includes not only child rape, but a broader range of child sexual offences. Most important of all, the previous Government talked of change, but failed to deliver. We will deliver this change to protect children. We all have a huge amount of sympathy for families in these circumstances, and I want to do all we can to support them in getting the right outcome for their children.
New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, seeks to expand the instances where the Crown court will be under a duty to restrict the exercise of a perpetrator’s parental responsibility at the point they are sentenced to 10 years or more for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for the child.
I reassure the hon. Member that there are already clear powers in the family court to restrict parental responsibility where it would be in the best interests of the children involved. If a parent or other interested party wishes to make an application, they can do so. Where relevant, the family court is able to and will remove parental responsibility or restrict it to the point that it cannot be exercised in any meaningful way.
The existing law is clear that in every case, the court’s paramount consideration must be what will be in the best interests of the child. We cannot rule out that sometimes it may not be in the child’s best interests for parental responsibility to be removed or restricted, particularly where the child is not the direct victim of the offence. However, as the Lord Chancellor and I have said, we look forward to working constructively across the House on this measure. While we cannot support new clause 13, we remain committed to ensuring that the law robustly protects children. I reassure hon. Members that the Government will continue to work to strike the right balance on this issue.
For the reasons I have outlined, I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments so that we can continue to develop this important legislation in a way that is principled and practical and gets the balance right for children.
Alex Brewer
I thank the Minister for her comments. While I understand that this is a novel approach and I welcome the measures in the Bill as a first step, we believe that they do not go far enough and still leave children at risk.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Brewer
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 3, page 6, line 19, after “justice” insert—
“or of a child and the non-offending parent”.
This amendment would mean that a judge could have discretion to decide not to make a prohibited steps order when it was not deemed in the interest of a child and the non-offending parent.
This is a small amendment that would continue to put children at the heart of this Bill. There are times when a court should not make a prohibited steps order in relation to a child. In the evidence session, we heard from many charities that children are not sufficiently heard as victims of crimes, and that their voices are not carried forward. We would like to include a small amendment that would put children and the non-offending parent at the heart of that decision making in the courts.
Alex Davies-Jones
Amendment 25 was tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne, for whom I have much respect, and seeks to amend clause 3 to allow the Crown court discretion not to make a prohibited steps order in cases where it considers such an order not to be in the best interests of the child or the non-offending parent. Let me begin by acknowledging the intent behind this amendment. It is of course right that we consider the welfare of children and the rights of non-offending parents in all decisions made by the court. However, the Government cannot support this amendment for several reasons.
The clause as drafted already strikes a careful and considered balance between protecting children and respecting judicial oversight. We have included a narrowly defined exemption to allow the Crown court the flexibility not to make a prohibited steps order, which is a section 8 order under the Children Act 1989, where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. That provision is intended to cover exceptional circumstances where the Crown court does not consider it to be in the interests of justice, which may arise from unusual facts or a case that is particularly complex. It ensures a degree of flexibility without undermining the core safeguarding purpose of the provision in the Bill.
The family court is the appropriate forum for determining what would be in the best interests of children and navigating the complexities of individual family circumstances. It is uniquely equipped to consider the full facts of each individual case, drawing on the expertise of all relevant professionals and supported by any necessary reports. That enables the judge to make a fully informed decision, one that is always guided by the paramount principle of the child’s best interests. The Crown court simply is not equipped to carry out that detailed consideration.
Legislation already provides a route for family members to bring an application to the family court, so it can consider whether the order should be varied or discharged and whether a more tailored order or other family court orders are required, and ensure that any order is consistent with the best interests of the child or children involved in the individual circumstances. This avenue is still open for families where the Crown court has made an order under the provisions of clause 4.
Alongside that existing route into the family court, we are also providing a clear new route in certain circumstances. If the offender is acquitted of the relevant offence, or their sentence is reduced to less than four years—I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify this point, because it was raised when I gave evidence to the Committee—the local authority is under a duty to bring the matter back before the family court. This ensures that decisions remain responsive to the best interests of the child, without compromising the initial safeguarding intent of the judge. The Government are committed to ensuring that the justice system protects children from further harm from such offenders. The provisions in clause 3 are a vital part of that commitment.
I also place on record the Government’s commitment to consulting on a new victims’ code, specifically with the intention of addressing concerns, raised by the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, regarding how we can ensure that child victims are at the centre of the justice system. As she has said, for the first time ever, children are considered victims in their own right for crimes such as domestic abuse, in law; but, as we know, in practice that sadly is not the reality for many child victims. Therefore this Government are determined to go further. Under our new consultation on the victims’ code, which we are hoping to launch later this year, we will make it a key focus to ensure that the code works for all victims, with a particular focus on children in mind.
I understand the reasons why the hon. Member for Eastbourne has tabled this amendment, but I hope that he and the hon. Member for North East Hampshire are reassured that there are already strong provisions in place to ensure that the family court can consider the interests of the children involved in these types of cases, and their families. As such, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 25.
Alex Brewer
I thank the Minister for her assurances. As with our previous amendment, I look forward to working with her on improving the family court. However, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, women’s and children’s charities, and victims strongly urged us all to ensure that children and non-offending parents are at the heart of the criminal justice system, so I believe that this is an important amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 20, leave out from “not” to end of line 25 and insert
“ceases to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal.
(5A) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more.”
This amendment would ensure that a prohibited steps order would cease to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal. It would also require that a prohibited steps order remain in effect where a sentence is reduced on appeal so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of four years or more.
I will keep my remarks brief. As we have said, these measures require balance and consideration for all parties concerned. We were surprised that the Government’s proposed measure would not cause a prohibited steps orders to automatically fall away if someone is acquitted of an offence. It might seem obvious to say this, but if someone is acquitted of an offence, they are innocent. They have not done anything in the eyes of the law, so I struggle to see why we would continue to insist that, if they are subject to a prohibited steps order, the onus is on them to get it removed.
On the other side of things, if a prohibited steps order is in place and has not been challenged, and someone remains guilty but is on a lesser sentence, the balance falls in the other direction and it should remain in place. Although she may tell me that this was our position in government too, I am interested in hearing from the Minister why the Government do not feel that it is appropriate for such an order to be removed if someone is acquitted.
Alex Davies-Jones
The amendment seeks to amend the process in clause 3 if an offender has been acquitted or had their sentence reduced on appeal. The Bill provides a clear route for considering a prohibited steps order following an appeal that has resulted in an acquittal or a reduction in the offender’s sentence. In such cases, the relevant local authority will be under a duty to bring an application to the family court to consider whether the original order should be upheld, varied or discharged.
The drafting of the amendment is deficient and risks creating confusion. It would provide that any prohibited steps order made under proposed new section 10C of the Children Act 1989 would cease to have effect where a person is acquitted, effectively discharging the order. In practice, there would be no order in place to discharge the original prohibited steps order, and therefore no documentary evidence that the order had been discharged. Compounding that, the amendment would retain an obligation for the relevant local authority to make an application to the family court to consider the prohibited steps order, under proposed new section 10D(2), and yet there would be no order for the family court to consider, because it would have ceased to have effect.
In short, the amendment would not make sense in practice and would risk creating confusion in a context where clarity is particularly important.
Dr Mullan
I thank the Minister for that feedback. Perhaps we need to consider how the amendment is drafted, but does she accept the principle? There is no other example I can think of where someone is acquitted of an offence, because they are innocent, but they remain subject to any provisions whatever that were related to the conviction. Perhaps the amendment needs to be redrafted, but surely the Minister agrees in principle that someone should not be subjected to a consequence of a conviction that has been overturned.
Alex Davies-Jones
We need to remember that for a criminal case to have been brought, the child or another party will have made an allegation of serious sexual abuse committed against that child, and that will have been followed by criminal proceedings and an initial guilty verdict. The relationship between the child and the accused parent may have completely broken down during that process. When the family court reviews the case, the judge will undertake a holistic review of all the circumstances, including the acquittal, before deciding what is in the best interests of the child.
We must also remember that the prohibited steps order does not form part of the sentence when it is made by the Crown court. The order is not part of the punishment, or an additional punishment, for an offender; it is a tool to protect children who have been the victims of a dreadful crime, and their families. Even where the individual is acquitted—I have huge sympathy for those who are found innocent and acquitted—it is likely that the case will have gone through lengthy proceedings, and complex family dynamics will be involved. We must keep in mind the overarching aim of protecting children and doing what is best for them. That is why the order will not be automatically discharged following a successful appeal.
I think it is important that if there is a successful appeal, there is a clearly defined process during which the best interests of the children involved are considered, which is why we have put that measure in place. We understand that following a successful appeal, it is important that decisions about a prohibited steps order are made quickly. That is why the process already included in clause 3 requires the local authority to make the application within 30 days of the acquittal. By placing the duty to make the application on the local authority, we are reducing the burden on the families involved, at what will already be a difficult and potentially traumatic time. Moving the proceedings to the family court centres deliberations in the correct forum. The family court will consider whether varying, discharging or, indeed, upholding the order will be in the best interests of the children involved, which I am sure we can agree is what we all want.
Mike Wood
I am struggling to understand either the legal or the ethical distinction that says that someone who is acquitted at trial should be in a fundamentally different position from someone who is acquitted following an appeal and has their conviction overturned. Surely the practical results should be the same. In every other part of the criminal justice process that I have encountered, they are.
Alex Davies-Jones
That goes to the heart of why we have kept these measures as niche and tight as possible—because they are quite novel. We are restricting parental responsibility where an offender has been found guilty in a Crown court, with a jury and a judge, of any sexual offence against their own child for which they will be sentenced to four years or more in prison. That is incredibly traumatic for the child and family involved. The person will have already been found guilty. This is not similar to cases in which someone is acquitted and a prohibited steps order can be removed immediately. We have to consider the impact on the child. These are offences that the perpetrator will have been found guilty of, in a court of law, against their own child.
Mike Wood
As the Minister will be aware, where the Court of Appeal overturns a criminal conviction for a serious offence such as this, it will generally be because there was a serious flaw in the original trial that has left it invalid. Even in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal may grant a retrial rather than overturning the conviction. I understand the point the Minister is making about the trauma to the family and child, but would that not apply equally to someone who is acquitted at the original trial, in which case should the court not also be considering it in the event of a not guilty verdict? I really am struggling to understand why a conviction being overturned on appeal is substantively different from a not guilty verdict.
Alex Davies-Jones
I will happily answer that point. We are not saying that we would not remove the prohibited steps order; of course there will be a route to remove it. If the offender or alleged perpetrator is then acquitted through the Court of Appeal, there should always be a route to do that, and there will be within 30 days. However, the correct route for doing that is the family court, which will have all the reports available to determine the best interests of that child’s welfare, given everything they have been through, rather than the Crown court, which is not equipped to make that assessment.
Dr Mullan
Can the Minister give me any other example in our legal system where someone who has suffered a consequence directly as a result of a conviction that is then overturned is required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows from that overturned conviction? I cannot think of any. If someone is exonerated, everything falls away. This measure is specifically linked to someone being found guilty; if they are then essentially found not guilty, they will have to take further steps. Nobody else who is essentially found innocent has to do other things to get things removed from them.
Alex Davies-Jones
The shadow Minister cannot think of any and, off the top of my head, stood here right now, I cannot think of any either, but that goes to the heart of the reason why we need to keep these novel measures quite tight—it is because of their potential impact. Primarily, my interest, and the interest of the Government, is to protect children and child victims, and I put my faith in the family court system to do what is in the best interest of the child following an acquittal, given everything that that child—that victim—has been through. We must remember that if the perpetrator is acquitted in the Court of Appeal, there is still a child victim and a crime that has been committed against that child.
Dr Mullan
With respect, there is not a victim. The person has been acquitted, and there is not a child that has suffered anything, any more than if the person was found not guilty in the first place. I respect the Minister’s comments on how the amendment might be better drafted, but the Government have to accept that they are introducing an extremely unusual interpretation of what happens to someone when they are found not guilty, compared with every other bit of the justice system that I am aware of. Someone who is found not guilty is innocent; the court has decided that the accusation made did not transpire.
Alex Davies-Jones
That is exactly why we have included a route to remove the prohibited steps order, and we feel the appropriate route for that is the family court. That is the measure in the Bill, and it still stands that that is the safest route to protect the welfare of the child in the circumstances, given what—I was going to say, “I can only imagine”, but I cannot even imagine it—will be an immensely traumatising and awful experience for everyone involved. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Mullan
The Minister made heroic efforts to explain the logic and context of how we ordinarily deal with these matters. We think the prohibited steps orders are an important enhancement for the safeguarding of children, but I cannot imagine a scenario, even in circumstances in which the offence has not been found proven, in which the children the Minister talks about will not have had the involvement of social services and other steps taken to ensure their wellbeing more generally.
This measure is specifically about parental responsibility, and I find it difficult to understand why the Government are setting a precedent that an innocent party should be required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows specifically from their conviction. I appreciate the feedback on the drafting of the amendment, and I will not press it to a vote, but the Government need to think very carefully about the precedent they are setting in relation to what happens to innocent people. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)
Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 19th June 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 June 2025 - (19 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Hon. Members may wish to remove their jackets. Please make sure that electronic devices are switched to silent mode. Hansard will be grateful if you email speaking notes. I remind Members to rise in their place if they wish to speak.
Clause 42
Information about complaints for detained patients
Question (17 June) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are considering clauses 43 and 44 stand part.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
I know that the Committee has been waiting in earnest for me to deliver this speech on clauses 42 to 44. As the temperature gets to almost 30° today, I will try to maintain the same gumption that President Trump had when introducing his flagpoles, because this is an exciting topic and I am keen to treat it with verve.
Clauses 42 to 44 will introduce new duties on hospital managers to provide information about complaints procedures to patients under different legal regimes within the Mental Health Act 1983. The clauses move important safeguards from the code of practice into primary legislation, thereby giving them statutory force, which is a welcome step. I acknowledge the Government’s intentions to strengthen patients’ rights and accountabilities within the mental health system.
Clause 42 concerns information for detained patients. Under the current law, section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires hospital managers to give patients information about their rights under the Act, including their rights to apply to the mental health tribunal and to access independent mental health advocates. Although complaint procedures are mentioned in the code of practice, however, they are not explicitly covered in statute. Clause 42 will amend section 132 to impose a new statutory duty to provide information on how to make complaints about: the carrying out of functions under the Act, any medical treatment received while detained, and the outcome of any such complaint, including routes for escalation such as through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.
Importantly, the information must be provided both orally and in writing, and steps must be taken to ensure that the patient actually understands it. Those duties must be carried out on initial detention and then repeated either annually for restricted patients or on the submission of renewed report under section 20 of the Act. The Opposition welcome that positive and necessary step. We know from independent reviews, including the Wessely review, that many patients do not know how to complain or fear that doing so will affect their care. By placing these requirements in primary legislation, we provide more robust legal protection.
I would be grateful if the Minister clarified some points. How will “understanding” be assessed or evidenced in practice? For example, what guidance will be issued to ensure that the needs of patients with a learning disability, cognitive impairment or limited English are met? Will independent mental health advocate services play a formal role in supporting patients to understand the Act with regard to this information about complaints? Is that part of their expanded role? Will complaints about poor complaint handling, not just about the original matter, be clearly included in the framework, as implied in the explanatory notes? To whom would such complaints be reported: NHS England, the Department, the integrated care board or a regulator such as the Care Quality Commission?
As we are talking about complaints, I notice that paragraph 327 of the explanatory notes states:
“New subsection (2A)(c) ensures the duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman about the maladministration of complaints about medical treatment.”
That is very welcome, but it brings up an entirely new set of questions about the role of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in this guise—an institution that embodies the public’s right to accountability, redress and justice when our health and public services fall short. In essence, it is the final arbiter; at best, it is the final safety net for those who feel they have nowhere else to turn. In particular, I want to focus on its critical yet often underappreciated work in relation to mental health complaints and how it intersects with the new Bill.
The ombudsman investigates unresolved complaints about NHS services in England, including those related to mental health care, alongside complaints against Government Departments and other bodies. For many families affected by failings in mental health provision, be that in crisis care, discharge planning or secure settings, the ombudsman provides a route to independent evidence-based resolution. We must therefore ask whether it is functioning with the efficiency, compassion and authority that patients deserve.
To pick just some of the data, in 2022-23 the PHSO received more than 35,000 complaints, which was an increase of 20% on pre-pandemic levels. If we look at timelines, performance remains under pressure: only 32% of investigations were completed within 13 weeks, 50% within 26 weeks and 81% within 52 weeks—that comes from the annual report. In the mental health sphere, such delays can exacerbate trauma and deepen distrust in public systems, in particular if the complainant is already experiencing severe distress.
The PHSO has reported a rise in callers exhibiting suicidal ideation, a tragic indicator of the depth of need and the urgency of timely reform. Over the past few years, to its credit, the ombudsman has introduced reforms for a new case severity assessment framework to triage cases more effectively; investment in digital case management; training for frontline staff to deal more sensitively with mental health complaints; and a proactive push for transparency, including publishing more case outcomes and data.
That is important work, but there is still some way to go. What assurances can the Government provide that PHSO’s funding is sufficient to cope with increased volumes of complex mental health cases, especially as it has a somewhat unique structure? The PHSO reports to the Public Accounts Committee. It does not have a departmental home. It is appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister, after scrutiny by the PAC, but it is funded through the House of Commons Commission. That makes the PHSO rightly independent, but we need to ensure that it has the ability to deal with the top level of complaints about severe cases of mental health issues.
Under this legislation, we will be creating more automatic referrals to tribunals; we are rightly empowering more patients to complain; and we are putting more reports in for accountability. We need to ensure that when there are complaints—as there could well be—they will still be dealt with. Therefore, has an impact assessment been carried out, or will one be carried out, about PHSO funding, capacity and ability to deal with more mental health complaints?
As we debate a new Bill, we must ensure that accountability mechanisms fully integrate with any legislative reform. The Bill will, rightly, enhance patient rights and restrict inappropriate detention, but the ombudsman must be equipped to robustly investigate breaches of those rights. We should also ensure a clear reporting pathway for detained individuals when their families go to the ombudsman. My overarching question for the Minister, which I hope he will address is: how will the Bill, empowered in this way, interface with the PHSO? Will it strengthen the ombudsman’s ability to investigate complaints relating to involuntary treatment or detention?
Clause 43, on information about complaints for community patients, will make an equivalent amendment to section 132A of the Mental Health Act, which governs patients subject to a community treatment order. Again, patients are currently told about their rights to tribunal and IMHA support, but not necessarily about how to raise concerns or complaints about their care in the community. The clause will therefore require hospital managers to provide information about how to make complaints about functions carried out under the Act, about medical treatments for mental disorder while on a CTO, and about the outcome of any such complaint.
Clause 43 will also add a new requirement to repeat the information as soon as practicably possible after the CTO renewal. Again, that seems sensible and overdue, because clear repeat information can help to balance the power dynamics and support the patient voice. However, what steps will be taken to ensure that community patients who do not have regular contact with hospital staff are still given the information promptly and meaningfully? Will that be the duty of the new community clinician, for example? What is the role of community mental health teams or primary care staff, such as GPs or community psychiatric nurses, in delivering or enforcing the duties? Will the Minister confirm whether patient carers or families beyond the nominated person will be supported in understanding how someone can make a complaint?
Finally, clause 44, on information for conditionally discharged patients, will introduce proposed new section 132B of the Mental Health Act, extending the same principles to patients who are conditionally discharged, including restricted patients under section 42, 73 or 74. Such individuals often remain subject to significant restrictions in the community, such as curfews, reporting conditions or residence in supervised accommodation, and they can be recalled to hospital at any time, yet under the current law they have no statutory right to be informed of how to complain about or challenge decisions that affect them.
Clause 44 will require hospital managers to inform those patients about which section they are discharged under, how the Mental Health Act continues to apply, their rights to apply to a tribunal, and—crucially—how to make complaints about the carrying out of MHA functions, medical treatments and complaints outcomes. That requirement must be met as soon as practicable, in both oral and written form. A copy must also be given to the nominated person.
