Trade Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Trade Bill 2019-21 View all Trade Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 June 2020 - (23 Jun 2020)
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. Before we start, I remind Members that the Hansard reporters would be grateful if you emailed electronic copies of your speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. At 11 o’clock, I will invite the Committee to observe a one-minute silence in memory of the victims of the knife attacks in Reading on Saturday.
Clause 2
Implementation of international trade agreements
Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 2, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) to make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement may only be made if—
(a) the provisions of section [Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements before signature] were complied with before the United Kingdom had ratified the agreement;
(b) the requirements under subsection (3) and under paragraph 4(1) to (1D) of Schedule 2 have been met;
(c) the requirements under subsection (4) and under paragraph 4(1) to (1D) of Schedule 2 have been met; or
(d) the requirements under subparagraph 4A(1) to (1D) of Schedule 2 have been met.”
This amendment would put in place a structure for Parliamentary scrutiny of proposed international trade agreements.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 15, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement immediately before exit day.
(4) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement other than a free trade agreement if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union were signatories to an international trade agreement immediately before exit day.
(4A) Paragraph 4A of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing any international trade agreement not falling within subsection (3) or subsection (4) above.”
This amendment would apply the provisions of the Bill to trade agreements other than EU rollover trade agreements.
Amendment 6, in schedule 2, page 13, leave out lines 13 to 16 and insert—
“4 (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting alone under section 2(1) in respect of an international trade agreement which meets the criteria under section 2(3) or 2(4) may not be made unless all provisions of sub-paragraphs (1A) to (1D) have been satisfied.
(1A) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) a draft of an order to the effect that the agreement be ratified, and
(b) a document which explains why the Secretary of State believes that the agreement should be ratified.
(1B) The Secretary of State may make an order in the terms of the draft order laid under subparagraph (1A) if—
(a) after the expiry of a period of 21 sitting days after the draft order is laid, no committee of either House of Parliament has recommended that the order should not be made, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 40 sitting days after the draft order is laid, a motion in the terms of the draft order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(1C) If a committee of either House of Parliament recommends that an order should not be made under subparagraph (2), the Secretary of State may, after the expiry of a period of 60 sitting days after the draft order is laid, make a motion for a resolution in each House of Parliament in the terms of the draft order.
(1D) If a motion in the terms of the draft order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament under subparagraph (1B)(b), the Secretary of State may make an order in the terms of the draft order.
(1E) A free trade agreement to which this paragraph applies shall not be deemed to be a treaty for the purposes of Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
(1F) In section 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, after subsection (1)(b), at end insert “but does not include an international trade agreement to which paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 to the Trade Act 2020 applies.”
This amendment would establish a form of super-affirmative procedure for scrutiny of an international trade agreement before ratification and before regulations implementing the agreement could be made.
Amendment 7, in schedule 2, page 13, line 25, at end insert—
“4A (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting alone under section 2(1) in respect of an international trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) or section 2(4) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1A) to (1D).
(1A) The Minister shall lay before Parliament—
(a) a draft of the regulations, and
(b) a document which explains why the Secretary of State believes that regulations should be made in terms of the draft regulations.
(1B) The Minister may make an order in the terms of the draft regulations laid under subparagraph (1A) if—
(a) after the expiry of a period of 21 sitting days after the draft regulations are laid, no committee of either House of Parliament has recommended that the regulations should not be made, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 60 sitting days after the draft regulations are laid, the draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(1C) If a committee of either House of Parliament recommends that the regulations should not be made, the Secretary of State may—
(a) lay before Parliament revised draft regulations, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 40 sitting days after the revised draft regulations are laid, make a motion for a resolution in each House of Parliament for approval of the revised draft regulations.
(1D) If a motion under subparagraph (1C)(b) is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make the regulations.”
This amendment would establish a form of super-affirmative procedure for scrutiny of regulations implementing all trade agreements covered by the bill. The procedure would apply to agreements other than EU rollover trade agreements if amendments extending the application of the bill were agreed to.
Amendment 19, in schedule 2, page 13, leave out lines 33 to 35 and insert—
“(3A) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority under section 2(1) in respect of an agreement which falls within the description in section 2(3) or section 2(4) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1) to (1D) of paragraph 4.
(3B) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority under section 2(1) in respect of an agreement which falls within the description in section 2(4A) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1) to (1D) of paragraph 4A.”
This amendment would extend the super-affirmative procedure under former Amendment 19 to regulations where the Minister was acting jointly with a devolved authority.
New clause 5—Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements before signature—
“(1) The United Kingdom may not become a signatory to a free trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) unless—
(a) before entering negotiations on the proposed agreement, the Secretary of State has—
(i) laid before Parliament a sustainability impact assessment carried out following consultation as prescribed by section [Sustainability impact assessments], and
(ii) published a response to any report which a committee of either House of Parliament may have published expressing an opinion on the sustainability impact assessment, as long as that report is published within 30 sitting days of the day on which the sustainability impact assessment is laid before Parliament;
(b) both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution authorising the Secretary of State to enter negotiations on the proposed agreement as prescribed by section [Parliamentary consent to launch of trade negotiations];
(c) during the course of negotiations, the text of the agreement as so far agreed or consolidated has been made available as prescribed by section [Availability of agreement texts];
(d) the Secretary of State has, within ten sitting days of the close of each round of negotiations on the proposed agreement, laid before Parliament a statement detailing the progress made in each area of the negotiations and the obstacles still remaining at the close of that round;
(e) the text of the agreement in the form to which it is proposed that the United Kingdom should become a signatory has been made available to Parliament for a period of 21 sitting days; and
(f) a resolution has been passed by the House of Commons approving the Secretary of State’s intention to sign the agreement.
(2) “Sitting day”, for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii) shall mean any day on which both Houses of Parliament begin to sit”.
This new clause would set out a structure for parliamentary scrutiny of negotiations on proposed trade agreements.
New clause 6—Sustainability impact assessments—
“(1) A sustainability impact assessment laid before Parliament under section [Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements before signature] (1)(a) shall be carried out following consultation.
(2) A consultation under subsection (1) shall—
(a) be carried out in line with any guidance or code of practice on consultations issued by Her Majesty’s Government, and
(b) actively seek the views of—
(i) Scottish Ministers,
(ii) Welsh Ministers,
(iii) a Northern Ireland devolved authority,
(iv) representatives of businesses and trade unions in sectors which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, are likely to be affected by the proposed international trade agreement, and
(v) any other person or organisation which appears to the Secretary of State to be representative of interests affected by the proposed international trade agreement.
(3) The Secretary of State shall ensure that public bodies, non-governmental organisations and the public may be made aware of the consultation by circulating and publishing details of it prominently on relevant government websites.
(4) A sustainability impact assessment under subsection (1) shall be conducted by a credible body independent of government and shall include both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the potential impacts of the proposed trade agreement, including as a minimum—
(a) the economic impacts on individual sectors of the economy, including, but not restricted to—
(i) the impacts on the quantity and quality of employment,
(ii) the various regional impacts across the different parts of the UK,
(iii) the impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises, and
(iv) the impacts on vulnerable economic groups;
(b) the social impacts, including but not restricted to—
(i) the impacts on public services, wages, labour standards, social dialogue, health and safety at work, public health, food safety, social protection, consumer protection and information, and
(ii) the government’s duties under the Equality Act 2010;
(c) the impacts on human rights, including but not restricted to—
(i) workers’ rights,
(ii) women’s rights,
(iii) cultural rights and
(iv) all UK obligations under international human rights law;
(d) the impacts on the environment, including but not restricted to—
(i) the need to protect and preserve the oceans,
(ii) biodiversity,
(iii) the rural environment and air quality, and
(iv) the need to meet the UK’s international obligations to combat climate change;
(e) the impacts on animal welfare, including but not restricted to the impacts on animal welfare in food production, both as it relates to food produced in the UK and as it relates to food imported into the UK from other countries; and
(f) the economic, social, cultural, food security and environmental interests of those countries considered to be developing countries for the purposes of clause 10 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, as defined in Schedule 3 to that Act and as amended by regulations.
(5) The elements of the sustainability impact assessment to be undertaken under (4)(f) must be sufficiently disaggregated so as to capture the full range of impacts on different groups of developing countries, and must include both direct and indirect impacts, such as loss of market share through trade diversion or preference erosion.
(6) A sustainability impact assessment under subsection (1) shall include recommendations for possible action to maximise any positive impacts and to prevent or offset any negative impacts foreseen, including the possible limitation of the negotiating mandate so as to exclude those sectors most at risk from the proposed trade agreement.”
New clause 7—Parliamentary consent to launch of trade negotiations—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall not commence negotiations relating to a free trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) unless all provisions of this section have been satisfied.
(2) A Minister of the Crown shall lay before Parliament a draft of a negotiating mandate relating to the proposed international trade agreement.
(3) The draft mandate under subsection (2) shall set out—
(a) all fields and sectors to be included in the proposed negotiations;
(b) the principles to underpin the proposed negotiations;
(c) any limits on the proposed negotiations, including sectors to be excluded from the proposed negotiations; and
(d) the desired outcomes from the proposed negotiations.
(4) The Secretary of State shall make a motion for a resolution in the House of Commons in respect of the draft, setting out the elements listed in subsection (3), but such a motion shall be made—
(a) no earlier than 25 sitting days after the day on which the draft of the negotiating mandate is laid under subsection (2), and
(b) not before the Secretary of State has published a response to any report which a committee of either House of Parliament may have published expressing an opinion on the draft negotiating mandate , as long as that report is published within 20 sitting days of the day on which the draft mandate is laid before Parliament.
(5) A motion for a resolution under subsection (4) shall be made in such a way as to permit amendment of any of the elements prescribed under subsection (3).
(6) A motion to enable consideration of the negotiating mandate shall be laid before the House of Lords.
(7) The terms of any negotiating mandate authorised by a resolution under subsection (4) shall be binding upon the Secretary of State and anyone acting on his or her behalf in the course of negotiation.
(8) “Sitting day” shall, for the purposes of subsection (4), mean any day on which both Houses of Parliament begin to sit.”
New clause 8—Availability of agreement texts—
“(1) The text of any proposed international trade agreement which is being negotiated shall, so far as it is agreed or consolidated, be made publicly available within ten days of the close of each round of negotiations.
(2) Every—
(a) document submitted formally by the United Kingdom government to the negotiations, and
(b) agenda for each new round of negotiations
shall be made publicly available by the Secretary of State.
(3) All other documents relating to the negotiations and not falling within the descriptions provided in subsections (1) and (2) shall be made publicly available by the Secretary of State, subject to subsection (4).
(4) The Secretary of State may withhold from publication any document of a kind falling within the description in subsection (3) but must publish a statement of the reasons for doing so.
(5) In the case of any document withheld under subsection (4), the Secretary of State shall provide full and unfettered access to that document to—
(a) any select committee of either House of Parliament to which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the proposed agreement is relevant, and
(b) any other person or body which the Secretary of State may authorise.
(6) In the case of a document to which access is provided under subsection (5), the Secretary of State may specify conditions under which the text shall be made available.
(7) The Secretary of State shall maintain an online public register of all documents published under subsections (1), (2) and (3) or withheld under subsection (4).”
New clause 19—Report on proposed free trade agreement—
“(1) This section applies (subject to subsection (2)) where the United Kingdom has authenticated a free trade agreement (“the proposed agreement”), if—
(a) the other party (or each other party) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement immediately before exit day, or
(b) where the proposed agreement was authenticated by the United Kingdom before exit day, the other party (or each other party) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement on the day the proposed agreement was authenticated by the United Kingdom.
(2) This section applies only if the proposed agreement is not binding on the United Kingdom as a matter of international law unless it is ratified by the United Kingdom.
(3) Before the United Kingdom ratifies the proposed agreement, a Minister of the Crown must lay before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, any significant differences between—
(a) the trade-related provisions of the proposed agreement, and
(b) the trade-related provisions of the existing free trade agreement.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if a report in relation to the proposed agreement has been laid before Parliament under section (Report to be laid with regulations under section 2(1))(2).
(5) The duty imposed by subsection (3) applies only at a time when regulations may be made under section 2(1) (see section 2(8)).
(6) In this section a reference to authenticating a free trade agreement is a reference to doing an act which establishes the text of the agreement as authentic and definitive as a matter of international law.
(7) In this section—
“the existing free trade agreement” means the free trade agreement referred to in subsection (1)(a) or (b);
the “trade-related provisions” of a free trade agreement are the provisions of the agreement that mainly relate to trade.”
New clause 20—Report to be laid with regulations under section 2(1)—
“(1) This section applies where a Minister of the Crown proposes to make regulations under section 2(1) for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement to which the United Kingdom and another signatory (or other signatories) are signatories.
(2) A draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations may not be laid before Parliament unless, at least 10 Commons sitting days before the draft is laid, a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, any significant differences between—
(a) the trade-related provisions of the free trade agreement to which the United Kingdom and the other signatory (or other signatories) are signatories, and
(b) the trade-related provisions of the existing free trade agreement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if, at least 10 Commons sitting days before a draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations is laid, a report in relation to the agreement has been laid before Parliament under section (Report on proposed free trade agreement)(3).
(4) In this section—
“Commons sitting day” means a day on which the House of Commons begins to sit;
“the existing free trade agreement” means the free trade agreement to which the European Union and the other signatory (or other signatories) were signatories immediately before exit day;
the “trade-related provisions” of a free trade agreement are the provisions of the agreement that mainly relate to trade.”
Gareth Thomas
It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair once again, Mrs Cummins. We had an interesting sitting in your absence on Thursday afternoon, at which three Conservative Members of Parliament applied to join the Co-operative party, the Government Whip tried to shut down a debate on what we could do to tackle an anti-northern bias in procurement, and the Minister gave the first hint that he recognises the Bill is in need of improvement.
Let me say at the outset that I want Britain to be ambitious in trade, in the deals we look to achieve, and in our determination to help imaginative and innovative businesses access new markets. However, I do not want us to sell ourselves short. That is why the amendments are so important.
Trade agreements done well create new economic opportunities. They can help inspire the generation of thousands of new jobs and expand the horizons of the very best of British businesses. They can and have helped to lift thousands out of terrible poverty and hunger, and they have helped to generate substantial tax revenues for better public services.
Trade deals done badly, however, cause myriad problems. They can lead to the loss of markets for vital companies, and in turn create left-behind communities and a race to the bottom in wages and conditions. When done well, trade agreements can help to generate competition, giving more consumer choice and lowering prices for consumers, but there needs to be fair competition. When done badly, trade agreements can entrench unaccountable corporate power and miss vital opportunities to improve our environment. That is why it is essential that we have effective, detailed scrutiny, with a Trade Ministry that is determined to be open and transparent, if we are secure the trade deals that can fulfil the country’s potential and avoid creating the worst of all worlds.
As the Committee will know, Parliament has its legions of critics, but the structures it provides for scrutiny—if Ministers are willing to allow both Houses to do their job—can help to create the consensus behind trade policy that business organisations are desperate to see, as they set out in our first witness session. Ministers have told us repeatedly that the Bill will provide the basis for the country’s future trade policy once we have left the European Union. In the debate on the Queen’s Speech, it was said that the Trade Bill would
“put in place the essential legislative framework to allow the UK to operate its own independent trade policy upon exit from the European Union.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 June 2017; Vol. 783, c. 437.]
If one potential trade deal serves to underline the failure of the Bill to meet that ambition and the need for proper parliamentary scrutiny, it is the deal that the Department seeks to negotiate with Donald Trump’s Administration. There are already a huge number of public concerns around food standards, the national health service, the use of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, the future of geographical indications and whether the Bill will help to cement action on climate change. Let me run through some of those concerns. The Soil Association has very helpfully charted a series of concerns that highlight the need for proper scrutiny—proper scrutiny that is not as yet locked into the Bill—of a future US trade deal. We know that US negotiators are pushing hard for the weakening of UK food and farming standards, describing EU farming—and therefore, implicitly, UK farming—as the “Museum of Agriculture”.
The UK Government have made repeated commitments, including at Trade questions last Thursday, to high environmental and animal welfare standards, but those standards could be undermined by a US trade deal, as a series of Members from across the House have noted. That underlines the need for proper parliamentary scrutiny of a UK-US trade deal, which the Bill does not currently allow for. That is why our amendments are so important.
The Soil Association has a list of the top 10 risks for the US trade deal. The first is anti-microbial resistance. Experts are warning that by 2050, as many as 10 million people could die annually from anti-microbial resistance. The use of antibiotics per annum in US farming is, on average, five times higher than in the UK. Investigations have shown that antibiotics crucial to human medicine are still being used in unacceptable quantities on US livestock farms, despite rules being brought in last year to try to curb their use and combat the spread of deadly superbugs. A US trade deal risks undermining the efforts that UK farmers have been making to reduce antibiotic use, fuelling further anti-microbial resistance, with potentially grave consequences for public health. Surely we, the House of Commons, and indeed the other place, should have the opportunity to scrutinise on the Floor of the House and in Committee whether there is adequate protection from such an eventuality.
Secondly, a number of farmers’ representatives in the unions, a number of Conservative Members of Parliament, as well as Opposition Members, and a former UK ambassador to the US have warned of the threat to the UK farming industry if British farmers are forced to compete against cheap low-quality food imports. If UK farming is forced to compete on price with countries such as the US that operate to different or lower standards, UK farming may become unprofitable. That could create a race to the bottom, putting pressure on Ministers to lower existing standards here in the UK, including standards of food quality, environmental protection and animal welfare.
Thirdly, a US trade deal could affect EU market access for our farmers. The UK currently holds a suite of significant and valuable agri-food trade relationships with the EU27. A weakening of UK food standards or a future lack of alignment with EU standards resulting from a US trade deal could result in barriers to UK farmers and food companies wishing to export their products to the EU single market. In turn, those barriers would pose significant risks for food businesses and farmers’ livelihoods. Why would we not want, as the House of Commons, to have the opportunity to scrutinise whether that fear about a potential UK-US deal merits rightful concern?
Then there is chlorine-washed chicken. The American poultry industry is more intensive, with lower animal welfare standards than in the UK. The chicken produced has high levels of bacteria, so the industry has resorted to acid and chlorine washes at the end of the meat production chain, producing chicken that may not be safe for consumers to eat. Recent comments from a senior representative of the US Government have suggested that the US is “sick and tired” of UK concerns over chlorine-washed chicken, but it remains an important issue for UK citizens, who, I suggest, have no desire to see welfare standards lowered after the UK leaves the European Union.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
My hon. Friend puts his finger on the point. For many people, quite rightly, this is about not lowering animal welfare standards. Has he seen reports from trade unions in the United States that, in order to speed up processes, there are now fewer inspections of the meat production process, particularly around chicken, which increases the likelihood that the acid or chlorine wash is less effective? There are not only animal welfare concerns, but concerns about the safety of food that we have been told we should not be concerned about because the chlorine wash removes the threat of food poisoning.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend makes a good point. Not only is there a multitude of expert analysis that chlorine washing chicken is ineffective at getting rid of the risk of infection but, as he rightly points out, there are concerns that the inspection regime for the chlorine washing of chicken is not remotely as effective as we had been led to believe. That is all the more reason why it is so important that amendments 4 and 5, and the subsequent amendments, are added to the Bill.
The fifth concern that the Soil Association helpfully sets out concerns hormone-treated beef. The US Food and Drug Administration allows steroid hormone drugs for use in beef production, which we banned in the UK and the European Union in 1989. Cattle producers use hormones to induce faster, bigger animal growth, but there is a cost to that: an EU scientific review back in 2003 concluded that one of those commonly used hormones is carcinogenic. In the event of a UK-US trade deal, hormone-treated beef could be sold in the UK, posing potential public health risks. Surely it is the responsibility of the House to understand and scrutinise in detail a UK-US trade deal, to ensure that there are no such potential public health risks for UK consumers.
Lee Rowley (North East Derbyshire) (Con)
I am hugely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for letting me intervene. He is right that a US trade deal needs to be scrutinised, but I remind him that we are not debating a US trade deal. We are debating what is effectively a continuity Bill, and while much of what he says is incredibly interesting—although I disagree with it—it is not relevant to the scope of the discussions.
Gareth Thomas
With due respect, the coffee that the hon. Gentleman had this morning may not have quite kicked in at the beginning of my remarks, when I set out what the Queen’s Speech defined as the purpose of the Trade Bill. As I said, it made clear that the Bill was designed to set the tone for the future of UK trade policy post Brexit, which it quite clearly does not if all the Bill serves to do is to explore the scrutiny of roll-over agreements. Our contention is that we need a proper parliamentary scrutiny process for future trade deals that we negotiate, including with the US and the Trans-Pacific Partnership—on which more anon.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes some powerful points. To broaden this a little, because it would be easy to become extremely focused on the US-UK trade deal, he knows very well that these sort of issues—food standards and production, and safeguards for consumers—apply to other countries, such as Australia. Any UK-Australia trade deal will face exactly the same issues as those we are talking about between the UK and the US.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is not the option at the moment for proper parliamentary scrutiny of a trade deal with Australia. If the Government were to bring forward a trade deal with China, there is as yet no scope in Parliament for proper scrutiny of such a deal. That is why amendments 4 and 5 and those linked to them are so important.
Matt Western
I just want to elaborate on that point. It is really important that the public are fully aware of what we are talking about. Hormone-fed beef applies to Australian-produced beef as much as to US beef. When it comes to egg production in Australia, they use battery hens, caged hens and so on. It is really important that consumers are made fully aware of what will happen with these trade deals if they are opened up in the way that the Government would like.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend remakes my point for me. We need to have proper parliamentary scrutiny locked into the Bill. As we have been told, this the only trade legislation that is likely to come before this Parliament. There has been no hint of any other legislation to improve the parliamentary scrutiny of future trade agreements. That is why this group of amendments is so important.
Bill Esterson
Just for the benefit of the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire who intervened, if he looks at the explanatory note to amendment 5, he will see that the amendment would apply the provisions of the Bill to trade agreements other than the EU roll-over trade agreements, so it covers trade agreements that go beyond those that were originally in the scope of the Bill. As my hon. Friend said, this is relevant, not only because of what the Queen’s Speech—
Bill Esterson
I do not think the hon. Gentleman is allowed to intervene when I am already intervening on my hon. Friend. He will get his chance to make a speech later. The important point is that we have tabled amendments precisely because of the need for the Bill to cover more than the narrow scope that clause 2 originally envisaged. My hon. Friend is right to highlight what was in the Queen’s Speech, but I want to remind the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire that it is actually in our amendments. They have been allowed by the Clerks and must therefore be within the scope of our debate.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend makes his point to the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire, who intervened on me very well. I do not know whether the long title of the Bill was as badly drafted as some other parts of the Bill, allowing as a result for our amendments to be in scope, but they are. The hon. Member for North East Derbyshire in his heckle suggested that I was making a series of hypotheses. I would not use his phrase, but I gently suggest that that is surely the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny—to test the concerns that the wider public and organisations outside the House have about particular pieces of legislation.
The Soil Association highlighted a further concern about nutritional labelling—so-called traffic light labelling—which has been a very important tool in supporting improvements in UK public health. The US is clear that it considers nutrition labelling a barrier to trade, and it has an ongoing dispute with the European Union over this. Imported US food already enjoys a voluntary concession to the UK labelling requirements. Any trade deal could weaken those consumer labelling efforts still further. A US trade deal could result in low-cost, ultra-processed foods flooding the UK market, placing a potential double health burden on UK citizens. That is one of the concerns of the Soil Association, and it is right that parliamentary scrutiny should give us the opportunity to test that.
There are serious concerns about the public health implications of genetically modified foods and pesticide regulations, which we will come on to under amendment 11. Incidents of food poisoning in the US affect 14% of the US population annually—10 times greater than in the UK, where just 1% is affected. Again, surely, it is the purpose of Parliament to allow our amendments to test whether or not a deal with the US or any other country in the world is likely to lead to an increase in food poisoning. Those are the Soil Association’s concerns around food standards.
There is a series of other concerns about a potential deal with Donald Trump’s Administration. Let us take the national health service, where Ministers have been desperate to try to reassure the public. If investor-state dispute settlement clauses were to be included in a UK-US trade deal, or any other post-Brexit trade agreement, there is a real chance that the corporate giants that had bought the right to run part of the national health service might be tempted to challenge a decision by a future Government about the provision of that part. If a future Government wanted to favour a public provider over the big private corporate provider, or renationalise parts of the health service that have been privatised, that could be challenged by the corporate giant using the investor-state dispute settlement system, potentially at huge cost to the British taxpayer and resulting in huge damage to the national health service.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is right to highlight the challenge of ISDS. The debate about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which was dragged into the public domain when negotiating texts were eventually shared with the public, was the only way for the potential problems that he has highlighted to come into the public domain. The initial lack of scrutiny poses a great threat of the kind that he has set out.
May I add to the list the concerns about the negative list system, where every single service has to be named, and about ratchet clauses and standstill clauses? In addition to ISDS, they are a real threat to the ability of this country’s Government to have control over what is in the public sector and what services are delivered, whether the health service or other public services.
Gareth Thomas
Not surprisingly, my hon. Friend is ahead of me in making that concern clear. I underline the issues about negative listing that he sets out, which I will come to. To finish the point about medicine pricing, Donald Trump’s chief negotiator has made it clear that they wish to use a trade deal to challenge the NHS’s current purchasing model for NHS drugs. That could be done through them securing specific market access provisions or other clauses aimed at helping the US pharmaceutical industry. Again, surely it is the responsibility of the House, and indeed the other place, to have in place the scrutiny mechanisms to check whether that concern is justified.
My hon. Friend set out the concerns about standstill clauses and ratchet clauses in trade agreements, which can lock in levels of privatisation and other forms of liberalisation and accelerate them, which will limit the scope of future Governments to take sensible steps, when services are not being properly provided, to bring them back into the public sector. He rightly set out concerns about negative listing, which emerged in particular in the EU-Canada deal, which we will explore in more detail in the debate on amendment 9. There are concerns that NHS management data services could be opened up to US corporate giants as a result of a UK-US trade deal. Surely it is Parliament’s responsibility to explore those concerns.
If a UK-US deal were concluded by the Government, MPs would not be guaranteed a vote or a debate on the signed deal. The proposals in the Command Paper, which Ministers were forced to publish in February last year, allow a scrutiny Committee to recommend one, but leave it at the Government’s discretion whether to hold one.
The deal is being negotiated in secret, even though it could have huge implications for Britain’s post-Brexit future. Negotiations with the US are particularly controversial, yet after six rounds of preparatory talks and one round of formal negotiations, we still are in the dark, at least from a UK perspective, about the substance of what is being debated. It is true that the Secretary of State made a statement to the House. However, apart from listing the major areas of the talks, which were hardly revealing, and reassuring us all that the meetings were positive and constructive, again, no substance was offered on the real concerns that members of the public and organisations outside this House have set out on food, import standards and medicine prices. As Mr Lawrence from Trade Justice Movement reminded us all in last Thursday morning’s witness session, there will have been more scrutiny of the decision to proceed with High Speed 2 than there will be, as things stand, of a UK-US deal. Our amendments would help put that situation right.
Matt Western
When those of us on the International Trade Committee were hearing evidence about potential trade agreements with Japan and South Korea and the Government’s failure to be transparent, to be open, to set objectives and to consult, we discovered in that process, online, that the Koreans had already shared publicly what was going on and where they were in the negotiation. It was secret from our side but open on theirs. It was not until we discovered that information online and Google Translated it that we knew what the Government were up to. Isn’t that extraordinary?
Gareth Thomas
That is an extraordinary position, but sadly, it is becoming clear that that is how Members of Parliament are likely to find out about the substance of these trade negotiations. Let us again take the US as an example. We are finding out through evidence to Congress what many of the concerns of UK business organisations are in terms of the desire to secure access to UK markets, which is surely an entirely outrageous situation for the House of Commons. We were promised we would be taking back control after Brexit, yet the Houses of Parliament and the British public are being left in the dark.
There are real concerns from a UK-US deal about the potential for ISDS.
Bill Esterson
Before my hon. Friend moves on from the point about where evidence comes around what is a negotiating text, he will remember the evidence from Rosa Crawford from the TUC that the unions in this country are finding out what is in the negotiating texts for the US-UK talks from unions in the United States, which have access to those texts from the US Government. That is completely absent in this country. Is this not yet another example of how absurd it is that we have different approaches to scrutiny in this country compared with others? Surely those approaches need to be equivalent to ensure proper scrutiny and the right outcomes in the interests of the people of our country?
Gareth Thomas
We should thank the TUC for its work with American trade unions to help inform British workers and the British House of Commons, and for that little bit more of an insight into what is really going on in the UK-US negotiations. I hope Ministers will be sufficiently embarrassed by the British people’s reliance on what is being told to Congress to open up more scrutiny opportunities for this Parliament.
ISDS clauses have been favoured by the US in many of its existing trade deals. They potentially allow new investors, if included in a UK deal, to sue our Government over measures that harm their profits. We know that ISDS lawyers are already talking up the possibility of compensation for corporate giants whose profits have been hit by Governments taking lockdown measures to tackle the covid pandemic. In case Government Members think that is not a real threat, the American firm Cargill won more than $77 million from the Mexican Government after they introduced a tax to deter high-fructose syrup to tackle serious health issues in Mexico.
ISDS provisions create regulatory chill—the temptation for Governments not to introduce necessary public health or, indeed, other environmental measures, for fear of being taken to an ISDS tribunal by a big overseas investor. They create a two-tier system, since it is rarely small and medium-sized enterprises that are able to access these secret courts. There is normally no appeals system for the Government to access, and there is extraordinary secrecy around the nature of the settlements.
The irony is that there is little obvious benefit to businesses from those clauses being included in trade agreements. Indeed, the Government under David Cameron published an analysis of the pros and cons of ISDS clauses and could not find any great pros to champion. Business organisations tell us—although this tends to be in private—that ISDS clauses do not matter much to them; what they take serious notice of is the business environments.
There are real concerns about the labelling of geographical indicators, where products in the UK have a geographic indicator that prevents their being imitated: one thinks of Welsh lamb, Scottish salmon and Armagh Bramley apples, for example. The American negotiators do not like those types of food label and will seek to get rid of them. Surely it is the responsibility of this House of Commons to explore whether those concerns have merit and to push the Government to protect those labels.
Matt Western
That labelling is so important because throughout this process the public have been led to believe, because the Government have insisted on this point, that they as consumers will always be informed about what it is that they are buying. The only way they can be informed of that is by labelling, but that is not going to happen because, as my hon. Friend says, the US negotiators will not allow it to. When I approached KFC—other leading fast-food outlets are of course available—and asked, “Will you be informing the consumer where the chicken has come from that has gone into those nuggets or whatever the product is?” there was no reply, but clearly it will not be doing so, which must be a profound concern.
Gareth Thomas
I have made my point already about chlorinated chicken, and my hon. Friend raises that concern again.
The point that I was specifically referring to is the significance of GIs for many British products, and I think particularly of Welsh lamb and Welsh beef, where the Welsh Government have concentrated much of their promotional effort around the agriculture industry in Wales on talking up the benefits of those GI-protected products. There is real concern that that is at stake in some of the trade negotiations that the Government are taking part in.
It is surely right that this House have the opportunity to scrutinise whether such concerns would be appropriate with respect to a UK-US deal, a UK-Australia deal or a UK-Japan deal. At the moment, we, as the House of Commons, will not have the chance to explore in detail whether that is a concern, or have the opportunity to force Ministers to take action. Our amendments would put that right.
One last concern to flag about a UK-US deal is Donald Trump’s hostility to action on climate, and therefore the possible lack of potential for Ministers to make progress on bringing carbon dioxide emissions down and helping to tackle the climate and nature emergencies that the world and our country face. Those are the potential concerns being talked about around the headline free trade agreement being negotiated by Ministers, which merit proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Amendment 4 would put in place a structure for proper parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements. New clause 5 sets out the process for scrutiny of those free trade agreements before they could be signed, including giving parliamentarians a vote on whether to approve the start of negotiations. That would help to lock in scrutiny of trade negotiations from the very beginning of the process.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
May I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his damascene conversion to parliamentary democracy and scrutiny of trade, which are things that, as part of our membership of the European Union, we would never have been able to engage in? It is only because the Government are getting Brexit done that we can even entertain these ideas.
Gareth Thomas
The hon. Gentleman opens up a whole new area for discussion and I am grateful to him for doing so. Let me confess in these secret discussions here in this House that the biggest mistake that I made when I was a Minister was to agree in 2007—in the run-up to the general election in that year that never was—to appear before seven Select Committees in the space of two weeks, confident in the knowledge that a general election was about to happen and that, actually, I would instead be spending my time with the great people of Harrow West.
Imagine my horror when I discovered that we were not going ahead with a general election and that I would have to appear and talk about our trade policy to seven Select Committees, one after the other over a two-week period. Boy, did I know the detail of trade policy by the end of those that two weeks, and crucially I also had confidence that the negotiating teams working on the EU negotiations knew the detail, too.
The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs mentioned Brexit. The decision of the British people to go ahead with Brexit gives us the opportunity to rewrite the UK’s deal with Canada, which we will consider when we debate amendment 9—I suspect that the whole House could potentially be grateful for that opportunity. I look forward to hearing the hon. Gentleman’s interventions then, too.
As well as seeking a mandate, the amendments would require Ministers to be much more open and transparent with the British people about the likely impact of the negotiations and, crucially, how each round of the negotiations have gone. They would require the consent of the British people through their representatives in this great House of Parliament to agree to any trade treaty. In short, our amendments would genuinely help the British people to take back control of who the businesses they work in can trade with and on what terms. They would give, for example, key workers a say in how the services that we all recognise as essential—such as medicines and drugs and our health services—are delivered, and whether trade agreements should impact on them or not. They would give British people the chance to say, “These are the standards that we want those selling goods and services to us as consumers to abide by.”
I do not think it is unreasonable to expect Ministers to put their plans and their record for securing better trade terms to the House of Commons for approval. Under cover of lots of offers of consultation, Ministers seem determined to keep for themselves and No. 10 a power to decide with who and on what terms a trade deal gets done. The picture is painted already, but let us imagine for a moment that the Prime Minister decides to ignore the concerns of Government Members as well as Members across the House about a potential trade deal with China. The negotiated plans would not need the approval of the British people. We would not have access to any of the detail of how those negotiations were going, and potentially only a handful of MPs would have a say. Parliament would in effect be sidelined. The British people, as a result, would be sidelined.
Let us be honest: Government Ministers would pack any statutory instrument Committee with ambitious young Turks, such as the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, who recently intervened on me, who are desperate for advancement and so inclined to ask tough questions that they would sit on their hands throughout the entire process. If the Prime Minister would not listen to Conservative MPs’ concerns over Dominic Cummings’s future, what confidence can we have that he would listen to their concerns about a future free trade agreement with China or anyone else?
Modern trade agreements are wide ranging and comprehensive. They do not only cover tariff reductions, but a whole range of regulatory issues, including issues of public health, social standards, labour rights and environmental standards, so detailed parliamentary scrutiny, making Ministers work to convince the British people of the merits of a deal, should be seen as entirely appropriate.
There is a need to properly consider the trade-offs in a trade agreement. The Committee might have heard of a book that five-year-olds like called “The Enchanted Wood”, which I am currently reading with my five-year-old. In it there is a magic faraway tree. At the moment the central characters are going up the magic faraway tree and out through a hole in the clouds to a new land: the land of take-what-you-want. I gently suggest that that is the way in which Ministers are presenting the merits of the trade negotiations that they are seeking to do at the moment. They are not seeking to explain the difficult trade-offs that such negotiations involve. They seek to give the impression that it is all wins for the British people and that there are no downsides to trade agreements.
Once they are signed, trade agreements are very hard to unpick. They are not benevolent arrangements.
Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a powerful argument with many different opinions on how important scrutiny is. I can add to that the voices of three other groups. One is the constituents and businesses of Putney: 39% of businesses will be affected by these trade negotiations, but I as their representative would be shut out from scrutinising those negotiations by the lack of scrutiny afforded by the Bill. Another group is the Institute of Directors, which we heard from in our evidence session. It has concerns that it will not know about the standards that will feature in the negotiations. It is concerned about immigration policy, temporary labour mobility, e-commerce and digital commerce and how wide the Bill will go. The final voice is that of the Confederation of British Industry which, in its paper, “Building a world-leading UK trade policy”, said:
“Governments worldwide are finding that public concerns on trade are necessitating an opening up of transparency, and it is becoming increasingly crucial for ratification of trade agreements”
and for building public support for trade agreements that will last. While the rest of the world is opening up its trade scrutiny and getting better trade deals as a result, we are going in the opposite direction.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend is right. I fear that if Ministers persist with their refusal to give the House of Commons greater opportunities to scrutinise and vote on trade deals, her membership of this Committee may be her only opportunity to vote on concerns about a future UK-US deal. She rightly also opens up a concern about immigration. One of the trade-offs in trade deals, under so-called mode 4 agreements, is often the requirement for Governments to give ground on immigration requirements, yet we hear no mention of that from Ministers.
Ministers give the impression that it is a win-win-win and there are no trade-offs, but trade agreements are not benevolent arrangements in which our negotiators can simply rock up to another country’s trade ministry and pick up some wonderful new bargain deals. We cannot just take what we want. That is the nature of negotiations.
Another analogy might be that Ministers talk about trade agreements as if they were the Christmas sales; they only have to turn up and there are amazing bargains to be had. They have not bothered to explain that the negotiator sitting opposite them will want something in return, which will not necessarily be a comfortable choice for us as a country. All the more reason, therefore, for us to have proper scrutiny to consider whether the downsides of a potential trade agreement are not as significant as the gains.
To listen to some sceptics about a UK-US deal with Donald Trump’s Administration, our farmers will be undercut, standards of food production will be lowered, the NHS will be on the table, climate change will not feature, big corporates will be even more powerful and labour rights will be undermined. Ministers will say that is an outrageous and scurrilous description of the likely benefits of a UK-US trade deal. Those are the potential downsides, however, so we should be able to consider whether the trade-offs of a UK-US deal, or indeed any deal with any other country, outweigh the benefits and therefore should not be approved, or whether, in fact, the benefits outweigh the downsides.
It is certainly the job of the Government to try to negotiate the best possible terms for a free trade agreement with another country, but surely it is for the people of this country to decide in the round, through their Members of Parliament, whether, on balance, it is the great deal that it has been set out to be. I ask the Committee why Ministers are apparently desperate to exclude the British people from having the final say, through their MPs, on whether a trade deal goes ahead.
Trade agreements can take a long time to negotiate and can seem like great prizes to have. I recognise the potential desperation of the Secretary of State to rock up to the signing ceremony for a new free trade agreement and bask in the positive glow from newspapers such as The Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail, and maybe even the Daily Mirror and The Guardian, which will provide all sorts of photo opportunities for Members of Parliament. That desperation to get a deal, however, might sometimes take ministerial eyes off the downsides of a deal. It is surely the job of the House to look in the round at whether a trade agreement is genuinely in the interests of the country.
Surely Ministers having to work a bit harder to convince us that they have a genuinely good deal can be only a good thing in law. Giving the British people back control through a series of votes in this House and the other place on future free trade agreements will help to lock in high standards of deal making. Ministers seem to be taking the George Bush approach—the “Read my lips: taxes won’t rise” approach to trade. They are saying, “Trust us, we won’t reduce standards; we will protect the NHS and we will deliver the most amazing opportunities for British business.”
Let us pretend for a minute that I am willing to believe such a message from this particular Minister and this particular Secretary of State. The trouble is, Ministers change. Governments change. A commitment may not outlast the next Minister or Secretary of State who comes along. That is why it is essential to underpin in law a right for the British people, through the people they have chosen to represent them in the House of Commons, to agree to start negotiations and to vote on the final result of those negotiations.
Even over the last three years, ministerial attitudes to trade have shifted back and forth, as we shall discuss in debates on other amendments. One moment, the Government are opposing the idea that they should produce a report on a proposed free trade agreement, then they agree to do it voluntarily but oppose the idea of having that written into law; and then they agree, on Report on the 2017-2019 Trade Bill, to write it into the Bill. Today, we are back to a voluntary process—a commitment given by a Minister who is no longer Trade Minister. If the Executive’s line can change on such a simple point in so short a time, it is essential that the interests of the British people are protected by a lasting lock in law on a clear and sensible process to give the people through their representatives in the House of Commons a direct say on trade agreements that will have a lasting significance for their lives.
