Tuesday 9th June 2020
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The first duty of any Government is to protect the public from harm. Combating the unprecedented threat of coronavirus has, of course, been the focus of our energies over the last few months, but as our country begins to open up once again, it is crucial that we maintain our vigilance towards the all too familiar threat of terrorism. As the House will recall, there have been a number of devastating incidents in recent years. The appalling atrocities at Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November last year and in Streatham on 2 February this year, barely two months apart, were brutal attacks on innocent members of the public just going about their day-to-day lives. Those incidents drove home some hard truths about our approach to managing terrorists in the justice system, with each committed by an offender who had been released automatically halfway through their sentence, with no involvement from the Parole Board. We cannot allow that to happen again.
Following the Streatham attack, we acted swiftly to introduce the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which ended the automatic early release of terrorist offenders and ensured that any release before the end of a sentence is dependent on a thorough risk assessment by the Parole Board. I was extremely grateful for the co-operation we received from Members on both sides of the House on that vital piece of legislation, and I was proud of how quickly this place acted to get it on to the statute book. That piece of legislation built on the Government’s plans to bolster the United Kingdom’s response to terrorism and to ensure that we have some of the strongest measures in the world to tackle that threat.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
The Lord Chancellor mentions the importance of speed in dealing with these situations. Does he agree that we have perhaps not moved fast enough in, for example, proscribing some organisations? I am thinking particularly of extreme right-wing organisations that target the black community, other people of colour, the Jewish community and the gay community. It took years to get System Resistance Network and Sonnenkrieg Division banned by the Government, and there are other organisations out there, such as the Order of Nine Angles, that need to be banned. Does he agree that we need to move further and faster on proscription so that people involved in those organisations can receive the sentences that he is talking about in this legislation?
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman knows that the function of proscription is for the Home Secretary. From my knowledge of it, which is not as close as that of my colleague, proscription is a device that should be applied equally, without discrimination. He is absolutely right to talk about the rise of far-right extremism. At this Dispatch Box and elsewhere, I have readily acknowledged the fact that out in our community, sadly, and in our prison system, we have a proportion of far-right wing terrorists who have been convicted and brought to justice. What I would say about those individual examples is that wherever there is evidence of activities that amounts to grounds for proscription, I know that this Home Secretary—indeed, like her predecessors—will act with alacrity. Of course, her predecessor did in the instances that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, so I assure him that the Government will work within the law and apply it equally to all groups and organisations that pose a direct threat to our way of life. That is what we are talking about here.
I was dealing with the measures that we announced in the aftermath of the atrocity at Fishmongers’ Hall. In the current financial year, 2020-21, we have increased funding for counter-terrorism policing by £90 million. We announced a review for the support for victims of terrorism, with a further £500,000 being provided to the Victims of Terrorism Unit. We then announced our plans to double the number of counter-terrorism specialist probation staff. We are also working to increase the places that are available in probation hostels, so that authorities can keep closer tabs on terrorists in the weeks after their release from prison. Of course there is also the independent review—led by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall, QC—of the way in which different agencies investigate, monitor and manage terrorist offenders. This was just the first stage of our response, because these attacks clearly demonstrated the need for terrorist offenders to spend longer in prison and to be subject to more stringent monitoring in the community.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I am very conscious that although we are looking at the recent period, at those who were involved in ISIS and Daesh attacks in London and elsewhere, IRA terrorism is clearly a strong issue, as was illustrated last week when there was a bomb and arms find in Londonderry. When it comes to sentencing, I ask that those who are involved in IRA terrorism, who are convicted in this jurisdiction—on the mainland—will not receive any reduction in the sentences that they receive if they are transferred back to Northern Ireland, for instance. I seek that assurance from the Secretary of State—that IRA terrorists will get the full brunt of the law and not get away with a reduced sentence if they are sent back home.
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman can be reassured that the whole purpose of this UK-wide legislation is not to discriminate between different types of terrorists. It would be wholly wrong for this legislation, for example, to focus on so-called Islamic terrorism, as opposed to far-right terrorism, the Provisional IRA and irregular republican, or indeed, irregular terrorism of a general nature within Northern Ireland or any other part of the United Kingdom. This is not discriminatory legislation. It is designed to deal with terrorism in all its forms, and I believe that this legislation is also agile when it comes to dealing with and anticipating the enduring challenge of how to manage terrorists in whatever form they might come. As we know, terrorism is evolving and taking different forms all the time.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
My right hon. and learned Friend mentions a couple of cases, including Fishmongers’ Hall. Does that not illustrate the great range of problems that have to be addressed? In recent times, was there not a case where someone had to be released even though people were sure he would reoffend at the first opportunity—he did so, and had to be trailed and stopped by an MI5 team—whereas at Fishmongers’ Hall, was the problem not that the person had claimed to be reformed and that there was no reason, apparently, not to release him? It will have to be a very comprehensive piece of legislation to cope with such a wide range of problems.
Robert Buckland
I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend, who speaks with experience of these matters. He helps me to outline the point I was about to make about the complex and evolving nature of the threat. He is right to talk about different types of threat: superficial compliance, which we saw, sadly, with regard to Fishmongers’ Hall; and known threat, but with an inability of the authorities, due to the current regime, to manage that within custodial settings, and the paraphernalia, cost and sheer planning that has then to be undertaken to try to deal with and manage the threat in the community.
I must pay tribute to the teams who worked so hard at Streatham to minimise what could have been an even more horrific incident on that Sunday afternoon on Streatham High Road. I well remember looking at the detail of what the teams did that day and being lost in sheer admiration for their bravery and professionalism in dealing with a terrible incident that could have involved very serious loss of life. The work of looking at the detailed facts will go on by way of an independent inquest. We will, of course, look precisely at the outcome of that, and at the serious further offence reviews, which are ongoing but will conclude very shortly. They will help to supplement the excellent work done by Jonathan Hall in his review of MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements.
I was explaining that the announcements we made some months ago were but the first stage of our response. The step-up response to counter-terrorism is very much at the heart of what I and the Government are about. The legislation we are now introducing will ensure that the process for how we at each stage deal with both convicted terrorist offenders and those who pose a concern of becoming terrorist offenders will be strengthened. We are determined to ensure that those who commit serious acts of terror and put members of the public at risk serve sentences that properly reflect the harm they cause.
The Bill will reform the sentences which can be handed down to terror offenders by introducing a new category of sentence. The serious terrorism sentence, for the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders, will carry a minimum period of 14 years of custody, with an extended licence period of up to 25 years. That sentence will apply to only the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders who would otherwise receive a life sentence: those who have been found guilty of an offence where there was a high likelihood of causing multiple deaths.
The Bill also introduces further provisions for terrorist offenders who have been assessed to be dangerous, and who have committed a sufficiently serious offence, to spend the entirety of their sentence in custody without the prospect of early release. In addition to spending that full term in prison, the courts will be able to apply longer extended licence periods of up to 10 years for those offenders, so we can continue to supervise them once they are allowed back into the community. Any breach would put them straight back into prison.
In February, I announced that the Government would review sentencing for terrorist offenders, including whether current maximum penalties for terrorist offences were sufficient. Following that review, the Bill proposes to increase the maximum penalty for three specific terrorism offences: first, membership of a proscribed organisation; secondly, supporting a proscribed organisation; and thirdly, attending a place used for terrorist training. The maximum term is currently 10 years, but will be increased to 14, which sends a clear message about how serious the Government consider that type of offending and is consistent with existing penalties for similarly serious terrorist offences.
Another outcome of the review included in the Bill is an amendment to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which will enable the courts to find any offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years to have a terrorist connection. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation noted that that would be a useful change. It will give the courts more flexibility to reflect the facts of each case fully in the sentence that they may wish to pass.
Jim Shannon
Madam Deputy Speaker, I endeavour to follow your instructions and I will do my best.
I seek assurance that those who are involved in terrorist activity, be it providing safe houses, physical assistance, cars or weapons, and who play a smaller role will also feel the brunt of the sentencing for their minor role in a bigger terrorist atrocity.
Robert Buckland
I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. As he knows, there have been developments in terrorism law since the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which he will remember, then the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Acts that followed the atrocity of 9/11, which saw a development and evolution in the law that allowed a wider penumbra of people who supported, encouraged or facilitated that type of serious offending to be brought before the courts.
I was explaining that the particular measure to which I was drawing the House’s attention allows the courts to find a terrorist connection in offences that are not specifically terrorism or terrorism-related; they might be offences under a different type of Act, such as an offence of violence or an acquisitive crime. If there is enough evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof that there is a terrorism connection, the court can use that as an aggravating factor in increasing the level of sentence given to that particular offender.
That will result in more offenders being managed through the registered terrorist offender notification requirements and will ensure that operational partners can effectively manage that risk on release so that no terrorism-connected offender should fall through the cracks. Taken together, the sentencing provisions will reduce the threat posed to the public by incapacitating dangerous terrorists and will maximise the time that the authorities have to work with offenders, giving offenders more time in which to disengage from their dangerous and deeply entrenched ideologies.
The recent terror attacks demonstrated the importance of improving and maximising our capability to monitor offenders in the community. The Bill introduces a range of measures to allow the Government to intervene more effectively where required. Time spent on licence is crucial in monitoring and managing offenders in the community, and also in giving them the opportunity and support to change their behaviour to desist and disengage from terrorism.
Right hon. and hon. Members were rightly concerned during the passage of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 that terrorist offenders released at the end of their sentence would not be subject to licence supervision when released. This legislation takes vital steps to extend the scope of the special sentence for offenders of particular concern to cover all terrorist offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years. That will mean that any terrorist offenders convicted of an offence covered by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act will no longer be able to receive a standard determinate sentence, but will instead face a minimum period of supervision on licence of 12 months, even if they are released at the end of their custodial term.
The Bill will also strengthen the licence conditions to which terrorist offenders are subject by making available polygraph testing as a condition of their licence. We believe that that will help probation staff to monitor compliance with the other licence conditions—such as contact with named individuals, entering exclusion zones or accessing material that promotes or relates to acts of terrorism—imposed on offenders. Research has shown that mandatory polygraph testing for adult sexual offenders can be an effective risk-management tool; extending that to certain terrorist offenders will therefore enhance our ability to monitor them in the community.
In addition, the measures in the Bill will maximise the effectiveness of the existing disruptions and risk-management toolkit available to counter-terrorism policing and our security services. That toolkit can be used alongside licence conditions for those serving a licence period after sentence, or with individuals of terrorism concern who have not otherwise been convicted.
Prosecution and conviction are always our preference for dealing with terrorists, but in the limited instances in which we cannot prosecute, deport or otherwise manage an individual of terrorism concern, terrorism prevention and investigation measures—known as TPIMs—are a crucial tool for protecting the public. The Bill makes a number of changes to TPIMs to increase their value as a risk-management tool and support their use by operational partners in cases when it is considered necessary. The changes include lowering the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM notice, specifying new measures that can be applied to TPIM subjects, and removing the current two-year limit from which a TPIM notice can last, to ensure that we are better equipped to manage individuals of significant concern who pose a continued threat.