The explanatory notes state that the duty applies to
“patients subject to transfer directions”
from prison, and that the information should be given before discharge if possible. That is welcome, but it raises a question why, unlike clause 42, clause 44 does not impose a duty to repeat that information periodically. Given that conditionally discharged patients may remain under conditions for many years, have the Government considered adding a requirement to re-provide the information, say, annually? What support or advocacy will be available to conditionally discharged patients, particularly those in forensic or community forensic services, to help them to make complaints or understand their rights? Finally, will the Minister clarify how the provisions will work for patients who lack capacity, or who have no nominated person? Will there be a fall-back or safeguard in those cases?
In clauses 42 to 44, the Government are rightly seeking to embed the right to complain, and to understand that right, into the framework of the Mental Health Act. These are technical but powerful reforms. As ever, however, the challenge lies in not what is required but how it is delivered, especially for the patients who are most marginalised, restricted or isolated. I hope that the Minister can provide some reassurances about monitoring for compliance, clear statutory guidance, and the support of the advocacy structure, particularly at the very top, for dealing with complaints.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will respond to the questions that have been asked.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked what training would be provided to staff on communicating the information clearly and compassionately. We will seek to clarify the complaints process and, when we come to revise the code of practice, we will consult on the guidance for how information on complaints should be provided. The Department will work with the NHS, Social Work England and other partners to develop appropriate training for staff on the reforms. Once the code of practice has been updated, professionals working under the Act will be required to undergo training to maintain their competence and awareness of the Act.
The hon. Member also asked how to ensure that information is genuinely accessible. It is important that the complaints process is accessible to all patients. Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. We expect all healthcare organisations to meet people’s communication needs to support equitable access, experience and outcomes, including when someone is in hospital for their mental health.
NHS England sets out guidance for providers on how to support individuals with their communication needs. That support may involve providing access to interpreters, providing information in a range of formats—such as in translation, large print, braille and easy read format—or the use of augmentative and alternative communication, video clips and visual diagrams to aid understanding. The accessible information standard requires all applicable organisations to identify, record, flag, share and meet the information and communication support needs of patients, service users, carers and parents with a disability, impairment or sensory loss.
On the question of whether there will be an audit of whether patients feel genuinely informed and empowered to complain, we know that some service users are not aware of the avenues by which they can make a complaint. The changes in clauses 42 to 44 seek to address that problem, and to increase awareness of the complaints system. To ensure that patients are supported and empowered to exercise their rights, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health in-patients. Complaints information must be provided to both the patient and the nominated person. Family and carers also have a right to complain about care and treatment given under the Mental Health Act.
The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked for reassurance on oversight, and that feedback from complaints will identify issues. I think that the hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury also asked about that, as well as asking what mechanisms will be in place to give feedback on how the system is working. Complaints data enables CQC Mental Health Act reviewers and mental health inspectors to understand trends and focus on areas of concern in their respective monitoring and inspection activities. Focused activity— for example, a focused Mental Health Act visit or inspection activity—can also be scheduled in response to concerns raised in MHA complaints. When looking at trust and provider-level MHA inspection activity, complaints information informs the CQC’s questioning of trusts or independent providers about their complaints processes.
Dr Evans
I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 45, page 57, leave out lines 5 to 11 and insert—
“(1) All eligible patients shall have a right to create an advance choice document.
(1A) For the purposes of this section, an ‘eligible patient’ is a patient who—
(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act,
(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future, or
(c) is an English qualifying informal patient (see section 130CA).
(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—
(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and
(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”
This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 32 and 33.
Amendment 18, in clause 45, page 57, line 33, at end insert—
“(3A) An ‘advance choice document’ under subsection (3) should include consideration of the person’s financial circumstances.”
This amendment ensures that the advance choice document includes matters relating to the patient’s financial circumstances.
Government amendments 34 and 35.
Clause stand part.
Dr Evans
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to clause 45 and amendment 46. I will also speak to the amendments from the Government and the Liberal Democrats.
The Bill introduces advance choice documents as a new tool to empower people with lived experience of mental health conditions. This is a significant development in mental health law and policy. Currently, people who are detained or treated under the 1983 Act often have limited ability to influence decisions about their care at times when they lack capacity. Although the Act includes some mechanisms such as advance statements, they have been criticised for their limited legal weight and inconsistent application.
Clause 45 will insert proposed new sections 130M and 130N into the Act, and place duties on NHS England, integrated care boards in England and local health boards in Wales to facilitate access to information about ACDs and to provide support to individuals who want to create such documents. As the Government’s explanatory notes state, ACDs are written statements
“made by an individual while they have capacity or competence …setting out their decisions, wishes and/or feelings about matters that may be relevant to their assessment for admission…and treatment”
should they lack capacity. That extends the scope of patients’ involvement in care planning and respects autonomy in a way that the current law does not fully achieve.
I commend the Government for recognising the importance of enabling people to set out their wishes in advance, especially when they have previously been detained or treated informally. That can help to reduce stress, improve trust between patients and professionals, and potentially prevent crisis escalation to detention. Nevertheless, I have some constructive questions that I hope the Committee will consider.
On the strength of duty on the NHS bodies, proposed new section 130M(1) will require NHS England and each ICB to
“make such arrangements as it considers appropriate”
to provide information about and support with ACDs, which leaves considerable discretion. Will that discretion lead to inconsistencies across regions and vulnerable populations? Should the Bill include clear minimum standards or benchmarks for what constitutes “appropriate” arrangements, for example by mandating proactive outreach to high-risk groups, such as those in secure children’s homes or immigration centres, where awareness of rights or access to support is often poor?
There is then the legal status and practical use of ACDs. The clause defines ACDs but does not specifically set out their legal weight in decisions about treatment or detention. How will clinicians balance these documents with their clinical judgment or clinical care needs? The explanatory notes mention that ACDs may include
“advance decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”
The Bill could clarify how conflicts will be resolved; this is a recurring theme in our discussions. It would be helpful to have explicit guidance on safeguards to ensure that ACDs are given full weight and respect while maintaining clinical safety.
I turn to the issues of training, resourcing and monitoring. This is a big change, and supporting people to make meaningful ACDs requires skilled staff and resources. Who is expected to provide that support? Is it the CPN, the community clinician, the IMHA or even the GP? Will there be training programmes for clinicians and care staff on how to discuss, record and use ACDs effectively? Furthermore, will there be monitoring and reporting requirements so that Parliament and public can hold the services to account? Who will those requirements sit with if NHS England is abolished? Will it be the CQC, the ICBs or even the Department of Health and Social Care?
We then have the issues of access and equity. We have already identified that people with learning difficulties and certain racial groups find themselves in contact with mental health services more than other groups. These groups can be less keen then to interact with services, either by choice or due to ability, so how do the Government intend to ensure that ACDs are accessible to people from diverse backgrounds, including those with communication difficulties, learning disabilities or limited English? What consultation will there be with charity and representative groups to ensure that documentation is accessible enough for all, yet thorough and robust enough to properly reflect wishes correctly?
Clause 45 is a welcome step towards enhancing patient autonomy and improving mental health care, but to ensure that the new powers deliver real benefits, the Government should consider how to strengthen the duties placed on various bodies. That leads me to amendment 46, tabled in my name. Embedding ACDs into mental health is long overdue, but the clause places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards only to “make such arrangements” as they consider “appropriate” for providing information and support for ACDs. The intention is good, and a marked step from where we were, but the language risks creating a postcode lottery in which patients’ access to this important right depends on where they live or how proactive their local systems happen to be.
That is why my amendment seeks to move from discretion to entitlement. It would replace the current discretionary wording of the clause with a clear legal right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. The amendment defines “eligible patient” as a patient who has previously been detained under parts II or III of the Act, who has a diagnosis that may lead to future detention, or who qualifies as an informal patient under proposed new section 130CA. It would also require NHS England and ICBs to proactively inform eligible patients of their rights and offer them support in exercising them. This is a targeted and proportionate amendment. It would not mandate ACDs for all, nor would it impose burdensome new duties; it would simply create a right to be offered and supported to make an ACD.
The letter of 3 June from Baroness Merron to my colleague in the Lords appears, in part, to address the issue, so I will talk a little about what she wrote. I thank Baroness Merron for the letter and the tone of the letter, which reflects genuine engagement on the issue and acknowledges the importance of reflective care after detention. She notes:
“The impact assessment for the Bill accounts for multiple hours being spent with the individual by health and care professionals to inform and support them to make choice in advance of a potential future mental health crisis.”
That is welcome. She also stated that the Government had tabled an amendment that day that
“requires commissioners to make arrangements for bringing information and help available regarding ACDs, to the attention of people…especially those in the 12 months following their discharge from hospital.”
I believe that that is a reference to one of the Government amendments to this clause. I hope I am right; if so, I will return to that amendment once I have set out the position on ours. As set out in the letter, the Government amendment is another step forward, and I acknowledge that the Government have appeared to move in response to concerns raised by my colleagues in the Lords and by many stakeholders, but I gently suggest that it falls short. It retains the same permissive language—duties to do what is a “appropriate”, decided locally by commissioners. That may allow for good practice in some areas, but it does not create enforceable rights for individuals. Without a clear entitlement, patients who need this the most may never even be told that it was an option.
Let me give a practical example to illustrate why statutory rights matter. A person with bipolar disorder may be detained under the 1983 Act during an acute episode, but once well, they may want to specify in writing that in future they do not want a particular medication or that they want to be admitted to a specific hospital near family. Those are reasonable, clinically relevant requests, but unless the person is informed of the right to make an ACD and offered support to do so, that opportunity could be lost, especially for those facing health inequalities or language barriers, or those who have a history of mistrust with services.
The Government have said that those conversations will happen anyway within the care planning or under the community mental health framework, but the reality is that the systems are patchy. People discharged from hospital often face month-long waits to be re-engaged by community teams. They may not have a named worker. They may receive support only from overstretched primary care. ACDs must not rely on assumptions about care pathways, which too often do not work as intended.
On trauma and mandating reflection, I want to take seriously a point that Baroness Merron raises in her letter: for some individuals, reflecting on past detention may be traumatic, and that support should be user-led. Absolutely—that is why my amendment would create a right, not an obligation. No one should be forced to make an ACD, but people should be informed that they can, and they should receive its support if they so choose. Choice is not trauma; it is autonomy.
Let us remember that, for many, reflecting on what went wrong in past care is not re-traumatising but restorative. It is how people regain control and how the services learn. I believe this is a thoughtful and sensible amendment. It would strengthen clause 45 by creating clear, predictable entitlements for those most at risk of future detention. It would respect clinical discretion while affirming patients’ rights. It would not undermine the Government’s intent but fulfil it. We all agree that ACDs could be transformative. Let us give them the best chance to succeed by ensuring those who need them the most are offered them, not just as a maybe.
I will touch quickly on amendment 18, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, and spend the rest of my speech addressing the Government amendments. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for highlighting an important part of dealing with mental health, but I simply wonder whether primary legislation is the correct place to do what he suggests. Could it be done in codes of practice? What if people are admitted, but when they produce plans do not want to disclose their financial arrangements? Might compulsions have to be created for them to do so? I wonder about the unintended consequences of amendment 18, and I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s addressing them.
I think the Minister in the other place was referring to Government amendments 32 and 33, so I am grateful to be able to address what has come forward. Government amendment 32 appears to be a step in the right direction. It seeks to insert new paragraph (c) into proposed new section 130M(1), with the following wording:
“bringing the availability of that information and help to the attention of such people as it considers appropriate.”
That is welcome, as it moves beyond simply making information available, which could mean leaving a leaflet in a waiting room or uploading something to a website, and instead encourages proactive communication. However, the language still leaves a significant loophole: it is limited to
“such people as it considers appropriate”.
That allows NHS England or integrated care boards to withhold communication for individuals who may be eligible, based on subjective judgment or resource constraints. Although it improves the duty, it still falls short of a universal and consistent approach to ensure people with serious mental health needs know their rights.
Government amendment 33 will insert two further subsections, (1A) and (1B). Proposed new subsection (1A) states:
“The arrangements that must be made…include such arrangements…for people to be given information or help by having a conversation with someone who is suitably qualified”.
Proposed new subsection (1B) states:
“NHS England or an integrated care board must have regard to the particular benefits to a person of making an advance choice document within 12 months of their discharge”.
The amendment rightly recognises that a conversation, not just a form, is often essential for meaningful care. It also acknowledges that the post-discharge period is a crucial window in which individuals are stabilising and may be open to shaping a future care plan in a thoughtful way, but again the language is discretionary. There is no guarantee that the conversation will happen, even where a person is recently discharged from hospital and known to be at high risk of readmission. Who is “suitably qualified”? Is it the clinician, an independent advocate or a voluntary sector worker with lived experience? If the amendment is to be meaningful, the Government must provide clarity in the codes of practice or in regulations.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman makes some very good points about the importance of patients being offered advance choice documents and being supported to make them, as the Bill describes. The evidence submitted from the General Medical Council makes it clear that it supports the duties as set out in the Bill, and it says that they are in line with the current good medical practice guidelines for professionals. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill, as it stands, fits very well with current medical practice?
Dr Evans
I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s point. It would be interesting to know if that advice came when the Bill was debated in the Lords, because these clauses were not in place, but were introduced through the Government’s amendments. This is an extension to that. Our amendment to give a right to a patient would be a further strengthening. I entirely agree that the Bill is a good step forward, but if we are not going to address this again in the next 40 years, the Opposition would like that right to be enshrined. To be offered the opportunity is the key bit here—no mandation. It is good practice to let people know their rights, and we are affirming that. The worry is that while there is good intention to allow it based on the system, what happens if times are stretched? The amendment would give someone a statutory chance to say they have that right, and that it is upheld in law. That is what the Opposition are pushing for.
In essence, we are both trying to solve the same problem, but taking different approaches. The key distinction between the approach of the Government and that of the Opposition is that the Government’s creates a duty on the system, but no individual entitlement, while the Opposition’s proposes a patient right matched by a clear responsibility to inform and support the individual. The Government’s clause says that NHS England and ICBs must make arrangements as they consider “appropriate”. We say all eligible patients should have an informed right to create one. I anticipate that the Government might turn around and say, “Well, this is too rigid,” or that it imposes unfunded burdens on the ICB. I argue that it is targeted; we are not extending the right to everyone with a mental health condition but only to those at the most risk of future detention.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
As a clinician, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand what I am trying to say. There are many mental health patients who do not have any insight into their illness and often refuse to take medications. It is important that, as the clause says,
“‘qualifying person’ means a person who has capacity or competence to make the statement,”
so that people do not make inappropriate decisions in their advance choice documents. It is important to keep the clause as it is, whereby a qualifying person is someone who can make a competence decision.
Dr Evans
The hon. Gentleman is spot on. We do not want people making decisions about their care when they do not have capacity. The whole point of what we are trying to do—as is the Government’s intent—is to allow people to make advance care decisions when they have capacity, so that when they are not lucid in the future and come back into contact, their preferred decisions are already set out. The clause does allow for a handbrake mechanism for clinical safety, to overstep them. However, what I am worried about is finding ourselves in a situation where patients never even find out that they have the right to create one of these ACDs.
The hon. Gentleman will know, as I do from my time, that good clinical practice is to ensure that patients have a plan. We do that for asthma: we expect patients to have an emergency plan for what happens, who they contact, where they go, what they take and what it looks like, personalised to them. Why should mental health be any different? My amendment actually gives ACDs legal footing, rather than simply saying that the system should offer it to them.
The amendment is cost-effective. Evidence suggests that ACDs can reduce the use of coercive powers, prevent relapse and improve continuity of care. That reduces costs, not adds to them. It is already good clinical practice; many mental health trusts already encourage care planning conversations. Our amendment would simply raise the standard across the country.
The Opposition understand that the Government have the numbers on this Committee. Will the Government clarify the role of the code of conduct? Do the Government intend to issue national guidance or benchmarks to ensure that ICBs do not apply widely different criteria for who is appropriate to be informed or held? Could the Government explain further, in response to the letter and in this Committee, why they do not accept ACDs as a basic right, narrowly defined, for only the most vulnerable individuals to be offered this opportunity? What mechanism will be used to monitor compliance with these new duties? How will patients know whether they are being fulfilled?
To my eyes, Government amendments 34 and 35 will do the same as amendments 32 and 33, but covering the Welsh system and local health boards, so I will not rehearse the arguments that we have just had. However, I would be interested to know whether this creates an issue for data collection on compliance across the two countries. We touched on this in relation to clause 2, but if different health authorities take different approaches to monitoring data, does that not risk making it even more opaque when we try to see both good and bad performance? Could the Minister address that point?
Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)
I rise to speak briefly to clause 45, Government amendments 32 and 33, Lib Dem amendment 18 and Opposition amendment 46. I am very supportive of clause 45. The ability to make an advance choice document is incredibly important to people who may come under the scope of the 1983 Act and be subject to detention under mental health legislation.
We have spoken at length about the importance of patients’ input into their care and the improvements in outcomes when they feel that they have been involved and their wishes and feelings are taken into account. An advance choice document allows someone at risk of being detained under the Act to set out their choices, thoughts and opinions before becoming so unwell that they may need to be admitted to hospital. Other hon. Members have spoken about how an advance choice document can help prevent detention in a mental health unit, as it can stop issues escalating to the point where there is no option but detention, to ensure patient safety or the safety of others. I am broadly supportive of clause 45, and I urge the Committee to be.
I turn briefly to Opposition amendment 46. I have heard the thoughts of the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. My understanding is that clause 45, along with Government amendments 32 and 33, will effectively create the rights for those who should have an advance choice document to be able to take advantage of them. Government amendments 32 and 33 will go further in ensuring that people who may benefit most from an advance choice document are informed of their ability to do so.
I note that Government amendment 32 will put a duty on an integrated care board to bring information to such people as it deems appropriate. I welcome the duty being on an integrated care board or commissioner locally, particularly because there are such nuances in localised care and localised populations. There are areas of the country in which the prevalence of things like learning disability and autism is higher than in others. The amendment will allow an ICB or local commissioner to consider what may be appropriate for the population in their area.
Dr Evans
I appreciate what the hon. Lady is saying. There are differences—rightly so—and regional variation. By definition, different regions will take different approaches to dealing with this issue. My argument is simply that someone with a learning disability should have the right to decide to make an ACD, as should someone with bipolar disorder or anorexia. There should be no regional variance in that; it should be a right given to the individual there and then. Regional discrepancy should not come into the system to deal with this. I appreciate that there will be regional discrepancy, but, fundamentally, we want to engage the right, not just the responsibility for the ICB to decide who it thinks is appropriate. I am interested in the hon. Lady’s take—I think this goes to the heart of what we are trying to do.
Jen Craft
I agree on the notion of a right; where we vary is that I think that the Bill as written, and Government amendments 32 and 33, enshrine the notion of a right without it having to be spelled out as such. Local variation includes localised populations, such as those from marginalised communities. We might consider different translations of support that is available. That will not be the case across the board—it will vary from area to area. This does not remove people’s ability to make an advance choice document; it simply gives local commissioners the ability to determine what is most appropriate for their area, how that support should look and how it will be targeted.
Without getting ahead of the Minister, I hope that he will say what guidance on best practice for local commissioners and ICBs will be set out, particularly in relation to those with learning disabilities and autism. We have spoken about easy-read documents, for example, which should probably be made available, as should advice on how commissioners can best make sure that all those who might benefit from an advance choice document are meaningfully engaged and informed of their right and ability to do so.
The Minister has agreed previously to make sure that he works with disabled people’s organisations, including those run by and for people with learning disabilities and autism, on bringing forward a code of practice on the Mental Health Bill. Input on patient experience into how best to contact and meaningfully engage people who would benefit from an advance choice document would be particularly beneficial.
Very briefly, the aim of Liberal Democrat amendment 18 is to include consideration of financial circumstances in an advance choice document. I have looked into this—in my opinion, it is outside the scope of what an advance choice document does. An advance choice document sets out how an individual would wish to be treated if they became so unwell that they were unable to make those decisions for themselves. I am not fully sure how one’s financial circumstances fit into how one would be treated relative to detention or, potentially, in a community-based setting. I understand that financial circumstances have an impact on people’s mental health—we have talked about that in debates on other clauses—but they do not necessarily have a place in this specific part of the Bill.