Ministers have a record of promising the earth on trade deals. Who can forget the last Secretary of State, who said in October 2017:
“I hear people saying, ‘Oh we won't have any free trade agreements before we leave’. Well believe me we’ll have up to 40 ready for one second after midnight in March 2019”?
Sadly, as the Minister knows only too well, the reality is very different. One of my favourite trade quotes has to be from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, then the Secretary of State for Agriculture I think, who said:
“There is a free trade zone stretching from Iceland to Turkey that all European nations have access to, regardless of whether they are in or out of the euro or EU. After we vote to leave we will remain in this zone. The suggestion that Bosnia, Serbia, Albania and the Ukraine would remain part of this free trade area—and Britain would be on the outside with just Belarus—is as credible as Jean-Claude Juncker joining UKIP.”
We all know what has happened since.
My final quote demonstrating what Ministers have said on free trade agreements is from the now Foreign Secretary, who said:
“I hadn’t quite understood the full extent of this, but…we are particularly reliant…on the Dover-Calais crossing”.
If Ministers do not understand the basics about the nature of British trade, it is even more essential that we lock into law a process for giving Parliament the right to scrutinise free trade agreements.
Governments make mistakes. Ministers make mistakes. Let us think about this Government: too late to the lockdown, a failure to protect care homes, a failure to stockpile personal protective equipment, the chaos over schools reopening and now the test-and-trace app fiasco. Ministers make mistakes. Scrutiny in the House of Commons helps to minimise the damage that those mistakes can have. Given the long-term significance of trade agreements, and to help to prevent mistakes being made, we need to lock in a tighter, stronger process of parliamentary scrutiny.
Matt Western
To amplify that point, irrespective of where we currently sit in the House—whether on the Front Bench or the Back Bench, or on the Government or Opposition Benches—it is important that we have some say. That is not simply about scrutiny and holding the Government to account; it is about asking the questions that ultimately lead to better governance. Surely that is what this place is all about.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend is right. I recognise the temptation, having been a Minister for Trade, to fear scrutiny—to fear being asked detailed questions about rules of origin and things like that. However, that fear helps to make Ministers and officials get over the detail of those hugely important technical questions on trade agreements, which as a result helps to make government better, helping to make trade deals much better as a result.
As I indicated, Ministers had to be dragged kicking and screaming to publish the February 2019 Command Paper on future scrutiny of free trade agreements. A series of commitments were implicit in that Command Paper, but we have heard in recent times that some of those commitments may no longer enjoy ministerial support. Indeed, there seems to be some suggestion that Ministers will no longer publish reports at the end of negotiating rounds. Perhaps the Minister can clarify that point in his wind-up remarks.
Certainly, there has been zero progress on agreeing to give a Committee of this House access to confidential information and briefing from negotiators. If ministerial views on parliamentary scrutiny of new FTAs have changed since the publication of that Command Paper, surely the British people have a further justified claim for ensuring that a process for scrutinising all trade agreements be locked in to law. If Ministers are determined to row back on that commitment to work with a dedicated Committee in both Houses, providing confidential information and private briefings from the negotiating teams, there is even more need to lock into law new powers for Parliament to have more leverage over Ministers regarding those trade agreements.
The amendments would also widen the scrutiny requirements for continuity trade agreements that Ministers are negotiating with countries that already have a trade agreement with the European Union. Many agreements already notionally negotiated have small but significant differences from the original EU agreement on which they are based. At the moment, the British people do not have a say, through their representatives in the House, on whether those changes were appropriate.
It is slowly becoming clear, from the little we are able to glean from those negotiations on continuity trade agreements, that the agreements that have been signed, and indeed being negotiated, are slowly making the terms of trade for British businesses and our existing partners and allies worse. As Professor Winters made clear in his evidence last Tuesday, in conversations about how negotiations on the so-called roll-over agreement with Japan were going, Ministers and negotiators were being studiously vague about what was really going on.
The detail of concerns expressed about what has been negotiated only underlines the need for increased scrutiny—not only of all future FTAs but, crucially, of existing continuity deals. Nick Ashton-Hart of the Digital Trade Network noted that the UK-Swiss deal that has been negotiated has only three mutual recognition chapters, compared with the EU-Swiss deal, which has some 20. It will be interesting to know from Ministers why the UK-Swiss deal had just three mutual recognition chapters whereas its predecessor, the EU-Swiss deal, had 20. Apparently, there are similar problems with customs arrangements. In the case of Norway, only a goods arrangement was rolled over, so British companies have no idea at the moment what they will be able to access in terms of services markets in Norway from 1 January next year. There is a similar position with Switzerland—much has not been rolled over. Companies operating in services markets will have little idea at the moment what access to those markets in Switzerland they will have from 1 January.
Matt Western
My hon. Friend is quite right to highlight the vulnerability of UK automotive manufacturing, particularly with Japanese plants, and the consequences of that throughout the entire sector. The Japanese clearly want to hold off on any negotiation with the UK until there is clarity on our future position with the EU. I recall attending a Japanese ambassador’s event two and a half years ago, at which the Japanese chamber of commerce said, “We will be watching you very closely to see what you decide to do, particularly in relation to your arrangements with the EU. If you get it wrong, watch this space.” The UK is incredibly vulnerable. That is why the Japanese are treading very carefully around any trade deal with us and why they will only come to high-line arrangements; they are going to hold off until they can see what happens with the EU.
Gareth Thomas
That is a very good point. Specific Japanese automotive manufacturers such as Nissan have been very public with their concerns about the way trade negotiations are going. In that sense, they amplify the case for proper parliamentary scrutiny of our future trade agreements.
A series of witnesses, as my hon. Friend the Member for Putney mentioned, made clear the lack of proper parliamentary scrutiny of trade agreements. Indeed, it would be fair to say that a majority of the witnesses who appeared before us in the three evidence sessions we had last week noted the lack of proper parliamentary scrutiny for free trade agreements and expressed serious concerns about it.
I remember that Sam Lowe from the Centre for European Reform suggested that our scrutiny of trade is very poor and not particularly democratic when compared with the US and the European Union, and he gave the UK parliamentary process for trade treaty scrutiny less than five out of 10. He made it clear that some agreements that Ministers have negotiated are purely continuity agreements and alluded to those with the Faroe Islands, Chile and Jordan. He thought there would be substantially different trade agreements with Turkey, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine, and in effect fundamentally new agreements—surely they are not within the terms of the Bill, if it is limited merely to agreements we have through the EU with existing trade allies—with Japan, Canada and the stage 2 deal with South Korea, which will merit a different, more robust parliamentary process.
David Lawrence from Trade Justice Movement said he has heard “nothing new” billed by Ministers on scrutiny of trade agreements. He described the process as archaic, dating back to the first world war when it was used for secret defence treaties. It has not changed in about 100 years. Trade Justice Movement made clear that it has relied on reports from Washington and Brussels to find out what is going on in trade talks that the UK is a part of, which again underlines the point that surely the British people, through their representatives in the House of Commons, should have access to much more detail.
The principal justification that Ministers have deployed and hidden behind to resist giving the British people more control over such agreements is a decades-old convention first articulated, I believe, by Arthur Ponsonby in 1924. One can understand why Ministers look to Mr Ponsonby for inspiration as he was a Labour Member of Parliament, from whom Ministers get their best advice. Trade then was very much with the different parts of the empire; it looks completely different now, with the drastic changes we have seen to world trade and, of course, our exit from the European Union.
That convention was formalised in part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which no one conceived would still be in use should Britain exit from the European Union and need to negotiate all sorts of future free trade agreements on our own, without our EU allies. CRAG does not require Parliament’s approval for the Government to ratify treaties. Indeed, as a House of Commons Library briefing helps to make painfully clear,
“it gives any parliamentary objection to ratification (or similar processes like accession) a limited”—
limited is crucial—“statutory effect”. There is a theoretical power for the House of Commons to block ratification, but in practice that power does not amount to much. The briefing continues:
“Parliament does not have to debate or vote on the treaty, and indeed time to do so is hard to secure given the Government’s control over the timetable of the House of Commons.”
That the Conservative Government have a large majority underlines how it is entirely in No. 10’s gift whether a debate and a vote takes place on a UK-US deal, a UK-China deal, UK membership of the transatlantic partnership or on a deal with Australia or New Zealand. Why should not Members of Parliament have a vote on those free trade agreements?
It is worth underlining that Parliament cannot make amendments to a trade treaty under the CRAG process as the treaty will have already been signed. Parliament can only object to ratification of an entire treaty, and that is very much a theoretical power—it is fantasy. There is also the slightly less than theoretical option of Parliament refusing to put into domestic law the different elements of a new trade agreement. Again, with a Government with an 80-seat majority, it is difficult to see how that, in any way, could be anything other than a fantastical possibility.
The Chair
Going forward, I am happy for Members to remove their jackets if they feel the need to do so.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West has given the Committee a tour de force that is worthy of parliamentary history. The Minister says it lasted an hour and a quarter. I hate to correct him on this occasion, because there are plenty of other opportunities to do so, but I made it one hour and 23 minutes, or possibly one hour and 24 minutes. It was slightly longer than an hour and a quarter but was very good anyway.
My hon. Friend made some incredibly important points about the amendments we have tabled, and about exactly why putting a proper set of parliamentary scrutiny procedures in place is so important. He described the 19 or 20 agreements that have gone through already, the lack of scrutiny of those procedures—some are more significant than others, such as the agreement with South Korea—the remaining 20 or so agreements that have to go through, and the prospect of having a scrutiny system for future international trade agreements. As he quite rightly pointed out, the framework of the Bill is to:
“Make provision about the implementation of international trade agreements”,
which provides the opportunity to get this right and to get it in place. That is why our amendments are so important.
In an intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Putney absolutely nailed this as well. I do not want to play down in any way the importance of the one-hour-and-23-minute contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West, and her single intervention did not go into the depth that he did, but she made a very good point about the scrutiny of trade policy in this country and the fact that it is going in the opposite direction to that taken by almost everybody else in the world, at a time when international trade agreements are so significant and so far reaching. They are about so much more than trade, which is the point my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West made later in his speech, when he described the way that our current procedures are based on the 1924 Ponsonby rule.
In an intervention, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, who is no longer in his place, made the Brexiteer point about taking back control, in all its lack of glory, yet I am afraid he was wrong. The European Union had full scrutiny arrangements. This is one of the points about our amendments. We are now left with a complete absence of those arrangements, and the fact is that we should be looking to replicate, at the very least, what we inherit from the EU.
I will read from the EU’s step-by-step guide to trade deals:
“After both sides sign, the Council examines the proposal for conclusion and sends the agreement to the Parliament for its consent (approval)…The Parliament receives the agreement. The Parliament and its trade committee (‘INTA’) consult with representatives of industry, trade unions, environmental groups and other outside experts about the agreement. The committee:
• writes up a report on the agreement
• votes on it
…The whole Parliament votes on whether to give its consent to the agreement. This is a ‘Yes/No’ vote.”
We have nothing on that scale of detailed scrutiny to replace such arrangements in order to look at the agreements to which the Government want to confine the Bill, or for future agreements. We are left with a process of rubber stamping, not scrutiny. In his analysis, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West set out the dangers of that lack of scrutiny when he described in detail the evidence presented to us that only three of 20 mutual recognition agreement chapters from the Swiss-EU deal are in place in the UK-Swiss deal; that only the goods element of the Norway deal has been rolled over; that the South Koreans want to renegotiate after two years; and that only two of 11 products from the equivalent EU-South Korea deal have been included at the same zero tariffs for export to South Korea.
My hon. Friend also made some good points about the lack of trade negotiating expertise, which he said has been raised by the Japanese and South Korean negotiators. It has also been raised by the US and Canadians as a reason that they are reluctant to engage with the UK. They feared that the quality of negotiations would be so weak as to affect the outcome of those negotiations so badly that it simply was not worth engaging. Things have moved on a bit on the American side since they raised those reservations last year, but we still await signs of progress with Canada. It must be the role of scrutiny, as my hon. Friend said, to try to avoid mistakes that we will regret for years to come.
My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington made several good interventions, including on the need to avoid mistakes. He is quite right about that. If we do not get it right now, we will pay for years to come. However, this place is about not only governance, but representing constituents. We are the only 650 people in the United Kingdom with the ability to scrutinise and potentially vote on such matters in Parliament, which is why it is so important that we have access to that level of scrutiny and that Parliament is able to play its full part. That European system is a good place to start.
On Second Reading and on other occasions, the Minister described this as a continuity Bill, and he described my speech—I do not know whether kindly or unkindly—as a continuity speech on a continuity Bill. He is keen to play this as a continuity Bill, and of course, for many of those agreements, it is; where there have been only changes of wording to reflect that the agreement relates to the UK rather than EU, that is true and we have acknowledged it. However, for many other agreements, it is not true—it is far more than that.
That is also true of scrutiny, because we have not applied continuity to the system of scrutiny. If this was a continuity agreement, that EU system’s level of scrutiny would be replicated as far as possible, by having a Committee with those responsibilities, having that level of engagement and consultation on the content of the deal and having those kinds of vote. However, that is not what is being offered. That is why our amendments cover it as one option, because that is precisely what we should be doing.
The Library note is a good place to go to as it sets out what is going on elsewhere in the world. We have no formal role in scrutinising most treaties while they are being negotiated, but while they are being negotiated is the only point at which the terms of the proposed treaty could be amended. The Minister may well want to say this, but I will say it for him; I will anticipate what he might say. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West mentioned the statement on the mandate for the US deal. There was a statement on the mandate for the EU deal. There was a statement on the first round of negotiations—
The Chair
Order. I will now suspend the Committee for one minute of silence in memory of the victims of the knife attack in Reading.
Sitting suspended.
Bill Esterson
It is appropriate to pause and reflect at this time to remember that terrible attack. The thoughts of all present in the Committee are with those affected—the victims, their families and the emergency services and civilians who intervened.
I was referring to the processes of scrutiny on trade agreements, as the Minister might describe them. The statements that we have had—statements in general—permit him to say what the Government are going to do. They allow for a five-minute response from the Opposition, a three-minute response from the SNP and individual questions from Back Benchers. That is not thorough scrutiny. It does not allow cross-examination. It does not allow scrutiny beyond the Chamber.
There is a limit to what a parliamentary statement can achieve and what it does achieve, and the idea that written parliamentary questions deliver very much other than a stonewall from Ministers—this Minister is very good at that—would be laughable, if that were to be used as an example of detailed scrutiny. Questions in the Chamber are invariably met with an ability by Ministers to avoid answering them, rather than shedding very much light. The Government control the timetable, so the ability to debate in detail is limited. Of course, we have Opposition day debates, but we are competing for time with so many other urgent and important topics, which limits our ability to scrutinise.
Committees are important and they can carry out scrutiny, but without access to negotiating texts and without detailed engagement in the development of mandates, all these processes are limited by definition. At this time, when other countries are looking to expand—whether that is Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the United States—in all those countries there is far greater access throughout the process of the development of mandates and in the scrutiny of negotiating texts, and greater engagement of industry, trade unions, civil society, environmental groups and elected representatives.
There is a lack of continuity in scrutiny from what we have now, but, as the Library note sets out, there are at least four possible ways for Parliaments to be involved in treaties: first, by setting the negotiating mandate; secondly, by scrutinising negotiations; thirdly, by approving or objecting to ratification; and fourthly, by passing implementing legislation for treaties that need changes to domestic law. All those are covered by amendments. All those are what my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West has covered in great detail, so I shall not go into that same detail on the amendments. That is set out for us in the Library note and covered by these proposals.
International trade agreements cover so much now that they deserve that level of domestic scrutiny. I thought the example of HS2 and the way its development has been subjected to massive scrutiny, compared with the minimal scrutiny of international trade agreements, made a pretty good argument about what is wrong and why there is the need to put this right. If not in the Bill, when?
Gareth Thomas
There is perhaps an even better example to use in comparing the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of a potential UK-US deal, or any other free trade agreement deal, with existing legislation. The Minister, as a London Member of Parliament, will remember that Transport for London sought additional powers in a private Bill and there was substantial scrutiny of that private Bill on the Floor of the House of Commons. That is vastly more than Ministers are planning for a UK-US deal or, indeed, any other free trade agreement.
Bill Esterson
That is another good example. I thought for a minute my hon. Friend was going to mention Heathrow, because the Minister, last time he was in this job, had to resign from it to vote against the Government. However, I think we are in different territory and the current Prime Minister and he were in the same place there, although I do not know whether the Prime Minister is talking of lying down in front of bulldozers these days—[Interruption.] I do not know whether the Minister will want to respond to that.
The Library note also mentions the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, or CRAG, provisions. The point about CRAG is that it does not require Parliament’s approval for the Government to ratify treaties. That is the point my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West made. There is such a democratic deficit here, which is why these matters need to be set straight. In the previous debate on this in Committee, the point was made that Labour introduced CRAG. Yes, we did, but we introduced CRAG in the context of being members of the European Union and in the context of the scrutiny system that I described a few minutes ago.
CRAG is no longer suitable precisely because we are no longer party to that European Union system of scrutiny—which, by the way, we were entirely able to contribute to and to access as much as any other nation, and which was far ahead of what is being offered now, albeit concerns were raised about the level of engagement over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership under that system. That is why we should be pushing for a better system than that of the European Union and the one we have just left. TTIP showed that we need to continue to improve the level of scrutiny and engagement, and the involvement of wider society.
There is no continuity in scrutiny, whatever the degree of continuity may be in the agreements being considered. The House of Lords amended the previous Bill to give Parliament a role in setting the mandate for trade negotiations and approving the final agreement, which goes to the point made in the Library note. The Command Paper that my hon. Friend referred to was produced in time for the Report stage in the House of Lords. Although the Lords felt that the Command Paper did not go far enough, it started to make progress, so I am keen to hear the Minister’s response to my hon. Friend’s question about what has happened to the recommendations in the Command Paper.
There is quite a lot of support on the question of what good scrutiny looks like, as set out in the House of Commons Library paper and as in the evidence from David Lawrence, who described broadly similar points. The written submissions from a number of organisations make the same point about debates and votes on objectives; reports back to Parliament on progress; ideally, the publication of texts from each round; a debate and vote on the deal after negotiations; a public consultation; and an independent impact assessment that looks at social and environmental factors, which is why we tabled new clause 6.
As my hon. Friend said, we have scrutiny measures from world war two that are completely inappropriate. There is no way, as David Lawrence told us on Thursday, that trade deals can meet high standards without more scrutiny. As to future trade agreements, he told us that unless we get this right now, there will not be an opportunity to revisit how we approach scrutiny.
David Lawrence said on Thursday that sequencing issues are not being addressed in the Bill and that there should be priorities in respect of when we legislate. That goes back to my hon. Friend’s point about the response from Japan, South Korea and Canada. They want to know what is in the EU deal before they reach an agreement with us. The EU deal, because of its impact on the agreements that we were party to through our EU membership, should come first before the US deal.
We need a level of scrutiny in place for those agreements and for the US deal, which will concern public services, digital services and regulations on health and food standards, which are the subject of a series of amendments that I imagine we will reach this afternoon. There are similar concerns about Canada, which is why greater scrutiny needs to be agreed to in the Bill. We should be able to consider the exact consequences of that deal. The scrutiny should be of the same degree and nature as that described by my hon. Friend earlier.
My hon. Friend mentioned Sam Lowe’s evidence and his three boxes. The problem deals are in box 3: Japan, Canada, Mexico and Ukraine. Those countries want the certainty of an EU-UK deal before they negotiate with us, for reasons related to future arrangements for mutual recognition or rules of origin. The examples that my hon. Friend gave of what has already been agreed in the deals with South Korea and Switzerland show what those concerns might be.
Gareth Thomas
My hon. Friend will remember that Professor Winters described the information he got back from negotiators about how the UK-Japan talks were going as “studiously” vague. Is that not a fair description of all the information we have had back from Ministers thus far about the progress on free trade agreements? That is all the more reason why this group of amendments needs to be in the Bill.
Bill Esterson
The arguments set out by my hon. Friend were extremely well made by our hon. Friend the Member for Brent North two years ago. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West has surpassed the formidable nature of the arguments made on that occasion.
Bill Esterson
Having sat and listened to both speeches—as did the Minister—my hon. Friend’s contribution has taken us to a whole new level, and the point he just made is exactly right.
George Peretz, QC made the point that scrutiny can help negotiators. Parliament just will not accept that point in this country, but the US uses that tactic. It is a strength to have the buy-in of Congress for the US trade negotiators, because they can say “I cannot agree that because Congress will not support it.” That is a standard negotiating tactic used across the world. It is used by trade unions that go back to their members. It is how good negotiators operate. They do it by having engagement, by building trust from their stakeholders and by using the strength of that engagement, trust and support as a negotiating tactic. There are many good examples around the world. We should be seeking to emulate them. These amendments give a good guiding light on how to do so, and I suggest to Members and to the Government that they seriously consider taking them on board in the same way as the House of Lords did last time.
Gareth Thomas
I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the document that he briefly referred to: the Command Paper, “Processes for making free trade agreements after the United Kingdom has left the European Union”. He will remember from that Command Paper Ministers’ commitment to have a close relationship with a specific parliamentary Committee in each House. They proposed
“to work with the House Authorities to establish which committee”
it should be,
“including the possibility of creating a new one”.
They go on to say that the Committee
“could have access to sensitive information”
that would not be more widely available. Has my hon. Friend heard of any update on the progress of establishing such a—
Parliamentary Constituencies bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 23rd June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Parliamentary Constituencies Act 2020 View all Parliamentary Constituencies Act 2020 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 June 2020 - (23 Jun 2020)
Tuesday 23 June | Until no later than 9.55 am | Dr Alan Renwick, The Constitution Unit, University College London Professor Robert Hazell, The Constitution Unit, University College London |
Tuesday 23 June | Until no later than 10.20 am | The Green Party |
Mrs Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
On a point of order, Sir David. Can I perhaps ask that Members be given priority to sit, so we can hear the evidence?
The Chair
That is what I thought would have been done. Surely the Members should be in the main body.
Mrs Miller
Further to that point of order, Sir David. Actually, perhaps the Whip can make room. Thank you, Sir David.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Robert Hazell and Dr Alan Renwick gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Professor Robert Hazell and Dr Alan Renwick, both from the constitution unit at University College London. We have until 9.55. They are appearing virtually, in audio only. Professor Robert Hazell, can you hear me?
Professor Hazell: Yes, I can hear you, and I apologise for being a disembodied voice. Can you hear me?
The Chair
We can hear you loud and clear, professor. Dr Alan Renwick, can you hear us?
Dr Renwick: Good morning. I can hear you very well.
The Chair
You have probably never taken part in one of these sittings before, and I do not think that any of us have done so in these circumstances, so it is a big learning curve for us all, but please relax and enjoy the sitting. Colleagues are not here to interrogate you. They are trying to get information out of you to enrich the deliberations that the Committee will begin on Thursday. Professor Hazell, would you briefly introduce yourself, please?
Professor Hazell: I am Professor Robert Hazell. I was the founder and first director of the constitution unit at University College London and I am professor of government and the constitution.
The Chair
Dr Renwick, would you introduce yourself, please?
Dr Renwick: I am Dr Alan Renwick. I am the deputy director of the constitution unit at University College London and I lead our work on elections and referendums.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Chloe Smith)
Q
“among the best in the world”?
Dr Renwick: Perhaps I can kick off. Thank you, Minister, for that question, and thank you to the Committee for inviting us this morning.
As you say, the boundary commissions in the UK are unusual in international comparison in the degree to which they uphold the principle of independence. They are appointed in a process that, on the whole, upholds that principle. As we said in our submission, we have some concerns that the safeguards should be enhanced, but the process that the commissions follow is independent of Government and of Parliament, as it should be. The principle that should be followed is that those who have a direct interest in the outcome of the review process should not be able to determine the outcome of that process, so it is proper that Parliament sets the overall rules but that the process is then conducted by the independent boundary commissions. Of course, it is also proper that MPs should be able to make submissions to the boundary commissions, as they do, but that the final decisions ought to be made by the commissions.
At present, the reviews are conducted by the boundary commissions, but it is then up to Parliament to decide whether to implement those reviews. It seems to us that that is simply a very clear breach of the principle of independence. There have been three cases now—in 1969, 2013 and 2018—when the review was blocked in one way or another. That is not a desirable outcome. Whether or not partisan or personal interests were involved in those decisions, at the very least the perception is created that they could have been. That is undesirable, and we now have boundaries that at least in England are based on electoral registers from 2000—clearly, they are very out of date.
We have a strong view that it is correct to have automatic implementation of reviews, which already works very well and without any problem in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. It ought to be introduced in the UK as well, alongside better safeguards to ensure that the current independence of the boundary commissions from Government cannot be taken away by Government in the future.
Cat Smith (Lancaster and Fleetwood) (Lab)
Q
“safeguards against a government that wanted to interfere are relatively weak.”
Of course I am not suggesting that that is the position of the current Government, but obviously when we legislate we need to safeguard against any interference by future Governments who may wish to interfere with the process.
You explained that you have various concerns about the Bill and you suggest various solutions to strengthen it. What action do you think could be taken to improve the Bill, in order to safeguard us from political interference? Also, can you expand slightly on some of the solutions that you outlined in that blog, for example an amendment perhaps to legislate to bar members of or donors to political parties from appointment to the commission, as is the case with local government?
Professor Hazell: Shall I answer that question? The first point to make is that the greatest risk of political interference is the one that Alan Renwick referred to in his first answer—namely, the ability of Parliament at the final stage to vote down the orders made by the boundary commissioners for their proposed changes. The strongest single point in our submission to the Committee is that in future the boundary commissions’ reports should be implemented automatically, without any opportunity for Parliament to intervene at that final stage.
As we also argue in our submission, however, there is a risk that once Parliament loses the ability to control the final decision, the Government may seek to influence the work of the boundary commissions prior to that final stage. I think, Ms Smith, that was the burden of your question, and in our submission we propose four ways in which the independence of the commission in future should be strengthened, mainly through tightening up the appointments process.
Briefly, those four ways are as follows: first, that in future the commissioners should be appointed for a single, non-renewable term, as with many other constitutional watchdogs, which I can enumerate if you want further details; secondly, that they should be subject to the same political restrictions as members of the Local Government Boundary Commission for England, which performs a very similar boundary defining function; thirdly, that the deputy chair of each commission should sit on the appointments panel, as indeed they did last year in the selection of two new boundary commissioners; and fourthly, that the appointing Minister should be required to appoint only from the names recommended by the panel.
Therefore, we are recommending that paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of the “Governance Code on Public Appointments” should be disapplied for these appointments. I remind members of the Committee that those paragraphs allow Ministers in some cases to appoint someone who has not been deemed appointable by the assessment panel, and in exceptional cases Ministers may decide to appoint a candidate without holding a competition.
Mrs Miller
Q
Dr Renwick: One impact is simply the delay that is introduced into the process. As I said, at present we have boundaries that were first used in 2010, and in 2005 in the case of in Scotland, which are based on electoral registers that in England’s case date from 2000. Those registers are now 20 years old, and clearly that delay is undesirable.
Secondly, as I suggested, there is at least a danger of the perception that the process is not as impartial as it should be, and it seems to me clearly undesirable to create that perception.
Thirdly, there is the danger of the reality that the process is not as impartial as it should be. I do not think it is helpful for me to speculate on what the motivations might or might not have been for the decisions that have been taken on those reviews. Perhaps it is safer to go back to the 1969 case, given that no one involved in that decision is present any longer. I think it is fairly universally accepted that that review was blocked because the Labour Government at the time thought that they would lose seats as a result of the implementation of the review and therefore they did not want that to go ahead.
There are similar perceptions in the case of the 2013 decision not to proceed with the review and the decision in 2018 not to go ahead with the review, but I do not want to speculate on whether those perceptions are correct.
The Chair
We have at least six colleagues wishing to ask questions and only 14 minutes left.
Mrs Miller
Q
Dr Renwick: Some people have expressed a concern that, because the boundaries are old, they have had a marked biasing effect on election results. The evidence shows that, in fact, the effect is quite small. There are a number of factors that can mean that a vote cast for one party has more weight in the overall results than a vote cast for another party. The main factors that shape that are turnout. Turnout in Labour seats tends to be lower than turnout in Conservative seats, and therefore Labour MPs tend to be elected with fewer votes than Conservative MPs.
The second big factor is the efficiency of the distribution of votes across the country. Between 1997 and 2005, the Labour vote was much more efficiently distributed than the Conservative vote. Labour had tended to win more marginal seats and did not waste, as it were, lots of votes in constituencies that it lost, whereas in the last several elections the Conservatives have had the more efficient distribution of votes across the country. Those are the main factors that lead to biases in terms of the overall election result.
There is also some effect from the distribution of constituencies—both the distribution between the countries within the United Kingdom and the distribution within those countries. At recent elections those effects have produced small biases in favour of Labour, but those are fairly small biases. I am sure you will hear much more on this when you hear evidence from Charles Pattie and David Rossiter, who are the real experts on this, but the consensus in the literature on this is that that effect is fairly small. The effect that really matters is the effect on the democratic principles, not the outcome of elections.
The Chair
I thank our witnesses for their full answers, but I am afraid we will have to have very brief questions and responses.
Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)
Q
Dr Renwick: Both of the principles that you have just mentioned matter, and so does the principle that there should not be too much chopping and changing of constituency boundaries from election to election. There is no single correct answer to the question of how those different principles should be balanced. The Venice Commission from the Council of Europe recommends a maximum deviation from perfect equality in numerical terms of 10%. Currently, under the UK rules we have 5%. The evidence from Charles Pattie and David Rossiter, which I am sure you will hear this afternoon, suggests that something like a deviation of 8% would allow much greater account to be taken of local community ties and much less chopping and changing between elections.
Clive Efford
Q
Dr Renwick: I think there should be a maximum, but there is a good case for saying that the maximum could be extended a little bit without undue cost to the equality of the vote.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
Q
Dr Renwick: What I am referring to is the guidance from the Venice Commission. My reading of that is that it implies a 10% deviation from the average. If we look at other countries, we see that in New Zealand the deviation is permitted as 5% from the average, and in Australia it is, so far as possible, 3% from the average, and not more than 10%. Therefore, numbers around 5% to 10% seem to be fairly standard. There is no answer that an academic can give you as to what is the correct number, but something in that region is appropriate.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Dr Renwick: The difference between Scotland and England is in the practice of the Boundary Commissions with respect to splitting wards. The Boundary Commission for Scotland is much more willing to split wards than the Boundary Commission for England. As I understand it—and you heard evidence on this last week from Tony Bellringer—it is very difficult for the Boundary Commission for England to split wards, because it does not have sufficient evidence to do that. It seems clear to me that, if you can split wards in a way that does not break community ties, that is a better way of achieving the balance between the principles of equality of votes and maintaining community ties than by increasing the margin. If the Boundary Commission for England were able to split wards more often, that would certainly help the overall process.
Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)
Q
Dr Renwick: No, I do not think so. I think the principle should be that Parliament sets up the rules in the first place that will allow the boundary commissions to produce a satisfactory set of recommendations, and that those recommendations should then be implemented.
Christian Matheson
Q
Dr Renwick: Yes, I certainly agree that 650 is a better number than 600, but it was Parliament that legislated to go to 600, so it needs legislation to make a decision to move back to 650.
Christian Matheson
Q
Professor Hazell: Perhaps I could answer that, if I may? We are suggesting both. We strongly support automaticity, as Alan Renwick has said. In conjunction with that, to bolster the independence of the boundary commissions, in our submission we propose four important changes to the way in which the commissioners are appointed. Some of those are already matters of good practice, which I am glad to say are followed—for example, that the deputy chair was on the panel for the appointment of junior commissioners last year. To prevent any backsliding, we argue that those four changes should be written into law, so we are inviting the Committee, if it supports the principle of automaticity, to say that we should also have those further safeguards written into the same Bill, in order to strengthen the independence of the boundary commissioners.
The Chair
Order. We have three people wanting to ask questions and three minutes left. Mr Linden?
David Linden (Glasgow East) (SNP)
Q
The Chair
Before that is answered, can we finally have Jane Hunt’s question as well, please?
Jane Hunt (Loughborough) (Con)
Q
Dr Renwick: I can take David Linden’s questions and perhaps Robert can take the second question. I think the New Zealand process is too fast. In a sense, in New Zealand it matters a little bit less because the constituencies are only part of the overall electoral system—it is a more complex electoral system, so they can get away with it in New Zealand. I do not think that would be appropriate in the UK.
In New Zealand there is essentially one set of draft recommendations, then the consultation and then the final set, whereas in the UK we go through several steps. The UK system, which the Bill proposes to maintain, provides the appropriate safeguards and assurances that MPs and others can make representations if the original recommendations are not quite right.
Professor Hazell: To answer the question from Jane Hunt, yes, it is the case that although the boundary commissions are formally chaired by the Speaker, in practice he plays no role and never has. The commissions are led by the deputy chair, who, in each of the four nations of the UK, is a High Court judge, or equivalent. To assist the deputy chair, other commissioners are appointed by the Government; for the Boundary Commission for England they are appointed by the Cabinet Office Minister. The commissioners appointed last year, for example, were appointed for a five-year term, which is renewable. In our submission, we argue that future boundary commissioners should be appointed only for a single non-renewable term, because that is now best practice in relation to other important constitutional watchdogs.
I will mention three recent changes to the law to make the appointment of those people non-renewable. The parliamentary ombudsman is now appointable for a non-renewable seven-year term; that law was changed in 2006. In 2011, the Comptroller and Auditor General appointment was made for 10 years, non-renewable. In 2012, the Information Commissioner appointment was made non-renewable for a single term of seven years.
The Chair
Professor Hazell and Dr Renwick, on behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much for the time you have spent with us. We all feel cheated that we could not see your faces; nevertheless, we are very grateful for the evidence you have given us.
Examination of Witness
Chris Williams gave evidence.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
Chair, before we come on to that, we have had several references in evidence to the OSCE report. Would it be possible for the Clerks to get the link for that and send it through to members of the Committee?
The Chair
That is a splendid idea. Thank you for that suggestion. It will be done sooner rather than later.
I am delighted that Chris Williams is here in person. He is the head of elections and field operations for the Green party. We have until 10.20 am for this session, not as was indicated on the Order Paper. Mr Williams, please briefly introduce yourself.
Chris Williams: I am Chris Williams. I work for the Green party of England and Wales as head of elections and field operations.
Chloe Smith
Q
Chris Williams: I can run through our thoughts briefly. Thank you for the involvement we have been invited to have with yourself and civil servants.
We are supportive of the change to 650 MPs. We are also pleased that the electoral register data to be used has moved back to March 2020. A minor improvement would have been to move it to December 2019, but that is still a good move. Changing the future reviews to every eight years is positive.
I have some concerns around how the constituencies will end up looking in terms of representation of the communities that we want to see well represented as part of the system we operate within. The 5% tolerance limit is potentially challenging. We have some concerns around how all this will be perceived in Wales. The last speakers spoke about automaticity. I have commented on perception and the perception that any involvement from the Government could be seen as problematic without the ability for Back Benchers to stop any recommendations once they come back from the commissions.
Finally, if I have understood things correctly, in future reviews, the Bill says the deadline in any year for the commissions to report back to the Government or the Speaker is 1 October. In future, there would not be very long before a general election—just seven months. That does not give a great deal of time for reselection and candidate selection to take place and for smaller parties and independents to get their act together, so to speak. I think moving the date forward to something more like July before a general election would provide a bit of protection there.
Cat Smith
Q
Chris Williams: That is a good question. I guess I should say—I appreciate it is beyond the scope of this Bill—that the Green party does not support the first-past-the-post system, but one of the benefits of it is the very strong link between Members of Parliament and the communities they represent. If members of a community perceive that their constituency is of a very bizarre make-up, or that they have been stuck together for some convenience, that breaks down that benefit that currently exists with MPs.
Certainly from my experience last time around, when we were seeking 600 constituencies with a 5% tolerance limit, some very bizarre constituencies were put together. I looked at the west midlands make-up in some detail, and some of the constituencies were incredibly bizarre, with an awful lot of complaints. One was effectively a sausage-shaped constituency that was very, very long—I think it was the Birmingham Selly Oak and Halesowen constituency. The only thing that the boundary commission, bless them, could find to operate within the tolerance limit that had a community tie was a canal, but of course if you take that to its extremity, you will end up connecting some places that are very far away from each other. Giving the Commission the flexibility to have a 7.5% variance in extreme circumstances, where it is necessary, would help avoid some of those problems. I can see some real problems in rural areas as well, where I think a greater tolerance would really help.
The Chair
Just before I turn to Mrs Miller, I want colleagues who are sitting in the Public Gallery to realise that I am aware that they are part of the Committee. If they want to ask a question, they should indicate to me and then speak from the microphone, as Mrs Miller has done.
Mrs Miller
Q
Chris Williams: There is an argument to be made, particularly around Ynys Môn. I am worried about how all this is going to be perceived in Wales, with a drop of about 20% in the number of MPs, and I think it would be a softener if they see they have been treated equally with England and Scotland, with Ynys Môn seen as a protected constituency. There is an argument about taking into account other geographical features when protecting constituencies, but if you start to look at mountains or rivers, you then start to look at the height or width of mountain ranges, and you get in a complete mess. Certainly, there is a sea in the way between Ynys Môn and the mainland, which is exactly the same criterion that is being used for the Isle of Wight, the Western Isles and Orkney and Shetland. I think it should be applied in Wales as well; otherwise there would be a rightful feeling of wrongdoing to Wales.
David Linden
Q
Chris Williams: Our Scottish Green colleagues will have a similar position to you on the Union. I guess we come from a perspective of wanting every vote to have the same weight and potentially the same impact on an election, in terms of determining the future Government. The difficulty we have is that whatever we do with the process and with first past the post, there is always going to be some inequity between the constituencies, even if we have no tolerance or variance limit at all. By the time they come in, the numbers will still be different, because the data is always historical and never accurate enough. If we are going to go down the line of every vote being pretty much equal, and trying to make that as equal as possible within the system, it is very hard to argue for a great deal of difference between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I would say that a vote in Hartlepool is as equal as one in Ogmore but, at the same time, I can see that this might well bring greater arguments for further devolution.
Chris Clarkson (Heywood and Middleton) (Con)
Q
Chris Williams: I guess I argue that there should not be that inequity, except for protected constituencies. Every vote should be as equal as possible in terms of being able to influence the future make-up of the Government.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Chris Williams: Yes, unfortunately, but I think that we need to consider the Ynys Môn example. Giving the commission the flexibility of a greater tolerance limit will perhaps mean that places like Wales will feel a little less hard done by, and constituencies will be a little more representative of communities.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Chris Williams: I would agree with them.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Chris Williams: Unfortunately, yes. I dare say that England as a whole will not necessarily feel a huge benefit from about 10 extra MPs, but an area like Greater Manchester might well do so.
The Chair
No other colleagues are indicating that they wish to ask a question so, if that is the case, Mr Williams, before leaving, do you wish to add anything?
Chris Williams: I think I have made the key points. Thank you for having me.
The Chair
On behalf of the Committee, we are very grateful for the time that you spent with us. Thank you.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Iain McLean and Professor Sir John Curtice gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Professor McLean: Thank you, Chair. I am Iain McLean, professor of politics at Oxford University. John—as he will say in a moment—and I are academics who have been working in this area for decades. I have been a witness at various boundary inquiries, at the fourth and fifth English reviews, never on behalf of political parties, but always on behalf of local authorities. I have published academic papers pointing out that the former rules were mutually contradictory. That was fixed in the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and it is important that the Bill should not unfix it. I will leave it there.
Professor Sir John Curtice: I am John Curtice, professor of politics at the University of Strathclyde. I have written, as Ian was implying, for about 40 years on the way in which the single member plurality electoral system works in the UK and the way in which the geography affects and has changed its operation in the post-war period. That therefore meets my interest in this area, which has been rather more to do with political ramifications of the commissions’ work and the boundary redrawing rather than some of the more technical side, on which you will find Iain much more expert than I, but I am more than happy to share my observations from the stats in which I am interested. I have written about how the electoral systems operate in virtually every election since 1979.
