Financial Services Bill (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, just a few reminders: please switch electronic devices to silent; no tea and coffee during sittings; and, again, I thank everybody for observing the social distancing regulations. As you have seen, the spaces are marked and now cannot even be moved, so there is no excuse for not social distancing. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members emailed any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
We continue now with line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 8
Review of which benchmarks are critical benchmarks
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 8, page 7, line 38, at end insert—
‘(7) In reviewing critical benchmarks in accordance with Article A20 of the Benchmarks regulation as amended by this Act the FCA must have regard to—
(a) ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts;
(b) preventing a benchmark from manipulation for the benefit of anyone submitting information to that benchmark; and
(c) robust sanctions up to and including custodial sentences for anyone found to be engaged in manipulation or attempted manipulation of a benchmark.’
This amendment would require the FCA to have regard to ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts, that it is not open to manipulation and that robust sanctions are in place for those who manipulate, or attempt to manipulate, a benchmark.
Thank you for your chairmanship today, Mr Davies. Perhaps with your indulgence I may, as I did the other day, explain how I shall try to approach this morning’s sitting. I believe that within a sometimes impenetrable Bill the clauses we are to debate this morning may be the most impenetrable. That is often the case when clauses change provisions elsewhere, as in this instance. I shall, as I go through my remarks on the provisions, ask the Minister some questions. The real meat will come at about clauses 13 to 16, and I will speak for a bit longer. I just want to give the Committee the shape of my approach.
To return to the amendment, it begins, I guess, with LIBOR. I want by way of illustration to ask the Committee to think about the price of bread. If we were all asked what the benchmark price of a loaf is, it would be easy to establish it. We would go to a supermarket, look on the shelf, and see the price of a loaf. If we were keen shoppers with a good eye for a bargain, we might go to two or three supermarkets and compare the price of a loaf. I could pop-quiz the Committee, but I shall not put anyone through that.
The price of a standard loaf in one of our supermarkets is roughly £1.10, give or take; people who want to go for one of those sourdough loaves can pay a bit more if they want, but for what I would call a normal brown loaf it is about £1.10. That is the benchmark price of a loaf, dictated by the supply and demand of a competitive supermarket environment.
Now I want Members to imagine a different way of setting prices, where we were setting the price of a loaf and could all submit our opinion on what the price of the loaf might be—and we owned bakeries, and were selling loaves. We would have a debate every day to set the price of bread. Perhaps the Minister and I would converge on about £1.10, but someone else might say, “Look, could we just edge that price up? Could you do me a favour and make today’s price £1.11 or £1.12? It would be a really good favour and, by the way, if you do it I might send you a case of champagne at Christmas.”
The trader might be saying those things in the knowledge that they had a lot of loaves to sell that afternoon—maybe millions. The penny difference in price could make a great difference to the profit. Alternatively, a benchmark price of £1.09 instead of £1.10 could mean that they would lose a lot of money on the bread they had to sell. That is basically what was happening with LIBOR. That is the problem that was unveiled.
The problem is exacerbated where there is not a liquid market for bread and where the benchmark relies more and more on what our oral witnesses last week called “expert judgment”. That is one phrase for it, but we could also call it opinion, and if we did not have supermarkets selling millions of loaves every day and the price of bread was down to the opinion of only the bakers, we can see there would be the potential for price manipulation.
That is what was happening with LIBOR and what was uncovered as traders around the world shaved tiny proportions off the daily rates. The volume of money being traded meant that even a tiny proportion—0.01% or something like that—could make a huge difference to their own trading account over the course of the year. That is the problem that this set of clauses is trying to deal with.
How do we deal with the problem? We focus a lot on what the Bill calls the representativeness of the benchmark, because there is not really a problem when millions of loaves are being sold and there is a competitive environment; if I do not like the price at Tesco, I can go to another supermarket and try my luck elsewhere. But when wholesale markets were not very liquid and relied more and more on expert opinions, there was the potential for—indeed, the reality of—manipulation. That is what happened.
That matters because this benchmark underpins trillions of pounds’-worth of trades, yet was found to be vulnerable to the kind of manipulation I have just tried to illustrate. I have tried to show that even the tiniest movement in the daily benchmark could make a big difference to traders because of the volumes of money that they were trading. The benchmark’s flaws were exposed a number of years ago, yet its use to underpin trading has persisted because of the volume of contracts linked to it.
One of the problems in the complexity of this set of clauses is that it takes us into the area of contract law, which is both complex and, in this case, international. Huge volumes, contract law and international jurisdictions are involved, so—to be fair to the regulators and the Treasury—it is not easy to get this right. Our amendment does not try to get into the contract issue, which we will come to later when we debate a few clauses further on, but rather tries to set out some ground rules for the regulator in establishing and sanctioning successor benchmarks to LIBOR.
The criteria that we have set out ought to be uncontroversial. The first is that the benchmark should be based on actual trades in the market for which real prices were paid. I confess I have been away from the issue for a while, although I served on parliamentary inquiries into it some years ago, but we learned last week that those so-called expert judgments are still being used to set LIBOR prices. That is someone’s opinion of what a trade might cost, not necessarily what it does cost in a real marketplace. That use of expert judgments has created the potential—and, as we have seen, more than the potential—for manipulation.
We also learned that SONIA, the sterling overnight index average and the favoured successor to LIBOR in the UK, is based on much more liquid markets. That is a good thing, but there is also a potential problem. LIBOR is an internationally used benchmark. While we are debating this legislation, the United States is also legislating, the European Union has parallel legislation and the Swiss have parallel legislation—and they have all gone for slightly different successors. That raises the problem, which the Minister and I will get into discussing: how to take contracts based on an internationally used benchmark and try to ensure fairness to those who signed up to contracts under it when the countries legislating for successors to it are all choosing slightly different overnight rates for those successors.
The amendment, therefore, goes with the grain of how trades are moving. We all agree that a benchmark based on large liquid markets will be more accurate than one based on opinion. The second and third elements of the amendment give the regulator a duty to prevent manipulation by those submitting information to the benchmark and to have robust sanctions, including custodial sentences, when that occurs.
We will get back to debating that elsewhere in the Bill. When the LIBOR scandal unfolded some seven or eight years ago, I remember that both the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards heard evidence from chief executives of the major banks. Often, their defence was, “I had no idea what my traders were doing. I did not know that they were doing this.” There was a constructive ignorance built into the system. Although that did not make the chief executive look good, it was far better than the chief executive admitting that they knew what the trader was doing but they looked the other way because it was making more profit for the bank and the trader. The sanctions and the responsibility up through the institution are very important.
All that is hugely important for trust in the system. The average constituent probably does not know much about LIBOR or what it does, but the truth is that the financial products they buy are often related to this benchmark, so it does have an impact in the real world. No matter how esoteric the financial products are—they have become too esoteric—in the end there is a customer, and the customer should only pay a fair price. The imbalance of information should not result in the customer being fleeced or the trader being unfairly enriched, and it is the job of the regulator and the financial institution for which that trader works to ensure that is the case. That is the intention behind our amendment: to set that as a clear goal for the regulators before we get into the meat in the clauses of how we will transition from LIBOR to other kinds of benchmarks.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Davies. I appreciate the opening remarks of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and his compelling attempt to contextualise the complexity of the scrutiny of the clauses that we will undertake this morning. In that spirit, it might be helpful if I contextualise for the Committee what benchmarks are, what the LIBOR benchmark is and where we are with the EU benchmarks regulation before I respond to the Opposition amendment.
A benchmark is a standard against which the performance of a fund can be measured or by reference to which payments can be calculated. They are most commonly found in financial instruments, but are used to compare a variety of products, from commodities—oil, gold and diamonds—to the weather. The most widely used benchmarks are interest rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR, the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and SONIA. They reflect interest rates for inter-bank lending and borrowing. They are regularly calculated and made publicly available. As was mentioned, they are used in a wide array of financial instruments used in global financial markets. They also have a use in trade, finance, valuation, accounting and taxation.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
It is wonderful to serve under your chairmanship, as ever, Mr Davies. The Minister is explaining that there is a process for enforcement. We all know that this issue is very specialist. If he thinks the current regulations and sanctions are appropriate, could he set out how they are being enacted and monitored? Frankly, it requires someone with a specialist understanding of how these rates can be manipulated to enact them in the way he outlines. If he does not want to add the amendment, could he explain how these issues can be investigated, and what resources there are to do that?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. These matters are administered by the FCA. I have set out the framework under which it operates. Its resourcing is a matter for it, and I speak on a six-weekly basis to the chief executive about that. The sanctions available to the FCA vary considerably according the nature of the breaches. Some will be small, modest technical breaches.
Stella Creasy
The Minister has set out the criminal sanction. I am interested in whether there is support and resourcing expertise in relation to the criminal element, as opposed to the regulatory element.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I will be brief. The Minister has made a compelling case, but perhaps not as compelling as that made by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, who made illuminating remarks on the potential price of bread, although I encourage him to go to Aldi, where he will get it for a lot cheaper than £1.10.
What is proposed here is a common-sense approach that would give the wider public confidence that the Government are taking this matter seriously, notwith- standing the Minister’s remarks thus far. In general terms, I do not think there is a huge difference between the two positions, but looking at both sides, I think the common-sense approach would be to tighten this process and make it more robust; that would provide the public with the confidence they feel they need on these matters, particularly given the scale of past scandals.
Mr McFadden
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I do not think anyone looking at the issue would conclude that the responsibility for these actions had been fairly allocated, so there is an issue. I am not saying we want to go around looking to put people’s heads on spikes—we do not want that sort of politics—but it does rankle with our constituents when certain types of crime that are, candidly, easier to understand are met with heavy punishments while somebody who does a very complex crime that is more difficult to understand can somehow get away with it.
Having said that, I accept that legislation for criminal offences, and particularly for custodial sentences, needs to be very carefully drafted in exactly the right way, and I cannot say that I am 100% certain that my amendment is, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 8 is the first of 14 clauses that amend the benchmarks regulation in order to provide the FCA with the powers it needs to oversee the orderly wind-down of critical benchmarks such as LIBOR. Critical benchmarks are benchmarks that meet certain criteria—for instance, they are used in a significant volume of transactions, or the benchmark is based on submissions by contributors, the majority of whom are located in the UK. A number of powers in the benchmarks regulation are limited to the oversight supervision of critical benchmarks or the administrators of such benchmarks.
Clause 8 adds new criteria for what may be designated as a critical benchmark. As a result, a benchmark will be considered critical if its cessation would cause significant and adverse impacts on market integrity in the UK, even where the benchmark has market-led substitutes, provided one or more users of the benchmark cannot move on to a substitute. The new test means that, as a critical benchmark winds down, the value of contracts that use the benchmark diminishes. The powers available to the FCA to manage the wind-down of critical benchmarks will remain available, provided that the benchmark meets the relevant tests to remain designated as a critical benchmark.
In addition, one of the existing tests for what may be designated as a critical benchmark has been changed. The test originally stated that a benchmark would be designated as critical where it met either both a qualitative and quantitative threshold of use in more than €400 billion-worth of products, or the qualitative threshold only. The quantitative threshold has now been removed, as it has become redundant. This measure has been welcomed by industry as an important development in managing LIBOR transition, and will ensure that the FCA has the powers it needs to manage the orderly wind-down of this critical benchmark.
I am aware, as a result of my engagement with industry—indeed, the Committee heard evidence of this last week—that there is support among market participants for additional safe harbour provisions to complement the provisions in this Bill. I can assure the Committee that we are committed to looking into that further issue and providing industry with the reassurance it needs. That conversation is ongoing and, I think, is to the satisfaction of the industry; we are working to a conclusion with it. However, given what I think the Committee will concede is the complexity of the matters involved, I cannot commit to an outcome, and I think the industry recognises that.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
I want to go back to what happens if moving to another benchmark is “not reasonably practicable”. I note that the Minister is looking into that and seeking reassurance. One thing that we are particularly concerned about in this clause is the question of whether “one or more users”, if it is reasonable and practicable, can switch to a market-led substitute benchmark. How do the Government define what is reasonably practicable in this case? Will he explain that to me, please?
John Glen
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her question. In terms of the benchmark’s being classed as critical and the appropriateness of substitutes, certain contracts face barriers to moving off a benchmark. While some contracts are bilateral and that renegotiation may be possible, many contracts are multilateral and involve the consent of multiple parties before a change can be made. Therefore, in some cases, achieving consensus on the changes is likely to be difficult or impossible, due to the absolute number of parties that will be involved, or due to the threshold at which consent would be achieved. In those situations the existence of an appropriate substitute is not relevant, as users will not be able to move on to it. The complexity of what they are on means that there is not anything substitutable.
Abena Oppong-Asare
On the point about the Government making a direct evaluation, if the benchmark user argues that it would not be reasonably practical to move to a market-led substitute, but the Treasury disagrees with that, what recourse does the user have to challenge this decision?
John Glen
These matters will be governed by protocols with the industry. The industry would have a dialogue with the FCA, through which these matters would be resolved. There would be a dispute, I would imagine, about the number of contracts, the number of people involved in those contracts, and the readiness of an available alternative. Usually, these matters would be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
Abena Oppong-Asare
That is really helpful, in terms of the dialogue with the FCA. Will a process be followed to ensure a fair system is applied with regard to substitutes that disagree with the Treasury process, or will how it is done be judged at that time?
John Glen
The complexity of these contracts and their reference to these benchmarks necessitates ongoing dialogue. There is a significant team in the FCA that deals with this work. The industry has been very concerned about this. This is a live, ongoing conversation. Given the context, and the history that the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and I set out, and how appalling this situation was previously, there is wide consensus that this should be done in an open and collaborative way. This regulation will be used in that spirit.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Paul Richards from the International Capital Market Association, who gave evidence last week, said there were around 520 legacy bond contracts to be moved over, and only 20 had been converted in the market so far, because it is a difficult and time-consuming process. Is there more the Government could be doing to reassure and help? Does the Minister envisage bringing forward any amendments to make this any easier? It sounds like this process will cost the markets money.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. The evidence from the ICMA last week underscored the ongoing complexity and challenges of this. It may be that legislation will be required in a future Session, but that would be subject to a resolution. There is no point of crystallisation from the industry; it is not compelling us to bring something forward. There is no resistance on the part of the Treasury to doing that; it is a question of working out what would be appropriate for the market. That dialogue will continue, and the Government will respond in the appropriate way in due course. I think the gentleman who gave evidence last week was appropriately making the Committee aware of that ongoing additional dialogue regarding that safe harbour provision. But there is no point of conflict between the Treasury and the industry on this matter.
Mr McFadden
The questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead expose the potential for litigation if the Government and regulators are moving contracts from one basis to another; some of the people involved will have deep pockets and expensive lawyers. The Minister tells us that it will all be sorted out—thrashed out—and I hope he is right; but I am not sure that we can guarantee that.
I have a couple of questions about the clause and those clauses that follow. First, is it all about LIBOR, even though it talks about critical benchmarks, or is it more general? For example, might the provisions be used on a benchmark related to the price of a particular metal, or something like that? For our understanding of the matter, should we, wherever the provisions refer to a critical benchmark, just be thinking about LIBOR—because that is what we really mean; and is there some parliamentary drafting reason why the Bill does not say that?
Secondly, the clause deals with a review of which benchmarks are critical benchmarks. The Minister said, and the clause says, that that seems to be a benchmark for which a market-led substitute exists, although for some reason it is not practical to transfer activity to such a market-led substitute. That is what is confusing about the clauses. We are told that the policy decision, and the regulatory decision, is to move away from LIBOR and to cease using it by the end of 2021. That is my understanding. Yet it seems that the clauses both facilitate that and facilitate the continued use of such benchmarks.
My reading of the clause and the one that follows is that the FCA will retain the power to compel organisations to submit information to a critical benchmark, even though the policy decision has been made to move away from that benchmark. The question then is why the regulator would want to do that, and what the power means for the 2021 LIBOR end date. Does the power mean that the FCA could compel submitters to keep submitting information to LIBOR, and is that because so many contracts depend on it? Is that really why the power to continue submitting information to critical benchmarks is engaged in this? What I am really asking is whether the clause is putting the brakes on LIBOR or, in some ways, continuing a facilitation of LIBOR after the end of 2021, for some things.
John Glen
In the UK, LIBOR is the only critical benchmark. However, for reasons that the right hon. Gentleman has alluded to, we do not want the provision to be on just the LIBOR benchmark. For reasons to do with the type of legislation that that would mean—private legislation referring to something specific—a different process would be created. We have to use benchmark legislation—benchmark regulations; but LIBOR is what it pertains to. That is the only critical benchmark in the UK.
A mechanism to compel panel banks to continue to submit data beyond the end of 2021 does not exist. We have to be able to wind down in an orderly way and make provision for continuity, which is needed for the tough contracts that continue to exist and will need some reference point. We need to do that in a way that satisfies the market and maintains stability. It is in that context that we are giving the FCA the powers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Mandatory administration of a critical benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 9 amends article 21 of the benchmarks regulation, which concerns the mandatory administration of a critical benchmark.
Article 21 gives the FCA the power to compel the provision of a critical benchmark where the administrator notifies the FCA of its intention to cease providing the benchmark. Clause 9 amends article 21 to increase from five to 10 years the maximum period for which an administrator can be compelled by the FCA to continue to provide the benchmark. This will increase the time which the FCA has to manage the wind-down of a critical benchmark.
Under the clause, if the FCA decides to compel an administrator to continue publishing the benchmark, the FCA must assess the capability of the benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality and inform the administrator in writing of the outcome of this assessment. The FCA’s assessment that a critical benchmark is no longer representative of its underlying market, or is at risk of becoming unrepresentative, is the first step in providing the FCA with its wider powers to manage the wind-down of such a benchmark. We therefore wish to ensure that the FCA can take steps towards starting the managed wind-down of a critical benchmark in circumstances where the benchmark administrator itself proposes to cease the benchmark. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
The clause takes us, in a sense, to the next step after a review. Again, I have a couple of questions. First, subsection (2) refers to a period of 10 years. The Minister made clear a few minutes ago that LIBOR is definitely winding up by the end of 2021, so to what does 10 years refer? With something that is supposed to be winding up in one year, I still cannot quite understand why we are giving the regulator powers to continue it in a form for up to 10 years. I am confused about that, and I do not know if I am the only one.
Secondly, subsection (3) refers to an assessment of a benchmark. That assessment revolves around the question of the representative nature of the benchmark. It says that the FCA will always give either
“a written notice stating that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the…economic reality”—
perhaps it has become too illiquid, in the way we discussed, or too reliant on expert opinion—or
“a written notice stating that it considers that the representativeness of the benchmark is not at risk.”
In other words, we have a good competition going here for the price of the bread. Does the 10-year period of extended mandatory information apply when the FCA has judged that the benchmark is not representative, or could it apply in cases where it is judged that it is representative as well? Subsection (3) seems to indicate that the assessment could go either way. I am trying to get at what this 10-year power is for and to which kind of benchmark it applies.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his entirely reasonable and appropriate questions. The compulsion period of 10 years is about having a timely period to continue with the revised methodology of the synthetic LIBOR. One of the main aims of the Bill is to provide an appropriate mechanism for the wind-down of LIBOR and to reduce the risk of contractual frustration in the event of an unplanned or sudden cessation of LIBOR. To enable a managed wind-down of LIBOR, it may be necessary for the FCA to compel the benchmark administrator to continue to provide the benchmark for a period of time, to allow a portion of LIBOR-referencing contracts to mature and end. We expect a significant number of outstanding LIBOR legacy contracts at the end of the five-year compulsion period, and those outstanding contracts will still pose a material financial stability risk, as the Financial Stability Board noted in 2014.
Mr McFadden
The Minister’s phrase, “synthetic LIBOR”, helps us to understand this. I think it might mean something like this: that the regulator has the power to designate a benchmark as critical when it is unrepresentative of market reality, but in a way LIBOR is not really ending at the end of 2021, because we have synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR, we might say—and the ghost of LIBOR is necessary because of those legacy contracts.
Where I still get confused is that the reason LIBOR is being wound up, and the reason that the FCA can designate it in this manner, is that it is unrepresentative—yet for the ghost of LIBOR, or synthetic LIBOR, to have any validity, the FCA has to continue to compel submitters to submit information to it. I do not know what the implications of that are for the quality of the ghost of LIBOR; we must remember that the reason it has been designated in the first place is that it is failing the market representativeness test. How is it, therefore, that for up to 10 years we can compel submitters to submit information to something that the regulator has judged invalid?
John Glen
The right hon. Gentleman has accurately summarised the issue around synthetic LIBOR, but we are getting into suppositions about the time period for which that synthetic LIBOR would be necessary. The FCA recently published a paper on this. It is about evolving circumstances in the market. It is very difficult to be prescriptive, hence the 10-year provision. We are now getting into the realm of market operating realities at some point in the future. We have to have something that references the fact that we have a considerable volume of contracts that reference the historical LIBOR and we have to have a reference point going forward. I hope that is helpful.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Prohibition on new use where administrator to cease providing critical benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 10 inserts article 21A to the benchmarks regulation. This article provides the FCA with the power to issue a notice prohibiting some or all new use of a critical benchmark by supervised entities. The FCA may use this power where the administrator has stated that it wishes to cease providing the benchmark and the FCA has assessed the administrator’s plans to cease the benchmark or otherwise transfer it to a new administrator.
The FCA can exercise this power only if it considers that it is desirable to advance its consumer protection objective or its integrity objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The notice will contain the reasons for the prohibition, the date when it is to take effect and any further information that the FCA considers appropriate to allow supervised entities to understand the decision. The FCA’s ability to prohibit new use in circumstances where the administrator is seeking to cease to provide the critical benchmark is an important step in preventing the pool of contracts referencing a benchmark from growing ahead of its possible cessation. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I thank the Minister for his explanation. This clause is about the prohibition of the use of benchmarks. Again, I have a few questions. Is it the case that prohibition can take place only after the kind of assessment of the representative nature of the benchmark that we discussed under clause 9(3), or are there other grounds for issuing a notice prohibiting the use of a benchmark, such as suspected criminal activity or manipulation in some other way?
My second question is about use. New article 21A prohibits “new use” of a benchmark. I think the Minister is saying that there should not be new use of a benchmark, but there may be continued use for the reasons that we have discussed—for legacy reasons. Could the Minister confirm that existing contracts referenced in the benchmark would not be covered by this “new use” provision?
My third question is about paragraph 4 of new article 21A, which says that the FCA must have regard to effects outside the UK of any decision to cease use of a benchmark. I can see why such a provision would be there, because LIBOR is used to underpin contracts all over the world. However, what can the regulator, which only has jurisdiction in the UK, do to stop the use of a benchmark elsewhere in the world? To what degree does this require work with other regulators through, for example, the Financial Stability Board, or is the judgment that action by the FCA alone would be enough, even though that action might have international effects, because of the importance of UK benchmarks? I suppose it is as if some jurisdiction has a particular influence in a sport, so when they change the rules, everybody else has to change the rules, too.
I assume that those criteria about the protection of the consumer and so on that the Minister referred to are in the Bill to protect the FCA from litigation risk by making clear that in acting on this, it was doing so in line with its statutory objectives, because the danger of litigation risk runs right through this.
John Glen
The right hon. Gentleman raises a number of questions, and I should start by making it clear that we in the UK cannot stop use overseas. The provision applies to UK-supervised entities working with international partners. He is right to say that there is interconnectedness between those institutions, and the FCA has a significant role in terms of LIBOR.
The simple purpose here is that, where a benchmark is to be ceased, the pool of contracts referencing that benchmark should stop growing. The prohibition power that the right hon. Gentleman referenced is available only at the point at which the benchmark administrator has informed the FCA that it is planning to cease to publish it and the FCA has considered whether it is realistic for the benchmark to be ceased or transferred to a new administrator. Clearly, it would not be desirable for the pool of contracts that reference the benchmark to continue to grow in circumstances where it is likely that that benchmark is on a pathway to ceasing to be used. It is therefore appropriate at that stage to stop supervised entities entering into new contracts that reference the relevant benchmark.
In terms of the rules broadly governing the FCA in exercising this power, it can do that only if it is desirable to do so in order to advance this FSMA consumer protection objective or the integrity objective, so it would have to be confident that it would secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers or advance the integrity of the market, and it would have to publish a statement along those lines. I recognise that this is complex, but we are really trying to give an appropriate toolkit to the FCA to do what is necessary not only to safeguard the appropriate ongoing construction of benchmarks, but to ensure that it has the authority to justify the management of the wind-down in circumstances where that is necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Assessment of representativeness of critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 11 introduces two new articles to the benchmarks regulation. New article 22A requires the administrator of a critical benchmark to undertake,
“an assessment of the capability of the benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality”.
The administrator must undertake such an assessment when a contributor to the benchmark is proposing to withdraw, when the FCA requires the administrator to undertake a review of the benchmark, or every two years as part of a biannual review process. New article 22A also requires that:
“If a supervised contributor…intends to cease contributing input data to a critical benchmark”,
it must provide written notification to the administrator at least 15 weeks ahead of the date it intends to cease contributing. That replaces the existing four-week notice period, which is insufficient.
New article 22B requires that the FCA must conduct its own representativeness assessment of the benchmark once it receives an assessment from a benchmark administrator under article 22A. The FCA may also proceed with its assessment where the administrator has failed to provide an assessment within the timelines specified by the legislation. After making its assessment under this article, the FCA must provide the benchmark administrator with a written notice setting out its findings, which could be that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the economic reality it is intended to measure, that it is at risk of not being representative, or that the representativeness of the benchmark is not at risk.
Those assessments play a crucial role in the process we have designed for managing the wind-down of a critical benchmark. A finding that a benchmark is no longer representative or that its representativeness is at risk is the first step in activating many of the new powers that are being granted to the FCA. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Mandatory contribution to critical benchmarks
John Glen
Clause 12 amends article 23 of the benchmarks regulation, which concerns the mandatory contribution to a critical benchmark by supervised entities. Article 23 already provides the FCA with certain compulsion powers over the administrator and supervised entities, which contribute to a benchmark, including the power to compel supervised contributors to continue to contribute to a benchmark. These powers were previously only available where the representativeness of the benchmark was judged to be at risk.
The clause amends the article to ensure that it works with the new representativeness assessments we are introducing under the Bill, and that these powers are available either where the benchmark is at risk, or where the benchmark has actually become unrepresentative. The changes mean that, for instance, the power to compel a contributor will now become available whenever the FCA has made a finding that the benchmark is unrepresentative, or its representativeness is at risk.
The clause also extends the compulsion powers to supervised third country contributors and requires that if a contributor gives notice that it intends to withdraw on a specific date, it may not cease contributing on that date without written permission from the FCA. It also clarifies that the FCA’s compulsion powers and other powers in paragraph 6 of article 23 are available specifically for the purpose of restoring, maintaining or improving the representativeness of a benchmark.
These powers are important in ensuring that a critical benchmark does not simply cease in circumstances where the representativeness of the benchmark could reasonably be maintained or restored through appropriate FCA action. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I have one or two questions to the Minister. The clause gives the FCA the power to mandate contributors, including those outside the UK—it will be interesting to see how that works—to continue to submit information to a benchmark for up to five years. However, clause 9 states that synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR—can be kept going for up to 10 years. Why is it five years in this clause but 10 years in clause 9?
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question. He draws attention to the discrepancy between the provision for five years in clause 12 and 10 years elsewhere. It is important to remember that the powers in the Bill are not just for LIBOR but will be relevant to benchmarks that are designated as critical in the future. The changes in the clause ensure that the existing compulsion powers work with the amendments made to the wider regulation. Where we have a benchmark that is unrepresentative or is at risk of being unrepresentative, the FCA should have access to these powers.
With respect to LIBOR, the amendments ensure the FCA will have the required time to implement the various processes that we are introducing, to access their new powers, and to mitigate the risk of the rate simply ceasing due to insufficient input data. The 10-year provision is a contingency about the ongoing use of the benchmark. The timeframes are constructed with respect to both the LIBOR provision and the wider needs of benchmarks and have been constructed in consultation with the FCA over quite a long period.
Mr McFadden
I am not sure that that is entirely convincing, because neither clause refers specifically to LIBOR, for reasons that the Minister has explained. They both refer to benchmarks in general.