I encourage the Committee to support clause 45 and to adopt Government amendments 32 and 33. This is, once again, a big step forward in ensuring that those with serious mental illnesses are able to input into their care and treatment in a real and meaningful way.
Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. In the previous sitting of the Committee, I spoke extensively about the close link between money worries and poor mental health. That link is why I have sought, through amendment 18, to ensure that advance choice documents include a specific section on money. This would give people greater choice and control over their finances when they are in crisis. Without that provision, financial worries could be an even greater hurdle to recovery.
We have talked a lot about financial problems being a major contributor to mental health crises, and they can make it much more difficult to recover from one. I will not go through all the details again, but the numbers show how significant the problem is. Last year, nearly 21,000 people in England alone were struggling with problem debt while in hospital for their mental health, so it is not a small cohort of patients for whom this is a specific issue. Ensuring that people’s finances are taken into consideration when they are in a mental health crisis will prevent future illness, reduce waiting lists and help people to return to daily life more smoothly, including to work. If we ignore it, that will end up costing the NHS more in time and resources.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I want to speak in support of amendment 46. It is eminently sensible and would give all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document to record their treatment preferences in a formal legal document. Those preferences would be enjoyed only in the event of a future mental health crisis or detention under the Mental Health Act.
The amendment would give important control to patients and to those around them to know that their future care decisions would be applicable at the point at which they become incapacious. It would quite rightly place a requirement on NHS England—for as long as it continues to exist—and ICBs to ensure that those individuals are aware of their rights and, more importantly, that they are not just aware of them but are supported in creating an advance choice document if they so wish.
The amendment is all about empowering patients. The more we can empower patients who face these challenges, the better. It would increase their autonomy and help with the planning of their future care. It would help both in the understanding and the honouring of patients’ wishes. Critically, it would reduce conflict. In these circumstances, tensions are high and pressures are acute, so conflict can arise in the most unintended of ways. Having an advance choice document minimises that risk.
If the Government will not support amendment 46, what reassurances can the Minister give in relation to the code of practice? How will this be accounted for in the code of practice to ensure consistency in the information imparted to patients across the country by NHS England and the ICBs? We must ensure that there is not a postcode lottery and that everybody, regardless of where they live in the country, gets the consistency of care that they are entitled to.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of amendment 46, tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, which seeks to strengthen clause 45, an already welcome and progressive clause, by creating a statutory right for all eligible patients to create advance choice documents if they so wish.
Let me begin by saying that I think everyone on the Committee recognises the importance of advance choice documents. They are an excellent initiative, and I am glad that the Bill introduces a framework to support their use. I hope we can all agree that they represent a constructive and compassionate shift in how we think about mental health care—one that puts the patient’s voice at the centre. ACDs are fundamentally about empowerment. They allow individuals, while they are well and have full capacity, to record their wishes, preferences and concerns regarding their treatment, so that during future periods of unwellness, when they may lack capacity, their past self can still be heard and respected. As Bipolar UK has rightly put it:
“The idea behind an ACD is that you use your past to plan your future.”
That simple principle holds immense power. Individuals with lived experience of severe mental illness like bipolar disorder are often experts in their own care. They know what works, what does not and what signs to look out for. An ACD allows that hard-earned knowledge to be recorded, shared and used to guide clinical decisions. By identifying early warning signs and outlining preferred treatments, ACDs can enable families, friends and professionals to intervene earlier, potentially avoiding a crisis or reducing the severity of an episode. This is not just about better care; it is about safer care and, crucially, more timely care.
The research is persuasive. Studies suggest that ACDs can reduce rates of compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act by up to 25%. That is not a small statistic; it is a significant reduction in trauma for patients, in the use of force and in resource pressures on services. It is hard to think of a better example of a policy that both improves outcomes and reduces system strain. ACDs can also play a vital role in reducing inequalities, especially among racial minority groups, who, as we have all said, are statistically more likely to be detained under the Act. Ensuring that those patients can express their wishes in advance gives them greater agency and helps to address long-standing disparities in the system.
ACDs are not just a useful administrative tool; they are, as Earl Howe put it in the House of Lords,
“are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 79.]
I absolutely agree, which brings me to amendment 46. The clause as drafted places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards to consider making information about ACDs available, and to help those people whom they consider “appropriate” to create one. That is a start, but it falls short of what is needed. The shadow Minister’s amendment would take us further and create a statutory right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. It would define clearly who is eligible—for example, those previously detained under the Act, those diagnosed with a condition that may require future detention and qualifying informal patients—and would put a clear duty on NHS bodies to inform these patients of their right and to help them to exercise it. This is not about placing a burden on services; it is about ensuring that everyone who stands to benefit from an ACD knows that they can make one and is supported to do so if they wish.
I appreciate that the Government have tabled amendments 32 and 33 to clause 45, and I welcome the intention behind them. Amendment 32 requires that NHS England and integrated care boards must bring the availability of this information and help to the attention of such people “as it considers appropriate.” Amendment 33 expands on how that might be delivered, including through conversations with qualified individuals and by having specific regard to the benefits of ACDs in the 12 months following discharge from hospital.
Although these are improvements, I must respectfully say that they stop short of what is needed. They continue to frame the duty in terms of who the board considers appropriate, yet the very point of ACDs is that we should not be gatekeeping access. We should not be making assumptions about who would or would not benefit from having one. Every eligible patient should be offered the choice, not just those whom the system deems suitable. We are dealing here with people’s autonomy and right to shape their future care, and if we start from a place of selective provision, we immediately disempower many of the very individuals we claim to support.
Jen Craft
I would welcome the hon. Lady’s thoughts on where clause 45 or the Government’s amendments allow for selective provision. My understanding is that they place an onus on mental health commissioners to make sure that all those who are deemed appropriate to be in receipt of an ACD should be given the ability to make one. I do not think that is selective; it is very much related to the purposes of the Bill, and it spells out who may come under the provision.
Aphra Brandreth
The hon. Lady has just made my exact point: that it is who they deem appropriate. That is the point I am trying to make. It is for the individual—of course, with support of people looking after them—to decide whether it is appropriate for them and to be offered it.
Aphra Brandreth
I will make progress, as I know that a few Members wish to speak on this point, and we have a long day ahead.
I will touch briefly on amendment 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, which suggests that ACDs should include a person’s financial circumstances. I recognise the sentiment behind the amendment. As both I and the hon. Member for Winchester have said in Committee, financial stress can be a major factor in mental health, but I gently suggest that prescribing the content of an ACD in this way is unhelpful. The point of the document is choice. The individual decides what they want to include, not us. That is the strength of the approach. It is personal and voluntary; it is theirs.
Amendment 46 respects that principle. It does not tell patients what to include in their ACD; it simply gives them the right to make one, and ensures they are informed of that right and supported to act on it. ACDs can be lifesaving, and they help people to stay well, safe and in control. They are especially valuable for those who have been detained before or who are at risk of detention in the future. We know that they are already supported by a wide range of stakeholders and experts by experience.
The question for us is not whether to support ACDs—I think we all do. The question is: do we want to make access to ACDs a universal right for those eligible, or do we want to continue to leave it to the discretion of the system? I believe the answer is clear: we must empower people, honour their voice and do so not only when they are well and able to speak, but when they are unwell and most vulnerable. That is what the amendment seeks to do. I urge all colleagues on the Committee to support amendment 46 and strengthen clause 45. Let us make the right to create an advance choice document a reality for everyone who needs one.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. You and the Committee will be pleased to know that my hon. Friends have made most of the points I wanted to flag.
In poll after poll and survey after survey, patients feel they do not get information in a timely and constructive way. Our amendment 46 would give patients a stronger say in their future care if they lose capacity. It clarifies that patients must be given clear, proactive support to understand, prepare and use the documents. It is about ensuring that advance choice documents are not just theoretical paperwork, but living, respected statements of a patient’s wishes.
I therefore support the clause and the amendment, and I ask the Minister three questions. How will NHS England and local integrated care boards ensure that commissioners are trained to respect and use ACDs in practice, especially in emergencies? Secondly, what oversight will ensure that ACDs are not simply ignored at the bedside, when a patient is most vulnerable? Will the Government consider a review mechanism so that we can assess how well ACDs are working in a few years’ time, after the Bill is passed?
I turn briefly to Liberal Democrat amendment 18. Like other hon. Members, I feel that the inclusion of financial information in an ACD is not appropriate, both from a practical and a personal security, safety and information point of view. I do, however, completely support the hon. Member for Winchester’s overall view that there is a significant problem with how financial stress can affect a person’s mental health. Like him, I call on the Minister to think about how we as a country, whether in this Bill or somewhere else, can address the impact of financial stress on mental health.
Stephen Kinnock
I will speak first to amendment 46. We agree with the principle of the amendment, but do not think it necessary. Under the Bill, if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an advance choice document approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.
Dr Evans
If I am correct, the Minister said “if” a patient “approaches”. That is the fundamental point: that the onus is on the patient to know what their right is to approach the authorities. We are trying to do it the other way, by saying that their right is to be told about what is going on. Will the Minister clarify what he meant, because this is essentially what we are concerned about?
Stephen Kinnock
What I meant is what I said. I will read it again: if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an ACD approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.
We are also concerned about prescribing that commissioners inform and support some of the groups of individuals identified by the amendment. For example, it may be practically challenging and not always appropriate to contact people who were detained or admitted informally many years ago about making an ACD. We agree, however, that that there is a good rationale for encouraging past voluntary and involuntary patients, especially those discharged in the past 12 months, to create an ACD. That is reflected in the Government amendments to strengthen the duties on health commissioners, which I will come to shortly.
The approach is based on research findings that suggest that the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after discharge from hospital. That also recognises that many of the individuals are likely still to be under the care of mental health services and therefore well positioned to receive support and advice from services to make their ACD. Ultimately, the amendment was debated in the other place and not considered workable. In recognition of concerns expressed by Earl Howe and Lord Kamall, however, my noble Friend Baroness Merron made a commitment to strengthen duties on health commissioners in relation to the advance choice documents.
Government amendments 32 to 35, which we tabled in response to the amendment, will strengthen the duties in three ways. First, they will require that health commissioners proactively make arrangements to bring information on and help with making an advance choice document to the attention of the appropriate people. That is to prevent the risk of commissioners taking a minimal approach to discharging the duties.
Secondly, the Government amendments will require that information and help is provided through discussion with a suitably qualified person, such as a health or care professional, advocate, support worker or peer support worker. That is to ensure that people can rely on the guidance and support of a professional, where they wish to receive it.
Lastly, the Government amendments will encourage commissioners to have regard to the benefits of a person making an advance choice document within 12 months of discharge from a mental health hospital. That builds on research findings that suggest the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after detention.
Government amendments 32 to 35 will help to further secure the success of advance choice documents by ensuring that people who are at risk of contact with the Act are given the opportunity to make an ACD, as well as being offered the dedicated support that they may need to do so.
On amendment 18, we agree that there is value in encouraging people to include details of any relevant financial matters within their ACD. Financial matters, such as problem debt, can worsen or even trigger a person’s mental illness. We expect that doing so will help to ensure that people receive the care and support that they need if they later experience a mental health crisis. We feel that it is important for individuals to have autonomy over what they include in their ACD, however, rather than prescribing the contents in legislation. We therefore think that the intention behind the amendment is better achieved by other means.
We plan to develop guidance and a template ACD to support service users in making their document. Those will include prompts to consider any relevant financial matters. Furthermore, the guidance that we plan to include in the code of practice for mental health professionals will cover the need to support the person to consider any relevant financial matters that may be important to their mental health recovery.
Finally, I turn to the clause in its entirety. Advance choice documents provide a place for people to set out their wishes, feelings, decisions, values and beliefs, while they are well, regarding their care and treatment. That is in preparation for the scenario in which they are too unwell and lack capacity to express such things at the time. At that point, the contents of their ACD should be considered by mental health professionals to inform their decision making regarding the person’s admission to hospital, detention under the Act, and care and treatment.
Research shows that ACDs can have a range of benefits, including reducing the risk of hospital admissions. To help to unlock those benefits and ensure the uptake of ACDs among service users, the clause will place duties on health commissioners to make appropriate arrangements so that relevant individuals are informed and supported to make an ACD. The duty aims to ensure that individuals who are likely to benefit most from making an ACD are proactively given the opportunity to make one while they are well.
Other clauses create the framework to ensure that the contents of a person’s ACD have a real impact on care and treatment decisions, for example the clinical checklist, the compelling reason test and the new framework for creating a nominated person. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth to withdraw amendment 46, and I ask Liberal Democrat Members not to press amendment 18. I commend Government amendments 32 to 35 and clause 45 to the Committee.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 47 stand part.
New clause 21—Duty to provide advice and support to families and carers—
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 117B, insert—
‘117C After-care: provision of support and advice to families and carers
(1) The responsible integrated care board must ensure that, as part of the provision of after-care services under section 117 of this Act, advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the person discharged.
(2) This support must include—
(a) information about the person’s condition and recovery;
(b) guidance on how to support their recovery at home and avoid relapse;
(c) access to financial, housing, and social care advice services relevant to the situation of the person’s family; and
(d) procedures for family members or nominated persons to notify the integrated care board of concerns that the person is at future risk of detention under Part 2 of this Act.
(3) Where a concern is raised under subsection (2)(d), the integrated care board must—
(a) consider whether the individual meets criteria to be included on the register of persons at risk under section 125D of this Act; and
(b) take reasonable steps to involve the family or nominated person in planning of subsequent support, subject to—
(i) the person’s consent; or
(ii) if they lack capacity, the person’s best interests.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance under section 125B of this Act on the format and provision of support under subsection (3)(b).’”
This new clause would require the integrated care board, as part of the aftercare services offered under the Mental Health Act 1982, to offer support and advice to the family or carers of the person being discharged from treatment.
Stephen Kinnock
I will set out the details of two important clauses relating to aftercare. Clause 46 will provide the tribunal with an important new power to recommend that plans for aftercare arrangements are undertaken for patients who are not yet ready to be discharged from hospital. Under the Mental Health Act, the tribunal can make decisions about discharge, but it does not have a role in recommending aftercare while a patient remains detained. Giving the tribunal the power to make recommendations that aftercare planning should take place will encourage earlier planning for a patient’s eventual discharge from hospital.
Those recommendations are particularly important for complex cases in which patients may require intensive support following their discharge. Early aftercare planning ensures that the necessary health and social care services are co-ordinated and in place when the patient is ready to leave the hospital. This will help to reduce the likelihood of delayed discharges or failed transitions back into the community.
Although the tribunal’s recommendations are not legally binding, they are intended to carry significant weight with aftercare providers. If recommendations are not taken forward, the tribunal retains the power to review the patient’s case. That will ensure that there is both encouragement and accountability in the aftercare planning process, enhancing patient outcomes by making sure that care is appropriately planned and delivered.
The clause will strengthen the role of tribunals in overseeing the care and treatment of patients under the Mental Health Act, ensuring that a patient’s needs are addressed holistically and in a timely manner. By encouraging earlier and more co-ordinated aftercare planning, we will reduce the risk of patients being discharged without the necessary support in place, leading to better overall patient outcomes and smoother transitions from hospital to community care.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. Again, I reflect on stories that I have heard from local constituents on the issues that are being addressed in the Lampard inquiry. Does the Minister agree that these provisions will help to avoid the too early discharges that have led people either to go back into care or to get into even more difficult situations? One of my constituents ended up taking his own life because he was discharged too early from care.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In many ways, the best way to look at the issue of discharge is to start thinking about it almost as soon as the patient is admitted. We need to be thinking holistically about what place they are in, what the aftercare plan might look like and how it might relate to the discharge plan. The earlier we do so, the better. In so many cases, upstream intervention is important to avoid having to scramble to deal with a crisis further down the line. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that point.
I turn to clause 47. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act places a duty on the NHS and local social services authorities to provide aftercare to certain patients who have been detained under the Act once they leave hospital. Aftercare services seek to reduce the risk of readmission, and they must be provided until the NHS and local social services authorities are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. However, there is currently no requirement to notify the person when that ends. Clause 47 requires that the provision of aftercare lasts until the NHS and local social services authorities jointly give notice to the person in writing that they are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. This will clarify when aftercare services have ended.
Decisions on entitlement to and responsibility for aftercare services are heavily contested. Deeming rules are used to deem a person to be ordinarily resident in one area, even though they are living in a different area. They ensure continuity of financial responsibility when a person is placed in a local authority area and prevent the local authority from placing someone out of area to ease its financial burdens. Currently, section 117 does not contain any deeming rules.
Clause 47 will apply existing deeming rules under social care legislation to identify which local authority is responsible for arranging aftercare for an individual patient. This change will add clarity and consistency to an often litigious system and more closely align local authority social care and NHS rules for determining ordinary residents. This aims to support organisations to work together to provide and plan for aftercare services and reduce the number of disputes that have arisen in recent years.
Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Guildford for tabling new clause 21, which seeks to place a duty on the responsible integrated care board to ensure that advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the patient being discharged. The statutory guidance on discharge from mental health in-patient settings sets out how NHS organisations should exercise duties to co-operate under sections 72 and 82 of the National Health Service Act 2006 in the discharge process. This includes providing information or support on housing, social services provision and financial support. The Mental Health Act code of practice also provides statutory guidance on the information that should be provided to patients, families and carers.
We do not believe that it is necessary to place additional duties on integrated care boards to provide information and support, as existing duties are sufficient. We will consider whether to use the revised code to bring together guidance on discharge into one place and explore how to clarify best practice on information and support to carers. I hope that what I have set out satisfies the hon. Member for Guildford and that she will not press new clause 21. I commend clauses 46 and 47 to the Committee.
Dr Evans
I will speak to clauses 46 and 47 and then to new clause 21. Clauses 46 and 47 form a significant part of the Government’s effort to strengthen discharge planning in continuity of mental health aftercare. Clause 46 extends tribunal power. Under the current Mental Health Act, when a first-tier tribunal considers a patient detained under part II of the Act and decides not to discharge them, it may still make non-binding recommendations, for example that the patient be transferred to another hospital or given leave of absence.
Rosie Wrighting (Kettering) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of clauses 46 and 47, two vital reforms that place people instead of process at the heart of mental health care.
Clause 46 will empower mental health tribunals to do more than simply decide on discharge. It will give them the ability to recommend aftercare planning even when a patient is not yet ready to leave hospital. As the Minister says, this is so important for the co-ordination of local services. In a previous sitting, I spoke about my constituent who was sectioned and then discharged from hospital in the middle of the night, in winter. The clause is vitally forward-thinking and will ensure that for people like my constituent, the necessary support structures—housing, therapy and community services—are in place early, smoothing the path to recovery and reducing the risk of relapse. It is about planning with people in mind, instead of reacting when it is too late.
Clause 47 will strengthen the legal framework around aftercare itself. It will clarify when aftercare ends and, crucially, who is responsible for providing it. By aligning the rules of ordinary residence with existing social care legislation, it will remove ambiguity and ensure that patients receive care even when they have moved between areas. The impact of care continuity cannot be overstated, especially for people up and down the country who do not have stable housing or support networks, like many of my constituents in Kettering.
My local council used to be Northamptonshire county council, but it then split into North Northamptonshire council and West Northamptonshire council. Some services are separated between the two, but others still operate across Northamptonshire as a whole. Having a local authority that is clearly responsible will be really important to my constituents and will offer a clear, accountable council for their care.
Together, these clauses will reduce delays, improve accountability and, importantly, give people the best chance of rebuilding their lives, preventing them from relapsing or having to be sectioned again. They will promote a more compassionate, co-ordinated and consistent approach to mental health recovery. I am happy to support them.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak to new clause 21, which would place a clear statutory duty on integrated care boards to offer advice and support to families or carers of patients receiving aftercare under section 117 of the Mental Health Act.