The Chair
Sir John, your voice is very familiar to us all. Again, at least as Chair, I feel cheated that we cannot see you, but never mind. Just so colleagues realise, you do not have to take the time, but we have until 11.25 am if you so wish.
Chloe Smith
Q
Professor McLean, you began in your introduction by referring to the rules having been put right in the earlier Bill and said that you would not change them again. Could you go into a little more detail on that? I am taking you to mean the rules that we find in schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, which, as you will know, the Bill predominantly leaves unchanged. We—perhaps like you—think that they flexible enough to allow the commissions to do their work, but perhaps you could elaborate on that. If I may, I would then like to ask Sir John a question once Iain has had a chance to speak.
Professor McLean: The rules, as originally drafted in 1986, were mutually contradictory. Rule 1 said that you should not expand the size of the House of Commons, and there was an equality rule, the unintended effect of which, as it was then written, was to tend to increase the size of the House of Commons after each review, for mathematical reasons that I hope I do not have to go into now, although I can.
They are now expired because two things in the 2011 Act fixed that problem. It gave total priority to a fixed number of seats in the House of Commons, and because that overrules everything else in schedule 2 to the 1986 Act, the creeping enlargement of the House of Commons, which some people thought a problem, is no longer a problem. Secondly, within the other rules, the 2011 Act amends the 1986 Act by giving equality of constituency size priority over the other criteria, including local ties and respect for local government boundaries. Once that priority has been set—I am speaking mathematically, not politically—the contradictions in schedule 2 as it originally operated have disappeared.
I have looked at—with some difficulty during lockdown—the text of the Bill and I have it and the explanatory notes in front of me, via a rather dodgy connection to my iPhone. I have looked rather nerdily at the proposed amendments to the vital schedule 2 to the 1986 Act. From my reading—though I am not a lawyer—I would say that they do not upset the changes that were made in 2011 and, therefore, they should be left as they are. I think that will do at the technical level, although the Committee may have further questions.
Chloe Smith
Q
Thank you for that helpful explanation. To clarify it further, do you think that rule 5(1), the list of factors, does a good enough job of providing flexibility to the boundary commissions, given its place in the hierarchy of rules that you have just gone through?
Professor McLean: I may need a moment, Minister; I have just collected paper copies of the documents. Would it be in order to ask you to park that question and ask John in the meantime?
Chloe Smith
Of course. I am still driving at schedule 2 to the 1986 Act, which admittedly you do not have there in your papers.
Professor McLean: I have the Bill here; the amendments to schedule 2 to the 1986 Act are at the back, in the schedule to the Bill.
The Chair
Shall we go over to Sir John to give you time to absorb it all?
Professor McLean: Okay. I will be ready to answer your question, Minister, when you have asked the next one to Sir John.
Chloe Smith
Q
Sir John, thank you very much for joining us. I wonder whether you might be able to help us with our understanding of the data used for boundary reviews. They are based on electoral registration data; could you give us your views on the adequacy of that?
Professor Sir John Curtice: The short answer is that over the long run, from the various exercises—most recently by the Electoral Commission, and before the commission was created, by the Office for National Statistics—that have looked at the accuracy and completeness of the electoral register, we know that there are inadequacies in the register that have increased over time. Those inaccuracies are also related to certain circumstances such as having recently moved house, living in private accommodation or being unemployed. The Electoral Commission’s most recent report, for the December 2018 registers, said that they were 85% complete, meaning that only 85% of those people who should be on the register are on it, and 89% accurate, meaning that about 11% of entries relate to people who should not be on the register at the place that they are at.
The Bill makes no difference at all for all practical purposes to the rules for redistribution that were passed in the 2011 Act, but that Act places a premium on allocating constituencies with respect to electorates. We know that those electorates are less than perfect; I guess that if we are really now concerned about the mathematical accuracy of boundaries, what we should probably be worrying about is not the rules for redistribution, but ensuring that those rules are implemented more effectively by improving the accuracy of the electoral register. But that is a long-running problem, and I am not trying to argue that it will be easy to resolve.
Chloe Smith
Q
Looking at electoral registration data with its ins and outs, as you have just outlined, is it the right kind of data to base boundaries on—as opposed to census data, for example, or other kinds that you could conceive of being collected?
Professor Sir John Curtice: The problem with census data, obviously, is that it is now nearly 10 years out of date. You might want to argue that the ONS produces a mid-year population estimate over time, but it does not necessarily have the detail required to set up boundaries.
The second problem is that there is a disjuncture between residency and citizenship. If you went in the same direction as the Scottish Government by giving anybody who is permanently resident in the United Kingdom the right to vote, you might want to consider population as a reasonable proxy for that. However, as long as we are going to limit the franchise to British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens, given that this country has a substantial resident non-citizen population, you are probably not going to want to go down the route of using population. That, again, is tied up with the issue of the franchise.
Chloe Smith
Q
Professor McLean: Thank you Minister, and thank you Chair, for your forbearance. It is quite a jigsaw puzzle, but on page seven of the Bill are what you call “Minor and consequential amendments”. That is a mistaken heading; one of them is neither minor nor consequential. I will not comment on the addition of the county of Blackpool in paragraph 4 of the schedule; the only material amendment here is in paragraph 4(2): “for ‘596’ substitute ‘646’.” As Members know, that is one of the consequences of keeping the House of Commons’ size at 650. The number 646 appears in the paragraph because of the four reserved constituencies, which are islands exempted from the equality criterion. That is all good. What is not in here are the changes to the schedule of the 1986 Act introduced by the 2011 Act. I was in a position to check that yesterday.
The Chair
Order. I am slightly embarrassed, but I have to share with the Committee that the Bill available in the room is the wrong Bill. Quite how that has happened, I do not know. The Clerks will make sure that the right Bill is available for the next sitting. I was completely unaware of that, and unfortunately there is nothing I can do about it, I am afraid. It is a pity. Professor McLean, one of the Committee members will get the right Bill; it is on its way, and everyone will have the copies.
David Linden
On a point of order, the Bill that I am working from is the one we used for the Second Reading debate. That is not the Bill in the Committee Room. I do not know if I am the only person in the Committee using the Bill from Second Reading. Will you clarify that, Sir David?
The Chair
The ones that were on the table at the side of the room were wrong, but Bills from elsewhere are accurate. I am very sorry about that.
Mrs Miller
On a point of order, Sir David. Could I ask for clarification on the difference between the Bills? Is it material to our discussion? Does it affect the answer we might get from witnesses?
The Chair
My view is that it does not really affect that materially, but I felt that I should place on record the fact that the Bill that we had was not the right one.
Chloe Smith
Further to that point of order, Sir David. The Bill we should be talking about is the Parliamentary Constituencies Bill. The incorrect one is the Parliamentary Constituencies (Amendment) Bill, a private Member’s Bill put forward by none other than my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone).
The Chair
This is surreal. I thank the Minister for enlightening the Committee. It was an innocent mistake. The hon. Member for the City of Chester has kindly now made sure that we all have the correct Bill. Professor McLean, are you now in a position to respond?
Professor McLean: It turns out that I always was; my document is the correct Bill. To reiterate, for those who are looking at the correct one, paragraph 4 of the schedule to the Bill, “Minor and Consequential Amendments”, addresses schedule 2 to the 1986 Act. That is the one that does all the work. The only material change that is introduced is one of the consequences of keeping the size of the House at 650 Members; after subtracting the four protected constituencies, that is 646. This ensures that the House’s size continues to be fixed absolutely. That removes one of the sources of the incoherence of the schedule as originally drafted.
The other source of the incoherence was that the electoral equality criterion, until the 2011 Act, had no priority over the local ties and local government boundaries criteria. Amendments to the 2011 Act, which is not further changed and is therefore not in front of you here, gave the equality criterion priority over the local ties and local government boundaries criteria. That remains unchanged by the Bill. Ministers and parliamentary drafters have not, therefore, by any mistake reintroduced any of the inconsistencies in the original 1986 Bill. I hope that that is sufficiently clear to Members, but I can expand further if people wish.
The Chair
There we are: the Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Wellingborough inadvertently got some further scrutiny from the Committee.
Cat Smith
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: The short answer is that the Bill is not concerned with the process of electoral administration. The process of electoral registration deals with electoral administration. As Professor McLean has just pointed out, frankly the Bill does nothing material to change the rules on redistribution, including on the basis on which the electorate is used to do that. I simply pointed out in my response to the Minister that there are limitations to the data. We know that those limitations are somewhat greater in, for example, inner-city constituencies with a highly mobile population, than in constituencies with lots of older voters and a more stable population. That, undoubtedly, is correlated to some degree with the political proclivity of constituencies.
As I indicated earlier, as long as we wish to make a distinction between permanent residence and the right to vote, and as long as we do not wish to have a national identity card system, it is difficult to think of an alternative to the system we have. The question therefore is whether there are ways of improving the accuracy of the register. One thing we can note is that although we moved from household registration to individual registration—a somewhat controversial move—it is not obvious that it has fundamentally changed the character of the problem before us.
Cat Smith
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: The answer to that question, to be honest, is technically beyond my competence, in the sense that I guess the question that the boundary commissioners would ask is whether it is possible to get DWP data—which refers to the right to work, not necessarily to the right to vote—at the level of local government wards, which are the principal building block used by the boundary commissioners in building parliamentary constituencies. I would not be surprised to be told that the answer is no, but I do not know. Again, DWP data might rely on whether people have a national insurance record, but that is not the same thing as citizenship.
Cat Smith
Q
How can that balance be struck? Is the 5% tolerance most appropriate, or if we are not moving towards a system of proportional representation, should there be a larger tolerance, so that community ties are considered more important?
Professor McLean: For clarity, it is important to separate the question of proportional representation from that of the 5% tolerance, because they are different questions. As I evidently said in 2010—you have better recall of what I said than I do—a single-member district system cannot be proportional. That is a mathematical truth. Legislators must make a choice, and the choice that the UK Parliament has made is reflected in this Bill and many others: the single-member district system.
I do not think that it would be a good use of this Committee’s time to talk about whether the UK should switch to proportional representation; with your permission, Chair, I would rather duck that part of the Member’s question.
On equality, the Member poses an important question: is it correct that the equality criterion should override the other ones—the ones on local ties, and on the constituency boundaries following local government ones where possible? My view, which is an arithmetical view, not a political one, is that it is right for the equality criterion to override the others.
Becoming somewhat more political, my observation of boundary inquiries is that since local ties are not further defined in the Act, I have observed on several occasions that for a number of very shrewd operators, who will be well known to members of this Committee, Conservative local ties go one way, Labour local ties go another, and Liberal Democrat local ties go yet another. Each of them, because they are paid to do so, makes a plausible case before a commissioner, who in England is deliberately chosen not to be from the area. Moving on from the mathematics, my view as a political scientist is that the local ties criterion is eminently manipulable, whereas the plus or minus 5% criterion is not.
Is the criterion wide enough? In the United States the courts have said that as near as possible to 0%— not 5%—is the accepted tolerance for US congressional districts. So, it is possible to have a tolerance lower than 5%, but that is not in this Bill and it is not in the earlier Acts.
John Spellar
Q
Professor McLean: Well, since we have more time than we thought, we could have a discussion about US congressional districts, but Members may wish to move on.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Building on what you have just said, Professor McLean, about keeping the right size and in terms of communities, about which one can always argue, can we look at rule 5(1)(c) in the 1986 Act, which is about keeping boundaries in existing constituencies? My question, to both witnesses, is about whether the Bill needs to have some clarifications put in it, especially around what we are struggling with regarding the Boundary Commission for England. The evidence from the Boundary Commission for England was pretty much, “We are always going to try and do it with wards, and we will just get the numbers to work.” That overrides almost all the rules in clause 5, including geographic considerations. I gave the example of a North Yorkshire ward that one can only get to by completely leaving the constituency and spending a considerable amount of time on the road, but it would make the numbers work.
Can I probe your minds on the resistance to building outside of the wards, or, in other words, splitting wards down, as they do in Scotland, in order to try to keep existing communities together? What are your views on the different definitions of county constituencies and borough constituencies? How does that play into the building of constituencies? Does the Bill need further guidance to try to equalise the United Kingdom’s approach to how it builds constituencies, with the gold standard of Scotland being a good example?
Alec Shelbrooke
Yes or whoever feels it is more appropriate for them to answer it.
Professor McLean: If John is willing, I will go first, but John will wish to add something about the practicalities of the Boundary Commission for Scotland, which he has written about in academic articles.
The presumption against disturbing existing constituencies is no longer sustainable because these are based on electorates in 2000. Population movements, in what will be 24 years before the new constituencies are implemented, will make it impossible, in more than the odd coincidental case, to give any priority to the maintaining of existing constituencies preference. I think 5% plus or minus should be enough for the boundary commissions and the county-by-county inquiries to deal with difficult situations, such as the one the Member mentioned of a large, empty area in the middle of a constituency. I take it that that is the geographical problem that the Member mentions.
There are other well-known problems of estuaries, such as the problems in the Wirral area last time. Plus or minus 5% should be enough to cope with that. At the risk of sounding like a stuck record, I think it is right that in the 2011 Act, which this Bill importantly does not modify, the plus or minus 5% is given priority over the other local ties rules.
As to whether local government wards are the essential building blocks, that is non-statutory. It is the practice of the English commission, but it has not been the practice of the Scottish commission. I will now hand the floor to John to answer that part of the question.
Professor Sir John Curtice: There is a crucial difference these days between local government wards in Scotland and those in England. Scottish local government is run under the single transferable vote in multiple constituencies system. When that system was introduced, it was introduced without changing the number of local government councillors significantly. All the wards elect three or four members. As a result, every ward in Scotland was increased by three or four. That means, therefore, that the building blocks in Scotland are large, making it difficult for the Boundary Commission to respect more badges. There are one or two instances in England, such as Birmingham, where that issue can also arise, but it is relatively limited.
It is also true—this is not the area of my own expertise—that some entrepreneurial past secretaries of the Boundary Commission for Scotland have ensured that the Boundary Commission has a much better geographically-referenced database than the one in England. I was reading some of the evidence given to the Committee last week and that came out. I am tempted to say that that is one of the advantages of living in a small country: it becomes possible to administer things in finer detail. We have referred to county and borough constituencies. That only relates to the rules for expenditure. It does not otherwise make a great deal of difference.
Beyond that, I simply observe that in this conversation and this morning, and in much of what the Committee seemed to be talking about last night, seems to be about what this Bill is not about, as opposed to what it is about. The Bill does not fundamentally change the rules of redistribution that were introduced by the 2011 Act and implemented by the Boundary Commissions in their 2013 and 2018 reviews—sadly, neither of which were implemented. Apart from changing the number of MPs, it does nothing to change that—apart from a minor and perfectly sensible change with the rules about respected local government boundaries. I suggest that at some point the Committee might want to focus on the significant changes the Bill does introduce as opposed to the areas that the Bill does not propose to change at all. I understand, of course, that some Members may wish to unpick the provisions of the 2011 Act.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
This comes down to guidance. As you pointed out, the large wards and the way they are managed in Scotland has allowed a more detailed approach. When you get to the arguments of whether it should be plus or minus 10% or 5%, I am seeking your view as to whether the arguments about the variations can be overcome by the guidance, which goes more explicitly to the Boundary Commission for England in splitting wards.
In the past, there has been a habit of them trying to form some strange shapes, like American congressional districts, just to get the numbers right, forming very strange communities. They have almost always then changed the first draft significantly in the second draft. The guidance that will go in this Bill, especially for the Boundary Commission for England, should try to avoid that situation.
The parliamentary oversight is going, which I believe is the correct thing to do. But we must get this right the first time and use this Bill to iron out these issues. Is this Bill strong enough, in terms of the Boundary Commission for England, to construct constituencies, which have an eye to what has gone on in the past, but do not end up with peculiar shapes and communities just to make the numbers work?
Professor Sir John Curtice: Can I respond to that? It is true that the current arrangements for parliamentary oversight do not make it very easy for the House of Commons to change the detail of the provisions. It basically has to say yes or no, and only after it has said no can the Government attempt to change the provisions of the Commission. That is the first point; otherwise, it is a guess on my part, but I would anticipate that now we are going to a House of 650 seats rather than one of 600, some of the difficulties with supposedly major constituencies may be less sharp.
The final thing to say is that even with us going for 650 seats rather than 600, the next boundary revision is bound to be a major one. Because Parliament has blocked both of the last two redistributions that it ordered, we now have boundaries that are 20 years out of date. We are also finally getting around to dealing with the differences in the allocation of constituencies to England, Scotland and Wales, so this is bound to be a disruptive redistribution. It will be somewhat less disruptive than it would have been with 600 seats, but it is bound to be disruptive, in much the same way as the one that was introduced in 1983, because that got affected by the direction of local government.
You might want to investigate the forces that have resulted in boundaries going out of date—that is, population movements, which historically for most of the post-war period meant people moving out of the inner city into more suburban and rural areas. The last analysis of this I read, which was by the expert Tony Champion, indicates that this has been going on to a lesser extent; it is notable that somewhere like London is now gaining population and is certainly not going to lose out from the current redistribution. Of course, nobody knows what is going to happen in the wake of the pandemic, but it is worth being aware that some of the demographic forces that have given rise to the kinds of inequalities we have been used to may no longer have quite the same force as in the past.
Professor McLean: If time permits, Chair, may I come in on part of the Member’s question, which was to do with whether the guidance in the Bill should be more explicit than this current draft? My view is no, for the following reasons.
The legislation is UK-wide, as you all know. As this discussion has revealed, the English and Scottish—and, may I say, Northern Irish—commissions have all taken different approaches to the local government boundary question. Those different approaches are all legitimate within the text of the Act that this Bill amends, and it does not amend that Act in any material way. Therefore, I do not think there is any need to give guidance to the Boundary Commission for England that, if it wishes, it can be more flexible in Birmingham and West Yorkshire than its predecessors have been. It already has that discretion; that discretion is exercised by the Boundary Commission for Scotland, and to pick up a point of John’s, if at the last review the Boundary Commission for England had invested in geographic information systems that were as up to date as the Scottish commission’s, some of the problems that the Member mentioned—which I know concern a lot of Members—could have been avoided. My view is that as the existing statutory framework gives the commission the authority to ignore local government boundaries if it has to, there is no need to change the draft Bill in that respect.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: The research on this goes back quite a way, and the answer is “to a degree”. For the purposes of answering this question, I will go back 20 years psephologically, because the psephology of party support has changed so much over the past 20 years that this is not necessarily true now. If we go back 20 years, to an era when a middle-class person was markedly more likely to vote Conservative than Labour, and the opposite was true of someone who was working class—that, by the way, is not currently the case—historically, it had long been demonstrated that if you were a middle-class person living in an area that was predominantly populated by people in working-class occupations, you were more likely to vote Labour than if you were a middle-class person living in a more middle-class area.
There were two potential forces going on there. One is that, to some degree, middle-class people who choose to live in a more working-class area may actually already be rather more of a Labour disposition, but equally, it has certainly long been argued that to some degree, you are influenced by the social interaction to which you are exposed, so if you are living in a working-class community, you are more likely to be exposed to pro-Labour arguments than if you were living in a Conservative one.
Of course, the world has moved on in terms of the demography of party support, which is much less clearly structured by class, and social interaction is no longer as geographically bound as it once was and can now take place over social media. Iain may know more than me, but it has certainly been a while since I have seen anybody doing anything major on the extent to which community makes a difference. The only thing that I would say is that, undoubtedly, one of the reasons why MPs will always be concerned about any redistribution is that it upsets the connection between them and their existing electorate.
One of the things that we certainly do know—again, this may also be relevant to your question—is that if somebody has been elected for the first time at the last election and defeated the incumbent MP from another party, there is a fairly consistent tendency now whereby, in view of the next election, that new Member, who has probably just won a marginal seat, has a great deal of incentive to be representing their community and to be visible and so on, to get something of a personal bonus. You can see that in the way that the Labour party defended some seats in 2019, with newly incumbent, first-term Labour MPs doing well, and it was similar for the Conservative party in 2017. To that extent at least, yes, you can certainly also argue that a minority of voters—in some instances a crucial minority—will vote for their individual MP rather than for the party, but of course, if you get a boundary redistribution that carves up an individual MP’s constituency, that link is broken.
In truth, in our electoral system, there is a continuous and perpetual tension. We want our electoral system to do two things: on the one hand, we want it to provide local representation, and on the other, we want it to be a system that provides a means by which the electorate can choose between alternative Governments. I am afraid that I have spent the last 40 years pointing out the potential conflict between those two objectives and that, if you wish to ensure that the system is fair in the ability of voters to choose between alternative Governments, at some point you have to let go of the emphasis on local representation.
In a sense, the debate that we are having now about mathematical equality versus respecting community ties is a sub-part of that broader debate. Decide what your elections are about: if they are about the election of individual MPs and less to do with Governments, you can focus on representing communities; if you think that it is a system for enabling us to choose between alternative Governments, which is the traditional defence of the single member plurality system, I am afraid that local representation has to be given a lower priority.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: That is what we used to have in the system of parliamentary representation when both boroughs and counties were represented and they were often of considerably unequal size. That comes back to the fundamental question about what we think elections should be about. Are they about providing MPs who represent communities, or are they a mechanism for choosing between alternative Governments? I am afraid that is just an inherent tension within the electoral system that we are looking at.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: Well, you are assuming that the current decisions of parliamentary constituents in some way already play out in—[Inaudible.] As Professor McLean has pointed out, what we regard as our community is sometimes in the eye of the beholder.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: There is a certain geographical concentration of voters who may or may not feel a sense of community, or who may in fact feel that they are an aggregation of many different communities. For example, I expect that relatively few of the constituencies in the far north of Scotland necessarily think that their constituency represents one agreed community, as opposed to a collection of villages. Indeed, if we go out to the Western Isles, where even the concept of village does not really exist, they will not necessarily think that the constituency is some clear, single, coterminous and homogenous community.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: The truth is that whatever set of rules you come up with, you may discover that you have got a choice about exactly how you try to represent community interest. At the end of the day, you may well simply discover that whatever rules you come up with, you end up dividing some places that you think—acknowledging that there is a question mark—might be a community.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: I think my answer is that, while you might make it somewhat easier to avoid some of the cries that “This community is being divided”, the fact is that—if you go back to the current constituencies—communities are divided. Do we think that some of the lines that are drawn down the middle of Birmingham or London boroughs necessarily represent a community boundary? I suggest that they do not always do so.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor McLean: I would urge Members not to go down that road. Of course, it is a political judgment for the Committee and the House of Commons. This is somewhat of a knight’s move answer to Mr Efford, but paragraphs 86 to 89 of the explanatory notes have a section about compatibility with the European convention on human rights. The criteria to be met are in paragraph 88 of the explanatory notes:
“The Bill maintains the principle of equal suffrage”.
The wider the margin, the less equal is the suffrage. That is the trade-off, which Parliament must decide to make. My view is that plus or minus 5% is ample, given that we have the device of protected constituencies. Of course, Members may wish to add to that number. I see that an amendment has been tabled that Ynys Môn should be added to the list, and Members might feel that Wirral should be added. Those are further instances of geographical peculiarities that might make the application of the 5% plus or minus more difficult. That is a political judgment for Members; as political scientists, or electoral mathematicians, we cannot say anything about it, except that those might be plausible cases. I would be against relaxing the plus or minus 5%, in the light of compatibility with the European convention on human rights, among other things.
The Chair
Before asking Mrs Miller to put her question, in a moment the Division bell will ring. Please stand to observe a minute’s silence for those murdered in Reading.
Mrs Miller
Q
What comments can be made about trying to future-proof any proposals, to take into account any proposed developments and house building, while noting that those cannot be taken into any analysis of the quota? Do our experts have any views on whether that should be taken into account with regards to the geographical boundaries, so as to avoid unnecessary disruption in the future?
Professor Sir John Curtice: There is a difference between the rules of the Local Government Boundary Commission for England and the parliamentary boundary commissions. The local government boundary commissions are permitted to take into account anticipated housing developments. I have had the occasional private conversation with people about this. You may want to quiz the Local Government Boundary Commission for England. The question that arises is how accurate the forecasts of house building and demolition activity are and the extent to which that ensure that the local government ward boundaries do not get out of date.
The answer to you is that it is certainly possible—see the rules of the Local Government Boundary Commission for England—but regarding the extent to which it is effective, you should ask the Local Government Boundary Commission for England, because I am not certain. There is a difference and you could anticipate doing a degree of that.
Professor McLean: May I add to that? It is rather unfortunate that there are two sets of boundary commissions with different operating rules. Although it is not in the Bill, I do not understand why there needs to be a separate local government boundary commission, in particular one that operates under different rules, as John has just highlighted, from those used by the parliamentary boundary commission.
If one had to choose between these sets of rules—the Local Government Boundary Commission for England permitting evidence about future housing developments and the rules currently before you not permitting them —I would go with the rules that are in front of you, for the same reason that I gave in an earlier answer. One person’s likely housing development, which may just happen to favour that political party could be countered by another person’s likely future housing development, which may favour another party. I feel for the poor inspector, who is, by construction, not a specialist in the area, and is faced with claims that are very hard to adjudicate. You can adjudicate numbers, but future housing development is much more difficult.
David Linden
Q
Professor Sir John Curtice: That is not difficult. Turkeys were persuaded to put Christmas in the calendar in 2011 but, when Christmas eve came along, they decided to abandon it. There was always going to be a question mark about the willingness of MPs to vote for their own demise.
The reason why we were to have the cuts in the first place is that in 2010 both parties in the coalition proposed reductions in the size of the House of Commons. That was a populist response to the MPs’ expenses scandal. In the end, the cut to 600 that they introduced was less than those in the two parties’ manifestos. Then, of course, implementing it became a victim in 2013 of the spat within the coalition over the failure to reform the House of Lords, and in 2018 of the anticipated inability of the then Conservative Administration to get the provisions through—because they were asking turkeys to vote for Christmas. I am indicating that that is a classic case of how, at the end of the day, it is difficult to persuade Members of the House of Commons to engage in a radical reform that will make their lives difficult.
By the way, given that you have asked this question, let me expand its scope slightly. This is an aspect of the Bill that matters, and this is the question of the attempt at automaticity. To make it clear, there is an issue about automaticity—that is, the ability of Parliament to intervene. Parliament intervened in 2013 and stopped the boundary commissioners working—that was the work of Labour and the Liberal Democrats together—and in 2018 the Conservative Government failed to push the provisions through. Back in the late 1960s, the then Labour Government got their MPs to vote down the provisions. To that extent, there is clearly an issue. Although we have a process of neutral boundary proposals operating under rules set by the House of Commons, in effect the Commons has on three occasions, under different Administrations, ended up not implementing the rule, so there is an automaticity question.
My concern, however, is that although the Bill might make it more difficult for that to happen again, it will not stop it happening again. Given that in clause 8 the Bill stops implementation of the 2018 review, going on to have provisions that supposedly make it impossible for Parliament to overturn things in future, the truth is that the same is perfectly possible for a future House of Commons—a boundary review comes along, the current Administration does not like it, saying, “Actually, we should delay it”, and all they need to do is to introduce a quick piece of primary legislation to overturn it.
As we saw with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, it is very difficult to introduce provisions that discipline the House of Commons to keep to a set of constitutional rules, given that we do not have an entrenched constitution. Although all of us would laud the fact that the provisions of the Bill are an improvement, reducing the ability of Parliament to stop things, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that it will necessarily stop Parliament, not least because even within the terms of the Bill an order has to be laid—instead of
“as soon as is reasonably practicable”
at the moment—under the new provisions,
“as soon as may be reasonably practicable”.
I am not a lawyer, but the distinction between those two things still strikes me as rather fine on whether or not we could still be left in the situation that we had in the last Parliament, when the provisions were simply were not put before the House of Commons in a timely fashion. That could be repeated.
Professor McLean: I have very little to add. The automaticity may look worrying to some, because it removes the rule from Parliament, but parliamentary supremacy is mentioned in the explanatory notes and of course the Bill could be enacted and then repealed by a future Parliament. That is the nature of parliamentary supremacy. It would be very embarrassing—the mother of Parliaments, one of the oldest parliamentary democracies and so on: it is already very embarrassing that it is operating on the basis of 20-year-old boundaries and therefore we did not have equal suffrage in the 2019 general election, to put it at its most blunt. I would concur with John that Parliament could do it again. It would be embarrassing, and I rather hope it does not.
David Linden
Q
Professor McLean: It was bound to be disruptive once a uniform electoral quota was introduced for the four nations of the UK. John, the Minister, or others can correct me, but I think that that was done by the 2011 Act. The fact that, as has already been mentioned, the two instances of review that should have happened under the 2011 Act have not yet happened, means that that bomb, as it seems to some in Scotland and in Wales, was primed in 2011. It has not yet exploded, but it will with the implementation of this Bill; but that is a necessary consequence, as all Members know, of a uniform electoral quota for the United Kingdom. I cannot say any more than that.
Professor Sir John Curtice: Can we go back a bit on the history of this? The truth, as Iain will explain much more eloquently than me, is that he original over-representation of Scotland and Wales was entirely the product of accident rather than design. When the Scottish Parliament was introduced in 1999 by the Labour Administration one of the things that was done as a result was indeed to reduce the size of Scotland’s representation in the House of Commons—although it was done in a manner that was arguably technically deficient, and did not necessarily deal with the possibility that there would be future disparities between the growth in population in Scotland and that in England.
The principle of basically saying that Scotland’s representation should be proportionate to England’s representation was already embodied by the Labour party and Labour Administration at the beginning of the century. The same thing was not done for Wales because of course when the then Welsh Assembly was first created it had only secondary legislative powers, and it was therefore felt that the devolution was not on a scale that justified the reduction in the number of Welsh MPs. Given that we now have a Welsh Senedd that has primary legislative powers that are not commensurate with, but not that dissimilar from, those of the Scottish Parliament, as it were, what has already been done for Scotland seems to be relevant for Wales.
As to the actual effect, now we are talking about a 650 Parliament: by my calculation, which is based on the electorates as of the election—but, given we are now going to do the electorate on 1 March it will be slightly different, but will not be very different—Scotland is probably going to lose three seats. It is the last seat, I think, at the moment, that is tight between Scotland and England. At worst Scotland loses three seats. Effectively, Scotland is affected at the edges but not fundamentally, and the fact that Scotland’s political system and political representation is now very different from that in England and Wales is still likely to be heavily reflected in any new House.
This is essentially a redistribution from Wales to England, and then within England it is a redistribution really from a line from East Anglia southwards—as opposed to the northern parts of England. Of course one of the ironies of the situation we are now in is that because the Conservative party gained so many seats—they had the so-called red wall seats in the north of England and so on—actually the disparity in the size of the electorate between constituencies that are represented by the Labour party and those represented by the Conservatives is smaller than it has been at any point during these current set of constituencies. In other words, changes in electoral geography are changing the politics of redistribution. London is one of the places that will benefit; it is now a Labour city. The north-east of England, which now has a non-trivial number of Conservative MPs, will lose out heavily. Therefore, actually the redistributive consequences politically are perhaps not quite as toxic as we might have imagined 10 or 15 years ago.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
Q
Professor McLean: A problem is caused when you are going by a regional area. The practice of the English commission has been to go by counties for some of its units, including administrative counties such as the former metropolitan counties that were abolished in 1986. That is a defensible practice, because the larger the unit within which you operate, the easier it is to reconcile conflicting criteria. Therefore, if you are in a unit of, let us say, three constituencies, one of which by happenstance is the right size and the others are not, it might be difficult to maintain the right-sized one and observe the other rules. If you are in a unit of 15 constituencies, one of which is the right size, the commissioners have more freedom to draw a map that retains the constituency that happens to be the right size while altering the others.
I said earlier that it is likely—I do not have the data, but John may—that there are now very few constituencies anywhere in the UK that are the right size, which is to say, one 600th of the House, given that we have had 20 years of migration and the disruption mentioned in Scotland and especially Wales. So I think it will be very hard to preserve existing constituencies.
Professor Sir John Curtice: All I can add is that I did look quickly at what statisticians call the standard deviation of constituency size—that is simply a measure of the extent to which the number of registered electors in a constituency varies between one seat and another—and that number is constantly increasing. Basically, there is now a greater difference in the size of constituencies than there was in 2017, there was a greater difference in 2017 than in 2015, and there was a greater difference in 2015 than in 2010. Although politically this redistribution may not be as dramatic as people on both sides of the House might imagine, there is no doubt that getting the constituencies to reflect electorate sizes is bound to be disruptive.
Bim Afolami
Q
Professor McLean: That is going to be up to the operating practices of the Boundary Commission for England if it remains non-statutory, and it is not proposed in this Bill that it should be given statutory instructions different from those in the 1986 Bill. Thinking on my feet, I think that with the exception of the Isle of Wight, which is not a true exception because it is one of the preserved areas, county populations in the south of England are sufficiently large that—sorry, we are not here treating Rutland as a county—
Bim Afolami
It is not a proper county anyway.
Professor McLean: If we take out the Isle of Wight and possibly Rutland, it should be reasonably feasible for the English commission to operate at county level, but that is an operating matter for the commission. At present it is not in the Bill. If an amendment to give greater respect to county boundaries were introduced to the Bill during its progress, that might imperil the equality rule, which the current law gives as trumps.
Bim Afolami
Q
Professor McLean: The only one of the four commissions that has possibly felt itself at risk under those conditions in the past is the Northern Ireland one, where there are deep issues of community and sectarianism. I am all for protecting commissions from that sort of pressure. Having observed the operations of county inquiries in England—I have never done a Scottish inquiry—I would say that the boundary commissions’ staff and inspectors have always maintained great professionalism. I would not expect that to change under the sort of behavioural issues that you raise.
Professor Sir John Curtice: I would trust the boundary commissioners much more than I would the House of Commons on this subject, to be perfectly frank with you.
The Chair
I would like to take the two final questions together because we have only three minutes left. First, Mr Matheson and then Mr Clarkson.
Christian Matheson
Q
Chris Clarkson
It is fine, Chair. My question is far too long for the time we have left.
The Chair
Splendid. Witnesses?
Professor McLean: To Mr Matheson’s question, I am not too concerned about this Bill, perhaps precisely because this Bill does not go into the level of detail that some people might have wanted. It does not give instructions to the commissions, for instance, to always respect local government boundaries or not. The commissions have that discretion. If this Bill is enacted in the rather spare form in which it is in front of you, I would not be too worried about the sorts of issues that the Member has just raised.
Professor Sir John Curtice: Yes, of course you are right that the rules for redistribution are always politically contentious. That said, and to give him due praise, the rules that are now being devised, in so far as how you allocate seats to the parts of the United Kingdom and within England, do follow the rules that Professor McLean was crucial in persuading the Electoral Commission were the right rules to use for allocating MEPs to the regions in the European electoral system. That can be shown to be the fairest way of doing it. On the first point, yes, you are right.
On the second point, as I have been keen to point out to you, if at the end of the day the House of Commons thinks a boundary commission has fouled up, it can still stop the boundary commission. Any new Administration, in particular, can stop it by simply passing new legislation, so you still have the nuclear weapon if you want it.
On the subject of political aspects, that is a part of the Bill that should be discussed; I am concerned that there is some political consideration going on here. Nobody has raised the point that the next review under this is supposed to end in July 2023 rather than in October 2023. No justification is given for that in the Cabinet Office memo or in the explanatory notes. The only explanation that I can think of—maybe I am being unfair—is that somebody is wanting to pave the way to make it possible to hold a general election in autumn 2023 rather than in spring 2024. Certainly, somebody needs to explain why the next procedure is going to be foreshortened by three months for a set of boundaries that are then going to be in place for another eight years, and this is not going to happen thereafter. There is no justification so far, and I encourage the Committee to inquire further.
The Chair
On that final note, which the Committee will have time to reflect on, on behalf of everyone, I thank you, Professor MacLean, and you, Sir John, for the time you have spent with the Committee. We have greatly enjoyed listening to you both.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Eddie Hughes.)
Parliamentary Constituencies bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Parliamentary Constituencies Act 2020 View all Parliamentary Constituencies Act 2020 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 June 2020 - (23 Jun 2020)
The Chair
We will now hear from Peter Stanyon, chief executive of the Association of Electoral Administrators, and we have until 2.30 pm for this session. Mr Stanyon, would you briefly introduce yourself to the Committee, please?
Peter Stanyon: Certainly. I am chief executive of the Association of Electoral Administrators, or AEA, and we are the professional body that represents those who deliver the electoral process across the United Kingdom. It includes some returning officers and some registration officers, but primarily it includes those who many of you will have come across, who actually deliver the nuts and bolts of the electoral process in the field. We are a body that represents their interests, such as liaison, training and the like, across the board.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Chloe Smith)
Q
Peter Stanyon: Certainly, Minister, and thank you. The key point is that these are the building blocks of the democratic system. The hard work is not necessarily directly to do with the elections process, but is more to do with the production of the electoral register. In terms of how the process works for administrators, the actual involvement in whether the proposals are right, wrong or whatever is not quite at the same level as that for local government boundary reviews. It is more about providing support to elected representatives and others regarding statistics and the like, to make sure that all the relevant needs are met so that the boundary commissions can come forward with their proposals, and councils and the like can make representations through the various processes available to them.
When presented with the final outcomes, the task starts. The key point is to revise the electoral register, so a lot of work goes on to ensure that the building blocks are correct. That does not just mean the parliamentary constituency boundaries—how they interrelate with local government ward boundaries, council divisions, parishes and the like—but, following on immediately from the constituency boundary changes, there is a need to look at all the polling districts, polling places and polling stations for the elections themselves. A lot of technical work goes on behind the scenes to make sure that on polling day, the elector arrives at their polling station in the correct area, with accessible venues and things like that.
One of the huge challenges—this goes back to the outcome of the previous review, which obviously is being effectively terminated—is the fact that each individual registration officer works in the individual building block of their local authority, but parliamentary constituencies do not follow those boundaries. One of the dangers of the previous review was that an awful lot of cross-boundary work needed to take place, which means liaising with neighbouring local authorities. That sounds reasonably straightforward, and in most instances it is, but it often means that different software systems are used for the electoral register and there are different working practices.
Although we all work according to the same legislative background, there are different ways of interpreting that locally. That means trying to ensure consistency across the piece, with the electors and candidates at elections receiving the right level of service and being able to be involved. Where there is more cross-boundary work, more elements of risk come in. Effectively, when it is under their self-control, it is a lot easier for local authorities to deal with those sorts of things. It is really a communication beast between individual registration and returning officers once the actual boundaries are agreed.
Chloe Smith
Q
Peter Stanyon: Absolutely. That came from Sir Ron Gould, who did an investigation into—I think, from memory—the Scottish independence referendum, where there had been some very late changes to legislation. Anything can be planned for. With elections, as you all know, the period ahead of the polls becomes very pressurised. A longer lead-in to any significant change—a constituency boundary change would be significant—is welcome, and six months is certainly the minimum that an election administrator would want.
In the case of these boundaries, the fundamental point to bear in mind is that the electoral registers will need to be reshaped and put into their new building blocks. Whatever the case, we have 1 December as the date the revised versions of registers are published. That is often the logical date at which we would want parliamentary constituencies to be reflected in the electoral roll, simply because it means a full change in the register, which helps political parties and candidates. It can be changed later on but, again, that makes it more complicated. The sooner it is said—the Gould principle is six months—makes it far easier for that communication and working across boundaries with different administrators. De-risking the process is far easier if we have that lead-in time.
Cat Smith (Lancaster and Fleetwood) (Lab)
Q
Peter Stanyon: If I were to ask for tomorrow, that would be helpful, but I am not sure that is going to happen. In terms of the lead-in periods, we welcome the proposed spring timescale for boundary commissions to submit their reports to the Speaker. An ideal timescale would be elections taking place in May 2023, with preparations for an electoral registration cavass kicking on immediately after those May elections finish. We would then certainly look to have something by early summer at the very latest, so that, over that autumn period, as the canvass takes place, the amendments can be introduced to registers in the time for the revisions to be published on or by 1 December 2023.
Cat Smith
Q
Peter Stanyon: Yes, I did. Ironically, the most accurate register of electors is arguably the register that is published with the additions the month after a major poll. In the case of the December 2019 general election, applications were flooding in, but what happens over the elections process is that people are deleted from the register as a result of returned poll cards information coming through to registration officers. Ironically, it is usually the month after an election, when the updates are made, that we have the most accurate version of the register. You may well see drop-offs from the register because your processing-through information has been returned to registration officers as part of poll cards going out, postal votes for deceased electors being returned, and other such issues.