The different timescales used throughout this section are somewhat confusing. There are reviews every two years; other timescales of three months are mentioned here and there. I am genuinely confused about why clause 9 gives the power to compel contributions for up to 10 years, yet here we are a few clauses on talking about five years. I accept that the Minister says that the 10 years might be a maximum, but if these powers are to deal with the issue of legacy contracts, I am still not sure why we have this discrepancy. It could be that I am not understanding something or that I am missing something. That is certainly possible. Is this an arena where the Government may come forward with an amendment during the later stages of the Bill’s passage?
John Glen
I am always open to looking at the possibility of amendments, as I have demonstrated during the sittings we have had so far. The 10-year reference was under the revised methodology for LIBOR to be produced by the administrator. It will probably be useful for me to reflect on this exchange, and to write to the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee to clarify the apparent discrepancies and rationale for this. I recognise that this is genuinely complicated. I want to bring satisfaction to the Committee and I am happy to do that.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. The shadow Minister is obviously concerned and quite rightly scrutinising the detail of every clause. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be apposite to recall from the evidence from the regulators, including the Prudential Regulation Authority, the FCA, and specifically the LIBOR transition director for UK finance, how supportive they are of the provisions of this Bill? The LIBOR transition director said explicitly in his evidence:
“These powers, in preventing all those negative outcomes for both customers and market integrity, are absolutely critical as part of the transition.”––[Official Report, Financial Services Public Bill Committee, 17 November 2020; c. 18, Q30.]
That plays back into the consultation and regulators’ support for the Bill.
John Glen
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention. It demonstrates that there is widespread concern for this legislation to be passed. The right hon. Gentleman is pressing me, quite appropriately, on these apparent anomalies, and I am happy to submit to his questions. The issue is that synthetic LIBOR is related to the 10-year provision, but the five-year provision is for other critical benchmarks, which do not have the same context in terms of their contractual longevity. As I said in my response to the right hon. Gentleman, I will write to him and to the Committee to bring clarity on this matter. It is an important matter that needs clarifying.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly order to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Designation of certain critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause inserts a new article into the benchmarks regulation that, in essence, provides the FCA with the power to designate a critical benchmark as an article 23A benchmark, if they consider that the representativeness of the benchmark cannot reasonably be restored, or there are not good reasons to restore and maintain its representativeness. This designation allows the FCA to use a number of the new powers that are set out later in the Bill, such as the ability to require that the administrator change the benchmarks methodology.
Given the significant impacts of making such a designation, we have included a number of safeguards to the designation power. First, if the FCA considers it appropriate to designate a benchmark, they must inform the administrator and allow 14 days for the administrator to make representations before proceeding with the designation. If the FCA decides to proceed with the designation, they must publish a notice. That should include, among other things, the reasons for their decision, the date it takes effect and any further information that the FCA considers appropriate to assist supervised entities in understanding the effects of the designation.
In summary, clause 13 sets out the procedure by which the FCA can designate a benchmark and access the powers detailed later in the Bill. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I am grateful to the Minister. Before I begin, I say to the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford that we are under a duty here to try to understand what we are doing. It is in that spirit that I am asking these questions. I was reminded by a colleague about a different kind of Standing Committee, which some years ago was considering the Hunting Bill. He told me that after a month they were still on clause 1, which was about the title of the Bill, so I do not think we have gone over the top in asking these questions.
With your and the Minister’s indulgence, Mr Davies, I would like to make a few points about the next few clauses; I think they go together and get to the heart of what this area of the Bill is about. As I said, the Opposition understand why LIBOR is being wound down; we have gone over the history of the manipulation and so on. It is why the Bill rightly places such an emphasis on benchmarks being representative of market activity: so far, so uncontroversial.
However, there is a problem in the transition from LIBOR to SONIA or other new benchmarks. As we have referenced several times, there will clearly be some impact on the value of LIBOR-based contracts. That impact is openly acknowledged by the FCA when it says:
“Where parties to contracts referencing LIBOR cannot reach agreement on how those contracts would operate in the event of LIBOR’s cessation, discontinuation could cause uncertainty, litigation or loss of value because contracts no longer function as intended. If this problem affects large volumes of contracts it could pose risks to wider market integrity of contracts/financial instruments.”
Remember that, given the volume of money involved—we are talking about not millions or billions but trillions—this is a systemic risk, as well as a risk to individual parties to contract.
My understanding of the provisions in clause 13 and a few that follow is this. When the FCA feels that a benchmark is no longer representative of the market to which it relates or that that representativeness is at risk, it can designate the benchmark under article 23A of the benchmark regulation. Then there are various provisions about notices being published, reasonable fees being charged and so on; we can leave those aside. When such a benchmark is designated by the FCA, that can only be done in line with the statutory duties, to which the Minister referred, of consumer protection and market integrity. When a benchmark is designated in that way, new use of the benchmark is prohibited, but—this is the critical “but”—the FCA can mandate continued legacy use of that benchmark. The Minister may come back to me about timescales—five years, 10 years or whatever it is.
Finally, if the potential disruption brought about by the discontinuation of LIBOR—or a critical benchmark, if we want to refer to it in that way—is too great, it is suggested in the Bill that the FCA may compel its continuation, as we have discussed. How realistic is it for the FCA to continue to compel administrators to submit information to something that they have said they want to phase out in a year’s time? The provisions are intended to allow the FCA to wind down a critical benchmark but in a way that protects these legacy contracts, which are based on the old benchmark. That brings us to those legacy contracts and what is or is not included, and to the potential legal risks.
As I understand it, there might be two issues. First, what is the definition of a legacy contract? Is it one where there has not been agreement between the two parties to transfer to the new benchmark, or is it something different? What are we talking about when we discuss legacy contracts? What would we do if there were a dispute between the parties about whether something should be treated as a legacy contract or not?
Secondly, how will the provisions cope with the potential legal action and/or market disruption as a result of parties feeling aggrieved, for one reason or another, about the switch from one benchmark to another or, in consequence, taking action that results in disorderly markets? In other words, to what degree is the process subject to disruption through legal action by the parties involved, which could feed into market operation, given the volume of money involved in these contracts?
Mr McFadden
However, I thought it better to take these next few clauses together and raise those points with him in this way.
Alison Thewliss
I want to ask a quick question about what is perhaps neither synthetic nor ghostly LIBOR, but zombie LIBOR, because it seems to be lurching on and not quite dead.
I am curious about the monitoring of whether these critical benchmarks are becoming unrepresentative, how that practically would work and at which stage that happens. I also note that there is an obligation under clauses 13 to 16 to bring things to the attention of the public and the supervised entities, but no such requirement to bring them to the attention of Parliament. Will the Minister reflect on whether it would be useful to us as parliamentarians to hear about those things? We cannot necessarily be expected to monitor things on the FCA website as members of the public, and those things might be something that parliamentarians might usefully want to find out.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East for their questions, and I will do my best to address them.
On legacy use, this is broadly where a benchmark was used in specified existing contracts or instruments prior to its designation as an article 23A benchmark. The right hon. Gentleman went on to ask a series of questions about the concept of safe harbours, the different jurisdictions of legal process, and the compulsion process. The Government believe that the proposal is realistic. The administrators do not submit information; the contributors do. On safe harbours, which we picked up on from the evidence from the gentleman from the trade association last week, we recognise the challenges identified in that session, and the powers are designed to assist those contracts that cannot feasibly move away from LIBOR, as Paul Richards described. I am committed to looking to address the issue of safe harbour through further work with industry.
In practice, it will not be possible to table amendments during the passage of this Bill, but that is not down to my unwillingness to do so; it is a matter of the maturity of the conversation, and I think that will be acknowledged. A live productive conversation is going on.
Mr McFadden
Is the parallel legislation in the United States and the EU part of that consideration? When we received the oral evidence last week, I confess that I had not appreciated that parallel legislation on this subject, with safe harbour provisions, was going through in those two jurisdictions. Given the co-operation that already exists through the FSB, involving in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of England, is that part of the consideration?
John Glen
We are looking and working internationally. We have an active dialogue with the US through a regulatory working group, and we will be monitoring that. There is no question of us seeking to find some competitive advantage in this; there will be a need to find as much alignment as possible to give as much clarity and certainty to the market actors. However, the conversation is not at that stage yet here. There is no sense that that is jeopardising the integrity of this process. This is the first step, but we reserve the right to do other things further to the conclusion of those conversations.
As for accountability to Parliament, as raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, the legislation requires the FCA to produce statements of policy and notices when exercising the powers. There is also a requirement to review the exercise of its methodology every two years and to publish a report following that review. The FCA is required to exercise its powers in accordance with the two statutory objectives: consumer protection and market integrity. That is the relationship to parliamentary accountability.
Turning to the other matters raised by the right hon. Gentleman around the administrator challenging a designation, if the FCA decides to designate a benchmark under this article, the benchmark administrator has the option of referring the matter to the upper tribunal. The FCA is required to inform the administrator of its right to refer the decision to the upper tribunal and the procedure for doing so.
As for the continued publication of a benchmark that has been deemed unrepresentative, in the case of a critical benchmark such as LIBOR, the benchmark is so widely used that its discontinuation would represent a risk to financial stability and create disruption for market participants. Therefore, this Bill provides the FCA with the power to require a change to how a critical benchmark is determined, including input data, to preserve the existence of the benchmark for a limited time period to help those contracts that otherwise would not realistically transfer to an alternative benchmark.
I hope I have done justice to most of what the right hon. Gentleman raised. I will seek to review what we have exchanged and, if there are outstanding matters, to write to him. I am relieved we have moved beyond clause 1.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
The same drill as the other day: I am happy to permit Members to remove their jackets. Apparently permission has to be sought from the Chair to remove a jacket, so there you go—that is how nice I am. I saw you a lot on TV yesterday, Minister; it is nice to see you in the flesh.
Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Review of exercise of powers under Article 23D
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 16, page 23, line 13, leave out “latest” and insert “most recent previous”.
This amendment clarifies what the FCA has to review before re-exercising the power under Article 23D(2) of the Benchmarks Regulation.
Clause 16 introduces a new provision: article 23E of the benchmarks regulation. It requires the Financial Conduct Authority to conduct and publish a review of an exercise of its article 23D powers to direct the administrator of an article 23A benchmark to change the methodology rules, or code of conduct, of the benchmark. Where the FCA has exercised a power under article 23D, the FCA is required to conduct and publish a review of the exercise of that power two years after the power is first exercised. The FCA must then conduct and publish such a review in each subsequent two-year period until the benchmark ceases to be published.
The FCA will also be required to review the exercise of this power under article 23D whenever it intends to re-exercise its power in relation to the same benchmark. The FCA must conduct and publish a review of the latest exercise of its article 23D power before re-exercising the power where that is reasonably practicable. In circumstances where it may not be reasonably possible for the FCA to conduct its review prior to the use of the power, the FCA must conduct and publish its review as soon as is reasonably practicable after the re-exercise of its article 23 power. For instance, it is possible that the FCA may need to take such a course of action when it needs to access its article 23D powers urgently to prevent significant market disruption or financial stability risks.
In concluding the review, the FCA will be required to consider whether the exercise of its power has advanced, or is likely to advance, its statutory objectives to protect consumers and market integrity. It must also have regard to the statement of policy that the FCA has published in respect of the use of its article 23D powers. The clause provides a statutory mechanism through which the effectiveness of the FCA’s exercise of its powers under article 23D can be evaluated. It also serves to increase the accountability of the FCA in the exercise and re-exercise of the powers.
I apologise for not acknowledging you in the Chair, Dr Huq; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I thank you, Dr Huq, for chairing this afternoon’s session. For clarity, we had a fairly extensive debate on clauses 13 to 16 together, hence the speed of our progress at the beginning of this session.
John Glen
Amendment 3, which stands in my name, is a technical amendment. As the explanatory note says, it is intended to clarify the scope of the review that the FCA is required to undertake where it re-exercises its article 23D(2) powers in relation to the same benchmark. Article 23D(2) provides the FCA with the powers to direct the administrator of a critical benchmark to change the methodology rules or code of conduct of the benchmark. The amendment serves to put beyond doubt which exercise of power the FCA is required to review at this point in time.
I would like to address the point raised by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East just before we broke for lunch on the international LIBOR transition. The Government have followed related global regulatory developments closely, including what is going on the United States, as he mentioned, with the US Alternative Reference Rates Committee’s legislative proposal. We continue to work with regulators to engage our international counterparts directly, as well as through the Financial Stability Board’s official sector steering group and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.
It is quite clear that, as the right hon. Gentleman stated, we will need a co-ordinated global approach, and we aim to provide consistent outcomes for users. The Government are committed to ensuring that their dialogue with international counterparts continues, and aim to firmly limit any unhelpful divergence to outcomes. I hope it will be helpful for the Committee to have that put on the record.
Mr McFadden
I am grateful to the Minister; I suspect that is a harbinger of a Government amendment at some point, because of the debate we had on safe harbour provisions. If they are coming in in the US and the EU, I suspect, given what he has just said about marching together on this internationally, we may see an amendment from him on this at some point.
The Chair
It sounds like fine-tooth comb stuff this morning.
Amendment 3 agreed to.
Clause 16, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Policy statements relating to critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 17 introduces a new provision, article 23F of the benchmarks regulation. This clause requires the FCA to publish statements of policy and to have regard to those statements when exercising certain new powers set out in the benchmarks regulation. The FCA is required to publish a statement of policy with respect to the exercise of this power to designate a critical benchmark as an article 23A benchmark. This is the designation the FCA can make where it determines that a benchmark’s representativeness cannot be restored or maintained, or that there are good reasons not to restore or maintain representativeness.
The FCA must also publish a statement of policy with respect to the exercise of its powers under article 21A, which allow it to prohibit new use of a critical benchmark when the administrator of that benchmark has notified the FCA of its intention to cease providing the benchmark. The FCA is also required to publish a statement of policy in exercising its powers under article 23C, which allow it to permit certain types of legacy use of an article 23A benchmark by supervised entities. Finally, the FCA must also publish a statement of policy in exercising its power under article 23D, which allows the FCA to impose requirements on the administrator of an article 23A benchmark to change the methodology, rules or code of conduct of the benchmark.
The Bill states that the FCA’s duty to prepare and publish those statements of policy can be satisfied before as well as after this legislation comes into force. On 18 November, the FCA published two consultations inviting industry feedback on statements, which ask for views on how the FCA intends to exercise its article 23A and article 23D powers granted under this Bill. It has also stated its intention to engage with industry stakeholders and international counterparts in the development of its statements of policy with respect to its powers under articles 21A and 23C.
This clause increases transparency regarding how the FCA will exercise certain new powers set out in the Bill to support the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark. In developing statements of policy, the FCA will be able to engage with industry and international counterparts. The clause also requires the FCA to have regard to those statements when exercising its new powers, reducing uncertainty for market participants. Therefore, I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I just have a question about these policy statements. We have been through quite a lot about how the FCA will designate, compel and continue the submission of information and all the rest of it. What role do these policy statements play in all of that? Is the policy statement simply putting into law a requirement on the FCA to say why it has acted as it has, or is it, as part of what I think is behind some of the stuff in these clauses, insulating the FCA against the threat of legal action because of the possible effect on contracts? Is this a nice to have, best practice or is it something that helps to protect the FCA against the threat of litigation, which has been a thread through this discussion?
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Obviously, this is a very technical area, to say the least. I just want to ask a couple of questions so that I can get my head round how the FCA will use the power. We have different regulators who could make different determinations as to what constitutes benchmarks going forward, and yet those benchmarks write contracts worth trillions of pounds and dollars into the future. Any arbitrage opportunity in the way that those contracts work could make some people very rich and ruin others. This will be decided as one goes along. Some of these contracts are being made, but some are already projected into the future.
To ensure that markets are not distorted and the potential for nefarious profit by some with insider information is minimised, we need reassurance about how the FCA will perform the task, particularly in its interactions with the other regulators. I am not sure what the Government’s intention is, apart from saying they are going to liaise with other regulators. Is it the Government’s intention that these benchmarks ought to be similarly designed and defined across different regulatory jurisdictions, since this is almost a currency, or are we seeking divergence here as well in order to perhaps increase our chances of being the place where some of this business is written?
Perhaps the Economic Secretary could reassure me on that, because the FCA’s powers are pretty strong, but what is the intention? That might be in all of the many consultations, which I confess I have not read, so it might be set out there. If the Minister could put a little more on the record, we might at least have some certainty there, not least for Pepper v. Hart purposes.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Wallasey for their observations. The hon. Lady demonstrates her experience and professionalism in being able to jump in on the first clause, having not been here this morning—no disrespect intended.
John Glen
The point that the hon. Lady makes is absolutely clear. We need to ensure that the regulations are in line with global practices because the issue is global. The interconnectedness of financial services markets demands, as in the statement I made just now, that we work very closely with regulators in other jurisdictions. It is absolutely right that we learn the lessons that the right hon. Gentleman, in his work on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards several years ago, drew attention to with respect to the appalling abuses in the market. This measure is designed to give us a framework and to give the FCA the powers to ensure that we have global best practice and no ambiguity.
John Glen
This clause introduces a new provision, article 23G, into the benchmarks regulation. The clause makes provision about critical benchmarks provided for different currencies, or for different maturities or periods of time. This type of benchmark is known as an umbrella benchmark. LIBOR, for instance, is an umbrella benchmark. It is published in five different currencies over seven different time periods, ranging from overnight to up to one year. Those five currencies and seven time periods are paired to form 35 individual LIBOR settings, referred to in the legislation as “versions” of the benchmark. An example of a version of LIBOR would be three-month US dollar LIBOR.
Paragraph 3 of article 23G sets out that specified articles of the benchmarks regulation will apply to umbrella benchmarks as if each version were a separate critical benchmark. Paragraph 4 sets out how provisions under paragraph 3 of article 21, paragraphs 1(a) and 2 of article 22A and paragraph 1 of article 23E of the benchmarks regulation are modified in relation to an umbrella benchmark.
The Treasury will be able to make, by regulations, provisions about the operation of the UK BMR in respect of umbrella benchmarks. The regulations must be made by way of the affirmative procedure.
This clause sets out that the FCA will be able to exercise certain new powers to support the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark in different ways in relation to different versions of an umbrella benchmark. It also clarifies the existing operation of certain provisions of the benchmarks regulation and how the FCA’s powers apply to versions of a benchmark. Those clarifications of the FCA’s powers will be of aid in supporting the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark. For example, where panel banks begin to withdraw their submissions to some or all versions of LIBOR after the end of 2021, the different versions of LIBOR are likely to become unrepresentative, as we discussed earlier, or be at risk of becoming unrepresentative at different speeds.
It would be neither practicable nor appropriate for the FCA to exercise its new and existing powers uniformly across all versions of LIBOR simultaneously. For example, it is possible that if the robust input data necessary for an alternative methodology is not clearly available for certain versions of LIBOR, the FCA may not be able to exercise its power to direct a change in its methodology. In other cases, market participants may prefer to cease publication of some LIBOR versions. The FCA will consider evidence and views from market participants and global authorities in deciding the best course of action in respect of LIBOR versions.
It is critical to the wind-down of LIBOR, and future umbrella benchmarks, that the FCA can apply its powers under this legal framework to different versions of an umbrella benchmark at different times and in different ways. I therefore recommend that this clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Changes to and cessation of a benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause introduces amendments to article 28 of the benchmarks regulation, including new paragraphs 1A to 1E. Article 28 of the benchmarks regulation stipulates requirements for benchmark administrators and supervised entities in preparing for changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks. I will refer to this as the change and cessation procedure.
The clause inserts the word “robust” in paragraph 1 of article 28 to define and strengthen the nature of the change and cessation procedures that benchmark administrators are required to publish. The clause also inserts new paragraphs 1A to 1E, which set out requirements for the written change and cessation procedure that a benchmark administrator must publish.
New paragraph 1A establishes that the administrator must publish a robust written change and cessation procedure alongside the publication of the administrator’s benchmark statement, which, among other things, sets out the market or economic reality that the benchmark intends to measure. The documents must be published within two weeks of the benchmark being registered in the FCA’s register. Wherever a material change occurs, the benchmark administrator is required to update its written procedure. For critical benchmarks, the proposed changes in new paragraphs 1B to 1E set out additional and more stringent requirements.
When publishing its written procedure, the administrator of a critical benchmark is required to provide an assessment to the FCA, on the basis of the information available to it, that considers the nature and extent of the current use of the benchmark, the availability of suitable alternatives, and how prepared users are for changes to, or the cessation of, the benchmark. Before publishing an updated written change and cessation procedure, critical benchmark administrators must also provide that assessment together with their updated written procedure to the FCA for review. The FCA is required to review and consider whether the procedure is sufficiently robust. The administrator must not publish an update of its procedure without receiving written notice from the FCA that its procedure is sufficiently robust.
In order to be designated as a critical benchmark, a benchmark must be used extensively, and its cessation may pose significant and adverse impacts on market integrity, financial stability, consumers, the real economy, or the financing of households and businesses. It is therefore reasonable and proportionate to require administrators of critical benchmarks to demonstrate via an assessment that their cessation plans are robust. We do not expect it to be an overly burdensome assessment for benchmark administrators. The clause will support increased preparedness in the event of changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks in the future. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Ms Eagle
Again, I have just a few questions so that I can get in my head precisely what the reason is for putting this in primary legislation. LIBOR clearly had its issues but it was used for a very long time. Is the Minister anticipating that benchmarks will change much more rapidly in the future, or does he want some kind of stability with the new benchmarks that are based on actual prices, rather than the guesses of participants in the market, as LIBOR came to be defined prior to its demise?
Is the Minister expecting that this kind of provision for ceasing benchmarks will be used regularly? I anticipate that the answer will be, “Only when it is needed because of what is happening in the market.” If this kind of procedure is theoretical and on the face of a piece of legislation but hardly ever used, does that mean that the mechanisms that the Minister is setting out in clause 19 and other parts of the Bill will rust away? They will be there in theory, but there will be nobody there to work them properly. How does he anticipate that the market, the FCA and the benchmark administrators will maintain the capacity to do this if cessation is a very irregular, rare thing?
Will the Minister spend a bit of time defining what “robust” means in this context? In my time in this place, I have had many arguments with Ministers, and made many arguments as a Minister, about why we must not put particular words on the face of Bills and what their meaning is. Can the Minister enlighten us as to what he, the FCA and the Treasury mean by “robust” and how they are defining that in law, so that I can have a bit more confidence that they have got it right on the face of the Bill?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. Although the provisions of this legislation are under the heading of benchmarks, they really refer to the capacity that we need to have to deal with the LIBOR issue. She is right to raise the question of the enduring provision and how tested and exercised that capacity would be, but this is about setting a framework for future use, which is very difficult to anticipate. We want to ensure that it is fit for purpose for the future.
The hon. Lady asks when the framework could be used, which is not a matter that I can reasonably be drawn on, because it would be about market conditions evolving, but it certainly means that we are ready for whatever might evolve, in terms of benchmarks on the path towards becoming critical. However, it will be for the FCA, in conversation with the market and Parliament, to determine how to bring that forward.
Ms Eagle
Does the Economic Secretary think that, given the incredible trouble that the wind-down of LIBOR has caused in the markets—not least because of what is on the face of the Bill and the very difficult issues caused by having to exit the LIBOR benchmark—it is best to try to get the next benchmark sorted and future-proofed, so that it does not turn into LIBOR 2 and cause his future successor in the Treasury and me all this kerfuffle in a Public Bill Committee?
John Glen
Absolutely. It is absolutely right that we give the power to the FCA but also keep a vigilant eye on evolving market conditions, so that we are well placed to move earlier to deal with any failures in benchmarks.
The hon. Lady asked me to define “robust” in the context of the Bill. I am reluctant to be drawn on that, because it is a matter of legal definition, but I would be very happy to write to her on that and respond at subsequent sittings of the Committee, if she wishes me to do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Extension of transitional period for benchmarks with non-UK administrators
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause amends article 51(5) of the benchmarks regulation, which provides for a transitional period during which the UK’s supervised entities can continue to use all third-party benchmarks. Those are benchmarks that are provided by administrators located outside the UK. When the UK onshored the EU benchmarks regulation, the transitional period for third-country benchmarks was extended from the end of 2019 to the end of 2022. The extension was made to provide third-party benchmark administrators with more time to apply for continued access to UK markets. For the UK’s supervised entities to continue to use benchmarks that are administered outside the UK after the end of 2022, the benchmarks or their administrator must be listed on the FCA benchmarks register.
The benchmarks regulation provides three access routes for third-country administrators or benchmarks. They must apply for the endorsement of specific benchmarks or for recognition as an administrator, or they can benefit from an equivalence decision made by the Treasury with respect to their home jurisdiction’s regulatory framework. As of October 2020, however, only 14 third-country benchmark administrators have come through the access routes that are outlined in the EU benchmarks regulation. Industry engagement has also revealed important concerns about the operation of the current regulatory regime for third-country benchmarks under the benchmarks regulation. For example, many non-European economic area jurisdictions do not have specific regulator rules for benchmarks.
The UK will explore how best to support the use of global, non-UK benchmarks that adhere to equivalent regulatory outcomes. The endorsement and recognition access routes both rely on third-country administrators being willing to apply for market access, and require the appointment of a UK entity to facilitate their application for ongoing market access. Some third-country benchmarks are provided on a non-commercial basis, however, meaning that those administrators lack an economic incentive to apply. Smaller firms may also be reluctant to appoint a third-party UK entity to oversee their benchmark administration.
Mr McFadden
I just want to ask the Economic Secretary a question to ensure that we have properly understood the clause. All through this part of the Bill, we have talked about the different timescales in different clauses, and here we have another, which extends the transition period for benchmarks with third-country administrators until the end of 2025.
For my clarity, and perhaps for that of colleagues, will the Economic Secretary clarify whether the measures are different—I think they are—from the five and 10-year timescales in clauses 9 and 12, relating to the FCA designating what the hon. Member for Glasgow Central called zombie LIBOR? Is this five-year period about something different or does it relate to that?
Having debated this matter for a couple of hours, I am not sure that we have resolved it. My feeling is that we are leaving quite a lot to the FCA. I hope that the clause minimises the risk of harm. We have talked a lot about the risk of litigation, but there is also the risk of harm to those who have entered contracts based on LIBOR in good faith. The Government and regulators are trying to move away from that system for reasons that we understand are to minimise harm to those who signed up in good faith, but I suspect that there is still a fair bit of work for the regulator to do to ensure that that is the case.
Ms Eagle
Will the Economic Secretary share with the Committee the intention behind the extension to 2025? He said that it was to create certainty—I can understand that. Is the intention to transition to something different—the new third-country regime—after the extension, or is it to develop and introduce it earlier if it looks like there are advantages to doing so? I know that I am asking him to gaze into the future, but this will be in the Treasury and regulators’ work list and they will presumably schedule it at some stage. Does he expect the creation of a third-country regime to be difficult or quite easy? Are the Government thinking of basing it on the existing regimes or diverging from what we are used to? Will he give us a little more information about how the Treasury intends to proceed with this piece of technical but very important work.
John Glen
I am very happy to address those points. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East raised the issue of the different time periods. This is different from the LIBOR transition; it is about the third-party benchmarks exclusively. It is a response to the market reality, as we have seen in the number of applications. I will come to the point of the hon. Member for Wallasey in a second.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the risk of harm concept and how important that is. Clearly, the LIBOR transition, as we have established today, is an incredibly complicated matter with a great deal of legal complexity, an imperative to align to global best practice, the need to produce a synthetic alternative and the evolution of policy around that. It is also designed to protect. He is right to say that there is a lot more work to be done; there is no off-the-shelf solution. This measure allows the formal framework for that to evolve.
The hon. Member for Wallasey asked me to comment on the future time period by which the new third-country benchmark regime would be constructed. The extension is a response intended to resolve industry concerns and to ensure that UK markets can retain access to the third-country benchmarks. There is no intention to find some way of deviating from norms on that. It is in our interest to have complete alignment to global best practice. The extension gives UK firms the legal and economic certainty. As soon as it can be done, it should be done. I cannot give her the precise location of where that is in the work plan—the FCA has a lot on at the moment—but she is right that we need to operationalise it appropriately, recognising the different obligations on different sized firms. I will be working with the FCA to keep an eye on that in the coming weeks and months.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Benchmarks: minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
This clause inserts schedule 5, which sets out minor and consequential amendments to the benchmarks regulation to provide for the effective operation of that regulation in the context of the amendments introduced by clauses 8 to 19. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 22
Regulated activities and Gibraltar
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
It was projected that we would get up to clause 20 by the end of this morning, in fact.