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)
Is the Secretary of State aware of cases in respect of which he, the Home Secretary or others think that a TPIM should have been granted but could not be because the burden of proof was set at the wrong level?
Robert Buckland
I am sure the right hon. Lady will understand that it would be a little invidious of me to go into individual cases, but she will know from her long experience of this issue, and control orders previously, that TPIMs and control orders are complex and resource-intensive mechanisms that require a high degree of planning and continued monitoring, so decisions made to apply for them are never entered into lightly. By returning the position on the standard of proof to the one that existed some years ago, the Bill creates a more flexible means of monitoring, rather than a system that does, and did, require a higher standard of proof. It is not my wish or the wish of the Government to see an overdependence on TPIMs to the exclusion of other types of disposal.
It is still very much the Government’s view that prosecution and conviction is absolutely our priority, but experience has shown that the judicious use of this type of measure is not only lawful and proportionate but necessary when we cannot meet the high standard of proof that the right hon. Lady knows exists in criminal prosecution. It is my view that although TPIMs have never been the complete solution to the problem, they are an invaluable additional tool that the security services and all of us need when it comes to managing this complex problem. The right hon. Lady will be reassured that according to the latest published figures the number of TPIMs in force is currently five. I do not believe that the changes we bring in will act as any incentive or artificial stimulus to a sudden change in the way that the measures are used.
Forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, if I dwell at length on the point made the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee. I have noticed, certainly from my time as a Law Officer, that from the middle part of this decade we saw a welcome increase in the number of prosecutions, particularly of returning foreign fighters. That showed that where we put the resources and the will into investigation we can make the prosecutorial system work well. Maintaining that focus, but then adapting, refining and modernising the system as we are doing in this Bill, strikes the right balance in terms of the need to protect the public and to adhere to those principles of liberty, the individual and the rule of law that all of us in this House share.
Sir Robert Neill
I have a lot of sympathy with the point that my right hon. and learned Friend makes about the value that TPIMs can have as part of the armoury, so to speak, in dealing with these matters. May I draw him back to the point about the change in the burden of proof? The increase in the burden of proof to the current standard was specifically in response to a recommendation from the then independent reviewer, Lord Anderson. The current independent reviewer, Mr Hall QC, has made no such recommendation to reduce the burden proof, as is proposed here. That is a striking difference. What we are trying to get to is this: what is it that triggers this change in the burden of proof without some evidence, either by way of recommendation or some hard fact to demonstrate it?
Robert Buckland
I absolutely accept and understand the motivation behind my hon. Friend’s intervention, and he makes such a recommendation not just as Chair of the Select Committee, but as a guardian of the principles of the rule of law, which, after all, is what we, as a nation, are trying to defend against those who would kill, shoot and bomb their way into power and influence. He can be reassured that this—if you like—reversion to the previous standard of proof is all about making sure that we have as agile a tool as possible, bearing in mind the rapidly changing nature of the terrorist threat that we face. It is vital that we make sure that, when applications for TPIMs are made, they can be done not only in such a way that there is clearly an evidential basis and those grounds exist, but in a way that means they can be effective and as rapidly implemented as possible. The focus of the TPIM and the number of people on it will change, adapt and evolve according to the constant and the changing nature of the threats.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. The point made by the Chair of the Justice Committee is very well made. Not only has the current independent reviewer of terrorism, Jonathan Hall QC, not recommended the change, but he has specifically questioned the basis for the change. So again, is the Lord Chancellor able to clearly articulate for us why this change in the burden of proof is necessary?
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her question. Indeed, in the lengthy answers that I am giving, I am trying to do just that. What I am trying to explain is—I know that she knows this—that the TPIM mechanism is not something that is entered upon lightly. It involves a high degree of resource and a high intensity of resource management. It is a self-evident truth that the resources of the state, however large they may be, are not infinite and therefore choices and priorities have to be allocated. What I can assure the House of is that of course every time we assess that the grounds are met and that there is a risk, we will act. That is what our security services do, day in, day out, for us. What I am saying is that the change in the threshold creates that greater agility. I accept that it will be a lower standard, yes, but the reason for that is to allow for greater flexibility when our operational partners come to apply them.
I was talking about the importance of TPIMs’ use being proportionate. I believe that the annual review of TPIMs, which is going to be part of this process to qualify the question about their indefinite duration, strikes the right balance between the need for vigilance and control against the need for those basic civil liberties that we all guard jealously to be maintained. Let us not forget that where it is no longer necessary or proportionate to extend a particular TPIM for the purposes of public protection, that TPIM will be revoked. That check and balance is very much at the heart of the regimen that we are proposing in the Bill.
The Bill also amends legislation governing serious crime prevention orders. Those are civil orders imposed by the courts that protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting an individual’s involvement in serious crime, which of course includes terrorism. The Bill supports the use of these orders in terrorist-related cases by allowing counter-terrorism policing to make a direct application to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order. We are therefore streamlining that process. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has noted that these mechanisms are at the moment an under-utilised tool in terrorism cases, and I believe that by streamlining the process we will see a greater reliance upon them.
We are also adding the offences of breaching a TPIM notice and breaching a temporary exclusion order to the list of relevant terrorism offences that can trigger the registered terrorist offender notification requirements. Again, the independent reviewer has publicly confirmed his support for that change. The regime requires individuals aged 16 or over who have been sentenced to 12 months or more in custody for a relevant terrorism offence to provide certain information about changes in their circumstances, such as their address, to the police and to notify them of any foreign travel plans. Together, these changes strengthen our ability to manage the risk posed by those of terrorism concern in our community, including those who have been released from prison without a period on licence.
The Bill also reforms how we deal with terrorist offenders under the age of 18. We recognise, of course, that there is a separate sentencing framework for that category of offenders, and that it has distinct purposes and aims that differ from those relating to adult offenders. We have carefully considered which measures it would be appropriate to apply to under 18-year-olds in developing this proposed legislation. Although we remain firm in our aim to ensure that custody should be used only where absolutely necessary, it is a sad and inescapable fact that some young people are susceptible to radicalisation or to the adoption of extremist views, and that among those, there are a few who pose a very serious threat to the public.
The Bill will therefore ensure that the courts have the right range of tools at their disposal to deal with those under the age of 18 who commit serious terrorist or terrorist-related offences. We will do that by introducing a youth equivalent to the special sentence for offenders of particular concern. This will mean that, if convicted of terrorist offences serious enough to warrant custody, these offenders will serve a fixed period on licence once they have been released into the community. This will ensure that they receive an appropriate level of supervision. We are also replicating the changes to the extended determinate sentence to ensure better public protection from young terrorist offenders who have been assessed as dangerous. This removes Parole Board consideration of the two-thirds point for the most serious terrorism offences, and in the interests of public protection, it gives the courts the option to apply an extension period of up to 10 years on licence. I accept that this is an exceptional series of measures, but we are dealing with an exceptional type of offending.
Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)
Can the Secretary of State explain, first, what additional resources will be made available within the prison system to ensure that those who commit terror offences are not then left there to radicalise other young offenders? That has been a huge concern, and the Government have been pretty lacklustre in dealing with it. Secondly, when they are released, what resources and support will be made available to local authorities and other partnerships to ensure that other young people are not susceptible to their influence? It is one thing to sentence, but quite another to deal with the underlying challenges in communities.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for raising that issue. I can give her the strongest reassurance that, though at times it might appear, from some of the coverage of how terrorism is monitored in prison, that our system is failing, it is not. There are many aspects of the counter-terrorism regimen in our prisons that are world leading and which other countries are learning from and coming to us for help and advice on. I can say this about our recent announcement: the doubling of the number of specialist probation officers, and imams with specialist training, will further improve the way we deal with terrorism both inside prisons and in the community.
I can reassure the hon. Lady that, after 2017, when the Home Office and my Department came together with the joint extremism unit that deals with terrorism, a visitor to a prison with a particular specialism—Belmarsh, for example—would have seen embedded in the command and control structure police officers, probation officers, all parts of the system working jointly around a particular offender: not just monitoring but anticipating and understanding the trends, themes and information emerging. A lot of this is of a sensitive nature and it would be wrong of me to dwell too heavily upon the detail, but I can say that we have created separation centres. Those are challenging, as one should not use them on a whim and there needs to be a clear basis on which to separate individuals of known extremism from the rest of the prison population. Otherwise, there is a danger of creating an even more worrying unit or cadre of individuals who feed off each other and whose agenda of hate and terror is only entrenched by their being separated from the rest of the prison community.
The hon. Lady is right to say there is a challenging balance to be reached between separation and the danger of the proselytization of these views among other more susceptible members of the prison community, but we have the resources and are ploughing them in. The Bill is only part of the step-up approach I announced earlier this year. She can be reassured that not only is the work being done in prisons but—to deal with her point about the community—the specialist probation officers will have a community role as well. Furthermore, as I will refer to shortly, the statutory review of Prevent will give us all an opportunity to hone, improve and refine our approach to terrorism within the community.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
When I was Prisons Minister between 2010 and 2012, we abolished control orders, to which we are returning, because of the inflexibilities they created. I will speak on that in my main remarks. Will not the inflexibilities and the mandatory elements in the Bill make significantly more difficult the job of those most brilliant people in the Prison Service engaged in the rehabilitation of this most difficult class of offenders?
Robert Buckland
I pay tribute to the work my hon. Friend did in my Department at the beginning of the coalition Government. He is right that in many instances the removal of flexibility in sentencing can pose huge challenges, but we are dealing with an exceptional cohort—a small group of people whose type of offending is very different in my view from the mainstream of other types of offender. As he knows, I have worked in the system for many years, and I have seen individuals capable of the most astonishing rehabilitation, who have turned away from crime and gone on to lead blameless lives, but I am afraid that within this cadre of people there is a stubborn minority who are not capable of rehabilitation, who might show superficial signs of co-operation but whose agenda remains unchanged and undeterred and whose chosen path remains the same, even many years later. That is the sad reality of terrorism and I make no apology for taking an exceptional course to deal with an exceptionally difficult, troublesome, and dangerous group of people.
Stephen Doughty
The Lord Chancellor is being incredibly generous in giving way. He will be aware of the tragic circumstances in which young people in my constituency were recruited to Daesh/ISIS, and that the perpetrator of neo-Nazi actions a couple of years ago in Grangetown was only 19. It is right to focus on issues that relate to young people, but will the right hon. and learned Gentleman say a little more about the specialist probation officers, and about what training skills they will be given to look at the increasingly sophisticated way that some of these individuals engage online? As he said, they might be superficially engaging in face-to-face conversations, but then having a completely different set of conversations online, including through gaming platforms.
Robert Buckland
I know the hon. Gentleman’s community very well through my work in the criminal justice system. It sounds as if his community has particular criminal justice problems—that would be an insult, as it is a diverse and lively community that I know very well indeed. From that knowledge, I know that he represents a wide and wonderfully diverse range of cultures and views in the great city of Cardiff. He can be reassured that online work is as important as any offline interaction. I am impressed by the constant attention to renewal when it comes to the training of probation officers, and there is an acknowledgement that the threat is constantly evolving. The sad reality of the tender ages of some of these perpetrators is something we had to acknowledge in the Bill, hence the measures we are taking.