One of the huge things with regards to the 1 December register is that it is not the most accurate and complete register—any registration officer will tell you that. Since the introduction of individual elector registration, the canvass does not register people any longer; it identifies potential applicants. As a result, whereas prior to individual registration everything took place during the canvass period and the register was as complete as it could be on 1 December, now the canvassing process seeps into January, February and March as it runs towards the traditional May dates. You will see fluctuations in registers that mean that the snapshot taken in December is not necessarily the most complete or accurate register; it is more likely to be among the ones that you mentioned.
The register on 2 March, which is being proposed, would provide a more accurate figure than that provided by the register in December, simply because it has taken account of all the additions that were made through the canvass and that went through as part of rolling registration ahead of the general election, and then cleansed the register as a result of the information gleaned from both the canvass and the fall-out from the general election. I hope that answers your question. I am not sure whether I got everything covered there.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
Q
Peter Stanyon: Yes, certainly. The legislative background is that a local authority must subdivide every constituency in its area into polling districts, and then designate a polling place for polling stations. If there are changes to boundaries within a local authority area, they might not replicate the situation that is currently in place, so there would need to be a review of the provision to ensure that the newly defined constituencies and the building blocks within them are still applicable to the electorate at that stage.
We have just come to the conclusion of the statutory period for polling district review. The next one is due during the period between 1 October 2023 and 31 January 2025, when every single local authority must do this job. If a significant change to constituency boundaries meant that it was sensible to make those changes, there would be an additional layer to be done. Those same polling district boundaries are generally used for local government elections as well. It is about trying to get all the different layers of boundaries together so that the elector is, generally speaking, always going to the same polling station. If there is a combined poll, it is about getting the ballot papers for them in that particular station.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Peter Stanyon: There are instances where a review would be needed—whether that is a full review or a light-touch review—to ensure that the scheme is appropriate for the electorate at that stage. There are examples—this is from my personal experience—of where a boundary change has a polling station in one constituency but it moves to another constituency in a shared district because of the nature of the buildings available. That will add a degree of complexity, with two constituencies going in where previously there had been one, so there would be a need to make sure that each of the layers there still related to the constituency.
Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)
Q
Peter Stanyon: It is a local authority decision, generally in full council. It depends on how individual local authorities approach this, but there is a need within the statutory process to seek views from those affected in the area and those with special skills with regards to accessibility and disability, for example. Ultimately it is, in effect, a geographical and numbers exercise, but it also takes into account what is best for the needs of the electorate in that area, which is where the political aspect comes in, with the council making that decision for the subdivisions.
Christian Matheson
Q
Peter Stanyon: That much depends on the relationship between the local authorities. On the split wards situation, the returning officer responsible for running the parliamentary election in that area must comment on the review potentially undertaken by the other local authority. It very much depends again on what local practices are. The ideal situation for an administrator would be to have full control of all the areas—the subdivisions, polling stations, districts, staffing and so on —as that makes life easier for administrative arrangements. It is not insurmountable; it is purely about the local practice.
It gets slightly more complicated when we talk about combined polls. If you have a local government election and a parliamentary election taking place side by side, that adds to the degree of complexity. If it is a stand-alone parliamentary election, it is not quite as difficult to administer.
Chris Clarkson (Heywood and Middleton) (Con)
Q
Peter Stanyon: We welcome the fact that the Bill provides for an understanding of the situation closer to when the decisions are recommended by the boundary commissions. One of the big issues is that where ward boundary changes have taken place and the new constituencies follow the old ward boundaries, there is an awful lot of complication in trying to explain that to electors and trying to change systems to reflect a system no longer in place. When you look at a map and see a boundary going straight through the centre of a ward, you are sometimes puzzled about why that is the case. You go back to how it was, based on the previous situation. It is far preferable for the parliamentary constituency situation to be closer to that of the local authority, purely for the administrative reasons of ensuring that you de-risk the possibility of sending electors, postal votes or ballot papers to the wrong area. We would always welcome the latest situation, which is as close as possible to the review, being the one that is enacted and rolled out in the electoral registers themselves.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Peter Stanyon: In many respects, it is the certainty of what the boundaries are. One of the difficulties of the 2018 boundary review was that the boundaries had changed so significantly in some areas that it was trying to replicate them back to the areas themselves. Where registration officers are aware that a previous system—for want of a better phrase—will be the preferred system, as long as that is known well in advance, it is easier to administer than if there is a sudden change to something later on.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Peter Stanyon: Absolutely. It comes back to the electoral figures that are being dealt with. Certainly, the proposed reduction of seats from 650 to 600 exacerbated it. It is 20 years since the review was undertaken, so there will be significant changes in some areas. Over time, hopefully they will be negated as we go forward, but yes, it is difficult to cope with at the moment because it has been a long time since the last boundary review.
Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)
Q
Peter Stanyon: In local authority A, the electoral registration officer will cover the area for that local authority, maybe giving that register away. That is reasonably straightforward in terms of polling stations and the like, but slightly more complicated with absent votes and postal votes. There need to be agreements about who will be leading on each individual process. In some areas, the give-away authority will administer parts of the process for the authority that has taken it in, because of software incompatibility or different approaches being taken.
Most of the challenge is about: how do you mirror local authority A’s working practice on to local authority B? Despite the fact that the law that everybody is working to is exactly the same, there are local practices that are slightly different. That comes down to the real nitty-gritty of things like how many staff are appointed to polling stations, the processes used for the opening of postal votes and things like that. It is more an administrative approach that is difficult, which means that the respective returning officers need to communicate very closely with each other, to make sure that there is no element of doubt as to the way in which processes are administered.
Clive Efford
Q
Peter Stanyon: It would really depend on the nature of the split in the area, but, generally speaking, it is far easier to manage a constituency within a local authority area in which you are normally running elections. Equally, splitting down to polling districts, and going lower than the ward building block, may be preferable in some areas, but it could add different issues, depending on the nature of those splits. We would probably be able to cope with the odd one here and there, but if it were across the board of a local authority on a consistent basis, I could foresee that being as complicated as it would be across boundaries.
Clive Efford
Q
Peter Stanyon: Much of what is going on as we speak in terms of the changes to the canvass process is about data. As you are aware, the new IER process involves inviting people to register. More access to data that allows registration officers to target those who could potentially be on the register would be welcome, be that local, national or regional. It depends on the type of data source; equally, it needs to be the right sort of data so that register updates can be done in an accurate and convenient manner.
Clive Efford
Q
Peter Stanyon: I think the Department for Work and Pensions database is, at the moment, pretty robust in terms of checking. The Electoral Commission has done a lot of work on other sources that we have been a party to, including HM Passport Office and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Each comes with its positives and negatives; there are lots of pros and cons. One of the things we want to avoid is the provision of data for the sake of the provision of data, because sometimes the data that we already have is more accurate than the data coming in, throwing EROs off course in terms of registration.
Clive Efford
Q
Peter Stanyon: There are potential sources. We need to see the quality of those data sources before we can jump that way.
Mrs Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
Q
Peter Stanyon: It will vary across the UK. A statutory review must be undertaken every five years. One has just finished, and the next one is due to report between October 2023 and January 2025. In some local authorities, polling district reviews are undertaken after each major poll, just to make sure that the scheme is suitable. It depends on the fluidity of local authority areas.
Mrs Miller
Q
Peter Stanyon: They are separate, as some local authorities will have access to far better mapping tools than others. The simple answer to the question is that basically the polling districts are left to each individual local authority. How they are reported to a national sub-dataset may be inconsistent across the UK, unlike ward boundaries and constituency boundaries, which are on the public record. Because it concerns local authorities, they do report these things but there is no up-to-date central database of every single polling district sub-division, as far as I am aware.
Mrs Miller
Q
Peter Stanyon: I am not sure that I am qualified to say that GIS would be the answer to that sort of situation. Better and more complete reporting of where changes have occurred would be beneficial to all those involved in the delineation of boundaries, whether that involves GIS or something else.
Jane Hunt (Loughborough) (Con)
Q
Peter Stanyon: That is a fair summation. The legislation is currently worded to say that you start at the top and work down; the reality is that most polling district reviews are based on working upwards, based on the availability of premises. The key point for any review of polling districts is that the locations—the polling places—must be accessible to the majority of electors. In the case you have described, the decision, which was presumably made by the local authority, is that there are two good venues with good accessibility, so it would make sense to use both venues in that situation. In other cases, there will be a surfeit of venues, making it far more difficult. It really depends in many respects on what premises or locations are available. In some locations you see temporary buildings, such as portakabins and caravans, because there is physically nothing else for returning officers to use.
The Chair
Colleagues, I know there are more questions to ask, but I must end the session now. On behalf of the Committee, Peter, I thank you for your time and the evidence you have provided. We are very grateful.
Examination of Witnesses
Andrew Scallan gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Andrew Scallan, who is the deputy chair of the Local Government Boundary Commission for England. Andrew, please introduce yourself.
Andrew Scallan: Thank you. There is not a lot more to say. I am the deputy and I have been for a couple of years now.
Chloe Smith
Q
Andrew Scallan: We have a rolling programme of reviews. Typically, we start 25 reviews each year. Each review, of whatever type, has a certain process resulting in a set of final recommendations. Those recommendations are turned into an order, which is signed by our chief executive after they have sat in Parliament for 40 days under the negative procedure.
Our programme has been worked out. Our reviews take about 15 months. We have a very good idea of where we will be by the beginning of December., and we know where our timetables will take us with our further reviews. The reviews take a long time. We have some contingency because some of our reviews do not finish when we expected them to, because we put in a further set of consultations where there has been something particularly contentious.
Chloe Smith
Q
Andrew Scallan: It depends on how you define prospective, because for us it is our work in hand. We anticipate that 19 reviews covering 3.3 million people will be made before 1 December. Our work programme, at the moment, includes a range of reviews that will not be completed by 1 December. There are around 13 reviews covering 2.1 million people that will be close to completion but will not be ready by 1 December.
Cat Smith
Q
Andrew Scallan: Yes, we think that is exactly the case. It presents the opportunity to challenge; since 2010, there have been three discussions about our orders, but none has been overturned. They are either accepted or overturned, and the 214 that we have done since 2010 have all been approved.
Cat Smith
Q
Andrew Scallan: No. The polling districts are a very useful tool. Our relationship is very different from the parliamentary process. We engage with the local authority, and, as you will know, a feature of our work is forecasting five years from the date of our final recommendations, which is not a feature of the parliamentary boundary commissions’ work. We engage very closely with local authorities and talk through the methodology for doing that forecasting, and the polling districts are a useful building block. When people come to us with proposals, they will often use the existing polling districts to shuffle around, either to create new wards or consolidate thoughts on what ward proposals should be.
Polling districts can change—I know Peter Stanyon was explaining to you the process—but for us it is very rare that we have a change of polling district during our review process. Once we have come up with our new wards, there is the need for new polling districts to be created.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Andrew Scallan: From my previous life, the reasons for changing polling districts vary a lot. Sometimes councils take a policy that they do not want schools to be used for polling districts, which then requires other public buildings or even locations for temporary buildings to be thought through.
In terms of what goes through our mind, the legislation is clear that we can carry out a range of reviews. Some are periodic, and those are the ones where we try to go around the country, bearing in mind the number of authorities that we deal with. We also include two-tier county councils, which do not feature in the stats that the parliamentary boundary commission will use, but they are nevertheless a feature of our workload. We have periodic reviews, we have those that can be asked for by Ministers, and local authorities can sometimes request a review because they have chosen, for example—perhaps as part of an election manifesto—to reduce the size of the council. We will go in and start the review process, which for us has a series of starting points.
First, what will the council size be? Unlike with the parliamentary boundary commissions, that is a local discussion that takes place, during which we invite local authorities to think about what their governance arrangements should be. A figure is then arrived at, and we use that to divide the forecast electorate to work out what the average number of electors per councillor should be. That sets the ball rolling.
The other features involved will be whether a local authority has one, two or three-member wards, or a mixture of those. In the starting of our process, we invite local authorities and others to put in their suggestions about what the warding arrangements might be using those divisors, because we cannot claim to know every local authority in detail. We invite wide representation for local authority-wide schemes, but also from residents’ groups and community groups, who are only concerned about their own particular patch within their local authority.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
“Whilst we support the concept of using the most up-to-date local government boundaries, the Committee will appreciate our concern that doing so should not, unintentionally, compromise the independence and integrity”
of our review programme, which I entirely agree with. Is it your opinion that it is vital for the boundary commission to try to stick to wards, or do you think that is irrelevant? It is useful, but with your five-year timetable and their eight-year timetable and things moving apart, do you think it really matters to constituents if the ward boundaries change and do not quite match constituency boundaries? Do you think that we are trying to blend a round hole and a square hole together?
Andrew Scallan: I am trying to work out what a round hole and a square hole together might look like. There is a real challenge. I do not wish to complicate matters, but in the work that we do, we also take a strong view about the arrangements that exist for parish councils, which vary enormously in size and scope. As well as polling districts, as part of our test around effective and convenient local government, we try not to cause too much disruption to parish councils.
People’s strength of feeling varies enormously and I would not like to generalise. We know that people are concerned about the names of wards. We often get people very agitated about that, which you would not necessarily expect, given that they are overlaid on the real map of any local authority area.
The important point for any organisation dealing with boundaries is to try to explain why they have arrived at the decisions that they have arrived at. For a ward, it might be entirely appropriate to include a ward that has, for example, a major road down the middle of it. If that ward is split by that major road for parliamentary purposes, that needs to be properly explained in the formulation of it. It may well be that that will cut a community in two, but it may also be the only way to balance the criteria that we always juggle with, which is trying to get the electorate as close as possible to whatever quota we work to.
Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)
Q
Andrew Scallan: The strength of views in Cornwall is well known. In terms of our work, it was all self-contained in Cornwall. We try not to get involved in discussions about parliamentary boundaries when we are doing our reviews, not least because we do not want to confuse anyone, especially the community groups that we are dealing with. We have no view about crossed boundaries. We work to our legislation, which basically tells us to stay within local authority boundaries.
The Chair
If there are no other questions from Committee members, I thank you, Mr Scallan, for the time you have spent with us. We are most appreciative of the evidence you have given us.
Examination of Witness
Darren Hughes gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Darren Hughes: Good afternoon, Chair. My name is Darren Hughes. I am the chief executive of the Electoral Reform Society. We are an independent, non-partisan research and campaigns organisation founded in 1884. Basically, we work towards fair voting rules, principally through proportional representation in the House of Commons, but also on other democratic issues where we can encourage participation. We have quite a strong belief that we should write rules that are technical and fair and that will suit political actors and players when times are good and bad, so that there is never any question about their being written in a way that favours one particular side.
We referred to accents. My accent is a New Zealand one. I served three terms in the New Zealand Parliament, so I am happy to answer any questions that Members might have about New Zealand’s experience with boundaries as well.
Chloe Smith
Q
Darren Hughes: Sure thing. We welcome the change to go back to the future, as it were, with the 650 number. We were quite concerned, at the time that was being looked at, that it would have resulted in quite a high proportion of the Commons being MPs who were also on the Government payroll, which would lower the scrutiny aspect of the legislative side of the role of Members of Parliament. It would also have made the Commons even more out of proportion with the second Chamber, the membership of which gallops along at an alarming pace. I think it is better to have gone for 650.
On some of the differences, in New Zealand there has been more of a philosophical decision that a Member of Parliament’s local duty is to every citizen resident in their constituency, regardless of their age and so on, so constituency size is entirely based on the census figures, rather than on the number of people on the electoral register. We have a long-held view that a lot of constituency casework is irrelevant to the age or electoral status of the citizen in front of the MP. That is a difference.
Another difference that may be of interest is that it is so important that these things are done in a clear, straight, technically correct, robust and honest way. If you lose control of these sort of things, you will live to regret it for a very long time indeed, so it is so important to get it right. However, we also cannot deny that there is a political dynamic to the entire process. Very few industry players get the opportunity to sit around and come up with the rules for their own industry in quite the way that parliamentarians do. You are the guardians of the whole society, so recognising some of the realities there can sometimes take some of the tension out.
In New Zealand, on the Representation Commission, which is a boundary commission equivalent, in addition to those members chosen based on the positions that they hold, such as the surveyor general for mapping, the Government Statistician from our Office for National Statistics equivalent and so on, the Prime Minister is asked to nominate a representative on behalf of governing parties—I say that plural, because in New Zealand a collection of parties run the Government—and the Leader of the Opposition is invited to appoint somebody to represent Opposition parties, or to at least bring their perspectives to bear. They are obviously rightly in a numerical minority, but that blends some of those technical aspects with the political reality.
I should also say that there are reserved constituencies like those discussed this morning, in that seven constituencies are reserved for Maori indigenous voters who register on that roll. Again, taking into account some of the unique identifying features of our polity is quite an important point.
Chloe Smith
Q
Darren Hughes: Yes. Forgive me; I should have touched on that. That is very important. That takes it out the perception or, in some examples, as Professor Curtice pointed to, the reality of political interference, based on what was happening at that particular time in politics.
As I said earlier, there are a handful of laws and rules and conventions that really need to be able to stand the test of time, regardless of any particular party’s fortunes—whenever you start to decide based on that, it is not long before it blows up in the face of those who have done it; they certainly regret it down the line. Putting that in place is important.
That is at the end of the process, and I think it creates a huge responsibility at the beginning of the process to get the scope right and the membership of the commission right, because it is handing a lot of power and say, in a democratic sense, to that institution. That is why you need to spend some time thinking about who should go on it, how long they should be there for and how you balance the need for straight demographic information versus community interests versus the political dimension that exists.
One thought I had on that was that we have consultation periods, but as we all know, consultation can be a small number of very squeaky wheels that take up the opportunity, and are then painted as being “the community”. Given the recent narrow interest in parliamentary boundaries, this might be an area for some of the more innovative techniques for consulting publics, such as citizens’ juries and deliberative democracy mechanisms, where you could take randomly selected citizens for a particular region and use them as a way of consulting. Then actual people could tell you whether they thought a bridge being in one constituency or another really mattered, as opposed to those who take the initiative to write the letter and subsequently take on a cloak of authority when they may represent a tiny fraction of the real population.
Chloe Smith
Q
Can I round off my international comparison questions by checking whether New Zealand or any other countries that you are aware of also run with a judge-led process, securing a high level of independence, as we do in this country?
Darren Hughes: That has been a feature in New Zealand, and I know it is in other jurisdictions as well. One of the dilemmas to resolve is whether you draw up a list of positions you want to serve on the commission and to make the decisions—and in that sense you are blind to whoever the postholder happens to be when the review is done—or whether there are particular people who you think have the skills and strength and integrity to run the decision process for that particular round. That is something for the Committee to think about, because if you nominate particular positions, you always know who will be responsible for the decision, seeing as there will not be that final parliamentary vote, and that may have an impact on recruitment decisions, because those extra responsibilities are thought about. Alternatively, if there are particular people deemed appropriate for that time, that might reflect on whether or not it is judge-led, or whether there is some other structure that might be important.
Rounding off on that point, what you have to have at the back of your mind when coming up with these systems is what happens if they fall into the hands of a bad actor or a disruptive actor, or somebody who says, “This is just a bunch of conventions. It’s not really written down anywhere. We can drive a lorry through this.” The UK system is so trusted and has not gone down the Americanised gerrymander system, so that has got to be protected at all costs. That might lead you to want to be a little bit more prescriptive at the beginning, seeing that you are conceding that final vote at the end.
Cat Smith
Q
Darren Hughes: There are so many strong arguments on the threshold question. We would come down in favour of a higher threshold than the plus or minus 5%, to be able to offer some flexibility in that sense. There are two competing ways of looking at this. On the one hand, who are the people for whom communities of interest are important with respect to parliamentary boundaries? The answer is: every single Member of Parliament and all the people who are in that orbit of representation, democratic work and politics. Outside of the campaign periods, the boundaries themselves, for the most part, do not have enduring appeal or identity. It has always struck me that, on a basic thing that people need to do all the time—think about where they are going to rent or buy a property—Zoopla does not make a big thing of telling you what parliamentary constituency you will be in if you move to this particular accommodation, whereas it will talk about the borough, the schools and the other services that are available. It makes sense to, as best as possible, come up with sensible communities for a constituency because the Member of Parliament will need to be doing a lot of important work there. However, I do not think you want to stretch it too far to pretend that people’s connection to a particular constituency is the most important thing. One way of dealing with that might be to look at the threshold question.
Chris Clarkson
Q
I want to pick up on a couple of points that have been raised. In terms of the 5% electoral quota and splitting communities, going back to the Maori electorates—which I think are arrived at by dividing the South Island’s population by 16 and then applying to the Maori electoral register—they do lead to some splitting of communities and they still stay within the 5% boundary. Is that correct? I am thinking, for example, of Te Tai Tonga, which covers the entire South Island and only part of Wellington.
Darren Hughes: That is mostly right. The number of constituencies for the South Island is set: the population on the census is taken, divided by 16, and that gives you your quota for North Island seats, plus or minus. That number is demand driven by the number of Maori New Zealanders who decide to register on the Maori electorate. For a long time, only about 50% of people did that. It has gone up a lot more in recent times and that is why it has gone from only four seats up to seven, because it is demand driven. It comes off the back of that quota formula that you quote. Therefore—remembering that New Zealand is the same geographic size as the UK—one constituency is the entire South Island plus Wellington in the North Island.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Darren Hughes: Well, they have to work incredibly hard, not just because of the geographic size, but because those constituencies will cover more than one iwi—one tribe. Finding a single Member of Parliament to represent such a broad number of Maori interests, views and citizens is a tough challenge. However, Maori electors are also on the general roll and so will have access to a general electorate Member of Parliament. Also, because New Zealand has used proportional representation for the last quarter of a century, all the political parties of size will have a significant number of Maori Members of Parliament on the list as well. I think that mixed model has certainly led to more Maori Members of Parliament being elected than there were under the previous system. For the actual geographic seats, the burden of size is absolutely something they would all willingly concede.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Darren Hughes: With the boundaries here we have to talk about the single-member “winner takes all” voting system. That means that many millions of people either vote for a candidate who does not win or a winner who did not need their votes. Those votes are not translated into representation. If we had the single transferable vote, you would draw the boundaries differently. Of course, they would be geographically bigger, but you would be electing a team of Members of Parliament to cover that geographic area.
That could also be of assistance for local government. As you are aware, Scotland has had the single transferable vote system of proportional representation for local government for quite some time, and that has better reflected the political views of Scotland, in terms both of parties and of communities of interest. I think it would be great to have parliamentary constituencies for which we did not expect just one person, on a plurality of the vote, to represent absolutely everybody in the area. That is too big a challenge for just one person when such quality alternative arrangements exist.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Darren Hughes: I think that ties into the way in which the boundaries are drawn up. Using the electoral register imposes a responsibility to make sure that it is as accurate and complete as possible, so that those decisions about fairness can be looked at. In that respect, we know that, no matter how you slice it, millions of people are not on the register. Some of the work that has been done on promoting automatic voter registration—the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust published a paper in April looking at how we can make sure that we find as many citizens as possible and get them on the electoral register—would achieve a lot for a fairer electoral administration, which would then leak through into the kind of decisions that would need to be taken by the boundary commissioners.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Darren Hughes: Yes, provided that we are talking about things such as the electoral register being more accurate and complete by taking proactive measures, for example automatic voter registration. Keeping the number of seats at 650 adds to that argument. So yes, but with the important caveat that you mentioned: this is not a system that we would choose if it were over the last—[Inaudible.]
David Linden (Glasgow East) (SNP)
Q
Darren Hughes: These questions on the Union are very interesting. In our three most recent general election reports, we have been tracking the movement between the nations at elections. In addition to some of the class voting changes that Professor Curtice talked about this morning, we think that those issues of the politics and the psephology of the nations of the UK are certainly worth more attention than they probably get.
The most obvious point with respect to the Bill is that it makes a bad situation slightly better, in the sense that at once stage Wales would have fallen to 28 seats from its current 40 under the cut to 600 seats. I guess that it is important to recognise the effects of the Bill in that regard. Even so, the impact on Scotland is not exactly clear, but it would certainly be a reduction, maybe in the order of two or three seats, while in Wales, it would be more like eight. That becomes quite a significant proportion of the representation.
One thought that we have had about that, though, comes back to the previous answer that I gave to Chris Clarkson about the electoral register and making sure that more people are on it in areas where there might be under-registration or non-registration, in order to boost the entitlement to more constituencies.
David Linden
Q
Darren Hughes: I think that is exactly right. These processes give us the opportunity to say, “What would the rules be and how would they apply in the majority of cases?”, and then, “Where are the outliers, whereby if we did apply the rules we could congratulate ourselves on the consistency?”, but actually we are creating a brand new representation injury, by making politics and representation so distant from people.
As we were discussing with the last set of questions, if we had multi-Member wards, these things could be addressed. Obviously, you cannot change the geographic challenges of some areas—they simply cannot be addressed by any system—but you can make decisions to make the situation worse, and sometimes that is what tends to happen.
If there was a multi-Member system, that would be of assistance, but it is also important to carve out the ability for the commissioners to look at a particular constituency and say, “This just doesn’t make sense.” Equally, you could not make a decision based on those examples and then necessarily apply it to the rest of the UK, because that would create further injustices as well. Until we know more about the effect of the new regime, given that by the time we get to the next election it will be nearly a quarter of a century since the 2000 dataset that is being used, that needs to be part of the consideration. But you point to examples or rules that you could use that would minimise that.
Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)
Q
One of the things we heard this morning was that US congressional districts had close to zero margin of deviation around population size, and one of the points that you made was that when people buy a house, or look on Zoopla, they are not given information about their political constituency, but they are given other very local information, for example school proximity. I just wondered whether there was any sort of empirical basis that you had in mind when you said that you thought that the 5% range, if I can call it that, was not sufficient.
Darren Hughes: Sure. The American examples are obviously the extreme ones, but they are ones to bear in mind, because they are examples of what can happen if you set hard and fast rules, so they apply everywhere no matter what, and then you also allow for a rampant politicisation of the process.
There is an author called David Daley who has written a couple of books, which are incredibly readable and accessible, about how the boundary system in American got to the state it is in. Unfortunately, one of them has such a colourful title that you will need to google it; I could not possibly say it in this forum.
However, regarding your point about the 5% versus the 10% range, these are the areas where you can go round in a lot of circles, because there are arguments in favour of each range. I just feel that if you could offer reasonable flexibility to the commission, what you would hope is that the practice would develop and that it gives them an extra tool when a particular geographic situation confronts them, as opposed to just starting out by saying, “We’ll flex our muscles wherever we can.” The thinking on that was that they are the final line in the arguments, but because you are not having that final parliamentary vote and you are not getting the commissions to do the work, it might make sense to offer them those tools.
Laura Farris
Q
Darren Hughes: I do agree with that analysis. Sometimes things are important but not very popular, or not very—[Inaudible]— or not very engaging. When we conduct elections, they are very important to millions of people, which is why around two thirds of people on the register turn out. We all wish that that was higher, but there is still a lot of interest in elections. Some of the mechanics of how we build the demographic architecture does not result in a huge amount of engagement. I think that on parliamentary boundaries, if you were wanting to involve them in a submission process, you either hire somebody to run that for you or you ensure that tweets and letters go out and so on. As I said before, it takes on an incredible cloak of authority for that community, even though it might not be entitled to the status that it receives. I agree that it is possible to happen, and I think in some cases the community argument is very strong, but in a lot of cases it is a shield for more of a partisan argument for that particular electoral cycle, which, as I say, is the sort of thing we should avoid.
Being able to have things like citizens’ juries or —[Inaudible]—citizens who are asked to come together to assist the commissions with information, with their feelings and the values of that area, and with people saying what they think the community interests really are, might be a more real way of being able to include the community, getting better quality information and ensuring that the final decisions reflect the reasonable view of the public, as opposed to those who knew that the consultation was on.
Clive Efford
Q
Darren Hughes: I do not know, is the answer to that. I assume not, but sometimes when these processes are going on for a long period of time, and if people are appointed who might not have a lot of experience in dealing with active organised citizens pushing a particular view, these are the risks you run. It might not be the case in every cycle, but you would want to make sure that organised political activity dressed up as the concerned citizen was not able to take hold. That is an important thing. Secondly, if there are mechanisms to get very good quality information about what the general public think, like deliberative consultation processes enable you to do, that is pretty rich information for the commissioners to receive in addition to the demography data that they would be using as well.
Clive Efford
Q
Darren Hughes: Not that I can provide you with right now, no. I have never sat on one of those commissions, so I do not have personal experience there. There is plenty of both academic and more political-style literature that is available to describe some of the tactics that can go on. All I am saying is that those things are really easy to avoid, and we should build it into the process.
Clive Efford
Q
Darren Hughes: The main suggestion I have on that would be to move proactively to an overt position of automatic voter registration where we basically said that every time a citizen makes contact, or touches base in any way, with the Government or Government agencies, there is an ability to register—and that that is proactively put to people: we do work with people before they attain registration age to explain what democracy is, why participation is important and how you can have your say, and we really try to increase the amount of information that our younger citizens have. Then, with an automatic voter registration model where they would go on the register, you would hope that that would lead to participation in elections. Even if it did not, it would then get more accurate and complete data for the drawing up of boundaries.
I think some improvements were made by using other sources of Government data and requiring DWP involvement when the IER changes were made. That is coming up to 10 years ago, so now the next step is to say, “What could we do to be more proactive?” I think this paper that the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust has produced on automatic voter registration would be a good place to start.
Clive Efford
Q
Darren Hughes: I suppose it would be political involvement at both levels, would not it? It was the decision to propose going from 650 to 600, and then another decision to reverse that and go back. I think that there was a political element to that. I guess the other thing is, right at the very beginning, making sure that these things are written for all time, not just one time, one particular cycle or one particular Government or Opposition—just doing these things in a very straight way so that if you are up it works for you and if you are down it works for you as well.
I do not think the decision to go from 650 to 600 was driven by any particular democratic principle. It was part of a response to a crisis at the time, and that has not stood the test of time because it was not grounded in much more than that. Also, probably it is easy to agree to a cut in the number of MPs until you realise that it also involves the boundaries of the remaining 600. That might have focused minds a wee bit.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Darren Hughes: That is a good question, because I guess it is philosophical. The duties and responsibilities of being a citizen do not actually require much, but being on the electoral register means that you can, right at the last minute, decide whether you will vote. It also helps us with the way we structure democracy and ensures that the way the boundaries are done is open and transparent. For people who want to be involved in elected politics, it is important to know the number of people in the country for whom they can campaign with their ideas and policies. Those are all some basic responsibilities that just come with the duty of being a citizen.
Alec Shelbrooke
Q
Darren Hughes: Yes, we have. We have done work on that in the past with organisations that try to reach people who are not on the register. Often there is a mixture of reasons. Some people do not know about it and are just oblivious to the fact that it exists or that it is a legal requirement at the present time. Other people have not engaged with the question of why politics matters, which is why we think citizenship education is so important. Once you get people into a discussion on that, it can change things. In a large, dynamic society like this, there are always a lot of people who are in the middle of things. Their hectic lives and situations sometimes mean that registration falls off the bottom of the to-do list. We should be doing positive things, such as showing people that registration is simple and free, to promote politics as being a good thing for the country and a good thing for society.
Ben Lake
Q
Darren Hughes: Yes, that is correct. It uses the census, so everybody is taken into account for the drawing of the boundaries. There are different qualification rules to being an elector, but the way that the constituencies are put together is based on the number of people who were living in an area when the census was done.
Ben Lake
Q
Darren Hughes: If that is where they are on census evening, that is correct, although students are able to register at their family address, depending on when they started their study. I hesitate on that, because there was a court case about it once and I would not want to give you the wrong information. I will come back to you on that. It does take into account the place people were when the census was held.
Ben Lake
Q
Darren Hughes: The list system helps in a peripheral sense, in that it is a way to ensure different styles of representation beyond just geography, but the commission itself has to deal with the majority of the Parliament, which consists of geographic constituencies, and it can take into account factors such as rurality. There is a threshold that enables it to do that, which is the same as in the legislation before you: plus or minus 5%. But there is always a very alive debate about whether that figure is high enough for parts of the country that are outside main population centres. As I mentioned before, New Zealand is geographically the same size as the whole UK, but it has a similar population to that of Scotland. There are far-flung places where, to be an effective Member of Parliament, a lot of travel is required.
The Chair
If there are no other questions from Committee members, I thank Mr Hughes very much indeed for his evidence. We are very grateful.
Examination of Witness
Gavin Robinson MP gave evidence.
The Chair
We now move on to one of our colleagues, Gavin Robinson. Gavin, we know what you look like, but we cannot see you. Will you please introduce yourself and tell us why you are giving us evidence?
Gavin Robinson: Certainly, Sir David. I thank you and all our colleagues for hosting this session. I am a Member of Parliament and my party’s director of elections. Therefore, I was tapped on the shoulder and asked if I would participate as part of your proceedings, so I happily give evidence on that basis, as director of elections for the Democratic Unionist party.
Chloe Smith
Q
Gavin Robinson: Thank you for that curveball. I am very happy to speak on behalf of the Democratic Unionist party. I am a little more curtailed in hoping to assist the Bill Committee as to the position of other parties. We had engagement at party level with you, Minister, and we are grateful for that. Some of the other parties participated in that engagement. We had separate engagement with the Northern Ireland Office as well, as part of the overall consideration.
One of the perennial issues with and concerns about the previous proposals before Parliament was the reduction from 650 to 600, with the impact that it had on the parliamentary constituencies in Northern Ireland. We have 18; we were proposed to be reduced to 17 and—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Gavin, may I interrupt you for a minute? There is a three-minute suspension. We cannot hear what you are saying clearly, so please hang on until the bell has stopped ringing.
Gavin Robinson: There was concern about the reduction from 18 seats to 17, which was consequential on the decision to move from 650 to 600. Given the acute political divisions that we have in Northern Ireland and the history, people are easily led into surmising how that might have impacted on one community or another. I am happy for the Committee to explore that further. At least in the initial stages, it formed part of a court case that concluded within the past month on the previous boundary proposals.
In these proposals, we are satisfied and pleased to see that the 650 figure will remain, albeit highlighting the fact that in the previous Parliament legislation was introduced in 2018 that sought to solidify in legislation the 18 seats for Northern Ireland, with 632 for the rest of the United Kingdom. That is a commitment that was there two years ago, although it did not leave Committee. We believe that it is important to solidify the constituency and boundary arrangements that we have at present in Northern Ireland.
Chloe Smith
Q
Gavin Robinson: The particular rule that we can rely on in Northern Ireland is rule 7. That rule is important for us, given the geographical nature of Northern Ireland, with the urban dimensions and restrictiveness of our small part of the United Kingdom. Rule 7 allows us, where there is unreasonable infringement, to go beyond the 5% tolerance. We wish to see that important rule maintained. That is maintained.
We are mildly concerned that the consequence of the judicial review that just emerged from the Court of Appeal may inject a level of chill in the Boundary Commission’s ability to rely on rule 7. It is an important flexibility that it should use, with the need ultimately to demonstrate the rationale for doing so.
Cat Smith
Q
Gavin Robinson: I do not think it compromises the integrity of the Union in the longer term, but I do see that some of the arguments that could be used for retaining 18 seats in Northern Ireland could naturally apply to some of the other devolved Administrations. Fundamentally, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for Assembly constituencies to be contiguous with our parliamentary constituencies. Without elections occurring at the same time, you could have a situation where you have representatives for a parliamentary constituency that no longer exists remaining in the Northern Ireland Assembly. I assume that unless there was some co-ordination between election times and reviews, that anomalous situation could occur, with representation for areas that no longer exist, depending on a boundary change and the configuration at that time. That is important for us.
You cannot really go beyond our boundaries unless you are prepared to go into extraterritorial application or the sea. Land boundaries with Scotland and Wales are obviously a little less constrained, but when you consider the impact on the devolved Administrations, I do think there is an argument that you can extrapolate from Northern Ireland to others.
Cat Smith
Q
Gavin Robinson: I believe it is wrong to move away from parliamentary approval. I see the proposal is to remove the ministerial ability for amendment and to remove the ability for Parliament ultimately to approve the proposals. Parliamentary approval is an important constitutional dimension that should be retained. It is a bulwark against proposals that do not rest well with our body politic, and I do not think the removal from Ministers of the ability to amend is in any way commensurate with the removal of Parliament’s ability to approve the proposals. The Minister will know better than I, but I am unaware of any fundamental use of the Minister’s ability to amend. We are all aware, however, of Parliament’s ability to inject itself and determine one way or another whether proposals should proceed. So we are concerned about the loss of parliamentary approval in the process.
David Linden
Q
Gavin Robinson: Arguments can be made for solidifying the number of constituencies in other parts of the United Kingdom, but I do not think there should be any rationale that precludes me from advancing an argument that is important for Northern Ireland on our political context and make-up. On our number of electors, at this moment in time we have sufficient electors for 17.63 constituencies, leading to the 18 constituencies, and we have that additional flexibility on rule 7.
Mr Linden, you are more than capable of advancing arguments that are important for Scotland, as indeed is Mr Lake for Wales. I think it is appropriate that the concerns highlighted about a cyclical reduction that could potentially arise through future reviews—a cyclical reduction or increase of parliamentary boundaries, and the knock-on consequence that would have for devolved Administrations—should be considered more generally, but I will advance the argument on Northern Ireland’s behalf.
David Linden
Q
Gavin Robinson: I am sure it could be. Again, that is an argument that could and should be advanced, and I would not hinder someone in making that argument. When we went through the process within the past two years, with the various iterations of Boundary Commission proposals for Northern Ireland, the rationale for using rule 7 was incredibly clear. The Boundary Commission’s initial draft proposals brought forward constituencies that were not in any way consistent with geographical localities, urban dimensions or local ties, and were outwith the legislative framework that I believe the commission had in its process. They commenced with a false premise, and ended up with a real mishmash of parliamentary boundaries.
I was pleased that they invoked rule 7. I mentioned the chill effect earlier: that use of rule 7 was struck down by the Court of Appeal within the past month in the case of Patrick Lynch. It was not struck down because rule 7 was used inappropriately, but because the Boundary Commission simply failed to articulate the rationale for using it. It has been proven to be an incredibly important tool to ensure the fundamentals of achieving good boundaries within Northern Ireland were attained in the last process.
David Linden
Q
Gavin Robinson: I think you imbue me with greater knowledge, Mr Linden, and considerably more power than the circumstances merit.
Chloe Smith
Q
As you will have seen from a close reading, this Bill makes provision for a buffer period between recommendations from a boundary review that would come into effect for the UK, and the point at which the Northern Ireland Assembly constituencies would change to reflect those new boundaries. I wonder if you might be able to give us a little more insight into the impact of such a scenario—that is, what effect not having that kind of buffer and protection would have on constituencies and electors in Northern Ireland.
Gavin Robinson: I think as currently outlined, with a projected Assembly election in 2022, the process is manageable. There are two considerations for further reflection; we will reflect on them, and I am sure others will as well.
The first would be a cyclical reduction in uplift from 17 and 18, which I think would be unhelpful given the knock-on consequences that would have for the Assembly elections. Fundamentally, given the difficulties we have faced over the past three years—the stagnation in the effective operation of our devolved institutions—I do not think we have fully reflected on or resolved what would happen should there be an early or emergency Assembly election and how that may be impacted by this boundary process.
Chloe Smith
Q
Gavin Robinson: Only that, as I indicated at the start of the answer, as currently drafted, the process will be entirely manageable.
Chloe Smith
Thank you very much indeed. I was keen for the Committee to note that, so I appreciate your help on that.
The Chair
There are no other questions from the Committee to our witness. Gavin, I thank you very much indeed for enlightening us on the views of your party on the Bill and for sharing how other parties in Northern Ireland feel about this particular piece of legislation.
Examination of Witness
Dr Jac Larner gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Dr Larner: It has been very interesting, actually; certainly not boring at all. I am a research associate at the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University. My research focuses on electoral behaviour—how people behave around elections. A big part of that is that I am a research associate on the Welsh Election Study and the Scottish Election Study, which are big surveys around election times.