John Glen
I allowed myself a moment of light-heartedness, but I can see that that was not appropriate.
In financial services, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 allows for several categories of authorised persons to carry on regulated activities in the UK, such as firms with domestic part 4A permission or, until the end of the transition period, EEA passporting firms. The clause provides a regime through which firms authorised for activities in Gibraltar can be recognised as authorised persons in the UK.
When significant areas of financial services regulation were set at EU level, that meant that the UK and Gibraltar followed the same rules. Now that the UK and Gibraltar have left the European Union together, the legal framework that provides for mutual market access and aligned standards needs amending. Without new permanent arrangements, Gibraltar will lose its current breadth and depth of access to the UK market, which not only would damage Gibraltar’s economy and our special and historic relationship but could lead to disruption and more limited choice for UK consumers.
The detailed application of the regime is set out in two schedules, which in turn insert two new schedules into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: schedule 2A, as inserted by schedule 6, governing the operation of the arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms; and schedule 2B, as inserted by schedule 7, which provides for the requirements that outgoing UK-based firms must meet before accessing the Gibraltarian market.
I should clarify that we are not legislating for Gibraltar. The measure is primarily about Gibraltar-based firms’ access to the UK. The Government have a responsibility to ensure financial stability and the correct operation of the UK financial services system, particularly when we open our markets to other jurisdictions. The clause therefore also requires the Treasury to lay a report before Parliament about the operation of the regime every two years.
The report will explain the Treasury’s assessment of whether the three conditions in the clause—that is, compatibility with the objectives in the clause, the alignment of law and practice, and co-operation—have been met during any reporting period, and whether the Treasury therefore proposes to enable market access for particular activities. That will give Parliament confidence that regulatory and supervisory standards are being applied in a consistent manner by UK and Gibraltarian institutions, so that UK consumers can benefit from products from a wide range of providers without additional risks.
Given that clause 22 is central to the creation of permanent market access arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar, I recommend that it stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
Like the Minister, I too bid a fond farewell to LIBOR. Clauses 22 and 23 and schedules 6 and 7 establish the Gibraltar authorisation regime, which could be described as a sort of mini-single market in financial services between the UK and Gibraltar. The Government have set out many detailed pages in the schedules in particular about how that mini-single market should work.
Up until now, Gibraltar has been regarded as a European territory that was a member of the EU through its status as a British overseas territory. That meant that Gibraltar had full access to single market rights, including those in financial services. Given that Gibraltar, as well as the UK, has now left the EU and is coming towards the end of the transition period, the Government clearly felt that they had to put a regime in place to be the basis of future trade in financial services between Gibraltar and the UK.
Such a regime was, to some extent, necessary, because of the volume of trade in financial services that already exists between the UK and Gibraltar. We heard during last week’s oral evidence that roughly one in five car insurance policies in the UK is held by Gibraltar-based insurance companies. As I said during an oral evidence session last week, there is great good will towards Gibraltar on both sides of the House. The people of Gibraltar voted to remain in the EU by an overwhelming margin—I think it was about 95%—so we could describe the clauses and the accompanying schedules as the consolation prize to Gibraltar for having to depart the EU at the same time as the UK.
I know that under clause 22 the Treasury will report every two years on how the regime is operating. I cannot fail to reflect that that is precisely the kind of regular reporting mechanism that the Minister so stoutly rejected about four times on Tuesday when we were trying to insert it into the clauses on capital requirements. Why is it right and necessary for the Treasury to review this regime every two years but not to review the impact of change in the capital requirements on major parts of our financial system?
According to schedule 6, the report must have particular regard to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of that schedule, which set out the details of the new regime. Paragraph 7 tries to instil protections for the UK into this process, including for the soundness and stability of our own system, and, according to paragraph 7(c),
“to prevent the use of the UK financial system for a purpose connected with financial crime”.
It goes on to talk about ensuring markets work well, the protection of consumers and, interestingly, according to paragraph 7(h), about the need
“to maintain and improve relations between the United Kingdom and other countries and territories with…significant markets for financial services.”
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful and important case about the importance of ensuring that we do not inadvertently support money laundering or standards that could enable that by accident. It is worth reflecting that in February this year, the EU anti-money laundering watchdog, MONEYVAL, called for Gibraltar to do more. One question for us in this legislation is whether there are things we can do to ensure that we are not inadvertently creating access that would enable such behaviour, now that we are leaving the European Union, which might have been offering that level of scrutiny. Does my right hon. Friend have a view on joining up those dots?
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In fairness, I do not think that the UK system on money laundering and financial crime is perfect—we have our own issues, which we have debated before and will debate later in our consideration of the Bill—but these findings should be taken seriously, particularly as we are creating a new situation. In the past, both the UK and Gibraltar were part of the EU and we operated under the single market rules, including those on financial services. I do not know whether what we are creating is unique—I will ask the Minister about uniqueness—but it is certainly a new concept: a mini-single market in financial services between two territories.
What is the Minister’s response to the report’s findings? In particular, given that protection from financial crime has been written into the Bill through the Government’s two-year review process, what contact has there been between the Treasury, the relevant regulators and the financial institutions in Gibraltar since the report was published a year ago? What actions do the authorities propose to take? I certainly believe that the Gibraltar authorities will want to act in good faith and try to uphold proper standards, but some of the report’s findings are concerning.
Another issue raised last week was the difference in corporation tax between Gibraltar and the UK: Gibraltar’s main corporation tax rate of 10% is significantly lower than our own. The Minister from Gibraltar said in his evidence, with some charm, that corporation tax would not be a factor in location—that, if anything, quality of life was more important. I have no doubt that the quality of life in Gibraltar is very good; looking out on a slightly gloomy London autumn afternoon, I have no doubt that the weather and climate is a big attraction, too. I am sure that he was right about that, but it is a big tax difference. He also pointed out—again, quite fairly—that the corporation tax differential predates our departure from the EU and has been in place for some time. However, this is a new situation, with a new, specially designed market access regime for Gibraltar being enshrined in UK law. Has the Treasury made any assessment of the likelihood of corporate relocations from the UK to Gibraltar as a result of the new measures under discussion?
I also ask the Minister about the condition, which I have described as interesting, about relationships with other territories with significant financial services markets. Why has it been written into schedule 6 as something that the Government should consider in their biennial review? Is it considered that this mini-single market will create some sort of vulnerability in those other relationships? Why is it thought possible that the arrangement might affect our relationships with other territories?
Finally, how unique and specific to the Gibraltar situation is the new regime? Could it conceivably be extended to other territories such as Jersey and the other Channel Islands? As the Minister will know, some Crown dependencies have been accused of being tax havens or of being susceptible to money laundering. Is it possible that such a regime could, in effect, be used to extend the reach of UK regulators to territories other than Gibraltar? This is a very big topic that has been debated quite a lot over recent years. I suppose I am asking about the Treasury’s thinking, rather than just about the Bill: might the arrangement with Gibraltar be a model for the treatment of other Crown dependencies or overseas territories, or should we view it as specific and purely a consequence of Gibraltar having to leave the European Union? I would be grateful if the Minister considered and responded to some of those points.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I just have a few quick questions, mainly coming from the evidence we heard last week. During the fourth sitting, at column 125, the Minister, Albert Isola, said that the Bill is akin to enabling legislation, and that other things would need to be worked through in relation to other aspects of the financial services that are currently dealt with. If the Minister could clarify what would happen about those other areas, that would be useful.
Secondly, perhaps the Minister could give further assurances about access to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It is important that consumers here should have adequate protections in the new arrangements, and that those should be made clear. That is the kind of scenario that would not be found out until a consumer needed to make a complaint. Something would have to go wrong for it to be addressed, and I would not want to be such a consumer, feeling in those circumstances that I did not have recourse to the protection that I would have had if I had chosen an insurance policy not based in Gibraltar. It would be useful to hear about that.
Lastly, it would be helpful to have any further clarity that the Minister can give about what would happen to UK businesses and customers if market access were suddenly withdrawn, and where that would leave consumers in the UK. Would they be left without policies and protection? What would happen as a reaction to that, should market access be withdrawn for a period of time? Would it mean that businesses would dry up, withdraw their UK services and go somewhere else, or does the Minister envisage other scenarios happening in that case? I appreciate that it is a scenario that he would want to avoid at all costs, but it could well arise, and I want to ask what state the Government’s preparations for such a scenario are in.
Ms Eagle
I suppose I want the Minister to reassure me about the fact that financial markets are rapid and regulation—if there is an equivalence regime, or mini-single market as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East put it—allows the Gibraltarian authorities to do the regulation and then have immediate access to the UK. That may be done in a way that gives us some benefit; perhaps the Minister will say what the benefits of the regime are, particularly for UK consumers, given that Gibraltar does 90% of its business with the UK anyway. Perhaps he will also say what the risks would be.
My right hon. Friend spent a little time raising some of the risks and I suppose they can be characterised by the view that in a very liquid and rapid global money market, if there are vulnerabilities or back doors into regimes that are interconnected, that causes risks. We saw some of those risks playing out during the global financial crisis. To what extent does the Minister believe that the Gibraltar regime for which the clauses legislate will be—I am going to use that word—robust enough to prevent the opening of back doors to vulnerabilities for all sorts of money that is sloshing round the world? My right hon. Friend mentioned some of that—money used for money laundering, drugs and terrorism. It is important that the defences that we have against coming under that kind of influence should be maintained and strengthened, rather than weakened.
Stella Creasy
My hon. Friend is giving the speech that I wanted to give, so I thought I would intervene. One example, to express some of the concerns we might have, is the fact that in the Gibraltar regime there is currently no legal requirement to refuse registration to someone with a criminal record. In practice that does happen. It is something that the FATF report flags, but it is not inevitable. One thing we might want to think about for our regulatory regime—and I take the point made by the shadow Minister about not suggesting that the UK regime is perfect—is looking at whether there are lessons in the report that should be put into the Bill to make sure we do not create such a back door. That seems an eminently practical example of the sorts of things that might happen if people with criminal convictions, who may still be able to access financial regulations as a result of the Gibraltar regime, are now able to operate in the UK.
Ms Eagle
My hon. Friend gives an example of exactly the kind of point I was trying to make more generally about ensuring that these regimes are correct. Given that Gibraltar governs itself, the Bill makes it clear that Gibraltarian regulators will continue to do that job in Gibraltar and supervise the companies based there after this arrangement has been legislated for. That is quite proper in many ways, but it does give our regulators in a small number of narrowly-defined circumstances—I think this is the phrase—the duty or the right to leap in and do some regulation or enforcement presumably. Will the Minister say a bit more about that? He did mention it in passing in his introduction to the clause, in which he talked about financial stability. We clearly had some recent examples during the 2008 crash, where some robust enforcement had to take place with offshore island countries or territories that were trying to take money out of our jurisdiction in ways that were unacceptable at the time.
There is therefore a financial stability issue, but there is surely something about consumer protection, fraud and money laundering here as well. Perhaps he could talk in more detail about what those narrow circumstances are. Our regulators will be reluctant to romp and stomp all over Gibraltarian institutions and their regulators. Yet, by definition, Gibraltar is a small territory, and it will have less capacity to deal with some of the sophisticated fraudsters and international terrorist, money-laundering types than we do here. I am not saying that our regime is perfect, if we are honest, and we will get on to that later in the Bill.
My worry is that this might inadvertently create some vulnerabilities. I suppose what I am seeking from the Minister is some reassurance that the regulators have got a handle on this, that they will not allow the wish not to infantilise the Gibraltarian regulators to be a reason for not paying close attention to this, and that there will be some close supervision of what is happening, particularly once the regime is established. Once these things settle down, it is then that things start to happen. If a door is opened inadvertently somewhere, this money swilling around tends to find it, and then things can start changing very rapidly.
What warning flags does this regime put up to ensure that if that dynamic begins to happen, we can close it down rapidly? Does the Bill expect some kind of relationship between the Gibraltarian regulators and the Treasury? How does the Minister expect that relationship to work out? Obviously, I do not want to spend all my time being so negative about these things, so will the Minister also say a little more about what the benefits might be?
Will the Minister also talk about consumer protection in his response? Motor insurance is one of the largest components of the financial services that Gibraltar currently sells into the UK, and clearly there is a big retail consumer protection angle to such financial services.
Stella Creasy
While we are considering the variations for companies based in Gibraltar as opposed to the UK, it would be helpful if the Minister answered the question that the insurance bodies could not: about VAT benefits for companies based in Gibraltar and the likelihood, now that we have left the European Union, of companies moving more industry to Gibraltar because of that benefit, which could also affect consumers. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be helpful if the Minister set out those figures? The industry seemed slightly coy when we spoke to it about those matters.
Ms Eagle
Clearly, the potential situation is there now. In evidence, the response—reasonably—was that that has not happened to date, even though there have been close connections between Gibraltar and the UK. However, these things tend to be dynamic and, once the agreement with Gibraltar is established, our tax regimes may diverge even further. If the Chancellor has his way after yesterday’s statement, I suspect they might have to.
Will that create more of a temptation for financial service companies to offshore to Gibraltar outside of the UK? Is the Minister convinced that that will not happen as a result of the Bill? I want reassurance from him about those potential weaknesses or risks and about consumer protections. He might even want to say a bit about benefits, if he feels up to it.
John Glen
I counted several questions in those four contributions and I will do my best to address them. First, I will reiterate what we are trying to do: to create the market access regime for Gibraltar-based financial services wishing to operate in the UK, and to make provision for outbound UK-based firms wishing to operate in Gibraltar.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East made a number of points, which I will start to address. He asked about the two-year reporting mechanism. The Gibraltar authorisation regime provides a broader and deeper market access into the UK market—including to the retail market—than other market access regimes, so the Treasury needs to be satisfied continuously that all conditions are met. We will therefore work carefully with the Minister we spoke to last week from the Government of Gibraltar to ensure that those conditions can be satisfied on an ongoing basis.
It is important to contextualise the nature of the relationship with Gibraltar. There has been a lot of dialogue, visits—not latterly—and evaluation of each other’s situation with respect to market access. In the lead up to the new regime, the Treasury will assess Gibraltar against the relevant market conditions for the sub-sectors to which it seeks access, and we will work closely with the Government of Gibraltar. The most significant area is the Gibraltarian insurance market, and 90% of that is UK facing.
The right hon. Gentleman compared the two-year review to our refusal to review the prudential regimes. As we have already discussed, the prudential measures include an accountability framework; we had a different view on the suitability of the one we suggested versus the amendment. The regulators have the expertise to set rules in the complex and technical areas of financial regulation and can do so in an agile way.
The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the FATF report. I have not read it in full, but I am aware of its broad indications of the challenges that exist. I am also aware that, while we had a good report, there are some challenges that we need to address in the UK. I will not hold back on admitting that. I will write to him specifically on those measures that pertain to Gibraltar, because I ought to do justice to his proper scrutiny.
There is an issue with the extension of the Gibraltarian regime to other countries. That is a bespoke regime that has been specifically designed for Gibraltar, recognising what the right hon. Gentleman and others will acknowledge is a special historical relationship, and our past common membership of the EU. These circumstances do not apply to any other jurisdictions, so that is not designed as a model or, as he said, a mini-single market to be extended elsewhere.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about the scope of the FOS jurisdiction over products sold by Gibraltarian firms. Our intention is that all Gibraltar-based firms with a schedule 2A commission will be covered by the FOS’s compulsory jurisdiction. That ensures that individuals and small businesses can seek appropriate redress. However, the extension of the FOS’s jurisdiction to schedule 2A firms does not require express wording in this Bill. The Bill makes schedule 2A firms a type of authorised person, so the FCA be able to make rules about them, bringing them inside the FOS’s remit. The FCA will be reflecting that change in the rules governing the FOS’s jurisdiction. Firms already under the FOS’s voluntary jurisdiction will transfer to the compulsory jurisdiction, with no loss of eligibility for their consumers in respect of actions occurring before they entered the compulsory jurisdiction.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central also asked about the withdrawal of equivalence. If market access were to be withdrawn, schedule 2A puts in place winding down arrangements that enable the Government to pass secondary legislation providing for Gibraltar-based firms to exit the market in an orderly fashion, with appropriate protections for UK consumers. That is what would happen in market failure.
Stella Creasy
The Minister was just talking about the Financial Ombudsman Service being extended. One of the things that we might be concerned about is that our constituents might experience fraud from companies based in Gibraltar, perhaps in relation to insurance. Many of us can think of some famous Brexit backers who run insurance companies in Gibraltar and might have concerns about these issues. The FAFT report tells us that at the moment the supervision is only for new companies. There is a historical legacy of companies that have not previously been registered that might, therefore, under new supervision, be companies that we would not want to see operating in the UK. The Minister talked about the FOS’s requirements being retrospective, but that will be the same with the FCA. Can he clarify that if there are companies that are historically registered in Gibraltar, which we would not want to see registered here, perhaps because the people running them have criminal records, will they retrospectively be denied a licence, or is it only those from new registrations onwards, as with the current Gibraltarian regime?
John Glen
I wish to examine that matter carefully on the basis of the FATF report. I totally understand the clear point the hon. Lady is making about the retrospective nature of this and what could we essentially onshore, in terms of access to UK consumers, and the inherent and apparent risks in that. If the hon. Lady will permit me, I would like to examine that and get back to her.
The hon. Member for Wallasey asked about the independent Gibraltarian regulator and whether it will remain the supervisor of Gibraltar-based firms. The explicit intention for the UK regulators, contained in proposed schedule 2A, is to guarantee the protection of UK consumers, but that will be exercisable only on specific grounds, for example where a situation is urgent or if a Gibraltar-based firm is contravening a rule. We are not trying to take over their regulator.
The hon. Lady asked if the parties will co-operate sufficiently. There has been close and frequent co-operation over the past three years, between both Governments and regulators. They are developing their regime, and I am confident that will continue. The Minister in Gibraltar —effectively, my opposite number there—was positive about that last week. Schedule 2A will create a framework for this effective co-operation. That also means that the UK and Gibraltar Governments, the respective regulators and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme will put in place effective procedures to carry out any dialogue and co-ordinated action for the good functioning of the regime.
The hon. Members for Walthamstow and for Wallasey asked about consumer protection. It is obviously of the upmost importance that we provide the right level of protection for UK customers of Gibraltarian products, and that the level of protection afforded is communicated to them. Under this regime, most UK-based consumers purchasing products from Gibraltarian providers will receive a similar level of compensation as those purchasing their products from UK firms, whether through the FSCS or through the equivalent Gibraltarian schemes.
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 4, in schedule 6, page 100, line 31, at end insert—
“(i) an order under section 143S, or”.
This amendment extends the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under section 143S (inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill).
John Glen
These very simple and limited amendments are necessary to ensure that the measure functions as intended. As the explanatory note states, amendment 4 expands the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order made under section 143S, as inserted by part 1 of schedule 2 to the Bill.
The amendment ensures that UK regulators can reject a notification in relation to a Gibraltar-based firm if a senior manager of the Gibraltar-based firm is prohibited from performing a function by a part 9C prohibition order made under new section 143S, in line with the treatment of other firms in the Bill. A part 9C prohibition order may be made by the FCA in relation to an individual if the FCA believes that the individual is not of sufficiently good repute or does not possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform a function relating to an activity carried on by a non-authorised parent undertaking of an FCA investment firm.
Amendment 5 expands the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under the law of Gibraltar that the appropriate UK regulator considers to be equivalent to an order under section 143S as inserted by part 1 of schedule 2 to the Bill. That is a simple and limited expansion enabling the UK regulators to reject a notification if a senior manager of a Gibraltar-based firm is prohibited from performing a function by a prohibition order under the law of Gibraltar that they consider to be equivalent to an order under section 143S.
Finally, amendments 6 to 11 clarify the UK regulators’ powers to give directions altering the meaning of “protected contract” and “existing contract” for the purposes of part 10 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in the event that a UK regulator or the Gibraltar regulator cancels the permission of a Gibraltar-based firm.
Amendment 4 agreed to.
Amendments made: 5, in schedule 6, page 100, line 34, after “56” insert “or 143S”.
This amendment extends the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under the law of Gibraltar which a UK regulator considers to be equivalent to an order under section 143S (inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill).
Amendment 6, in schedule 6, page 123, line 32, leave out “67” and insert “67(1)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 7, in schedule 6, page 123, line 38, leave out “67” and insert “67(2)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 8, in schedule 6, page 124, line 37, leave out “67” and insert “67(1)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 9, in schedule 6, page 124, line 43, leave out “67” and insert “67(2)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 10, in schedule 6, page 125, line 17, leave out
“this Part of this Schedule”
and insert
“paragraph 64 or 65 (or both)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 11, in schedule 6, page 125, line 19, leave out
“The power under sub-paragraph (1) includes power to”
and insert
“A UK regulator may, by giving a direction,”.—(John Glen.)
This amendment and Amendments 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 clarify the UK regulators’ powers to give directions altering the meaning of “protected contract” and “existing contract” for the purposes of Part 10 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
New schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sets out in detail the operation of the new market access arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms into the UK. Part 1 of the schedule defines key concepts of the new framework, such as approved activity. Part 2 sets out that the Treasury will be able to designate a regulated activity as an approved activity for market access only if the following conditions are met: if approval of an activity is compatible with certain objectives, such as financial stability and consumer protection; if the Treasury is satisfied that the relevant law and practice between the UK and Gibraltar is sufficiently aligned; and if the Treasury is satisfied that there is co-operation between the UK and Gibraltar Governments, our respective independent regulators and the FSCS.
Part 3 will introduce a simple notification process by which Gibraltar-based firms will be able to obtain permission to carry on an approved activity. I stress that this is not intended to be an application process; Gibraltar-based firms will automatically obtain a schedule 2A permission once the period for the UK regulators to consider a notification has expired. Parts 4 to 6 provide for the Gibraltarian regulator or the UK regulator to be able to vary or cancel a schedule 2A permission, or to impose, vary or cancel requirements on a Gibraltar-based firm, and set out the process the regulators could follow in each case. None of those powers dilutes the fact that Gibraltar-based firms will continue to be supervised by the Gibraltarian regulator and remain subject to the laws of Gibraltar. The intervention powers for the UK regulators will be available only in specific defined circumstances, as set out in paragraph 28. The option of withdrawal of approval for an activity will remain available to the Government as a tool of last resort. However, were any issues to emerge, the Treasury would work closely with the Gibraltarian authorities to ensure that all conditions of market access can be satisfied.
To provide clarity and transparency, part 11 will require each UK regulator to issue a statement of its policy on the use of its intervention powers. Part 12 imposes duties on the UK regulators to inform, consult and obtain consent from one another, as well as to keep the Gibraltarian regulator informed to support the functioning of the regime. Similarly, part 13 will require co-operation between the UK and Gibraltar Governments, our independent regulators and the manager of the FSCS, including setting out procedures and approaches to resolving any supervisory concerns to support the delivery of the regime.
I have summarised the effects of proposed new schedule 2A in the legislation. It sets out in great detail the new market access arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms looking to operate in the UK and it will lead to the renewal and strengthening of our relationship with Gibraltar. For that reason, I therefore recommend that the schedule be agreed to.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 6, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 23
Power to make provision about Gibraltar
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The new regime introduced by clause 22 revolves around activities covered by the so-called Gibraltar order, which provides Gibraltar-based firms accessing UK markets and UK-based firms accessing Gibraltar markets with rights equivalent to the passporting rights conferred on European economic area firms. Certain regimes conferring rights on UK and Gibraltar firms sit outside the remit of the Gibraltar order, as they are authorised not under the Financial Services and Markets Act but under separate regulatory regimes, and therefore need to be addressed separately.
The majority of these regimes are not as central to the UK-Gibraltar bilateral relationship as the regimes under clause 22, as they represent smaller sub-sectors such as e-money and payment services. The Government are requesting a delegated power to make provision for these regimes, which will allow the Treasury to safeguard the rights that Gibraltar firms currently exercise, to ensure that the legislative framework works efficiently and, wherever possible, to subject these regimes to principles and mechanisms similar to those in the new section 32A of and schedules 2A and 2B to the Financial Services and Markets Act, to ensure consistency with the rest of the regime introduced by clause 22.
Regarding the regime introduced by clause 22, it is right and proportionate that the Government are able to make adjustments to take account of the UK’s and Gibraltar’s new position outside the European Union and in relation to the regimes not captured by the Gibraltar order. The power that the Treasury is requesting is not unlimited, but is constrained at multiple levels. The power is limited in scope, as it only applies to a narrow pool of legislative regimes, as described in clause 23, which are not covered by clause 22. Further, this power can be exercised only in a manner that is compatible with the objectives set out in clause 23, such as financial stability and consumer protection. In addition, the Treasury must consult the FCA, the PRA and the Government of Gibraltar before making certain regulations. Finally, all regulations made in the exercise of this power will be subject to the affirmative procedure, giving Parliament effective oversight of the exercise of these powers by the Treasury.
The clause is crucial to ensuring a consistent approach to regulatory supervision, co-operation and other relevant standards and requirements across different financial services regimes. It achieves the right balance between accountability and effectiveness, so I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Ms Eagle
Given that some of the areas caught by this part of the regulation were previously quite esoteric, but might not be so esoteric in the not-too-distant future—I am thinking of electronic money, which a few years ago would have been a tiny amount of transactions and is now very much larger—can the Minister reassure the Committee that, if the size and importance of these transactions grow, they are confined in the right area of the law for regulation? Does the Treasury have any views on how to take account of the changing importance and size of this area and to change the regulations around it in future? As we see, the pandemic has meant that many people who used to use cash no longer use it. Payment services and e-money are growing areas and could grow rapidly.. Is he convinced that this is the right regime to have in and around areas of perhaps rapid evolution?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for that relevant question about how we intend to apply these powers to smaller regimes that are of increasing significance to consumers and potentially to stability. As a Government, our intention is to ensure that existing cross-border activities are not disrupted in any way. We are asking for the ability to update these regimes to reflect the growing relationship and the evolving domestic mechanisms and principles.
To some extent, many of these areas being looked at now—crypto-assets, stablecoins and so on—are evolving globally and there is is a spectrum of approaches, so we need to examine the appropriateness of the application. We would work to examine closely where the risks are, and therefore where the application of new and evolving orthodoxies of regulation would apply to Gibraltar. We are committing to ensuring that the necessary legislative arrangements are in place in any event, but we rule nothing out in terms of scope and application to new sectors as the world of financial services evolves, which it has done considerably in recent years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Collective investment schemes authorised in approved countries
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause introduces the new overseas funds regime, which delivers on the Government’s commitment to introduce a simpler way for large numbers of investment funds from other countries to be marketed to retail investors, including the general public. The OFR will promote openness to overseas markets, allowing the UK to offer broad market access to investment funds from other countries. It will also allow consumers to benefit from the widest possible choice of funds, while maintaining existing levels of investor protection.
The new regime could provide a more efficient way of allowing large numbers of investment funds from the EEA to market to retail investors on a more permanent basis. Many EEA funds are marketed into the UK through the EU’s passporting regime, which will end after the transition period. Although the Government have introduced a temporary marketing permissions regime to allow existing EEA funds to continue marketing after the transition period, these funds will need to apply for permission to market on a more permanent basis. If the OFR were not legislated for, the funds would have to apply for recognition under the existing regime; that regime allows overseas funds to be marketed to the general public, but it requires an assessment of each individual fund. Establishing the OFR could therefore provide a more permanent basis for these EEA funds to continue marketing in the UK, provided that the EEA member states are found equivalent. It will also allow for the possibility of funds in other countries gaining easier access to the UK if they meet the criteria set out in the schedule. The new regime has been welcomed by the UK’s asset management industry, and the majority of consultation respondents were highly supportive.
I will now detail how clause 24 introduces the new OFR. The clause adds to the legal definition of a recognised scheme, so that it includes funds recognised under the OFR. That will allow the funds to market to the general public in the UK. The clause also introduces schedule 9 to the Bill, which comprises the main operational elements of the OFR and any minor and consequential amendments needed to ensure the new regime is fully functional. Compared with the current assessment of individual funds, the OFR enables the Treasury to make equivalence determinations which allow specified categories of funds from other countries and territories to be marketed in the UK. Therefore, the OFR has the potential to promote the interconnectedness of financial markets and consumer choice, to provide a more appropriate basis for recognising the large number of EEA funds currently marketing through the temporary marketing permissions regime, and to support bilateral agreements with other countries.