I was talking about the statutory review of Prevent. As we know, there was a deadline in statute for the completion of that review. We are having to change that, which is unfortunate and not something we wanted. We know there was a difficulty with the process, and Lord Carlile had to step down. We are engaging in a full and open competition to appoint the next independent reviewer, which is what the House would want; it has to be open and independent. We want to give the new reviewer the time necessary to carry out the review, so the statutory deadline will be removed. That does not in any way diminish my commitment, or that of the Home Secretary, to the success of the review, or our determination for it to be done properly and at speed. Our aim is for the review to conclude, with the Government response, by August next year.
In response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) I made the point that, perhaps unusually for a criminal justice Bill, this Bill has UK-wide application, because of the devolution settlement and the question of reserved matters when it comes to counter-terrorism. We have committed to ensuring that the seriousness of terrorist offending is treated equally across the three jurisdictions of the UK, and that we are able to protect all our citizens. We owe it to the people of Northern Ireland, of Scotland, and of England and Wales, not to discriminate in any way or to create false and unhelpful distinctions between all corners of our kingdom. To that end, the provisions will apply equally to the three jurisdictions. That includes applying the measures that we took in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, in full, to Northern Ireland.
Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)
Does the Lord Chancellor recognise that, despite supporting the Bill overall, the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland has expressed some concerns about the extension of those provisions to Northern Ireland, and raised some potential inadvertent and unintended consequences that would be undesirable?
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman was good enough to write to me and I can reassure him that I have spoken directly in an official capacity on several occasions to the Justice Minister, who was of course a distinguished Member of this House in the 2010 Parliament. I know she is a dedicated public servant who is reviving the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland in an important way. I have of course discussed these matters carefully with her and considered them. She makes some important points about the sensitivity of polygraph testing, which I well understand, and the regime for youth offenders, which is a particular passion of hers.
The hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) will know that when I considered retrospective application to Northern Ireland in February, I was careful not to rush into doing that in an emergency Bill. That was because I respected the devolution settlement and some of the differences in our approaches in various parts of the kingdom. I assure him that, having reflected, taken the appropriate steps and considered the matter in the round, I now believe that the provisions of article 7 of the European convention on human rights will not be affected by the measures I wish to take. It is important that we ensure that there is equal treatment of all types of terrorist offender throughout the kingdom.
Earlier, I made the point that I do not want the legislation to be discriminatory. That underlies my approach and I therefore intend to move ahead. Of course, it is a matter for the Administration in Stormont, but I very much hope that they will grant legislative consent. That is what I am seeking and that applies to the Scottish Government as well. My discussions with the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland and the Justice Secretary in Scotland, with whom I have a good professional relationship, will continue so that, with the consent of both legislatures, we can press forward with what I hope will be UK-wide legislation. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
We know all too well the consequences that face us when terrorists are given sentences that are just not long enough, when they are released too early or when the arrangements to supervise them in the community are not robust enough. It is abundantly clear that the law failed the victims of Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham. I believe that the comprehensive set of measures in the Bill helps to put that right. By strengthening our hand at each stage of the process of dealing with terrorist offenders, it represents our determination to do everything in our power to ensure that the public are protected.
Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)
I apologise to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to the Chamber for arriving late. I was at a Defence Committee meeting. My right hon. and learned Friend will know that the post-covid world we enter will be very different security-wise from the one we left. That distraction is being used by our adversaries, including terrorists, to regroup, rearm and retrain. Does he agree that this is not the time to reduce our security or defence budgets and that we must remain on our guard?
Robert Buckland
My right hon. Friend is right to remind us all of the need for constant vigilance. He described the current covid crisis as a distraction; it is a serious and grave crisis and all Governments must give their energy, heart and soul to dealing with it. However, he is right that there is a risk that we take our eye off the ball when it comes to security and defence. We are not doing that. At no stage are the Government doing that. That is why we are putting more resources into counter-terrorism and the Bill is just part of that.
The rapid passage of the emergency Bill a few months ago represented Parliament at its best: acting swiftly to take the urgent steps necessary to keep all our constituents safe from harm. That legislation was a necessary step then, but now we must finish the job. I hope that the Government will have the full support of hon. Members across the House in doing just that.
Sir Robert Neill
That is very generous—characteristically so—of the right hon. Gentleman. This is something that, as he rightly observes, has nothing to do with party. Any of us who has lived in any of our great cities has lived with the reality of that risk from time to time. That is why, to return to my point, we must try to get the detail right as well as the broad thrust.
There is much in the Bill that I support, and I shall certainly support it on Second Reading. I think we all accept that, precisely because of the particular nature of Islamist terrorism, the threat of which we now have to confront—the way it seems to warp an ideology even more particularly and more deep-rootedly than many other political motivations—it requires particular care in its handling.
There is no doubt—we have seen it in some of the cases that have been referred to, and it is well established by those who have researched these matters—that those who have been attracted to that ideology frequently present as particularly manipulative and are sometimes adept, as the Lord Chancellor has observed in previous debates, at hiding their motivations for a considerable time. It is therefore is all the harder for the authorities to make an assessment about when it is safe for them to be released, so it is not at all unreasonable that we should have particular types of regimes for sentencing, rehabilitation and release to deal with the particular types of threat that can arise from this particular class of offending.
That said, there are legitimate concerns, which must be raised, about whether we are still getting this right. I do not think any Government have ever got it wholly right. We always have to learn as we go along, as greater awareness and understanding become apparent. That is no criticism of anyone in this context.
I agree with the point that the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) made about the work of Ian Acheson. Mr Acheson’s report was most important and significant and, I think, extremely valuable. He gave compelling evidence to the Justice Committee at the time he brought it out. I have always regarded it as a matter of regret that that report was not more fully implemented. Much of it was, but I still think that there may be bits that we ought to look at.
Robert Buckland
I am extremely grateful to the Chair of the Justice Committee for giving way. He is helping to develop the debate in an extremely productive way. I can assure him that I have engaged regularly with Ian Acheson, whose work I respect hugely. Eight of those 11 recommendations were carried out. There was one in particular, with regard to Friday prayers, that we did not think was necessary. However, things have moved on considerably in the four years since that important report. I speak with the benefit of having been into some of these institutions, of engaging weekly with members of JEXU and of getting frontline information that gives me a higher degree of confidence that there is indeed a plan, a strategy and an approach that is yielding benefits. There is more to do, but there is far more out there than perhaps is fully appreciated.
Sir Robert Neill
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for that intervention. I know that he takes this immensely seriously on a personal level as well as an official level. We ought to be prepared to engage with all expertise in this field. He is right to keep things under review, and I hope that he will continue to use the expertise of Mr Acheson and others who worked with him on that report to inform our best practice.
I visited a young offenders institution where a young girl who had been suborned into this dreadful ideology was being held on remand. She was no doubt going to receive a very substantial sentence, such was the gravity of the matters in which she had become involved, but because of her age, it was inevitable that at some point she would have to be released. Having a means of doing that safely is profoundly important, but I accept also that it is profoundly difficult because it is well established that the pre-indicators that we find in relation to general criminality are often not available to be picked up in this type of case. So I totally understand where the Government are coming from in that regard. That is why, as I said, I do not have a problem with the basic thrust of the changes to the regime that the Bill proposes.
The other point, which has been picked up in the debate by Members on both sides of the House and in interventions, is that the whole purpose of our standing up against terrorism, from whatever source it comes, is to protect our basic values as a society, which are underpinned, perhaps more fundamentally than almost anything else, by a commitment to the rule of law. Anything that seeks to drive us away from that, or inadvertently causes us to move away from that, ironically serves in its own insidious way to assist the terrorist cause rather than our own. I do not think for one second that any Government—none of the Governments who have had to confront this going back to the time I was talking about when I was a young man—have ever sought to do that deliberately.
We have to be particularly alert to that risk, and that is why I hope that when we look at the detail of the Bill we will take on board the need to ensure that we continue safeguards in this regard. That is one reason why it was a good thing that we appointed an independent reviewer of terrorism in the first place. I am a great believer in independent inspectorates, be they of the Prison Service, probation, the Crown Prosecution Service or education services. The same applies to the desirability of having a robust independent reviewer, and we have always had those in the shape of distinguished lawyers. That is why I have a concern about the burden of proof in relation to terrorism prevention and investigation measures. The initial changes were driven, as has been pointed out and I said in my intervention, in response to specific recommendations from the independent reviewer.
The current independent reviewer, Mr Jonathan Hall, QC, supports and endorses a number of changes that the Bill makes, and I think that is powerful evidence in the Lord Chancellor’s favour in relation to many elements of the Bill. But that actually makes it all the more striking that the change to the burden of proof in relation to TPIMs does not arise from anything that the independent reviewer has sought, or anything that the independent reviewer has advocated. His silence on that point, as opposed to other areas where I would suggest that he has given valuable external support to the Government’s position, is therefore striking, and that is why we must be particularly careful about how we deal with this matter. It is a little bit like putting the other side to proof, if I can put it that way.
There may well be a good reason for that, and I am sure that the Lord Chancellor would not reinforce the proposal unless he genuinely believed there was, but I think we have to be able to set a reason before the public as well. I accept that there are pressures in terms of resource and the amount of time it takes to bring forward one of these measures. I accept, too, that the Lord Chancellor observes that it is therefore not done lightly. That is all perfectly fair, but if we are going to make that change—after all, I was a junior member of the coalition Government who made the change in the opposite direction, away from control orders, as has already been observed—we ought always to be able to do it on the basis of the clearest evidence. With every respect, I am not quite sure that we have yet got the clarity of evidence that I would like to see to satisfy me on that point.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Select Committee for his indulgence. I was talking about the need for flexibility. That is why we are making the change. I served on the Committee that considered the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill in 2011, and I followed the developments in the law very carefully, but it is right that we act on the advice and support of the security services and all those involved in the monitoring of offenders, and it is because of that need for flexibility that we judge it right to make the change now. I hope that that is clear.
Sir Robert Neill
The Lord Chancellor makes the point very clearly, and I fully understand that, but I do just juxtapose it with the observation by Mr Hall, QC, in his note dated 2 June, in which he says:
“In these circumstances it is not clear why there is any need to change the law in the manner proposed. Steps to reduce the resource burden of obtaining TPIMs are already in hand. The courts have not found that the current approach is wrong.”
There may be an argument for flexibility, but we cannot say that it comes from the independent reviewer, so I wonder where it does come from.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
We in the Scottish National party take our duty to protect the public from all serious crime, including terrorism, very seriously, as our record in government in Scotland shows. We have a number of reservations about the Bill, which I shall outline, but like the official Opposition we do not intend to divide the House. We intend to take a constructive but critical approach. To that end, we will play a full part in the Bill Committee.
I thank the Lord Chancellor and his colleagues for the engagement that we have had to date on the Bill. I look forward to further discussions about the Scottish National party’s and the Scottish Government’s concerns. I also thank the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) for the constructive discussions that we have had prior to Second Reading. It is fair to say that the Scottish National party shares many of the official Opposition’s concerns about the Bill. We note that those concerns relate to matters about which the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has also expressed reservations. That is to say, they are responsible concerns.