Chloe Smith
Q
Dr Larner: The Bill has particularly drastic changes and implications for future elections in Wales. The planned change to reduce the number of MPs from 650 to 600 has now obviously been rethought, but proportionally, that does not really make much difference in the reduction for Wales. If we have 600 MPs, there is a planned reduction of around 12 seats. In the new plan to stay at 650, Wales’ seats will drop by eight. Either way, the proportional representation of Wales in the Commons will be around the 5% mark. That is obviously of concern.
Wales is the biggest loser here. At the same time, it is also worth bearing in mind that, in pretty much any set-up, Wales will always be, proportionally, a very small part of the representation in the Commons. It might also be important to consider things such as really strengthening intergovernmental relations between the devolved Administrations and Westminster going forward.
On whether I outrightly support the Bill or disapprove of it, that is slightly more complicated. I will leave my answer at that, if that is okay.
Cat Smith
Q
Dr Larner: That is a very important question, and particularly relevant where I am from, for example, in south Wales. People talk about the valleys as one block, but I can assure you that people from one valley to the next, no matter how small, consider themselves quite different. There is the importance of people feeling that their community is being represented, without being interfered with by what they might see as people from other, different communities.
There is also the important uniqueness of Wales’s being particularly rural in its population. Given the tolerance at the moment, doing some quick maths, at the lower bound of what is being suggested at the moment— around the 69,000 voter mark—depending on which data source you use, there are only either two or four constituencies in Wales larger than that lower bound. That would necessitate really big boundary changes, and we know from some of our research that people like do not like the idea of constituencies being merged in different areas. It is really a balancing act in terms of how much importance you give to that kind of intuitive feeling of, “Oh no, I want boundaries to stay as they are,” versus the idea of fairness in the size of constituencies.
Cat Smith
Q
Dr Larner: Don’t get me wrong, not everyone will feel like this, but there is a certain feeling that yes, the Rhymney valley is very different from the Rhondda. There is that kind of feeling—although, when confronted with anyone from north Wales, you are from the valleys, the whole thing. It changes depending on who you are talking to, of course.
Cat Smith
Q
Dr Larner: Absolutely. There is a lot of very well-backed-up evidence in Wales that Welsh speakers, particularly fluent, first language Welsh speakers, tend to hold slightly different opinions on a whole range of ideas. They see themselves slightly differently from other people; they tend to identify not particularly as British, but more overwhelmingly as Welsh-only, whereas in more English-speaking areas there is more of a mix of Welsh and British identity. I would absolutely say that the ability to speak Welsh is a really important part of some people’s identity.
Ben Lake
Q
Dr Larner: In terms of those who are interested in a solid Welsh representation in the Commons, I would not say that this Bill is particularly good news. On the other hand, if we took a hypothetical situation where the number of Welsh MPs was increased by 10, you would still be looking at a very small proportion of the total representation in the Commons.
Specifically with the Bill, it is tricky to see how that can be fixed. More broadly, if we want to take the nations approach seriously, we need to think about how we do devolution. We need to think about doing that properly in Wales, which has had what my colleague Ed Poole likes to call salami-sliced devolution, as opposed to Scotland. We need proper inter-governmental relations baked into Whitehall processes. Another idea commonly talked about is House of Lords reform. I know that is far beyond the scope of the Bill, but those are the things we need to think and talk about.
Ben Lake
Q
The panellist from the Liberal Democrats suggested that there should be no reduction in the number of seats without further devolution. I think his point was that the devolution settlements across the UK—especially if we compare Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland—are very different. There are perhaps more policy issues decided in Westminster that directly impact Wales.
A recent change that I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on is the UK leaving the European Union. Things that were previously decided on a European level, where Wales had four MEPs, are now being decided at Westminster. Some aspects of that touch, indirectly or directly, touch on policy fields that are commonly considered to be devolved to Wales. Should this new dynamic, now that the UK has left the European Union, in which more things will be directly or indirectly influenced at Westminster, be borne in mind when we allocate seats across the nations of the UK?
Dr Larner: I certainly think that is something to keep in mind, not only with the allocation of seats, but with the general operation of Government. There is another important idea—related to that and other points made earlier by your colleagues—about voter knowledge in Wales: it is important for people to know who is responsible for what.
Another idea often talked about in academia is that a reduction in the number of MPs in Wales, given that people are aware that more constituencies in Wales are being scrapped than in other places, will cause people to give less importance and salience to Westminster generally. That would be the message coming from the centre, if you like. The idea is to make it very clear who is responsible for what, and that should always be taken into account.
Ben Lake
Q
The automaticity of the Bill, should it pass, would mean that Wales would not only lose eight seats in this particular review but a further couple of seats at the next review, unless something drastic happens and everybody wants to live in Wales—there is a welcome in the hillsides, by the way. Should that scenario come to pass—I appreciate it is a hypothetical scenario at the moment—could it have any impact on sentiments within Wales and perhaps attitudes towards the Union?
Dr Larner: It is of course hypothetical, but as I have said, there is the idea—I should point out that we do not have firm evidence on this—that a reduction in the number of MPs is seen by some in Wales as meaning that Westminster is no longer as important to them politically. I know that Professor Wyn Jones has some quite strong views about the importance of rural dynamics and things like that, which I disagree with slightly. It is certainly something to bear in mind, however, especially given the real and rapid increase in the visibility and general salience of the Welsh Government and the Senedd in the last couple of months.
Christian Matheson
Q
Dr Larner: We have done some research on that. There is not really much geographical variation in terms of general support or attitudes towards the Senedd. Certainly among some people, there is the idea that devolution has largely profited Cardiff. I would not say that that is a unique feeling in Wales. In most systems, there is a general feeling that the further you are geographically from the centre of power, the more fed up you might feel about it.
In those areas, although people might not look to places such as Liverpool and Manchester politically, those areas and cities have a significant impact culturally. There are also more people working across the border in those areas. In a lot of those constituencies, a higher number of people were born in England and might still consider themselves to be English or British, not necessarily Welsh. That is a big divide in Wales. National identity does determine—well, not determine in a lot of ways, but is a good predictor of—your general attitude to devolution.
Christian Matheson
Q
We have already heard about the south Wales valleys and there are parts of Snowdonia that are very mountainous. I suspect that Wales is more badly affected by losing so many seats because we are focusing solely on the numbers, and that the areas of sparsity and the geographical barriers would lead to much larger constituencies in area. How would you strike a balance between geography, sparsity, rurality and numbers?
Dr Larner: There is an understanding that Wales is the most rural nation in terms of population in the UK. As you say, there are very large constituencies. The issue with the plus or minus 5% rule is that these areas are badly affected. I do not necessarily have a problem with the idea of levelling up constituencies in terms of population size, but I think there are certain geographic limits to what is a manageable constituency. There could be the inclusion of an upper band for the number of square miles in a constituency, or something as simple as that. I know that is a down-the-middle answer.
Mrs Miller
Q
Under these provisions there are four protected constituencies, as you know: two are on the Isle of Wight, near my own constituency of Basingstoke, and two are in Scotland, but there are none in Wales. When the proposal was to reduce to 600 constituencies, it was difficult to give protection to Ynys Môn, yet under this proposal it is easier to do so and stay closer to the potential threshold for constituency sizes. I have tabled an amendment to that affect, which I do not know whether you have had a chance to look at. Can you see any problems with introducing such an amendment into this legislation? I declare an interest as I was brought up in south Wales.
Dr Larner: On the face of it, I certainly do not see any problems. I have also seen some people discussing the idea of some of the constituencies on the west coast of Wales, where there are far more Welsh speakers and very rural constituencies, being considered for something like that. Obviously, Ynys Môn is not as isolated geographically as some of the Scottish constituencies, but, when you consider that the Isle of Wight is involved in these protections, it is reasonable to suggest that Ynys Môn should be too.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
Q
Have you come across any evidence from the last few boundary reviews on what a more disruptive boundary review does to voting behaviour, as regards the parties or candidates people vote for, or whether they vote at all?
Dr Larner: Not necessarily in the way you put it, but there is interesting evidence if you compare strategic voting in Scotland and Wales, especially at devolved elections. In Wales, constituency boundaries for devolved and UK general election elections are coterminous, which is a silly word meaning the same, and in Scotland, they are different; they do not overlap. There is a lot of very interesting evidence on those elections. When people are faced with different boundaries, how do they calculate who they will vote for? There is some evidence from Scotland that there is more confusion when faced with different boundaries and boundary changes. For example, people are not always sure which is the strongest candidate, or which is the favourite or second favourite candidate. There is evidence that those boundary changes, which are consistent and repeated—they are not one-off events—cause some confusion among voters.
The Chair
Dr Larner, you waited a long time, but the Committee had plenty of questions for you, and we are very grateful for the time you spent with us. Thank you.
Examination of witnesses
Dr David Rossiter and Professor Charles Pattie gave evidence.
The Chair
Colleagues, we come to our final session this afternoon. We have Dr Rossiter and Professor Charles Pattie. Could you please introduce yourselves, gentlemen?
Professor Pattie: I am Charles Pattie, professor of politics at the University of Sheffield. I have been studying elections and boundary reviews for something like 30 or 35 years.
Dr Rossiter: My name is David Rossiter. I do not want to outdo Charles, but I have studied and published on the process of redrawing boundaries for about 40 years. I was the lead researcher on a Leverhulme-sponsored study on the work of Boundary Commissions in the 1990s, and was responsible for much of the modelling for the McDougall Trust report on the impact of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 in 2014.
Chloe Smith
Q
I noted that you and your late colleague, Professor Ron Johnston—we send you our condolences on his loss—looked into claims of bias in prior reviews. You were very clear that there is a function here for levelling the playing field by ensuring updated and equal boundaries. Could you please go into that?
Professor Pattie: Thank you for your words on Ron. Do not take it amiss, but I think both David and I would, in some respects, prefer it if Ron were here to talk to you in person. I mean that in the best of possible senses.
Your question about bias is very interesting. Obviously, it has been the cause of some concern. There has been a particular party political concern about the extent to which the system has become substantially biased in Labour’s favour. Part of the concern is around constituency size effects, which the current legislation and the 2011 Act deal with.
You heard earlier today—I think John Curtice also discussed it this morning—that there are two things to bear in mind. First, we are talking about bias between Conservative and Labour. As long as we have a first-past-the-post system, there is in-built bias against small parties with equal vote shares. The Conservative-Labour bias in particular does have an element around the constituency size effect, which the legislation largely removes. Most of the bias that has caused comment and concern in recent years has come from other sources that are nothing to do with the constituency size issue. They are to do with things such as preferential abstention rates, third-party effects in different seats, and in particular the efficiency with which parties’ votes are spread.
In the last few elections—every election since 2015—the relative Conservative-Labour bias has run in favour of the Conservative party and not Labour, largely because the Conservatives have become much more efficient in how they campaign and where they win the votes. To that extent, the legislation deals with one of the sources of bias. However, as a few witnesses this morning pointed out, that is one of the smaller components of the bias picture, and the bigger elements of bias are not really dealt with by this legislation—and I suspect cannot be dealt with by any legislation.
Dr Rossiter: The change to a UK-wide quota quite clearly deals with the fact that there were higher levels of representation in Scotland up to 2005, and still are in Wales. If you look back to when the current constituencies —the ones you are representing—were first defined using 2000 data, there was no bias at that time in favour of either party in terms of the size of the seats. The 10 largest seats defined at that stage included Hornchurch and Upminster as well as Croydon North; one was Conservative, one Labour. If you look at the 10 smallest seats, again, there is a completely equal mix. So for every Hexham, there was an Islington South and Finsbury. It is not that the commissions were unable to provide equality at the date of enumeration—that is, the date they have to work to. It is the demographic change that took place in ensuing years that has caused the big disparities that were more evident in the 2005 and 2010 elections than in 2000.
That demographic change was already slowing down in the 1990s, and over the past decade it has effectively ground to a halt. That process is no longer continuing. From that point of view, the pre-2011 legislation was able to deal with an awful lot of the difficulties that come from differently sized seats. The issue was: how, if at all, can you deal with the fact that certain areas grow in size and certain areas reduce in size? Reducing the period between reviews—the Bill suggests eight years—seems the best way to achieve that.
Chloe Smith
Q
Dr Rossiter: Yes.
Professor Pattie: Absolutely.
Cat Smith
Q
Professor Pattie: I guess we can break that down into two constituent parts. One is whether we should have a principle of priority within the rules, as in the 2011 Act and in the Bill, with some notion of equalisation of electorates being the top criterion rather than the medium criterion, to avoid some of the confusion and tension of the earlier rules. To that extent—Dave may feel differently about this—I would certainly endorse the notion of having an equalisation rule as the top priority.
The second element of this is where to draw the tolerance. Should it be 5%, 1% or 10%? On that point, I think you have a rather more open debate on your hands. Dave referred, when introducing himself, to the work that we did for the McDougall Trust in 2014, looking at the process around the sixth review—the first under the 2011 legislation. In that work, we tried to estimate how much disruption different tolerances would cause in the system—how much breaking of ties and breaking up of existing seats there would be. Inevitably, there will be quite a lot, both in the first review under the new rules and in any subsequent revision. However, on our estimates, if you set the tolerance at around 7%, 8% or 9%, disruption is reduced, and you do a better job of maintaining existing ties and links.
Yes, equalisation is important, but the question is what tolerance you should work to, and how wide you set that tolerance. Our estimates suggested that 8% starts to get you into the compromise zone and makes life a bit easier.
Cat Smith
Q
Dr Rossiter: Yes. I am afraid that it is probably a rather technical point, but it is quite important, in terms of the effect that the rules will have on future reviews. The 2011 Act created the UK quota and laid down the rules for allocations to countries and regions, but if we look at registration statistics over the last 20 years, we can see how those national and regional entitlements vary over time. We know that in an average eight-year period, we would be likely to see about eight changes to either national or English regional entitlements—that is between each pair of reviews. With a fixed Parliament size, that would necessarily mean that four new seats would be created in the UK and four abolished.
In the case of an abolished seat, you will have to redistribute 60-odd thousand electors to neighbouring constituencies. That in itself will take most, if not all, of those neighbours over quota. Any seat over quota will need to lose one or more wards to compensate for the addition. The process continues in this way, much like ripples on a pond, until all seats are within the 5% tolerance. Several of the affected seats will need to become participants in the process, even though they were within quota; they act merely as transit stations.
You can think of the scale of the impact of this process, which is required by the 2011 rules, as inversely proportional to the level of tolerance. As a rule of thumb, which is always useful in such circumstances, dividing 100 by the level of tolerance give you a rough idea of the number of seats that will be affected. By contrast, under the previous rules, which allowed the commissions far more discretion, the process would affect just a handful of seats and would typically be contained within a county. In the fifth review, Cornwall gained a seat, but that had no knock-on effect whatever on Devon. That is simply not possible under the current rules.
If we assume eight changes of entitlement in eight years, and if we take the existing 5% tolerance, the rule of thumb would suggest that, every eight years, 160 seats will require significant and often major change. To that has to be added the 100-plus other seats that have drifted outside what is a much tighter quota than has ever existed before. This is something that I have not heard mentioned as part of what the 2011 Act effectively ensured. The critical point to take away is that the interplay of the rules with such a tight tolerance will effectively guarantee a major redrawing of constituency boundaries at every subsequent review.
Cat Smith
Q
Dr Rossiter: Back in 1998, we wrote a proposed new set of rules that would have achieved what I think would have been a rather better way to work—I would say that, wouldn’t I? We felt at the time that the differences between national quotas, and the discrepancies between constituencies across England, were too large. We suggested that a new set of rules could say, “Yes, we’ll have a UK-wide quota, and we will have a target size for Parliament of whatever number of seats you wish.” It is 650 in the present case. We then said that a commission should be restricted to no more than 10% variance around the UK-wide quota, but that it should aim to get constituencies as near to that quota as was practical. That would give commissions the extra latitude that they would need to avoid many of the difficulties that were so evident in the 2013 and 2018 exercises.
At the same time, we would make it clear that electoral equality is a very important thing to aim for, and it should be the goal in all circumstances. I believe that having a degree of flexibility is extremely important, and I fear that not having it will inevitably cause consequences further down the line.
Cat Smith
Q
Professor Pattie: One of the areas that I was quite pleased to see in the Bill was a re-examination of how the inquiry and hearings are held, because that is problematic.
However, there is still a bit of a challenge for the public hearing process, because the areas in which those hearings now operate are just so incredibly large. There was some discussion earlier in your deliberations about ways in which the process might be improved to allow greater flexibility in local discussion. But you must remember that you are talking about entire regions, and about entire countries in Scotland and Wales, and people can turn up at a hearing in one corner of the region or country to talk about a seat in quite another part, and the chances of having a meaningful conversation about those proposals are remarkably small.
I am not sure that I have a clever proposal for you, but I think that is something to worry about; the extent to which those hearings really produce helpful information in all bar a few cases would be a concern that I have. I cannot suggest a fix for you, but if you want to look at something, that is another area that it is worth just having a bit more thought given to it.
Bim Afolami
Q
Professor Pattie: Big is the very short answer. This is liable to be one of the most disruptive reviews that we have seen for quite some time. As Dave mentioned earlier, on our estimates you are looking at major disruption again, and again, and again, into the future, especially if you hang on to that 5% tolerance. So, this will be big. Further reviews will also be big, so this will become a feature of the system going forward.
Dr Rossiter: If I can just add to what Charles has said, when we did our 2014 exercise we estimated that approximately half of seats would experience major change at this first review, but we based that on 2010 data, because that was the data that was available at that time. So, we were looking at rectifying changes that had taken place over 10 years, plus the change to the rules. We will now be looking at an exercise that has to rectify the changes over 20 years and I think that we will be looking at something like two thirds to three quarters of seats experiencing very significant change at this coming review.
Contrary to what I think are some of the optimistic views that were expressed earlier in proceedings, I see little chance of county boundaries remaining intact in large parts of the country. I think that most county and unitary authority boundaries will need to be breached. I also think that many more constituencies will be split across local authorities, and vice versa, and many more seats will have orphan wards in them.
Again, looking at this in an historical context, there have not been that many reviews that have had to deal with 20 years of changes, so it is probably not too helpful to concentrate on the disruption this time round; it was always going to be like this. I think that what is much more worthy of consideration in terms of legislation is realising the longer-term implications of it, because the danger is that if these changes are not realised, you only have to go back to the 1954-55 debates in Parliament, when MPs suddenly realised what had happened in the previous legislation and said, “We do not want our constituencies changed on this basis. Why are we having all this change?” Four years later, legislation was introduced to reduce the need to change to meet an arithmetical standard. My fear, obviously, is that that will be repeated.
Bim Afolami
Q
Dr Rossiter: I do not have that figure to hand. One of the problems is that this affects different parts of the country differently, so, for example, during the 2018 review, the south-east of England was little affected because it was set to lose only one seat during that review. Now that we go back to 650 seats, because of the growth in the south-east of England, the south-east will gain seven seats. Gaining seven seats inevitably results in a huge amount of change.
So, it can be helpful to look at what happened in 2013 and 2018 as exemplars of what results from this, but this is the problem: the devil is always in the detail. It is always in the specific geography of the area. It is always in the specific number of electors—whether a county, for example, has an integer entitlement or a non-integer entitlement. I have near me the example of East Sussex. East Sussex at the moment is entitled to eight and a half seats. With a 5% tolerance either way, that will mean that the East Sussex boundary has to be bridged. Kent is perfectly okay. West Sussex is perfectly okay. Therefore, in sorting out the problem in East Sussex—this is all provisional on 2019 data not changing an awful lot—we will need to see something that goes across the county boundary in one way or another.
Until we know the final figures, we will not be able to be absolutely certain on any of these issues. At least half of seats were changed during the 2013 and 2018 reviews, and when I say that the forthcoming review would be between two thirds and 75%, that is simply a reflection of the fact that it is trying to deal with that extra amount of time. What seems surprising is that maintaining 650 seats does not necessarily help a huge amount. It helps slightly, but not a great deal, in minimising the disruption that is going to happen. I hope that that is helpful.
David Linden
Q
Professor Pattie: This is an interesting issue, isn’t it? The issue here again is obviously over, partially, the practice of splitting wards—which clearly can be done—and partially the pragmatics, if you like. I know you have had lots of evidence already about data sources, software availability, etc. I will leave that to people who are more expert in handling those data systems, but clearly that causes an issue. I think I would raise just two points, here. First of all, harking back to our 2014 McDougall Trust report, we did try there to estimate the relative effects on disruption of playing around with the tolerances versus playing around with ward splitting. Ward splitting certainly helped to reduce the amount of disruption, but in our estimates it did not reduce disruption anything like as much as widening the tolerances moderately. The second thing you have to bear in mind here is that we are talking about disruption to communities. Remember how the Boundary Commission’s local government wards operate. It tends to be quite strong on the idea that, in building the ward suggestions, it is trying to represent people, so when you split a ward, arguably you are splitting a community—you are doing the very thing that you are trying to avoid, to avoid the thing that you are trying to avoid, if that makes sense. You end up in a strange circular process in which you disrupt a community to save a community. Where the white line is on that is anyone’s guess, but ward splitting is neither technically a global panacea, nor conceptually a panacea, precisely because in splitting a ward, you might well be splitting a community.
David Linden
Q
Professor Pattie: At the risk of sounding flippant, the Durack division in Western Australia is 1.63 million sq km. The north highlands is large, but there are much larger seats out there. It is how you strike the balance, I guess, but where it is can be tricky. I would not want to minimise the workload of an MP, in particular working in any area as large as the north highlands. Where one draws that line is a judgment call. I do not think that you will find an easy answer. To use a phrase much bandied about at the moment, I do not think that this is an area where one can defer to the science, because there is no clear science to this.
Chris Clarkson
Q
At the moment, Wales has an electoral quota of about 54,500, as opposed to about 72,000 in the north-west. Within Greater Manchester, where I am an MP, the number ranges from about 63,000 to 95,000. To take the concept that you just put forward of not splitting communities, in my borough are two seats that are prettily evenly divided: mine is Heywood and Middleton, and the neighbouring one is called Rochdale. From the sound of things, they are self-contained communities, but, in reality, I represent about a third of Rochdale. If you were not to split the communities, my neighbour would represent 103,000 people to my 57,000. Taking that to the logical extreme, do you not accept that, at some point, you will have to split some communities in order to achieve electoral equality?
Beyond that, talking about disruption in future reviews, would you accept that, to a degree, splitting wards would minimise that, reducing the amount of absolute disruption? Most of the disruption that will come from this review relies on the fact that the electoral figures we are using are 20 years out of date.
Dr Rossiter: If I take your second point first, I do not think that the difficulties that are going to come with the current review will be of such a scale that anything really can be read into them—too much should not be read into that, if you see what I mean. To take your first point, the commissions have always been capable of producing constituencies that are very close to quota. The problem you are identifying—these large differences in constituencies—has largely come not because of an observance of local ties, but from demographic change within and between regions. I am totally comfortable with the concept of trying to achieve equally populated constituencies—I have always thought that should be aimed for. My concern is the unintended consequences of a set of rules, which I think is the territory we have entered.
In terms of principles, absolutely every person’s vote should be treated as equal in so far as that can be achieved in a constituency-based system. There is no reason why either between or within areas that should not be achievable. Where local authority boundaries have to be crossed to achieve that, I have no problem with that. I remember writing a paper back in the 1980s about how we needed to look at crossing London borough boundaries, which were being observed as almost sacrosanct at the time, causing quite significant difficulties and an over-representation effect.
What I think we are looking at is how you strike the right balance. I do not disagree at all with where you are coming from and what you are trying to achieve; it is just that by placing in a rule as strict as 5%, you are removing a degree of discretion that will not benefit anybody either politically or in their sense of connection with a constituency and their MP.
Professor Pattie: To add to that, the point I was trying to make earlier was not that one must never split communities. That is going to happen, and it always has happened under the boundary review process; there have always been communities split. My point is to recognise that splitting wards in itself is not a solution, because that may involve another form of community split. But we must also remember—Iain put this nicely this morning when he described the different directions in which community can run, depending on how it serves different people’s interests—that community is very much in the eye of the beholder. I am sure we all recognise, even in areas that we know well, that we could quite quickly generate quite a few different views of what a local community really was. They are often genuinely held. So, one should not be too—how can I put this?—precious about community versus size. I think David is absolutely right: the issue is where to strike the balance and how one achieves that as relatively painlessly as possible.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Professor Pattie: We would argue it is better because it involves less disruption to the boundaries of existing constituencies, so you get more continuity of representation over time.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Professor Pattie: Well, you still have equalisation and a fairly tight parameter in terms of the size of seats, but one does not have to artificially flex things too much. You are trying to strike the balance between the rules of equalisation and rule 5 conditions. One is trying to hit that balance point between equal electorates and not too much disruption.
Chris Clarkson
Q
Professor Pattie: Yes, but it will not be at that sort of level.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Pattie: You heard evidence from John Curtice this morning on this and I would not disagree with him. There certainly is evidence that people are influenced by the context in which they live and by what is happening around them both in terms of the economic and political environment and in terms of the climate of opinion around them. People who in a sociological sense look very similar, but live in different areas, can go in very different ways much more akin to other people within their area. Is it the biggest influence on people’s voting? No, probably it is not. Does it have an effect? Yes, it does.
Clive Efford
Q
Professor Pattie: That is rather harder to argue, to be honest. The extent to which people would see themselves as acting for their local area in a constituency sense is quite a hard one to argue. People have a sense of “my area” [Inaudible], but is that the constituency? That is much less obvious.
Dr Rossiter: Over the years, for my sins, I have attended an awful lot of what were local inquiries and I have listened to a very large amount of evidence put forward about local ties. I tend to agree with Professor McLean, who gave evidence this morning, that one person’s local ties go in diametrically opposed directions to another person’s local ties, depending on their political preferences, so I am not at all upset at the idea that arguments in terms of local ties might take a lower role in the hierarchy. In fact, I think that that is a sensible thing.
What I do think—this also goes back to the previous question—is that where you have got local government boundaries and existing seats, you have inconvenience when you cross those. I listened to the evidence earlier from the person representing the electoral registration officers and I have also heard evidence given at inquiries from Members of Parliament who have repeatedly referenced the difficulties that they have when they have to deal with multiple local authorities. People deal with four. or, as recommended in one of the recent reviews, five local authorities for one Member of Parliament. That aspect of discretion is something that the Boundary Commissions over years and years have shown great ability to recognise. Again, I come back to my point: that is where their discretion and their ability to address those concerns is being curtailed.
Clive Efford
Q
Dr Rossiter: Speaking personally, it would depend on the evidence in the particular case. I do not think that one is necessarily better than the other. I have noticed, when we have been looking at this, the significant help that increasing that tolerance by very small amounts will provide. As soon as you go from 5% to 6%, you have a big payback from going up by that one percentage point. That payback increases to around 8%, which is why we came to the conclusion in our previous report that a figure of 8% would be much more helpful. Beyond 8%, the advantage begins to flatten off, because you are reaching a point at which any sensible commission can reach solutions.
In all this, we accept and understand entirely that the 5% introduction was not an attempt to be cussed or anything of that nature. It is simply that 8% and 5% are not worlds apart. If you are able to achieve far more when you adopt one rather than the other, you have to wonder why you would want to go for the lower figure, unless there is some major negativity in that regard. Again, as people who write published papers, we have to do our research, and we have looked for anything that would support 5% in any of the previous discussions regarding the 2011 Act and so on, and we have struggled.
I know you have had reference to the standards related to the “Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters”, and there seems to have been some confusion over what that says. I am not sure whether that confusion has been sorted out; I was very surprised by what I heard the other day. I think there is probably an understandable source for this confusion, because an earlier edition of an OSCE publication did indeed say that a 10% tolerance—quite reasonably taken to mean no more than 5% either side of the norm—should be aimed for, but that was never referenced in that version of that booklet; a subsequent edition of that observer handbook has come out, and that reference is no longer in there.
Probably the best statement of what is best in this area is the OSCE’s “Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections”, which specifically endorses the “Code of Good Practice” and states that proximate equality—no more than 10% between electorates—should be the aim, but interestingly goes on to say that
“frequent changes in the boundaries of constituencies should be avoided”.
If we are looking for international standards on this, there is a clear suggestion that going right down to 5% is not necessary, and in so far as it causes change to boundaries, we would not fall foul of OSCE reports. They all seem to find that UK elections fail in one respect or another, but at least we would not fall foul on that.
The Chair
Are there any other questions from Committee Members to put to our two witnesses? If there are no other questions, I would like to thank Dr Rossiter and Professor Pattie for the evidence you have given us this afternoon. We are very grateful. I am grateful to Members for their cooperation during this virtual session in these somewhat unusual proceedings.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Eddie Hughes.)
Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Trade Bill 2019-21 View all Trade Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 June 2020 - (23 Jun 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 15, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement immediately before exit day.
(4) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement other than a free trade agreement if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union were signatories to an international trade agreement immediately before exit day.
(4A) Paragraph 4A of Schedule 2 shall apply to any regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the purpose of implementing any international trade agreement not falling within subsection (3) or subsection (4) above.”
This amendment would apply the provisions of the Bill to trade agreements other than EU rollover trade agreements.
Amendment 6, in schedule 2, page 13, leave out lines 13 to 16 and insert—
“4 (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting alone under section 2(1) in respect of an international trade agreement which meets the criteria under section 2(3) or 2(4) may not be made unless all provisions of sub-paragraphs (1A) to (1D) have been satisfied.
(1A) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) a draft of an order to the effect that the agreement be ratified, and
(b) a document which explains why the Secretary of State believes that the agreement should be ratified.
(1B) The Secretary of State may make an order in the terms of the draft order laid under subparagraph (1A) if—
(a) after the expiry of a period of 21 sitting days after the draft order is laid, no committee of either House of Parliament has recommended that the order should not be made, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 40 sitting days after the draft order is laid, a motion in the terms of the draft order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(1C) If a committee of either House of Parliament recommends that an order should not be made under subparagraph (2), the Secretary of State may, after the expiry of a period of 60 sitting days after the draft order is laid, make a motion for a resolution in each House of Parliament in the terms of the draft order.
(1D) If a motion in the terms of the draft order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament under subparagraph (1B)(b), the Secretary of State may make an order in the terms of the draft order.
(1E) A free trade agreement to which this paragraph applies shall not be deemed to be a treaty for the purposes of Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
(1F) In section 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, after subsection (1)(b), at end insert “but does not include an international trade agreement to which paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 to the Trade Act 2020 applies.””
This amendment would establish a form of super-affirmative procedure for scrutiny of an international trade agreement before ratification and before regulations implementing the agreement could be made.
Amendment 7, in schedule 2, page 13, line 25, at end insert—
“4A (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting alone under section 2(1) in respect of an international trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) or section 2(4) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1A) to (1D).
(1A) The Minister shall lay before Parliament—
(a) a draft of the regulations, and
(b) a document which explains why the Secretary of State believes that regulations should be made in terms of the draft regulations.
(1B) The Minister may make an order in the terms of the draft regulations laid under subparagraph (1A) if—
(a) after the expiry of a period of 21 sitting days after the draft regulations are laid, no committee of either House of Parliament has recommended that the regulations should not be made, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 60 sitting days after the draft regulations are laid, the draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(1C) If a committee of either House of Parliament recommends that the regulations should not be made, the Secretary of State may—
(a) lay before Parliament revised draft regulations, and
(b) after the expiry of a period of 40 sitting days after the revised draft regulations are laid, make a motion for a resolution in each House of Parliament for approval of the revised draft regulations.
(1D) If a motion under subparagraph (1C)(b) is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make the regulations.”
This amendment would establish a form of super-affirmative procedure for scrutiny of regulations implementing all trade agreements covered by the bill. The procedure would apply to agreements other than EU rollover trade agreements if amendments extending the application of the bill were agreed to.
Amendment 19, in schedule 2, page 13, leave out lines 33 to 35 and insert—
“(3A) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority under section 2(1) in respect of an agreement which falls within the description in section 2(3) or section 2(4) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1) to (1D) of paragraph 4.
(3B) A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority under section 2(1) in respect of an agreement which falls within the description in section 2(4A) may not be made except in accordance with the steps in subparagraphs (1) to (1D) of paragraph 4A.”
This amendment would extend the super-affirmative procedure under former Amendment 19 to regulations where the Minister was acting jointly with a devolved authority.
New clause 5—Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements before signature—
“(1) The United Kingdom may not become a signatory to a free trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) unless—
(a) before entering negotiations on the proposed agreement, the Secretary of State has—
(i) laid before Parliament a sustainability impact assessment carried out following consultation as prescribed by section [Sustainability impact assessments], and
(ii) published a response to any report which a committee of either House of Parliament may have published expressing an opinion on the sustainability impact assessment, as long as that report is published within 30 sitting days of the day on which the sustainability impact assessment is laid before Parliament;
(b) both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution authorising the Secretary of State to enter negotiations on the proposed agreement as prescribed by section [Parliamentary consent to launch of trade negotiations];
(c) during the course of negotiations, the text of the agreement as so far agreed or consolidated has been made available as prescribed by section [Availability of agreement texts];
(d) the Secretary of State has, within ten sitting days of the close of each round of negotiations on the proposed agreement, laid before Parliament a statement detailing the progress made in each area of the negotiations and the obstacles still remaining at the close of that round;
(e) the text of the agreement in the form to which it is proposed that the United Kingdom should become a signatory has been made available to Parliament for a period of 21 sitting days; and
(f) a resolution has been passed by the House of Commons approving the Secretary of State’s intention to sign the agreement.
(2) “Sitting day”, for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii) shall mean any day on which both Houses of Parliament begin to sit.”
This new clause would set out a structure for parliamentary scrutiny of negotiations on proposed trade agreements.
New clause 6—Sustainability impact assessments—
“(1) A sustainability impact assessment laid before Parliament under section [Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements before signature] (1)(a) shall be carried out following consultation.
(2) A consultation under subsection (1) shall—
(a) be carried out in line with any guidance or code of practice on consultations issued by Her Majesty’s Government, and
(b) actively seek the views of—
(i) Scottish Ministers,
(ii) Welsh Ministers,
(iii) a Northern Ireland devolved authority,
(iv) representatives of businesses and trade unions in sectors which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, are likely to be affected by the proposed international trade agreement, and
(v) any other person or organisation which appears to the Secretary of State to be representative of interests affected by the proposed international trade agreement.
(3) The Secretary of State shall ensure that public bodies, non-governmental organisations and the public may be made aware of the consultation by circulating and publishing details of it prominently on relevant government websites.
(4) A sustainability impact assessment under subsection (1) shall be conducted by a credible body independent of government and shall include both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the potential impacts of the proposed trade agreement, including as a minimum—
(a) the economic impacts on individual sectors of the economy, including, but not restricted to—
(i) the impacts on the quantity and quality of employment,
(ii) the various regional impacts across the different parts of the UK,
(iii) the impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises, and
(iv) the impacts on vulnerable economic groups;
(b) the social impacts, including but not restricted to—
(i) the impacts on public services, wages, labour standards, social dialogue, health and safety at work, public health, food safety, social protection, consumer protection and information, and
(ii) the government’s duties under the Equality Act 2010;
(c) the impacts on human rights, including but not restricted to—
(i) workers’ rights,
(ii) women’s rights,
(iii) cultural rights and
(iv) all UK obligations under international human rights law;
(d) the impacts on the environment, including but not restricted to—
(i) the need to protect and preserve the oceans,
(ii) biodiversity,
(iii) the rural environment and air quality, and
(iv) the need to meet the UK’s international obligations to combat climate change;
(e) the impacts on animal welfare, including but not restricted to the impacts on animal welfare in food production, both as it relates to food produced in the UK and as it relates to food imported into the UK from other countries; and
(f) the economic, social, cultural, food security and environmental interests of those countries considered to be developing countries for the purposes of clause 10 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, as defined in Schedule 3 to that Act and as amended by regulations.
(5) The elements of the sustainability impact assessment to be undertaken under (4)(f) must be sufficiently disaggregated so as to capture the full range of impacts on different groups of developing countries, and must include both direct and indirect impacts, such as loss of market share through trade diversion or preference erosion.
(6) A sustainability impact assessment under subsection (1) shall include recommendations for possible action to maximise any positive impacts and to prevent or offset any negative impacts foreseen, including the possible limitation of the negotiating mandate so as to exclude those sectors most at risk from the proposed trade agreement.”
New clause 7—Parliamentary consent to launch of trade negotiations—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall not commence negotiations relating to a free trade agreement which does not meet the criteria under section 2(3) unless all provisions of this section have been satisfied.
(2) A Minister of the Crown shall lay before Parliament a draft of a negotiating mandate relating to the proposed international trade agreement.
(3) The draft mandate under subsection (2) shall set out—
(a) all fields and sectors to be included in the proposed negotiations;
(b) the principles to underpin the proposed negotiations;
(c) any limits on the proposed negotiations, including sectors to be excluded from the proposed negotiations; and
(d) the desired outcomes from the proposed negotiations.
(4) The Secretary of State shall make a motion for a resolution in the House of Commons in respect of the draft, setting out the elements listed in subsection (3), but such a motion shall be made—
(a) no earlier than 25 sitting days after the day on which the draft of the negotiating mandate is laid under subsection (2), and
(b) not before the Secretary of State has published a response to any report which a committee of either House of Parliament may have published expressing an opinion on the draft negotiating mandate , as long as that report is published within 20 sitting days of the day on which the draft mandate is laid before Parliament.
(5) A motion for a resolution under subsection (4) shall be made in such a way as to permit amendment of any of the elements prescribed under subsection (3).
(6) A motion to enable consideration of the negotiating mandate shall be laid before the House of Lords.
(7) The terms of any negotiating mandate authorised by a resolution under subsection (4) shall be binding upon the Secretary of State and anyone acting on his or her behalf in the course of negotiation.
(8) “Sitting day” shall, for the purposes of subsection (4), mean any day on which both Houses of Parliament begin to sit.”
New clause 8—Availability of agreement texts—
“(1) The text of any proposed international trade agreement which is being negotiated shall, so far as it is agreed or consolidated, be made publicly available within ten days of the close of each round of negotiations.
(2) Every—
(a) document submitted formally by the United Kingdom government to the negotiations, and
(b) agenda for each new round of negotiations
shall be made publicly available by the Secretary of State.
(3) All other documents relating to the negotiations and not falling within the descriptions provided in subsections (1) and (2) shall be made publicly available by the Secretary of State, subject to subsection (4).
(4) The Secretary of State may withhold from publication any document of a kind falling within the description in subsection (3) but must publish a statement of the reasons for doing so.
(5) In the case of any document withheld under subsection (4), the Secretary of State shall provide full and unfettered access to that document to—
(a) any select committee of either House of Parliament to which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the proposed agreement is relevant, and
(b) any other person or body which the Secretary of State may authorise.
(6) In the case of a document to which access is provided under subsection (5), the Secretary of State may specify conditions under which the text shall be made available.
(7) The Secretary of State shall maintain an online public register of all documents published under subsections (1), (2) and (3) or withheld under subsection (4).”
New clause 19—Report on proposed free trade agreement—
“(1) This section applies (subject to subsection (2)) where the United Kingdom has authenticated a free trade agreement (“the proposed agreement”), if—
(a) the other party (or each other party) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement immediately before exit day, or
(b) where the proposed agreement was authenticated by the United Kingdom before exit day, the other party (or each other party) and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement on the day the proposed agreement was authenticated by the United Kingdom.
(2) This section applies only if the proposed agreement is not binding on the United Kingdom as a matter of international law unless it is ratified by the United Kingdom.
(3) Before the United Kingdom ratifies the proposed agreement, a Minister of the Crown must lay before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, any significant differences between—
(a) the trade-related provisions of the proposed agreement, and
(b) the trade-related provisions of the existing free trade agreement.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if a report in relation to the proposed agreement has been laid before Parliament under section (Report to be laid with regulations under section 2(1))(2).
(5) The duty imposed by subsection (3) applies only at a time when regulations may be made under section 2(1) (see section 2(8)).
(6) In this section a reference to authenticating a free trade agreement is a reference to doing an act which establishes the text of the agreement as authentic and definitive as a matter of international law.
(7) In this section—
“the existing free trade agreement” means the free trade agreement referred to in subsection (1)(a) or (b);
the “trade-related provisions” of a free trade agreement are the provisions of the agreement that mainly relate to trade.”