I thank the Minister for his comments about the new clause. I acknowledge what he says about the statutory guidance and code of practice, but I hear from far too many patients and their families living in my constituency of Guildford that advice and support is often not being provided and that authorities are falling short.
This new clause is rooted in a very simple principle: good mental health care does not end at the point of discharge. Recovery is often long, fragile and dependent on support at home, yet families and carers—the people holding things together day in, day out—are often left behind with little or no guidance. This clause seeks to change that: it would ensure that carers are given clear information about the patient’s condition and recovery journey, supported in helping to prevent relapse and readmission, linked to relevant support systems, including housing and social care, and provided with a route to raise concerns if they believe that someone is at risk in future.
Jen Craft
Having looked at new clause 21, I have a rather large concern about consent. The hon. Lady is setting out what the integrated care board would have a duty to do, including giving information about a “person’s condition and recovery” to
“the family or carers of the person discharged”.
I have a significant concern that the person being discharged may not have the kind of relationship with their family or carers that would make that helpful. The clause, as drafted, does not seem to make allowance for consent, except where
“the person is at future risk of detention”
under part II of the Mental Health Act. I would welcome the hon. Lady’s thoughts on that.
Zöe Franklin
The hon. Member makes a really good point. There is definitely a place for ensuring that we work on this further to make sure that it covers that. I will come on to that later, if she will allow me.
We know that early intervention is key. We know that families, carers and those around an individual are often the first to spot the warning signs, and that they need to feel empowered, not sidelined. I hear time and again, as I am sure hon. Members across this Committee Room have heard, from people who have been left out of the discharge planning for their loved ones. They say that they have received no clear information and that they feel unsupported and unable to fully support their loved one when they return home.
Importantly, the new clause sets out a process whereby, if a family member wants to raise a concern, the team must consider whether that individual should be added to the register of persons at risk of detention under part II of the Mental Health Act. We believe that this is a sensible, joined-up approach to prevention, spotting risks early and acting before a crisis point is reached. Finally, the new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish national guidance and ensure consistency and clarity across the system.
We often speak of carers as the invisible workforce of our NHS. The new clause would make their contribution visible by recognising their role and giving them the information and support they need to fulfil it well.
Dr Evans
Forgive me if I missed it, but I did not hear any discussion of this point. I am slightly concerned about the way the new clause is written, as it could be a duplication of the support, protections and duties put in place through the Care Act 2014. Could the hon. Member set out how the new clause would run in parallel with the Care Act? Is it complementary, or does it work against it?
Zöe Franklin
In my final comments, I was going to say to the Minister that, having considered the points he set out in his opening statement in relation to this clause, I am prepared not to press the new clause. I appreciate that some of the information already exists in the Bill and in the existing documentation to which the shadow Minister referred. I also acknowledge the point made by the hon. Member for Thurrock, that some aspects around consent must be dug into.
However, I ask the Minister to work with me, my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester and other hon. Members with an interest in the issue, so that he can hear our constituents’ experiences of where the current guidance is clearly not working, and ensure that appropriate additions are made to the supporting documents for the Bill to address the concerns that we have raised in the new clause.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 19th June 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 June 2025 - (19 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
If any Member wishes to take their jacket off, I am happy for them to do so, as this is an extremely warm room. I am hoping to finish at 5 pm, so in the interests of making progress, Members should keep interventions to a minimum. If there were no repetition in speeches, that would be very welcome.
Clause 46
Tribunal power to recommend after-care
Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clause 47 stand part.
New clause 21—Duty to provide advice and support to families and carers—
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 117B, insert—
‘117C After-care: provision of support and advice to families and carers
(1) The responsible integrated care board must ensure that, as part of the provision of after-care services under section 117 of this Act, advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the person discharged.
(2) This support must include—
(a) information about the person’s condition and recovery;
(b) guidance on how to support their recovery at home and avoid relapse;
(c) access to financial, housing, and social care advice services relevant to the situation of the person’s family; and
(d) procedures for family members or nominated persons to notify the integrated care board of concerns that the person is at future risk of detention under Part 2 of this Act.
(3) Where a concern is raised under subsection (2)(d), the integrated care board must—
(a) consider whether the individual meets criteria to be included on the register of persons at risk under section 125D of this Act; and
(b) take reasonable steps to involve the family or nominated person in planning of subsequent support, subject to—
(i) the person’s consent; or
(ii) if they lack capacity, the person’s best interests.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance under section 125B of this Act on the format and provision of support under subsection (3)(b).’”
This new clause would require the integrated care board, as part of the aftercare services offered under the Mental Health Act 1982, to offer support and advice to the family or carers of the person being discharged from treatment.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
I will take a few moments to reflect on clauses 46 and 47. They deal with aftercare, which is at the heart of how we help people to recover from serious mental illness and reduce the chance of their readmission. Clause 46 will give mental health tribunals the ability to make recommendations about aftercare services—a welcome shift in emphasis towards recognising that recovery is something that happens not at the point of discharge, but in the weeks, months and even years that follow.
Until now, tribunals could recommend things like hospital leave or transfer, but they had no say in the vital question of what happens after discharge. Clause 46 gives them a voice in shaping that next phase. It is a step that could help to ensure that aftercare is not an afterthought, but a core part of discharge planning. The effectiveness of this change, however, depends on whether there are services to recommend. As the independent review made clear, the challenge is not just in writing aftercare into law, but in making sure that it is there in practice.
Clause 47 takes a welcome step in providing greater clarity and accountability around which local authority is responsible for arranging section 117 aftercare. By clarifying the rules on ordinary residents, especially for people who received care as children, and by requiring that local authorities and NHS bodies jointly issue written notice when aftercare is ending, the clause helps to ensure that decisions are made in a timely and transparent way. That improved clarity should support smoother transitions from hospital to community, reduce disputes between services and, ultimately, help to prevent relapse and readmission.
Clarity in law must be met by capacity on the ground, which is why the core question is not just what the clauses enable, but whether the system is equipped to deliver on them. I therefore ask the Minister what assessment has been made of the availability of appropriate aftercare services in the community. Can we be confident that NHS and social care teams have the resources that they need to meet the duty effectively?
We know that aftercare, under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, can include support with housing, employment, social engagement and culturally appropriate services, all of which can mean the difference between recovery and relapse, but they only work when they are properly joined up, tailored to the individual and delivered in a timely way. The independent review put it well:
“priority should be given to making sure that good services are available to all…But we also believe that it is right that people who have been detained should have additional support to ensure a successful transition to the community.”
I agree with that principle. If we want to see fewer people detained, we must do better at supporting people once they leave hospital.
I support clauses 46 and 47. They are sensible, necessary reforms that will give structure and clarity to a part of the system that has often been patchy or overlooked. But if we want them to work as intended, they must be backed up by investment in community services, good local commissioning and effective partnership between health and social care. In short, these are good steps but must be followed through with real delivery on the ground if we are to achieve the lasting outcomes that we all want.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. Having taken your clear instructions, I will be very brief in speaking to clauses 46 and 47.
Clause 46 is a positive step in principle, but there are concerns that the recommendations remain non-binary and may therefore lack the practical effect—or the teeth —without enforcement or review mechanisms. I have three questions that I hope the Minister will address. First, will he clarify whether there are any plans to give legal weight to tribunal recommendations, perhaps by requiring a written response or justification where those recommendations are not followed? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that resource-constrained local authorities can implement recommended aftercare plans promptly and fully? Thirdly, could he please provide data on the expected impact of this provision on readmission rates?
Clause 47 clearly sets out and improves on the legal clarity, which is welcome, but I have a couple of questions. What steps will be taken to ensure that frontline practitioners understand and consistently apply the revised ordinary residence test? Has the Department conducted an assessment of the administrative burdens or delays that may result from the implementation of the clause? Apart from those questions, I welcome the provision.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I will go through the questions that have been asked.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether there will be any duty on ICBs or local authorities to respond to recommendations. The tribunal will have the power to recommend that plans are put in place for a patient’s aftercare. To assist in ensuring that these recommendations are followed, the tribunal can reconvene if its recommendations are not acted on, ensuring accountability from aftercare bodies.
The shadow Minister asked what mechanisms are in place to resolve disputes between authorities. There is already a process in place under the Care Act 2014 for resolving disputes and an opportunity to escalate decisions to the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers, if required. He also asked what the notice must contain. We will absolutely look at the guidance in the code on the process for ending aftercare and notifying the person.
The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about plans for legal weight, resourcing and data. I will write to him on his questions about plans for legal weight and data. I think that resourcing will be a constant theme. Obviously, we have to assess all the resourcing implications once the Bill receives Royal Assent, and we will develop an implementation plan on that basis. The first annual written ministerial statement will be the hon. Gentleman’s opportunity to hold the Government to account on that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Tribunal powers in guardianship cases: burden of proof
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Currently, where an application is made to the appropriate tribunal by or in respect of a patient who is subject to guardianship, the patient can be discharged only if they can prove to the tribunal that they do not continue to meet the guardianship criteria. The burden of proof is on the patient. The clause will amend the Mental Health Act so that it will now be for the local authority responsible for the guardianship to prove to the tribunal that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria. As the independent review pointed out, the current burden of proof is “out of line” with all other applications to the tribunal. The Government consider that this should be remedied.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I fear that I may test your patience a little further on this occasion, Mrs Harris, but I rise to address clause 48. Although much of the Bill aims to modernise and humanise our mental health framework, and in many ways it does so commendably, clause 47 presents not only an opportunity, but a challenge: to ensure that we get the balance right between liberty and protection.
The clause will make an amendment to section 72(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983. As the Minister said, it will shift the burden of proof in tribunal proceedings concerning patients who are subject to a guardianship order. Under the current legal framework, it is the patient who must demonstrate that the criteria for guardianship are no longer met, by showing either that they are no longer suffering from a mental disorder or that continued guardianship is no longer necessary for their welfare or the protection of others.
Clause 48 would reverse that burden. It would place the onus instead upon the local authority to demonstrate, in the mental health tribunal, that the individual still meets the statutory test. The tribunal would be required to direct a discharge unless the authority can prove otherwise.
Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the principle of this reform. On the contrary, I believe that there is a strong case for rebalancing the legal dynamics in favour of the individual, particularly when we reach situations in which their liberty and autonomy are at stake. The principle of least restriction is not, or should not be, merely aspirational; it should be foundational to any mental health regime in a liberal democracy.
I say with equal conviction that the practical operation of such a change requires careful thought and adequate resourcing. It must be done under clear legal parameters. Precisely on those fronts, I seek clarification from the Minister and, if I may be so bold, I seek some improvements to this aspect of the Bill.
First, we must consider the legal principle at play. A reversal of the burden of proof in this context is not technical or incidental; it marks a constitutional shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Traditionally, as the Minister well knows, the burden of proof lies on the party making an assertion that departs from the status quo. In this case, that would ordinarily be the patient applying for discharge from the guardianship. However, when the state exercises more coercive powers—particularly powers that have an impact on an individual’s liberty and private life—it is appropriate that the state be required to justify those powers afresh, especially when challenged. That is the logic that clause 48 seeks to embrace. In broad terms, as I say, I support it.
The approaches are reinforced by our obligations under article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which protects the right to liberty and security of the person. It is clear that any deprivation of liberty must be justified not just initially, but on an ongoing basis. Jurisprudence from Strasbourg has repeatedly emphasised that periodic review mechanisms must be substantive and not merely procedural in nature. The state must show continuing justification and must not rely on past assessments or presumptions in its favour.
Clause 48 helps us to move closer to compliance with those principles, but the legislation, as drafted, does leave some important questions unanswered. What, precisely, is the standard of proof that local authorities must meet? Is it the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, or is it something higher, given the gravity of what is at stake? If we are to take this shift seriously, we must also give tribunals clear statutory guidance on how to interpret the new burden. Otherwise, we will fall into the trap of risking inconsistency in decision making, confusion among professionals and a potential increase in appeals and legal challenges.
Secondly, and crucially, I would like to press the Minister on the question of practical implementation. Changing the legal burden is not merely a matter of legislative drafting; it requires a systematic adjustment in how evidence is gathered, how professionals prepare for tribunal hearings, and how decisions are reviewed internally within local authorities. As hon. Members will know, local authorities are already operating under intense financial and operational pressures. Mental health social workers are often working with caseloads that stretch the limits of what may be considered reasonable. Legal teams within councils are often overstretched and under-resourced; if we now place them under a legal obligation to present a comprehensive, evidentially sound case for continued guardianship—perhaps at multiple intervals across an individual’s care pathway—we must ensure that they are adequately supported to do so.
What assessment have the Government made of the financial and operational impact of clause 48? Will local authorities receive new funding to enable them to meet that duty? Will social care professionals receive specific training on the evidential requirements now expected of them? Without such support, we risk not only undermining the intent of the clause, but creating a perverse outcome in which discharges may occur not because the patient no longer meets the criteria, but because the local authority lacks the capacity to make the evidential case in time.
I also caution against the risk of overcorrection. Although I fully support the principle that individuals should not bear an unfair evidential burden, we must not move so far in the other direction that we weaken the legitimate protective mechanisms that should be in place. Guardianship is not detention; it is a community-based measure designed to provide oversight and structure for individuals who may struggle to live independently due to serious mental illness. It is used infrequently and only where strictly necessary.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. I would expect nothing less from him than a fantastic canter through this important clause. I will not repeat a lot of what he said, but I will try to emphasise it.
Although clause 48 is short, it speaks to the much larger principle of the balance between public protection and individual liberty. I will not go through all the details, as the Minister laid out the changes, but the burden of proof is currently on the patient to convince the tribunal that they no longer meet the criteria for guardianship. The clause will change that. Instead, the burden will fall on the local authority or relevant public body to prove that guardianship remains justified. The Government’s explanatory notes put it plainly:
“the patient should be discharged by the Tribunal unless the local authority can prove that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria.”
The clause is not just a technical amendment; it is a fundamental realignment of legal principle. It reinforces the presumption of liberty. It aligns guardianship cases with the principle that when the state restricts an individual freedom, it is for the state to justify that restriction, not the individual to justify their freedom. It echoes the evolution of mental health law towards a less restrictive approach, a principle we put in place on the first day of our deliberations on the Bill. Although clause 48 amends only a few words, it reflects a big change in principle: liberty is the default, and restriction must be justified and not presumed.
There are some important questions that I want to echo and emphasise, again leading on from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. Are local authorities prepared for the reversal of burden? Have they been consulted? Do they have the legal resources, documentation, standards and evidential processes to meet the burden before the tribunal? On top of that, we have already agreed that there will be automatic referrals. We would therefore expect more referrals to the tribunal as well as a change in how they operate. This is a huge undertaking. If they fail through a lack of capacity organisation, we risk a situation in which patients are discharged not because they no longer meet the criteria, but because the case was poorly presented. How will the Government ensure that that does not happen?
Secondly, will the Government issue statutory guidance or regulations to ensure that consistency in how the burden is discharged? We do not want a postcode lottery in the quality of guardianship applications or tribunal evidence. Thirdly, we must always consider public protection. The guardianship regime is not designed for high-risk individuals, but it can still apply in cases where behaviour poses a serious risk to self or others—for example, individuals with profound learning difficulties who might place themselves in danger if not properly supported.
We also talked about cumulative or escalating behaviour in one of our first debates. The reason for doing so is that we are at the fringe of significant cases. What safeguards are in place to ensure that public safety considerations are given due weight in cases where the evidence might be incomplete or borderline? Finally, do the Government intend to monitor the impact of the clause? Will data be published on whether tribunal discharge rates increase following this reform, and whether that leads to any unintended consequences?
I want to be clear that His Majesty’s Opposition support the principle behind the clause. We support a mental health system that is rights-based, person-centred and built on the presumption of liberty. But that principle must be matched by a system capable of meeting the duties it imposes. Rights on paper are meaningful only if public authorities are resourced and able to support them and uphold them in practice. I look forward to the Minister addressing those points.
Stephen Kinnock
On the assessment of impact, it might be useful for the Committee to know, for context, that the use of guardianships under the Act is small: the number of new cases has declined from 470 in 2004-05 to just 40 in 2024-25. The number of open cases has also fallen in recent years. I think pretty much all the questions from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley and the shadow Minister are addressed by that point. We are talking here about small numbers, so the cost would be relatively minor.
Dr Evans
That is a staggering drop in numbers. Is there a reason behind it? Is it that the burden of proof was always put on the patient, so they did not feel that they were in a position to do something? If we are inverting that, does the Minister expect the numbers to go back up?
Stephen Kinnock
I do not have any data to suggest that the numbers will go back up. That relates to the question that the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about having a statutory review. We will be vigilant. As with all the changes in the Bill, we will closely monitor implementation and impact. That goes right across the board and, hopefully, addresses the Member’s questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Police stations are not appropriate places to hold people in need of mental health treatment. The Mental Health Act 1983 (Places of Safety) Regulations 2017 amended the 1983 Act to set a high threshold for using police stations as places of safety. Uses have reduced from over 8,000 in 2012-13 to just 322 in 2023-24 across England and Wales. While that number is mercifully low, the Bill will, under the principles of therapeutic benefit, end the use of police cells as places of safety. Instead, when police exercise powers to remove a person from a public space or private premises for the purpose of a mental health assessment, they will take them to a suitable place of safety, such as a hospital.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
I declare an interest: my sister practises as a psychiatrist within the NHS, as the Minister knows. She has seen the important shift away from the use of police stations as places of safety and towards making sure that all patients have access to a place of safety in a healthcare setting. I know from my local police that, while they do their best to support people in distress in a police station, it is not the right place. This is the right thing to do, and I support the Government’s move.
Stephen Kinnock
I ask my hon. Friend to pass on our thanks to her sister for the vital work that she does in what I know can often be a challenging environment—we appreciate it. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this is an important principle. There has been a remarkable drop in the use of police cells, which is to be warmly welcomed. We think that now is the time to make it clear, on the face of the Bill, that a police cell is not an appropriate place for these purposes.
The clause’s amendment to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act will not change the police’s ability to intervene when someone is in a mental health crisis, nor their ability to detain someone in a cell when exercising their powers in relation to criminal, or suspected criminal, activity. The clause will prevent courts from temporarily detaining people with severe mental illness in prison as a place of safety while they are waiting to access a bed for treatment or assessment under the Mental Health Act. Under the reforms, a defendant or convicted person who meets the criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act for treatment or assessment must be transferred directly to hospital, or, in the case of children, to a hospital, surgery, community home or other place that the court considers suitable, ensuring that they receive swifter access to the care they need. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
You will be pleased to know that I will be briefer this time, Mrs Harris; I want to leave room for my Opposition colleagues. The intent of the clause is entirely sound: to treat mental health as a health issue, not a criminal one. However, the capacity of NHS services to provide timely and suitable alternatives remains in question.
With that in mind, I have three questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address. First, will the Government commit to publishing the implementation plan for ensuring adequate numbers of health-based places of safety across regions before the clause comes into force? Secondly, what contingency measures are currently in place or foreseen if no place of safety is available and police powers have been limited? Thirdly, can the Minister commit to an annual publication of data on hospital-based places of safety, their capacity and their use?
Aphra Brandreth
As we have heard, the clause removes police stations and prisons as designated places of safety for individuals in mental health crises, ensuring that they are instead taken to appropriate healthcare settings. In my view, this is a pragmatic and practical part of the Bill that supports patients going through an extremely challenging time. Perhaps, in the past, it has been all too easy to look to police stations as, if not the default option for those suffering a mental health crisis, certainly an easy one. That is not because police stations are the right place for patients, but because alternative provisions were not readily accessible.
Clause 49 brings about several critical changes. First, it redefines “place of safety” so that for adults it now refers exclusively to hospitals that are willing and able to provide care. For children and young people, the definition aligns with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but crucially, it explicitly excludes police stations. Furthermore, the clause repeals section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously allowed police stations to be used in so-called exceptional circumstances. The crux of the clause is to recognise that a mental health emergency is a medical crisis rather than a criminal one, and our system must reflect that.