No discussion about terrorist legislation in this House should take place without parliamentarians taking the opportunity to extend their deepest sympathies to all those who have suffered bereavement or injury as a result of terrorist acts. I look back to the past, particularly in Northern Ireland and indeed the whole island of Ireland in that respect. On behalf of the SNP, I also pay tribute to the brave members of our police and security services, first responders, those in the Prison Service, probation officers and those who work in rehabilitation. All those people have to deal with the consequences of terrorism. We have heard some moving tributes to them. I also pay tribute to the brave bystanders who have intervened to help others in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks.
Many of the provisions in the Bill relate to sentencing, which is of course a devolved matter. Discussions are ongoing between my colleague Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Secretary, and the Lord Chancellor. Of course, there will need to be a legislative consent motion. I will outline the concerns that I share with the Scottish Government and my colleagues in the Scottish Government about the sentencing aspects of the Bill, as well as the use of polygraphs, the changes to TPIMs and the provisions regarding the review of the Prevent strategy. I want to make it clear that I do so from this viewpoint: it is the Scottish National party’s aim that our communities in Scotland are inclusive, empowered and resilient, so they can resist those sowing the seeds of division that can lead to radicalisation and terrorism.
The Bill has some far-reaching changes in it, with implications for human rights as well as policy, and the Scottish Government have already expressed their concerns directly with the Lord Chancellor, as I have done with his junior colleagues. I know that the UK Government, in relation to this Bill at least, realise that they need to work closely with Members of all parties and with the devolved Administrations, because that is what is necessary to ensure effective counter-terrorism measures across the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland. I hope that this consideration will be at the forefront of the Minister’s mind as the Bill pilots its way through the House.
On the issue of sentencing, I am pleased that the UK Government are following the Scottish Government’s lead in ending automatic early release for the most serious offenders. Some time has now passed since the Scottish Government introduced a change to the effect that no long-term prisoner—four years or over—would be eligible for automatic early release after two thirds of their sentence. However, I am far from convinced—as I know others are far from convinced—that simply locking up terrorists for longer and then providing longer supervision on release is going to do much to deradicalise terrorist offenders.
The Bill will require the courts to ensure that certain terrorist offenders receive a custodial sentence of a certain minimum length and that a minimum length of supervision applies on release. In that respect it is a form of minimum mandatory sentencing, which is against the general approach in Scotland. However, it is not completely new to the justice system in Scotland, and that is why discussions are ongoing with my colleague, the Scottish Justice Secretary.
Sentencing is only a small part of the answer to terrorism, however. What happens during the sentence also matters, and, to date, deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have been largely underfunded and poorly executed. That is not my view; that is the view of Nazir Afzal, the former chief Crown prosecutor for the north-west of England. He is an experienced lawyer and a prosecutor worth listening to. He says that this has happened as a direct consequence of the decision by successive Conservative Governments to cut funding to probation and other rehabilitation programmes. The costs of extensive post-release surveillance far outweigh the costs of adequate funding for preventive measures and deradicalisation. I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor agrees with me and Mr Afzal on that point, and whether he is in a position to assure the House that sufficient funds and resources will be made available to deal with preventive and deradicalisation programmes in prison.
Can the Lord Chancellor also assure me that the Bill will not turn out to be counterproductive by leading to less parole, less offender management and less incentive to behave well during a sentence and to attempt deradicalisation? In this respect it will be interesting to hear what the professionals who work in the area of offender management and parole have to say about the Bill, and I look forward to the Bill Committee’s evidence sessions. I am pleased that will there be more than one of those—
Joanna Cherry
Three? Excellent.
The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the issue of polygraphs. He will be aware that in Scotland’s justice system, polygraph testing is not used as a mechanism to monitor compliance with licence conditions or any kind of orders. Indeed, it is not used at all. The reason we have chosen not to use it is the lack of evidence of its effectiveness. If the provisions of the Bill were to apply in Scotland, that would require a significant shift in policy and practice and could also have significant implications for investment in infrastructure. In Scotland, we already have mechanisms in place to monitor compliance with licence conditions and conditions associated with statutory justice orders. These include supervision by justice social workers and the use of electronic monitoring for high-risk offenders. There is a multi-agency public protection arrangement—MAPPA. Under that procedure, those assessed as high or very high risk and who require multi-agency management are subject to a regular review. In Scotland, individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences can be managed under that MAPPA approach, and there are indeed a small number of cases that have been managed in this
More generally on the issue of polygraph testing, I note, as has already been said, that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation expressed some concerns about the lack of pilots and emphasised that there would therefore be a very strong case for very thorough post-legislative scrutiny of the measures. I look forward to hearing what the Minister summing up has to say in response to that point.
On TPIMs, much of what I have to say has already been canvassed. Clearly, the amendments would: reverse the changes to the burden of proof, lowering the burden of proof; reverse changes to the curfew provisions to allow for what is effectively home detention; and allow us to make the orders potentially indefinite. I am not convinced that the changes are necessary and nor are my colleagues in the Scottish Government. We are fortified in that view by the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who is also unconvinced of the necessity of the changes. To be frank, I have heard nothing so far this afternoon to convince me that our reservations are wrong. Those reservations are really important because of the human rights implications, the lack of safeguards built into the Bill, and the lack of any review mechanism.
I am not going to go through what Jonathan Hall, QC said in his two very detailed notes, but he has tackled, in some detail, both the reduction of the standard of proof and making the orders potentially indefinite. He has been very clear that he is not convinced of the case for change, so my questions for the Minister are these. Can we hear more clearly why? Can we see an example of what justifies both the reduction in the burden of proof and the need for the orders to be without time limit? Can we hear why, in the face of such potentially draconian powers, there are no safeguards in the Bill? Would the Government be prepared to consider an oversight mechanism or a review mechanism?
Finally, on Prevent, it is important to remember that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved and that while national security is referred to the UK Government, the way the Scottish Government deliver the Prevent strategy in Scotland reflects Scottish differences and is unique to the challenge faced by Scottish communities. I think it is fair to say that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland has not encountered the same community resistance and community impacts as it has south of the border. Because of the problems encountered in England, the Scottish National party supported the call for a review of the Prevent strategy, but we also shared the very widespread concerns about the Government’s initial choice of reviewer. We believe now that it is very important that a new reviewer is found quickly, and that lessons about impartiality and the important appearance of impartiality are learned from the debacle over the previous putative appointments, so that the review can be seen as genuine and robust. We are a little concerned that the time limit for the review has been removed. I heard what the Lord Chancellor had to say about that, but it is very important that the removal of the time limit does not simply become an excuse to kick this into the long grass. That is the final point on which I seek reassurance from the Minister in his summing up.
Yvette Cooper
I do recognise that these are always difficult judgments, and I say this in a cross-party spirit. These are always difficult judgments and difficult cases to deal with. It is because I have spoken consistently about the importance of having strong powers that I say to Ministers now that it is hugely important to have strong safeguards and strong checks and balances. That is where I think Ministers are getting some of the provisions wrong in the Bill. They will know, with my record of arguing for those powers, that I say with the greatest sincerity to the Secretary of State that he is getting the judgments wrong on the kinds of safeguards that might be needed, because the flipside of those strong powers is having the checks and balances to make sure that they cannot be abused or misused. That is why I asked him specifically what the evidence was for changing the burden of proof and for not having safeguards in place at the two-year point as well. The Bill does not include any safeguards requiring judicial scrutiny after two years. That was a weakness in the original control orders as well: those sorts of independent safeguards were not in place, where they could be continued.
Chris Philp
The right hon. Lady raised the issue of safeguards, which I had intended to address in my wind-up. Section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 contains a provision whereby when the Home Secretary makes a TPIM order she has to go to the High Court to seek permission and the High Court must find that it is not “obviously flawed”. In addition, the subject has the ability to judicially review the decision, so there is that automatic safeguard in the form of High Court permission under section 6 of the 2011 Act.
Yvette Cooper
There is when the TPIMs are first set out—the hon. Gentleman is right about that. My argument about the control orders at the beginning, where I thought they should have been amended back in 2011, was for introducing stronger safeguards. I have always believed that we need stronger safeguards in place, but the Bill does not include any safeguards for judicial scrutiny after two years if these measures are going to be extended—if they are going to be for longer. The independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, has suggested a solution would be to require the Secretary of State to seek the court’s permission for any extension beyond two years, in the same way that she currently does when a TPIM is first made. That would seem to be a sensible additional safeguard to put in if those TPIMs are to be extended.
In addition, no explanation has been given about the burden of proof. I asked the Minister to tell me, hand on heart, whether he knew of cases—I do not ask for the detail—where he believes the wrong decision has been made not to put somebody on a TPIM because of the burden of proof, and he was not able to do so. I am therefore really concerned that there is not the evidence to justify lowering the burden of proof in this way. He referred to the idea that we somehow need greater “flexibility”. I hope he will reconsider his use of that word, because the powers are flexible; they can be used to apply to all sorts of different circumstances and different kinds of threats that an individual might pose. He should not use the word “flexibility” to apply to the burden of proof. We do not apply flexibility to proof, just as we do not apply it to truth.
Robert Buckland
I did not mean it in those terms. Clearly where we have a regime specified by statute, it needs to be applied rigorously. I was talking about operational flexibility, bearing in mind the complexities of these orders, and the fact that they are not obtained lightly and there has to be a very good operational case for them. That is what I meant, and I am sorry if there was any ambiguity in my remarks.
Yvette Cooper
I appreciate that, but I think that also makes clear the gap in the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s case, because operational flexibility still should not apply to the burden of proof—the evidence required in order to justify applying measures that are for particularly extreme circumstances. The independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, has said that
“administrative convenience does not appear to provide a basis for reversing the safeguard of a higher standard of proof.”
We cannot justify saying that in order to somehow reduce the paperwork, we want to reduce the burden of proof to use such measures. His predecessor, Lord David Anderson, who argued for bringing back relocation and who has been a supporter of strong powers, has agreed with him on this matter. Initially he argued for increasing the burden of proof, and he has said that the Home Secretary should at least have to “believe” someone is a terrorist, not just “suspect” it. That is the important criterion if these powers are to be used. I urge the Government to rethink these safeguards. If we are to have these strong powers to keep us all safe, prevent terrorist attacks, and protect us from people who may be immensely dangerous, we should also ensure the right kinds of safeguards to make sure that those powers are not misused, abused, or used in the wrong cases.
On the Government’s Prevent programme and the review of it, I am disappointed that there is now no date in the Bill—it has been removed altogether. It is clear that we still have no reviewer in place for the Prevent programme, so they will obviously not complete the review by August, but that in itself is a huge disappointment. The timetable has been extended again, as has the application process. There is no deadline at all, and it is immensely important that the review is not just chucked into the long grass. Will the Minister include an alternative date? A date was included for a good reason, after debates about previous legislation, to ensure that the review happened. A programme that is so important and has had different questions about it raised, should be effectively reviewed to see how it should work.