The clause is necessary to ensure that the OFR is inserted into the relevant legislation and can fulfil its potential. I recommend that it stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I thank the Minister for his explanation. As he said, this clause, schedule 9 and clause 25 create an overseas fund regime for establishing the recognition of collective investment schemes based outside the UK. It is estimated that there are about 9,000 such schemes, which are often known as UCITS.
Up until now, those schemes have operated under the European Union’s passporting provisions, as have UK-based schemes operating in other countries; it has been a two-way street. It was not inevitable that passporting had to end when the UK left the EU. There were models of leaving that could have preserved those rights for UK-based firms. Indeed, there were votes in Parliament that sought to guarantee the continuation of passporting rights, but the Government set their face against that, so the first thing to say about these provisions is that the need for them has arisen out of choices made by the Government.
That there would be an adverse impact on services from this decision was acknowledged. It seems the dim and distant past now, but back in the halcyon days of 2018, we had something called the Chequers plan. That document was issued in July 2018 with—I noted when I had another look at it—a foreword from the current Foreign Secretary. The Minister could usefully remind him of that the next time he bumps into him. The document said that the Government
“acknowledges that there will be more barriers to the UK’s access to the EU market than is the case today.”
It went on to note that
“these arrangements will not replicate the EU’s passporting regimes”.
Let us look at what the document’s verdict was on equivalence, which is the thing that we are trying to achieve and in part legislate for today. This is the Government’s own verdict on the kind of regime in clauses 24 and 25 and schedule 9. It said:
“The EU has third country equivalence regimes which provide limited access for some of its third country partners to some areas of EU financial services markets. These regimes are not sufficient to deal with a third country whose financial markets are as deeply interconnected with the EU’s as those of the UK are. In particular, the existing regimes do not provide for:…institutional dialogue…a mediated solution where equivalence is threatened by a divergence of rules”—
we have discussed divergence of rules quite a lot in this Committee—
“or supervisory practices…sufficient tools for reciprocal supervisory cooperation…This would lead to unnecessary fragmentation of markets and increased costs to consumers and businesses; or…phased adjustments and careful management of the impacts of change, so that businesses face a predictable environment.”
That is not my verdict on equivalence; it is the Government’s verdict on equivalence when they published their own plan two years ago. So there we have it in the Government’s own words. That which they have been as yet unable to secure from the EU was dismissed as inadequate for the UK’s financial services sector even if we were able to secure it, which we have not, or at least not yet. The Government were aiming for something different, because it was deemed by them to be inadequate. They were aiming for
“a bilateral framework of treaty-based commitments to…ensure transparency and stability”,
because, as the document goes on to say, equivalence
“is not sufficient in scope for the breadth of the interconnectedness of UK-EU financial services provision. A new arrangement would need to encompass a broader range of cross-border activities”.
The Government wanted common principles, supervisory co-operation and
“a shared intention to avoid adopting regulations that produce divergent outcomes”.
Where did all that go? What happened to all of that? That was the aim. Why is it now the summit of the Government’s ambitions to achieve an outcome for the UK’s globally significant financial services sector that they dismissed as inadequate only two years ago? Why is this not at the heart of the UK-EU negotiations, in this crucial period? We have just over a month left—less, in real terms—to strike a deal. We must think of the significance of this sector to the UK economy and look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenue.
Stella Creasy
The shadow Minister is making a powerful case, and I suspect he is about to move on to this point. In layman’s terms, the Government are asking financial companies, which represent hundreds of thousands of jobs in our country, to deal with more paperwork, more bureaucracy, more regulation and a tougher business environment in which to operate. Does the shadow Minister think that these major financial companies are going to adhere to that because they are rather fond of London, or might they make different commercial decisions because we have not secured the kind of regulation he is talking about as yet and move themselves to other parts of the European Union?
Mr McFadden
We will come on to their reaction. It is extraordinary that a sector this important has been relegated so far in the Government’s priorities. It is absolutely extraordinary that in these final days of renegotiation this is not front and centre. We just need to look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenues, and the role that the sector can play in global standards. Yet it has been relegated by the Government to an outcome that they admit is inferior and which, right now, they have not even been able to achieve.
All we can legislate for here is what we do. The fact that it is not front and centre of the negotiations right now speaks volumes about how far we have drifted from talk of achieving all the same benefits and securing a free trade zone from Iceland to the Urals—do hon. Members remember that? All of that has gone.
Mr McFadden
That is the OBR’s estimate of the additional cost of a no-deal scenario, on top of the already long-term hit in the deal scenario. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to set that out.
The fact that this has happened slowly over the past couple of years, and maybe the fact that the industry has become weary of arguing about it—as, perhaps, have all of us—should not disguise the importance of what has happened. It is important to set that out and to put these clauses in perspective. The Government chose to relegate the importance of UK financial services industries in the Brexit negotiations. Having made that decision, they then relegated financial services even further by aiming for an outcome that they openly admitted was inadequate, and they have not even been able to achieve that outcome. That is the context of these clauses.
I have a few questions on the details of the regime being established by the clauses. First, how does this relate to the Chancellor’s statement on financial services on 9 November? The clause and schedule 9 set out a country-by-country approval system for equivalence decisions, but in his statement on 9 November the Chancellor said that he was publishing a set of equivalence decisions for the UK and the EEA member states—those member states who still have access to these passporting rights, even though they are not EU members. Clause 24, as I said, implies a country-by-country process. Does the Chancellor’s statement mean that in policy terms, the equivalent recognition has already been given to all EU and EEA member states? Is that for all the financial products that are produced to which such equivalence might apply—that is, those traded on a cross-border basis?
Alison Thewliss
I have one or two further questions about people who are invested in things for which equivalence is withdrawn. The Association of British Insurers said in its written evidence:
“While the regime states that investors can stay invested in funds if equivalence has been withdrawn, they do not to spell out the practicalities of the situation an existing investor may face if a fund they are invested in has been suspended, for example if additional money is invested after a fund suspension. For the regime to fully work for consumers, situations such as this need to be clarified.”
What happens to investors in those funds if equivalence is withdrawn? What information will they receive from the Government, from regulators or from anybody else if that happens, so that they know what they have to do in that scenario, if anything? That could affect many people and would be very complicated to unravel, so it would be useful to set out people’s obligations in those circumstances.
John Glen
We were treated to more of a Second Reading response there from the shadow Minister, with all that he said about the frustrations of the last three years. Having been Minister for three years under three Chancellors and seen the evolution in the nature of that negotiation, I have a lot of empathy with his analysis about the evolving nature of a negotiation, which is of course what happens.
I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the whole issue of the importance of financial services has gripped me since 9 January 2018, when I came into the role, and he is absolutely right to say that it is a very important industry and that we must do all that we can to maximise opportunities for it. I very much regret where we are on what we thought would be a technical process of equivalence granting. We filled in 2,500 pages of forms over about 40 questionnaires by June last year and, self-evidently, we have been leaders in the regulation of financial services within the EU. We have not heard anything from the EU on the equivalence determinations, which is strange. We regard the EU as some of our most important trading partners, and we look forward to continuing a constructive dialogue.
The right hon. Gentleman raised a number of questions about the Chancellor’s statement, the registration process and the situation for jurisdictions beyond the EU, and I will address those. On the equivalence for UK firms, although the EU does not currently have an equivalence regime for the marketing of investment funds—we cannot speak for any future changes to the EU’s equivalence framework—the Government are introducing the new equivalence regime for overseas investment funds to market to UK retail investors, to allow our consumers to benefit from the widest possible choice of funds. We are doing that to support and preserve consumer choice for UK investors. Currently, about 9,000 EEA-domiciled funds use passporting to market to retail investors in the UK. That makes up a substantial proportion of the overseas funds that are on offer to UK investors. In comparison, about 2,600 UK-domiciled funds are available to UK investors, and UK funds do not commonly sell into the EU.
The geographic scope of the OFR could be used to find any jurisdiction equivalent, but a fund from another jurisdiction could be permissible even if the jurisdiction is not equivalent. That would use a different process—the existing process, which I think is provided for in section 272 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. We hope and expect to refine that to align it with this process to remove any uncertainty.
The Chancellor’s announcement of 9 November, when we made 17 equivalence decisions, is separate to the OFR, which is a new equivalence regime that the UK is introducing for EEA funds. The withdrawal of equivalence can happen at the country level, but the FCA has powers to suspend or revoke the marketing permissions of individual funds. If funds from a country are found equivalent under the OFR, they will not need to go through the section 272 provision, so this will be a faster route.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked what happens to investors if equivalence is withdrawn or a fund is suspended. Obviously equivalence is necessary to ensure that UK investors can assume at least equivalent investor protection to that of the UK. If the Government believe that that is no longer the case, it would be appropriate for the Treasury to act and to make that clear to potential existing investors by withdrawing equivalence.
We recognise the importance of clarity and stability regarding the potential withdrawal of equivalence, so withdrawing an equivalence determination will be undertaken in an orderly and controlled manner to ensure that investors are protected and businesses have time to adjust. In the event of equivalence being withdrawn, funds from the country or territory in question will no longer have recognised status and can no longer be marketed to the general public in the UK.
The Treasury does not envisage that investors will be forced to divest their investments in the fund, and the funds should continue to service them; however, the loss of recognition could make it more difficult for investors to continue investing in the fund.
For example, the loss of recognition might result in investment platforms no longer offering the fund on their platforms. The Bill also includes a power so that the Treasury can take steps to smooth the transition for funds to the existing regime if equivalence has been withdrawn.
Alison Thewliss
I thank the Minister for that clarification. I am just trying to get my head around the practicality or how this would work. If equivalence is withdrawn, how do people who have money in the funds find out about it? Is there an obligation on the funds to tell them, or on the Government to ask the funds to tell them? Do the Government somehow contact these people, and what is the timeline of those things, should that occur?
John Glen
That procedure would depend on the particular breakdown of the fund and the scale of the problem. It would be for the regulator to work with the individual fund to demonstrate that, and to give clarity to consumers. It is difficult without a specific example to set that out, but the provision is there and the provisions are comprehensive in terms of being able to do that.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked about the relationship between equivalence and the divergence allowed for by the Bill. The Bill makes no assumptions about what the relationship between the UK and the EU will be in the area of financial services. That negotiation is ongoing. That is entirely consistent with the mutual findings of equivalence. It ensures that the right framework is in place for making equivalence decisions and for ensuring that any likely impact on existing equivalence decisions is taken into account when making rules in an area covered by the Bill.
I have tried to cover everything that has been raised. I am sure that I have not covered everything, but if I find anything substantive when I reflect on today’s proceedings, I will write to the right hon. Gentleman and make the letter available to the Committee.
The Chair
These letters are coming back quite quickly. The one from the other day is already here, so we look forward to any future ones.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9
Collective investment schemes authorised in approved countries
Amendments made: 12, in schedule 9, page 151, line 16, leave out
“granting an application under section 271A”
and insert
“under section 271A granting an application under that section”.
This amendment clarifies that both the application and the order are made under section 271A.
Amendment 13, in schedule 9, page 154, line 43, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
This amendment and Amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17 correct cross-references to the section under which an order recognising a scheme is made.
Amendment 14, in schedule 9, page 155, line 14, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 15, in schedule 9, page 155, line 24, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 16, in schedule 9, page 156, line 7, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 17, in schedule 9, page 156, line 29, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.—(John Glen.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(David Rutley.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 View all National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Q
I welcome the two witnesses from Slaughter and May. Can I ask you to introduce yourselves for the record, please?
Lisa Wright: Hi, my name is Lisa Wright and I am a partner in the competition group at Slaughter and May.
Christian Boney: Good morning. I am Christian Boney and I am a partner in the corporate mergers and acquisitions group at Slaughter and May.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
I am sure you are aware that many countries—the US and Canada are just two—give some sense of the factors that might be considered under a national security assessment. Do you think it would be helpful for market participants to have greater clarity about the types of factors that would be considered? How could we give that clarity while retaining the sensitivity and discretion that are needed on those matters?
Joined to that, there are cases such as Arm and DeepMind where economic security became national security over time. When considering what national security is, what links do you see between national security and economic security or sovereign capability? Can they better be reflected in the Bill?
Christian Boney: Lisa, shall I have a go at that first?
Lisa Wright: Yes, go for it.
Christian Boney: Starting with the need for factors to help inform market participants’ decisions about whether, for example, their potential transaction presents risks, yes—in short, the more guidance that can be given about the kinds of factors that the Government will consider in determining whether a transaction presents a national security concern, the better. The statement of policy intent is very helpful in framing that, but clearly the more detail that can be included, the better.
The other thing that will be important in giving people a sense of whether their transaction should be notified or whether it falls within a mandatory notification sector is the interaction that will take place through informal engagement through the investment security unit. It is very important that the process for getting informal guidance from that unit is as streamlined, interactive and responsive as it can be. That will go some way to giving practitioners realtime guidance on potential concerns.
Lisa Wright: Can I just add a point to the idea of the desire for more certainty around what national security means? I think it is worth recognising that that is particularly important if you look at where we have come from. With the existing regime under the Enterprise Act 2002, there have only ever been a dozen or so interventions on national security grounds. There is not a widespread understanding of what it means and the circumstances in which the Government would intervene. That is the historical position, but we all know that this is constantly evolving.
When you take that and add to it the fact that the prediction now is that there will be, as it says in the papers, between 70 and 90 call-ins a year, that is obviously a huge increase against the 12 since the Enterprise Act. Any greater clarity that can be given around the circumstances in which the Government would be looking to, for instance, exercise the call-in powers would be beneficial, particularly at the beginning of the regime when everybody is trying to learn the ropes.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Christian Boney: I think this question really divides into two. In terms of larger corporates, investment by, and in, larger corporates is very likely to be unimpacted in any meaningful way by this legislation, because large corporates and their advisers are very used to going through regulatory clearance processes. This will just be another thing that needs to be added to the list.
I think you make a very valid point in the context of start-up and early-stage companies. The concern I would have principally is with those companies that are in that phase of their corporate life and fall within the mandatory notification sectors. Given the kinds of companies that this country is trying to encourage to flourish—those that are active in areas like artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and quantum technologies—a reasonable number of start-ups, I would expect, would fall within those mandatory notification sectors. For them, this regime is going to make the process of getting investment more time-consuming and more complex.
Anything that can be done in the process of consulting on the mandatory sectors, and anything that can be done to pair back the regime to make it more workable for companies in that stage of life, the better. An example might be some form of de minimis threshold, which is included, such that really early-stage companies do not fall within the mandatory notification regime, but the Government can nevertheless rely on their call-in power down the track, should that early-stage company becomes successful and more strategically important within the UK. Those are my principal thoughts. Lisa, do you have anything to add?
Lisa Wright: Not on that point, no
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Q
Chi Onwurah
To clarify, my question was this: how would you distinguish between national and economic security?
Nadhim Zahawi
My question is more about your reflections on the Bill being narrow in its purpose to deal with national security versus the wider public interest.
Lisa Wright: It is already a very broad regime; it catches a lot of transactions, as we have just discussed. I therefore think it is important and right that it is limited, in terms of the substantive concerns that it is catching, to national security. That is already a necessarily, I think, uncertain or undefined concept. Corporates and investors can make it work as long as other aspects of the regime work efficiently. That may be subject to some of the points that Christian just made about the impact on start-ups.
I think that once you broaden the regime out from national security into other considerations, you do risk introducing quite a degree of unpredictability, which possibly would impact on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK. My understanding is that the existing intervention regime under the Enterprise Act is planned to remain in force, so the national security considerations will come out of that and will be dealt with under this new regime. But there will still be the ability for—[Inaudible.]
The Chair
Mr Boney, do you have any observations while we are waiting for the tech to work?
Christian Boney: I agree entirely with what Lisa has been saying. I think the scope of the Bill is already broad, so to my mind, broadening it further to take account of other areas is likely to introduce the uncertainty that Lisa was referring to and, as a consequence, have a potentially negative impact on the investment climate in the UK.
The Chair
Lisa, it looks like we have got you back now. Would you like to add anything?
Lisa Wright: I am not sure at what point you lost me, but I think I was saying—
Nadhim Zahawi
We lost you while you were talking about a “degree of unpredictability”, Lisa.
Lisa Wright: Okay. In my view, if you were to broaden the regime out from national security to take into account other considerations, that would introduce quite a degree of unpredictability and would, I think, potentially impact negatively on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK—I am sorry if I am repeating myself. However, my understanding is that the existing intervention regime will remain, so national security will come out of it, but the Government will still be able to intervene in transactions on other public interest grounds under the Enterprise Act. That regime has some limitations, but those powers will still be there.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Christian Boney: I think the de minimis concept is potentially relevant and helpful in the context of thinking about what needs to be subject to mandatory notification. If you are not within the mandatory notification regime, that does not mean that the Government cannot exercise the call-in power so long as the relevant tests in the legislation are satisfied; it just means that the relevant company does not have to make a notification. There are elements of the mandatory sectors where some form of de minimis has already been included. Energy is a good example of that, and that makes sense in the context of energy.
I think it is worth exploring whether, within any of the other sectors, where we are more likely to see start-up, early-stage companies operating, there is benefit in introducing some form of de minimis regime solely in respect of the mandatory notification requirement. As I say, if a small-scale company operating in critical artificial intelligence is receiving investment from somebody who we view as a hostile actor, that transaction might escape mandatory notification, but that does not mean it escapes voluntary call-in by the Government at the point they become aware of it. That is something that might be worth exploring.
Stephen Kinnock
Thanks very much. Does Ms Wright want to add anything?
Lisa Wright: No.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Christian Boney: If I am following the question correctly, I think it is the correct balance to strike to say that people pursuing significant M and A activity involving the UK’s critical national infrastructure should expect to go through a notification process and should expect their transaction to be at potential risk of examination and call-in. From my experience, corporates undertaking transactions in the spheres of national infrastructure and so on expect that. It is what they see in other countries and jurisdictions, so it is something they come to accept as part of doing deals in top-tier democratic nations.
Lisa Wright: I agree with all that. I guess I would also add that people are well aware that these considerations change over time. This year has shown that more than ever. People have an eye on what might not have been an issue yesterday; today, it might be different. We saw the amendments coming through to the Enterprise Act earlier in the autumn to bring in the power to allow the Government to intervene on public health grounds. People are very conscious of the fact that this changes, and they keep an eye on it from that perspective.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
I would have thought that there are two aspects to that. One is the nature of the acquirer, which is partly what you have already alluded to. The second part is that I would have thought that it is quite difficult to ascertain whether something at the cutting edge of technology is or is not a threat. I would have thought that that is a really difficult judgment to make in practice. Do you have any thoughts on that, and what experience do you have of other regimes trying to make that kind of judgment?
Lisa Wright: I think there are probably a number of ways to tackle that question. I guess that an answer is that it is ultimately a question for the Government. They are the ones who understand the threats and the intelligence. As advisers, we can look at the guidance and cases that have happened in the past, and we can speak to the unit, which, as we understand it, will be open for engagement and will welcome that. We can guide clients through the process, using the touch points and information that is available to us, but ultimately it is the Government that are in possession of the full set of facts and considerations that go into the decisions about whether that particular transaction is a problem or not. I guess what that speaks to is having the right people in the unit and getting them plugged into the right people elsewhere in Government to arm them with the ability to make these assessments.
Christian Boney: To pick up on that, I agree entirely with what Lisa said. It is not necessarily an easy thing for the advisory community or clients themselves to make a judgment about whether they are presenting risk to national security. That is why this concept of real-time, interactive engagement with the unit that is set up to police this regime is going to be so important.
In the world I operate in, one of the regulators we deal with is the Takeover Panel, which is fantastic at being responsive, with real-time engagement. It results in a dialogue and an interaction that helps advisers navigate their clients through a regime that is not straightforward at times. That is the kind of practice that could usefully be learned from in the context of the investment security unit, because that kind of real-time feedback and informal advice will be very helpful in helping companies make the judgment about which side of the line they fall.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
There is a fair amount of information in the Bill and the documents published alongside it about the kinds of businesses being acquired or taken over that might give rise to concern. There are quite clear definitions of what constitutes a trigger event, whether it is a purchase of shares or whatever, but there is very little detail about how the Secretary of State will decide which potential acquirers pose a threat. There are clearly good reasons why that information cannot be made public in too much detail, but is the fact that there is so little on the face of the Bill about how that decision is arrived at a problem? Does it make it less certain and therefore more likely to result in legal challenge?
Christian Boney: Acquirer risk is one of the points picked up in the statement of policy intent that is going to be looked at when determining the level of risk that a transaction presents. When looking at and explaining acquirer risk, I think that helpful additional guidance could be added to it to, for example, make clearer how the Government will consider acquirer risk in the context of things such as private equity funds and other funds that may be looking to invest in the UK. By that, I mean in particular whether the Government will be willing to disregard the identity of limited partners and other investors in funds that sit above the particular acquisition vehicle that is doing the relevant transaction. That is the kind of thing that I think there would be real benefit in trying to make clearer in the statement of policy intent.
Peter Grant
Q
The Companies Act 2006 has similar requirements for a company to notify Companies House if certain things happen that put someone in a position of significant influence. From a lay person’s point of view, such as my own, some of those provisions are almost word for word the same in the Companies Act and the Bill. Some appear to have the same effect but the wording is different, and therefore there will potentially be occasions when the definition is different. Would there be benefits in completely aligning both pieces of legislation so that a particular event either has to be notified or does not have to be notified? Otherwise, there is the possibility that some events will have to be notified under the Bill, and other events will have to be notified under the Companies Act but not the Bill.
Christian Boney: In short, I think there would be benefit in having as much alignment as there can be. Clearly, the two pieces of legislation are not necessarily designed with the same intent and focus in mind. Yes, I think there is merit in having as much alignment between the two as there can be.
If I may, there is just one point about the trigger events that is worth considering. One of the points in the statement of policy intent in the context of trigger events is the Government considering the risk of espionage. That seems to me to be something that is worth thinking about in the context of this regime. At the moment, the trigger events are focused, as you were saying, on the ability to influence a particular company, but there are certainly circumstances where, without acquiring a level of shareholding that enables a person to influence the company, the person can nevertheless gain very significant access to information—for example, through a board seat, which might come at a shareholding of lower than, for example, 15%. That would give that person considerable access to information within the company. If they were a hostile actor and they wanted to act in a nefarious manner, it would enable them to feed that information back to another hostile party. We have spoken about narrowing the scope of the regime, and I appreciate that that would be an amplification of it, but I think that is a point that is worth considering.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
The other thing is that a start-up company can raise money in other ways. The Bill tries to make sure that we are not losing intellectual property, but a business can raise finance by licensing the intellectual property that we are trying to protect—I am not sure that that would come within the scope of this Bill—or even sell the intellectual property and license it back again. There are various other ways in which a company can raise finance, over and above equity, where there is a huge amount of influence or it falls outside the Bill. Clearly, crucial national infrastructure is a very different thing, but intellectual property is something that is very difficult to grab hold of; it is like trying to grasp a handful of sand. Given the objectives, I wonder how the Bill tackles those other areas, which seem to allow malign investors a way through.
Christian Boney: I think an important aspect of the Bill—this is one of the reasons why Lisa and I have described it as a broad regime—is that it does allow policing of the acquisition and control of assets, including intellectual property. In my experience, at least, that is quite different from what you see in other international regimes. Clearly, the acquisition of control of assets does not fall within the mandatory notification regime; nevertheless, it is helpful that the Government have the power potentially to exercise a voluntary call-in in respect of, for example, an acquisition or a licence of intellectual property.
Mark Garnier
Q
Christian Boney: That is certainly fair. I think the level of influence and control that a debt provider will typically get in what I will call the ordinary courts means that it is less likely—I am certainly not saying it is impossible—to be at the level of getting such granular, sensitive, let us call it operational information, which is the kind of thing we would really be concerned about. It would more be focused on getting access to financial projections, financial performance and that kind of information, which, although it can still be sensitive, is probably less sensitive than operational data. A balance needs to be struck, it seems to me, in the context of this legislation. Not having debt providers obviously within scope does limit the legislation, but does it strike an acceptable balance? My personal view is that, on balance, it probably does.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
Q
Lisa Wright: In many ways, the regime just brings the UK into line with major international peers. From that perspective, for people doing deals around the world who have already experienced those other regimes, it ought not to have any real negative impact at all, provided that BEIS can deliver on the aspiration set out of a slick and efficient regime, turning around notifications within sensible deal timeframes and providing the kind of informal advice and early engagement promised. That will be critical, particularly in the early stages of the regime. From that perspective, I do not think this should have a long-term negative impact on people wanting to do deals in the UK. As Christian was mentioning earlier, it may be a slightly different picture for the start-ups and the smaller companies where they are caught up in the mandatory sectors, but overall I think it is right that this can be viewed as the UK bringing itself into line with what else is going on around the world.
Christian Boney: I agree with that. That is the right assessment.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
Lisa Wright: It is certainly worth considering. I would imagine that those sorts of considerations will be going through the mind of the officials and the Secretary of State tasked with making these assessments and issuing the decisions. I can see there may be some sensitivities and a desire perhaps not to make that all transparent in terms of public documents. Perhaps they think they will deal with it over time through this engagement and, with advisers and parties coming to talk to them, you will get a sense of who is okay and who is not that. But I can see that perhaps they will not want to put that down in very great detail on a public piece of paper, not least because one might imagine it could change over time. I guess there needs to be a degree of flexibility to recognise that.
Christian Boney: I agree. I am certainly not a CFIUS expert, but my understanding of the exempt list of countries is that actually the practical impact is quite tightly drawn. I do agree with Lisa. I think we are likely to get the best sense of those countries that are viewed as more risky than others through the engagement process and as people’s experience of the regime develops.
The Chair
We are almost at the end of the time available for this session, so there will be no further questions for these witnesses, but thank you, Ms Wright and Mr Boney, for being so generous with your time and assisting the Committee so much. We will now move on to the next witness—either we will suspend the sitting briefly until everything is sorted out or we will move seamlessly on—but thank you both very much.
Examination of Witness
Professor Ciaran Martin gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Professor Martin: Thank you. My name is Ciaran Martin. I am currently a professor of practice at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, but until August of this year I was the founding chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre and a member of the executive board of GCHQ, within the Government. I should also declare for these purposes, although I am not sure it is relevant, that I serve on the advisory board of a US venture capital company called Paladin.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Professor Martin: Thank you for your comments, Ms Onwurah; it is nice to see you again. I speak as someone who thinks that the Government have broadly got this issue correct, in terms of their proposals in this Bill. That is not to underestimate the sheer complexity of dealing with the core, fundamental question that you rightly identify of balancing economic security and national security and of where one stops and the other begins. That is a very complicated and difficult thing to do. I think one starts with an attempt to define a core principle, which is essentially around the freedom to act. I think that if you look at something such as Arm—I would say this probably more in the case of Arm than DeepMind—and its potential ultimate sale to Nvidia, you see that the UK has less freedom of choice in a key strategic technology, which undermines its own ability.
I think there is an analogy with the little known but quite long-standing—for more than a century—work on sovereign cryptography. That is one of the areas that has long been covered by national sovereignty requirements. There are things in information security, as we used to call it, cyber-security, as we do call it, that have always needed to be fully sovereign, entirely British-made—they are not very many areas. The problem has been that as technology and communications have changed, it has been quite hard to keep up, and there are always pressures to expand that in a way that is economically harmful to competition and so on. So it needs a clever buyer within Government to identify what will be the strategic areas and what will not be.
In the area of sovereign cryptography, we end up trying to keep, depending on the era, around half a dozen or a dozen companies viable, because it is not a lucrative market. You can see the problem, but the key issue is whether there is enough, first, sovereign, but if not sovereign, friendly capability that allows us the freedom of choice to adopt key technologies. That means identifying the key technologies in the first place, evolving them over time and then having a very difficult to achieve but necessary intelligent function within Government that can evaluate the notifications that it gets. Of course, at the moment we do not have the power to do that, and that is what this Bill correctly seeks to remedy.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Moving on slightly, a comment made numerous times on Second Reading was about the role of the intelligence services. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked for more intelligence in the process. How can the Bill better ensure that the intelligence services, including the National Cyber Security Centre, have input and scrutiny and, indeed, provide their expertise as part of the process so that the appropriate decisions are taken?
Professor Martin: I think the essential, principal requirement is not the intelligence services’ involvement—although that is important and I will come to that in a minute—but the understanding of technology and technological developments within Government. These are fundamentally economic issues as well. Apart from anything else, if you look at some of the reasons why the Bill has come about, you will see that, in strategically important technologies, the Government have invested heavily in university-sponsored research and in private sector research, only to see the fruits of that research sold off. Even if that did not impact on national security, which in most cases it does, it is not a good return for the taxpayer in terms of long-term UK involvement if the intellectual property ends up being monetised elsewhere.