New clause 20—Report to be laid with regulations under section 2(1)—
“(1) This section applies where a Minister of the Crown proposes to make regulations under section 2(1) for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement to which the United Kingdom and another signatory (or other signatories) are signatories.
(2) A draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations may not be laid before Parliament unless, at least 10 Commons sitting days before the draft is laid, a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, any significant differences between—
(a) the trade-related provisions of the free trade agreement to which the United Kingdom and the other signatory (or other signatories) are signatories, and
(b) the trade-related provisions of the existing free trade agreement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if, at least 10 Commons sitting days before a draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations is laid, a report in relation to the agreement has been laid before Parliament under section (Report on proposed free trade agreement)(3).
(4) In this section—
“Commons sitting day” means a day on which the House of Commons begins to sit;
“the existing free trade agreement” means the free trade agreement to which the European Union and the other signatory (or other signatories) were signatories immediately before exit day;
the “trade-related provisions” of a free trade agreement are the provisions of the agreement that mainly relate to trade.”
Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)
On a point of order, Sir Graham. By the way, it is very nice to have you back. During the interval, I have come under pressure from a Government Member to speak again at length. To do so comfortably, it would be appreciated if you allowed us to take off our jackets.
The Chair
I was minded, given the forecast of a warm week, to allow Members to remove their jackets, but the way the argument has been advanced is making me wonder. I think, on balance, that Members may remove their jackets if that makes them more comfortable. I gather that we had this morning a thorough examination of the topics, so I anticipate that we may be poised to make progress at this point, but I also understand that Mr Thomas had just come to the conclusion of an intervention and has been eagerly anticipating in the intervening hours the response from Mr Esterson.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Welcome back, Sir Graham. It was getting warm for those of us standing up and holding forth, so I am grateful for your ruling. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West intervened before the break and asked me to comment on the Command Paper and the indications in it about reports on changes to agreements that have been made. In his speech earlier, he pointed out that the Government have changed their mind several times on this matter, and I think we are none the wiser.
The point is that it is desirable to have the reports on the differences between the existing EU agreements and the so-called continuity agreements that replace them, but more important is what we do with the information. Unless there is adequate scrutiny and proper analysis of it by having the right processes in the House and outside, it is very difficult to do anything meaningful with them.
I had just one or two more pieces of evidence that we had been presented with and I was reminded of a cautionary tale from Australia about what happens when international trade agreements are not properly analysed and scrutinised before they are signed. In Australia, there used to be a car industry and there is no more, in large part because of the international trade agreements—the free trade agreements—that Australia signed, including the one with Thailand in 2005, in which Australia agreed to lift the import tariff on cars from Thailand. Since then, more than 2 million Thai-made vehicles have been imported into Australia. They are familiar brands: Ford, Holden, which is familiar to Australians, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Mazda and others. In return, Australia ships to Thailand just 100 Ford Territory SUVs. The reason for that imbalance in trade is the hidden non-tariff barriers that the Thais maintained while Australia opened its borders completely. It is a cautionary tale of what goes wrong when international trade agreements are not properly implemented, when they are not adequately scrutinised and when one party does not get it right. We would do well to learn from that example.
Bill Esterson
I was hoping that we would be able to accept the advice from the Chair and move on, but I will briefly give way.
Robert Courts
The hon. Gentleman mentioned Australia and the vehicle tariff, and he is right that Holden was the last big Australian manufacturer, but is it not the case that there is a 5% tariff on imported vehicles for Australia? Is not the cause of the demise of Australia’s vehicle industry in fact the protectionist tariff that was imposed? I think it lingers on.
Bill Esterson
I think that we will be in a rather worse position if we do not sort out our agreements in this country, where we would face a 10% tariff, with rather more devastating consequences for the car industry here. Anyway, we dealt with the car industry at some length this morning; I do not anticipate spending longer on it.
Gareth Thomas
Is not the significance of the intervention from the hon. Member for Witney the fact that it underlines the need for a proper opportunity for the House to consider the impacts of free trade agreements and all their tariffs—10%, 5% or whatever—on British industry?
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is quite right. That was the point he was making this morning at slightly greater length. If we want to get these things right and avoid unintended or adverse consequences, scrutiny is the answer. I thank my hon. Friend for pointing that out again.
I want to remind the Committee of the work of the International Chamber of Commerce UK. Its coalition of business groups, trade unions, consumer groups, environmentalists, other non-governmental organisations and civil society more widely produced a paper in 2017, “A Trade Model That Works for Everyone”, in which there was consensus about the need for proper scrutiny from elected representatives and wider stakeholders. It is a point made right across society. In its written evidence to the Committee, the ICC UK points out:
“The Bill ignores the seriousness of the situation we face regarding trade. Public trust in the system is at an all-time low—this is an opportunity to acknowledge the failures and get it right if the UK wants to set new global standards, ensure everyone benefits and future proof trade governance.”
The Bill is the chance for this country to set new global standards—to lead the way and show the rest of the world what is possible, by creating a new gold standard.
As George Riddell from Ernst and Young told us last week, business wants certainty, political security and support across the board, so they know trade deals will last. That means proper parliamentary and non-parliamentary scrutiny. That is how we can achieve the new global standards that the ICC recommends.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Thank you, Sir Graham. I rise to speak very briefly. I concur with all the comments made by my hon. Friends and will not rehearse many of them. I would just say that we should remember the famous line from the film, “Infamy! Infamy! They’ve all got it in for me!” There is something about scrutiny and more scrutiny. We have to keep repeating the word, because it is so important for all of us, wherever we sit. Whether we are Government Back Benchers or Opposition Members, the opportunity for scrutiny is important. Trust and transparency are in short supply and it is critical for the validity of this place that they are restored. There is likewise a matter of competency, which I will come on to. How do we face the challenges of the trade deals before us and ensure that we have sufficient competency and capacity?
The issue is secondary legislation and what Ministers are permitted to do that allows them to avoid full scrutiny. As such, the affirmative process in the Bill will not allow us the checks and balances that our constituents require, irrespective of the territory, geography or community that we represent. There will be serious issues that will fall to Government Ministers, and it should be a great concern for hon. Members on both sides of the Committee to make sure that Ministers can be held to account.
The process should be iterative. A great thing that we found out when the International Trade Committee visited Canada and the US was how involved their Parliament and Congress are in the process of determining and setting parameters for their trade representative bodies. That is what we should be pushing for: from the beginning, we as parliamentarians should have more say on the direction that the trade representatives take in negotiating our position.
We mentioned the situation with vehicles and what that means for our automotive sector, but irrespective of the sector or region that is up for discussion, trade deals will have an impact. It is about understanding those impacts through modelling, so a value decision or judgment can be made. Understanding and appreciating the consequences of that sort of trade deal was important in the evidence given to us by the Australian trade people and, likewise, the US and the Canadians.
I mentioned what we discovered several months ago from the South Koreans about where they were in their negotiations and discussions with the UK. It was all published online but there was nothing from our side, which should not be the case. I do not see how any of us, Back Benchers or Front Benchers, in government or in opposition, can face constituents or the major businesses that each of us have in our constituencies and say that we are unaware of what is going on on their behalf. In contrast, the Koreans—in the case of vehicles, the Kias, Hyundais, Samsungs and so on—will be totally aware of what is going on in the negotiations.
Trust and transparency are important because, without scrutiny, the process will lead to poor governance. As has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West about events in the recent crisis, if more had been put into the parliamentary domain and if there had been more involvement across the House, perhaps we would have avoided some of the difficulties that we have experienced. We have to avoid a bunker mentality. It is not healthy for the Government or for the reputation of Parliament.
As has been said, while we are sitting here, many trade deals are being discussed, such as the UK-Japan deal, the UK-Australia deal, the UK-US deal and so on. They are seriously huge undertakings. In our evidence sessions in the International Trade Committee, we discovered that many such trade deals typically take six to eight years, yet the Japanese are telling us that they want a trade deal within six weeks. That is terrific—good for them—but they are holding us in a difficult position. They know that we need a trade deal, but it will be on their terms, because we are in a weak position. None of us want to be in that weak position.
The Australians are saying, “Yes, we will have a trade deal within a year.” Again, that will be very much on their terms. That is the sort of understanding that we need to share with the public and that needs to be shared in this place, so that we fully appreciate what the consequences of those decisions will be.
As we heard in the evidence sessions last week, there is no real rocket science about it. The ideal approach to negotiating trade deals is that there is involvement through parliamentarians, through consultation with trade unions, with business sectors and so on. It is understood, through some sort of guaranteed debate, what is trying to be achieved. Then, during negotiations, texts are published and updates are given. That is what the US, the EU and other nations such as Australia do. The negotiated deal can then be put to a formal voting process for ratification. However, it seems the Government do not wish to do that. Looking across the room here, that has to be of concern, irrespective of the constituencies we represent, because of what it means economically and what it means for some of our businesses, the agriculture sector and so on.
Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)
It is four years to the day since the referendum vote to leave the European Union and here we are, hardly oven ready. The stripping out of scrutiny is the most alarming of the many alarming parts of the Bill. A world-leading trade Bill must contain strong parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The amendments and new clauses would enable debates to be held before, during and after negotiations, and the meaningful involvement of businesses, trade unions and interest groups across the country and around the world to assess the impact of any negotiations and help us make the best decisions.
The coronavirus crisis has shown the importance of proper parliamentary scrutiny. For example, the Chancellor’s economic support package—while I commend and welcome the support on offer—has been flawed in many crucial areas. I do not think that would have happened if there had been time—and there was not, I can see that—for much longer parliamentary scrutiny. That would have allowed self-employed people, people who had new contracts and limited company directors to say where they needed support from the economic support package. That is an example of where there needed to be better parliamentary scrutiny—there should have been more, catching up—and of where there are failings when we do not have time to look at the Bills we pass.
In the post-Brexit world, trade has been catapulted from the margins of public debate into one of the major talking points of political discourse. Trade agreements will have huge implications for our economy and future prosperity, and cut across huge swathes of public policy. They are of interest to all parliamentarians and to all areas of public policy, and are not to be done in secret in smaller areas. Future trade deals should be developed democratically. As such, it is wrong that the Bill does not address the gaping democratic deficit in trade policy. That is what the amendments seek to address.
The system under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 is entirely inadequate and has not kept up with the times. It is no surprise that it has been criticised by no fewer than five parliamentary Committees. As the Minister himself has said:
“Parliamentary scrutiny is crucial for trade agreements, and we have seen the difficulties in recent years with trade agreements that have been insufficiently scrutinised, or where there was a feeling that there had been insufficient scrutiny—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership perhaps being the most important example.”—[Official Report, 17 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 281.]
Under the current system, MPs will have less say than our counterparts in Brussels and in Washington. In my constituency, 39% of jobs are in sectors identified as being directly and severely impacted by the continuity agreements. I am angry that, as an MP, I will have little say and little opportunity to prevent that. Moreover, given the profound effect that trade deals will have on jobs in Putney and Wandsworth, in London and across the country, it is troubling that under the Bill there will be no formal assessment of the impact of trade deals on different sectors of the economy and different regions of our nation, or consultation with businesses and trade unions.
New clause 6 lists all the different impact assessments: economic, social, human rights, environmental, animal welfare and food standards. Those things are of immediate concern to constituents, and yet we will not have an assessment of the impact of trade deals on them—or, if it does happen, it will happen behind closed doors and will not be open for public debate and scrutiny.
The CBI has noted:
“A trade policy that provides a clear, meaningful way for businesses to feed in all their experience and expertise into government will create the greatest value from the UK’s opportunities across the world—and ultimately support prosperity across the country.”
Surely that is what we want. There are expert groups, of course, but they need parliamentary scrutiny to lock in their feedback.
It is concerning that the Bill only addresses EU roll-over agreements and does nothing to set the parameters of future agreements with non-EU nations such as the United States. The Bill is a huge missed opportunity to establish a framework for future trade negotiations. The scope of the Bill is just too narrow.
For four years, we have been repeatedly told by Trade Ministers that the world is queuing up to do business with the UK. Last year, the then Secretary of State for International Trade declared to the Future of Trade and Export Forum that
“the UK has an untapped potential of £124 billion in the export of goods alone.”
The current Secretary of State has triumphantly announced:
“We are growing wheat more competitively than the Canadian prairies. We’re producing more varieties of cheese than the French. And we are even selling tea to China.”
If the Government are so confident in our attractiveness to prospective trading partners, as they should be, why is there such reticence about codifying the high standards and regulations that have been promised by the Prime Minister? Why are the Government so intent on ensuring the lowest common denominator in trading standards—a rush to get it through without an ambition to get through the best?
There is a constitutional point to be made here as well. The Trade Justice Movement, which represents 60 organisations, noted in its evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee that proper parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals is far more compatible with
“the UK’s traditional constitutional division between executive and legislative powers, where the executive is responsible for foreign policy.”
The crucial point is that, when it comes to trade, it is impossible to distinguish between the international and the domestic. The two are intricately linked, so to take trade out of the hands of Parliament runs contrary to hundreds of years of constitutional precedent. To ensure that Parliament is sovereign over domestic affairs, it is essential that it is given a role in scrutinising trade agreements.
To summarise, the amendments and new clauses that my colleagues and I have tabled would address the democratic deficit and create a stronger trade policy, which would ensure greater prosperity across our country. They would ensure a meaningful vote and debate for MPs on the Government’s negotiating objectives from the start, and a much-needed widening of the scope of a Bill that is silent on too many crucial issues. They would ensure far greater transparency during the negotiations, proper public consultation and meaningful engagement with civil society, businesses and trade unions, and the introduction of much-needed impact assessments that look beyond economic metrics to include the impact on the environment, human rights and developing countries. The Trade Bill would be far better for them.
The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)
May I start by welcoming you again to the Chair this afternoon, Sir Graham? In an oversight, I was not able to welcome Mrs Cummins this morning, because there had yet to be a contribution from the Government Front Bench, thanks to the expansive efforts of the two chief Opposition spokesmen, the hon. Members for Harrow West and for Sefton Central.
Let me start by being in complete accordance with the words the hon. Member for Sefton Central said at the end of our minute’s silence, in paying tribute to the first responders and the emergency services in Reading at the weekend. We owe them all a debt of gratitude for the public response that took place.
Amendment 4 would mean that, before regulations were made under clause 2, the process of parliamentary scrutiny set out by the Opposition in new clause 5 or amendments 6 or 7, as appropriate, would need to be completed. I take this opportunity to remind hon. Members that the power in clause 2 is needed to provide for the continuity of existing trading relationships, not to implement free trade agreements with new trading partners. It will ensure that the UK continues to benefit from the EU-third country agreements to which we were a signatory before exit day.
During the evidence sessions, we heard from a very diverse group of witnesses, ranging as widely as the Institute of Directors, the CBI and ClientEarth, that the Government’s continuity programme was sensible and reasonable. Indeed, Parliament has so far ratified 20 continuity agreements with 48 countries. That accounts for £110 billion-worth of UK trade in 2018, which represents 74% of the trade with countries with which we were seeking continuity before the withdrawal agreement was signed. Those agreements were, of course, subject to extensive scrutiny in their original form as EU agreements. The main purpose of the power in clause 2 is to replicate existing obligations in current agreements. Additional new scrutiny, on top of what we already have in place, would not be a proportionate use of parliamentary time for existing agreements.
To reassure Parliament, we are going further and providing additional measures to constrain the power in clause 2 and provide extra scrutiny for any resulting legislation. All regulations made to implement obligations under these arrangements will be subject to the affirmative procedure, and the power is also subject to a five-year sunset period, which can be extended only with the consent of both Houses. We will discuss the sunset clause under a later group of amendments. Moreover, we have voluntarily published parliamentary reports—alongside continuity agreements—outlining any significant differences between our signed agreements and the underlying EU agreement.
Gareth Thomas
The Minister is referring to the voluntary tabling of reports. At Report stage of the last Trade Bill, Ministers were going to put that on the statute book. Why the change this time?
Greg Hands
I will come on to that shortly, but in brief, the proof has been in the pudding. For each of those 20 agreements, we have published the report. The reports have been available for Members of both Houses to study. A few of the reports have been made subject to a debate in the Lords. None of those Lords debates resulted in a motion to regret on the ensuing agreements. I would say this: rather than trusting in our word, trust in our deeds. We have published those reports and we will continue to do so.
Gareth Thomas
I simply make the point that the most significant of the so-called continuity trade agreements—with the exception of Singapore and what Sam Lowe described as phase 1 of the South Korea agreement—have yet to be rolled over. Locking into law reports on the significance of those agreements would, I suspect, attract substantially more interest than the other reports have attracted so far.
Greg Hands
More than half of the continuity agreements have already been ratified, each with a report. The intention is to carry on producing those reports. I will deal with some of the points that the hon. Gentleman raised earlier, including his quite technical points in relation to the roll-over of the South Korea and Switzerland agreements. I will come back to him on the points he raised about differences between the EU version and the UK version.
The reports have enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, and I can confirm that we will continue to publish reports for the remaining continuity agreements.
Bill Esterson
A moment ago, the Minister mentioned that the Lords had held debates on previous agreements that have been subject to these reports. That did not happen in the Commons; that has gone. Given that the Government set the time, will the Minister take this opportunity to promise that the Government will create time in the Commons for debates on the remaining so-called continuity agreements, not least because agreements such as the one with Japan are significantly different to the ones we were party to as members of the EU?
Greg Hands
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but there is no way of knowing whether the UK-Japan agreement will be significantly different, because it is yet to be negotiated. We are trying to get an enhanced agreement with Japan, but that negotiation is under way. It is be impossible to speculate in what way, or to what degree, it will be different from the EU agreement. We are hoping for an enhanced FTA, and we believe there is further to go with Japan on that, so I do not think the hon. Gentleman’s request would be appropriate.
Stewart Hosie
Taking what the Minister has said at face value, it is true that reports have been published, but the affirmative resolution process that he spoke about is effectively a “take it or leave it” option. There is no ability for Members to amend what the Government have proposed. If the Government were to use clause 2(6)(a) to modify retained legislation, we would be given no more than the opportunity to take or leave something that may look considerably different from the pre-existing arrangement we had through the European Union.
Greg Hands
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and I plan to come to constraints on that power shortly. He rightly said that on the face of it, the power is broad, but there are significant constraints on its use. We must not forget that the continuity agreements are already in effect, and have already been scrutinised through previous processes in both the Commons and the Lords.
I draw the Committee’s attention to our track record. Of the 20 signed continuity agreements passed through CRAG, their lordships have recommended six for the attention of Parliament, most recently the UK-Morocco association agreement on 9 March 2020. As I have said, not a single one of those debates carried a motion of regret. Due to the limited scope of the continuity agreements for which we intend to use the clause 2 power and the existing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny, the scrutiny procedure set out by the Opposition in new clause 5, to which I will turn in due course, would be disproportionate and unnecessary. That consequently means that amendment 4 is unnecessary.
I will now turn to amendment 5, which would seek to bring new FTAs within the scope of the Bill. The Government are only seeking a power in this Bill to ensure the continuity of trading relations with our existing partners, with whom we previously traded as a member of the EU. The Bill is not, and never was in its previous form, a vehicle to implement agreements with partners, such as the USA, that did not have a trade agreement with the EU before 31 January 2020.
Gareth Thomas
In relation to amendment 5, will the Minister confirm that there is no current legislative requirement for the Government to hold either a debate or a vote on any UK-US deal they negotiate?
Greg Hands
We have been absolutely clear in the process we have laid out. The publication of the negotiation objectives and the economic impact assessment, the fact that we have reported back at the end of the first round with a written ministerial statement, and the fact that we will publish an impact assessment at the end of the deal all show our commitment to parliamentary scrutiny of deals as we go forward.
Then, of course, there is the procedure under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. I would have thought that the hon. Member for Harrow West would be rather more proud of that procedure, because I had a look around at the members of this Committee and studied their dates of arrival in this place quite carefully. I worked out that two members of this Committee voted for that procedure in 2010: myself and him. The only member of this Committee who was here in 2010 and did not vote in favour of CRAG is the hon. Member for Dundee East. Not only that: the hon. Member for Harrow West was a member of the Government at the time, in an international-facing Department to which CRAG was highly relevant, so he would have been part of the team that put forward CRAG 10 years ago. Miraculously, he is now against it. Perhaps he could explain that.
Gareth Thomas
What the Minister’s brief may not have told him was that the provisions that implemented the relevant CRAG power came into force as a result of his Government’s decision in November 2010, but that is by the bye.
The Minister gave a skilful and studious non-answer to the direct question I posed. Let me give him another opportunity to confirm that there is nothing in legislation at the moment that requires a debate or a vote on any future UK-US deal that his Government may negotiate.
Greg Hands
Sir Graham, you will know that under CRAG it is up to Parliament to determine whether to have that debate. Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the agreement and its ability to study the economic impact of that agreement are absolutely clear. On top of that, any legislative changes that would need to be made as a result of any future trade agreement would have to go through both Houses of Parliament in the usual way.
It is understandable that colleagues are keen to make their voices heard on new FTAs, and as a result the Government have said repeatedly that we will introduce primary legislation to implement new FTAs where necessary. As I have just said, that primary legislation will be debated and scrutinised by Parliament in the usual way, and I can assure Members that Government will draw on the expertise and experience in Parliament when delivering our trade agenda.
Those are not just warm words; I invite the Committee to look at our track record. If we take the current negotiations with the USA as an example, before negotiations began, we launched a public bundle, including our negotiating mandate and a response to the public consultation that we had conducted as well as an initial scoping assessment. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made a statement in the House, and she and I have engaged with colleagues intensively. During negotiations, we have committed to keeping Parliament updated. Indeed, the Secretary of State provided a statement to Parliament on 18 May with a comprehensive update on progress in the US talks. These updates will continue as the negotiations proceed. We have said that once negotiations conclude, we will introduce implementing legislation, if it is required. Any agreement will also be subject to CRAG, which will provide further opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.
I must stress that scrutiny of FTAs with new countries is a conversation that must take place separately from consideration of the Bill. Hon. Members such as the hon. Members for Harrow West, for Sefton Central and for Dundee East have expressed valid concerns about what will happen, and my door remains open to discuss such concerns at a future date. Nevertheless, we must not threaten this essential piece of continuity legislation by having discussions about the future.
Gareth Thomas
In the spirit of openness about future free trade agreements to which the Minister says he is committed, can he confirm to the Committee, given the concerns that exist about a potential UK-US deal, that there will not be any investor-state dispute settlement provisions in a future UK-US deal?
Greg Hands
I was being very generous in saying that my door was open, but it is not open to discuss the content of the current negotiations with the US. That, of course, is a matter—in the proper way—for statements to Parliament, but that is a live negotiation, so what may or may not be in that negotiation is probably a matter for that negotiation.
We laid out our negotiation objectives, in a document that I commend to the hon. Gentleman, on 2 March. It lays out our objectives in the talks, which are live at the moment, so it would be inappropriate for me to go down that road. However, my door remains open to having further discussions with all the Opposition parties about the scrutiny of future free trade agreements.
Stewart Hosie
I think the Minister is inadvertently getting to the nub of the concerns of many people both in Parliament and outside. It is all very well him saying, “We have published this, and we have made these statements to Parliament”, but does he not recognise that simply publishing what are no more than heads of terms for negotiations, and then updates that say “Everything’s going swimmingly”, really does not cut the mustard?
Greg Hands
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention and I am glad that he made it, because I will take him back five years to a very interesting negotiation that I had with his friend, John Swinney, which was a negotiation between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. It related to the Scottish fiscal framework: how exactly Scotland’s finances and support from Westminster would work in coming years. We—John Swinney and I—agreed that it was a negotiation between two Governments, and it was not appropriate to publish text during the course of the negotiation. We would both provide general updates on the progress of the negotiation, rather than constant updates on text. That approach led to us getting a good agreement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. I think both Governments were not entirely satisfied with it, but both could live with it. That shows the way forward, rather than publishing after each negotiation round, or mid-negotiation, what the latest text or approach is.
Matt Western
I hear that, and it is terrific, whatever happened between Scotland and the UK in that arrangement, but nub of this is essentially: how can it be that the EU informs and updates, providing not just heads of terms and whether things are going okay or badly or whatever, but the detail? That is what the US does and what Australia does. Why is the UK the only nation that will not give that detail to its public?
Greg Hands
Sir Graham, I think a comparison of how the UK and European Union do international treaties is a debate for another day. I do not think the two political systems are comparable. The approach proposed by the UK has greater parliamentary scrutiny than that of many Commonwealth counterparts that use the Westminster system—it is more extensive than that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Gareth Thomas
The Command Paper that the Minister’s colleagues published last February committed the Government to publishing reports at the end of each negotiating round. Is that still a commitment and practice that the Minister recognises, or has his Department and new Secretary of State gone back on that?
Greg Hands
I was going to return to the Command Paper, because the hon. Member for Sefton Central asked me a direct question about it. If the hon. Gentlemen will bear with me, I will return to the status of the Command Paper in due course. I want to make a bit more progress in setting out why we think this approach is not right overall for the Bill.
The Bill focuses on ensuring continuity of trading relationships with existing partners. Businesses and consumers are relying on the consistency that the Bill provides. Amendment 6 would disapply CRAG to international trade agreements and instead seek to apply a super-affirmative procedure to scrutiny of continuity agreements before regulations could be made under clause 2. Like other Opposition amendments, that would undermine the constitutional balance and upset an established, well-functioning system of scrutiny. It would also create a two-tier system of scrutiny for international agreements, whereby trade agreements on the one hand, and other important international agreements on the other, are scrutinised in an entirely inconsistent way. It is worth reminding ourselves that CRAG was designed to cover international treaties of all the types we would expect.
Bill Esterson
The Minister has said that many times. CRAG was designed and passed in this place when we were a member of the European Union. It was designed when international treaties were an EU competence, to complement the system in the EU. I read that out earlier; I will not read it out again. He wants this to be a continuity Bill, but what is the equivalent continuity of scrutiny and parliamentary process for what we were party to where CRAG was part of that European process?
Greg Hands
It is simply not correct to say that all international treaties are subject to EU competence. Many international treaties are, of course, subject to a UK competence, and CRAG has worked well. It is worth remembering that CRAG was arrived at after an extensive period of consultation—and it may be, Sir Graham, that you voted for CRAG in 2010 as well. It was backed by both the Government party of the day, represented by the hon. Member for Harrow West, and the main Opposition of the day as a sensible way of codifying what he referred to earlier as the 1924 Ponsonby rule. The whole purpose of CRAG was to codify that long-standing rule that has served as well, including over the past 10 years. An extensive change such as this would add significant and unnecessary risk to the Government’s ability—
Bill Esterson
Yes, it is an international trade agreement, absolutely correct. Where is the equivalent to the EU process that we have been party to? CRAG was party to that international trade bit of it, and yes, I accept that it applies to other elements of international treaties. Where is the continuity from the EU process to what we have now? That was the other half of my question.
Greg Hands
Again, we are talking about continuity agreements that have already gone through a process of scrutiny in the House. I was a member of the European Scrutiny Committee pretty much exactly when the hon. Member for Harrow West was a member of the Government. There was an established process by which treaties were recommended by the European Scrutiny Committee for scrutiny in this House. Most have already been through an established process of European scrutiny.
On future trade policies, I would say that the EU has a fundamentally different constitutional set-up from the United Kingdom. Our most similar constitutional set-ups are in countries such as Canada, Australia or New Zealand, which have very successful independent trade policies, and have done for a number of decades. I am confident that our scrutiny system, as proposed, stacks up well—in fact, it exceeds those, and stacks up very favourably—against those systems in making sure that our Parliament can have its say on future trade agreements.
I stress again, however, that this Bill is not about future trade agreements; it is about the continuity of our existing arrangements. Such an extensive change as proposed in the amendment would add significant and unnecessary risk to the Government’s ability to secure and bring into effect the remaining continuity agreements by the start of 2021. That situation was not advocated by any of the witnesses we heard from. None of them said, “We want to junk all those 40 agreements and pretend that we have never had them”, from ClientEarth right the way across to the Institute of Directors. Only the Opposition seem to want to junk those agreements by voting against Second Reading of the Bill and by not having the continuity agreements in place.
Gareth Thomas
I am sure that the Minister would not wish to imply that the majority of witnesses simply supported the existing parliamentary scrutiny processes for trade agreements in general. It was clear that we heard a majority saying that, for new free trade agreements, the current parliamentary scrutiny set-up was not good enough.
Greg Hands
I am not saying that; I am clearly saying that the witnesses we heard from were, I think, unanimous in saying that the continuity agreements were important for the UK economy and trade. They would share my surprise at the opposition of the Labour party to rolling over those agreements, many of which were negotiated when Labour was in government, including the hon. Member for Harrow West. He was the Trade Minister when two of the agreements were negotiated by the European Union. I would love him to tell us what he was doing at the time. If he finds the agreements so objectionable in 2020, what on earth was he doing in 2008 or 2009 being party to the negotiations that led to those agreements being put in place in the first place? Perhaps he will tell us, or write to the Committee to explain.
Gareth Thomas
What we find objectionable is the lack of proper scrutiny in the process. That is the significant issue. I gently say to the Minister, he has not so far advanced an answer—I am agog to hear it—to the criticisms of a whole series of witnesses, from the business community and the trade union movement to trade exporters, about the failure of the Government to give Parliament a proper debating and voting opportunity on big new free trade agreements, such as a UK-US deal.
Greg Hands
We are going slightly around in circles, conflating the continuity arrangements and future free trade agreements. I will happily debate with the hon. Gentleman the merits of our proposals for future free trade agreements. I reiterate that my door remains open to his suggestions as to how we might scrutinise future free trade agreements. However, the Bill is about continuity arrangements for the 40 or more EU agreements that we currently have. Many of the witnesses, whatever they said about future trade agreements, were unanimous in talking about the importance of the continuity agreements.
Robert Courts
I am conscious of what the Minister has said about the Bill being a trade continuity Bill and that being its purpose. We have heard a great deal of debate today about scrutiny of future trading relationships. Would the Minister comment on something that seems to me is the case? We have parliamentary government in this country, where a mandate is derived from a general election. We do not have government by Parliament and any such scrutiny proposal needs to be considered very carefully in terms of its constitutional ramifications.
Greg Hands
My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I was going to come on to describe the Opposition’s panoply of amendments taken in their entirety; at the moment, I am still going through the deficiencies in each of the amendments. When we put them all together, they seek fundamentally to rewrite the constitutional balance in this country in terms of international agreements. That is properly a matter for the Executive and for royal prerogative, as scrutinised by Parliament.
Once again, I remind colleagues that continuity agreements have already been subject to significant scrutiny as underlying EU agreements. I say again that we believe that the existing constraints in the Bill are proportionate and provide Parliament with sufficient opportunities to scrutinise agreements. I have drawn Members’ attention to the 33rd report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the 2017-2019 Trade Bill, which raised no concerns about the delegated powers of the Bill and welcomed our move to introduce the affirmative procedure for any regulations.
I turn to amendment 7, which seeks to apply the super-affirmative procedure to any regulations made under clause 2 to implement FTAs with new countries, if the other amendments were to be carried. I will not recap why new FTAs are not included in the application of the Bill. However, I reiterate that we will introduce implementing legislation for new FTAs, if required, which would mean the proposals in the amendment are unnecessary.
Amendment 19 would extend the aforementioned procedures to any regulations made jointly with the devolved authorities. I have outlined the reasons why we do not believe those procedures are necessary. I can also assure colleagues that our approach with the devolved Governments is based on regular dialogue and consultation.
I thank Opposition Members for tabling new clause 5, which outlines in some detail the Opposition’s proposal for how current and future trade agreements might be scrutinised. I have already remarked that this is a continuity Bill and therefore not the place for discussing our wider priority FTA programme or our approach hereto. However, I am happy to reiterate to hon. Members the Government’s commitment to appropriate parliamentary involvement.
I believe we share common ground, insofar as we agree that Parliament should be able properly to scrutinise trade agreements and have sufficient information available to it in order to do so. The Government have ensured that that information is provided through sharing negotiating objectives, responses to public consultations and economic assessments. The amendments go beyond what is needed and, as hon. Members will be aware and as my hon. Friend the Member for Witney pointed out, cross the line that separates the powers of Parliament and the Executive.
We must respect that initiating, negotiating and signing international agreements are functions of the Executive, exercised under the royal prerogative. New clause 5 would have serious consequences. It would both undermine that cornerstone of our constitution and limit the Government’s ability to negotiate effectively and in the best interests of UK businesses, consumers and citizens.
To be clear, the prerogative power is not just a historical throwback or a constitutional quirk. It serves an important purpose in enabling the UK to speak with a single voice as a unitary actor under international law. It ensures that our partners can trust in the position presented during negotiations. It is the same principle that applies in similar Westminster-style democracies with sophisticated trade negotiating functions, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Setting aside for a moment the significant constitutional issues that we have just examined, the proposals are also unworkable in a practical sense. First, treaty texts are liable to change significantly right up to point of signature. As they say, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Sharing texts as we go might be a waste of parliamentary time, as they could quickly be made redundant. It is also not in line with the practice of our FTA partners, including the US, let alone Australia or New Zealand. Those countries will have legitimate expectations of confidentiality around key negotiating texts in our trade negotiations with them.
Final texts of agreements—which, after all, are what matters—are already laid in Parliament for 21 days under the CRAG process, and the Commons has an option to restart CRAG, potentially indefinitely. The Government have gone well beyond the requirements of CRAG and its statutory obligations, in line with our commitment to transparency and scrutiny, by providing Parliament with extensive information on negotiations. For the trade talks with the US on a new FTA and with Japan on an enhanced FTA, the Government have set out their negotiating objectives alongside a response to the public consultation, as well as an initial economic assessment prior to the start of the talks. Ministers have also held open briefings for MPs and peers both at the launch of the US talks—I held one myself—and after the conclusion of the first round.
We will continue to keep Parliament updated on negotiations as they progress, including close engagement with the International Trade Committee in the House of Commons and the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee in the other place. We are committed to publishing full impact assessments prior to the implementation of the agreements. That provides Parliament with more than sufficient information to scrutinise the Government’s trade agenda properly.
Turning to new clause 6, I hope that on the issue of consultation, the Opposition will note the Government’s strong record of consulting widely with the public and key stakeholders on our trade agenda. The Government’s consultation on our priority FTA programme attracted 600,000 responses, making it one of the largest consultations ever undertaken by Government.
Gareth Thomas
I want to press the Minister on the proposals that were in the Command Paper last year. He has not quite answered us on that. The Command Paper said clearly that the Government would work with a Committee and give it access to sensitive information that is not suitable for wider publication, including private briefings from negotiating teams. On the record, is the Minister willing to confirm that they will do that with the International Trade Committee and the relevant Lords Committee, or not?
Greg Hands
I should be clear that the Command Paper was published by a previous Government in a different parliamentary context. However, we have in our approach so far followed what was set out in the Command Paper in relation to publishing negotiation objectives and impact assessments, and reporting back after the first round. I would again ask for confidence in our deeds, in terms of our overall commitment to parliamentary scrutiny.
In line with our commitment, we have published the Government’s response to the consultations on FTAs with the US, Australia and New Zealand, and on an enhanced FTA with Japan. In relation to sustainability impact assessments, as the EU calls them, the Department has published, and will continue to publish, our own scoping assessments for each of our new free trade agreements, prior to negotiations commencing. As with the published UK-US, UK-Japan, UK-Australia and UK-New Zealand scoping assessments, those include preliminary assessment of the potential economic impacts, the implications for UK nations and regions, the impact on small and medium-sized enterprises, the environmental impacts, and the effects on different groups in the labour market, including whether there are any disproportionate impacts on groups with protected characteristics, arising from an FTA with the partner country.
The scoping assessments attracted quite a bit of attention, not least because of all the nations and regions of the UK that would benefit from the US trade agreement, Scotland would benefit the most, followed by the west midlands and then the north-east of England. Those are good things. We are proud of that, and of the fact that we published the assessment.
We are committed to publishing full impact assessments once negotiations have concluded and prior to the implementation of the agreements, when the effects of an agreement can be better understood.
On the point about standards raised in new clause 6, I encourage hon. Members to look at our record on negotiating agreements. We said we would not lower standards, and we have not, as can be seen from the parliamentary reports we published on each of the 20 agreements. None of the 20 agreements that have been signed to date involved any reduction in standards.
Gareth Thomas
In the Command Paper published in February last year, the Government committed during negotiations to publish and lay before Parliament a round report following each substantive round of negotiations. Does that commitment still stand or has it been axed, like the commitment to give sensitive information to a Select Committee of the House of Commons?
Greg Hands
Nothing has been axed; all I am saying is that the Command Paper was produced at a different time. What we have done is to follow the Command Paper in publishing, for example, the written ministerial statement at the end of round one of the talks with the US. That has greatly enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, as has publishing the negotiation objectives and the scoping assessment of who would be most likely to benefit from the agreement.
Greg Hands
I will make a bit more progress.
As with new clause 5, new clause 8 contains a number of practical flaws in the proposed system. Those flaws would undermine negotiations and disadvantage the UK. I understand that colleagues are keen to remain abreast of negotiations, and the Government are supportive of that endeavour, as I have outlined. I point hon. Members not just towards our commitments to share information but towards our record on the recent US negotiations, which I have mentioned.
Ultimately, this debate boils down to whether we believe that it is right that the UK Government, supported by experts, civil service negotiating teams and advisers, are able to negotiate international agreements on behalf of those who elected them, drawing on the expertise and views of Parliament and of the devolved authorities, via strong scrutiny mechanisms. Or do we believe that Parliament itself should be in control of the negotiations, determining who we negotiate with and how, and within what timeframes?
It seems clear to me that in the national interest, the former scenario must be right. It ensures that when our partners face the UK around the negotiating table, they know that it has a credible single voice—one that is represented by the UK Government alone, after they have consulted with the devolved Administrations and drawn on the extensive expertise in this House and the other place, via close engagement and scrutiny processes, such as those we have here for international agreements.
Matt Western
I understand that point. The EU has 27 nations, and yet it manages to achieve that. It has a coherent position from 27 nations, but it can still carry out talks. Surely, it is possible for us to have the involvement of Parliament to scrutinise matters and to be updated about them, and to have its engagement in this process. Can the Minister just answer that one point?
Greg Hands
I have already outlined in immense detail, probably three or four times now, the involvement that Parliament will have in future trade agreements. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the Bill is about the continuity of existing trade agreements. I may be the only person in this room—perhaps the hon. Member for Harrow West has done so as well—who has represented the UK at trade Foreign Affairs Council meetings of the European Union. I can reveal to the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington that the EU does not always speak with one voice when it comes to trade. I can tell him of many a fruity row at those meetings involving different member states—rows between the Commission and the European Parliament and so on in relation to EU trade policy. I am afraid that the idea that the EU is one happy whole as it goes into trade agreements, with total uniformity of opinion across the EU27, is for the birds.
I hope that I have provided Members with some assurance that the amendments are unnecessary and impractical, and will unquestionably limit the UK Government’s ability to negotiate in the best interests of UK businesses, consumers and citizens.
On a slightly different topic, new clause 19 seeks to oblige the Government to publish parliamentary reports on continuity agreements, which the hon. Member for Harrow West has already drawn attention to, outlining any significant differences between the signed agreements and the underlying EU agreements. I am aware that, in the last Parliament, the Government introduced an amendment to that effect to the previous Trade Bill. However, Members will be aware that, despite the previous Bill falling, we have committed to publishing such parliamentary reports on a voluntary basis, to assist the House with the scrutiny of agreements.
We have published such a report for each of the 20 continuity agreements we have signed, outlining any significant differences from the underlying EU agreement. That process affords parliamentarians extra transparency on our continuity agreements, above and beyond the statutory framework set out in CRAG. As is demonstrated by the measures we have taken, and by the inclusion of a sunset clause and the affirmative procedure for any secondary legislation, we will ensure that Parliament’s voice is heard when clause 2 powers are exercised. I reiterate the commitment that we will continue to publish parliamentary reports for all remaining continuity agreements.
I suspect the Committee will be glad to hear that I am finally turning to new clause 20, which stipulates that the parliamentary reports must be published at least 10 sitting days before any statutory instruments are made under this power. Members will be aware that trade negotiations, and indeed many other international negotiations, have a habit of going down to the wire. I have only to remind colleagues of the negotiations surrounding the EU withdrawal agreement as evidence of that fact, although that negotiation is not included in the scope of the Bill, perhaps thankfully. As such, it is possible that we will be unable to sign continuity agreements until very shortly before the transition period ends.