Finally, we should also be looking at deradicalisation more widely, both as part of the Prevent programme and in our prisons, as well as at how we can do more to prevent extremism and radicalisation, and at how to turn people back towards a better course once things have gone wrong.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure to speak on Second Reading of this Bill. As Members have said, at the heart of the Bill is a desire to protect the public, which is our first duty as Members of Parliament and as a Government. There is no duty more important than protecting our fellow citizens.
It is right that, as we debate the Bill, we remember and pay tribute to the members of the emergency services who have put themselves in harm’s way defending the public, in particular, of course, PC Keith Palmer, who gave his life just a few yards from where we now stand. We remember and pay tribute to those people who have sadly and tragically lost their lives to terrorism of many different kinds over the past few years. As I look across the Chamber, I see the shield of Jo Cox, one of our own Members who was brutally, savagely and disgustingly murdered a few years ago.
In the spirit of the duty of public protection that binds us all together, the spirit in which the debate has been conducted is heartening. Of course, as the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) said, I am sure that there will be points that we will debate forensically in Committee in the coming weeks, but the broad principles that we are debating command cross-party support and are an example of the House at its best. For people who think that British politics is broken, the debate this afternoon proves them categorically wrong.
The speech given by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), was statesmanlike in its quality and I greatly enjoyed listening to and learning from it. The speeches from the Chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, and from long-standing and experienced Members such as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), gave us all great pause for thought, as did the speech from the SNP Front-Bench spokesperson, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry).
Like the hon. Member for St Helens North, I was struck by the enthusiasm, force and thoughtfulness of Members of the 2019 intake, all of whom made tremendous contributions and, more importantly, will continue to do so in the years ahead. The House is richer for their presence.
Of course, I welcome the hon. Member for St Helens North to his place. I am delighted to see him on the Front Bench. We worked together on Helen’s law which, without his work, would not be on the statute book. I know that Marie McCourt and many victims are grateful to him for that work, which will now continue from his deserved and rightful place at the Dispatch Box.
I will turn to some of the specific points that have arisen in this afternoon’s debate, starting with TPIMs, which were the most extensively debated of the measures. I thank the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) for the consistency with which she has advocated on that point. I note that the consistency from 2005 does not quite extend to the burden of proof, but it seems to extend to most other elements.
Let me start with the burden of proof. Many hon. Members have asked why we are returning to the burden of proof of “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that was contained in the Labour Government’s original 2005 legislation. It is a delicate question, as Members have said. As we consider the burden of proof that is appropriate, we have to balance and weigh the rights of the subject, whose liberty is being curtailed to some extent, with our duties to protect the public. We have spoken this afternoon about the victims of these terrible terrorist offences. We in public office—Members of Parliament and those in government—have a duty to think very carefully about our duties to protect people who might become victims of these terrible offences.
In answer to the question about why we are proposing this burden of proof, it is because it gives the Government the maximum reasonable ability to introduce TPIMs where they are necessary to protect the public. Setting the burden where we have suggested—a reasonable suspicion, rather than a reasonable belief or on the balance of probabilities—gives the Home Secretary the ability to act more widely than would otherwise be the case when public safety is at stake.
Yvette Cooper
Can the Minister tell us how many cases in the last two years have not met the current threshold but would meet his lower threshold?
Chris Philp
As the Lord Chancellor said, we will not comment on individual cases. As the right hon. Lady knows, the number of TPIMs in force is very low—it is only five currently. We are not just talking about what may have happened historically; we are looking prospectively at what measures we may need to take to protect our fellow citizens.
Members have asked what the safeguards are. The first safeguard is that the Home Secretary—who I see is now in the Chamber, and who is a doughty defender of public safety and public protection—does not act without fetter, because when a TPIM order is made by the Home Secretary, it is reviewed by the High Court under section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The High Court has to give permission before that TPIM can come into force, and if the High Court finds that it is “obviously flawed”, permission is not granted, so there is a judicial safeguard inherent in the structure of TPIMs. If the subject of the TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, they may go to the Court for a judicial review. There are significant safeguards inherent in the structure of TPIMs.
As I said a moment ago, the Government use these measures extremely sparingly. Our preference, of course, is prosecution, as it should be. We only use TPIMs where absolutely necessary to protect the public, and we make no apology for doing so. Only five are in force at the moment, which is evidence of how carefully the Government apply these measures. Since 2011, despite the judicial mechanisms I have described, not a single TPIM has been overturned. I hope that that gives Members confidence that there are safeguards and that these measures are being used in a thoughtful way.
Reference has been made to the opinion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Of course, we listen carefully to what Jonathan Hall QC has to say. We study his advice carefully, and we often follow his advice. It is for this House and for us as Members of Parliament to reach our own decision, which may in many cases accord with the independent reviewer, but in some cases it may not. Where our judgment differs, we should exercise our independent judgment, as we are doing in this case.
Dr Lewis
In the Minister’s references to TPIMs, he may have answered a question that I was hoping to ask him a little later: what do we do about that category of people who have gone abroad to fight for terrorist-backing organisations and return to this country, where there is not enough evidence to prosecute? I think that the Bill does not say a lot about that. If I am wrong, will he correct me? If I am right, surely that is an area where TPIMs might be relevant.
Chris Philp
Indeed. In relation to people who go overseas to assist terrorist organisations, we deprive them of their citizenship where we can, if it is lawful— if they are, for example, dual nationals—to prevent their return here in the first place. It is right that we do that. Secondly, on their return, it is our strong preference, if there is sufficient evidence, to prosecute them under the criminal law, as we very often do. However, if there are evidential difficulties and we cannot meet the burden of proof required by a criminal court—beyond reasonable doubt—but we do have a reasonable suspicion, we can use TPIMs to protect the public, should the Bill be passed in this form. The excellent example from my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) illustrates exactly why TPIMs could help us in those cases where we cannot achieve prosecution. Evidence from Syria, for example, is very hard to gather, but in cases where we have a reasonable suspicion, we must act to protect the public.
Yvette Cooper
Let me stress this point again: the Minister has still not given us any reason why the current system is no good and why it does not work. He has mentioned independent judgment, but he is giving us no evidence on which to make our independent judgment that is different from the reviewer.
Chris Philp
We are returning to a situation that was enshrined originally in 2005, which Members opposite strongly supported at the time. I have made the case already that the Bill gives the Home Secretary an ability to take a rounder judgment with the proof threshold set at reasonable suspicion, rather than reasonable belief or the balance of probabilities. I have made the case that we need to be mindful of protecting potential victims. We need to think about this not just retrospectively, as a historical review of case studies, but prospectively and how we may need the power in the future. I have explained the safeguards in place and I have proved that the Government use the powers sparingly. I think I have made the case for the legislation as currently drafted.
Let me turn now to the question of de-radicalisation and reducing reoffending, which the shadow Lord Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Tottenham, referred to very powerfully in his speech. Let me be clear that we are not giving up hope on any people who are convicted as terrorist offenders—especially young people, but frankly, we are not giving up hope on anyone. Although these cases are hard and rehabilitation is very difficult, we will never give up hope. There are cases such as that of Maajid Nawaz, the founder of the Quilliam Foundation, who harboured extremist ideologies, but is now fully reformed and is a powerful and moving advocate for tolerance and moderation. I look to examples like that for hope—and they give me hope.
It is in that spirit that the Government have been investing in this area. It is fair to say that there is more we need to do to meet our aspirations, but in January we announced an additional £90 million for counter-terrorism policing. We have doubled the number of counter-terrorism probation staff serving and we have introduced new national standards for monitoring terrorist offenders on licence, which includes work with psychologists to try to address any mental health issues that may relate to this sort of offending. We are also involving imams to try to explain in the case of Islamist offending that Islam is a peaceful religion and that the interpretation that some offenders have is a perversion of the true meaning of that great and peaceful religion. We are involving them in our work.
Things such as the theological and ideological interventions programme, the healthy identities programme and the desistance and disengagement programme are all designed to do the same thing. I do not pretend that those systems are working as fully effectively as we would like. I acknowledge there is more work to do, but that work is happening and being invested in. As I said a moment ago, I have hope that people can be turned on to a different path, and that ultimately must be our objective.
I turn now to the question of the removal of the Parole Board’s function in relation to people who will now serve their full custodial term in prison—those most serious offenders. It is right that we do that for the reasons that have been laid out. The most dangerous offenders should serve their full prison sentence, and the public expects that. We have acknowledged that rehabilitation needs to be taking place subsequently in the extended licence period provided after their release.
Although there will be no Parole Board intervention, as the shadow Secretary of State pointed out in his speech at the beginning, plenty of other intervention will take place. For example, very extensive mapper work will take place throughout the custodial sentence. The Prison Service and prison governors, including excellent governors, such as the governor at Belmarsh, will do enormous amounts of work with prisoners during their custodial sentence. The probation service, in the way that I described a moment ago, will work with the offender in their extended licence period afterwards.
Although the Parole Board will not make the release decision—that is effectively made by the judge at the point of sentence in handing down a sentence of this nature —a huge amount of work will none the less be done to manage, help, monitor and, where appropriate, intervene during the prison sentence and during the licence period subsequently. I am therefore satisfied, as is the Lord Chancellor, that these arrangements are comprehensive and will be effective.
Let me say a word about polygraphs, which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) referred to. It is important to stress that the use of polygraphs that we are proposing here is the same as the use currently deployed in relation to sex offenders on licence. These polygraph results, because they are not entirely accurate—they are quite accurate, but not entirely accurate—do not create any binding consequence. If somebody fails one of these polygraph tests on licence, further investigatory work is done by the police or the probation service. It triggers further work, which will then produce a conclusion one way or the other. It does not produce a binding result, but it serves as a trigger.
If we look at the way polygraphs have been used in relation to sex offences, we find that the level of disclosure of relevant information by those sex offenders to whom polygraph tests are applied has increased, since the introduction of the tests, from a 51% disclosure rate to 76%, so they have been helpful. They are not a panacea—they do not tell us everything and we cannot wholly rely on them—but they do yield some information, as a result of which further investigation can be conducted.
Some questions were asked about the Prevent review. We are very close to appointing a new chairman of that review, which is overdue, as Members rightly said. Members asked, again quite rightly and fairly, what our revised target date is for that review to report. Our target date is August 2021. That is a year later than originally anticipated, but Members will understand that the resignation of the initially appointed chairman and then the coronavirus outbreak have, unfortunately, caused that one-year delay. That is the timetable we are now working to.
Finally, the hon. Member for Belfast East and his colleague the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) made reference to the application to Northern Ireland of the ending of the automatic early release of terrorist offenders. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Belfast East welcomes that application. We thought very carefully about the legal implications, because the structure of sentences in Northern Ireland differs from that in the rest of the United Kingdom. That is why we did not act in February. We have now thought about it very carefully, we have taken extensive legal advice, and we are now wholly satisfied that it can properly be applied to Northern Ireland without any article 7 or, indeed, common law retrospectivity infringement. That is why we now include Northern Ireland in these provisions—and of course, because we want the United Kingdom to act as one in these terrorist-related matters, it is proper that we do so.