Dr Evans
As we have heard, the proposals set out to remove police stations and prisons as places of safety. It does this in both relation to people detained under civil powers—sections 135 and 136—and in respect of certain part III patients involved in the criminal justice system, who may currently be held in such settings when a hospital bed is not available. The Government’s explanatory notes describe the rationale clearly:
“This is in response to evidence that suggests these settings are not suitable environments for individuals with a severe mental health, in crisis, awaiting assessment and treatment.”
As we have discussed in some of the earlier clauses, it is not just treatment, but the environment that plays a part in helping harbour a holistic care approach, so this is very much welcome. To that end, the Opposition can agree on this position in principle. A police station or prison cell is no place for someone with acute mental distress. They are not therapeutic environments; they can be frightening, disorientating and, in some cases, re-traumatising, particularly for children and young people. The clause aims to remove that contradiction in the law.
As the law stands, when police officers encounter someone in a public place who appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and is in immediate need of care or control, they can detain them under section 136 and take them to a place of safety. Under section 135, a magistrate can issue a warrant to remove a person from their home or another place to a place of safety. Currently, that place of safety includes a police station, although section 136A limits that to exceptional circumstances—for example, when the individual poses an imminent risk of serious injury to themselves. Similarly, under part III of the Act, a person appearing before a criminal court can be held in a place of safety, which can currently include a police station or prison, pending hospital admission.
Clause 49 will remove that. It amends section 55 to redefine “place of safety” and exclude police stations and prisons. It alters section 35, repeals section 136A, which has previously allowed police stations to be used in limited situations, and retains transitional protections for individuals already detained under early directions before the clause comes into place. That is a bold and principled legislative step, and I acknowledge that it builds on progress under the last Government. The 2017 Conservative Government, following public outcry and recommendations from the Care Quality Commission and the Wessely review, pledged to eliminate police cells as a place of safety for children. Since then, the numbers of such detentions have significantly decreased. Data from NHS Digital shows a downward trend in the use of police stations under section 136, which is evidence that change is possible with the right investment and inter-agency collaboration. That work deserves credit, so I thank the Minister for that.
Clause 49 must not only move the law forward, but ensure that the practice can be followed. I therefore want to raise a number of questions, which I hope the Minister will take in good faith. The classic one is “Where would people go instead?” The explanatory notes are right to say that hospitals and healthcare-based settings are more appropriate, but do those settings exist in sufficient numbers, with trained staff, beds and security protocols to receive safely all those who would otherwise have been taken to police stations? If they do not, we risk creating a gap between the law and the real world—a dangerous vacuum, whereby someone in crisis may end up in an ambulance bay, in a police car or in a general A&E without specialist support. It could have wider impact on the safety of not only the individual patient suffering, but other patients in healthcare settings such as A&E, interacting with an acutely ill mental patient. Without proper capacity, we risk many more police officers having to be at health settings to keep the mental unwell patients safe from themselves and others.
I appreciate that the Government have said that it will take 10 years to implement the Bill fully, but this clause will come into force immediately. What assurances can the Government give that there will be not only capacity, but capacity in the right places, so that, for example, people are not transferred to other areas of the country to ensure that the legal requirement is met? Although it is welcome not to be in a police station, being miles from family and support circles would be just as detrimental.
What provisions are being made for children and young people? The clause rightly states that for minors, the place of safety must now comply with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, but excluding police stations. Are there sufficient CAMHS—child and adolescent mental health services—crisis beds and child-friendly places of safety in each region? What guarantees are there that children will not end up in adult settings, or worse, in informal or unlawful detention?
I turn to the transitional support given to the police. Officers may no longer be able to use their custody suites, but what training, resources and alternative pathways are being made? What happens in the middle of the night in a rural police force, where there is no mental health professional on call and the nearest hospital bed is 80 miles away? How would the Government monitor performance? Will the Government commit to publishing annual data on delays in finding a place of safety, the use of inappropriate settings post reform, and outcomes for those detained under sections 135 and 136? Will the CQC or another body be tasked with auditing local compliance?
Clause 49 reflects a consensus that mental healthcare belongs in health settings, not custodial ones. I urge the Minister to answer the questions in the good faith in which they were asked, because we all want to see this become a reality.
Stephen Kinnock
I think it is probably right to say that the questions asked by the hon. Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Chester South and Eddisbury and the shadow Minister basically all relate to building capacity to ensure that we are ready to absorb this change. We have committed to lay an annual report on implementation, which will set out progress made and future plans for implementation. We are working closely with the Home Office, the police and NHS England to better understand the implementation requirement for switching on this change. There is considerable variation across the country in the way in which police stations are being used, so there is a need to target support.
I would add that the number and shape of dedicated health-based places of safety that are needed in a local authority will depend on the mental health needs of that population and the wider mental health crisis pathway provision. We are taking steps to ensure that people in crisis receive support and treatment sooner, so that fewer people need to be taken to a place of safety. It is worth noting that the Government have hit the ground running on this issue since we came into office last July. We are committing £26 million in capital investment to open new mental health crisis centres, which will aim to provide accessible and responsive care for individuals in mental health crisis.
Evidence from systems with established crisis centres indicates that they can help to streamline urgent mental health care pathways and reduce unnecessary conveyance to A&E by ambulance, health-based transport or the police. We have also selected six areas to trial a new approach to mental health support by providing 24-hour neighbourhood mental health centres, seven days a week, bringing together all aspects of community mental health services.
Dr Evans
The Minister has partially answered my question. He talked about the £26 million investment being targeted at certain areas of the country, but will that be based on the areas of highest priority? The danger is that if the highest priorities are all in the north, the south will be left out.
Stephen Kinnock
We have selected six areas, but off the cuff I cannot tell the shadow Minister exactly what they are or whether they have been announced yet. If they have not been announced, I will not be able to tell him, but if they have been, of course I can share that information. I suspect that the areas will primarily be based on assessed need, but they are trial pilots, so there is no reason to suspect that they will be limited to six. Let us see how much traction they get.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill
Clause 50
Removal of patients by authorised persons
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
We have previously discussed Government amendments 26 to 29, which seek to overturn amendments tabled in the other place by Lord Kamall, Earl Howe and Baroness May, which added police and other authorised persons to sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act. As I said in the earlier debate, the police currently have no powers under those sections, and the decision makers on whether to use those sections are health and social care professionals. We do not support extending police powers to health and social care professionals in this way, and the police do not support such an extension either. We are therefore seeking to remove clause 50 from the Bill.
The clause extends legal powers currently held by the police under sections 135 and 136 to other professionals. That would enable other professionals to enter premises by force, if necessary, to remove a person believed to be suffering from a mental health disorder under section 135. Under section 136, other professionals would have the power to remove a person from a public space to a place of safety. Both those changes would represent a major shift in roles and responsibilities for health and care professionals.
Indeed, the co-chair of the approved mental health professional leads network has said that extending police powers in this way to health and care professionals would have
“disastrous unintended consequences for both individuals in crisis and those responding to mental health emergencies.”
Nine organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Emergency Medicine and the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives, have made a joint statement of concern about extending police powers to health and care professionals in this way.
Anna Dixon
It is clear from what the Minister is saying that there are widespread concerns among health professionals about the change that was proposed in the other place, which would effectively give police powers to health and care professionals. Can he reassure psychiatrists such as my sister, and others working in mental health services, that they will always be able to rely on and work closely with their police colleagues to have that back-up when they are entering somebody’s home to potentially detain them?
Stephen Kinnock
I absolutely can give my hon. Friend that assurance. There has to be a team-based approach to this work. In any successful team, it is about ensuring that everybody knows their role and that everybody’s role within that team is appropriate. There has to be good collaboration and co-ordination.
That is why I must say that I am quite taken aback by the attempts in the other place to insert these clauses; I do not think that is a safe way to make legislation. That is why it is so important that we remove the clause from the Bill.
The statement that I referred to earlier, by all those eminent organisations, called it a
“radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences”.
It also says:
“Delegating police powers to professionals without consulting them, or patients would be a very damaging way to make policy.”
It is important to restate what I said in an earlier sitting, namely that the majority of assessments under the Mental Health Act happen without police involvement, and that action is already under way to further reduce the amount of police involvement. However, we of course recognise the pressures that the police are facing and that police involvement can be stigmatising for people who are detained. Almost all police forces in England and Wales are implementing the “right care, right person” approach, a police-led initiative to reduce inappropriate police involvement in cases where people have health or social care needs. There has already been a 10% decrease in section 136 detentions in the year ending March 2024.
There remain certain circumstances in which the police play a vital role in keeping particular people and the wider public safe. A blanket approach of extending powers in sections 135 and 136 to other professionals may not necessarily address the issues being faced by police officers and could create other unintended challenges. For example, while the current Act deliberately sets out who has what powers in what situations, a blanket extension of the police’s powers under sections 135 and 136 to other professionals—giving multiple agencies the same powers—risks confusion over who should respond in an emergency situation and could lead to delays in action as services try to decide who should act. That would be counter to our shared aim of ensuring that people in a mental health crisis get the right support as rapidly as possible.
We are also concerned that giving health and social care staff statutory powers that increase the number of situations in which they may have to use reasonable force could have unintended risks for the safety of staff, patients and the public.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I rise to speak briefly to clause 50, which expands the authority to remove individuals under Mental Health Act powers by allowing trained and authorised non-police personnel to carry out removals that previously could be carried out only by police constables. A couple of key changes arise from the clause.
First, the clause provides for the inclusion of authorised persons by amending sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. That will allow individuals other than police officers, if they are authorised—“authorised” is the important word—to remove and transport people under Mental Health Act powers. That provides wider operational flexibility, and includes removals under warrant, by virtue of section 135, and without a warrant in public places. It is predicated on the fact that those authorised persons are appropriately trained and designated. Prior to the clause being inserted into the Bill, only police officers could carry out removals.
Anna Dixon
I am hearing that the hon. Gentleman supports clause 50, despite the very clear joint statement from organisations such as the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, the British Association of Social Workers, the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Psychiatrists. They see huge risks, not least the risk of the measure having an impact on the therapeutic relationship between clinicians and their patients. Is he ignoring that?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I am doing no such thing. I hope that I am doing my constitutional duty, which is to scrutinise the legislation and put some respectful challenges to the Minister about the operability of the clause were it to remain part of the Bill. Call me old fashioned, but I think that is what we are here to do.
The intent behind clause 50 is to support a more health-led response to enabling trained healthcare or crisis responders to act. That aligns with the Bill’s broader goals of reducing the perception of criminality around mental health illness and improving patient experiences.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
Does the hon. Member agree that section 136 is used when the police are alerted to a disturbance in a public place? If I saw a disturbance outside the Palace of Westminster, I would call the police, not a mental health professional. If the police arrive and think that the person is suffering from a mental illness, they will use the power under section 136. How can we give powers to health professionals to attend a public disturbance?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation.
I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?
Dr Evans
I am pleased that the Minister has clarified that the Government intend to take out clause 50, because that allows me to take out some of my speech. It would not be appropriate for me to retread the entirety of the argument—we have been through it, and I am aware of the numbers on the Committee—but I will address a few points, because the clause is important.
The clause would keep the role of authorised persons for the purposes of sections 135 and 136. Hon. Members will know that this is not a new issue, as we debated the removal of the definition of authorised person in relation to clause 5. On that occasion, I expressed my concerns about the risk of doing so, which were shared by Baroness May, who rightly argued that we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start enabling care to be delivered by the right person in the right way at the right time. This clause gives us a chance to make that principle real.
Clause 50 allows certain non-police professionals, defined as authorised persons, to use existing powers under section 135 to enter premises under a warrant and remove a person in a mental health crisis to a place of safety or assessment of care. It also allows those professionals to use powers under section 136, which is even more sensitive, permitting the removal and detention of a person from a public place without a warrant if they appear to be suffering from a mental health disorder.
The clause is not about weakening safeguards. It is about strengthening the frontline and moving away from a model where the police are the default responders to every mental health crisis, which is often not because they are best placed, but because no one else has the authority. As modelling has shown, 95% of mental health-related police calls do not require a criminal justice response. Officers are spending hours, even days, sitting in A&E with patients in distress, because no one else is trained and empowered to act.
Clause 50 helps to break that cycle. It creates a legal basis for trained health professionals—mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental health practitioners —to intervene in crisis situations, rather than relying solely on the police.
The hon. Member for Ashford asked how we decide, but we already triage people when they ring 999 or 111. How do we decide who gets an ambulance for what sounds like a heart attack or stroke? That decision is made by clinicians. We have the ability to make those triaging decisions, and I think it is completely appropriate to try to empower the health services to find a better way of dealing with these people.
Anna Dixon
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that health professionals do not wear stab vests or cameras? They are not equipped to go into dangerous situations. It is essential to protect healthcare workers and not put them at risk. We should maintain the current situation, whereby they work in tandem with the police, but the police are present for the detention.
Dr Evans
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. A paramedic never knows what they are going to when they are called out. It could be a terrorist incident; it could just be a person in distress who is hysterical. A paramedic never knows, but that is part of the point—when they get there, they would be able to make that assessment rather than having to call the police out. At the moment, they do not have those powers, so that is a reason to give them the option. I am not saying that that is always the right option, but it gives them the option. The clause allows us to think of new, innovative ways to deal with the complex, changing world of mental health in the modern age.
The Government have argued elsewhere that the definition of who detains could be too rigid or unnecessary, but I would say the opposite. Professionals on the ground need clarity—a lawful mandate to act in the best interests of a person in crisis, with clear boundaries of competence and training. The Lords were right to include a definition of “authorised person” that sets out the conditions of suitability. Clause 50 builds on that framework.
Having these powers in the Bill gives NHS trusts the chance and confidence to design alternative crisis responses. The clause is by no means a blanket approach—it actually drives innovation. Health professionals have the clarity to act and police forces have the breathing space to return to their core purpose: preventing and investigating crime.
Of course, the power must come with safeguards; it is not a blank cheque. The use of coercive powers by the police or anyone else must always be subject to training, regulation and oversight. Entering someone’s home or detaining them in public is a profound interference with their liberty and dignity, so the power must be exercised with care and caution.
We believe that clause 50 takes us in the right direction towards a health-led approach to mental health crisis, rather than a security-led one, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said. It supports the police by lightening a burden from which they have long asked to be freed. It supports patients by increasing the chance that they will be met by someone who understands their needs. It supports the wider public by allowing police officers to return to doing what they are trained to do and passionate about doing: keeping communities safe. We should be building on this type of reform, not rowing back from it. I urge the Government to reconsider.
The Chair
Before I call the Minister, I remind Members that interventions are meant to be short and to the point, and that responses are meant to be short and to the point.
Stephen Kinnock
Extending the police powers in section 135 and 136 to other authorised persons would represent a major shift in the roles and responsibilities of health and social care professionals. Our key health and social care stakeholders have warned us that extending the powers could have dangerous consequences, and that making changes to them without proper consultation is not the right way to go about making policy. I again extend my thanks to those stakeholders for their efforts to share their views on the role of police in mental health-related incidents.
We of course recognise the pressures that police face. However, I must emphasise that the majority of assessment under the Mental Health Act already happen without police involvement. Action under the “right care, right person” approach is already reducing that further: there was a 10% decrease in section 136 detentions in the year ending March 2024.
Simply taking the blanket approach of extending the powers may not actually address the issues the police face and could have unintended negative consequences, such as risks for staff, patients and the public, and delays in response. The Government are profoundly concerned about making such a change without proper engagement with the groups that would be impacted. I therefore do not commend clause 50 to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 51 will reform the Bail Act 1976 to prevent courts from remanding a defendant for their own protection where the only concern relates to their mental health.In response to the independent review, a commitment was made to end the use of prison as a place of safety. Those reforms were welcomed, but concerns were raised about the use of a similar power under the Bail Act 1976 to remand a defendant to prison for their “own protection”. That power can sometimes be used when the court is concerned that the defendant’s mental health presents a risk to their own safety.
Nobody should be sent to prison because they are struggling with their mental health, so the clause will amend the Bail Act to prevent the remand of a defendant for their own protection solely on mental health grounds. Instead, courts will be directed to bail the defendant and work with local health services to put in place appropriate support and care to address risks to their safety.
The clause does not amend the court’s power to refuse bail in respect of a child or young person for their own welfare, because it is already the case that youths cannot be subject to a custodial remand solely for mental health reasons. However, in exceptional circumstances it may still be necessary for a court to remand a child to local authority accommodation for their mental wellbeing, and for that reason the power is preserved.
On clause 52, patients from the Crown dependencies—the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—currently cannot be transferred to England and Wales under sections 35, 36 and 38 of the Mental Health Act. The clause will introduce new powers to enable the Crown dependencies’ courts to send patients who are subject to their equivalent of remand under sections 35 or 36, or an interim hospital order under section 38, to suitably secure hospitals in England and Wales for treatment and assessment. The changes will ensure that that vulnerable cohort of patients can receive appropriate and secure treatment in England and Wales, while enabling the Crown dependencies’ courts to maintain control of the criminal proceedings, so that justice can be done swiftly and efficiently.
Finally, clause 53 will ensure that where provisions in the Mental Health Act provide for the processing of personal data, any such processing, including the sharing of data, is subject to data protection legislation, including the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK general data protection regulation principles. For example, personal data—including special category data such as health data—is likely to be contained in a report produced under clause 4, which inserts clauses specific to people with a learning disability and autistic people, so that their care, treatment and differing support needs are identified, and recommendations are made to ensure that those needs can be met. That report will be shared with the bodies set out in the clause, including the patient’s responsible clinician, the relevant integrated care board and the local authority.
Clause 53 will ensure that such processing of personal data must comply with the controls and safeguards in the legal framework that governs the use of personal data. That includes compliance with key principles such as lawfulness and fairness, and adherence to high standards of information security, privacy and transparency.
In essence, the provision means that where there is a duty or power under the Mental Health Act to process personal data, the processing—including the sharing—of the information must be done in a way that will not contravene data protection legislation, including the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. In turn, among other things, that requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, and confers certain rights on data subjects to access that data and have any errors rectified. That gives vital reassurance to patients about the processing of their personal data under the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I commend clauses 51 to 53 to the Committee.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I ask for a series of clarifications from the Minister about all three clauses. On clause 51, how will the courts be supported in identifying community-based alternatives to remand? What training or guidance will be provided to judges in applying the provisions effectively? What assurances can the Minister give that support pathways will be available before and after the changes have taken effect?
I accept that clause 52 is a technical a change to the legislation, but it is an important clarification none the less. It will require some robust co-ordination between jurisdictions and clearer procedural safeguards. How will the Government monitor the implementation of proposed new schedule A2 to ensure that patients’ rights are preserved during transfers? Will guidance be issued to courts and practitioners in the UK and the Crown dependencies about the new procedures, particularly their cross-jurisdictional nature? What consultation has taken place, and will continue to take place, with authorities in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man before the measures are implemented in law?
Finally, I recognise that clause 53 is arguably a sensible safeguard. The challenge will be to ensure compliance on the frontline, especially where legal duties to share information and duties to protect confidentiality can butt against some degree of tension. With that in mind, what support or training will be given to health and care professionals to navigate overlapping legal duties? Will the Minister publish sector-specific guidance on data sharing as a consequence of the Bill? How will the Government assess whether the legal framework strikes the right balance between patient safety and privacy?
Dr Evans
Clause 51 amends the Bail Act 1976 to restrict the court’s ability to remand individuals in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children, for their welfare, where the sole concern is mental health. Under existing law, the court may refuse bail to a defendant if it is satisfied that the individual should be kept in custody for their own protection. For those under 18, the relevant test is whether custody is required for their own welfare. Those provisions are found in schedule 1 to the Bail Act.
There is currently nothing in statute that precludes the court from remanding someone entirely on the basis of their mental health conditions—for example, if the defendant appears to pose a danger to themselves but no suitable mental health provision is immediately available. Clause 51 aims to change that. It amends all three parts of schedule 1 to the Bail Act—those dealing with imprisonment and non-imprisonment offences—so that the adult defendant, aged 18 or over, may not be remanded in custody for their own protection if the only concern is mental health.