I have enormous respect for Mr Jones and I think he is on to something in terms of involving the national security and intelligence services, but I do not think this should be intelligence-led. In my experience—obviously, I cannot go into detail on this particular aspect of it—secret intelligence adds relatively little to your knowledge of intent. If we take Russia and China, the two big strategic threats to the UK, Russia does not have a strategy in this space. We have to worry about Russia and cyber-security because it attacks us, but it attacks us on the internet that the west has built.
China is very different. China has a technological, strategic dominance aim, but it is not a secret. It is published and has been translated into English in the Made in China 2025 strategy, as you know. Our knowledge about the precise, intricate details of how that is implemented gains relatively little from secret intelligence.
What secret intelligence does have, particularly in GCHQ and the NCSC within it, is a knowledge of how technology works in terms of the national security threat space. I think the UK has a head start on other countries, because the National Security Council innovations of the 2010s gave the intelligence services a much bigger voice at the table, and that is reflected in the structures that we have now. The UK should be well placed to be able to listen to the intelligence services, but I would encourage—not least to make sure that in this very delicate balance of trying to show that we still have an open economy and are not shutting the doors to investment—as much transparency as possible on the decision taking. It will not always be possible because GCHQ technologists will know about things—exploitations of particular bits of technology—that they cannot reveal. They will be able to tell that to secret forums within Government for consideration—I am quite confident about that: there will be a seat at the table for them.
My recommendation would be that, as far as can safely be done, the Government should be relatively open about why they make the judgements they make about strategic areas of technology and the interventions they will make once this Bill is passed—assuming that both Houses wish to pass it.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Professor Martin: I suppose the mantra, if I had one, would be, “Broad powers, sparingly used, with accountability mechanisms”. It is incredibly hard to be specific about this, for two reasons: one is that new areas of technology crop up, as they invariably do, and the other is that sweeping categorisations are needed on the face of legislation.
I am not a deep technical expert—although others are available from my former organisation—but if you take sweeping, umbrella titles like “quantum” or “artificial intelligence”, there are huge swathes of that where, actually, not a lot of these powers in the Bill will be used. There will be companies that will be doing very interesting things—10 interesting things—of which only one would be caught by this Bill.
If you take areas like specialist quantum computing and so forth, I think the community of interest and expertise is actually relatively small and has relatively good relations with Government—not least because, again, while it is not perfect, the whole system of research council funding and Government investment in funding technological research is pretty good, by international standards—so you end up knowing these people. One of the reasons that this sort of policy evolution came about, which has led to the publication of the Bill before you—I remember this from discussions within Government—is that people were volunteering to come to us. World-leading experts, people who had been funded by the Government—I will not go into individual cases because it is commercially sensitive and possibly security sensitive—would come to Government and say, “Look, we’ve had this inquiry from a Chinese behemoth,” or even, “We’ve had this inquiry from a US company,” and so forth: “What do you guys think about this?” and, invariably, we would have to have an informal influencing discussion.
I do not think that some of the businesses to which this will apply will be screaming that this is horrible Government regulation and intervention in areas where that should not be made. There was already a dialogue; there was just no legislative framework. Of course, that meant that companies that felt a loyalty to the UK and so forth but that also had to look after their commercial interests were sometimes in a real bind.
To try to answer your question, I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Professor Martin: I think there are broadly two or three areas in which China is very interested in doing that. I can make some comments on motivations, because I think they are very important, and then I will finish with how that manifests itself in UK casework.
Clearly, China has set out a stall, which it published in Made in China 2025, in which it said it wants to be the world’s pre-eminent leader in a number of key areas of technology. It mentioned artificial intelligence and quantum, and it is throwing vast sums of state money and long-term strategies at them, unencumbered by the need to seek re-election and popular consent, so it is a very powerful movement. That is the first thing: it is trying to build up its capability.
China is also trying to change, at least for itself—we will come to that in a minute—the way the internet works. It was reported earlier this year that Huawei and other major companies in these international standards bodies are looking at something called new IP protocols, among many other things. To give you a sense of what the motivations behind that are, at the minute when traffic flows around the internet, despite some popular impressions to the contrary, it is actually pretty hard to work out what is going through it. Therefore, it is relatively difficult to censor, although China has managed it in some ways. The new IP protocol will make it much easier to work out what sort of traffic is going through and being rerouted, so it makes it much easier to control. China is trying to dominate and essentially get a lead in the strategic technology, and also to change the character and culture of the technological age from one that started off fairly anarchic to one that is much easier to control. That is what it is trying to do.
Why is China trying to do that? A lot of this is about the assertion of its own power for itself—the regime, power, Chinese nationalism and so forth. I think it does intend to extend its sphere of influence, but I have never seen that as the primary motivation. One of the interesting things, post the pushback from the Trump Administration and the US sanctions on Huawei, is the extent to which China will now accelerate its desire for self-sufficiency, and the extent to which that leads to a separate pole of technological influence that may become less interested in countries such as the UK, European Union countries and North America.
To date, how has that manifested itself in cases in the UK? Ms Onwurah has already mentioned the Huawei controversy. If you take Huawei as a company, I think it shows the different ways in which this can manifest. The Huawei 5G controversy is going to be dealt with by a Bill that I believe is coming to the House next week, not this one. The 5G controversy was not about investment; it was about selling to British companies to build stuff. Obviously, that case has been very heavily analysed.
I think that the more interesting case in the last 10 years involving Huawei was its acquisition in 2012 of the Centre for Integrated Photonics—a world-leading British firm in a really key area of technology. That, in my view, was pretty strategically damaging. If we had our time over again, that is the sort of thing that the Bill might well notify. I know you have taken evidence from the likes of Charles Parton and people with huge China expertise. The fact that the acquisition of the Centre for Integrated Photonics did down Britain’s technological development was probably a by-product. The point is that Huawei could buy world-leading research, which China could then take and appropriate for itself very cheaply. That is what it will continue to do to build up its own capabilities.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Professor Martin: One of the reasons that this is so difficult, as I said in my first answer to Ms Onwurah, is that I can think of at least three areas of expertise that the unit is going to need to draw on. Technological, yes, because of what technologies will matter. Geopolitical, yes, and I do not have a strong view on whether it needs Mandarin speakers because the UK has a strong and intelligent foreign service mission in country in China and all over the place that can provide input. But the third thing is actually quite a lot of commercial nous—patent laws and so forth.
This is where there is a distinction. This is not all about China. It is layered, and there will be things that we would not want to see going even to quite friendly countries. Arm is a case in point, with the concentration of power in a couple of US companies—particularly when one of them is derived from UK technology. That is not comparable as a strategic threat to Chinese dominance—I hope the Committee does not think I am saying that—but there are times when it would be a damaging foreclosure, if you like, of UK freedom of action and freedom of choice. We know that the US has a strong and sometimes aggressively used extraterritorial legal system in which it can use the power of US companies and block trading with US companies and so on, so we need people who understand those areas where we think, “We are not sure we would want that to leave the country at all” as well as people who understand Chinese. That involves a lot of expertise in things like patents, international law, US commercial law, sanctions and so on.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Q
Professor Martin: I do not vehemently disagree with that suggestion, but I am not persuaded by it. It is not a new issue. I remember cases—they have nothing to do with this—going back to the aftermath of the so-called global war on terror, with demands during inquiries for definitions of national security. I am not sure what that would achieve other than it would be heavily litigated. In terms of both definitions of national security and the categories of technology, a better answer is a drumbeat of reviewable activity, which is by definition transparent, about how the Government interpret the scope of the Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the sort of cases it applies to so that, over time, you build up a broadly accepted framework—of course, not everyone will accept it—that is seen to be fair and rational.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: I certainly would not be against things like that, if it could be done in a way that did not compromise the wider use of the Bill, because I do not think there is intent to interfere in the democratic process. I think the intelligence services take that pretty seriously. I remember in other contexts, when asked to co-operate on cyber-security with other countries, given that some cyber-security capabilities—by no means all—can be intrusive, that a lot of due diligence is always done on whether they could be turned by more authoritarian regimes against their own people. I would not object to that in principle. I do not know whether you have a case in mind when you say that might be necessary, but I have an open mind on that.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: In general terms—this is a personal view, for what it is worth—I do not think the location of most government functions matters a great deal. Perhaps I am just a bit of a contrarian on that point, and always have been. The Government is the Government. Institutions do have cultures. I do not know whether the Government or the intelligence services have offered a formal view, but personally I would be reluctant to put it within the national security estate, first, because it has to be economically literate, and secondly, because it has to justify its existence and use. A strong national security input is important, but I would not leave it in the national security community.
I am sorry to sound like a broken record on this point, but I think the more important force in function is some form of reviewable transparency requirement. If you set it up and let it go away, first, you take away pressure to perform well, and secondly, you take away pressure to justify the decisions that are made.
This is a really hard problem. When I was still in government and there were discussions around it, this was not the sort of Bill that most Ministers and politicians came into Government to want to pass. It is a necessity of a bunch of case work that we have become concerned about that has required us to do this. It is sort of the least bad option. The country wants to be open to investment—we are all mindful of the impression it may give that it is trying to deter investment—so it is probably the least bad option, as I say.
I do not think there is any arrogance in government or belief that a bunch of civil servants assembled in BEIS or another Department will make infallible judgments on individual cases, but what is the alternative way to stop the sort of things we have seen happening—world-class taxpayer-funded research in key strategic technologies that are going to be vital for national security being sold for a song to potentially hostile regimes?
Peter Grant
I will leave it there, Sir Graham. I may want to come back later, but I will let someone else in now.
Simon Baynes
Q
Professor Martin: I get that completely. I do not think 100% transparency will be possible in this case. Obviously, it will be judicially reviewable, but I am entirely unsurprised that there is an explicit provision for closed material procedures. It will be a minority, but there will be cases in which the reason why a particular aspect of a particular piece of technology is really sensitive—it will probably be highly specialised, and there might be a dozen people, of whom four serve in government, who actually understand why—cannot be published. Then, of course, there will be commercial sensitivities.
Having said all that, if you take, for example—these are real examples—the current debate around the potential use of offensive cyber, or the sort of allegations Edward Snowden made against Five Eyes countries in 2013, or some of the defences that the Government had to use in the 2000s about their role in the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraq and co-operating with US forces, in my view there is a clear distinction between being able to describe the operating environment and the sorts of thematic issues that you are dealing with, versus individual cases, which often contain extremely sensitive detail. National security organisations can say much more about the former than historically they have been willing to do.
In something like this, where we are talking about business confidence and how the country looks to potentially very friendly and helpful outside investors who like the UK, want to come here, want to put money here and like the high-quality research and the brilliant innovators and individuals, it should be possible to give them something that says, “In the course of the last year, we have looked at quantum resistant cryptography and here are the types of aspects of this that we are reserving and here are the bits that are more open” or that sort of thing, without disclosing anything sensitive. That is all you need to be able to say—these are the judgments. Let us say that the Bill becomes law in the middle of 2021, for sake of argument. By 2025 and the beginning of the next Parliament, the tech landscape will look very different. You will not want investors to be looking back at the debates you are having in the House now as a guide to the latest way in which the Government are applying this, or looking at drip feeds of information. You will want something official. It should be possible to do that.
Mark Garnier
Q
Professor Martin: I do not know the ECJU that well, but it is relevant. I remember, although it was some time ago, being asked for specific inputs into that sort of point. The important thing is that the unit achieves a prominence and reach across the Government, because bits of Government will have to be involved occasionally and there will be bits that will be embedded. It needs a home—in our system of government, every organisation needs a home with a responsible Minister and an accounting officer and all that. However, I do think this needs to be broadly based and multidisciplinary. Export controls are one of the few areas where we have had to do that consistently for a number of years, so I agree that it is well worth a look.
Mark Garnier
Q
Professor Martin: I think it should be formal. The Government are not new to this. There should be some sort of review board to make sure that it has the right resources, the right performance, the right skillset and so forth. I would encourage ministerial interest. It may be something that the National Security Council wants to periodically review. In my time in national security, there were standing issues that the Government would come back to twice a year, whether there was anything interesting happening on them or not, just to take stock. That might be an issue. In answer to the previous question about transparency, there may be a case for a formal presentation, secret detail and all, to the National Security Council every year, which would include all the potentially covert and sensitive stuff. It really needs to work with the grain of ministerial thinking as well. That will need to be done collectively, at some point, so there may be a role for the NSC.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: There is a reasonable case for a more frequently reviewable point. There is also a cultural point about the way in which the political processes work. There are aspects of government about which questions are not routinely asked in Parliament, because they seem to be too secret. Again, it is a point about casework versus framework.
To my mind, there is no reason why the Secretary of State for BEIS could not be asked from time to time to update on this or why questions in the House should not be asked. I do not think technology changes fast enough that the whole framework of categories of regulated activity and so forth have to be updated more than every five years, but there will be a possibility of more frequent updates on working, approving listings and that sort of thing.
Peter Grant
To be fair, there is nothing to stop MPs from asking questions about international security, but the chances of us ever getting an answer may be somewhat less.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Professor Martin: I am not sure if the Bill will get in the way or help, one way or the other. I think Government technological nous across the civil service needs to be invested in properly. There is a deep, fairly sizeable reservoir in GCHQ. Again, without going into too much detail, more and more people are being transferred and seconded from there into other areas. That is a good thing, and we should welcome that rather than cast aspersions on this being all secret state stuff. It should be permeating normal Government activity.
There will be issues about how to pay for some of the specialists that are needed. I do not think we will ever compete with the big tech companies, but there may be scope for paying some specialists a bit more and bringing them in here. There is something about creating a career path for technologists in Government. There are big issues for the heads of the civil service and the permanent secretaries. If I were heading it, I would want an immediate infusion of seconded talent and private sector buy-ins relatively quickly. Government can do that quite well some- times, and sometimes not so well. There also needs to be a long-term strategy for technologists in Government.
The Chair
I will now thank you very much, Professor Martin, for giving your time so generously and being of such assistance to the Committee. Given that the next witness is not due to give evidence until 2 pm, I invite the Government Whip to propose the adjournment.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
Environment Bill (Twenty Second sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Environment Act 2021 View all Environment Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Welcome to this penultimate, or possibly ultimate—we hope—sitting of the Committee. I think that everybody is observing social distancing today, but the Speaker has made it perfectly clear that we must be very strict about this. For this last—or second last—event, please try to remember that.
New Clause 23
Reduction of lead poisoning from shot
(1) The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) After section 5(c)(viii) insert—
“(ix) any form of lead ammunition used in a shotgun.”
(3) After section 11 (1)(d) insert—
“(e) uses lead ammunition in a shotgun for the purposes of killing or taking any wild animal”.
(4) The provisions in this section come into force on 1 January 2023.
This new clause intends to provide an effective regulation to protect wildlife, the environment and human health by replacing widely-used toxic lead gunshot with alternatives. It intends to ensure a supply of healthy game for the market, whilst meeting societal requirements and those of shooting, food retail and conservation stakeholders.—(Fleur Anderson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is an honour to stand in this last sitting of our Environment Bill Committee consideration, which began 261 days ago. I have been disappointed, so far, by the lack of agreement over the amendments proposed by Opposition Members.
I hope today will see a sea change; that this new clause is the one that we can all accept, agreeing that lead shot is highly toxic, should not be in our system, is bad for the environment, bad for wildlife, bad for children, bad for adults—bad for everyone. Its days can now be hastily numbered, and we can support the shooting community in their efforts to get rid of lead shot from our environment, our ecosystem and our agriculture.
Lead shot is highly toxic and is easily absorbed into the bloodstream. Birds eat it as they mistake it for grit—which they eat for digestion—and it then gets absorbed into their bodies. It is also highly toxic for children; there is no minimum amount of lead, in any system, that is safe for children.
I am no urban MP, standing up for a city constituency, with no idea of what goes on in the country, because I was raised in Wiltshire, where my father was a rural vicar. Every Christmas, some of our presents would not be wrapped up, but would be hung up outside our door, as they would be a brace of pheasants. I do understand what happens in the shooting community.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
Will the vicar’s daughter give way?
Bim Afolami
Could the hon. Lady outline the differential impacts of steel and lead shot, as that is something that many in the shooting community are interested in and will carefully consider?
Fleur Anderson
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and for his interest in this subject, which I have become much more interested in since researching it and talking to relevant bodies.
Steel is considered to be safe, as are tungsten alloys and tin, so there are alternatives out there. There is obviously an issue with single-use plastics, which would currently have to be used with alternatives to lead. However, I believe that with the inspiration and impetus from this amendment, the whole shooting community—including manufacturers of alternatives to lead shot—would be encouraged to use and produce ammunition that was far, far safer than lead shot.
Lead does not need to be used; non-toxic ammunition is widely available, effective, and comparably priced. The hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden may be interested to know that Denmark and the Netherlands banned the use of all lead shot in the 1990s; they have proved that changing to safer ammunition is entirely possible.
Why do we need to do this new clause? We know that 8.7% of ducks and geese across Europe die every year from eating lead shot; this includes 23% of pochard, which is a species threatened with global extinction, and 31% of pintail ducks. Lead poisoning from ammunition kills an estimated 75,000 water birds each year, as well as other birds and mammals.
Through ingestion by cattle—which then results in food-safety issues as it enters their system—lead can end up in restaurants and retail outlets; in our food. It also seeps into land, including wetlands, and creates toxic grounds; wetlands have been found to be peppered with lead shot.
Lead is dangerous for people’s health, as lead shot often fragments and is ingested in game meat. Children and pregnant women are particularly at risk due to the negative impact of lead on the developing brain, which has led to Waitrose labelling its game meat products as not safe for pregnant women and children.
Lead is not something we should allow into our food system. Somewhere in the order of 10,000 children from the UK hunting community are estimated to be at risk of negative impacts on IQ due to household consumption of game meat. If the effects were immediate and something happened to us that caused an immediate breakdown of our health, we would have stopped this years ago, but because lead has a subtle effect on our health—on our brain development and IQ—it has been allowed to carry on for too long.
The new clause has not just been dreamed up in the past few months; it is the result of the Government engaging with this issue since 1991. There have been stakeholder groups, compliance studies, risk assessments and reviews, but the stars are now aligned. We cannot any longer say that the new clause is not needed. I know that the British Association for Shooting and Conservation is moving towards a ban on lead shot, which I welcome. It wants to take action within the next five years to see a change. There is clearly appetite in the shooting world to accomplish what is set out in the new clause by banning lead shot. However, things are not moving fast enough. We cannot entirely rely on that compliance, but the new clause would take us where the shooting community seems to want us to go.
The stars are aligned, and it is time for the new clause. There is a limited ban at the moment, focused on wetland birds, but it is widely flouted and there has been only one prosecution, which is another reason why we need to have the new clause in the legislation. The partial regulation focused on protecting wetland birds, and similar regulations in other home nations, have been ineffective in reducing lead poisoning in water birds because there has been a high level of non-compliance. Birds feeding in terrestrial habitats, where most of the lead shot is legally deposited, are also affected. Moreover, enforcement of the limited regulation has been negligible so far, and human and livestock health have not been protected. Two large-scale restriction proposals are currently being progressed in the EU under REACH, which will bring about a total ban and additional benefits to law enforcement. Let us pre-empt that and go one step further in the UK.
This is the right time for policy change. The coinciding of the new Environment Bill and proposed policy change on lead shot is opportune. The nine main UK shooting organisations recognise the risk from lead ammunition. There is no debate about that. The imminent impacts of regulation on lead ammunition in the EU, and the likely impacts on UK markets for game meat, all need to be considered. Hence, on 22 February, the move to a voluntary phase-out of lead shot within five years was announced. That has already prepared the UK’s shooting community for change, and I have seen that the media narratives around shooting have changed to reflect that.
To date, however, voluntary bans on lead shot have always failed, so to say that the new clause is unnecessary is just not good enough. Denmark, which has gone ahead of us on this issue—we can learn from them—banned all lead shot in 1996. Hunters accept that it was because a progressive Government took such a step that they now lead the world in the control of lead poisoning from shot.
Although there is a desire for change within hunting organisations, there also remains a tradition of resisting regulation, which might just roll on and on over the next five years.
Robbie Moore (Keighley) (Con)
I want to pick up on that point. It is not only BASC but the Moorland Association, the National Gamekeepers Organisation and the Country Land and Business Association that are behind the transition. They are actually going further than what the hon. Lady is asking for, by asking for a ban on single-use plastics in the cartridges, but what they are clearly asking for is a period of smooth transition over five years. Does the hon. Member not agree that that is more appropriate?
Fleur Anderson
I agree, and I thank the hon. Member for pointing out the wide support for a move in this direction, but if we can ensure it is in legislation, the move will go further, it will be deeper and it will be guaranteed to happen. Given the high toxicity of lead, we cannot just leave this issue to voluntary moves by all those organisations. Let us go with the flow and accept their willingness to change, but let us underpin that with legislative change, which moves it on faster. These issues have already been under negotiation. The smooth transition is happening. I am not asking for this to happen on 1 January—the proposal is to give another year. There is time to move forward; the new clause is very reasonable. If we want to go further and talk more about single-use plastics, that will happen in time, and this proposal will enable manufacturers to do that.
Only regulation will provide a guaranteed market for ammunition manufacturers. Moving all users of ammunition through these changes, all at once, will enable ammunition manufacturers to make the change that we all surely want to see, and will ensure the provision of game free from lead ammunition for the retail market. It will enable cost-effective enforcement and protect wildlife and human health much earlier than in five years. Why would we want lead shot in our food for another five years? Why would we want to kill all those birds for another five years?
Action on this issue was recommended in 1983 in the report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution on lead in the environment. It has been long enough. It is long overdue. Now, at last, is the time to act.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Rebecca Pow)
I thank the hon. Member for Putney for the new clause and for highlighting her eating of pheasant as a child. I, too, have had many a pheasant hanging in my garage. Indeed, we had roast pheasant for lunch this Sunday. It was absolutely delicious, covered in bacon. It was really nice.
I reassure the hon. Lady that this Government support the principle of addressing the impacts of lead shot. Evidence published by the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust suggests that, as she pointed out, tens of thousands of wildfowl die from lead poisoning each year and many more birds, including scavengers and predators such as raptors, suffer and die through secondary poisoning.
There is a lot of movement already going on in this space. In England, the use of lead shot is already prohibited over all foreshore, on sites of special scientific interest and for shooting certain waterfowl. I certainly know people in Somerset who give anyone all of the chat before they go out to shoot anywhere near wildfowl and local ponds about not using lead shot.
My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley has pointed out that the new clause falls short of what shooting organisations are calling for. Organisations such as BASC, the Moorland Association and various other countryside organisations—I engaged with a lot of them as a Back Bencher—are calling for an end within five years to both lead and single-use plastics. They are talking about it seriously. As the hon. Member for Putney will know, there is a lot of research going on as well.
An EU REACH regulation on the use of lead shot in or near wetlands is close to being adopted and a wider measure affecting all terrestrial areas is under consideration. The fact that the industry itself is calling for a ban within five years demonstrates the work going on in this space.
The wetlands measure will apply in Northern Ireland by virtue of the Northern Ireland protocol and will apply in the rest of the UK and be retained EU law after the transition period if the legislation providing for that comes into force before the end of this period.
The amendment seeks to prohibit use of lead shot in shotguns for the purposes of killing or taking any wild bird or wild animal. That approach may not be the most effective means of restricting the use of lead shot. It is also slightly unclear because it does not cover clay pigeon shooting, for example. If one were really going to address this issue, all aspects of the sport, as it might be termed, would need to be considered. The new clause does not address them all.
The police would enforce under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, but as with other wildlife crimes, there are considerable difficulties in detection and taking enforcement action in remote locations. All those things would need ironing out; it is not just a straightforward, “Let’s have a ban tomorrow.”
Fleur Anderson
I thank the Minister, but it will not surprise her to hear that I will not be withdrawing the new clause. Assurances do not cut it on this issue; it is too important. I would also absolutely refute any feeling that this is not underpinned by evidence. As I have outlined, so much work by so many different groups has gone into this that it does need to go ahead.
If we need it to, the Office for Environmental Protection has all the powers to go further than my proposal to talk about clay pigeon use and single-use plastics. Let us take this further, absolutely, but accepting the new clause would be a much better assurance and indication of our intentions for what should happen in terms of getting rid of lead ammunition. Assurances and good words will be far less effective than putting this new clause in the Bill. The new clause goes further than voluntary regulations because it puts this firm date, 1 January 2023, in legislation. Those five-year assurances might go on and on; when is the actual end of that five years? The new clause ensures that action will happen, so we will be dividing the Committee.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
Before we proceed, may I advise the Committee that we are able to sit here until 5 pm on Tuesday, but I personally feel a strong urge to get back to Wiltshire as soon as I possibly can, and cracking on would therefore be a good plan.
New Clause 28
Environmental objective and commitments
‘(1) In interpreting and applying this Act, any party with duties, responsibilities, obligations or discretions under or relating to it must comply with—
(a) the environmental objective in subsection (2); and
(b) the commitments in subsection (3).
(2) The environmental objective is to achieve and maintain—
(a) a healthy, resilient and biodiverse natural environment;
(b) an environment that supports human health and well-being for everyone; and
(c) sustainable use of resources.
(3) The commitments are—
(a) all commitments given by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Nations Leaders’ Pledge for Nature of 28 September 2020, including, but not limited to, the urgent actions committed to be taken by it over the period of ten years from the date of that pledge;
(b) any enhanced commitments given by Her Majesty’s Government pursuant to that pledge, any other pledge, and any international agreement; and
(c) all relevant domestic legislation, including, but not limited to, the Climate Change Act 2008, as amended from time to time.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the requirement in subsection (1), that requirement applies to—
(a) the Secretary of State in setting, amending and ensuring compliance with the environmental targets; preparing, amending and implementing environmental improvement plans; and performing all their obligations and exercising all their discretions under this Act;
(b) the Office for Environmental Protection and the Upper Tribunal in performing their respective obligations and exercising any applicable discretions; and
(c) all other persons and bodies with obligations and discretions under, or in connection with, the subject matter of this Act.’ .—(Dr Whitehead.)
This new clause ties obligations and discretions of the various parties under this Act (subsections 2 and 3), other acts and international agreements together. It seeks to incorporate commitments as they are made in the future. It requires all relevant public bodies to apply the commitments as they are agreed to
Brought up, and read the First time.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Hon. Members with an elephantine memory will recall that at the beginning of this Committee’s deliberations—I have here the exact date and time a clause is debated; it is written on a piece of parchment, it is so old—we tabled new clause 1, which related to the environmental objective. At that time, we said that one reason for tabling this new clause was that the Bill had no cohesion in terms of its overall objectives. While it has many good things in it, those are essentially disparate elements that do not pull themselves together in terms of what the Bill is or should be about overall. We tabled that brief clause to try to pull the Bill together. The clause was not agreed to on that occasion, but as the Bill Committee has progressed and as we have moved into our latter stages in the autumn, nothing has made the Bill more cohesive.
New clause 28 would do exactly that, with environmental objectives and commitments. It would place in the Bill a very clear environmental objective to
“achieve and maintain…a healthy, resilient and biodiverse natural environment…an environment that supports human health and well-being for everyone; and…sustainable use of resources.
I think that would absolutely pull together what we all think we are doing in this Bill Committee. If passed, imagine the new clause placed at the head of the Bill, where it would underline those objectives and ensure that everything in the Bill was read within them.
The new clause goes further still by ensuring that the Bill takes account of
“all commitments given by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Nations Leaders’ Pledge for Nature of 28 September 2020”,
which reflects those environmental objectives. The legislation would include the international commitments that we as a country have made to our environmental objectives, underlining just how important the Bill may be for those objectives.
We are offering a much better and improved environmental objective clause that takes account of all the various issues raised in Committee, and we think it would be a great adornment to the Bill. I know that in this place we are all looking for “the one” when it comes to clauses, and I was grievously disappointed that the last clause did not make it into the Bill, because there was absolutely no reason at all why it should not have been adopted. I have a similar feeling about new clause 28. I hope that the Committee will unanimously agree that we need an environmental objective in the Bill. This clause fits the bill admirably and should be supported.
Rebecca Pow
The shadow Minister said that there is no cohesion to what the Bill is about. He spoke about people with elephantine memories, but surely he has not been listening? Throughout Committee stage, we have talked about what the Bill is about. I thank him for his sentiments, but I honestly think that he has missed the point somewhere along the line.