Terrorists seek to divide our country, they seek to divide our community and they seek to create hatred among us, but I think that in the conduct of our debate this afternoon we have demonstrated that, no matter what our differences may be in day-to-day political matters, we will stand together in solidarity and in unity, as a House of Commons and as leaders of our various communities, against all those from all different wings of the terrorist fraternity. We will unite against hate, and we will keep in mind Jo Cox’s words in her maiden speech, which I remember listening to five years ago from the Back Benches. She said that there is more that unites us than divides us. Let us keep those words in mind and let us fight terrorism of all kinds wherever we find it.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 14 July 2020.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Eddie Hughes.)
Question agreed to.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (First sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 25th June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 June 2020 - (25 Jun 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a couple of housekeeping points to make. Please make sure that electronic devices are on silent. I am afraid that tea and coffee are not allowed; water is, along as it has not been near a tea bag or any coffee granules. Social distancing must be observed. Our Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please do remove jackets at any point under my chairmanship as we proceed through the Bill.
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to allow us to deliberate in private briefly, before moving to the oral evidence session. I hope we can get through these first bits without too much debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion that was agreed by the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
I beg to move, Day Time Witness Thursday 25 June Until no later than 12.30 pm Jonathan Hall QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Thursday 25 June Until no later than 13.00 pm The National Police Chiefs’ Council Thursday 25 June Until no later than 14.30 pm Prison Reform Trust Thursday 25 June Until no later than 15.00 pm The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Thursday 25 June Until no later than 15.30 pm Law Society of Scotland Thursday 25 June Until no later than 16.00 pm Professor Donald Grubin, Newcastle University Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 9.55 am The Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 10.25 am The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 10.55 am Professor Andrew Silke, Cranfield University
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 25 June) meet;
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 June;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 30 June;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 2 July;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 7 July;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 9 July;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following table:
TABLE
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clause 2; Schedule 2; Clause 3; Schedule 3; Clauses 4 to 6; Schedule 4; Clauses 7 to 19; Schedule 5; Clauses 20 and 21; Schedule 6; Clauses 22 and 23; Schedule 7; Clauses 24 and 25; Schedule 8; Clauses 26 and 27; Schedule 9; Clause 28; Schedule 10; Clauses 29 to 36; Schedule 11; Clauses 37 to 45; Schedule 12; Clauses 46 to 48; Schedule 13; Clauses 49 to 53; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 14 July.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I have one point of clarification to make. Yesterday, in the Programming Sub-Committee, we discussed whether we should invite the Prison Officers Association or the Prison Governors Association. On further investigation, it transpires that the Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers is in fact the Prison Officers Association—that is its full name. We will therefore see the Prison Officers Association on Tuesday at 9.25 am. We had contacted the Prison Governors Association, but I am told that, rather surprisingly, it did not reply. That should satisfy the request that the shadow Minister made yesterday.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Chris Philp.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Chris Philp.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Chris Philp
Q
I am sure we have all read the notes that you very helpfully prepared on this legislation and published on your website at the end of May and the beginning of June. I have them in front of me and have read them with great interest. To start, I want to ask about TPIMs—terrorism prevention and investigation measures—which were the subject of some debate on Second Reading. I want first to ask about the current circumstances in which a TPIM expires and has to be reapplied for from scratch without it being possible to use the previous evidence from two or more years before. Do you think there are circumstances in which public safety may still demand a TPIM beyond the two-year period? Are these proposals a better way of handling it than the current method?
Jonathan Hall: The answer is yes, there are be circumstances in which someone ought to be subject to controls for longer than two years. Yes, there will be circumstances in which it will be appropriate to rely on terrorism-related activity that predates the imposition of the first TPIM. I understand the business case, if you like, for allowing an extension beyond the two-year period. However, the reason I question in the first instance whether it is justified is that it is none the less possible, as the law currently stands, to extend beyond two years. There are two current examples—I will not go into the details—of where a second and fresh TPIM has been imposed.
The practical consequence of the current regime is that some will come off controls, and if they have literally lain doggo and have done nothing for that two-year period, the police and MI5 will have to start assembling a new case, assuming that the person re-engages with terrorism-related activity. There could be a gap period during which that terrorism-related activity is going on, during which the case is being built when they are re-imposed.
If TPIMs were currently imposed against attack planners, I would have fewer observations to make about the ability to extend further. However, in practice, as I said in my note, having spoken to officials, TPIMs are really currently used against radicalisers. It is certainly the case that public safety is not helped by radicalisation activities, but as things currently stand, people subject to TPIMs are not the attack planners, who, if they are free from restrictions, might go and do something very violent. More likely, they will re-engage in radicalising activities. As shown by the fact that two new TPIMs have been imposed, it is currently possible to manage that risk.
I understand the business case, more than I do for the lowering of the standard of proof, which we can come to separately. At the moment, I do not understand why it is needed as TPIMs are currently used.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, I have worked it out. In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: What I would say is that the risk was managed, as the law currently stands. There was a gap, but in fact, it is not as if something very bad happened from those sources in that period, as far as I can work out, having read the materials that I have read.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The latter. I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: You asked me about the current TPIMs. I cannot speak for all the uses of control orders and TPIMs that have happened before my period. There is a risk that mistakes can be made about assessing intelligence. I have reason to believe that. My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered. It is a fairness issue based on the authorities having all the cards.
The point that you make, which is that the authorities can be generally trusted to make TPIMs against the right people, to my mind rather demonstrates that a change is unnecessary. The authorities have been able to impose TPIMs, as far as I can see, where they have wanted to. I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower—where they could say, “We think this person’s a terrorist, but they may not be and we’d like to impose a TPIM, but we can’t, because we cannot show on the balance of probabilities.” I am not aware of that sort of case. So I agree that the authorities can be trusted and, at the moment, I think things are working okay.
The regime of control orders and TPIMs has fluctuated over the years since it was introduced. It has been subject to a lot of scrutiny and consideration by my predecessors and by the courts. It has landed in a reasonably good place. The danger about changing unnecessarily is that, maybe not now, but in a few years’ time, you might provoke an overreaction.
I will give an example of that. When the control order regime came in, it was seen as a bit illiberal and that led to the removal of the power to relocate individuals when the TPIM regime was introduced. Eventually, my predecessor David Anderson, the Government and Parliament agreed that it was necessary to bring back that power of relocation. So if you like, there was a period when the public were less safe because the ability to relocate had been removed, and the reason why that ability to relocate had been removed is that it was the reaction to what had been seen as a slightly illiberal measure. If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, but of course if the standard of proof is lowered, the extent of judicial protection is lowered, because the judge will not be asking him or herself, “Was the Secretary of State right to be satisfied on the balance of probability that this person is a terrorist?” The judge would have to say, “Well, in theory, they may not be a terrorist, but the Home Secretary’s view that they may be a terrorist is reasonable,” so you would remove the judicial protection.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am not aware of any misuse, but I am aware of circumstances in which the intelligence was misunderstood.
Chris Philp
Q
On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) raised the question of someone who had been a member of Daesh returning from Syria. Of course, if somebody has been circulating in Syria, it is very hard to establish their activities on the balance of probabilities. It is hard to get witness testimony and there will be no intelligence surveillance, but the fact remains that they have been to Syria and done whatever they have done over there. In those circumstances, is it conceivable that, when British citizens who are members of Daesh return from somewhere like Syria, the lower burden of proof might be helpful, or in fact necessary?
Jonathan Hall: I have thought a little about this. It is certainly the case that evidential coverage of what goes on in Daesh-controlled areas will be limited, which is why prosecution is particularly difficult. Intelligence coverage might be more, but it might be patchy. I think that if someone has been in Syria for a long time, it is a pretty obvious inference that they have been up to no good, so I do not think that you would need the lower standard of proof. You would not say, “I reasonably suspect that because you spent five years in Syria, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” My own view is that a judge would say, “On the balance of probabilities, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” Of course, there will always be some coverage. I do not think that what you said is right, although I see where you are coming from.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, but I think that, with respect, what you are missing out is the big factual matter, which would be undisputed, that they were in Syria. The Secretary of State’s starting point would be, “Here is a matter of fact, undisputed, that somebody spent all those years in Syria.” I think that that would provide a fairly good jumping-off point for an inference that they were engaged in terrorism-related activity.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think that judges, when they come to consider these matters, are prepared to draw robust inferences. They are not fools. No doubt the Secretary of State would also not be fooled by someone who simply claimed that they were there for humanitarian reasons.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The difficulty with terrorism risk is that it is quite difficult to measure. You have actuarial tools to look at whether people who have committed burglary will reoffend, and they are reasonably robust. You do not have those sorts of tools for terrorism. As I probably said in my notes, some of the factors that you normally associate with reoffending—for example, not having a stable family background—do not tend to work so well with terrorism offenders. You find terrorism offenders who come from a stable background and have a job, so it is inherently difficult to identify the probability that someone will reoffend.
The approach that I took when I did my MAPPA review was that the more information, the better. I agree that the probation service, the police and MI5 will be carrying out assessments, but you lose the confrontation that takes place at a Parole Board hearing. As you have probably done, I have attended such a hearing, where there is an opportunity for the chairman to speak to the offender in quite a formal setting. It brings something different to the table, which you would obviously lose. You would definitely have covert intelligence sources, and you would have overt management in the sense of the police being able to speak to the offender, but you would lose the opportunity for a confrontation before they have been released. You are losing something—that is probably how I would put it.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The Parole Board has two choices: it could release early, but it could, and often will, decide not to release early and say, “Actually, you’re far too dangerous.” That additional source of information about their risk will then be very useful to the security services when they are eventually released.
The Chair
We will now hear from the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Should hon. Members wish to ask a question, it would be helpful if they could catch my eye early in the proceedings, so that I can try to restrict Front Benchers as necessary.
Thank you very much for joining us, Mr Jacques. Could you please briefly introduce yourself and your organisation?
Tim Jacques: I am Tim Jacques. I am an assistant chief constable and I work with counter-terrorism policing here in the UK. I am the deputy senior national co-ordinator.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: It will make our job easier, and yes, I believe it will make the public safer.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: That is a very long question. On the first point, policing itself is not the applicant for TPIMs; the Security Service is. Am I able to share its view in this forum?
Chris Philp
Please do.
Tim Jacques: First—Jonathan touched on this—there have not been occasions thus far when the current burden of proof has prevented the application of a TPIM. In terms of the numbers, there are six now in place in the UK. Neither we nor the Security Service envisage a large increase in those numbers as a result of the provisions in the Bill. The Security Service points to three instances where it thinks this would have utility from an operational perspective. The first is where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing—hypothetically, somebody who we know might be operating online, but our belief is that they are moving towards posing an actual threat on the street with an attack plan in place. If that is very rapid, which it can now be—we have seen instances of that—then being able to use a lower standard of proof is something that MI5 thinks would be of use.