I stress that that is possible. We have already signed 20 such agreements, but some may well finally be negotiated and signed in the last days before the UK once again becomes a fully independent trading country. That would make it very difficult to leave a period of 10 sitting days before any SIs are introduced. I assure colleagues that we will leave as much time as possible for essential parliamentary scrutiny. I point again to our record: we have published parliamentary reports alongside all signed agreements entering the CRAG process, meaning that that information has been available for at least the full duration of CRAG. I remind colleagues that CRAG allows a period of 21 sitting days for our agreements to be scrutinised in Parliament before they can be formally ratified. That provides an effective period of time for parliamentarians to scrutinise the agreements.
Turning to a few of the more technical matters that have been raised, the Opposition said that the South Korean and Swiss agreements have not been signed. They have both been signed and have both gone through CRAG. The House of Lords European Union Committee called the Swiss agreement for debate but, as I said earlier, no motion of regret was passed. The hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) loved to talk about the Ponsonby rule, which is exactly what CRAG sought to codify. The Ponsonby rule, if it exists at all today, is there only through the living embodiment of CRAG.
The Opposition talked about the mutual recognition agreements incorporated within the Swiss agreement. The MRAs that have been signed and are part of the agreement cover 70% of our trade flow. On a technical point, we have in place a memorandum of understanding to continue discussions about trade continuity before the UK-Swiss trade agreement comes into effect on 1 January. We are committed to aiming to put in place mutual recognition of conformity assessment bodies in time for the agreement coming into effect.
The sectors not covered by the MRAs are underpinned by international standards regimes, not by EU standard regimes. There is therefore greater regulatory confidence in conformity assessments within these. On tariffs and the South Korea agreement, the hon. Member for Harrow West effected some kind of melange between tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. A tariff is the rate of tax at which we charge a product coming into the country; a tariff-rate quota is the quantity of that product that would be allowed on either a lower tariff or on no tariff at all.
Tariff-rate quotas have been resized from the original EU agreement. That is an entirely normal and expected part of the process. The TRQ stated that a certain volume of this, that or another product—the example of Cheddar cheese was used—is allowed to enter from the EU into South Korea without a tariff or with a lower tariff being applied. That volume is apportioned in the ensuing agreements: this part of the tariff-rate quota belongs to the European Union, and this part of the tariff-rate quota belongs to the UK.
How do we determine which part goes to which? Generally, the way in which to do this, which the European Union has agreed, is to look at recent trade patterns, take the average of recent years and say that a part should be determined to be the EU’s and another part should be the UK’s? If no UK products have been exported to South Korea under the tariff-rate quota, the effect will be that the tariff-rate quota ends up going to zero in the ensuing UK agreement, but it may well be that we end up with far more than the UK overall trade flow in the ensuing South Korea agreement in other areas. It simply is not the case that we have lost our tariff-free access, if it is a product that the UK does not currently export to South Korea under the tariff-rate quota.
Crucially, the tariff reductions are in the ensuing UK agreement. Whereas the tariff-rate quotas divide up, the agreed tariff reductions carry on. That is particularly relevant to Cheddar cheese. Tariffs on Cheddar cheese entering South Korea under the EU-Korea agreement have been coming down steadily each year since 1 July 2011. From 1 July 2021, UK Cheddar cheese will be free of customs duties entirely as a result of that gradual stepping-down process, which affects Cheddar made in the EU as much as it affects the UK. There has been no change in that and no loss in our preferential tariff treatment in the UK-Korea agreement.
I have talked at length about the Command Paper and one or two other things. I have responded to each of the points made by Labour Members, possibly to their satisfaction. I find various things a little bit rich. I think I heard regrets from the Labour Front Bench that we will not be able to transition the EU-Canada agreement. I remember, because I was doing this job at the time, a large part of the Labour party, including current Front Benchers, voting against the EU-Canada agreement even coming into effect. So Labour was opposed to the agreement three years ago, but now they suddenly complain that we are not being quick enough in transitioning it to a UK agreement. If there was any consistency in the Opposition’s approach, they should be cheering any delay to an agreement that they do not agree with. I find their position typical of the chaos still present on the Opposition Benches. They complain that we have not rolled over an agreement that they did not want to be part of anyway.
The hon. Member for Putney, who started off regretting the vote four years ago today to leave the EU, then made a speech questioning the trade agreements negotiated by the European Union that we are seeking to roll over. There must be more consistency.
I appreciate that the Labour party has had a leadership change. I thought that the whole basis of the new leader’s approach was to bring organisation and method to its opposition, but instead, we have seen continuing chaos. We see a shadow Front-Bench spokesman who now objects to the agreements that they presented when in government, and a shadow Front-Bench team who now want to roll over the Canada agreement that they originally voted against. Those on the shadow Front Bench regret the Brexit vote but now want to vote against our transitioning the very agreements that the EU, with UK participation, negotiated successfully. That is a recipe for chaos and one that the Opposition would do well to reflect on.
Gareth Thomas
At the risk of disappointing the Government Whip, I shall be brief in my concluding remarks. We had a very strong contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Sefton Central, who underlined that, at present, we will find out more on a UK-US deal from Congress than from anywhere else. My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington rightly raised, among a series of other points, concerns about our ability to scrutinise the impact of a new free trade agreement on the automotive sector. My hon. Friend the Member for Putney rightly drew attention to the significance of scrutiny, or otherwise, of the roll-over agreements, given that some 39% of jobs in her constituency depend on trade with countries where there are roll-over agreements.
We also heard interesting interventions from the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire, who I hope has used the lunchtime adjournment to look up the reference in the Queen’s Speech to the Trade Bill. It makes it very clear that the Trade Bill’s purpose is to put in place the essential and necessary legislative framework to allow the UK to operate its own independent trade policy on exit from the European Union. I appreciate that the Minister has sought to somewhat change the stated purpose of the Trade Bill, to provide some cover for not being willing to give Parliament proper scrutiny arrangements for future free trade agreements, but that is what the Queen’s Speech said.
Other interventions included that from the hon. Member for Witney on Australian cars. In their own different ways, hon. Members supplemented the arguments that we were making for greater scrutiny of free trade agreements.
Perhaps the most striking revelations were in the Minister’s winding-up contribution. In the previous Parliament, the Government committed to make limited improvements to the Bill by allowing parliamentary scrutiny in the form of reports and sunset clauses. Having witnessed them backslide on those commitments, we have now heard the Minister step back from commitments made in the Command Paper less than 15 months ago on scrutiny of free trade agreements. The Minister appeared to be clear that Parliament, including the International Trade Committee, will not have the opportunity to scrutinise the negotiators, receive private briefings from them, or access sensitive information, as was promised in the Command Paper. He was also studiously vague as to whether the commitment in the Command Paper to publish and lay before Parliament a round report following each substantive round of negotiations will be maintained or not. One can only conclude from his answer that that commitment is not being maintained, albeit one report, on the UK-US deal, has already been published.
This Bill is lamentable in the lack of proper opportunities it offers to scrutinise the continuity agreements, in particular the bigger ones, which have yet to be negotiated, on Canada, Japan and Turkey. It is also lamentable, as a series of witnesses and hon. Members have stated, in the arrangements for scrutinising new free trade agreements. On that basis, I intend to press the amendments to a Division.
Bill Esterson
On a point of order, Sir Graham. Is it in order to make a further speech at this stage? I understand that it is, but I stand to be corrected.
The Chair
It is in order, but given that the amendments have been moved, if you could do so briefly, that would be appreciated.
Bill Esterson
I shall be brief. I speak purely because the Minister made a number of comments that need further attention. He talked about our approach to the need for these agreements to be implemented. Our reasoned amendment said:
“That this House recognises that upon leaving the European Union, the UK will need effective legislation to implement agreements with partner countries corresponding to international trade agreements of the European Union in place before the UK’s exit”.
That is what it said and that is what we voted on, and we are clear in our commitment to doing just that.
The significance of the six times that the Minister’s hon. Friends asked questions of various witnesses last week was not lost on us—they wanted it clearly on the record that there is a desire for the continuity agreements to be concluded. We accept that, which is why we put it in our reasoned amendment. It is important that the Minister is under no illusion on that point. Our concern is that they are done properly, scrutinised effectively and that mistakes are not made, which is why we tabled these amendments.
The Bill has to go through this year. It was in the Government’s gift. They could have passed the Bill—or a very similar version of it—last year, as amended. They could have brought back that version, as amended, this year if it was so important to them. More than two years ago, we were in a nearby Committee Room having very similar debates on very similar amendments. The Government had the chance to do this. It is on them that there has been a delay in getting to this point. In some of the evidence sessions, we heard that, while the Bill is not perfect, the witnesses wanted it to go ahead. Last year’s Bill was not perfect either, but the Government could have brought it back and got it through earlier to address the witnesses’ concerns. It is important that these things are said.
The Minister distinguished between future trade agreements and existing ones. He tried to use some clever language right at the start of his remarks. He pointed out that the Bill, as drafted, does not cover free trade agreements with new trading partners. That is correct, although it has scope to do so, which is why our amendments are in scope. However, the Bill does cover new free trade agreements with existing trading partners, which is why our amendments are entirely appropriate in calling for scrutiny of the corresponding agreements.
The Minister used the phrase, “Parliament should be able to properly scrutinise trade agreements”, in the context of new trade agreements and the framework, and said that his door was always open. He did not say when we could expect to see that new framework. The United States agreement is already under way without that new framework. If not now, when? Why is that US trade agreement going through without that new framework in place, given that the Minister and the his colleagues deem it so important in enabling proper scrutiny? As he knows, the CRAG approach relies on the Opposition using one of their Opposition days within a 21-day period. There were occasions in the previous Parliament when there was not an Opposition day for a period of greater than 21 days. It is entirely dependent on the Government making time available in Parliament for CRAG to be applied. It is one of a number of flaws in our scrutiny process, and one of a number of reasons why changes are needed—because the Government are not addressing it at this stage.
I have no doubt that the Lords will table amendments similar to those tabled last time. The Minister’s colleagues in the Lords are going to have to face this question. The Government are going to win every vote in this House, but it could be a different story in the Lords. If not now, when? And why not take on board the scrutiny that we have suggested? Why not accept and retain the amendments from last time, including that dealing with the publication of reports?
My final point is that if it is the Government’s intention to always publish reports on the difference between the existing agreements and the new ones, why not keep that amendment in the Bill? At the moment, they have the option to not publish if they so choose or if a new Minister has a change of opinion. Given what the Minister has said, there are so many places in which what we have proposed has been justified, and the Government will need to consider them in the Lords even if they do not today.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Gareth Thomas
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 2, page 2, line 15, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement only if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union had ratified a free trade agreement with each other immediately before exit day.
(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement other than a free trade agreement only if the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union had ratified an international trade agreement with each other immediately before exit day.”
This amendment would require previous ratification of a trade agreement before regulations could be made to implement it.
Amendment 9 excludes from the scope of clause 2(1) those international trade agreements agreed between the UK and a third country where the corresponding agreement between the EU and that third country has been signed, but not ratified, as of 31 January this year. My understanding is that this would apply to the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement and the EU-Canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement, or CETA. Both agreements merit further detailed scrutiny, even if only through the CRAG process.
The new UK-Vietnam agreement would be a treaty in its own right, legally distinct, and therefore should surely face proper scrutiny. Under the Bill’s terms, any future UK-Vietnam agreement would be counted as a roll-over agreement, because the EU signed an agreement with Vietnam shortly before we left the EU on 31 January this year. That EU-Vietnam agreement has not been ratified, and indeed the scrutiny processes in this House had not been completed by 31 January. A future UK-Vietnam deal could be hugely different from the EU deal, but it would none the less be covered by this Bill, with its minimal scrutiny arrangements.
Greg Hands
I was intrigued by the amendment, but let us pause for a moment on what it would do. Amendment 9 would stipulate that agreements are in scope of the clause 2 power only if the underlying EU agreement were ratified, rather than signed, by end of the transition period. For the benefit of the Committee it might be useful to explain the difference. Something can be signed—but the dates on which a trade treaty can be signed, come into effect and be fully ratified are three different dates. A trade treaty can come into effect—this is the way the EU does it—when a certain number of EU countries have ratified it. I forget what that number is, but if about half of EU countries have ratified the agreement it comes into effect. Those three things—being signed, coming into effect, and ratification—happen on three different dates. Under the amendment, the clause 2 power that we currently say must relate to an EU agreement signed before 31 January 2020 would relate to an EU agreement ratified before that date.
Opposition Members will realise—I think, to be fair, the hon. Member for Harrow West covered that in his speech—that the amendment would restrict the scope of agreements that we could implement using clause 2. It would make the scope much narrower. However, it would do so in an entirely unreasonable manner. Important agreements such as the Canada one that he has mentioned would be excluded, as CETA has not been fully ratified by each individual member state of the EU, despite having been in effect for some time now.
Development-focused agreements would be similarly affected. The important matter of international development has yet to feature in discussions of the Bill—with the exception of something that the hon. Member for Putney said about it in passing. However, many development-focused agreements—those important economic partnership agreements—have been signed but not yet ratified. One example, involving the countries of the Caribbean, is the CARIFORUM agreement. In 2017 I signed an agreement with the CARIFORUM countries. We all gathered together—17 countries, I think, which was basically CARICOM—plus the Dominican Republic. We gathered together in Brussels to sign a continuity agreement. The nations of the Caribbean recognise the importance of that trade agreement, and one thing that they mentioned was its importance not just to their citizens but to the Caribbean diaspora in this country.
Greg Hands
No, I am not going to give way.
I think that a Member with quite a big Caribbean community in his constituency has quite a lot of explaining to do about why he is now opposed to the CARIFORUM agreement. It is a great agreement that does major good work for international development in Caribbean countries. I represent a quite substantial Caribbean community. I think its members would be alarmed if they were to learn that the Labour party is opposed to that international development agreement, which does great work among our Caribbean friends.
Gareth Thomas
On a point of order, Sir Graham. As the Minister knows full well, we are not opposed to the agreement. We simply want better scrutiny arrangements. What arrangements are there for me to correct the record in that respect?
The Chair
Order. I think I have to respond to the point of order, in spite of the fact that it was not a point of order. As to what the hon. Gentleman asked about, as he knows, he has just done it.
Greg Hands
The point of the amendment is to rule out of scope agreements that have yet to be fully ratified, which includes not only the Canada agreement but the CARIFORUM agreement and important economic partnership agreements. The hon. Member for Harrow West was a DFID Minister, and I think that that might have been when some of those agreements were negotiated —with important countries such as Kenya, Côte D’Ivoire and Ghana. However, the incredibly important beneficial trade arrangements made for those countries could no longer be effective, for lack of the clause 2 power. The Opposition have a lot of explaining to do. Developing countries are as we know sometimes unable to ratify agreements fully before—
Bill Esterson
On a point of order, Sir Graham. The Minister has a number of times asked us to explain things and then refused to give way. Can you perhaps shed some light on how we might overcome that apparent stand-off?
The Chair
I think that the hon. Gentleman has been here long enough to know that these things happen.
Greg Hands
Truth be told, I was going to allow an intervention when I had fully laid out the case, and mentioned the number of people that the trade stance that the hon. Member for Harrow West is outlining today will irritate. I have only just got started on the agreements, and the apologies that the hon. Gentleman will have to make to his constituents, and, on behalf of the Labour party, to people the length and breadth of the United Kingdom.
Developing countries are sometimes unable to ratify agreements fully before they are brought into effect, often for procedural reasons in those countries, but that should not mean that we deny UK businesses the opportunity to continue trading with them, and I am sure Opposition Members would not wish to deny our world-class trade for development assistance to those states either.
Greg Hands
I will allow the hon. Gentleman to intervene. Perhaps he can explain and apologise for his position in relation to those countries.
Bill Esterson
The party that has just abolished the Department for International Development is not in a good place to be criticising anybody for their approach to international development. The Minister knows full well, as he did with the reasoned amendment, that we fully support international development—in a way that his party, apparently, does not. Perhaps, if this is a problem because of the drafting of our amendment, he will tell us that on Report he will come back with an amendment that deals with the problems that he is taking great pains to explain.
Greg Hands
I am certainly not coming back on Report with a drafting correction for the deficiencies in the hon. Gentleman’s amendment; that would be a novel approach to Parliament. The fact is that this amendment rules out of scope all these agreements for roll-overs. I have to say, in fairness to him, that some of these agreements were controversial; some people opposed these EU EPAs in the first place, and I imagined that it was the Labour party’s position that it opposed these EPAs. If we listen to one or two groups, for example, they think that the EPAs have been stacked too heavily in the EU’s favour.
However, I think the hon. Gentleman is now saying that actually that is not his intention, and that his intention was not to prevent their being rolled over. I think he is now saying he is suddenly in support of the continuity of these agreements, despite having voted against the Second Reading of the Bill and despite the fact that virtually every word that we have heard from the Labour Party in this Committee has been against these agreements and against these Bills.
Returning to my point about continuity, these agreements have been subject in this country to the full EU agreement scrutiny process. The delay to ratification is not in this country, but relates to individual country or state delays. There is no scrutiny gap.
Fleur Anderson
Returning to the issue of Canada and delayed negotiations, can the Minister confirm that if we do not secure the free trade agreement with Canada before 31 December, we will lose all the benefits of the current EU trade deal with Canada and revert to trading with it on WTO terms?
Greg Hands
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, because I thought the Opposition were opposed to the Canada deal, so if we were to fall outside the Canada deal, they should be celebrating that. The Labour Front Bench opposed Canada in 2017, and I think they have opposed it again today. We are in discussions with Canada and we believe that there is time to do a roll-over agreement, but to do that we need the powers in the Bill. Amendment 9, which I think the hon. Lady has co-sponsored, would delete Canada from the list of agreements subject to the power, so if she votes for this amendment—if indeed there is a vote on it—she will effectively be preventing the roll-over of the Canada deal.
I will come to a conclusion. I was very surprised by this amendment. I praised the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sefton Central, last week for the attention he had given to oral questions earlier that day, but now I am not sure whether he really paid enough attention. He may have missed hearing the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), say from a sedentary position that she is in favour of CETA, the Canada agreement, and that she voted for it at the time.
The right hon. Lady is absolutely right: she did vote for it at the time, and that is obviously the Labour party’s new position. We know that sometimes in political parties, particularly when we are in opposition, there can be a new position and it takes a while for that new position to filter out across the whole party, but I am a little bit surprised that the new position has not filtered down to her own Front-Bench team, let alone the whole party, because they are trying to say they do not want to roll over the Canada agreement for an agreement that their shadow Secretary of State was praising only last Thursday. I find that approach absolutely bizarre.
If amendment 9 were to be accepted, there would be no UK-Canada trade agreement to roll over in the scope of clause 2. Labour said one thing in the Chamber last Thursday, but is saying precisely the opposite in Committee. Our Canadian friends will look on askance, as will our friends from the Caribbean, Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and so on.
This is a continuity Bill. There is certainly continuity in the Labour party’s confusion on trade. When it came to the original Canada agreement in the vote of February 2017, Labour split three ways: 68 of its members followed the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) in voting for the CT agreement; 86 broke with the right hon. Member for Islington North and voted with the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury in favour of the agreement; and the rest abstained.
I think I heard the hon. Member for Harrow West then say that he regretted the fact that there had not been a debate about the Canada agreement on the Floor of the House. I spent a few years in the Whips Office. One of the first rules of being a Whip in Opposition is never bring a debate on which your own party is divided to the Floor of the House, let alone something where you are divided three ways and your leader is in the minority view. Now he is saying that he regrets that it was not brought to the Floor of the House.
We should vote down amendment 9, because it would rule out of scope Canada, the Caribbean and many other important trade agreements that the EU has negotiated. The UK was part of that negotiating team. They are very important trade agreements. We would like to see the continuity of those trade agreements, as do our constituents and UK businesses. I urge hon. Members to vote against amendment 9. Indeed, I hope the Opposition withdraw the amendment.
Gareth Thomas
The Minister has been at his most diversionary with that characteristically chutzpah-led speech. As he knows only too well, constitutionally, the Government are able to sign and ratify international agreements. He went on at some length in his winding-up speech on the previous group of amendments about how wonderful that process was.
The Minister does not need the Trade Bill to sign agreements with CARIFORUM, Canada or Vietnam. The powers are already there for the Government to do so. If Ministers think the provisions in the Bill relating to those clauses are so important, one wonders why they did not bring the Trade Bill back in the last Parliament. It fell because Ministers chose not to bring it back, not because of opposition from the Labour party.
There were genuine concerns about the future of a UK-Canada trade pattern. On this side of the House, we repeat our concern that if Ministers cannot agree to roll over a deal with one of our oldest allies where the Queen is Head of State, it prompts questions about the effectiveness of the Department for International Trade. This was a probing amendment, which we will not push to a vote. The point about scrutiny remains on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement only if the provisions of that international trade agreement do not conflict with, and are consistent with—
(a) the provisions of international treaties ratified by the United Kingdom;
(b) the provisions of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015;
(c) the primacy of human rights law;
(d) international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(e) the United Kingdom’s obligations on workers’ rights and labour standards as established by but not limited to—
(i) the commitments under the International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Rights at Work and its Follow-up Conventions; and
(ii) the fundamental principles and rights at work inherent in membership of the International Labour Organisation;
(f) women’s rights and are in accordance with the United Kingdom’s obligations established by but not limited to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
(g) children’s rights and are in accordance with the United Kingdom’s obligations established by but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and
(h) the sovereignty of Parliament, the legal authority of UK courts, the rule of law and the principle of equality before the law.”
I will give my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West a chance to rest his vocal cords. Amendment 10 is part of a run of amendments that get into the implications of domestic and international policy on everyday life here and abroad. Amendment 10 would ensure that regulations on an international trade agreement can only be made if the provisions
“do not conflict with, and are consistent with…Sustainable Development Goals…the primacy of human rights law…international human rights law and international humanitarian law;…obligations on workers’ rights and labour standards as established by but not limited to…the commitments under the International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Rights at Work and its Follow-up Conventions; and…the fundamental principles and rights at work inherent in membership of the International Labour Organisation;…women’s rights and are in accordance with the United Kingdom’s obligations established by but not limited to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;…children’s rights and are in accordance with the United Kingdom’s obligations established by but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and…the sovereignty of Parliament, the legal authority of UK courts, the rule of law and the principle of equality before the law.”
There are some things in there that sound very much like taking back control to me. They are very much about the rights of human beings here and abroad, whether workers, women or children. What is not to like? What is there not to support in the amendment? What is there not to support in getting behind sustainable development goals at every available opportunity?
In the previous debate, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West mentioned the difficulties in Vietnam. Trade unions and workers in Vietnam face a very difficult time. They face persecution and exploitation. A trade agreement with Vietnam should include labour provisions under the ILO, consistent with amendment 10. The measures in amendment 10 also protect UK businesses by avoiding undercutting.
For the sake of posterity, Sir Graham—I think that is the right way of describing it—I checked that the amendment is similar to one moved by your co-Chair two years ago. At the time, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins) spoke about the human rights of the Sahrawi people and Morocco’s attempts to include them in international trade agreements. She set out the need for the ethical dimension in international trade agreements and talked about how poorest are left behind. She quoted Paul Collier’s work on the bottom billion and described how international trade agreements all too often lock the poorest in the world into the natural resource trap rather than benefiting them through export diversification, as is sometimes claimed.
It was a good speech then, and the points that my hon. Friend made remain good points now. That is backed up by what we were told in written briefings from Amnesty, which makes the point about the current Bill’s lack of provision in those areas, saying that
“the Bill as currently framed, makes it possible to alter human rights and equality protections using secondary legislation, in order to comply with renegotiated trade deals.”
Here we are again with the problem of Ministers’ use of secondary legislation because of the inadequate provisions in the Bill. The briefing goes on:
“Such powers should not be necessary if existing EU trade agreements, which are the subject of the Trade Bill, are to be rolled over primarily to ensure continuity, as claimed by the government.”
As such, the Government should not object to amendment 10.
The briefing states that the Bill grants
“extraordinarily wide powers to Ministers to amend retained EU law - including the Equality Act 2010, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Data Protection Act 2018 - leaving domestic rights protections open to alteration”
and that it lacks
“real parliamentary scrutiny and accountability throughout negotiations. This is essential because of the complexity and far-reaching implications of trade agreements for business and public policy”
in the areas of human rights. The briefing continues:
“Unlike the US and the EU, the UK looks set to conduct major elements of trade negotiations without any oversight role or negotiating mandate from Parliament.”
After the debates and votes that we have already had in this Committee, I think we can safely say that that is true.
Gareth Thomas
Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be sensible to include in the Bill a commitment to trying to achieve the sustainable development goals, as this amendment seeks to do, not least because with their decision to abolish the Department for International Development, Ministers have thrown away some of their soft power and global reputation for being good on development?
Bill Esterson
That is an incredibly important point. Given the Government’s previous apparent commitment to SDGs, one might have thought they would be open to such a suggestion. The EU conducts sustainability impact assessments of all new trade agreements to assess their the economic, environmental and social impact, including their impact on human rights and labour standards. That is a similar point to the one my hon. Friend just made.
Once in force, EU agreements include a commitment to assess the effects of the agreement on sustainable development. Although those sustainability impact assessments could go further in terms of detail, with sector-specific impact assessments on human rights or labour standards, they nevertheless provide a clear commitment to human rights and labour standards that the UK should replicate and improve on. I thought this was a continuity Bill—the Minister has told us that enough times—so why are the Government not doing the same thing with sustainability impact assessments?
There is no provision in the Bill for undertaking social and environmental assessments of prospective trade agreements, or for conducting related studies and surveys. Decision makers will be operating without the evidence base to take full decisions on complex instruments that will bind the UK for many years. Methodologies for this are well developed, and the Government should commit to undertake them in legislation and to make them public. If not now, when?
Gareth Thomas
One concern that led me to want the Bill to refer to the sustainable development goals is the fact that both Ghana and Kenya have not yet felt able to sign a continuity agreement with the UK. As I understand it, that is because of their concern that the tariff regime that Ministers are suggesting under such a continuity agreement would hinder the scope for regional integration in eastern and western Africa. Although I do not expect my hon. Friend to comment on it, perhaps my intervention might encourage the Minister to give some clarity on my genuine concern about those two continuity agreements.
Bill Esterson
I am glad my hon. Friend has raised the issue, and I hope the Minister can give clarity on those two continuity agreements. If the Minister missed the names of the agreements, I am sure my hon. Friend will repeat them for him. It appears that that may be necessary.
I turn to what the TUC has said to us. It has particular concerns about trade unionists. In its briefing for the Committee, the TUC refers to the lack of consultation on the text of the 19 continuity agreements that have been finalised so far. That has been a concern, because many of the deals that have already been signed are with countries where labour and human rights abuses are widespread. The TUC refers to Colombia and South Korea:
“In South Korea, trade union leaders have been thrown in prison for peaceful protest for workers to claim their rights. Colombia, meanwhile, remains the most dangerous country in the world for trade unionists with around two thirds of murders of trade unionists taking place in Colombia.”
That is according to an ITUC report from last year entitled, “The World’s Worst Countries for Workers”. The TUC continues:
“Whilst the UK’s trade deals with South Korea and Colombia have commitments on paper to uphold ILO standards, similar commitments in EU trade deals with South Korea and Colombia have not been effective in improving rights as they have no mechanism for effective enforcement.”
We had that discussion with Rosa Crawford in the evidence session last week, and that is what she confirmed to me.
Compare that with what goes on elsewhere. The TUC states:
“Trade unions in a number of other countries are consulted routinely by their governments in the process of trade negotiations, such as the US, Austria and Sweden…The TUC believes it is crucial for trade unions to be consulted on the text of trade negotiations in order to ensure they have adequate provisions to ensure labour rights commitments are upheld, contain effective protections for public services as well as other social standards and do not contain Investor-State Dispute Settlement Courts that would allow foreign investors to sue governments for enacting policies for the public good”,
including in the areas of workers’ rights and human rights. The TUC continues:
“The TUC believes it is also crucial for MPs to be able to see and comment on the text of continuity deals so that negotiations are subject to proper democratic scrutiny.”
All that brings us back to the text of the amendment. If the Government are committed to upholding sustainable development goals and to supporting human rights, workers’ rights, women’s rights and the rights of the child, the amendment is an opportunity. If the Government do not support this amendment, they might, as I suggested to the Minister on another occasion, want to bring back their own drafting that civil servants can tell them is appropriate to deliver the goals that I have just set out.
Charlotte Nichols (Warrington North) (Lab)
Can I say what an honour it is to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham? In the context of the debates about racial inequality that are taking place around the world, and the Government’s announcement that they will seek to absorb the Department for International Development into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, it is vital to ensure that we do not shy away from our international responsibilities. That includes ensuring that any future trade deals cannot be used as vehicles to undermine human rights and workers’ rights, either at home or abroad. The safeguards in the amendment are, frankly, common sense, and it should not prove any barrier to free trade agreements with a wide range of trading partners, as is the Government’s stated aspiration. However, it is important that those safeguards are explicit in the Bill.
To illustrate why that is the case, I will give an example. In the public evidence session, I asked the Digital Trade Network about the risk of the US exporting section 230-style provisions into trade deals. As members of the Committee will be aware, these provisions are pushed by the big technology firms, because they effectively restrict US trade partners from making domestic legislation that might introduce any regulation. Without the safeguards in the amendment, there is increasing concern that the UK will be bullied into accepting these provisions in the upcoming UK-US trade deal, which will gut the upcoming online harms Bill and its promise to increase protection for children online.
Ensuring consistency with children’s rights is essential, but the threat is not just to our children. The Community Security Trust’s report, “Hate Fuel: the hidden online world fuelling far right terror”, outlines the global threat of far-right terror, which has its own online language and subculture that are developed and sustained on these social media platforms. This material repeatedly and explicitly calls for Jews to be killed. Indeed, many of the most hateful things that I receive as a Jewish parliamentarian originate from the US and Canada.
Governments, law enforcement and technology platforms must co-operate internationally to combat the propaganda that fuels far-right terror, just as they have done previously to tackle the propaganda that encourages and promotes jihadist terrorism. Protecting the sovereignty of Parliament, the legal authority of UK courts, the rule of law and the principle of equality before the law will ensure that this place does not have one hand tied behind its back in its efforts to do just that.
As we discussed at length in debates on earlier amendments, because there is limited scope for parliamentary scrutiny of new trade agreements and because the Minister is unable to give guarantees on this issue today, despite being given repeated opportunities to do so by diligent Opposition Members, building these safeguards into the Bill will make sure that they cannot be missed out and that the scrutiny is sufficient to prevent adverse consequences that could result in a breach of one of the regulations set out in the amendment.
The amendment would also benefit our continuity agreements. The Minister mentioned that some of the predecessor agreements had been signed when Labour was last in Government. I was a teenager when Labour was last in Government, and a lot has happened since then—not just that my hair has started to go grey. I cannot understand the reluctance to ensure that continuity agreements that we are trying to secure are consistent with and do not conflict with these safeguards, given many of the seismic shifts that we have seen in geopolitics over the last decade or so; things have moved on considerably in that time.
It is only right that we ensure that continuity agreements remain fit for purpose. If they do not meet the criteria outlined in the amendment, why have we endeavoured to keep them? If the agreements do meet the criteria, there is really no need to oppose the criteria.
Fleur Anderson
This is, at last, a very uncontroversial amendment. I do not think that any of us in this Committee would disagree with the idea of complying with agreements that the Government have already decided to comply with.
For example, trade agreements and the UK’s commitment to the sustainable development goals are completely inseparable. In September, there will need to be a post-covid global rethink about, and recommitment to, the sustainable development goals to make it clear that we still aspire to attain them, so we will need to have this approach baked in to our trade negotiations.
“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” explicitly recognises international trade as an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction, and an important means of achieving the SDGs. Those goals include aims such as no poverty, zero hunger, gender equality, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, responsible consumption and production, and climate action. All of these goals are intrinsically tied to trade. It is, therefore, worrying that the Bill contains no mention of the SDGs, and it is a relief to have the opportunity to vote them into the Bill with amendment 10.
More worrying still is the fact that while trade will be crucial in achieving these global goals, it can also act as a barrier to achieving them. The economic partnership negotiations in west Africa, for example, are very controversial because of the impact of packaging requirements, and the use of sanitary and phytosanitary standards as non-tariff barriers to trade and to an increase in industrial strategy that could lead to greater development and greater prosperity, both in west Africa and here.
Greg Hands
As we have heard, amendment 10 intends to prevent the clause 2 power from being used to implement agreements that do not comply with existing international obligations on human rights, the environment and labour rights. Let me be absolutely clear: our continuity programme is coherent with existing international obligations as it seeks to replicate existing EU agreements, which are, of course, fully compliant with such obligations. By transitioning these agreements, we reaffirm the UK’s commitment to those international obligations.
I have said it before, but I am happy to repeat it as often as the Committee would like: we seek to provide certainty and stability in trading relationships for UK businesses and consumers, not to modify or dilute standards. None of the 20 agreements already signed has reduced EU standards in any area. Committee members can consult the parliamentary reports that we publish alongside continuity agreements detailing any changes required to transition the agreement to the UK context. These will confirm precisely what I have said. We will continue to publish these reports for remaining continuity agreements, so that hon. Members can satisfy themselves that we have not defaulted on our commitment not to reduce standards. That includes the agreement with Vietnam.
I am happy to look into the specific complaints that some Opposition Members have made on labour rights, but it would be helpful for me to understand whether they are in favour of the EU-Vietnam agreement. That was not really clear to me. The Opposition keep wanting to have their cake and eat it, saying that they like EU agreements but then trying to pick holes in them and saying that we should not roll them over because of some of the arrangements within them. The EU-Vietnam agreement is scheduled to come into effect on 1 August, so UK businesses will be able to take advantage of that agreement from 1 August.
As the Prime Minister outlined in his Greenwich speech, the UK has a strong history of protecting human rights and promoting our values globally. We will continue to encourage all states to uphold international human rights obligations. The hon. Member for Harrow West asked for examples of primary EU law that will be transitioned as a result of using these powers. To be clear, we intend to use the powers only for a limited number of obligations, most principally in relation to fully implementing conformity assessments and procurement matters in domestic law via secondary legislation.
To be clear, the human rights commitments in the joint statement that we made with South Korea do not enable the suspension of any of those human rights dialogues that are under way. The Colombia agreement, which is part of the EU-Andean agreement that has also been signed, has seen no weakening of labour rights; there have been some technical changes to that agreement, but none relating to labour rights, so far as I am aware. The continuity agreements signed have not changed those in any way.
The hon. Member for Warrington North mentioned action against the far right and other hate groups preaching violence. I can tell her that the Government are wholly united in our approach to making sure that that is exactly the case, but it is worth reminding ourselves that we are talking about existing trade agreements with those counterparts, not a new agreement as such.
The hon. Member for Putney talked about the commitment to the sustainable development goals. The Government are absolutely committed to the SDGs, but again we are talking about existing trade agreements. I will plough on, because we do not have an awful lot of time. The hon. Lady and her colleagues need to work out what it is that they want. On the one hand they seem to strongly support the EU and perhaps want the UK to rejoin, but on the other she seems, by the sound of it, to oppose the detail of virtually every one of the EU’s trade agreements. Opposition Members need to get clear in their minds whether they are pro-EU—in which case they might be in favour of the EU’s trade agreements—or anti-EU. That was not clear to me at all.
The hon. Member for Putney rightly says that human rights clauses in international trade deals are very important. We agree, which is why we are preserving their effects in these roll-over agreements. The Government have been clear that any future trade deals must work for UK consumers and businesses, upholding our high regulatory standards. The UK will remain committed to world-class environmental product and labour standards. We will not weaken these protections after the transition period ends. Our continuity agreements will safeguard, not undermine, our international obligations. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Sefton Central to withdraw his amendment.
Gareth Thomas
I had not intended to speak and I will be brief. I wish to amplify and expand on the concern that I raised in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Sefton Central regarding the continuity agreements for Kenya and Ghana. If those agreements are got wrong, they threaten the progress that both countries have made, and potentially that of other countries around them, in trying to achieve the sustainable development goals.
The concern is that what is currently being put to those countries by UK negotiators is a continuity agreement that requires them to sign up to something that risks regional integration in east and west Africa. Kenya and Ghana seek to work closely with the least developed countries that surround them as part of the trading blocs. Those LDCs want to continue to be part of a preference scheme, so Kenya and Ghana are caught in a trap between their desire to work very closely with their neighbouring countries and wanting to ensure that they can still trade on very good terms with the UK in, for example, bananas and cocoa.
Why is working with regional blocs so important? Because it is trade at a regional level in Africa that is likely to lead to faster development, more jobs being created, and, crucially, the development of more manufacturing jobs at a local level. When a no deal was about the happen last October, the UK Government proposed a transitional protection mechanism that would have included Ghana, Kenya and others in a similar position.
Greg Hands
I should apologise; I had not realised that the hon. Gentleman wanted to intervene on me on this issue. I undertake to write to him about Ghana and Kenya, and to copy in members of the Committee. The situation involving both those counterparts is complicated and would be best served not by a debate about this particular amendment, but more broadly were I to contact the hon. Gentleman.
Gareth Thomas
The Minister has made a gracious intervention and offer, which I am happy to accept. On that basis, I am happy to conclude my speech.
Bill Esterson
We had an excellent contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North, whose points about safeguards were well made. It is entirely common sense that we support the provisions of the amendment, but they need to be explicit. The Minister confirmed why in his remarks. The use of trade provisions to promote online hate is, sadly, all too familiar to my hon. Friend and to many other people in this country, including some in this Parliament. She described that extremely well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Putney rightly made the case for the sustainable development goals and ensuring that we deliver on them. The fact is that they are tied directly to trade. That point was reinforced by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West, who spoke on the importance of the Kenya and Ghana continuity agreements and the impact that they have on the LDCs. It reminded me of the reference, which I quoted in my remarks, that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South made to Paul Collier’s book “The Bottom Billion”. I am glad that the Minister has offered to write to members of the Committee about those concerns.
I think the Minister used the word “replicate” regarding how the agreements are carried over from the EU. Unfortunately, the Bill allows for dilution and for weaknesses, such as those that I set out in the South Korean and Colombian agreements, to continue. Such weaknesses will not be addressed, and the question is: if not now, when? In the case of South Korea and Colombia, it is: if not then, when? Of course, we will have another go at South Korea, because it wants to renegotiate what has been passed already.
I am afraid that the Minister’s points about Colombia rather miss the point. The point I made, in reference to the International Trade Union Confederation report from last year, is that it is the most dangerous country in the world for workers. We cannot simply accept continuity without doing something about that situation. Such things need to be dealt with in international trade, as well as through the Foreign Office and other mechanisms of Government; otherwise the abuses will continue.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement only if the provisions of that international trade agreement do not conflict with, and are consistent with the United Kingdom’s environmental obligations in international law and as established by but not limited to—
(a) the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change;
(b) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); and
(c) the Convention on Biological Diversity, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.”
The Government say they are committed to addressing the climate crisis and to net zero by 2050, even though they have missed the targets set by the fourth and fifth carbon budgets and the gap is getting worse, and even though their own analysis shows that their spend on nuclear export finance for energy projects has favoured the fossil fuel sector substantially, to the point where 99.3% of that budget spend over a five-year period went to fossil fuel projects, including recently to Bahrain. There is no sign of a real and meaningful switch away from fossil fuels and to renewables.
The Government can say that they are committed to something, but unless something is in legislation and in writing, and unless there are meaningful commitments, the situation does not change. That is why it is important to amend legislation such that we confirm our commitments to the Paris agreement, the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, and the convention on biological diversity, including the Cartagena protocol on biosafety.
Matt Western
What was telling about the evidence sessions was how everyone—including the Institute of Directors, the CBI, ClientEarth, the TUC—agreed that this type of amendment should be at the heart of what we do, and that they were disappointed that it was not included.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Bill really should be the framework for what a progressive international trade policy framework should look like. There was an opportunity. Given that the Government did not pass the Bill when they had the chance last year or the year before, they could have included the provision this time. This amendment would produce a framework of the order expected by the witnesses.