I reassure the Committee that we have designed each governance mechanism in part 1 of the Bill with guiding objectives. They will ensure that targets, environmental improvement plans, the environmental principles, which are included, and the Office for Environmental Protection work in harmony to protect and enhance our natural environment. That has all been devised as one framework. As is set out on the face of the Bill, the objective of the targets and environmental improvement plans is to deliver significant improvement and to provide certainty on the direction of travel. The first EIP is the 25-year environment plan, which the Opposition have waved at us many times.
The policy statement on the environment principles will be required to contribute to the improvement of environmental protection and sustainable development. Ministers of the Crown must have regard to that statement when making policy. Those aims will therefore be integral to policy making across Government. Furthermore, clause 22 sets a principal objective for the OEP of contributing to environmental protection and the improvement of the natural environmental in exercising its functions, so if the OEP does not think that enough is being done towards that objective, it can say why, give some steers and advice, and things will have to change. Those measures are all closely aligned and will work together to deliver the environmental objectives outlined in new clause 28 on the improvement and protection of the natural environment, and the sustainable use of resources—that is all very much a part of the measures.
The new clause would include commitments made under the voluntary leaders’ pledge for nature. I am very glad the hon. Gentleman mentioned that, because it was a big moment when our Prime Minister said that we support that pledge at the recent UN biodiversity summit at the UN General Assembly in September. The UK is now working with other key signatories to drive forward the 10 commitments in the pledge, including through our hosting of COP26 and our involvement in the convention on biological diversity negotiations in 2021. I reiterate that the leaders’ pledge for nature is voluntary and, as such, was drafted between the participating states in deliberately non-treaty language, partly to serve as a public document that could be read by as many constituents as possible. The UK is now working with other key signatory countries to drive forward those commitments.
Many of the areas reflected in the leaders’ pledge are already included in the Bill, which introduces a powerful package of new policies and tools to support nature’s recovery. I know that the shadow Minister wants that just as much as I do, but I assure him that the measures in the Bill already cover that, not least on biodiversity net gain, local nature recovery strategies, conservation covenants, which he did welcome, and a strengthened biodiversity duty on public authorities. All those things will work together to drive from the roots upwards to get overall improvement. As a result, we will be creating or restoring rich habitats to enable wildlife to recover and thrive in future years. Measures on resource efficiency will help to keep products in use for longer, encouraging better repair and recycling of materials by influencing product design at the very beginning.
Clause 2 places a clear, legally binding requirement on the Government to set an air quality target that goes beyond EU requirements and delivers significant health benefits for citizens. The Bill also supports recent legislation on reaching net zero emissions by 2050 and our wider efforts to build resilience to a changing climate. It will do so by improving air and water quality, supporting resource efficiency, and restoring habitats to allow plants and wildlife to thrive, along with other measures in that part of the Bill.
I hope that I have made it clear that I honestly do not believe that new clause 28 is needed. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Dr Whitehead
Although the Minister has provided a good concordance on where to look in the Bill for things that could conceivably pull it together, nothing in the Bill actually does that. Saying that if one looks at the Bill carefully, one can see things that move it in the right direction, is not really a defence.
Rebecca Pow
The shadow Minister’s new clause refers to a “healthy, resilient” environment—that is such a loose term. What exactly does he mean by that and what does it mean legally? Does he not agree that, were that wording to be used, it would create huge legal risk and could jeopardise the delivery of key policies in the Bill?
Dr Whitehead
I do not think a healthy and resilient environment can be interpreted in any other way than an environment that needs to be as healthy as possible for human development and progress, and one that is able to regenerate itself and keep as close as possible to the most beneficial way of working that it had prior to human intervention. I do not think there is a problem about the definition. Indeed, having it defined in that brief, particular way gives a very good remit for making sure that those are the ways in which that environment can be defined.
The Chair
Just to give the batting averages, we have taken half an hour for two new clauses. At this rate, we will be here until 4.30 pm this afternoon. Speed is of the essence.
New Clause 29
Report on climate and ecology
“(1) The Secretary of State must, no later than six months after the day of which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a report containing an assessment of the adequacy of environmental legislation and policy for meeting the climate and ecology challenges faced by the United Kingdom and the world.
(2) That report must include specific assessments relating to—
(a) water quality, availability and abundance;
(b) biodiversity, including, but not limited to, the restoration and regeneration of biodiverse habitats, natural and human modified ecosystems, and their respective soils;
(c) the expansion and enhancement of natural ecosystems and agroecosystems to safeguard their carbon-sink capacity and resilience to global heating; and
(d) resource efficiency, waste reduction and the promotion of the circular economy.”—(Daniel Zeichner.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to go beyond setting one target (as in Section 1(2)) to within 6 months, assess, develop plans and outline adequacy of each target. “Circular Economy” is included as the Prime Minister agreed this concept in September 2020 at UN Leaders Pledge for Nature
Brought up, and read the First time.
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am grateful to the Minister for writing to me yet again. We are such regular correspondents that I am half expecting a Christmas card any time soon. She wrote on the debate we had on new clauses 25 and 27. It is a very detailed reply and it does give some reassurance, but I have to say that it shows why we should have had a discussion about those clauses in an evidence session, rather than have them inserted late in the day. I suspect there will be other lawyers who will take a different view on some of these matters, but I am sure that can be pursued as we go through the later stages of the Bill.
On new clause 29, I very much echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. We believe that new clauses 29 and 28 together would strengthen the Bill. New clause 29 would give additional bite; it can stand on its own, so there is still time for the Minister to redeem herself. Exactly as my hon. Friend said, we take issue with the lack of overall clarity in the Bill. It needs a clearer thread running through.
The new clause, which would require the Secretary of State within six months of the Bill becoming law to report on the adequacy of current environmental law and policy in meeting the climate and ecological challenges the UK faces, would be tremendously helpful, not least because—as we saw yesterday—it seems the Government do one thing one day, and completely different things another day. They fail to face the challenges when they make big policy announcements. The new clause would make it much tougher for the Government to crawl out of their obligations.
We think the report should specifically be required to address issues of water, biodiversity, the capacity of natural and agroecosystems to mitigate global warming, resource efficiency, waste reduction and the promotion of the circular economy. That should be helpful to Government. As my hon. Friend said, we support the Prime Minister’s signing up to the UN leaders’ pledge for nature, and this includes the circular economy in our thinking.
We have taken a number of these ideas from the climate and ecological emergency Bill, which we believe is right to place emphasis on the importance of expanding and enhancing natural ecosystems and agroecosystems to safeguard their capacity as carbon sinks, as well as on the need to restore biodiverse habits and their soils. Out there in the world, which is sadly not following proceedings on the Bill as closely as some of us would hope, there is an appetite for this more ambitious approach.
After the Secretary of State has made the report, we would then very much hope that he or she would act on it and ensure that the environmental targets and environmental improvement plans were appropriately ambitious and would set out not just one long-term target in each area as required in clause 1, but set and outline the adequacy of those targets and lay out adequate plans to address each of those major issues within six months.
If it is an emergency, it needs addressing urgently. We do not believe the Bill does that at the moment. New clause 29 would help.
Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)
Much of the Bill is concerned with English-only environmental issues, as I have mentioned in the past, because environment is a devolved area under the Scotland Act 1998 and legislative consent motions have been agreed.
In connection to new clauses 29 and 29, I point out for those who are keen to hear what is happening in Scotland that the Scottish Government are developing their own environmental strategy. “The Environmental Strategy for Scotland: vision and outcomes” was published earlier this year. As the Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform indicated just yesterday at her appearance in front of the Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee, she will soon be publishing a monitoring framework for the strategy, which will bring together existing statutory targets, elements of the national performance framework and indicators from other strategies. That is after considerable consultation with stakeholders.
The strategy has attracted a broad range of cross-party support. The Cabinet Secretary just yesterday suggested working with Opposition Members to design amendments that will set out an obligation on Ministers to continue the work on an environmental strategy. It is an example of cross-party working that I think this place would do rather well to emulate. The Scottish Government and Parliament are leading the way in many environmental areas. I encourage Members from this place to lift their eyes from here and look to some of the great progress in this area that is being made in the devolved nations of the UK. I think it really would be worth their while.
Rebecca Pow
I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge for moving this new clause. He is always very passionate about what he says. I am pleased that my letter was able to give a bit of clarity on the subjects he raised in the Committee.
I reassure the Committee that the new clause is not needed. It will not surprise anyone to hear me say that. There are already measures in the Bill to help assess the adequacy of environmental legislation. Under clause 26, the OEP will proactively assess how our environmental laws work in practice and advise the Government on the most effective and efficient way of implementing those laws.
The OEP’s reports must be published and laid before Parliament and the Government are required to respond to the OEP and publish that response, which must also be laid before Parliament. Given that climate and ecology challenges are key environmental issues affecting us, we would expect that the OEP would want to address such matters in its clause 26 reports. That is basically its raison d’être and the raison d’être of the Bill. I do not think the hon. Gentleman is seeing what is in there, which covers what he is asking for. We also report annually on our progress in improving the environment through the 25-year environment plan.
The Bill as drafted already introduces a number of reporting requirements in the areas specified. Clause 94, for example, requires designated public authorities, including local planning authorities, to produce five-yearly biodiversity reports. The reports will provide transparency and accountability, and help local authorities to share best practice. Over time, they will become a very valuable source of data to support nature’s recovery. Clause 75 concerns improving water companies’ water resources management plans. This planning occurs every five years, taking into account the next 25-year period. Companies must review their plans annually.
The reporting requirements introduced by the Bill will complement the Government’s existing and proposed reporting and monitoring of the natural environment. There is only so much reporting people can cope with. I honestly think more reporting would cause people to groan under the weight of it all. What we want is action, and that is what this Bill is going to set in motion, which is why we need to get through it.
Last month, the Government published their response to the 2020 recommendations from the Committee on Climate Change. The response sets out the Government’s intention to publish a comprehensive net zero strategy in the lead up to COP26. The strategy will set out the Government’s vision for transitioning to net zero and reducing emissions across the economy. We have already set out our plans for a nationwide natural capital and ecosystem assessment. That is a big data-gathering census and a new large-scale surveying initiative, which will provide us with the all-important data to drive better decision making. That is something I have absolutely wished for as the Minister, as has the whole Department. It will be crucial in our future—we have talked about data before, and it is absolutely essential to know what we have now, what we will have tomorrow and what we would potentially like in the future.
I thank the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith for her comments. We obviously work closely with the devolved Administrations, and we will be sharing a lot of the measures in the Bill. We always like to learn best practice from others—I mentioned that in the main Chamber only this morning, when the hon. Member for Putney and I spoke about air quality.
Although I welcome the intent behind the proposed new clause, I do not believe it is necessary, for the reasons I have outlined. Wide-ranging reporting assessment measures are already in place in the Bill and will be able to drive the sort of action that I think the hon. Member for Cambridge is after. I honestly do not believe we need the new clause, so I ask him to withdraw it.
Daniel Zeichner
I am grateful, as ever, but disappointed by the Minister’s response. I do not think we need to divide the Committee, but I doubt whether even the Office for Environmental Protection will be established in the next months. Let us hope that it will go more quickly. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 30
Smoking related waste
“(1) The Secretary of State will by regulations introduce a producer responsibility scheme in England to tackle smoking related waste.
(2) The scheme will compel those tobacco companies operating in England, as defined in the regulations and subject to annual review, to provide financial support to the scheme based on a market share basis.
(3) The scheme will ensure that those tobacco companies will have no operational or other involvement in the scheme other than to provide financial support in accordance with guidance from the World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the Department of Health and Social Care.
(4) The regulations will set a target for a reduction in smoking related waste by 2030.
(5) The regulations will set out an appropriate vehicle to deliver the scheme including governance and criteria for funding related initiatives.
(6) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish an annual report of the scheme and must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.”—(Ruth Jones.)
The aim of this new clause is to ensure that the Government creates a producer responsibility scheme for smoking related waste. No such scheme exists at present and the clear up and waste reduction of cigarette butts are not covered by other Directives.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Ruth Jones (Newport West) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is really quite clear, and I suspect that colleagues on both sides of the Committee know what is coming, but I want to speak to it for a moment. It is designed to ensure that the Government create a producer responsibility scheme for smoking-related waste. No such scheme exists at present, and the clear-up and waste reduction of cigarette butts are not covered by other directives.
I remind colleagues that it was this Government who clarified, back in February 2020, that tobacco packaging is covered by the current producer responsibility regulations, which require companies to recycle a proportion of the packaging waste that they place on the market. In their resources and waste strategy, the Government committed to look into and consult on the extended producer responsibility, or EPR, for five new waste streams by 2025, as well as to consult on two of them by 2022. The five priority waste streams are: textiles, fishing gear, certain products in construction and demolition, bulky waste, and vehicle tyres—the Minister has already alluded to that several times during our debates. They are important areas for the challenges facing us as we look to tackle the climate emergency.
The producer responsibility powers in the Bill enable the Government to set up an EPR scheme for cigarette litter. I urge the Minister to do so, and I look forward to a positive response from her on that specific point. I am concerned that, up until now, Ministers have not identified cigarette litter as a priority area for EPR, so I would like some further clarity on the detail and the likely timescale for any progress. I am sure that the Committee does not need to be reminded—I will do so anyway—that cigarette butts are estimated to account for 5% of ocean plastic, which is a big deal. We need to act, and we need to act now.
I hope the Minister will take the opportunity to set out a clear action plan and timetable when addressing the issues raised by the new clause. There is a crossover with the other responsibilities that we have as parliamentarians and lawmakers, because it is clear that smoking has a public health impact. Having been an NHS physiotherapist for more than 30 years before being elected to this place, I know a fair bit about the lungs and the danger that smoking causes. New clause 30 will help the wider battle against smoking and help promote a healthier world for all of us. As such, and with the determination needed to tackle the climate emergency, I wish to divide the Committee.
Rebecca Pow
I thank the hon. Member for Newport West for her contribution. It is always good to hear about people’s backgrounds, and her medical knowledge is obviously very useful.
Smoking-related litter is a particularly persistent and widespread problem. In the 2017 litter strategy, we explained that the most effective way to tackle smoking-related litter is obviously by reducing the prevalence of smoking in the first place. Given the hon. Member’s background in health, I am sure she would agree with that. Smoking rates in England are currently at their lowest recorded level, and our ambition is for a smoke-free Britain by 2030. In the meantime, I have made it clear that the lack of serious investment by the industry to clear up the mess caused by its products cannot continue.
In September, I held a roundtable with the tobacco industry and other stakeholders. I got a key group together, and I was pleased that we were able to get them to come to the table. We understand that Keep Britain Tidy is working with the tobacco industry to develop a non-regulatory producer responsibility scheme, and we are watching very closely, because it could provide a rapid means of securing significant investment from the industry to tackle the litter created by its products, rather than having to take legislative action.
Ruth Jones
In a cyclical system, if we have less going in at the beginning, we have less waste coming out at the end, which is what we all want. As such, it is good to note that smoking is decreasing. That is a really important public health initiative, and it must continue. I am pleased to hear that the Minister held a roundtable with the tobacco companies and that she found it useful, but we want to put the onus on the manufacturers by introducing this producer responsibility scheme, which is why we think it is important to include it in the Bill. It is good to hear that the Minister is keen to do this in future, and that future options would be open, but why not have it in the Bill now? That is why we will divide the Committee.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Daniel Zeichner
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to address a glaring problem with the current biodiversity net gain provisions, which we discussed earlier in the proceedings. Currently, the Bill does not extend the requirement for biodiversity net gain to major infrastructure developments delivered through the nationally significant infrastructure projects regime. We fear that that exemption will result in habitat loss on a large scale due to the size of those major infrastructure developments and could potentially lead to the destruction of irreplaceable habitats, increased fragmentation of remaining habitats and the local extinction of endangered species.
We have a very controversial example at the moment in High Speed 2—a major infrastructure project that does not have biodiversity net gain and that has put at risk 108 ancient woodland sites, 33 sites of scientific interest and 693 local wildlife sites. I appreciate that HS2 was not delivered through the NSIP regime, but it is comparable with future major infrastructure projects that would be delivered in that way. It is disappointing that HS2 has not gone with the trend of recent times and moved away and gone beyond no net loss, despite frequent calls for it to do so. Will the Minister comment on why no net gain is necessary in her view?
In their response to the net gain consultation, in which the Government outlined their intention that nationally significant infrastructure would not be subject to the requirement, despite the fact that there was considerable support from many respondents, the Government said that they will
“continue to work on exploring potential net gain approaches for these types of developments”.
What alternative net gain approaches have been considered for NSIPs? I understand that the Government have commissioned a study into the costs and benefits of bringing the large infrastructure projects into the scope of mandatory biodiversity net gain. What are the findings from that study, and is the Minister able to share them with the Committee?
I have one final plea for the Minister to find redemption in this whole process. As I have said many times—she has quoted it many times—we started with the 25-year environment plan, but we now find ourselves with the “Planning for the future” planning White Paper. Will she write to me on this issue—another item in our endless list of correspondence—and explain how the planning White Paper proposals will impact on net gain? This is one last chance for redemption. I live in hope.
Rebecca Pow
I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge for his tempting words and for the new clause, which would extend the biodiversity net gain objective and the biodiversity gain plan requirement to include nationally significant infrastructure projects.
I recognise the good intentions behind wanting to apply the mandatory biodiversity net gain objective to such projects. The Government are clear in the 25-year environment plan that our commitment to seeking to embed a principle of environmental net gain for development applies to infrastructure as well as housing. In line with that commitment, we are exploring how a biodiversity net gain approach for major infrastructure projects could best be delivered and how policy or legislation could be used to support that.
There are a number of ways in which a form of the biodiversity net gain requirement could be implemented for nationally significant infrastructure projects, but it is very important, as I am sure the hon. Member will appreciate, to take the time to work with stakeholders to develop an appropriate approach. Many stakeholders are really keen to discuss the matter.
Introducing a new legal requirement for such projects now could lead to significant delay and increased costs for projects in the pipeline, hampering our ability to build back better in future generations. I am sure the hon. Member appreciates the need to get lots of the projects going, not least because of the link with jobs and levelling up across the nation. Risks of delays and costs to major infrastructure for a premature and inappropriate mandatory requirement could result in delays to the delivery of environmentally beneficial projects, such as those living renewable energy generation and waste facilities.
The hon. Member is trying to draw me on the planning White Paper. All I will say is that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is working very closely with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. We are at absolute pains to work with that Department, but also to ensure that the environmental protections remain there. It is going to be a green future, as the Prime Minister himself has said many times—in fact, I heard him say it again yesterday—so I can give assurances on that.
Nationally significant infrastructure projects are often distinct from other types of development in terms of scale and complexity. They have to be planned for over a number of years, as the hon. Gentleman knows, and many are in that design pipeline. We need to be very careful about doing what he is asking for now.
It is therefore important that any strengthening of biodiversity net gain requirements for the nationally significant infrastructure projects regime is done at the right time and in the right way, particularly if any mandatory net gain requirement is introduced. We do not want to be limited to the proposed approach to Town and Country Planning Act 1990 development when considering how to introduce any objective to other classes of development. As I have said, there are a number of ways in which biodiversity net gain for those big projects could be implemented through legislation or policy in future, for example through the national policy statement, sponsor-driven objectives or changes to planning legislation.
As I have said, the Government have set out a clear ambition to deliver infrastructure, but greener and faster. I support the intention behind the proposed new clause, but to ensure that we consider the best way to introduce any requirement for biodiversity net gain for major infrastructure, we need to consult on further details, which we will in due course. It is really important that we take that time to get this right. I would like to think that the hon. Gentleman will agree on that and will withdraw his new clause. I hope that we can continue to engage constructively on this issue when we do formally consult.
Daniel Zeichner
I admire the Minister’s relentless optimism, which she has managed to maintain throughout the Committee’s proceedings, and I congratulate her on that. I almost misheard her at one point: when she said that DEFRA had been “at absolute pains” with MHCLG, I thought she said that they “are absolute pains”. There may be some truth in that.
I am not surprised to hear that, yet again, the Minister is unable to support our new clause, but we will not divide the Committee. I will just say finally that the Minister’s jacket is enough to brighten any dull winter day, and I thank her for her optimism. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
Mr Gray, we consider that the aims of new clause 33 have already been aired in new clause 29—we know the result of that—so we do not wish to move it.
New Clause 34
Reducing Water Demand
“(1) The Secretary of State shall within 12 months of the commencement of this Act amend the Building Regulations 2010 Part G to—
(a) require all fittings to meet specified water efficiency requirements; and
(b) introduce mandatory minimum standards on water efficiency.
(2) Standards as introduced under subsection (1)(b) shall be reviewed every 5 years to assess their contribution to meeting government objectives for reducing water demand.”—(Ruth Jones.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Ruth Jones
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 34 was tabled in my name and in those of my hon. Friends the Members for Southampton, Test, for Cambridge, for Putney, and for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough. We are seeking to ensure that we build on the Minister’s words and give real effect to the long-term sustainable change that the climate emergency demands.
The new clause is clear in tone and intent. Although we are an island, safe and secure water supplies have eluded us in the past, and with a rising population and increased demand, the existing infrastructure, on which we have relied for many years, needs to be supported. It needs the pressure taken off, which is what the new clause would do.
In preparing to speak to new clause 34, I read Ofwat’s recent report exploring the decisions that can be taken, the options available, and the action required to reduce demand for water in coming years. The report notes that
“on average we currently use about 140 litres of water per person per day in England and Wales, up from 85 litres per person in the 1960s.”
The report’s findings also reveal that
“tackling household leaks and using innovative technologies could help to decrease water use by two thirds—or over one bath per person per day—over the next 50 years.”
The new clause therefore goes some way to giving parliamentary and legal effect to addressing many concerns related to tackling water waste up and down England.
The preservation of our environment is ultimately in our hands and those of the people we represent: working people in all parts of the United Kingdom. We need to ensure that the law in shaped in such a way that we motivate and encourage people to change their behaviour and to adapt to the changing and evolving demands of the climate emergency. The Bill will go some way towards ensuring that we reach out and give the people of England the necessary direction, whether that is through the introduction of mandatory minimum standards subject to a five-yearly review or a set of fittings requirements. If we do not act now—there is no reason for us not to seize this initiative—we cannot expect people in the country to act.
This is a once-in-a-generation Bill, as the Minister said on Second Reading and previously in Committee. Let us ensure that those words mean something. Let us deliver a Bill that is fit for purpose, and that will stand the test of time and the scrutiny of future generations. With the future of our planet in mind, I move the new clause.
Rebecca Pow
I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. I have met a range of bodies to talk about water efficiency, including the Bathroom Manufacturers Association, and there is no end of things to learn about loos, flushes and showers—it is genuinely very interesting. I now read the riot act to my kids when they have showers that are far too long.
I understand the hon. Member’s intention of improving water efficiency in our homes. We agree that more needs to be done to improve the management of our water resources, but I can reassure her that, with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, we are already investigating how the building regulations could best promote water efficiency through the introduction of mandatory water efficiency labelling for water-using products. We consulted on those measures in 2019, and we will be able to use clause 49 of and schedule 6 to the Bill, and existing powers under the Building Act 1984, to make the changes required. We expect to publish a Government response to the consultation in spring 2021, which is fast approaching, and that will set out our policy on water efficiency and, specifically, whether changes to the building regulations are required.
The new clause would introduce mandatory minimum standards for water efficiency in the building regulations. However, I hope that the hon. Member notes that the regulations already set minimum water efficiency standards for new homes. She is right about the amounts: we use 145 litres a day. We actually aim to get that down to 110 litres a day. Improving labelling and consumer information about the amount of water that gadgets use will be part and parcel of the new water efficiency world.
Let me add that under section 81 of the Water Act 2003, there is already a duty on the Secretary of State to report every three years on the steps that he has taken to encourage water conservation. That report must be laid before Parliament. The last report was published in December 2018, so I suggest that there is no need for a similar review requirement.
I hope that I have covered all the points that will reassure the hon. Member that she does not need to press the new clause, and that she might kindly withdraw it.
Ruth Jones
It is good to hear about the Minister’s new knowledge of bathroom fittings; I must admit that we have all learned a lot about them. I remember, even as a student, putting a brick in our cistern to save water, which was a great thing—and obviously a good use of household bricks. I think we all agree that more absolutely needs to be done, and while I take her point about new homes being covered by regulations, we need to deal with existing homes. Let us be honest: there are far more existing homes that need encouragement and help to do the right thing. We also need to ensure that people are aware of their water usage, because if they do not know how much water they are using, they cannot do anything to conserve it. It would be good to marry up the various sound water conservation measures in other legislation by incorporating them all in the new clause. It is a shame that she has not accepted—
Rebecca Pow
I just want to make a quick correction. I mentioned a figure of 110 litres. Does the hon. Member agree that, while the efficiency requirement for a new build will be 125 litres per person per day, it could be the 110 litre figure that I mentioned if that is imposed by a local authority when granting planning permission? Does she welcome that?
Ruth Jones
I do welcome it, but I am a bit lukewarm. I would sooner it was down to the original rate in the 1960s of 85 litres per person, which would be far more helpful in moving forward on the climate change emergency. I am disappointed that the Minister has not taken the new clause on board, but I will not seek to divide the Committee on it, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 35
Clean Air Duty
‘(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish an annual policy statement setting out how the Government is working to improve air quality, and must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(2) The annual policy statement in subsection (1) must include—
(a) how public authorities are improving air quality, including indoor air quality; and
(b) how Government departments are working together to improve air quality, including indoor air quality.
(3) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than three months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’—(Fleur Anderson.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on air quality which includes indoor air quality and the work of public authorities and Government departments working together to improve it.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Fleur Anderson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is the final new clause. It is only right and proper that, as we come towards the end of the Committee’s scrutiny of the Bill, after considering more than 230 amendments and 35 new clauses, we end with something that we can all agree on.
This new clause is all about working together. It has been tabled by the all-party parliamentary group on air pollution. It asks Government Departments to work together and for reports on how the Government are working with local authorities to achieve something very ambitious—tackling our air quality. It has cross-party support from hon. Members including the chair of the APPG, my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies), and 23 other MPs.
The new clause is intended to help the Minister to get to that holy grail of action—cross-departmental working—and to achieve cross-government support for action to tackle air pollution, specifically indoor air pollution. Given that the public health crisis results in 40,000 deaths a year and costs £20 billion, urgent action is needed by the Department for Transport and many others across Government. The new clause would help with that.
The new clause is an important addition to the parts of the Bill on air quality, in particular schedule 11. The Minister may say that that is sufficient, but I would argue that it is not. Schedule 11 amends the Environment Act 1995 and gives the Secretary of State the duty to report on the
“assessment of the progress made in meeting air quality objectives, and air quality standards, in relation to England, and…the steps the Secretary of State has taken in that year in support of the meeting of those objectives and standards.”
Those reports and that action are very welcome, but the new clause takes them further. It would be in the Bill itself, rather than an amendment to another Act, and has additional reporting requirements that would do more to ensure that there was more focus on achieving our air quality targets and more joined-up working in Government.
Hon. Members will have read an email sent to us all in which Professor Sir Stephen Holgate, the Royal College of Physicians’ adviser on air quality and the UK Research and Innovation clean air champion, supports the new clause. I know that it is important to the Minister to be science-led. He said:
“I strongly support the need for placing greater transparent responsibility on public bodies, both central and local, to say what steps they are taking to improve air quality, both outside and inside buildings including houses, workplaces and schools. Since most people spend over 80% of their time indoors, the indoor air is a particular concern especially since all the emphasis is on conserving energy by “sealing” buildings with little regard to ensuring that ventilation is adequate. …unless attention is focused on the ever-increasing chemical contaminants that will accumulate, without adequate ventilation, the public will suffer adverse health effects. This is especially so in periods of “lock-down” during the coronavirus pandemic and the attention needed to be given to this is in the building of new homes. Special attention must be given to vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, children, older people and those with chronic disease.”
Many other scientists back up those findings.
We all know that air pollution is a public health crisis, as acknowledged by the joint report of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, the Environmental Audit Committee, the Health and Social Care Committee and the Transport Committee last year. There was joint working there, which we can encourage with the joint working on the reports that the new clause would make a legislative commitment.