Secondly—Jonathan touched on this too—there is the issue of somebody returning from abroad, who we believe has been involved in terrorist-related activity overseas, and the issues of evidence in that. The Home Secretary can currently impose temporary exclusion orders at the lower standard of proof. If somebody wants to come back and has a right to come back to the UK, they can be imposed on the lower standard of proof. If someone somehow makes it to the UK under the radar or without our knowledge, the higher burden of proof would have to be applied to impose a TPIM. That is the second case that MI5 would point to.
The third issue, which Jonathan also touched on, relates to sensitive material. TPIMs are challengeable and there is an automatic review and so on. The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder, but the lower standard would assist them in their national security role.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: I certainly have a view on that. From a policing perspective—I do not think it is any different for our operational partners—there are two trains in place here: one is punishment and incarceration, which was mentioned earlier; and the other is rehabilitation, desistance and disengagement. Ultimately, the best outcome is the latter: we change the individual’s mindset and view of the world, and mitigate the risk that they pose to the public in an enduring manner. Anything that promotes that prevent, disengagement and deradicalization position is to be welcomed.
Both those options are considered with TPIMs, and indeed with most of the work that we undertake. Both protect the public, if successful. We are conscious of that and drive both of them. Counter-terrorism policing operates across all the Ps of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, called Contest, and prevent and pursue are included in that.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Second sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 25th June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 June 2020 - (25 Jun 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Q
Peter Dawson: Thank you very much for the opportunity to give evidence. The answer, of course, is yes, and I will try to explain why I can say yes with such conviction. Three of my colleagues and a number of close personal friends were present at Fishmongers’ Hall. Had I left my office five minutes earlier that afternoon, I would have been present myself. I have seen the devastation that that crime unleashed on some very close friends, so, absolutely, personal protection is the first priority. Our concern with the Bill, which I am sure we will get the chance to explore, is that aspects of it may not be justified by public protection, and indeed some aspects may undermine it.
Chris Philp
Q
Peter Dawson: It is the only way to be certain for that length of time, but it is not always certain when that length of time comes to an end. This is the dilemma that faces the criminal justice system in every case. Of course, it is brought to the public’s attention by events of this sort, and such events excite particularly strong emotions. Terrorism is a very difficult thing to understand, but a lot of criminal motivations are difficult to understand and to predict, so we have systems that seek to balance the difficulty of that prediction with the rights of the person who has been accused and their right to a future life when they have served their punishment.
The problem with denying all hope of release on a conditional basis by a judgment about whether the person can be released safely or not is that it denies hope and affects the whole of the prison sentence. You will be aware that I spent a good part of my career as a prison governor, and the way in which people can be encouraged and assisted to engage in work that may change their behaviour in the future is if there is something in it for them. The parole process is not just about the judgment at the end of the custodial period; it is about the whole of the sentence from the very first day and doing work that may make a difference and may make the public safer when that person eventually leaves prison. It is a dilemma, but I do not think that the public are best served by saying that we will postpone the moment at which risk arrives without taking the opportunity to reduce that risk. The possibility of parole is essential to the process that reduces risk.
Chris Philp
Q
You mentioned trying to make people safer upon release. What sort of activity is most effective during the prison sentence, whether release comes early or not? What are the most effective interventions that lower risk when they prisoners are released, whenever that release occurs?
Peter Dawson: The most important thing about understanding rehabilitation is that it happens in a community. You must always have one eye on what life is going to be like when that person comes out and what it is about life after release to cause them not to commit crime. That is true for terrorist crimes as well as for all other sorts of crime. There is nothing secret about this: people need somewhere to live, a way to earn their living, and a reason to live in a law-abiding way. Very often, that reason comes from family and from exactly the same things that cause all the rest of us to live the way we do. That means having people who care about you and have an interest in your future, and having a feeling yourself that you have a stake in a future that is law abiding.
You cannot coerce people into rehabilitation. There has been lots of discussion about particular programmes and courses that may assist in that, and across the picture of offending behaviour there are some programmes that have some effect, but we clearly need to be realistic about the impact of those programmes, whether in relation to terrorism or anything else.
First, a successful programme must be built on a research base and a theory of change that makes sense, and that research base is relatively small. Secondly, the programme then has to be delivered according to its manual. The third thing is that the environment in which it is delivered and in which the person lives has to support the aims of the course, and programmes should be audited. That third aspect is really important in this. The aims of the course are to give a person a stake in their society to encourage lawful behaviour, so the authority must be legitimate. The people must go into an environment that treats them fairly and which they feel is fair.
The difficulty with providing no incentive or reward for engagement in that change is that that appears to be unfair. If you add to the difficulties, which are real and difficult for the Prison Service to deal with, a bias against people who have committed offences like this, the danger is that someone can go through a programme and appear to have made progress and then go back into a sentence lasting many years, during which they do not feel treated fairly. None of these programmes cure; some of them have some impact on some people.
The Chair
Order. I have to interrupt there, Mr Dawson, because I am conscious of the time.
The Chair
Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but we really have to press on at this stage. Minister.
Chris Philp
Q
You will be aware that when Parliament passed the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in February, Northern Ireland was excluded because we were concerned about issues of retrospection, owing to the differences in sentencing structure in Northern Ireland compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. Having taken very detailed and extensive further legal advice, the Government now take the view that the measures in the TORER Act can safely be applied to Northern Ireland without engaging in issues of retrospectivity, and the Bill seeks to do that. Is that a conclusion with which you concur?
Les Allamby: Clearly, I have not seen your detailed legal advice, so I do not know, and I would have to reflect on whatever legal advice you received; we have not taken legal advice on the issue ourselves.
The one thing I would say is that, as you know, there will need to be a legislative consent motion on a number of the sentencing provisions and, off the top of my head, I suspect that this provision might be one of them. I know from discussions with the relevant Minister in Northern Ireland, who is publicly opposed to terror etc., that there are some very real practical concerns about extending this Act to Northern Ireland and some potentially unintended consequences.
So I think my answer to the question is this: listen very closely to your counterparts in the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and to the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, as to whether this change is advantageous to the circumstances of Northern Ireland. Frankly, I cannot speak for either the Minister or officials, but I would take very careful cognisance of what they have to say to your own civil service colleagues.
Chris Philp
Q
My final question relates to polygraphs. You mentioned the importance of evidence, and later this afternoon we are seeing a professor who is an expert in this area, as far as evidence is concerned. Would you agree that where polygraphs are used just to provide a bit more background information and perhaps prompt further investigation, rather than being used to have a biting and binding consequence, there can be some value in that, as part of a holistic assessment to work out where more work needs to be done? Nobody is suggesting that it would lead to a direct, binding consequence. Does that give you any assurance?
Les Allamby: It gives me, I have to say, a rather limited measure of reassurance. I say that because it seems to me that if that is the case, then frankly that ought to be written into the Bill. It ought to be clear that the outcome of a polygraph test on its own should not have any adverse impact.
If you are going to introduce polygraph tests, you really should pilot them. I will quickly give you an example. It may seem a slightly odd analogy, but I used to sit on the Social Security Advisory Committee, and I remember being told many years ago by the Department for Work and Pensions that it was looking at voice recognition, as a way of starting to tell whether somebody might be telling the truth or not. Great play was made about that approach as a possible way forward in fraud detection, etc. It unravelled as the evidence became clearer that there were significant flaws in using that technology for making assumptions about whether individuals were telling the truth.
I cannot draw any objective scientific comparison between voice recognition and polygraphs, but it is a cautionary tale of rushing into using technology without piloting it and really considering what other safeguards you should have before using it.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Les Allamby: Yes, certainly. One concern is the relative absence of safeguards around extending it beyond two years. I think there ought to be additional judicial safeguards. There ought to be a test, if you are going to extend beyond two years, as to whether there is a compelling basis for doing so.
I have concerns that the loosening of the test from the balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion. I note that we have slalomed, going back to control orders, as to what the required burden of proof is. I note the issues David Anderson raised. I also noted that the European convention on human rights memorandum issued by the Department suggested that things had changed between 2015 and 2020, but I am unsure whether that change is sufficiently compelling to reduce the test from balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion.
TPIMs are used in a very small number of cases. They are oppressive. None the less, they are utilised on a sparing basis. But you need additional safeguards, if you will extend them beyond two years. Two years is a significant period of time in someone’s life to restrict their freedom of movement and their liberty, to the extent that TPIMs currently do, bearing in mind some of the additional provisions that will now be contained in TPIMs.
Chris Philp
Q
Les Allamby: I think that is helpful—I would like to see any of those kinds of intentions in the Bill—but I come back to my fundamental point, which is that, as far as I understand it, the polygraph test is still untried in terms of its complete veracity, and we are using technology that has not been piloted in those circumstances. Frankly, if we are going to move to polygraph tests in those circumstances, I would much prefer them to be piloted, so we could then make a genuinely informed decision about their value before we start to take decisions that may have significant consequences.
Conor McGinn
Q
Les Allamby: Conor, I honestly do not know; I have not had discussions with either the PSNI or Garda Síochána on those arrangements. I certainly do not detect from PSNI a great deal of desire to see those kinds of arrangements in place, which I certainly do not think will be enhanced, but I cannot comment meaningfully on that.
One thing that I would say is that the much more significant issue for us in terms of cross-border co-operation—it is outwith your Committee—is reaching effective security and justice arrangements when we leave the European Union at the end of December. Northern Ireland’s land border with another member state creates a full range of issues that I think are slightly different for the rest of the UK. I have not detected in public discourse anything to suggest that, but “I don’t know” is a shorter and more succinct answer.
The Chair
Michael Clancy is the director of law reform at the Law Society of Scotland. Good afternoon, Mr Clancy.
Michael Clancy: Good afternoon, Chair; good afternoon everyone.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: Thank you, Mr Philp. To answer about projecting what the effect of legislation will be on protecting the public and making people safer is quite difficult, because for me, as an individual, it would certainly be speculation to say that the Bill would protect people. Legislation has limited effect in terms of it being passed; it really has to be brought into effect and made to work through enforcement for the real impact to be felt. That is part of the issue about whether or not people would be protected by the Bill. It may be some time before we can turn around and do adequate research on the implementation of the measures in order to assume that people have, since its enactment, been better protected than they were before. It is difficult for me to comment on that.
That having been said, I know that sociologists and criminologists have been looking at this kind of things. In one article I picked up latterly, entitled “Does Terrorism Dominate Citizens’ Hearts or Minds? The Relationship between Fear of Terrorism and Trust in Government” by Ramon van der Does. He came to the conclusion that
“Despite its well-known effects on public health, safety, and finances, we still know little about how fear of terrorism can be mitigated.”
That might go some way to edging to an answer to the Minister’s question. Every Bill is good in parts, and has good parts, parts that can be improved by amendment during its passage and parts that, in some instances, should not be legislated at all. So, as you can tell from the Law Society of Scotland’s memorandum on the Bill, we take very much that kind of view.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: I certainly agree that, for those who are convicted of serious terrorist offences, keeping them in prison for a longer time means that they are not at liberty to commit other terrorist offences. Whether that actually means that they have no influence on others in the commission of terrorist offences—either those they meet in prison who are on their way towards release, or those with whom they can communicate outside prison while they are serving their sentence—is another matter.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: Of course you can ask me, Minister. That is certainly something I will take back and think about, because I was not aware that that evidence had been given this morning. I should say that this is, of course, a civil law provision, not a criminal law provision, in terms of the standard of proof. Of course we have to take into account the views of the counter-terrorism police experts and weigh them very heavily, but it is a different environment, in one sense, from the environment that the police are used to operating in—namely, beyond reasonable doubt. But I take your point and will give that some further thought.