Paragraph 360 of the Government’s explanatory notes states:
“Evidence suggests that in some cases this power is being used by the courts to remand defendants into custody where they would otherwise have been bailed were it not for the court’s concern for their mental health.”
The intent here is good: to end the inappropriate use of custody—especially in prison, as we have been discussing—as a place of safety for people with acute mental health needs. The clause is consistent with the wider direction of the Bill, which seeks to ensure that people in crisis are met with healthcare and not handcuffs. Although I support the clause, I have a few questions and concerns about how it will operate in practice, and invite the Minister to consider further safeguards.
Where is the alternative provision? That is a question we will keep asking, not in the form of an attack, but as something helpful for our consideration. We are told that instead of custody, courts may impose bail conditions under section 3(6) of the Bail Act, such as requirements to engage with mental health services or, where the statutory criteria are met, remand the person to hospital under the Mental Health Act. That sounds reasonable, but the reality on the ground is often different. We know from NHS data, and from countless reports by inspectors and charities, that community mental health services are stretched, beds are scarce and out-of-hours support can be lacking.
What assessment has been made of local mental health capacity to absorb those individuals who, under clause 51, will no longer be eligible for a custodial remand? Do the Government know, for example, how many are currently in that position? If the law changes overnight, how much extra provision will be needed for these specific patients? How will the Government, specifically on remand patients, ensure that there are places? What are the requirements, if any, on NHS integrated care boards to ensure that a place of safety or support is available in every local area? Without that, there is a real risk that the courts will be left with no safe options, particularly when a person presents in crisis late at night, in distress and with nowhere else to go.
Are the bail and hospital powers workable substitutes? The explanatory note refers to courts using the power to remand for mental health reports or treatment, but the orders depend on medical evidence, the availability of beds and local agreement. They are not always available at the moment when bail is being considered. Meanwhile, bail conditions, however well-meaning, cannot guarantee care or prevent harm if services are not responsive. Has the Department considered issuing new statutory guidance to accompany the clause, outlining what courts should do when no hospital or community support is available, but the defendant is clearly at risk? Further to that, will there be a formal route for courts to escalate concerns to NHS bodies where no safe custodial options exist?
We also need to consider children and young people. As I read it, the clause applies only to adults. The Government are arguing that section 98 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already prevents the remand of children solely for mental health reasons. Does that not potentially leave a loophole? I am no lawyer, but the Bail Act still allows for remand for the child’s own welfare, and the revised wording in clause 51(2) and (4) does nothing to prevent that being interpreted in practice as the mental health concern that we have been discussing. Why have the Government not taken the opportunity to clarify in statute the status of children? They must not be remanded to custody solely on the basis of mental health-related welfare concerns.
Finally, how will we track the effects of the changes? I suggest that there must be ongoing scrutiny of how the clause operates. To that end, will the Minister commit to releasing annual statistics on the number of people refused bail under the provisions, to reporting on incidences where a safe, non-custodial alternative was not available, and to monitoring outcomes for those affected by the changes? Does the data fall under NHS or Ministry of Justice datasets? It is important that we understand who is responsible.
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked how the courts would be supported in training for judges and so on. To safely enact that reform, it is vital that the appropriate pathways are in place from first contact with the criminal justice system into the right care and support, whether that is community mental health services or receiving treatment in hospital under the Mental Health Act, where appropriate. We will work with courts, health service commissioners and clinicians to ensure that sentencers have the confidence to bail vulnerable defendants into the community, with the appropriate package of support and smooth pathways into treatment in a healthcare setting for those who need it. We will confirm the timelines for commencement in due course.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked about people who are under 18. Custody should be a last resort for children, and the legislative threshold for remanding a child to custody is already very high. Under-18s are not included in this provision, as the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already precludes the remand of children to custody solely for mental health reasons. When the court’s concerns relate only to the child’s welfare, the preferred option would usually be bail. In exceptional circumstances, a court might remand a child to local authority accommodation, such as a children’s home or foster care, for their own mental wellbeing. Including children in this provision would remove that important safeguard.
On the question of legal limbo, courts in England and Wales will not be able to exercise any criminal jurisdictional powers in relation to these patients. Their powers are restricted to renewal of the remand or interim order, ancillary powers and recommendations for the patient’s return, as well as obligations to inform the Secretary of State. We have included additional provisions in the Bill to allow courts in England and Wales to order a section 36 for treatment for a patient who has previously been transferred from the Crown dependencies on the equivalent of a section 35 for assessment. That is aimed at enabling access to treatment for the patient and preventing the need for the patient to be required to travel back and forth between jurisdictions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 52 and 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Review of duty to notify incidents
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 12—Age-appropriate treatment for children—
“(1) Section 131A of the Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1), insert—
‘(1A) A patient to whom this section applies must not be detained in, or admitted to, an adult ward unless the managers of the hospital consider that—
(a) there are exceptional circumstances which justify the patient’s detention in, or admission to, an adult ward; and
(b) the decision is in accordance with the best interests of the child.’
(3) After subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Where a patient has been detained in, or admitted to, an adult ward, the managers of the hospital must record in writing the reasons for the admission, including—
(a) the reason, or reasons, why other options for accommodation were not available or suitable for the patient;
(b) details of the measures to be taken by the hospital to ensure that, while the patient is detained or otherwise accommodated in the adult ward, the patient is provided with care in a safe environment; and
(c) unless it has been determined that an adult ward is the most appropriate environment for the patient in accordance with subsection (1A), the steps being taken by the hospital to transfer the patient to more appropriate accommodation.
(3B) Where a patient to whom this section applies is—
(a) detained in, or admitted to, an adult ward or placed out of area; and
(b) the detention or admission is of more than 24 consecutive hours’ duration,
the managers of the hospital must notify the regulatory authority immediately, setting out why they consider that the requirements under subsection (1A) above are met and providing the information set out in subsection (3A).
(3C) Subsection (3D) applies when—
(a) the managers of a hospital accommodate a patient to whom this section applies in an adult ward for a consecutive period of at least 28 days; or
(b) detain or admit a patient to whom this section applies who—
(i) was ordinarily resident immediately before being detained or admitted in the area of a local authority other than the local authority within whose area the hospital is situated, or
(ii) was not ordinarily resident within the area of any local authority.
(3D) Where this subsection applies, the managers of the hospital must immediately inform the appropriate officer of the responsible local authority—
(a) of the patient's detention or admission, and
(b) when the patient's detention or admission ceases.’
(4) Leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4) In this section—
(a) “adult ward” means a ward in a hospital to which persons aged 18 or over are detained in or admitted to;
(b) “the appropriate officer” means—
(i) in relation to a local authority in England, their director of children's services, and
(ii) in relation to a local authority in Wales, their director of social services;
(c) “hospital” includes a registered establishment; and
(d) “the responsible authority” means—
(i) the local authority appearing to the managers of the hospital to be the authority within whose area the child was ordinarily resident immediately before being detained or admitted, or
(ii) where it appears to the managers of the hospital that the patient was not ordinarily resident within the area of any local authority, the local authority within whose area the hospital is situated.’”
This new clause seeks to ensure that children are only placed on adult wards where there are exceptional circumstances, and it is in their best interests. It includes procedural safeguards for determining the reasons behind (and suitability of) admitting a child to a hospital environment in which adults are simultaneously accommodated or in an out of area placement.
New clause 17—Children detained on adult wards—
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 131A (Accommodation, etc. for children), insert—
‘131B Children detained on adult wards
(1) The Secretary of State must reduce to zero, within five years of the passage of the Mental Health Act 2025, the number of children detained on adult wards.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish, within six months of the passage of the Mental Health Act 2025, a report to outline how the duty under this section will be met, including how provision for treatment under this Act will be increased.’”
This new clause would require the number of children detained on adult wards to be reduced to zero within 5 years, and for the Secretary of State to produce a report on how this will be achieved.
New clause 20—Report and Guidance: Transition to Adult Mental Health Treatment—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 18 months of passing of this Act, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on improving provision for patients transitioning from treatment in a hospital environment for children and young people to one for adults when they attain the age of 18.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of—
(a) the current pathways and outcomes for young people transitioning between hospital environments for children and for adults;
(b) any gaps in care or support experienced by patients during this transition;
(c) best practices for ensuring safe and effective transitions.
(3) Following the report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish guidance for integrated care boards, local authorities, and providers of mental health treatment on improving outcomes and ensuring continuity of care for patients transitioning to a hospital environment for adults.
(4) The guidance under subsection (3) must include—
(a) specific steps to guarantee continuity of care for patients transitioning between treatment in a hospital environment for children and young people and one for adults;
(b) measures to identify young people requiring transition support at an appropriate stage;
(c) provisions for joint working and information sharing between providers of treatment for children and young people and for adults;
(d) requirements for the review and updating of care and treatment plans to reflect the needs of patients transitioning to a hospital environment for adults.
(5) Integrated care boards, local authorities, and providers of mental health treatment must have regard to guidance published under subsection (3).
(6) In preparing the report under subsection (1) and the guidance under subsection (3), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) young people with experience of transitioning between children and young people’s and adult mental health services, and their carers and guardians;
(b) relevant professional bodies;
(c) integrated care boards;
(d) local authorities;
(e) providers of mental health treatment;
(f) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(7) The Secretary of State must update the guidance under subsection (3) at regular intervals, and no less frequently than every three years.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review and report on the transition of patients from children's to adult mental health settings for treatment at age 18 and publish guidance for relevant bodies on improving provision and ensuring continuity of care during this transition.
Stephen Kinnock
I rise to speak to clause 54 and to a number of new clauses relating to the treatment of children and young people.
I turn first to clause 54. The Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 require the CQC to be notified of specified events, one of which is where a child is placed in an adult psychiatric unit and the placement has lasted more than 48 hours. When the CQC is notified, the circumstances are reviewed and the risk is assessed. These notifications can trigger further assessments and inspections, and require the trust to provide regular updates and give assurance that the children concerned are being safeguarded.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I thank the Minister for his comments on new clause 17, but I will speak to it briefly along with new clause 20, and then consider not pressing it later.
New clause 17 aims to end the harmful and inappropriate practice of detaining children on adult mental health wards. We know that children in mental health crises are among the most vulnerable in our care system. Placing them in an adult ward is not only developmentally inappropriate; it risks causing further trauma and harm. The practice continues not because it is clinically justified but because of a lack of specialist child and adolescent mental health provision.
Despite the existing statutory guidance under section 131A of the Mental Health Act, hundreds of children are still admitted to adult settings each year. That is a systematic failure. The new clause sets a clear goal: reduce the number of children detained on adult wards to zero within five years. It would also require the Secretary of State to publish within six months a concrete plan of how this will be achieved, including how children’s mental health services will be expanded. It is a question of not just capacity but political will. I urge the Committee to support the new clause if we press it to a Division. I say to the Minister that we are still looking for timelines. We need to protect young people from going into inappropriate adult mental health settings, as I have heard too often from residents in my constituency.
New clause 20 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to report within 18 months how to improve transitions between in-patient settings for children and young people and those for adults. I heard a particularly distressing case in my constituency recently, where an individual turned 18 and almost the next day was placed in an adult mental health setting. It was completely inappropriate for that individual, and no real transition work had been done. I appreciate that the Minister says that there is clear guidance, but that guidance has clearly not been adhered to at all times.
The new clause would require statutory guidance for integrated care boards, local authorities and providers, covering essential components, such as clear pathways and timelines, joint working across services, early identification of those needing transition support, and updates to care plans that reflect changing needs. We believe that the new clause is clear, proportionate and achievable. It asks for a plan and for consultation and guidance that can support more stable, person-centred care at a critical point in a young person’s life.
The Minister has indicated that he will not support the new clause. If he is unwilling to do so, my request is that he sets out how the Government will ensure the issues around transitioning between child and adult mental health services are addressed—particularly a clear timeline. He has mentioned a number of documents coming forward that start to address these issues, but as I have expressed, clearly the guidance already exists but it has not been adhered to in all cases, so we would like to see the timeline.
Josh Dean (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Mrs Harris. The Minister has set out in detail the function of clause 54, so I will not cover that in detail for reasons of time. I welcome the clause, which represents a step forward in regulating the placement of children and young people in adult treatment settings, and in ensuring their safeguarding. I welcome the fact that it recognises the need to review the existing safeguards available to young people.
The independent review of the Mental Health Act made recommendations in this area, including that when an under-18 is placed on an adult ward, the CQC should be notified within 24 hours, and that the reasons for and the proposed length of the placement should be recorded. I would be grateful if the Minister would set out what consideration the Government have given to those recommendations, and whether they will form part of the review.
I turn to the important matter of children and young people who are under 18 placed in adult treatment settings. I think we all recognise the extremely difficult context in which these detentions take place. We know that there is a serious shortage of specialist in-patient beds for children and young people, which means that places are often full or may not be available at a time of urgent crisis.
When someone under 18 is placed in an adult treatment setting, they are more likely to witness or even experience high levels of restraint, be denied support from their peers, and lack access to educational opportunities. These placements can actually cause further harm to children and young people’s mental health, and therefore be detrimental to their recovery. I will be grateful if the Minister can assure me of the actions that the Government will take to further safeguard those children and young people who hit crisis point and find themselves in adult treatment settings because of the shortage of beds. How will we ensure that they are protected from being placed in inappropriate treatment settings?
I do not wish to test your patience, Mrs Harris, but before I conclude I want to examine the point about children and young people a little further, given the interaction of clause 54 and associated new clauses with their treatment. I welcome the Government’s consistent restatement of the importance of getting the Bill right for children and young people. I know that the Minister takes such matters incredibly seriously, and I have listened carefully to what he has said this afternoon and throughout the Committee.
The Minister has stated that a number of the reforms relating to children and young people will be addressed in the code of practice, but that contrasts with the approach of many of the welcome safeguards set out for over-18s in the Bill. Will the Minister clarify why these issues are being addressed differently when it comes to children and young people, compared to adults? Children and young people are a uniquely vulnerable group.
On the point about the code of practice, I note that any deviation from that would need to be justified, but my understanding is that the code cannot impose duties on practitioners or require them to exercise their functions under the Act. I am concerned that putting safeguards for under-18s on a different footing from those for adults could make it harder for young people to access those safeguards. I welcome much of the work being done by the Bill, and I want to make sure that children and young people can also access its safeguards. I will be grateful if the Minister can address those points in his response.
In conclusion, I welcome the step forward that clause 54 represents, because it addresses an important issue that we need to get to grips with. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clause 54, but with the caveat that it would be much more effective if new clause 12, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, were added to the Bill.
Regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 requires healthcare providers to notify the Care Quality Commission of certain serious incidents. However, it may not comprehensively cover all mental health-related admissions of minors. Clause 54 responds to concerns about transparency and safeguarding in child and adolescent mental health services, and aims to ensure that all relevant incidents are properly monitored and reported.
Like other hon. Members who have spoken, we welcome the Government’s shift to improve these standards; there is support for that across the Committee. The clauses about children and young people are some of the most vital parts of the Bill. They are vital not only to get the Bill right but, more importantly, to ensure that children are protected. That is why new clause 12, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, is so essential to strengthen the Bill.
The new clause would amend section 131A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which governs the accommodation of children in mental health settings. It responds to ongoing concerns about the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which can be distressing and unsafe, and which is clearly contrary to best clinical practice. The new clause would introduce a requirement that hospital managers must justify such placements in writing, including an explanation of why no alternative was available, and the steps being taken to ensure the child’s safety and transfer to more suitable accommodation. The new clause would also introduce mandatory reporting to regulatory authorities when a child was placed on an adult ward for more than 24 hours, and to local authorities when the placement exceeds 28 days, or involves an out-of-area admission.
The new clause would ensure that children are placed on adult wards only when absolutely necessary. It requires the written justification and formal notification of placements. It involves local authorities and regulators in monitoring prolonged or out-of-area placements, and strengthens and clarifies existing provisions of the Mental Health Act. Most importantly, it aligns with clinical guidance on age-appropriate mental health care.
I turn to new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats. I think that their purpose is in some ways similar to that of our new clause 12. However, they put the cart before the horse, or the horse before the cart —it depends on which way round we are. We are trying to fix the system by ensuring that nobody enters an inappropriate place unless there are exceptional circumstances; new clauses 17 and 20 try to exclude those circumstances, but without necessarily fixing the problem in the first place. Although I understand, as ever, the motivations and sentiments of the new clauses tabled by the Liberal Democrats, I do not think they will have the intended consequences; at least, I do not think they will be effective.
I have two questions for the Minister about clause 54. First, will the Department publish regular summaries of the notifications mentioned in the clause showing trends and disparities across the services or regions? Secondly, will the Care Quality Commission be resourced and empowered to act swiftly where patterns of overuse or misuse emerge?
Aphra Brandreth
It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of new clause 12, which has been tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, and to comment on clause 54, which has been grouped for this debate alongside it. Those two provisions both deal with the care and treatment of children and young people admitted to hospital for mental health reasons. In doing so, they touch on one of the most sensitive and critical responsibilities we have as legislators: safeguarding vulnerable children at a moment of profound crisis in their lives.
Clause 54, as introduced in the Lords, will place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the current requirement to notify the Care Quality Commission should be extended. Currently, notifications are required only when a child or young person is placed in an adult ward for more than 48 hours. The clause asks whether that threshold remains appropriate, and whether other scenarios—for example, where a child is admitted for assessment or placed in an adult setting even for less than 48 hours—should also trigger notification. That is a welcome first step, and I support the clause.
However, I also recognise the limitations of a clause that asks the Secretary of State only to review existing safeguards, rather than requiring that those safeguards be strengthened. That is why I also support the aims of new clause 12, which sets out a more detailed and practical framework to ensure that children are admitted to adult wards only when there are truly exceptional circumstances, and always with appropriate scrutiny and documentation.
The issue has been a consistent concern across multiple reviews, including the independent review of the Mental Health Act, the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Each has made clear that existing protections are insufficient and that too often, vulnerable children are still being placed in inappropriate settings. That concern was echoed in evidence submitted to this Bill Committee by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition. Their written submission sets out the risks in stark terms.
In 2023-24, the CQC was notified of 120 instances in which a child or young person was placed on an adult ward. We also know that between December 2023 and November 2024, 319 children were sent out of area to receive treatment, often far from their families, schools and local support networks—that is nearly one child every single day. Those are not just numbers; they are children and teenagers, many already facing significant trauma, mental health challenges or adverse life experiences. They are often the most vulnerable young people in our society. How they are treated in the days and weeks following a mental health crisis may have lifelong consequences for their wellbeing, development and future.
The Mental Health Act and the code of practice are already clear: children should not be admitted to adult wards except in emergency situations, and even then, only if it is in their best interests. But as the Committee heard in written evidence, that standard is not always met in practice. Young people have reported feeling terrified on adult wards, with an expectation that they behave like adults in environments that were never designed for their needs. That is why new clause 12 is so important: it would give legal weight to existing guidance by requiring that any such admission was explicitly justified in writing, with clear reasons why no other options were available or suitable.
The new clause would also ensure that steps were taken to protect the young person during their time on the ward and, crucially, to transfer them to a more appropriate setting as soon as possible. It would also require immediate notification to the regulator when a child was placed on an adult ward or was out of area for more than 24 hours. Those are simple procedural safeguards, but they really matter. Requiring decisions to be explained and recorded helps ensure they are properly thought through, and provides transparency, oversight and a route to accountability.
I appreciate that the Government are seeking to address the issue through updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice. I welcome that intention and I recognise the role that the code can play in setting out professional guidance, but, with respect, I do not believe that is sufficient on its own. When children are being placed in adult psychiatric wards, potentially for weeks at a time, or being sent far from home in moments of crisis, we must do more than issue guidance—we must provide clear legal safeguards. This is not about placing unrealistic constraints on the NHS or criticising frontline professionals, who we know are working under significant pressure with limited resources. It is about ensuring that when difficult decisions are made, they are made transparently, in the best interests of the child and only when absolutely necessary.