A report by King’s College Hospital last year showed that cutting air pollution by a fifth would reduce the number of lung cancer cases by 7.6% in London, 6.4% in Birmingham, 5.9% in Bristol, 5.3% in Liverpool, 5.6% in Manchester, 6.7% in Nottingham, 6% in Oxford and 5.9% in Southampton. I read those figures out to show the local impact that air pollution is having on a considerable number of people’s lives; we know that it needs local action. The new clause would ensure that we find out what that local action is and whether it is good enough.
Living near a busy road can trigger bronchitic symptoms among children with asthma. If pollution were to be reduced by one fifth, there would be 3,865 fewer cases of children with bronchitic symptoms every year in London. In my own constituency, I would see the difference that that would make. The Government have made considerable funding available to local authorities, so local authorities should report back on what the funding has achieved.
We now know that there is a more urgent reason for the new clause, which would strengthen the Bill. There is a direct link between coronavirus deaths and air pollution. Harvard says there is an 8% risk, whereas the Max Planck Institute says it is 14%, for each additional microgram per cubic metre of PM2.5, the smaller particulates. There is a direct link between air quality and coronavirus deaths, and the new clause would make taking urgent action compulsory. It is no surprise that there is a link, because air pollution weakens lungs, hearts and brains, which covid also affects. We need a joined-up approach, with cleaner transport and ventilated schools. It is about education, health, better building regulations from MHCLG, better planning and knowing the effects of more home working with digital infrastructure.
The new clause would encourage a fiscal strategy that helps to drive a holistic vision of a cleaner, healthier and more productive future for all. Put simply, we need to have a joined-up approach to have the best effect, and the new clause would help to ensure that is done by asking for joined-up reporting. No matter what is already in the Bill, it just does not go far enough. The new clause is needed.
The new clause does not have specific targets and action plans that can be rejected by the Conservative party. In fact, they are for the Office for Environmental Protection, which was mentioned in many earlier debates, to decide. However, this would be a wonderful model for the UK to showcase at COP26 next year, and for other Governments to adopt. There is no doubt that there might be a silo mentality in DEFRA that says, “We can’t ask other Departments to do things,” but air pollution is an NHS public health issue of massive proportions, and it cannot be left to DEFRA or to the Secretary of State for one Department.
No one Department has the tools to combat air pollution. The Minister will say that she will work with the Department for Transport, the Department of Health and Social Care and many other Departments, but the new clause would ensure that others could learn from best practice—we would be able to see when things were not going well and put them right as quickly as possible. We need such a collective, joined-up approach. The Minister should raise her ambition to embrace other Departments that, in their hearts, want to work together for the common good.
As we have seen again and again with previous debates, the Government have a big majority and can vote against the new clause, but this is the opportunity—this last new clause—for us to come together and agree. The biggest test for the Government is not how many votes there are, but whether they are big enough to accept in good grace an idea from an all-party parliamentary group that they know is in the best interest and is supported in principle by all parties, and to take it forward for the common good. I think we would have cheers from people outside this place, who would hear that we are working together to tackle a concern that is so important to so many people.
This is an important opportunity to work together across government and public bodies to improve public health by improving air quality outside and inside, which would save lives. All our constituents would want us to do all that we can to protect them and their children, and the new clause would help us deliver on our duty to do so. I ask the Minister and members of the Committee to put their constituents and country first by supporting the new clause.
Rebecca Pow
After 230 amendments, why break the habit of a lifetime? Honestly, the hon. Lady will know that I have great sentiment about much of what she is saying. I also support the work of the APPG, who I have done a lot of close working with and spoken to many times. They have done some really useful work.
We recognise the importance of national leadership on this cross-cutting issue of air quality, including indoor air. It is right to draw attention to the issue. I want to give reassurances that we do not work in a silo. We work very closely with other Departments. We have a ground-breaking clean air strategy that goes across government. Air cannot be dealt with in one place and one silo, it travels everywhere, even to Gloucester. Only yesterday I had a joint meeting with the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean) on an air quality issue. Only last week I had a Zoom call with the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill). I hope that demonstrates how closely we are working on these issues.
On indoor air quality specifically, we are working across government. I have regular meetings with, in particular, the chief scientific adviser on this, and we work closely with the chief medical officer. We also work with the Department of Health and Social Care and Public Health England on indoor air quality in particular. They are all part of this big landscape, which she has pointed out. Building on the evidence base is a key step to ensure that interventions are appropriately targeted and introduced in the right way and in the right place. I hope that that gives some assurances on cross-government working.
I want to reassure the hon. Member for Putney that we have a range of reporting requirements relating to air quality, and we are introducing additional requirements through the Bill. We are introducing a requirement for the Secretary of State to make an annual statement to Parliament on progress toward securing local pollution objectives through paragraph 3 of schedule 11 to the Bill. Perhaps she has not noticed that. It will include steps taken in that year to support local authorities to meet objectives. In addition, the Secretary of State will be required to publish a national air quality strategy and review it every five years. That is under paragraph 2 of schedule 11 to the Bill, in case she wants to have a look at it.
Alongside this, through a statutory cycle of monitoring and reporting, which I have talked about constantly, the Bill ensures that the Government will take steps to achieve the targets set under the Bill. This includes the air quality targets. We have a legal duty to set an air quality target, and we are going to set another one in addition. We are going over and above for air quality. We can be held to account by the OEP if Parliament fails to monitor and report the progress toward the targets.
We also already have several annual reporting obligations on ambient air quality. The UK’s national atmospheric emissions inventory is compiled annually to report total emissions by pollutant. That is a very detailed inventory and has won an award, I think, for its detail. All of that information is already there. I think, perhaps, the Opposition are not aware of that. Do take a look. There is an annual requirement to report total emissions by pollutant and source sector in a similar way. We also remain signatory to the UN convention on long-range trans- boundary air pollution, because this is, of course, also a global issue, and we will continue to abide by that international agreement in full, including its reporting requirements.
The global work is really important. Back when we did the early assessment from the air quality expert group of what was happening during lockdown, we found that some of the pollutants did not reduce as we thought they might have done in the south of England. That was because we got some unexpected wind from Europe, and it brought all kinds of pollutants that were not even ours! It is very important that we remain part of that agreement.
Compliance with air pollution concentration limits and targets is reported in our annual air pollution in the UK report, which summarises measurements from the national air quality monitoring networks. I reassure the hon. Lady that we already work very closely with other Government Departments, and that we have robust mechanisms in place to report on progress. I hope that has provided more detail and clarity as to what is going on in air quality, and hope that the hon. Member might keep up with the trend—or maybe break it—and withdraw her new clause.
Fleur Anderson
I thank the Minister for the information about all the action being taken, and for the heartfelt—and I agree, sincere—desire to take action on this, and going over and above on air quality. We all welcome that. However, I have also read schedule 11 very thoroughly, as have the members of the all-party parliamentary group on air pollution. They have taken advice from scientific experts and feel that there is something missing in the reporting that would actually make a difference and ensure that we take the action we want to see on our air, and put that into practice. The missing parts are how public authorities are improving our air and how Government Departments are working together. I welcome the fact that the Minister is meeting with other Departments. She should welcome the opportunity to demonstrate what those meetings are resulting in with the annual report, and to demonstrate the appropriate targeting, achievements and progress we have discussed. As has been customary, we will be dividing on this, but we also want to work together to see a dramatic improvement in our air quality.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
May I congratulate the Committee on the briskness of our discussions this morning. The people of North Wiltshire—and of all our constituencies—are grateful to us for it. I must now report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Rebecca Pow
On a point of order, Mr Gray, I wanted to do a quick round-up. The hon. Member for Putney mentioned that this Committee has gone on for 261 days. We started back in March, then the Committee was adjourned and all the rest, but the whole process of this Bill has been even longer than that. We have done two Second Readings, so it has been a long time in the process and even longer than that behind the scenes.
I give my heartfelt thanks to absolutely everyone, starting with the Chair. Thank you, Mr Gray, for keeping us in great order and managing to have a grandchild during the process. Thank you to the Clerks, particularly the new Clerk, who really got the hang of the role very fast. I must thank the entire Committee, because it is a long old haul, and we are all obviously handpicked. I must also thank all the shadow Ministers for the spirit in which we have conducted this—the hon. Members for Southampton, Test, for Cambridge South and for Newport West—as well as the hon. Member for Putney and indeed, the Whip. We all have the shared desire to improve the environment, and I do not think that is ever going to change. We will all be driving the endeavour forward, and it must be said that it is good to have a bit of probing.
I want to thank the members of my private office, who have been phenomenal at keeping me up to speed, which is not always easy. I thank the Bill team: Amira, who is sitting in the room, as well as Brendan and Lucy, and four others in the main team. I thank them all, because they do a phenomenal job. Hon. Members do not see it, but I do. We have about 100 policy officials behind them, so it is a massive effort. I thank them all from the bottom of my heart, because their work has been phenomenal. Some of it is pretty detailed and tricky, and I ask a lot of questions about legislative things, because I do not have a legal background. I thank them for all their work. This is not over yet; onwards and upwards to Report.
Dr Whitehead
Further to that point of order, Mr Gray. At the risk of straining the point of order, I would like to add my thanks at the conclusion of our Bill Committee proceedings. They have been immensely long, as my hon. Friend the Member for Putney has enumerated, with 230 amendments and 35 new clauses. I thank you, Mr Gray, for your purposeful, elegant and impartial chairing of our proceedings, and I hope you will pass on our thanks to Sir George for his part in proceedings. I thank the Minister for her immense optimism and terrific jackets, and for the courteous and good-hearted way she has conducted proceedings throughout. I appreciate that undertaking a Bill of this length is a tremendous burden, and I appreciate her fortitude and perseverance in carrying through that job.
I want to single out the Committee Clerks for thanks. They have been a wonderful source of assistance, help and wise guidance, and they have enabled us to do our part as well as we have been able to. Finally, I thank other Opposition Members. I think it will be agreed that they are not a team of journeymen and women; they are a team of Galácticos in their own right, and I thank them for their contributions to scrutinising this Bill so well.
We are, naturally, very disappointed that we have not been able to strengthen the Bill as we had hoped to do, but we will continue with that task on Report and in the other place. We hope that our doing so will help to make it a Bill that we can all be proud of, when it comes to strengthening our country’s natural environment resources and providing the protections that must flow from that; we all agree that we want the Bill to do those things. I welcome the end of this Committee, for obvious reasons, but we can all be proud of our contribution to getting the Bill to this point, and I thank everybody on the Committee for their part in proceedings.
Deidre Brock
Further to that point of order, Mr Gray. On behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and myself, and with a slightly nervous eye on the clock, I thank all Members of the Committee for their good-humoured and thorough approach to the Bill. I have certainly appreciated that. I thank you, Mr Gray, and Sir George for your chairship. I thank the Clerks for their assistance, which has been much appreciated, and I thank the various representatives from Hansard who have sat through lengthy hours of this Committee. Although much of what we have debated has not covered Scotland, it has been instructive to hear from Members from all parts of the Committee about the approaches that are being taken. I wish England very well in all its efforts to create a much healthier and more vibrant, biodiverse and attractive environment for all its citizens.
The Chair
Those are all entirely bogus points of order, but we are grateful for them none the less.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
National Security and Investment Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 View all National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
We now come to our third panel. We will hear oral evidence from Mr James Palmer, senior partner from Herbert Smith Freehills. This will last until 2.30 pm. Mr Palmer, welcome; thank you for joining us. Would you be so kind as to introduce yourself for the record?
James Palmer: Thank you very much, Chair. I am James Palmer, a corporate mergers and acquisitions, and investments, partner at Herbert Smith Freehills. I have been doing that work for 34 years. I have worked with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on business regulation for over 25 years. I also chair our global board; we are an international firm.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
James Palmer: I was advising the takeover panel and the regulator, not one of the parties, so our thoughts were more about their role in ensuring appropriate regulation of that takeover—not from a foreign investment perspective, obviously, but there was a foreign investment angle to it. I am not a technical expert. My read of that—nothing to do with the work I did, but obviously I followed it and all the other transactions that have been looked at—is that it was more about economic security and positioning than necessarily about national security per se, but I am not the expert on it.
I think the point that you are drawing out—I heard your question earlier today—is a really fundamental one, which is that there is a spectrum of things that can be regarded as matters of national security. Indeed, the Bill papers draw this out. On the one hand, you have things that are clearly national security, like the risk of infiltration of systems that the country’s security depends on or that the country’s systems depend on—critical infrastructure being an example—but I do think that there are aspects of the Bill that are touching on things that stray more into economic influence and stability.
Again, I am not the expert on this, but I think we all know that in the debate about what is a matter of national security, there is a question of economic dependence, supply chain dependence and so on. That is one of the most difficult areas for this legislation, because where you have a straight, obvious national security real risk of some cyber-infiltration or whatever, nobody is going to argue about that. The grey into issues of supply chain dependency and more economic security starts to raise some of the more difficult areas, which I am sure we can come to.
I do not think that there is a simple binary distinction, and I am not here to give you the answer as to what the right approach is for dependency on China for supply chains. All I would say, having worked out in Asia many years ago, is that the interconnectedness of the world is not going to reduce and we are going to need to find ways of navigating that.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Also, we have heard a number of times today that under the Bill—this will be reflected in your experience—we are going from 12 call-ins to a much bigger number: 90 or 100. And the impact assessment estimates that, I think, 1,870 notifications might come in under the new regime. Could you consider how best to reflect that or to put in place the skills and the resources for the Bill, and say a little about what impact you think it might have on the attractiveness of investing in UK companies and, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises?
James Palmer: I have focused on the same numbers as you. I hope the Minister will excuse my saying so, because I think the team have genuinely done a superb job of looking at a lot of granularity on a swathe of issues, but there is one data point I did not agree with: the suggestion that there will be an 18% increase in the reviews; it was framed quite narrowly. In my maths, 12 reviews in nearly 20 years going to nearly 2,000 a year is well over a 10,000% increase. I think that that is a very important context in which to look at this—as the world outside looks at this, it is potentially looked at as pretty seismic change by the UK. Again, there is lots that we can go on to as to the ways in which the detailed thinking around this has tried to mitigate that, and I know the Department has worked very, very hard in trying to mitigate it, but I think that we just need to be realistic.
In terms of the skills, there is a fundamental question, which the Bill papers have started to try to set out, which is this: how do we focus the debate so that it is not all-encompassing? Again, the Minister is aware of my views on this. I am extremely pleased—I know that some may not share this view—that the Bill does not catch a broader public interest test. The reason for that is what happens every time we introduce a power for the Government, for very sensible reasons—these things are always about competing tensions with sensible reasons —to seek to interfere, review something and decide who should own it, or whether they want to impose conditions on that.
Let me give you an analogy. Let us say that I invite someone to come and invest in this country to build a house. At the moment, if I invite them to come to this country to build a house—or a business or a small technology business—they know they can build that house, live in it and sell it to whoever they want. If I invite them in and say, “Come and live in this country and build your house, but I reserve the right to decide who you sell it to and what conditions I impose on who you sell it to,” that is a very different prism—a new prism.
The Bill team have done a really good job of trying to narrow that so that everybody does not think, “Help! If I come to the UK, there is a Government discretion,” but there is an innate tension between, on one hand, the desire to have a broad power to interfere in circumstances that we have not all thought about to protect something as important as national security and, on the other hand, a desire to give investors certainty. My unhelpful view is that there is not a simple route through that, and I do worry about, in particular, small technology businesses.
Again, the team have done a good job of trying to narrow the sectors. This is a very different proposition, in terms of granularity, from what we saw in 2017 and 2018. But I think a lot of further work may be needed. The Government have been clear that they want to receive further feedback on how to narrow the remit. One example is the breadth of the communications sector, which has no de minimis. Artificial intelligence is not a thing done by four clever businesses anymore; it is a thing done by thousands of businesses. I think an awful lot of businesses are going to get caught that are not actually what the ministerial team are worried about.
The second bit is that, even outside the mandatory regime, other transactions may be judged with hindsight to be a matter of national security. Under the regime, a Minister—maybe not the current Minister, but whoever it is in the future—may decide that it is a matter of national security. As you have already highlighted, there is a spectrum of where economics becomes national security. People are going to worry about the predictability of investing in this country.
I am thinking particularly about smaller businesses. Obviously, there will be huge attractions to investing in the UK for technology. We have skills and expertise that can only be exploited here. The UK has had a very distinctive position as one of the few countries in the world where businesses without a particular nexus to a country have chosen to go as a destination of choice. Those businesses are the ones I am most worried about.
There is also the cost and risk for small businesses. If I was a European venture capitalist, how comfortable would I be in investing in a technology business in the UK that I will be able to sell it to an American or Danish buyer—not the Chinese—in five years’ time, or at least to do so simply? In terms of the call-in power, why would boards take a 1% risk that in five years’ time somebody will judge your transaction as being one that should have been notified? Why would I take even a 1% risk of my transaction being unravelled? I think that the Department has worked very hard—this is not just ritual politeness; I really think it has—to try to narrow it, but I do not think it has done so enough, because I think that there will be a lot more than 1,800 notifications.
Chi Onwurah
Q
James Palmer: My partner, Veronica Roberts, appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday, and she and I will be submitting a list to this Committee. I am afraid we do not have time to go through it today, but I will draw out a couple. Some of the mandatory filing sectors are very broad, such as communications. Again, the Government have said that they welcome narrowing those. There are not de minimises in a number of those sectors. It is true that there are other jurisdictions that do not have de minimises, but they are not jurisdictions with as large a proportion of their GDP linked to trade, and they are not jurisdictions that are as much seen as international business headquarters as well as centres of international business; there is a difference.
There is a de minimis for transport, for example, and it is very focused on ports over a certain threshold and on airports over certain levels of traffic. That is excellent, because those are the kinds of business that it makes sense that you would want to catch. The same layering has not been applied elsewhere. In particular, I worry about catching the sale or the licensing of intellectual property in relation to any of the technology areas. I think that that will catch an awful lot of things that people have not thought about yet, and I think that it will create a big burden for those small businesses.
I can conceive that in one or two very narrow areas—in some of the material science and so on, I am told—there may be low-value things that need to be caught. I am personally very sceptical that low-value things need to be caught in many other areas, because how can they be that important to the economy if they have a value that is below £1 million?
One of our concerns is that, although we know that the Government are very committed to a free trade agenda here and trying to make this work, I have worked with new regulators as they have developed for a very long time, and—forgive my saying so—I have never seen a regulator whose remit was only at the level that was predicted when it was set up. All remits expand exponentially, and that is one of the fears we have.
I would certainly advocate ensuring that the factors that the Secretary of State has to have regard to include, for example, impact on trade. The cost-benefit analysis sets out a sensible attempt—again, it is a much more developed piece of work than the, frankly, not-that-great cost-benefit analysis done in 2017-18; this one is a good and credible attempt—to work out what the actual cash costs are. But it does not address, as the Regulatory Policy Committee drew out, the real economic costs. It may all be okay, but the risks there are not hundreds of millions, but absolutely billions, and the UK’s competitive positioning there.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Q
James Palmer: I will just explain why. I remember working when the public interest regime still applied. The move away from the public interest regime started in the 1980s. Pre the 1980s, this country was not an international investment destination; it really was not. We have earned that position. Whatever one’s politics—I am not party political—this is something that the UK has earned. We have done that by moving to being pretty open-minded in foreign investment. We have actually not worried that much about national security considerations being controlled through ownership, because again this debate has been—sorry, let me first come back to the Minister’s point.
I am very nervous that if you open it up to public interest, you vest that authority in a politician; forgive me, but that is what leads to lobbying, to short-termism, and to completely inconsistent decision taking. I am afraid that whatever Ministers at the time may say about these decisions, there is no external credibility on the predictability of those. It does not matter whether Ministers think they are doing it in good faith or on security grounds. It does not come over that way.
On broadening it to public interest, I completely agree. I am very grateful—because I know that there was a debate about this—that it has been rightly focused just on national security, albeit with a broad ability to intervene to protect the national interest.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
James Palmer: My own view is that I actually hope so, because I think that there is a debate here. We all identify a business that has been established in the UK, and we regard it with pride as a national asset. I completely understand that. I am not just interested in global M and A; I am interested in investment in the UK. My goal is not just M and A. It is the investment, which we will not get without M and A at the end, because investors want to know that they have the ability to realise.
My own judgment—I am not an economist, but most of the economic evidence that I have seen supports this—is that you do better by allowing people to come in, allowing them to sell, not necessarily completely untrammelled, but on a broadly liberal perspective, giving them the certainty and confidence to do that.
I think what we are debating here is about those things that are generated solely in the UK—for example, research, work and ideas that are funded by the UK Government. I can see why the UK Government might want to keep control over those things and link their funding to a level of control. If someone takes funding on that basis, I can see that. I do not know enough about the history of Arm, but it was acquired by a Japanese parent, not by a so-called hostile actor. If we are not going to allow Japanese businesses to buy into our technology businesses, I think we look like a less interesting technology investment and growth destination. We might hold on to a business for another five years, but what businesses are we losing for our children and grandchildren in 10, 20 and 30 years’ time? That is how I look at the question.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
James Palmer: Partly. I was involved in that as well—not entirely, actually. By the way, I think there is a misunderstanding about hostile versus agreed deals. Agreed deals, politically, are regarded as generally okay, and hostile deals as not. But it is about price normally. In occasional cases, there may be other factors, but I think that should not be the determinant of whether a deal is favoured or not.
On AstraZeneca-Pfizer, the challenge there is that AstraZeneca is not just a UK company; it is a global company. Most of its business is not in the UK; it is all around the world. It was built up by making acquisitions all around the world. If we say that it cannot be acquired by an American pharmaceuticals company, what message does that give to businesses that want to come and headquarter in the UK to then go and buy elsewhere? The UK has been a net acquirer globally, and I think that our openness is what has allowed us to do that.
I completely understand the concerns about jobs, and I completely understand the concerns about science and the preservation of skills, and I do not dismiss those, but I worry that by trying to hold on to what we have today, we lose the appeal in the long term, a bit at a time, to people coming in the future. It seems to me that if we are going to have research in the UK, which I think we will, it should flow from our research skills, not from holding on to things that want to leave.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
James Palmer: There is an interesting issue about compliance with law. You need to be careful, because clearly, the draft legislation envisages—as, by the way, I think, the current very broad discretion, which catches an awful lot of transactions, gives discretion to do—allowing quite a bit of leeway to exercise judgment as to what is a national security issue. If you have an investor that is clearly law-abiding and not about to try to put toxic software into your systems or whatever it might be, you are going to worry a lot less about them, so I do not want to limit the discretion.
Do I think that you need to draw out compliance with law in particular? I am nervous about doing so, because it could become a hobby horse for a company that has breached some law somewhere or other. If a big global company has 50,000 employees, people make mistakes; someone somewhere will do something that will transgress. So I worry about it missing the substance. I think there is a discretion to look more substantively, rather than being too much tied to whether they are law-abiding or not. Again, there is clearly a China focus here—I am neutral on that issue; that is for you—but you are not going to know whether a Chinese company is law-abiding outside China or in China, in particular if it has not invested outside China before.
The only other thing I would say on comparator regimes is that the whole debate on this has been framed, as it was in the 2017 paper, around the main rationale, which was, “Other countries are doing this, so we need to look at it.” A much better rationale, which has also been articulated by the Government, is, “We’re coming out of the EU. We’ve got EU-based legislation at the moment. It’s actually the right time to take stock, rather than necessarily that the old regime was hugely defective.” I do not think it was as defective as everybody is saying.
We keep talking about France, the US and Australia. My firm is the largest law firm, or one of the largest law firms, in Australia, and we are in all the markets—France, Germany, Italy and Spain—that keep being cited. Those countries are our very friendly trading partners, but none of them has the reputation for being as open and free trade-oriented as this country. I think we need to be careful about setting comparisons with the most controlling of our friends, not the least controlling, because there are a whole load of countries that have not been named in any of the discussions that are not doing any of this.
Take Ireland and technology. Maybe, under pressure from the EU, they will introduce something, but the Irish have been trying to grow technology; so have the Danes and the Swedes, and the Dutch as well. The Dutch will come out with some proposals in this area, but my expectation is that they will be much more limited. The Dutch are very internationally competitive. For new industries—for green tech, which we really want to be in—the Nordic countries are significant competitors, and I do not think they are going to have all this. I think that, for investors, that is a factor we just need to bear in mind as we try to find the right balance.
The Chair
We have less than five minutes left, so I suspect that this will be the last question. Mark Garnier.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
James Palmer: I have not done any analysis, and I have not read the economics—that is beyond my pay grade—but I have worked on hostile takeovers for a very long time, and I have been involved in loads of auctions of businesses, with debates about who the buyers are and so on. It is blindingly obvious, isn’t it, that if you have fewer buyers, it has a price impact? I think the question is, what is the appropriate, proportionate acceptance of that? I do not think we should kid ourselves; if we want to dial up focus on national security, there will be a level of impact. I think what the Government are trying to do—they have sent very strong signals that this is their goal, which I am supportive of—is to ensure that, yes, we do it, and, yes, there may be a little bit of consequence, but that we try to keep it in proportion.
I think the risk we have here is not with the 10 or so active interventions that the Minister and Lord Grimstone have talked about in briefings on this, which is a very positive signal and a big reduction from the 50 or so that were consulted on before—that gave us, frankly, very high levels of concern. The concerns are, first, will that be held without a really rigorous review mechanism that ensures there is accountability over that review? I would raise four-year, eight-year, 12-year, continual reviews, where you actually look at economic impact and there are evidence-based requirements. I would also bring in proportionality on those to the judgments, because if you ask a group of very intelligent civil servants to think about risk and say that their job is to protect national security, you can find national security risks in almost anything.
I think there will be market distortion impact. John Fingleton, the former chief executive of the Office of Fair Trading, has commented broadly on this. The Economist wrote in an August article about the negative economic impact on US GDP being significant from its equivalent step up of the CFIUS rules. I think it is about trying to thread the needle in a way that keeps that very narrow and limited.
Mark Garnier
Q
James Palmer: I heard the question that you raised this morning on that. I am not troubled by that. I think debt is a bit of a myth. The material influence test that the Government have picked is lower than a number of other EU countries have gone for but is at least consistent—it is levered off the test we already use, which I think is helpful—so I am personally a bit less worried about that than some others are. Finance does not worry me that much. If somebody seeks to foreclose and exercise, they are not going to be able to do so if they are going to be caught. I think we could get ourselves in a knot, and I think the London financing markets could be disastrously impacted if we were to start to try to regulate lending heavily on this.
The Chair
I am afraid that brings us pretty much to the end of the time available. Many thanks, Mr Palmer, for your time and your assistance to the Committee.
We will move seamlessly on to the next session and hear evidence from David Offenbach, a consultant at Simons Muirhead & Burton. While he is taking his seat, let me say to those members of the Committee who were not able to ask questions last time that I will try to make sure that you get an opportunity on this occasion or a future one.
Examination of Witness
David Offenbach gave evidence.
The Chair
Welcome, Mr Offenbach. May I ask you to introduce yourself for the record?
David Offenbach: Yes, thank you very much, Sir Graham. I am consultant solicitor with Simons Muirhead & Burton solicitors, a firm of some 32 partners, and I have been there 19 years. I am here in a personal capacity. Previously, I was a senior partner of the law firm founded by my late father, and I merged my practice with Simons Muirhead in 2001.
I have acted for small public and private companies, and for 15 years, I was a non-executive director of a fully listed plc. I have been involved professionally in takeovers, and I have written on the subject. Currently, I am updating a paper I wrote previously called—this may be of interest to you—“Takeovers and the Public Interest”.
I have recently ceased being a further education college governor and non-executive director, after 18 years’ service, and I was with a social housing company for 15 years. In fact, one that I finished a term of six years with was the subject of one of the largest takeovers in the social housing sector. It is now one of the biggest housing associations.
Briefly, I welcome this Bill very much; but the UK has changed fundamentally since 2017, when the Government started their consultation on this, so I think that it is good, but it could be better. If the United Kingdom is going to build back better, as the Chancellor said yesterday, after covid and after Brexit, whether there is a deal or not, then this legislation needs to be wider than it is now, and I have some suggestions on how it could be improved and some amendments that might be made to it. Excuse me; I’ve got a bit of a cough.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Offenbach: Well, there are three categories. First, are the 17 subjects that are referred to in the paper sufficient? Sir John Redwood, in the debate last week, said that food should be included, because there is nothing more important than food security. Mr Tim Loughton said that pharma and biotechnology should be included. There is not really very much on energy in the 17 subject matters. So I would like to see those included.
The next is the definition. National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.