There are real problems in international trade that affect our ability to meet our climate obligations. Trade agreements are used to liberalise regulations, including environmental regulations. The Bill is an opportunity to redesign trade policy to support our environmental ambitions, as the Government set out. The target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050 and associated commitments are in our amendment. The opportunity is there for the UK to require trade partners to ratify and implement key climate change agreements, such as Paris, before entering into trade negotiations, and for us to suspend ISDS agreements.
Environmental policy has been the object of investor-state dispute settlement litigation. Companies that have fossil fuel interests have sued other companies’ Governments because of the impact of Government regulations and legislation on their interests. That undermines investment and support for the renewables sector, and efforts to decarbonise economies and meet our climate obligations. Similar points are made about the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, and the convention on biological diversity. If the Government want to address this agenda, they have an opportunity to do so with this amendment, and I hope they take it.
Given that the Bill is widely drawn and has the potential to address future trade agreements, let us look at what the US has been saying. This should worry us, given the damage that could be done by international trade agreements. In December, the US ruled out talk of a climate crisis in trade negotiations—yes, that is what trade representative Lighthizer said. He was categorical about that when the UK inquired—I am pleased that the UK did this—about the possibility of including reference to climate change in a future UK-US trade agreement, given that the UK has a strong historical stance on climate change and pushed strongly for the Paris agreement. The UK also highlighted in those talks the pressure for that that would come from civil society and non-governmental organisations. My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington referred to the evidence that the Committee received.
What was the response from the US? It
“responded emphatically that climate change is the most”
politically sensitive
“question for the US, stating it is a ‘lightning rod issue’, mentioning that as of 2015,”
US trade representatives
“are bound by Congress not to include mention of greenhouse gas emission reductions in trade agreements. US stated this ban would not be lifted anytime soon.”
The US trade representative went further:
“we have an obligation to help real working people...there’s no point in being so ambitious we don’t end up with an agreement at all”.
The problem with that statement, of course, is that it is not one or the other. In the end, real working people need a planet that they can live on. They need the global temperature not to increase by more than 1.5°. They need the action on climate that will deliver that agenda. They need the jobs that will come from investment in low carbon industries now and in the future.
We should be worried about what the US is saying on this subject. We should take note of it and make sure that if the price of an agreement with the US is to oppose action on addressing the climate crisis, it is a price far too high for us to accept. I hope the Government will take the amendment on board, because there is nothing in it that is not in accordance with Government policy.
Fleur Anderson
Moving on from the sustainable development goals, and looking at the environmental regulations and the environmental issues that are baked into the Bill, we are already committed to climate action. The Minister has affirmed that we are and want to be compliant, and we aspire to see the achievement of the sustainable development goals. That means taking radical action and treating the climate situation as an emergency. To do that we need to add the amendment to the Trade Bill.
In doing so, we will be safeguarding life in water and on land. Earlier this year, the Prime Minister reaffirmed his Government’s commitment to achieving net zero by 2050 and boldly stated that “we will crack” the climate emergency. As a global leader on climate action, the UK must set an example to the rest of the world by honouring its international obligations under the Paris agreement and other multilateral environmental agreements. Trade policy is an integral part of that, so it should not be left out of the Bill.
Trade agreements can foster good climate action, but they can also impede Government implementation of climate commitments. They could threaten to increase fossil fuel use, for example, which we explicitly decided not to do in declaring a climate emergency. They could also hinder the sharing of green technology.
Trade agreements typically include national treatment for trade in gas, thereby locking in dependency on a fossil fuel with high greenhouse gas emissions, while incentivising increased fracking and fossil fuel infrastructure. We would not want continuity agreements that include those. The EU’s own impact assessment of TTIP—the EU-US trade deal—predicts that it would generate an additional 11 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide per year. That is fundamentally at odds with our international climate obligations, so we must bring our trade policies up to date with our environment obligations.
The dangers that trade deals pose to the environment can be clearly seen in the EU-Mercosur trade agreement currently under negotiation. A fortnight ago, the Dutch Parliament rejected the agreement, due to a lack of enforceable agreements on the protection of the Amazon or the prevention of illegal deforestation. Conducting trade negotiations without clear environmental red lines on the statute book—which this amendment would provide—with countries led by individuals such as President Bolsonaro, under whom deforestation of the Amazon has increased by 27% according to the NGO SOS Atlantic Forest Foundation, poses a huge threat to the Government’s international, climate and environmental obligations.
As the WWF has noted, rushing into trade deals with partners that do not share our ambitions could undermine UK leadership on positive environmental outcomes, by allowing imports from industrialised agricultural systems or through supply chains that promote deforestation. “Risky Business”, a report by the WWF and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, demonstrates that the UK is already moving backwards on reducing the UK’s overseas land footprint, which increased by 15% between 2016 and 2018, suggesting that we are increasingly offshoring our environmental impact. We need to do better.
To conclude, the Bill gives us an opportunity to ensure that our trade policy supports our environmental ambitions by explicitly putting them into the Trade Bill, including the target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Amendment 11 is a positive step towards that goal and is consistent with the Government’s own commitments and obligations, so everyone should agree to it, to ensure that the UK complies with international law and that we remain a world leader on climate action.
Greg Hands
As I have set out, the Government’s continuity programme is coherent with existing international obligations, as it seeks to replicate existing EU agreements to secure continuity for businesses and consumers. As I have made clear, we have no intention of lowering standards—environmental, labour or otherwise. The Prime Minister set out that commitment in his Greenwich speech and I have repeated it on many occasions, including today.
The UK has often led the way and exceeded EU minima on environmental issues, such as greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. I predict that we will continue to do so, thus making the amendment redundant. For example, the UK was the first country to introduce legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets through the Climate Change Act 2008. We were also the first major economy to set a legally binding target to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions from across the economy by 2050. We have cut our carbon emissions by nearly twice the EU average since 1990—by 42%.
Put simply, the UK has an extremely strong record on environmental action. I hope that the Committee will agree that the amendment is unnecessary, as we will be safeguarding and promoting, not undermining, our environmental obligations. Consequently, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Bill Esterson
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Putney: it is absolutely right that we set an example to the world by honouring our Paris commitments, and honouring them in primary legislation is a formidable way of doing that. I am glad that she reminded me about fracking. There is fracking a mile from my constituency, and it causes enormous problems. Its relevance to the amendment is that the same companies engaged in fracking are able, under ISDS provisions if they are in place, to take action against the UK Government to defend their fossil fuel interests, even if the Government do not want to support such an industry and want to pursue a renewable energy agenda, so it is an important consideration.
That is why the amendment or something similar—if the Minister wants to bring it back, I will be very happy to look at it on Report—is the way to deal with this matter. We need to ensure that it is there, specified and clear in primary legislation, as part of our international trade framework, which is what the Bill should be. It is great of him to reference the Labour Government’s Climate Change Act 2008, but it is time for this Government to put such things into law as well, and this is their opportunity. I will press my amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing an international trade agreement only if the provisions of that international trade agreement do not in any way restrict the ability—
(a) to make public services at a national or local level subject to public monopoly;
(b) to make public services at a national or local level subject to exclusive rights granted to private operators; and
(c) to bring public services at a national or local level back into the public sector for delivery by public sector employees.”
We have significant written evidence to support this amendment—from the TUC, the British Medical Journal and the Trade Justice Movement. It is about ensuring that international trade agreements do not undermine the ability of Governments at national or local level to run services in the public sector or in a public monopoly in the private sector. Importantly, it also has provision for bringing services that have been privatised back into the public sector—as we have just seen with the probation service—when they have failed after a botched privatisation. We have seen the desirability of doing that all too often with outsourcing, as more and more councils seek to bring services back in-house.
However, with negative lists, standstill clauses and ratchet clauses in international trade agreements, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Governments to do these things. Negative lists ensure that only those services that are specified can be considered in the public sector. Standstill clauses mean that services cannot be brought back into the public sector. Ratchet clauses mean that we see increasing privatisation, with no prospect of a reduction. Failure to abide by them enables overseas interests to take legal action against the Government in this country. The proposed provisions need to be included for those reasons; otherwise, we face real problems in our national health service and elsewhere in our public services.
The Conservative party pledged in its manifesto last year that the NHS would be off the table in a trade agreement, but the pledge did not specifically cover any of the aspects that I have just described, including negative listing and standstill and ratchet clauses. There is digital trade as well. I did not deal with digital trade in my earlier remarks, but it is important because it covers areas such as NHS data, including patient data, which is of great concern to many people.
There is an opportunity for Government Members to rectify that omission from their manifesto by voting for our amendment. If they are committed to the NHS and our other public services, they can support the amendment and ensure that the opportunities are available for the public sector to deliver public services in the public interest.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?
Greg Hands
Amendment 12 would mean that the power in clause 2 could not be used to implement agreements that might restrict the delivery of public services through public monopolies, exclusive rights or nationalisation.
The amendment is not necessary, because this is a continuity Bill. None of the agreements in question restrict our ability to deliver public services in that way. We have always protected our right to choose how we deliver public services in our trade agreements. Indeed, the UK’s public services, including the NHS, are often protected by specific exclusions, exceptions and reservations in the trade agreements to which the UK is a party. No trade agreement has ever affected our ability to keep public services public.
Colleagues will observe from our record of the signed agreements that the continuity programme seeks to preserve current trading relationships and not to alter the way in which our public services are designed or delivered. The amendment is therefore unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Bill Esterson
Again, through secondary legislation the Bill enables the Government to do some of the things that we have described. More to the point, however, this issue is important because of the nature of the continuity agreements that will be renegotiated. We have discussed the agreements with Canada, Japan, Mexico and Turkey. I do not know whether any of those agreements would do what I have described, but they could potentially do so because they are not just continuity agreements.
The Bill sets the framework for trade agreements, because the Government are not bringing forward a different framework or alternatives on how trade agreements will be scrutinised and how they will end up. The Government are not challenging what the United States might do. We know the concerns that exist about how the US has expressed in the past its desire to intervene in public services in this country. We should be concerned and we should put this kind of commitment into law as it relates to international trade. I will press the amendment to the vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations may only be made under subsection (1) if—
(a) the provisions of the international trade agreement to which they relate are consistent with standards for food safety and quality as set and administered by—
(i) the Department of Health;
(ii) the Food Standards Agency;
(iii) Food Standards Scotland; and
(iv) any other public authority specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that mechanisms and bodies charged with enforcement of standards for food safety and quality have the capacity to absorb any extra requirement which may arise from the implementation of the agreement;
(c) the provisions of the international trade agreement to which they relate are consistent with policy to achieve reduction in the risk of disease or contamination as set and administered by—
(i) the Department of Health;
(ii) the Food Standards Agency;
(iii) Food Standards Scotland; and
(iv) any other public authority specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(d) the provisions of the international trade agreement to which they relate are consistent with achieving improvements in public health through any food policy priorities set and administered by—
(i) the Department of Health;
(ii) the Food Standards Agency;
(iii) Food Standards Scotland; and
(iv) any other public authority specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(e) the provisions of the international trade agreement to which they relate are compliant with policy to achieve targets for farm antibiotic reduction set by the Veterinary Medicines Directorate;
(f) the provisions of the international trade agreement to which they relate are compliant with retained EU law relating to food standards and the impact of food production upon the environment; and
(g) any food or food products to which the provisions of the international trade agreement apply meet standards of labelling, indication of provenance, and packaging specified by the Food Standards Agency or Food Standards Scotland.”
The amendment relates to food standards—food production standards and food safety standards. That is an important distinction, because the Secretary of State and the Ministers do not appear to appreciate that we are talking about both types of standards. We saw this during the latest International Trade questions, where the hon. Member for Dundee East and I both made a point that was about food production as well as food safety, but that seemed to escape the notice of the Secretary of State.
The reality is that the US Government have a rather different view of what is important. Their trade representative has told us that the US has the best agriculture in the world; he has also said that it
“has the safest, highest standards”,
and that we
“shouldn’t confuse science with consumer preference.”
One thing that worries me is that when the Paymaster General was answering questions on this topic in the House the week before last, she made the point that consumers will decide. That has made people on the Opposition side worried that perhaps the Government are not as concerned as about this as they might be.
Representative Lighthizer has also described chlorinated chicken as thinly veiled protectionism. He clearly wants that to be part of a deal—he has said so—and has told Congress that the American Government are looking for a comprehensive deal, not a more limited agreement. By “comprehensive deal”, they mean agriculture in a very significant way, with lower food production standards. He has expected a push for access to the UK market for American farmers, and he has said that on issues such as agriculture,
“this administration is not going to compromise”.
Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State, has made similar points, saying that chlorinated chicken must be part of the deal.
What do American standards mean? They mean a chlorine or acid wash to kill the pathogens in chicken, but those pathogens only need to be killed because of the poor animal welfare those chickens experience throughout their life. Other animal welfare concerns exist elsewhere, including the use of the feed additive, ractopamine, in pig farming and the use of injected growth hormones in cattle. Both give rise to significant welfare concerns for the animals involved; both are banned by the EU, and have been banned by the UK up to this point.
However, this is not just about food production standards, but food safety. The United States has 10 times the level of food poisonings that the European Union does, and one of the reasons is the allowable defect levels it has. It has a defect levels handbook, which sets out the maximum number of foreign bodies—such as maggots, insect fragments and mould—that can be in food products before they are put on the market. Chocolates can have insects in them, or parts of insects; noodles can have rat hair in them; and orange juice can contain maggots.
Bill Esterson
Those are just some of the horrors that UK consumers could be forced to accept if this country signs the kind of wide-ranging deal that Mike Pompeo and representative Lighthizer seem to be implying. I take it that the hon. Gentleman accepts that these things have been said by Mr Lighthizer and Mr Pompeo.
Robert Courts
The Opposition made the point about orange juice in a debate on the Floor of the House some months ago. It has since been completely debunked. Instead of using scaremongering about the standards of American food, could the hon. Gentleman address the facts?
Bill Esterson
The hon. Gentleman may want to withdraw that comment. I am not sure whether it was a bit close to the mark, but I know it has not gone over the mark; otherwise, you would have pulled him up, Sir Graham. The problem with what the hon. Member has just said is that the defect levels handbook says that US producers are allowed to include up to 30 insect fragments in a 100g jar of peanut butter.
Bill Esterson
The hon. Gentleman needs to get used to the idea that when someone takes an intervention, they have to answer that intervention before they take another one.
US producers are also allowed to include 11 rodent hairs in a 25g container of paprika, and 3mg of rat or mouse droppings per pound of ginger. There are similar rules for cocoa beans, cornmeal, ginger, oregano and spices. I will give way if the hon. Member wants to tell me that is not what is in the defect levels handbook.
Lee Rowley
I am happy to explain what I think is the case. Those are the thresholds at which the United States undertakes automatic prosecution against companies. They are not, as he is describing, the thresholds for what the US necessarily accepts in its domestic food production. That is a misrepresentation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Witney suggested. If the Labour party wants to have a mature and open discussion about trade in the future, given that we have just got these competencies back from the European Union for the first time in 40 years, it would do well to acknowledge those key and important nuances, which it is currently glossing over.
Bill Esterson
What is interesting about that intervention is that the hon. Member is right to say there are prosecutions above those thresholds, because it is illegal to cross them. However, US producers are legally allowed up to those thresholds, which is one of the reasons why food poisoning is such a problem in the United States. The difference between the United States, the EU and the UK is that we do not allow any of them. We have zero thresholds in this country, and I want that to continue. I am sure that everybody in the Committee wants that to continue, but unless we take action to provide safeguards in the event of international trade negotiations, there is a threat that such changes can be implemented.
We heard oral evidence from the NFU and have received written evidence from the RSPCA and the British Poultry Council to back up what I have just said. British and European standards are the highest in the world.
Gareth Thomas
Is not the broader significance of the intervention by the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire, when he asked whether the Labour party wants a mature and open discussion about trade, that we absolutely do want that? It is his ministerial colleagues and his Government who are preventing that from happening by denying a proper scrutiny process of future free trade agreements, including with the US.
Bill Esterson
A number of times, my hon. Friend has effectively reminded the Committee, in response to interventions from Government Members, that scrutiny will ensure that we do not have those sorts of problems. They would do well to take on board his advice and expertise, which is driven by his experience in government of looking at such matters. I daresay that when the Bill goes to the Lords, their Lordships will do just that. We might end with some changes to the Bill, even if we do not make any changes in Committee or on Report in the Commons.
We would do well to look at the evidence that was given to us. We would do well to look at what was said during the proceedings on the Agriculture Bill. We would do well to remember that some Government Members were led to believe that there would be an amendment to the Trade Bill that gave protections against the sorts of problems that I have just set out. That is why we have tabled an amendment later in proceedings to ensure that we deliver exactly that.
For now, the Paymaster General wants to leave it to the consumer. I want to ensure that the consumer is not put in a difficult position because, whereas in this country and in the EU we require labelling on meat about where it was hatched, reared and slaughtered, the US repealed similar legislation in 2015. If we do not want to have problems over the safety of our food—I will mention GM and some of the problems with vegetables as well—I suggest we attach an amendment such as this one to the Bill, or do as Ministers told their hon. Friends on the Agriculture Bill, and pass that amendment when we get there, probably, on Thursday.
Fleur Anderson
I have a few short remarks to make about food standards, which are of huge concern to my constituents. More than 100 people have written to me in the past week or so calling for a food standards commission to be set up, and they are watching this amendment carefully. I am sure this is another in a series of amendments on which we will hear from the Minister how much he agrees with what we are saying, and then he will go ahead and vote against it.
If so, and if we do not have these amendments in the Bill to say what our standards are, where would we have them? We could just have a note from the Secretary of State saying, “I am getting on with the trade agreements; let me carry on.” But no, we have a Bill, so we can set out what we want in those trade negotiations. The past few months have served as a reminder to us all to value our food, to think about where it comes from, its safety and its traceability, and to value our farmers and growers who produce it.
In a post-Brexit world, liberalised trade could expose British agriculture and mean that our farmers would have to compete with products that would be illegal to produce here in the UK. Now is the time for us to be world leaders and use that position to increase the animal welfare and environmental standards of food production across the world, in the continuity agreements and in others.
The chorus of voices in the food sector who are concerned about the future of food standards in our trade policy is deafening. The NFU has expressed concerns, noting that in our current and forthcoming trade negotiations other countries will not only urge the UK to follow their own sanitary and phytosanitary standards arrangements, which in many cases diverge from current UK practice, but resist any suggestion that their own producers meet the production standards and additional costs required of UK farmers, who will then lose out.
That leads us to the conclusion that it is hard to see how trade liberalisation will not inevitably lead to an increase in food imports produced in ways that would be illegal in the UK. In addition, the British Poultry Council believes that if food produced to lower standards is allowed to enter the British market, it will create a two-tier food system, in which only the affluent can afford to eat British food grown to British standards. That is unacceptable.
Turning briefly to animal welfare standards, it is important to understand that this is not a mere ethical luxury or a nicety—a nice-to-have addition to the Bill that we could have or not. Friends of the Earth has pointed out that intensive farming with few welfare protections is associated with deforestation, local pollution, poor workers’ rights and high emissions.
The Government have repeatedly assured us that they do not want to see regression in this area, and I am sure we are about to hear that again. Michael Gove committed on multiple occasions to ensuring that the UK was a global leader on animal welfare. That promise was reiterated in the 2019 Conservative manifesto. However, Friends of the Earth is concerned that future trade partners will want to water down the UK’s very high animal welfare standards, and that free trade agreements, which are the subject of the Bill, could pose a serious threat to the Government’s existing commitments to maintaining and improving UK standards.
The most effective way to prevent a regression in food and animal welfare standards, which is a worry for many different groups, and for the Government to keep their word would be to enshrine these standards in primary legislation before entering trade negotiations, taking them off the table altogether and therefore agreeing amendment 13.
Contrary to some commentators’ views, the amendment is not incompatible with global trade rules. Trade rules enshrine the rights of nations to regulate to achieve public policy goals, and to require that goods and services reach specific standards to qualify for import, as long as those requirements are applied fairly. The amendment would achieve that, and ensure that we have good food standards.
The Chair
I remind the hon. Lady to refer to Members of the House not by name, but by their constituency. I call Matt Western.
Matt Western
Thank you, Sir Graham. Very briefly, we have heard from Members across the Committee about our constituents’ concerns, and those of last week’s witnesses. We have only to think back to some of the extraordinary campaigns by Jamie Oliver, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall and others, who highlighted some of the terrible practices that were going on in the food chain, to realise that the public are very much in favour of an organisation such as the food and farming standards commission that has been proposed by the National Farmers Union, to ensure that our farming standards and food standards are maintained at the highest level.
We have some of the highest standards in the world. We also happen to have some of the cheapest food prices, due to the competition that we enjoy in this country. The question is what we would gain from not adding such an amendment to the legislation, and not including a food and farming standards commission. It is very easy to talk about the United States in isolation, and the concerns that the public have over such things as hormone-treated beef or chlorinated chickens. As I mentioned earlier, producers in Australia also supply that market, and have industrial-scale battery caged hens producing vast quantities of eggs.
It is likely that in any UK-Australia trade deal we would lose at least 20% of our current market of eggs produced in the UK to Australian producers. That is the sort of impact that we need to understand. I think the farming community is beginning to understand it fully. Consumers need to understand it as well because, at the end of the day, it is this sector that will be sacrificed in any future trade deal.
Just look at the YouGov poll that I think was announced in the last 24 hours. Some 80% of consumers do not want chlorine-washed chicken. They appreciate and enjoy very high standards currently and they do not want to see such standards reduced in a future trade deal, whether with Australia, the US or anywhere else.
Charlotte Nichols
Very quickly, the provisions in the amendment could prove to be some of the most significant debated today, particularly proposed new paragraph (e) regarding antibiotics. We have seen that antibiotic resistance is one of the greatest threats—perhaps even an existential threat—facing humanity. It is as significant as the climate crisis. As we have seen with coronavirus, it would wreak not just a public health impact but an economic impact on our country.
When we discuss the food standards that are laid out in the legislation, it is not only what we eat that is important; the conditions in which animals are kept can often be breeding grounds for diseases that can spread to humans. Ensuring that antibiotics are used appropriately and in line with current regulations is of massive importance.
Greg Hands
As the Committee will know, the UK’s food standards for both domestic production and imports are overseen by the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. Those agencies provide independent advice to the UK and Scottish Governments and will continue to do so to ensure that all food imports comply with the UK’s high safety standards.
Through the work of those independent organisations, consumers are protected from unsafe food that does not meet our high domestic standards. I reassure the Committee that all imports, whether under continuity agreements, most favoured nation terms or new free trade agreements, must comply with our import requirements and food safety standards. Countries seeking access to our markets in future will have to abide by those food standards.
Bill Esterson
I am grateful to my hon. Friends for their contributions, as ever. My hon. Friend the Member for Putney reminded us to value our food and its origins, and of the threat to farmers in the UK if they have to compete with lower-standard food. She was right to do so.
My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington reminded us about the fact that the public are in favour of high animal welfare standards, as well as food standards. We have some of the highest standards in the world.
My hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North rightly raised the issue of antibiotics; the potential for diseases to jump species, in the context of covid-19; and why it is so important that we maintain not just food safety standards but food production and animal welfare standards, and that we do not allow imports of food that do not meet those high production and animal welfare standards. I noticed that the Minister referred to food safety in his answer. The Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland do that job, but their remit is food safety, not how the food was produced or the animal welfare under which it was produced. The point about antibiotics should alarm us all right now, given the nature of the crisis that we are going through.
The Minister and his colleagues should keep the promise that was made to colleagues in debate on the Agriculture Bill about the inclusion of provisions in the Trade Bill. Colleagues were told that that would happen, which is why they did not pursue things in the Agriculture Bill. It is essential that we maintain standards—yes, in the continuity agreements, but in future agreements too. That is the relevance of the amendment. That should be the framework for all trade agreements, not just so-called continuity ones. I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Gareth Thomas
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 27 and 28.
The amendment is designed to remove the Henry VIII powers from the Bill. In its write up of the Trade Bill, Linklaters noted that constitutionally, the Government are already able to sign and ratify trade agreements with minimal reference to Parliament. The Trade Bill is designed to shortcut this process and to authorise the Government to implement the new agreements directly, by Executive act. To help them to do that, the Government seek to use Henry VIII powers to enable them to amend various bits of EU legislation, as they think appropriate, using regulations.
Liberty and others have argued that that represents a fundamental breach of Parliamentary sovereignty. The Committee has already debated the considerable weaknesses in the Bill in terms of opportunities for scrutiny. It is true that in comparison with the previous Trade Bill, Ministers have made a minor concession and agreed to the use of the affirmative process, but we can see no reason for the scale of the power grab represented by the Henry VIII powers in subsection (6)(a), and our amendment seeks to take them out.
Greg Hands
I will now address amendment 14. As the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, the amendment would remove the power to modify direct principal EU legislation, or primary legislation that is retained EU law, in order to implement obligations arising from continuity agreements.
It is important for Members to understand that without this power, we would, unfortunately, be unable to implement our obligations and we would risk being in breach of international law. It would also mean that our agreements were inoperable, adversely impacting upon UK businesses and consumers. I feel reasonably sure, Sir Graham, that that is not something that any Member of this Committee would support.
In addition, not only is this power necessary, but it is proportionate and constrained, because it only allows for the amendment of primary legislation that is retained EU law. Since trade continuity agreements will have been implemented substantially through EU law, the power is necessary to implement any technical changes that keep the agreements operable beyond the end of the transition period.
The Government have constrained the power as much as possible while ensuring that it is still capable of delivering continuity in our current trading relationships, which benefit businesses and consumers in every constituency represented by members of this Committee. To provide reassurance to Parliament, we have added a five-year sunset provision, which we will turn to shortly, and any regulations made under the clause 2 power will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I ask Members not to take my word for it, but to take the word of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, who raised no issues with the delegated powers in this Bill, gave it a clean bill of health and praised the introduction of the draft affirmative procedure for any regulations made. I hope that, in the light of the explanation that I have given, the Committee is reassured that not only is this power necessary, but it is proportionate and constrained. As such, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Gareth Thomas
I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, in the interests of time. I am not convinced by the Government’s argument, and we may return to the matter at Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stewart Hosie
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 2, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(6A) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers (within the meaning given in paragraph 6 of Schedule 1), unless the Scottish Ministers consent.
(6B) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers (within the meaning given in paragraph 7 of Schedule 1), unless the Welsh Ministers consent.
(6C) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of a Northern Ireland department (within the meaning given in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1), unless a Northern Ireland devolved authority (within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Schedule 1) gives consent.”
This amendment would ensure that the consent of a devolved government is required for regulations under section 2(1) if those regulations contain matters which are within the remit of the devolved government.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 16—Role of Joint Ministerial Committee—
“(1) The Joint Ministerial Committee is to be a forum—
(a) for discussing—
(i) the terms upon which the United Kingdom is to commence negotiations with respect to any international trade agreement;
(ii) proposals to amend retained EU law for the purposes of regulations made under section 1 or section 2;
(b) for seeking a consensus on the matters set out in subsection (1)(a) between Her Majesty’s Government and the other members of the Joint Ministerial Committee.
(2) Before Her Majesty’s Government concludes an international trade agreement, the Secretary of State must produce a document for consideration by the Joint Ministerial Committee setting out—
(a) Her Majesty’s Government’s objectives and strategy in negotiating and concluding an international trade agreement;
(b) the steps Her Majesty’s Government intends to take to keep the Joint Ministerial Committee informed of progress in reaching an international trade agreement;
(c) the steps Her Majesty’s Government intends to take to consult each member of the Joint Ministerial Committee before entering into an international trade agreement and for taking the views of each member into account.
(3) Before concluding an international trade agreement the Secretary of State must produce a document setting out the terms of the proposed agreement for consideration by the Joint Ministerial Committee.
(4) In this section, ‘the Joint Ministerial Committee’ means the body set up in accordance with Supplementary Agreement A of the Memorandum of Understanding on Devolution, between Her Majesty’s Government, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.”
Stewart Hosie
Although it was not my intention to press any of our amendments or new clauses to a vote, such has been the public support for new clause 12 on the NHS that it is my intention, if and when we reach that stage of the debate—perhaps on Thursday afternoon —to divide the Committee. I am sorry to leave it so late to advise the Committee of that, but this is the first opportunity I have had to do so.
Amendment 8 relates to the powers of the devolved Administrations, or, more accurately, the ability of the UK Government to make regulations under subsection (1), which makes provisions within devolved competencies, without the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers or a Northern Irish devolved authority. It certainly strikes us as fundamental that, if we are to respect the devolved settlement in the UK, Ministers must gain the consent of the devolved Administrations before making changes to regulations that directly affect them, possibly negatively or in a way that runs counter to their policy objectives.
I am aware that the previous Trade Bill from 2017 to 2019 made provision for regulation-making powers to be available to the UK Government and the devolved Administrations within areas of devolved competence. That version of the Trade Bill contained a provision that prohibited devolved Administrations from using powers to modify retained direct EU legislation or any EU law retained by virtue of section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 in ways that would be inconsistent with any UK Government modifications to retained direct legislation or EU law, even in devolved areas. As a result, the Scottish Government could not recommend giving consent to the previous Bill, and the Scottish Parliament’s Finance and Constitution Committee supported that position.
That Trade Bill did not complete its passage through the House, as Parliament was dissolved and the Bill therefore fell. The good news is that those provisions have been removed entirely from the reintroduced Trade Bill. However, there remains no statutory obligation for the UK Government even to consult, let alone to seek the consent of, Scottish Ministers before exercising the powers in the Bill in devolved areas.
During the partial proceedings on the previous Trade Bill, the UK Government made a commitment to avoid using the powers in devolved areas without consulting, and ideally obtaining the consent of, Scottish Ministers. The then Minister of State for Trade Policy at the Department of International Trade, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns), restated that commitment in a letter to Ivan McKee, the Scottish Government Minister, on 18 March, the day before this Bill was introduced. I asked on Second Reading whether those non-legislative commitments still stood, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that today.
I know that the Minister is aware of those commitments, but I suspect that many other Committee members may not be. The non-legislative commitments I refer to are as follows. The first is that UK Government Ministers will not normally use the powers conferred by the Bill in devolved areas without Scottish and other devolved Ministers’ consent, and that they will never do so without consulting them. The second is that the UK Government will consult the Scottish Government and other devolved Administrations before extending the sunset for the power in clause 2—that is, before extending the period during which clause 2 powers can be used under the Bill.
The third is that in relation to the Trade Remedies Authority—the TRA—the Secretary of State will notify the devolved Administrations of decisions to initiate a trade investigation that will have a particular impact on the devolved nation. The fourth is that the Secretary of State will notify the devolved Administrations of the TRA’s recommendations to the Secretary of State at the same time as consulting other Government Departments, so that they can feed in their views. The fifth is that the devolved Administrations can proactively submit to the TRA any information that they consider relevant to an investigation. The final commitment is that the Secretary of State will seek the devolved Administrations’ suggestions on the optimal way of recruiting TRA non-executive members with regional knowledge, skills and experience.
I hope the Minister can confirm that those non-legislative commitments still stand. That would be particularly helpful. That would not remove the obvious need for an amendment of this kind, to ensure that devolved Governments have an input in statute to changes that directly affect them, and that, at the very least, consent is sought and received before such changes are proceeded with.
Gareth Thomas
New clause 16 would put on the face of the Bill a joint ministerial committee, and give it powers to discuss international trade issues with the devolved Administrations. The Labour party brought the devolution settlements into effect. It has continued to champion the rights of the people of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, through the devolved Administrations, to use to good effect the rights and powers devolved to them under the settlements.
In the new world, post-Brexit, we need the devolution settlements to be slightly updated to reflect the significance of the international trade agreements that will be negotiated. Putting into statute the joint ministerial committee and effectively establishing a ministerial forum for international trade seems to us to be the most sensible way to lock in proper consultation between Whitehall and each of the devolved Administrations.
One area of potential future negotiations where discussions on trade at joint ministerial committee level might well be needed is that of geographical indications, given the significance to the Welsh economy of Welsh lamb, for example, and to the Scottish economy of Scottish salmon and Scotch whisky. One recognises that the Administrations will understandably want to make sure that those industries are properly taken into account in future trade agreements, given the considerable number of jobs dependent on them in those countries.
GIs raise a further issue—the question of who has the power to legislate on them during the implementation of a trade agreement. My understanding is that that remains an issue. The most recent Cabinet Office revised framework analysis, published in April last year, stated that Ministers believed there were four areas that were reserved but subject to continued discussion. Two of those seem to me to have strong relevance to international trade. One is state aid and one is food GIs. If the question of who has power to legislate on those issues has not yet been fully resolved, it is surely all the more important to establish a formal forum for serious discussions between Ministers in the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on what should or should not be in a future trade agreement.
I have some sympathy with the argument that the hon. Member for Dundee East has advanced, but one of the problems with his amendment was encapsulated in an exchange in the fourth sitting of the Committee on the previous Trade Bill, between the former Trade Minister Mark Prisk and the then Trade spokesman for the hon. Gentleman’s party—I believe that that was the hon. Member for Livingston (Hannah Bardell). In column 116 of that sitting, the then Minister asked whether the hon. Lady thought that Welsh Ministers should have the power to veto a deal that was hugely in the interest of Scottish whisky. As a result, I gently suggest to the hon. Member for Dundee East that when we seek to press new clause 16 to a vote—perhaps on Thursday—he may be open to supporting that as a sensible route to managing the inevitable slightly differing priorities of each of the devolved Administrations and, potentially, the UK Government too.
Greg Hands
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the important issues raised in the amendments, which I think are fundamentally on different topics from those that we have dealt with for much of today. There is significant common ground between the Government and the Opposition parties. I welcome the hon. Member for Dundee East to the debate, for his first contribution today. It was noticeable that he chose not to take part in the chaos that ensued earlier when the main Opposition party’s Front Benchers struggled with whether they are for or against the Canada agreement and so on. He wisely decided to sit that one out.
Under the UK constitution, the negotiation of international trade agreements is, as I have already made clear, a prerogative power of the UK Government. It is also a reserved matter, where the UK Government act on behalf of the whole UK. When exercising that reserved power, the Government have made clear that they will deliver trade agreements that benefit all parts of the UK—I have already referred to the scoping assessment for the US deal, showing that Scotland would be the nation or region of the UK that benefited most—unleashing the potential of businesses from all four countries of the United Kingdom.
I recognise the important role that the devolved Administrations can and should play in that endeavour, not only as representatives of their respective nations’ interest, but because we know our trade deals will interact with areas of devolved competence. As such, my Department has worked and will continue to work closely with the DAs on our trade policy.
Turning to new clause 16, I will explain why I think it is unnecessary and impractical, although the principle of engagement behind it is one that I share. The new clause seeks to create a statutory role for a joint committee of the UK Government and the devolved Administrations as a forum to discuss trade policy, but such an arrangement is already in place.
During the passage of the Trade Bill 2017-19, the previous Secretary of State for Trade, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), committed to establishing a new bespoke ministerial forum for trade with the devolved Administrations, in recognition of the importance of this relationship. That forum had its inaugural meeting in January and meets regularly to discuss our approach to trade negotiations, including key areas such as our objectives for the US trade agreement.
I am also happy to put on record my commitment to continuing to work closely with the devolved Administrations at all stages of trade negotiations, not only through the ministerial forum for trade, but via bilateral ad hoc engagement to reflect the sometimes fast-paced nature of trade negotiations. Indeed, I spoke about the US free trade agreement with all my counterparts in the devolved Administrations last month and have also recently written about the Trade Bill and other trade policy issues.
My former ministerial colleague, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) travelled to Belfast in February to meet colleagues in the Northern Ireland Executive to discuss trade policy. For the benefit of the hon. Member for Dundee East, I restate the commitments made by my right hon. Friend, when he was a Minister, in his March letter to the Scottish Minister Ivan McKee.
In short, we are already delivering the engagement envisaged by proposed new clause, and we have achieved that while continuing to observe the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. In contrast, this proposed new clause would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade negotiations, which would be constitutionally inappropriate.
Nor is this proposed new clause practical. It would lock us and the DAs into prescribed ways of working under the existing intergovernmental memorandum of understanding, a document last updated in 2013. It would constrain our ability to develop and adapt bespoke engagement mechanisms as we embark on negotiating our first UK trade agreements for more than a generation.
Turning to amendment 8, the powers created by this legislation will be used for the purpose of transitioning trade agreements with those countries that the UK had agreements with through its membership of the EU. That will ensure certainty, continuity and stability in our trade and investment relationships for businesses, citizens and trading partners in all parts of the UK.
As parts of these agreements touch on devolved matters, this legislation will create concurrent powers. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitional agreements are implemented, allowing each devolved Administration to implement the agreements independently in some cases, while also allowing the UK Government to legislate on a UK-wide basis where it makes practical sense to do so. This approach permits greater administrative efficiency, reducing the volume of legislation brought through the UK Parliament and through the devolved legislatures.
I recognise that the devolved Administrations and members of this Committee seek reassurance that those powers will be used appropriately. The Government have already made clear that we will not normally use them to legislate within devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration or Administrations, and never without consulting them first. I am, of course, happy to restate that commitment here.
It is not appropriate, however, to put that commitment on a statutory footing, as, like new clause 16, it would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade, undermining the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. We recognise that the technical implementation of international obligations in devolved areas is a devolved matter. However, as I have explained, the decision on which international obligations the UK enters into is a reserved matter and a prerogative power exercisable only by the UK Government. This rightly ensures that the UK Government can speak with a single voice under international law, providing certainty for our negotiating partners and the strongest possible negotiating position for the whole of the UK, for the benefit of all of the UK.
A statutory consent provision in the Bill would in effect give the devolved Administrations a veto over a reserved matter. This would be highly constitutionally inappropriate and could lead to a situation where international agreements applied in some parts of the UK but not others. This would be a fundamental weakening of our Union and the long-established principle that in the matter of international relations the UK Government negotiate for all parts of the UK.
Additionally, placing the commitment on a statutory footing could open us up to convoluted and lengthy procedures in which the courts were asked to determine in minute detail what was reserved and what was devolved. This is disproportionate and would create significant uncertainty for UK businesses, undermining the fundamental purpose of the Bill, which is to maximise certainty and continuity of trading arrangements. Our commitment to not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without consent, and never without consultation, strikes the proper balance between providing sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations while preserving international relations as a reserved matter. It is a sincere commitment that we will honour, as we have honoured the commitments made to the devolved Administrations on the Trade Bill 2017-19.
For example, we committed to seeking suggestions from the devolved Administrations on the optimal way of recruiting non-executive members for the Trade Remedies Authority, which we will discuss on Thursday, with regional knowledge, skills and experience, and we fulfilled that earlier this year.
Our new independent trade policy absolutely calls for engagement with the devolved Administrations and respect for the important role that they can and should play, but it does not call for fundamental shifts in the nature of devolution or the weakening of powers that Parliament agreed should remain reserved to the UK Government. We have worked collaboratively with all the DAs to ensure that the Bill enables us to transition arrangements in a way that delivers for the whole UK. Our existing commitments, which I have restated today, provide sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations on the issues covered by the amendments. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Welsh Government have recommended consent to the relevant clauses of the Bill.
I hope I have been able to satisfy hon. Members that we have recognised and met their objectives in this amendment and that the hon. Member for Dundee East will withdraw it.
Stewart Hosie
I thank the Minister for reconfirming the non-legislative commitments made by his predecessor in his letter to Ivan McKee. That has genuinely helped. However, the Minister falls back on the argument that bespoke powers are better than a permanent credible structure. I disagree. I think a permanent credible structure provides more stability and certainty than the bespoke ad hoc use of powers and discussions from time to time. However, in the current devolved process, I recognise that international treaties are reserved matters. I absolutely understand and respect that, but he knows as well as anyone who might be listening that the interface of the intersection between an international trade treaty and a devolved competence might be fairly high. That is all the more reason for structured statutory formal engagement rather than an ad hoc bespoke process, which may or may not satisfy one or more parties, or one or more of the nations, in the UK about the Government’s actions over a given international trade agreement.
Although I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, and I thank the Minister sincerely for the commitments he has restated, there is a fundamental difference of opinion on the bespoke ad hoc approach being suggested and a formal statutory structure, and I am sure we will return to that theme on Report. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Maria Caulfield.)