We have a rare opportunity in the Bill to put those protections in place. I hope the Minister will consider the evidence submitted to the Committee, the recommendations of previous reviews and the cross-party consensus on the importance of getting this right. Let us not miss this opportunity to ensure that our mental health system treats every child with the care, dignity and protection they deserve, and to set out clearly and transparently the standards we expect when they are at their most vulnerable.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
You will be disappointed to know, Mrs Harris, that the notable contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Chester South and Eddisbury and for Farnham and Bordon mean that my contribution will be even briefer than usual. [Interruption.] Rapturous support across the Committee—exactly the consensus-building that we are seeking to achieve.
I rise to speak in support of new clause 12. It necessarily addresses the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which is not just distressing but deeply damaging to those involved. The issue is about having child-centred safeguards. It is essential that we ensure that children under 18 are placed on adult wards only when it is absolutely necessary and there is no alternative. The new clause would not only support best practice—it aligns with clinical guidelines on age-appropriate care—but provide welcome legal clarity. It would strengthen and clarify the existing provisions within the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I encourage all hon. Members to support it.
On clause 54, the Minister would be disappointed if I did not put a couple of questions to him.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
That is an invitation that I will remember as we go on in this Committee. On this occasion, I have just two questions. First, will any interim guidance be issued while the review is ongoing? Secondly, can the Minister commit that the consultation will be undertaken on a wide basis, and include patient advocates, child psychologists and safeguarding boards?
Because I cannot count, I will add a third question: did the Government consider an alternative to a two-year review period, either through an immediate extension of regulation 18 or perhaps a shorter period, so that these important changes can be put in place without delay?
Dr Evans
I will first speak to clause 54, to give context to my comments about new clause 12, which is in my name, and new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats.
Currently, under regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, registered providers must notify the CQC if a child under 18 is placed in an adult psychiatric unit for longer than 48 continuous hours. The notification duty enables the CQC to monitor such placements and take appropriate action to protect young people.
The clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the duty to notify should be extended to other cases when a child is admitted to a hospital or registered establishment for treatment or assessment of a mental disorder—that bit is really important. It also requires a review of whether the current 48-hour notification timeframe remains appropriate. As the explanatory notes make clear, the purpose of the review is
“to ensure that where a child is admitted...notifications are made to the CQC in appropriate circumstances”,
so that the regulator can respond effectively. That is a welcome and sensible provision. It recognises that safe-guarding in mental health settings must be comprehensive and responsive in changing circumstances. For example, children placed in settings other than adult psychiatric units, such as specialist units or community hospitals, may also face risks that warrant timely CQC oversight.
However, I have a few questions for the Minister. Given the potential risks to children placed even briefly in adult psychiatric units or other settings, is the 48-hour threshold for notification too long? Would early notification—perhaps on admission—provide better protection for young people? Are there known gaps in the current notification system? For instance, how often do incidents involving children in mental health treatment go unreported under the existing framework?
The review is to be completed within two years of Royal Assent. Given the urgency of safeguarding children’s mental health and wellbeing, would it be possible to provide interim updates to Parliament to maintain transparency? Will that be part of the written statement, or stand alone? Will the review consider notifications from private and third sector providers, as well as NHS trusts, to ensure that no setting is overlooked?
We must look at the role of the CQC. In another letter from Baroness Merron, the Minister in the House of Lords, she addressed some of the issues raised and laid out the rationale for her confidence in the CQC as it stands. The letter emphasises the CQC’s “multiple roles” under the Mental Health Act as an independent regulator of services, an investigator of complaints and part of the national preventive mechanism to safeguard human rights. It points out that in 2022-23, the CQC carried out 860 monitoring visits and spoke to over 4,500 patients and 1,200 carers. Those impressive figures speak to a considerable degree of activity and reach.
However, as we have debated, the Bill puts significantly more requirements on the CQC, and clause 54 is a further one. The letter also stresses the CQC’s evolving role and notes that the creation of a new chief inspector of mental health is under way—a recommendation from Professor Sir Mike Richards. The aim, we are told, is to
“put mental health on an equal footing with physical health in CQC”
and to ensure “better information sharing” and
“stronger focus on Mental Health Act compliance.”
All that is welcome, but we also need to scrutinise what is not said. While the letter asserts that
“we will have a regulator that all of us can trust”,
it concedes that that
“will take time to achieve.”
That is a fair admission, but it weakens the case for relying on the status quo while reforms are still being bedded in. If the CQC’s systems are currently being rebuilt or recalibrated, can we be confident that they are robust enough right now to identify and respond to safeguarding concerns, especially when they are about children?
Then, there is the 48-hour threshold for notification when children are placed in adult units, which clause 54 seeks to address. Do we really believe that a child being in an inappropriate or unsafe environment for 47 hours is acceptable? Should the default not be real-time notification on admission, with durations used only to prioritise the level of scrutiny? We should aim for real-time notification in the 21st century—after all, we can track a bus on our phones anywhere in the world. Should we not aim for real-time data to spring services into action? Forty-eight hours is a long time in a young person’s life.
The clause rightly instructs the Secretary of State to review those questions, but I urge the Government to approach the review with openness—not just to minor procedural tweaks, but to the possibility that more fundamental changes might be necessary. On that point, does the Minister envisage the review as a desktop-type data review, or will it engage with children and families who have experienced these placements? Will it examine how well the notifications currently translate into timely action by the CQC? Seeing the data is important, but acting on it is more so. How will Parliament be kept informed before the two-year deadline for reporting? Will that be part of the written statement?
All that leads me to our new clause 12, which aims to address a lot of the background I have set out. At present, the Mental Health Act provides for the detention of patients who require treatment for mental health disorders, including children. Section 131A of that Act governs the accommodation of patients in hospital wards, but lacks explicit safeguards preventing children from being placed in adult wards, except in limited circumstances. That has led to troubling examples across the country, where children have been admitted to adult wards because of a lack of appropriate CAMHS beds.
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member for Guildford asked about timelines. There is the timeline for the review on the face of the Bill, and then there is the broader question about implementation and how all the moving parts fit together. We have now had the spending review, which will provide a financial envelope for mental health more broadly, and for implementation of the Bill. We will be ready to move forward with implementation on that basis, which will include the code of practice.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about a time limit for notification. It is already a legislative requirement for the CQC to be notified when a child or young person is placed on an adult ward for a continuous period of longer than 48 hours. In addition, the previous Government assessed that the current requirement of 48 hours was sufficient. As part of the review that is mentioned on the face of the Bill, we will consider whether that remains the case for receiving notifications, and whether it remains appropriate.
My hon. Friend also asked about further safeguards for children and young people, including those in inappropriate settings. Obviously, the placement of a child or young person on an adult mental health ward only happens following a thorough clinical assessment. Trusts are required to have robust local safeguarding protocols in place, including mandatory staff training on safeguarding and incident-reporting mechanisms, to ensure accountability and oversight. Staff are appropriately trained in child and adolescent mental health care, and they must meet level 3 competency in safeguarding children.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about data. The CQC already publishes “Monitoring the Mental Health Act”, a statutory annual report that must be laid before Parliament, in which it reports on the number of people under 18 who are admitted to adult wards. Additionally, it reports qualitative information on placements for children and young people, such as placements on children’s general wards. I hope that I have addressed that point.
Stephen Kinnock
The new clause takes forward a commitment made in the Lords by Baroness Merron to address issues relating to the unequal application of the Human Rights Act 1998 for some mental health patients. Sadly, this issue was highlighted following the death of Paul Sammut. I extend my deepest condolences to his family.
We now wish to take action to ensure a more equal application of the Human Rights Act, with the aim of extending its protection to certain mental health patients. Under this amendment, private providers will be taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when they are carrying out certain services and when those services are arranged and/or paid for by either local authorities or the NHS. Those functions are section 117 aftercare; services provided in pursuance of arrangements made by a local authority in Scotland, discharging its duty under section 25 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003; and in-patient treatment and assessment for mental disorder, whether or not a patient is detained under the Mental Health Act.
When carrying out those services, private providers will be required to act compatibly with the convention rights set out in the Human Rights Act. Many patients in private facilities already have those protections. Private providers are already taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when caring for patients detained under the Mental Health Act or providing care for patients due to the effect of section 73 of the Care Act 2014. The new clause seeks to extend those protections to other mental health patients in private provision, where care is arranged and/or paid for by the NHS or a local authority. As the new clause is a modification of the Human Rights Act, this is a reserved matter and the amendment will therefore apply in all four nations.
Government amendments 37 and 38 are minor technical amendments to the Bill’s extent provision in clause 57 to ensure that our amendment—new clause 10—relating to the Human Rights Act extends UK-wide. The Human Rights Act, which the new clause 10 seeks to modify, extends UK-wide. The amendments are therefore necessary to ensure that the same Human Rights Act protections extend to all four nations. I hope that hon. Members feel able to support the amendments.
Dr Evans
I welcome the opportunity to speak on these important provisions, which apply the Human Rights Act 1998 to certain private care providers delivering mental health services. At present, the Human Rights Act applies directly to public authorities and to those exercising functions of a public nature. However, an increasing proportion of mental health care and aftercare services are delivered by private providers, under arrangement with NHS bodies and local authorities. The current legislation leaves some ambiguity about whether private providers are legally bound to comply with the Human Rights Act when delivering such services. That creates a potential accountability gap that risks undermining the protections that we want to guarantee to vulnerable patients.
The Government’s proposal to explicitly extend the application of the Human Rights Act to registered private care providers when they deliver specific services commissioned or paid for by public authorities is a welcome step towards closing the gap. By doing so, it will ensure that these providers are treated as performing public functions under section 6 of the Act. That means that they will be directly accountable for upholding the rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act, including the rights to liberty, dignity, privacy and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment.
This approach is not without precedent. For example, in the case of prison outsourcing, courts have established that private companies running prisons are subject to the Human Rights Act because they perform public functions. Similarly, private care providers delivering publicly funded mental health services should be held to the same standard as NHS bodies or local authorities.
It is worth noting that although this explicit statutory extension of the Human Rights Act to private providers is a new provision in the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales, similar principles already apply in Scotland through case law and existing legislation. Under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, local authorities have a statutory duty to provide aftercare services, which may be delivered by private providers. Scottish courts recognise that when private providers perform public functions, such as delivering those statutory services, they are subject to the Human Rights Act, following key judgments such as YL v. Birmingham City Council.
This Government proposal provides much-needed clarity and an explicit statutory footing across all four nations of the UK. It also ensures consistency across the four nations, referencing equivalent legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This helps to remove ambiguity and ensure consistency. However, we must also consider the practical impact. Although these changes strengthen rights and protections, they also increase the regulatory burden on private providers. Providers may face new compliance costs, legal challenges and the need for enhanced training and oversight. That could have a knock-on effect on service availability, particularly in a market already facing staffing pressures and financial constraints.
The Government should therefore consider how to support providers to meet the new obligations without destabilising service provision. There is also a need to ensure that commissioners and regulators have the necessary resources and powers to monitor and enforce compliance effectively. In that spirit, I will pose some questions to the Minister for clarification and look for reassurance.
How will the Government monitor compliance with the Human Rights Act among private providers, and what enforcement mechanisms will be used? Has there been any consultation with private care providers about the potential operational and financial impacts of this extension, and will the extension apply only to services arranged or paid for by NHS bodies? What protections exist for patients receiving private mental health care outside these arrangements? How do the Government plan to ensure consistency in application across all four nations? Do the Government foresee private provision of mental health-related services expanding? If so, by how much?
I agree that the final two amendments look like two small consequential amendments that clarify and ensure that the human rights extension applies equally across England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The insertion of “subject to subsection (2)” appears to be technical. I would just welcome confirmation from the Minister that it will not inadvertently limit the scope of the new protections. Otherwise, Opposition Members will support them.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the shadow Minister for those questions. I will have to get back to him in writing, because the questions that he asks obviously have an important legal dimension, and it was physically impossible to get the information in the time between his sitting down and my standing up to speak. I am not a human rights lawyer either, so it is best if I write to him on those points.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Victims and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 19th June 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesVictims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Amendments as at 19 June 2025 - (19 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 3, page 7, line 4, leave out from “and” to end of line 9.
This amendment is linked to Amendment 22.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 7, line 14, leave out from “and” to end of line 16.
This amendment is linked to Amendment 22.
Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 7, leave out line 20.
This amendment, along with Amendments 20 and 21, would ensure that there has to be a review by the family court in all instances where a prohibited steps order is issued.
Dr Mullan
We return to consider the measures on parental responsibility. There was significant debate in our earlier sitting on the need to balance the measures, and the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats both moved amendments to widen the Bill’s scope in ways that I think would have been proportionate and necessary to secure the maximum possible benefit from a novel measure to protect children from people who would not ordinarily be able to exercise their parental responsibility.
The debate was about the need for balance, which is why, at the same time as seeking to widen the scope of the measure, we want to secure balance by making amendments to ensure that the family court has a bigger role to play where we introduce automatic powers for taking this through the family court.
Under the Bill as drafted, a review by the family court is required only if an offender is acquitted or if their sentence is reduced to below a life sentence or a term of four years or more. The amendment deletes those conditions by removing proposed new section 10D(1)(b), which limits review to the specific appellant outcomes I have described.
We believe that automaticity, while preferable to the risk of inaction in relation to children, should be enhanced with a considered approach—when time allows—to taking the necessary protective steps. The amendment would ultimately require such orders to be reviewed on their own merit, in a family court, with children’s welfare as the guiding principle. Our amendments would ensure that the safeguarding lens of the family court is engaged in all cases, not just in those that meet certain technical thresholds. This morning, the Minister was keen to emphasise the novelty of these measures, as well as the importance of the family court in considering these issues more widely.
Our amendment would help to ensure that those correctly put points are enacted more consistently than they currently will be. An automatic power, while important, will inevitably have limitations in understanding the specific circumstances of each case. I have spoken to experts in this area, and they highlighted the rare but compelling cases where, despite one parent being convicted of a very serious offence, there may be similar safeguarding concerns about the other parent. Where parental responsibility is removed in one case, it might be left to a single person whom the family court might also consider inappropriate, in isolation, to be exercising parental responsibility.
As unusual as they might sound, I understand that those scenarios sometimes occur. That is why family court practitioners are concerned about the automatic suspension of parental responsibility. Our amendments are designed to counterbalance those concerns and give greater strength to the desire of both the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats in broadening the scope of automaticity with a stronger safeguard for those exceptional circumstances where, at times, it might not be considered the best approach.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
The amendment seeks to insert a requirement for the family court to consider every prohibited steps order made under clause 3. The shadow Minister’s intention in moving the amendment is noble. However, the Government must ensure that we are acting in the best interests of all children, and there are several reasons why this amendment cannot be accepted.
First, we must protect the children and families in these horrific circumstances from unnecessary procedural burdens, particularly when there is no challenge to an order by the parties involved. Under clause 3, the prohibited steps order will have been made because an offender has been convicted of serious child sexual abuse offences against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility. For the child, that means that the very person who was supposed to protect them has committed some of the most heinous acts of abuse against them.
In such cases, we believe it is right that a prohibited steps order is made automatically, and that it would not be in the best interests of the child or their siblings for their abuser to continue exercising parental responsibility. However, we have provided flexibility for cases to be considered by the family court, where there is an application to do so.
This amendment would require the victim and their family to go through another set of potentially traumatic legal proceedings after the criminal case has concluded. This would prevent them from moving on with their lives, and we do not want to put that burden on victims and their families at what will already be an incredibly difficult time. We think it is right that, instead of mandating further consideration in the family court, the offender and others should apply to the family court to vary or discharge an order.
Furthermore, we must consider the impact this amendment would have on other, unconnected children already involved in family court proceedings. The family court makes difficult decisions about some of the most vulnerable children in our society every single day. This amendment would increase the caseload in the family court and would undoubtedly impact on the time it takes to resolve cases. Every member of this Committee will have constituency casework involving the family court, and we do not wish to add to its caseload. It is important that the family court can resolve cases as quickly as possible, and the Government do not want to add to the volume of cases in the system, unless it is absolutely necessary.
Finally, the amendment has inconsistencies that would create difficulties in its application. It maintains the definition of “local authority” as the relevant local authority at the time the verdict of acquittal is entered or the sentence is reduced. As drafted, the amendment leaves open questions as to who the relevant local authority is in cases where no appeal has been made. This would place an additional burden on the Crown court to ascertain who the relevant local authority is and would risk the measure being applied inconsistently.
The good intentions behind this amendment are clear. We all want to ensure that children and their welfare are protected. However, this amendment is not the way to do that. For the reasons I have outlined, we do not think that mandating a family court review is the right approach in these cases, and I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Mullan
I would like to make two points. First, on the drafting, I appreciate that the Government are ultimately responsible for the wording of legislation, but I gently say that perhaps the Minister might review this with her officials. The wording of the amendment was taken from the previously approved drafting of a similar measure in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which was introduced by the last Government, so there must have been a change of heart in the official advice to the Minister.
On the issue of substance, perhaps the Minister will elaborate on a compromise outside the Committee. These are new and novel measures, and undoubtedly there will be guidance for local authorities when they come into force. The Opposition would be reassured if the Minister committed to ensuring that the guidance highlights to local authorities the importance of carefully considering their role in seeking further review of a case, outside the limited scope of the legislation, in circumstances where parental responsibility is removed through an order. Local authorities will perhaps be in a better position to judge whether leaving someone with sole parental responsibility might not be the ideal scenario.
The Minister will not have a chance to respond, but I would be grateful if she could assure me, perhaps outside in the Committee corridor, that the guidance will be absolutely clear on the burden that will be placed on local authorities, as well as on the importance of local authorities acting swiftly. An automatic order is not necessarily in the best interests of children in all circumstances, when considering the wider factors.
I will not press the amendment to a vote, as I take it in good faith that the Minister will at least have a further discussion with me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 1.
Clause 4 stand part.
Alex Davies-Jones
We have already debated these clauses at length. I do not wish to labour the Committee or subject it to my voice any longer than necessary. The spirit of the clauses has been debated on the record.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Victims’ rights to make representations and receive information etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 2.
New clause 11—Extension of Victim Contact Scheme—
“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that the Victim Contact Scheme is made available to—
(a) victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences,
(b) victims in cases involving coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking, or harassment, and
(c) bereaved families in manslaughter or death by dangerous driving cases.
(2) The Secretary of State must ensure that information under the Victim Contact Scheme is communicated in a timely and trauma-informed manner.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish data each year on uptake and accessibility of the Victim Contact Scheme.”
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) for tabling new clause 11, which would expand eligibility for the victim contact scheme, ensure timely and sensitive communication under the scheme, and require the Secretary of State to publish a report covering key data on the scheme. I am pleased to reassure him that victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking and harassment will already be eligible for the new victim contact scheme, regardless of sentence length. I am also pleased to say that bereaved families whose loved ones have died as a result of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving will also be eligible for the scheme where the offender has received a sentence of 12 months or more.
I wholeheartedly agree that victims of violent, sexual and dangerous driving offences that have resulted in a sentence of less than 12 months should also have a clear route to request and receive information about their offender. That is why the Bill guarantees that these cohorts can request information through a new dedicated victim helpline, and where appropriate, they will receive the information. We think this is the right approach. It targets resources and delivers proactive contact through the victim contact scheme to those who need the information most, while still providing a new dedicated helpline for all victims to request information.
Turning to the second part of the new clause, the hon. Member for Eastbourne is right that victims deserve timely communication that is sensitive to their needs, but this is properly a matter of guidance and practice, not primary legislation. The upcoming consultation on the victims code offers an opportunity to consider how we can improve the delivery of the victim contact scheme, and I would welcome all Members’ engagement with that consultation once it launches.
Dr Mullan
As the Minister outlined, we are discussing changes primarily to the victim contact scheme and victim helpline. We supported the operation of those services in Government, and it is perfectly in order for the Government to seek to expand them further. But, during the Committee evidence sessions, the Minister will have noted the questions about the resources available to individuals for accessing those services. I note that the witnesses from HM Prison and Probation Service and others felt that there were the necessary resources, or at least that the impact of the expansion on the resource requirements would not be particularly significant, but I would welcome the Minister assuring the Committee that she has done the due diligence necessary to ensure that we do not raise expectations in those expansions and additions to victim support services that are not realised.