The other thing I would like to see included, contrary to the last speaker, is a general definition of public interest. The reason for that is that when you look at recent examples, you see that it is very easy for things to slip through the net that actually might be both in the national interest and in the interests of national security as a specific point.
Some of these examples have already been mentioned: SoftBank’s purchase of Arm. Now, that was world-beating British technology. It is in every computer, it is in every telephone and it came from Cambridge. It is now the subject of a bid by an American company owned by a Japanese bank. Do we really want to try and hang on to the research and development—as someone said in the House of Commons debate last week, the Crown jewels, or as Harold Macmillan said many years ago, the family silver? At this economic time, is it not desirable that we try and hang on to these important assets that are homegrown? Is self-reliance something that we should bear in mind?
Similarly, in 2014, Google bought DeepMind—world-beating British technology in artificial intelligence. Should that have been the subject of consideration? Recently, Lady Cobham was bemoaning the fact that Cobham had been sold to private equity for £4 billion. She said she only wished that the Act had already been in existence, and then perhaps the nine divisions that have now been reduced to four and the sell-off that started would not have happened. Of course, one of the problems is that the post-offer undertakings that can now legally be provided by companies to the takeover panel are fairly feeble and do not really deal with the issues to protect the necessary research and development and public interest.
At Immarsat, as those of you who drive around Old Street roundabout in the middle of London’s tech city will know, there was a £4 billion takeover of world-beating satellite technology. It started as a United Nations organisation, then became private and was quoted on the London stock exchange and has now gone to private equity.
Nvidia is buying Arm. When they bought Icera in 2011 in Bristol, they closed it down, 300 people lost their jobs and the technology went abroad. One that might now cause a bit of embarrassment is the case of Huawei, which bought from the East of England Development Agency the Centre for Integrated Photonics in 2012. Another piece of world-beating technology owned by the British Government has now gone abroad.
Those are just some of the numerable examples of assets that, at this difficult time, we really ought to try and hang on to. I do not want to decry the argument that Britain is open for business and that we believe in free trade. We do. There is twice as much foreign direct investment into Britain as there is into France and Germany. Several hundred thousand French people live in London. It is the fourth largest French city for French citizens. Why? Ask anybody. It is much easier to do business in London that it is in Paris.
As for the other argument—that if we do not make the business climate easy, people will start up their businesses elsewhere—the answer is that they will not, because in the other places where they want to open their businesses the regimes are tougher than here, so that argument does not wash. France has just passed its recent new law. They use a slightly different test that is strategic. Their test is not quite as wide as public interest. Of course, a right to intervene on strategic grounds is what Mr Tim Loughton and Mr Bob Seely suggested in the House of Commons debate last week, and Mr Tugendhat was very sad about the fact that Google had bought DeepMind and that SoftBank had managed to acquire Arm. For all those reasons, I think we do need to add to the definitions. That is the position.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Offenbach: It is very difficult to separate these. When you look at GKN, for example, 50,000 people—even now, after covid—are headquartered in Redditch, near the Minister’s constituency. It is one of the largest industrial companies worldwide, 250 years old, and a defence contractor to the Ministry of Defence, but the question is whether the amount of defence work it does, apart from its other engineering, is sufficient for it to be called in under the existing legislation. Clearly, the decision was made that it was not appropriate, and it is the same with Cobham. Cobham clearly had a national security element, but it was not sufficient for it to be called in and blocked by the Minister, so I think it is very difficult to separate the economic from the national interest, because these companies are multi-layered; they operate in different markets; some of their work is sensitive, and some of it is not sensitive.
That is why I think it is better to try and improve this Bill than deal with it under a separate Bill. The problem is that it has taken three years to get to where we are with this Bill. If we are just going to say, “Let’s deal with it another time”, it might take another three or four years before we get to consider that, so while it is here, while it is on the table, let’s try to improve it now and make it really work for Britain, so that we can build back better—to use a phrase—going forward.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
David Offenbach: I am very pleased with it. It is much better than the previous regime, because now, rather than just having post-offer undertakings that are subject only to contempt of court criteria if they are breached, we have a proper statutory framework that will enable the Minister to impose orders so that for non-compliance, there is a breach of statutory duty, not merely a breach of an undertaking. Of course, one of the problems with the takeover code is that the object of a takeover code is to protect shareholders and to encourage fair dealing in takeovers. It is not there—and this has never been its job—to protect the public interest; it is there to protect the shareholders who are in receipt of an offer, so that they have been given fair treatment. For example, if you take SoftBank and Arm at the moment, we do not know whether or not they will have complied with their post-offer undertakings when the five years is up, because the price that is being paid now is more than was paid in 2016. There is no complaint. Public interest is irrelevant to the job of the takeover panel, which is why this new regime is a very welcome improvement on the old regime.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
For me, there is something really important we need to explore a little bit more when it comes to our approach, in terms of rushing to be the most open, the most liberal, the most pro-business country we can possibly be, and the exposure that is left—in this case—to China. Just thinking about that, are there particular areas of law that you think need to be tightened up and thought about alongside this, and that need to be looked at in tandem, perhaps around IP protection, licensing and that kind of thing?
David Offenbach: I think this actually does most of what is necessary. I do not think it needs to be improved in that regard. One thing that does slightly worry me is that the present regime, which is essentially a competition regime, has the Competition and Markets Authority as a statutory body, having lost national security to the new unit that will be set up inside BEIS. They only have financial stability, media plurality and public health, which was added this summer, but it is a proper organisation that deals with public interest in those areas. Public interest is the only area.
It is quite important for us to think that one of the reasons why one wants to extend the definition of national security to a public interest element is because there are many more areas of public interest, other than those three that are now left in the CMA. There is a little bit of an anomaly, because national security does not have its own separate statutory body to deal with these issues. It suggests that this is going to be put into a little hole somewhere in BEIS and that somehow competition is more important than national security, because it has a statutory body.
I wonder whether there should be a parallel statutory body, which could be called the national security investment commission, or something like that, that actually dealt with these things separately, outside BEIS. That would deal with some of the objections that people have and that a Minister is going to be lobbied about. It would be dealt with in more of a quasi-judicial way, in the same way that the CMA now deals with referrals to it. I wonder whether the Minister would like to consider that, as part of the amendments.
Sam Tarry
Q
David Offenbach: I listened to and read the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons last week. I know that a lot of Members were concerned to try not to let issues of industrial strategy stray into areas of national security. It is a subject that I do not really want to go into.
Some people have expressed anxiety about the activities of sovereign funds in other countries posing dangers to assets in this country. Is there more of a risk from investments in China? Somehow, people feel that those investments are connected with the Government and that they are not really independent. I think the necessary protections are in this new statute that will prevent that from being an issue.
So far as industrial strategy is concerned, people are worried about sovereign funds. I think Britain should have its own sovereign wealth fund, like Norway does and like we used to have with the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, and then with 3i. There are amazing investments that could be made and wonderful technological discoveries that Britain should be able to get the profits from, and that should not be going overseas. When I went on a trade visit to China a few years ago, I saw the China Investment Corporation. They said, “We are really pleased with our investment in Thames Water. We do nothing every year. The dividends come and it doesn’t cost us any money.” I thought, “Why shouldn’t Britain have the advantage of the dividends, rather than the China Investment Corporation?” Norway’s sovereign wealth fund is worth more than £26,000 for every citizen in Norway and is one of the most successful. That is something that really we ought to look at.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, I am.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Offenbach: No, I do not—not in the slightest. I am thinking of clients of mine—French—who moved from Paris to London because it is easier to set up and promote business here. Why did they not stay in France? Because they know that the regime is more restrictive. Why did they not go to Australia? Because they are a similar regime. They are more restrictive. We are a very open environment to do business, in this country. You can come here and set up a company in 24 hours, and start trading. You cannot do that in France: it is much more difficult. In Germany, it is much more difficult, and in Australia. Those comparable regimes, if you like, are less favourable. That is why people come from the Baltic countries to set up business here. It is much easier to do business.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Offenbach: We have the issue that we do not know what difference being out of the European Union is going to make to future investment; but Ireland has been very attractive for many years, partially because of the tax regime—and for lots of other reasons—so will people choose Dublin rather than London if they want to do business? They might very well, but the fact that Britain is open to trade is an important part of the British economy. People will still come here and work here, open businesses and enjoy the infrastructure of the technology and the various businesses that are already here, and that they can feed off, so I am not worried about that in the medium term.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
David Offenbach: It does not need to be any different at all. I was pleased that land was included. Certainly one knows from seeing property transactions and looking at title deeds, sometimes where the owners of these companies are or purport to be is very curious. The Bill covers that very adequately.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: I do not know. I am sure that officials in the Minister’s Department have thought about whether or not this is an issue for the devolved Administration, but I do not think it is a problem.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, it is. The first thing that will be looked at is where is the beneficial ownership. It is, first, follow the money and, secondly, follow the beneficial ownership.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Then you block it.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, I am sure that is what the security unit will do. If it cannot be established where the beneficial ownership is, then they will block it, and so they should.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Well, I remember there was an outcry years ago when Michael Portillo was a Defence Minister and they were going to sell the Ministry of Defence. There was an outcry and it was withdrawn. Should Admiralty Arch become a hotel or is that an asset? These are the sort of issues which, if they come up, will be dealt with at the time. I like to think that certain things are fairly sacrosanct. We would not sell Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle to a foreign buyer if we did not know who they were—or at all, in fact.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Q
David Offenbach: The answer is that one is not quite sure. That is why I want to widen the definition. The reason why there are 17 different areas and categories in the Bill is that it is hard to know what national security is at any particular time and how it is reflected in the business that is actually being considered. The only way to make sure that something does not slip through the net is to have a slightly wider definition. There is no definition of national security itself in the Bill, which is perhaps why strategic, research and development, innovation or other issues should be brought in. Then one can be quite sure one has not accidentally lost an asset where there are national security issues.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
David Offenbach: Completely. It has also changed how the Government view it. In the summer, public health was added to the list of items on which a public interest intervention notice can be given. So it is clear that, in the face of the national emergency that, alas, we face—according to the Chancellor it is the greatest economic crisis for 300 years—we have to hang on to our assets. That is why the Bill is even more necessary than it was before. The pandemic gives added weight to the arguments that I was making even before we had covid. We need to have a wider test to protect our national assets.
Matt Western
Q
David Offenbach: I am not personally worried about state entities being said to pose more of a risk, because I think that the Bill is strong enough to make it possible to intervene where necessary. Although one is entitled to look at the asset being purchased, the acquirer and the person from whom it is acquired, I do not think that it will be a problem under the Bill as it is drafted.
Matt Western
Q
David Offenbach: I do not think that there is anything other than the 17 already mentioned and the ones that I mentioned, most of which came up in the debate last Tuesday. I think that telecoms might be mentioned as well, but the list really covers all the areas where national security is a significant risk.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“Land is generally only expected to be an asset of national security interest where it is, or is proximate to, a sensitive site, examples of which include critical national infrastructure”.
Do you think that scope is too narrow? For example, we know that property in London is used to launder large amounts of money—nefarious organisations often own property in London and use it for nefarious purposes. London is sometimes referred to as a laundromat for dark money. Do you think that that is a national security risk and should be included in the scope of the Bill, and that the land definition in the statement of political intent should reflect the money laundering issue?
David Offenbach: I am not sure I quite agree with the statement of intent as part of the Bill papers. The drafting of that section of the Bill is wide enough to include the issues that you raise. It would be open to the Minister to intervene in the cases that you mention without any change to the drafting of the Bill being necessary.
The Chair
If there are no further questions at this point, I will say thank you very much, Mr Offenbach. The next witness is not due until 3.15 so we will have a 10-minute suspension.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from our fifth panel. We welcome Mr Creon Butler from Chatham House. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. Mr Butler, may I welcome you to the Committee? Please will you introduce yourself for the record?
Creon Butler: I am Creon Butler, the director of the global economy and finance programme at Chatham House. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to give evidence.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Creon Butler: You get right to the heart of the matter and, indeed, to one of the points I wanted to make. Yesterday I looked at how national security is defined, and the “Collins English Dictionary” defines it as preventing a country from being attacked by hostile powers. One very important thing in relation to this Bill is that, first, while there is a good justification for having a broad range of powers to intervene, given the breadth of those powers to intervene and collect information, it is important that the Government define more clearly than they have hitherto exactly what those powers will be used for and, in those terms, use them in relation to national security. Specifically, I mean investments that could lead a hostile power to have technology that would enable it to make better weapons to attack us or would enable it to intervene in our critical national infrastructure.
There are other aspects of economic security, such as having a major industry in AI, renewable energy or something of that kind, that could be relevant to broader security in the future. You may well want to have a strategic intervention to ensure that the UK has that kind of industry, but I do not think this is the Bill for doing that. I think there are other tools you would want to use, including competition policy, strategic investments, contracting, R&D and so forth. That is one of the points I wanted to make.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Creon Butler: On your first question, I do not think we have that yet as a country. Actually, with the previous Prime Minister we had a clear definition of a number of sectors that were felt to be very important, but it is a continuing story in terms of exactly how we are going to intervene to ensure that those sectors are strong. We have some powers, but there are a range of tools. I previously mentioned public contracting, where we do our research and development, and competition policy specifically to make it impossible for British companies to develop in those sectors, and so on. There is a broad range of policies for ensuring we have those sectors, and I think they are continuing to evolve.
Your second question is a really crucial one. I guess a key point is that this is not an absolute thing: you cannot protect the country from all possible national security risks through this route. The only way you could do that, potentially, is by having every single investment notified and examined. That would create an enormous bureaucratic monster, which would really not be what we want.
The further point is that when you are looking at the right cases, you want to be sure that the judgments that are made trade off with the national security risk, as I have defined it, but also with the potential economic benefit of having an investment in that area. To do that, you need expertise among the people who are making such judgments, which spans security expertise but also economic, investment and commercial expertise. It is very important, first, that there enough people to do the judgments properly, and secondly, that you have a breadth of expertise. Certainly in the past, we may have swung from one side to the other. Sometimes you have had what people would describe as a securocrat approach: “There is a possible risk here. Let’s go for it—let’s eliminate it, whatever the economic cost.” Sometimes, on the other hand, you have had the alternative situation: “Let’s encourage investment, whatever the risk might be.” I think it is important that we get a balance between those two.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Creon Butler: I think—I am sure many people have said this—it is very clear that the previous legislation needed updating and was not fit for purpose, given both the way in which the global economy as a whole has evolved and the way in which the threats have evolved. It is both necessary and urgent to update that, and the way the Bill has done that, in terms of this first phase of creating the powers both to collect information and to intervene, makes a lot of sense. We have to fine-tune it and make sure it works properly, but this is a good first step. As I said, though, it is really important, if you are going to have such broad powers, to define exactly how you will use them—and much more precisely than the Government has done hitherto.
The further point is that this piece of legislation does not do everything. Alongside it, we need to strengthen our ability to collect the information we need about those threats. There are a number of elements. One that I have some experience of and that is really important is the question of who actually owns and controls companies that are operating in the UK—the question of beneficial ownership transparency. If you do not know that a hostile power is influencing a company that might be registered in an overseas territory or something of that kind, you will not be able to take the steps that you need to take.
A further area—it is a step in the right direction, because it gives us the powers to engage with this issue —is through international co-operation. Looking forwards, we need to strengthen and enhance our international co-operation with like-minded partners by going beyond the Five Eyes and including other really key partners, such as Japan, the EU and so on. That will enable us to do two things. First, it will enable us to share information about the things that can happen, such as the techniques that hostile powers are using. You may see it come up first in one country, and if we can share that information, we know that we can be prepared for that. Even more importantly, you may have a hostile power that does a number of things in different parts of the world, and it is only when you see the entire picture that you can see what the threat is.
Having that kind of international co-operation to do that is really important. These powers are necessary to get us in the same place as some of our key allies, in terms of what we can do. I do not think we are ever going to be able to standardise the areas of intervention or the nature of powers, but we should push very hard to enhance the sharing of information in the way I described.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“the National Security and Investment regime does not regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”
Do you agree with that assessment? Logic would seem to suggest that the closer an entity is to a foreign Government, the more likely it is to pose a risk to our national security.
Creon Butler: Clearly, some state-owned enterprises can be a significant risk, but some clearly are not. VW has a significant state element in it through North Rhine-Westphalia, but that does not make it a national security risk. At the same time—this goes back to the point I was making about who actually controls companies —you could well have a company that is registered in another country and, particularly if that country does not have very beneficial ownership transparency laws, as even some very close allies such as the US do not, the company emanating from it could have ill intent towards us.
For that reason, I think the Bill is right not to make a special regime for companies that are state owned, because that could go wrong in two ways: either you could be looking at only one set of companies when there are others that are potential threats, even though they come from close allies, or you may end up spending a lot of time looking at companies with state shareholdings that are really no threat at all. Clearly, when you come to do the analysis, whether there is a stake from a hostile state will be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing that threat. I think the Bill gets it right in not creating a special regime, but that does not mean that this will not be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing the threats.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Creon Butler: I did not read it quite that way. I read it more as meaning that that is not a reason for having a special regime, but when it comes to doing the assessment, you look at whether there is a state element of ownership and from which country that state element of ownership comes. That would be a factor when you are examining the likelihood that that particular investor could pose a threat to us. I am not a lawyer; I just read it that way. If the way you are reading it is the correct way to read it, I do not think that is quite right.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Q
Creon Butler: It is a constantly evolving picture. The benefit that the NSS can bring is a strategic overview. When you want to put the element of national security protection in the context of broader economic security issues, it is really important that the NSS plays a key role. I do not know the precise detail of exactly what the linkages are between the new unit and the NSS. I would think, from the way I worked in the NSS, that they will be very close in term of people, exchanges, links and so on.
In terms of the respective roles, the strategic role is one that the NSS should play, looking at this element alongside all the other elements of national economic security. As I understand it, it is very important that this unit has a very strong operational focus and effectiveness, the skills that enable it to do this, and the space in which to do it. If I was in charge of designing the relationship, that is how I would design it.
James Wild
Q
Creon Butler: There is obviously a trade-off again. My sense was that the provisions that are there now are realistic and sensible, but we need to see how the thing evolves and fine tune it according to the experience that we have had. People have pointed out that this will lead to a lot more cases being looked at than before. I do not think that that is a criticism of what is happening; it is a reflection of the world that we are in. However, in the light of the experience of looking at a much broader range of cases, we should be ready to adjust the timeframes and so on, taking account of that experience.
Matt Western
Q
Creon Butler: In my view of economic security broadly, the biggest existential threat is climate change, frankly. We are going through a ghastly pandemic. Fortunately, it looks like we can see the way out of it, but I do not think that at any point we felt that this particular virus was an existential threat to mankind more generally. My view of climate change is that it is, and it is very close. In any broad assessment of national and economic security, I would put climate change as one of the most important issues. That is why the accelerating efforts both within Governments and in the private sector to deal with it are crucial.
In terms of other kinds of threats, we have had this particular pandemic, which as far as we can see is not an existential one; there could be other pandemics that are. That is why infectious diseases have been so high on our risk register in the past. Steps to ensure that we do not face future pandemics that are even more serious than this one in terms of the threat to human life, or the economy, are a very important priority. Those are two examples of broader threats beyond hostile powers that we should incorporate in our approach to national and economic security.
Peter Grant
Q
Creon Butler: It is a good question. It is something I worked on when I was in the Government. There is a pending proposal in relation to property, to ensure that no foreign company can invest in UK property without some means—whether their own register of beneficial ownership or a regime put in place in the UK—of ensuring that transparency. That is in relation to ownership of property. It did not go much broader than that, because it involves a major bureaucratic process and there is the issue of not interfering too much with the way the economy works. If we did do that, it would help in relation to one of the national security concerns we have, which was highlighted in the Bill, where a hostile power buys some property close to a very sensitive site.
I need to think about it a bit more, but I do not think it would make sense at this stage to require that we can identify the ownership of every single investment. For example, in the US they do not have consistently strong beneficial ownership rules. You might find a situation in which several US investments in the UK did not meet those transparency requirements. If they were in non-sensitive sectors and did not pose a threat to us at all, it would create a considerable burden.
Thinking it through on my feet, the logic would be to do something of that kind, where it related to sectors that we knew to be sensitive. Indeed, those are already covered by the mandatory notification case. Where you have the mandatory notification, it will presumably trigger information about who owns the company that is making that investment. If that is not clear now, that may be the route to make sure that this element is covered.
Peter Grant
Q
Creon Butler: Absolutely. We currently have a public register of beneficial ownership for all UK-registered companies. That was a major and important step. There are issues about whether we are doing enough to enforce those legal requirements. That area could be looked at helpfully in this context. When that regime was designed, the view was that market forces, external pressures and gathering information from NGOs and others would ensure that the information on the register was accurate. I am not sure that we can now be sure that is the case. We want to get that transparency for UK-registered companies, and we may need to do more in that direction, particularly through the enforcement process in Companies House.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
Creon Butler: I think this comes again to the point about how we will tightly define national security in relation to these broad powers. I think you are thinking of a hostile power investing in a social media platform that can then be used to attack the UK—I guess that is what you have in mind. It is, again, something that I have not thought through. Probably, I would not see the nature of the threat as being so great that we would necessarily make it a mandatory notification, but by using other sources to collect information about threats, we might use the other powers in the Bill—the calling in and those kind of powers, and the voluntary notification —to make sure that we had covered the threat. I do not think I would put it in the mandatory category, but I would want to use other information and powers to collect information, and to call in a particular investment if I felt it was a threat.
The Chair
There are no further questions, so thank you, Mr Butler, for your time and your assistance to the Committee. We have our witness for the sixth and final panel in the witness in the room, so we can move on seamlessly and a little early.
Examination of Witness
Will Jackson-Moore gave evidence.
The Chair
We have until 4.30 pm at the latest for this session. Mr Jackson-Moore, will you introduce yourself for the record?
Will Jackson-Moore: I am a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers. I am responsible for our relationships with private equity, infrastructure, real estate and sovereign funds on a global basis. I started working in our Sheffield office, predominantly with small and medium-sized industrial organisations, before moving into our deals practice, where I spent the majority of my career working with corporates and private equity houses, undertaking transactions here in the UK and abroad. I then relocated with my family, while still at PWC to the middle east, where I spent a number of years —I got quite a lot of exposure to the sovereign funds there—before moving back to the UK and into my current role.
My areas of expertise are flows of international capital and the deals market. I am not a specialist in national security matters.
Chi Onwurah
Thank you for sharing your expertise with us, Mr Jackson-Moore. What impact do you expect the measures in the Bill to have on the sovereign funds and others you represent—the investors and potential acquirers of UK assets? You said clearly that you were not an expert in national security—why should you be? —but how will you identify those acquirers who may be considered to pose a national security threat? What kind of engagement would you expect to have with the Department for Business in order to make that sort of call?
Will Jackson-Moore: That is a two-part question. On how the proposed Bill will impact the flow of capital into the UK, generally these are sophisticated investors who operate across the globe, investing in territories that already have equivalent legislation, so the actual legislation itself will not come as a surprise or a barrier. It is in the application of it that there will be concerns, in that, quite rightly, the definitions are drawn quite broadly and we believe that a significant number of transactions and inbound investments will be brought into this—in many cases, voluntarily, so people can get guidance. That will be an area of concern, in terms of whether it will create a barrier, either through publicity or with the timing of bringing capital into the UK. That is probably one of the main concerns right now.
In terms of sovereign funds, I am not in a position to say whether an individual investor or fund is a threat to national security. That is not something I would be looking to comment on.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: In terms of how we might engage with organisations on the applicability of the Bill, I think we would be asked questions about the industries that are covered, the definitions of an industry and what a business actually does. Whether an organisation is drawn into the legislation—whether it is considered a national security threat—is not something we would be involved in. I would be pointing organisations in the direction of their legal advisers on that.
As I said, there are something in the order of 6,000 investments into venture capital in the UK each year. There are approaching 10,000 mergers and acquisitions transactions a year in the UK, plus a number of infrastructure investments, and many of those will fall into the definitions within the Bill. I do not think it is entirely clear to buyers yet whether they would be caught. A traditional private equity house or a venture capitalist looking to invest in a start-up in the UK, may well be owned by Britons, with a management team who are British, but they may have structures that include overseas entities, and many of their investors will be overseas investors. I think that many of those organisations will be wanting guidance as to whether they will be considered an overseas acquirer, even though on the face of it they appear relatively British.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: No. The way traditional fundraising for a start-up or a transaction takes place is that a business is either put up for sale or seeks investment from a number of parties; the entrepreneur wants to raise finance and have a competitive situation in which the providers of capital are making the most attractive offers possible to reduce the cost of capital for the organisation. I think there would be an incentive for them to be able to say to potential investors, “We are not going to be considered as an asset that is important to national security”. The definitions are quite broad and many organisations will have technologies that right now appear relatively benign and are used for purely civilian purposes but are cutting-edge and on a trajectory whereby in two years’ time they may have military applications or other things that could be a threat to national security.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, in many cases it is a raising of finance for a partial stake. It is an entrepreneur looking to attract capital to expand their business, seeking to bring in an investor to provide maybe 25% of additional equity capital. They want to have a competitive situation where people are offering the most beneficial terms possible. Many of those investors will be overseas investors.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: For the vast majority of existing transactions, the existing legislation was not really a major factor; it only addressed a handful of transactions each year, whereas this is much more in the mainstream of the M and A market and therefore it will be much more on people’s agenda. We already have a number of organisations reaching out to us to understand the potential implications for ongoing transactions.
I do not think the timeframe in itself represents a barrier, since it is not that dissimilar to other jurisdictions, but again it is the application. If you look at Australia, for example, buyers have the ability to pre-clear themselves, and that type of amendment would be very helpful to ensure the free flowing of capital.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, it potentially could, because it will create an additional uncertainty. In order to attract capital, you need as much certainty as possible. An ability to say to investors that we do not believe we are in an area of investment that presents a national security threat is important.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is already having an effect, in that it is being discussed by organisations that are considering investments into the UK right now. People do not necessarily want to be seen as a guinea pig or have high-profile investments unless they really have to. It is not that it is stopping it; it is just another factor on the balanced scorecard as to whether you are going to make an investment. It is one factor to consider and it is a degree of uncertainty, which is never helpful.
Andrew Bowie
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Not as the Bill stands in its own right. As you say, we are the largest inbound country for venture capital, for private equity and for infrastructure, and we have been seen as the gold standard for the location in Europe to invest into. Many other European territories have equivalent legislation, but again it is about the application of the legislation, in particular the process, the ability to pre-clear and the timelines actually being met. To understand some of these technologies is not going to be straightforward. These are emerging, cutting-edge technologies in some cases, and the talent required to assess that will not necessarily be easy to attract. Some consideration needs to be given to partnering with research institutes or academia in specific areas, so that there is a panel available to assess certain technologies, not only to understand its position right now but also its trajectory—where that technology may go in the next two or three years.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is not something I have specifically considered. It certainly would not that be within what I considered to be a matter of national security under the auspices of the Bill. I do not think I am in a position to comment any further.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: I am not in a position to talk about specific individual organisations. A number of sovereign funds in China are very well regarded in the international capital markets. However, in terms of their interaction with Chinese Government, that is not something that I have a perspective on.
Mark Garnier
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: As I mentioned earlier, the UK is the gold standard for a location to invest in, particularly within Europe. Investors like investing in the UK because of the fairness and transparency, UK law and UK courts, and as a place to be based and to live, so there is an inherent benefit to doing UK-based transactions. However, and as we sit here right now, on a scorecard-type approach, the UK is not as attractive a location as it has been historically. We have the uncertainties of Brexit and we have a number of other territories looking to recover and rethink their economies given the situation we are all in, so there will be more—
Mark Garnier
Competition?
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, there will be more competition for international flows of capital. As I have said, I do not think this Bill in its own right fundamentally changes the attractiveness, but it does create another level of shorter-term uncertainty, just because people have not seen it operating in practice yet.
Mark Garnier
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is entirely appropriate to have legislation to protect matters of national security, so perhaps this puts us on a level playing field with other nations. But does it specifically enhance our position for the attraction of international capital? The answer is not specifically, but it sets a standard that the international capital markets expect us to put in place.
The Chair
We have no further questions from the Committee, so thank you very much, Mr Jackson-Moore, for your time and assistance. We are finishing slightly ahead of time, but I invite the Government Whip to propose to adjourn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
4 pm
Adjourned till Tuesday 1 December at twenty-five minutes past Nine o’clock.