Alex Davies-Jones
I am happy to reassure the hon. Member on that point. These provisions have been drafted in consultation with colleagues, including from HMPPS, to ensure that we have the necessary resources. He will know that we have provided additional funding for the new helpline, and for the additional resources required to expand the victim contact scheme. That is all laid out in the economic impact assessment of the legislation. We will, of course, keep it under review to ensure that adequate resources are available to support victims, and give them the communication that they require.
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 11 would give access to the victim contact scheme for victims of violent and sexual offences where the offender is sentenced to less than 12 months. I think the Minister said that such access is included under the provisions of the Bill.
The new clause also mentions access for
“victims in cases involving coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking, or harassment and…death by dangerous driving”.
Caroline Voaden
I thank the Minister for clarifying that. New clause 11 would also require the Government to produce annual reports on the uptake and accessibility of the scheme, increasing transparency and accountability. We believe that it is important to know who is using the scheme so that we can know who is not accessing it. That will help us to improve the scheme, and to widen access to those victims who, for whatever reason, have not heard about the scheme or managed to access it.
On the training for the people managing and running the helpline, could the Minister give me some reassurance that there is funding and capacity available to give adequate training in gender-based violence and the effects of stalking and sexual violence on people, and particularly women, who may be quite scared about the potential release of an offender and what that means?
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Lady for those questions. I can happily and wholeheartedly reassure her on the last point. She will have heard the evidence given the Committee by colleagues in the Probation Service, who were quite forthright about the trauma-informed training provided to call handlers, which is so vital in such cases. They are well used to that, and we have provided additional funding and resources to enable training to continue so that they are well equipped to deal with the increased caseload that the expansion of the scheme and the new helpline will provide. On the annual report, the hon. Lady will have heard me say that there is a duty under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 to provide an annual report on victims code compliance. The victims code includes the right to information—the right to be notified—so that will be included in the compliance report.
However, I take on board the hon. Lady’s comments about the need to make sure that victims are aware of the scheme, and that they are able to apply to it. All that will be brought into the victims code consultation that we will take forward later this year, to ensure that we bring more victims up to speed on what their rights are and what they are entitled to under the criminal justice system. We have a long way to go to ensure that victims are aware of their rights on the whole—not just rights to communication and contact.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 6
Commissioner’s power to act in individual cases relevant to public policy
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
The next three clauses of the Bill, clauses 6 to 8, pertain to increasing the powers of the Victims’ Commissioner. In 2024, the passage of the Victims and Prisoners Act strengthened the role of the Victims’ Commissioner. Among other measures, it placed a duty on relevant bodies to co-operate with the Commissioner’s requests and respond to their recommendations. The Government’s manifesto committed to build on those powers, providing the Victims’ Commissioner with the full suite of tools to drive systemic change. These clauses deliver on that manifesto commitment.
I take this opportunity to thank the Victims’ Commissioner, Baroness Newlove, for her engagement on these clauses and on the vital work she does every single day to support victims and witnesses. The Victims’ Commissioner’s role is fundamental to appropriate scrutiny of, and accountability for, the systems that support victims and of the criminal justice system. The clauses on the Victims’ Commissioner empower the commissioner better to hold the system to account. They are an important step towards building victims’ confidence in the system and rebuilding their trust. They will ensure that victims’ voices are heard and that the system that supports victims of crime and of antisocial behaviour are held to the same standards, and are effectively and thoroughly scrutinised.
Clause 6 bolsters the Victims’ Commissioner’s ability to promote the interests of victims and witnesses by giving them a legislative foundation to act on individual cases, which expose systemic failure. Individuals’ lived experiences offer invaluable insights into how the system delivers for victims. Existing legislation lacks clarity on the extent to which the commissioner can act explicitly within the parameters of her existing functions in those individual cases.
The clause makes it clear that the Victims’ Commissioner can choose to act on individual cases and where such cases raise public policy issues. That will promote the interests of other victims and witnesses who may face similar systemic problems. In practical terms, therefore, if the commissioner identifies an issue or a failure—such as a policy not being followed, or the absence of a relevant policy—that may have wider implications for other victims, she may request information from the relevant agencies. That could include an explanation of what went wrong and the steps being taken to address that, and recommendations on how improvements can be made across the system.
To achieve that, the element of the legislative bar preventing the commissioner’s involvement in individual cases will be amended. Other elements of the bar will remain the same, including the preservation of the existing restrictions on the commissioner interfering with certain proceedings and with prosecutorial or judicial functions. The clause will enable the Victims’ Commissioner better to promote the interests of victims and witnesses on the issues that impact on them directly.
Dr Mullan
Again, the role and importance of the Victims’ Commissioner was something that we supported, reformed and strengthened during our time in Government, as the Minister highlighted. I too pay tribute to Baroness Newlove, whom I have had the pleasure of meeting on a number of occasions to discuss a whole variety of issues related to victims. She brings her incredible experience—and that of her wider family, who have their own perspectives —to so many different issues. I welcome measures that seek to strengthen her role.
I only have one question for the Minister. The new power will sit within a number of bodies—the ombudsman and others—who have roles to play. I am sure that Baroness Newlove and her successor will be forceful and proactive in helping to understand how the powers sit within those remits. Nevertheless, the Government and the Ministry of Justice have a convening and overarching role to ensure that, with all the different parties, the new power and the new individual approach do not confuse victims and that it is clear to everyone what the new Victims’ Commissioner role will or will not involve. Co-operation with others will be necessary to pick up cases that might need that. I will be grateful to the Minister for assurance that the MOJ is sighted of that issue, of ensuring that there is not confusion across the patch.
Alex Davies-Jones
I am happy to clarify that the powers in the Bill that we are extending to the Victims’ Commissioner to allow that measure to take place will bring them in line with other commissioners, such as the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and the Children’s Commissioner, which do those functions and operate well across different agencies. Therefore, it is just a matter of replicating the powers of the Children’s and the Domestic Abuse Commissioners, and how they work in those other jurisdictions. I take that on board.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Duty to co-operate with Commissioner: anti-social behaviour
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
The clause places a duty on local authorities and social housing providers, where they are engaged with victims of antisocial behaviour, to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. Antisocial behaviour is more than merely a nuisance. It can erode personal freedom, harm mental wellbeing and, ultimately, shatter the feeling of safety and belonging that defines a home.
Antisocial behaviour is not, however, always a criminal justice issue. Local authorities and social housing providers often play a key role in supporting victims and in finding a resolution. The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 introduced a duty for certain criminal justice agencies responsible for providing those victims code services to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. That duty does not apply to local authorities or social housing providers, so there is a gap in terms of ensuring that the commissioner has the tools to do their job effectively for victims of antisocial behaviour. This duty will close that gap and ensure that the commissioner is able to access the right information to identify the systemic issues, make more informed recommendations and scrutinise how the system as a whole responds to antisocial behaviour from a victim’s perspective.
Dr Mullan
Everybody in the Committee today will be familiar with the importance of engaging with local authorities and social housing providers in relation to antisocial behaviour. We will all have seen examples of good work and proactive local authorities and social housing providers, but we have almost certainly also seen examples of where they do not do the basics that we might expect for our constituents as residents of their housing. We therefore welcome the expansion of the role of the Victims’ Commissioner into this area.
My question is about understanding the different roles that agencies will have. First, what discussions did the Minister have with her colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government about ensuring that local authorities are minded and sighted to these changes, as well as on how they will operate and play their convening role when it comes to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman and the regulators of social housing.
I am sure the Victims’ Commissioner will do their own work and engagement, but the MHCLG and the MOJ will have an important role ensuring that all stakeholders understand and co-operate to make the most of these new powers, for the benefit of all our constituents who experience antisocial behaviour in local authority and social housing.
Alex Davies-Jones
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s questions. He will know that MHCLG already has a legal duty to respond to recommendations in the commissioner’s reports when relating to some of these measures, so it will feed into that more systemically as a result of these new powers. This Government are not legislating in a vacuum; the new powers in this Bill sit alongside and complement the new measures in the Crime and Policing Bill currently before the House, particularly the duty to create the new antisocial behaviour case reviews.
It is really important that we do not legislate in a vacuum. That is something that has been done previously, but this Government are taking a different approach, looking at how we can tackle issues across Government. We have made these Bills complementary because, in order to solve these problems, we have to do things together across Government and across different agencies. That is why colleagues across Government and from different Departments, including MHCLG and the Home Office, have been carefully involved in the creation of these new powers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Duty of Commissioner to report on compliance with victims code
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
Clause 8 requires the Victims’ Commissioner to produce an annual report to Ministers that will provide an independent assessment of compliance with the victims code. The code sets out the minimum level of service that victims should receive from the criminal justice system in England and Wales. It is part of the Victims’ Commissioner’s role and core functions to keep the code’s operation under review.
The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 contained a new code compliance framework that will require criminal justice bodies to provide Ministers with data demonstrating how they are complying with the code, but that measure lacked independent oversight and scrutiny. In recognition of the role of the Victims’ Commissioner in keeping the operation of the code under review, this measure will place a duty on them to produce their own independent assessment of code compliance. The measure will strengthen their role within the code compliance framework and enhance independent and victim-focused scrutiny of code compliance, with the aim of improving the service that victims receive from criminal justice bodies.
The report will also form a key part of the evidence that informs the ministerial annual report on code compliance. Once the code compliance framework is in force, Ministers will be under a statutory duty to have regard to the new report from the Victims’ Commissioner when preparing their own. As a result, we are removing the existing duty on Ministers to consult the commissioner during the preparation of their annual report, as previously set out in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The Victims’ Commissioner will also be able to use this report to make recommendations to authorities within their remit, to which those authorities will be required to respond, helping to drive up compliance with the code. As a result, I urge that clause 8 stand part of the Bill.
Dr Mullan
As we have come to the conclusion of the clauses relating to these powers, I thought I might bring Baroness Newlove into the room and quote her view overall on the measures that we are passing. She says:
“These important and welcome reforms give the Victims’ Commissioner the statutory powers needed to deliver on the role’s promise: championing victims’ rights, scrutinising compliance with the Victims code, holding agencies to account, and spotlighting the true victim experience to drive meaningful change. This marks a step towards a more accountable system that puts victims first.”
The measures have also been welcomed by SafeLives, Green & Burton ASB Associates and Victim Support, which we heard from during evidence sessions earlier in the week. Therefore we do not intend to oppose this final measure of the three; as I say, they all reflect our long-standing commitment over 14 years in government to the role of the Victims’ Commissioner, which we sought to enhance over time. Of course, as I said, it is right for this Government to think further about other changes that can be made for the benefit of victims.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Appointment of Crown Prosecutors
Alex Davies-Jones
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 9, page 11, line 4, leave out “persons” and insert “a person”.
This amendment and Amendments 2 to 7 ensure that exemptions conferred by sections 1 and 5 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 remain available to persons with rights of audience in relation to certain proceedings in the Senior Courts and all proceedings in the county court and magistrates’ court.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 2 to 7.
Clause stand part.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain sufficient qualified Crown prosecutors. Clause 9 supports that aim by increasing CPS recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help to increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors.
Currently, the CPS is restricted as to whom it can appoint as Crown prosecutors, because of an unnecessary legal requirement. That legislative barrier, set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold a general qualification. That definition excludes certain legal professionals, including most Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—CILEX—criminal practitioners. Those legal professionals hold the right skills and the specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including rights of audience, but they do not meet the “general qualification” criterion. That restriction limits the Director of Public Prosecutions’ ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent. It also reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.
The purpose of clause 9 is to remove the requirement for a general qualification under sections 1(3) and 5(1) of the 1985 Act. In so doing, it gives the Director of Public Prosecutions the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. It is important to stress that the removal of the “general qualification” criterion does not change the reality that prospective applicants must hold the necessary practice rights and meet the required competency standards in order to become Crown prosecutors. Rights of audience and the right to conduct litigation also remain protected as reserved legal activities under the Legal Services Act 2007.
This change reflects the modern legal services landscape. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common and professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing the unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause also supports the recruitment of a more diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors. The measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional; however, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the Director of Public Prosecutions’ control.
Government amendments 1 to 7 are technical amendments to address an unintended consequence arising from the previous drafting of the removal of the statutory exemptions in the 1985 Act—it happens to the best of us, Mr Stringer. Although the policy aim was to ensure that only suitably qualified individuals could act as Crown prosecutors, we have since identified that many existing CPS barristers currently rely on the statutory exemption in section 1(6) of the Act to conduct litigation without separate authorisation from the Bar Standards Board. That exemption is appropriate, because those barristers act under the direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions when conducting litigation. The amendments ensure that the exemption remains in place, preserving the status quo for those who already rely on it, while removing it for other legal professionals, who do not meet the relevant qualification requirement but are now eligible to be designated as Crown prosecutors. This approach avoids unintended barriers for those barristers, supports the CPS’s operational needs and maintains the policy intent of enabling a broader, properly qualified pool of Crown prosecutors.
The amendments will ensure that the clause operates as intended, broadening access to the CP roles while maintaining appropriate safeguards and supporting the CPS to meet its recruitment needs effectively. I commend the provisions to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
The Opposition recognise that flexibility in how we decide which professionals can perform important functions in our criminal justice system is important, and we do not object to the widening of the scope, for example by including CILEX members. However, the Minister will know that it has not been universally welcomed. In particular, former Director of Public Prosecutions Lord Macdonald described it as a
“cost cutting measure rather than a measure designed to improve the quality of justice”.
We will not oppose the measure, but given the significant expansion of the professionals involved, what plans do the Government have to review the impact of the change to ensure that there have not been any unintended consequences? It would reassure not just the Opposition but wider stakeholders if the Government kept a close eye on the measure and formally reviewed its implementation.
Alex Davies-Jones
I will happily reassure the Committee that the measures will not reduce professional standards in any way. As I have said, they will simply remove unnecessary barriers that prevent qualified individuals from becoming Crown prosecutors. We are all aware, sadly, of the issues with backlogs in our Crown courts and cases waiting a long time to get to trial. Part of the reason for that is recruitment challenges in the CPS.
I respectfully challenge the comments from the previous DPP. The measures are not a cost-cutting exercise. They are about ensuring that we have the broadest level of talent while maintaining the highest professional standards, so that more victims see justice and more perpetrators are held to account for their crimes.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, in clause 9, page 11, line 5, after “subsection (3)” insert
“who does not have a general qualification (within the meaning given by section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 1.
Amendment 3, in clause 9, page 11, line 11, leave out
“persons designated for the purposes of subsection (3)”
and insert “such a person”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 1.
Amendment 4, in clause 9, page 11, line 19, after “omit ’” insert “but”.
This amendment updates the text to be omitted from section 5(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 so that the provision reads correctly in light of the amendment to that provision currently included in the Bill.
Amendment 5, in clause 9, page 11, line 22, leave out “persons” and insert “a person”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 1.
Amendment 6, in clause 9, page 11, line 23, after “subsection (1)” insert
“who does not have a general qualification (within the meaning given by section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 1.
Amendment 7, in clause 9, page 11, line 29, leave out
“persons appointed under subsection (1)”
and insert “such a person”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 1.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Private prosecutions: regulations about costs payable out of central funds
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
In 2020, the Justice Committee carried out an inquiry into the private prosecution sector, resulting in the publication of a report, “Private prosecutions: safeguards”, on 2 October that year. I thank it for its diligent work and carefully considered recommendations. It made a number of recommendations to address the systemic issues highlighted by the Post Office Horizon scandal, and the Ministry of Justice has recently concluded a separate public consultation on the regulation and oversight of private prosecutors more generally. We are carefully considering the responses to that consultation, and will in due course publish a Government response on the steps we are taking to improve practice in the private prosecutorial landscape, including legislation if necessary.
Separately, the Justice Committee made a recommendation about the costs recoverable from central funds by private prosecutors. It found that there is a disparity between the compensation available to a private prosecutor seeking to recover their expenses from public funds and a defence practitioner whose client is in receipt of legal aid. A private prosecutor can apply to the court for an order of payment from central funds of an amount that offers reasonably sufficient compensation for their expenses. However, there is little clarity about what constitutes reasonable sufficiency and, as a result, cost orders for private prosecutors tend to be at least five times higher than the rates available to legal aid lawyers, often for acting in the same cases.
The Select Committee referred to evidence that the current cost regime for private prosecutions may give rise to perverse financial incentives, which are unlikely to lead to a just system. The Committee therefore recommended that the Government should review the funding arrangements for private prosecutions to reduce the disparity between payment rates for claims made by private prosecutors and defendants from central funds.
Dr Mullan
I am pleased to say that I was a member of the Select Committee, and I sat on that inquiry and signed off its recommendations. The issue of costs was particularly pertinent to me at the time. I welcome the commitment to extensive consultation, because while the Select Committee absolutely recognised the growing disparity between costs restrictions in non-private prosecutions and private prosecutions, we heard that that was still an important route to justice for some people and we would not want to overly restrict it, so the rate at which costs restrictions are set and the process for that will be important.
The rest of my remarks relate to what the Government are not doing. I note the Minister’s commitment to considering further changes, but she will know that opportunities to legislate do not always come along when we might want them to. Of course, the Government have committed to legislating later in the year on sentencing, and they will almost certainly be legislating on court reform, following Brian Leveson’s review. That is a hefty timetable of legislation in the increasingly short time available in this Parliament, so it may well be that there are not future opportunities to legislate in this important area.
I am sure that all hon. Members are familiar with just how badly private prosecutions can go wrong for some people, particularly in relation to the Post Office Horizon scandal. While there was some CPS involvement in some of those prosecutions, the majority of them were private prosecutions, and we all know the devastating consequences of some of them. We are yet to see whether criminal proceedings might flow from the inquiry, and the extent to which misconduct may have taken place. That is why, as part of our report, the Committee called for regulation of private prosecutions to bring them in line with the ordinary expectations we have of the good practice of the CPS—they really should not be any different.
I would like to hear from the Minister a clear commitment, rather than a generic assurance, and a timetable, during this Parliament, for when the Government expect to develop and publish proposals for the regulation of private prosecutors and when they hope to legislate to bring them into force. It is all well and good for the previous Government and this Government to speak powerfully about the Post Office and the impact that the scandal has had on people, but I think the public want to see steps taken to ensure that it cannot happen again. I am sure the inquiry will have recommendations about that, but the regulation of the private prosecutions sector will be important in ensuring that we do not see a repeat. I would welcome comments from the Minister in that regard.
Alex Davies-Jones
On the wider concerns about private prosecutions, the shadow Minister will have heard me say that we will shortly be publishing our response to the consultation that this Government carried out. We recognise that there is more to do in this area, and we will act if the recommendations suggest that we should do so. He will also know that, sadly, this Government inherited a justice system in absolute chaos, which has resulted in us having to bring forward a number of urgent reviews, including into sentencing and court backlogs, and a number of legislative vehicles. I guarantee that there will be ample opportunity for us to legislate on these issues during this parliamentary Session should that be deemed appropriate given their nature.
Dr Mullan
The point I was trying to make is that regulation of the private prosecutions sector will not necessarily be in the scope of legislation on sentencing or court reform. The MOJ will already be bidding for parliamentary time to bring through two potentially big Bills. I ask again whether the Minister might want to reconsider whether this Bill, in which we are literally legislating on private prosecutions, is the right vehicle to address the sector’s regulation, because we may not get another opportunity in this Parliament.
Alex Davies-Jones
I am confident that there will certainly be more opportunities, given, as I have said, the nature of the issues facing the Ministry of Justice and the need for the Government to act to correct some of the difficulties and problems that we inherited. This Government are getting on with action to clean up the mess in our prisons, to reduce the criminal cases backlog and, through this Bill, to ensure that victims’ rights are heard. We are not sitting on our hands and waiting for appropriate vehicles; we are getting on with the job, and that is exactly what we are doing today.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)