Chris Philp
Q
To give you further reassurance perhaps, the lower burden of proof, reasonable suspicion, is of course not a new burden of proof, because the old control orders, in force from 2005—they were introduced by the then Labour Government—and carrying on until 2012, had the same lower burden of proof, reasonable suspicion. This morning, I asked Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer, whether he was aware of any problems that occurred during that seven-year period, 2005 to 2012, when that lower burden of proof was in force, and he was unaware of any issues caused by it. Does that give you further reassurance?
Michael Clancy: It does. Of course, set against that is the fact that very few of these orders were in place at that time. I think that, in doing some reading in advance of this session, I saw numbers in the mid-40s—46 orders or something like that. If they are going to be used at that kind of level of exercise, it is clearly going to impact on a smaller group of people. Small does not mean insignificant, in this circumstance, but we will just have to wait and see what the evidence of their use produces.
Chris Philp
Q
I have one final point. You mentioned concerns about renewal. Of course, renewal, under these proposals, would take place annually. And you mentioned a few moments ago judicial oversight as a concern. Of course, the subject of the TPIM can at any time bring a legal challenge against the use of the TPIM if they feel that it has become unfair. Does the availability of that mechanism to bring a challenge give you reassurance that the subject of the TPIM does have recourse to the courts, and can be protected by a judge, if he or she feels that that is necessary?
Michael Clancy: Well, of course, yes, it gives me some reassurance. I am glad to hear you make such a clear statement of the interpretation of the Bill. Certainly, the TPIM is reduced for one year, but it is capable of being made indefinite. If one were to take action—as you have suggested someone who is subject to one of these orders might take action—it might be the case that the judge would only be able to quash the TPIM rather than make any variation. That might be a solution that we would mutually accept, but there may be implications from that I suppose.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: I have no evidence. As I have said, the important thing would be to see how this change to the legislation works and then, in a shortish period of time—between two to five years—think in terms of having some kind of post-legislative review, which would enable us to see whether this legislation had functioned properly and had met the objectives that the Committee has been discussing this afternoon of making people safer and protecting them. Then we can come to a view as to whether or not that change in the standard of proof was the right one.
The Chair
We now come to our final witness of the day, Professor Donald Grubin of Newcastle University, who has had the benefit of hearing some of the exchanges earlier. Let us begin.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I am a professor of forensic psychiatry, so I am a psychiatrist and not a polygraph examiner. I became interested in polygraph testing about 20 years ago in relation to work with offenders. What I found was that polygraph testing was being used very widely in the United States to monitor offenders. The people using it said, “This is fantastic. If they took it away, I would quit.” They would make comments like that, but the academics felt that there was no evidence for it and a lot of what we are hearing today is that it is not reliable. A lot of those issues were repeated. I became interested in that difference. We began to run some studies here in the UK. Gradually over time, a lot of evidence accumulated to show that it was a very effective means of monitoring and managing offenders in the community.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: The first thing to say is that there is a lot of misunderstanding about polygraph testing. We heard a lot of that earlier today, and I get very frustrated, because those same comments get repeated and repeated. There is also a lot of confusion about polygraph testing—what it is, what it does and how it is used.
In essence, all polygraph testing does is provide additional information—information gain—and it does that in two main ways. One is the test outcome, which people often get tied up in—is somebody lying or telling the truth?—but it is also about disclosures. The two are complementary. What every study ever carried out on polygraph testing has found is that when people are having a polygraph, they make disclosures. All the studies we have done here, and indeed the implementation of polygraph testing here with sex offenders, has found the same thing.
There was a comment that this has not been piloted, but we have now run about 5,000 tests in probation, with mandatory tests on sex offenders. We have tested over 2,000 individuals and the police, with voluntary testing, have tested about 1,000 individuals and run about 2,000 tests. We have a lot of information, and again we find that about 60% to 70% of tests result in new information that was not known before and is important to management.
The other aspect, of course, is test outcome. People always want to know how accurate it is, and we know —we have very good estimates. The best study was a comprehensive review carried out by the National Research Council in the United States about 20 years ago, when it was being raised for security vetting in Government agencies. It looked at all the available evidence and found it was between 80% and 90% accurate. That means it gets it wrong about one in five or one in 10 times, but that is a lot better than we can do.
The main question then is: is that accurate enough for the application you want to put it to? What we are talking about is post-release, post-conviction testing as part of monitoring offenders, and in that capacity it is being used alongside a number of other aspects of offender management. You are not relying on the polygraph either to clear someone or to send them back to prison or anything like that; it is not used in that way. It is just additional information that can be added. If you think about different sorts of results that you might get, if somebody, say, passes a polygraph test—I do not like to use the term pass, but I will for simplicity’s sake—and they do not make any disclosures and there are no other concerns about the individual, that provides reassurance that you are not missing anything; it is an agreement with everything else. If, on the other hand, you get some disclosures, that is something that can be investigated further. If somebody fails the polygraph, so they are thought to be lying, and there are already concerns, again, that reinforces that, but if there are not, the polygraph may be wrong—it may be one of the one in five or one in 10 times we have gotten it wrong—but it may also suggest that you need to look at it a bit closer and investigate further.
There were comments before about how if somebody fails a polygraph they are brought back to prison or brought before the courts. That is just not the policy, and we have heard that in the legislation that just does not happen. It is simply a warning sign that you had better take a closer look. Again, we have a lot of evidence from the testing we have done in this country—as I said, over 7,000 tests have been run—to show that that is in fact how things are working.
Can I say one last thing? We often present polygraph testing as if it is something that offenders do not like and is being imposed on them. That is true for some, but others actually find it useful. You have to remember that sometimes you catch people telling the truth, and where you have an individual who is being monitored, because a risk is a great cause of concern and there is a suspicion of them all the time, and they can demonstrate that they are actually not doing anything wrong and their risk is static or decreasing, that is very useful for them. We have anecdotal evidence of offenders saying they found that part of the testing helpful, and they like polygraph tests for that reason—because they can prove that they are following the rules.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: It is fair, except that I would say it is more than a prompt and that it actually uncovers information. You have to remember that a lot of this management relies on self-reports, so it is a way of saying, “We’re asking these questions anyway, only now we want you to tell the truth and we have a way of trying to determine whether you are telling the truth.” The other aspect, of course, which is often overlooked is its deterrence effect. If you know you are going to have a polygraph test, you are going to pay a lot closer attention to your activities, your actions and your behaviour. Again, we have a lot of anecdotal evidence—it is very difficult to prove—that people do modify their behaviour, because they know they are going to have a polygraph test.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: There are a couple of aspects to the answer to that. First, there is no reason to think it would not work similarly with terrorist offenders. They are people and they respond to polygraph testing like anybody else. It is used with terrorist offenders in other countries, but the problem is that that sort of work is not published. My understanding of it is anecdotal and what people have told me. They certainly find that its use is successful, and they get the same types of response that you would expect from the sex offender work. There is no real difference there. But none of that is published, so it is anecdotal.
One other thing to say from the sex offender work is that we looked at whether, after polygraph tests, there was an increase in actions taken by the probation officers managing those people. You get an increase by a factor of 10, sometimes higher, in actions taken. That does not necessarily mean recall to prison or charging with a new offence, but actions that mean you have an opportunity to reduce risk, which is really what you are looking for here. With any sort of offence where you have time to intervene, polygraph testing provides a good means to get that information to allow you to intervene and reduce risk.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I will give you a couple of examples of that, but the first thing to say is that we do not know why it happens. There are various psychological attempts to explain it, but I know that I have been polygraph tested as part of our training and it was all I could do not to confess to the crime that I was meant to have committed. There is a real urge to disclose that I do not really understand, but there are various theories that I am happy to discuss later on.
To give you a couple of examples off the top of my head, one interesting case was a sex offender who was released from prison. Everything was thought to be going well with him. He disclosed that he had a new girlfriend, which was not known to the offender manager. That seems pretty mundane, but when they found this girlfriend it turned out that she was a single mother, that she was a vulnerable woman, and that this man was visiting her and helping her to paint her sitting room. He would do that in his underwear because he did not want to get his clothes painted. Her daughter was present at that time. A lot of that mirrored the way he had offended before, so that one disclosure about having a new girlfriend led to that man being recalled to prison —not based directly on the disclosure, but only indirectly, once the girlfriend was found and interviewed.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I am not sure just what you would mean. I can tell you, because I checked these figures before I came, that in the probation testing about 65% of tests resulted in new disclosures in the pre-test. That is information that was important to management but was not known. That might be small bits of information or it might be big bits. After someone fails a test, they are asked to explain why that might be, and about 60% of those tests result in further disclosures to try to explain that. What I cannot say is how many of those were in tests where there were no pre-test disclosures, so it is likely that about two thirds or 70% of tests result in new information.
Chris Philp
Wow. Thank you.
Professor Grubin: That does not count something that I think is important but that is always overlooked: the truthful tests with no disclosures that provide reassurance, because decisions can be made on that. In the police world, they do voluntary testing of sex offenders on the register. Someone who is on the register for 15 years and wants to come off it may have been visited once a year for the past five years; there may be no intelligence on him, and an inspector is expected to sign off this person based on that information. If he passes a polygraph test and nothing of concern comes up, that gives them reassurance. Often, though, in those cases we find that bits of information do come up that they should have been aware of, and then they can move forward.
The Chair
Order. I am going to have to stop you there because we have run out of time. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence, Professor Grubin.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove).
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Third sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 30th June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 June 2020 - (30 Jun 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
Thank you very much. We will start with questions. We have until 9.55 am, when we have to end the session bang on the dot. First, I will ask the Minister if he would like to ask some questions.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Thank you. That is most welcome, and it will be appreciated.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Sure. It is very much intelligence led and risk based. Throughout a TACT offender’s sentence, they will be allocated a key worker officer, who will get to know them and help them through their sentence plan. During that sentence plan, they will be offered the opportunity to address their offending behaviour, and they will be offered two deradicalisation programmes while they are in custody.
Staff will observe their behaviour on the wings, and who they mix with, and they will submit intelligence reports on a regular basis, specifically if they have concerns around radical behaviour while an offender is in custody. That will then lead to a multi-agency approach, and when the offender is coming up to their release point with the Parole Board, we put in place MAPPA arrangements. We will have reports from prison officers, psychologists, psychiatrists and healthcare, and we will liaise with security services, and a full picture will be presented prior to that person’s release.
As we have just witnessed with the Streatham attacker, he left prison as a high-risk, category A offender. The intelligence and the risks that we highlighted to the security services led to him being monitored 24 hours a day, because he was a significant risk to the public. When you look at it in that vein, what we did was appropriate and led to an atrocity being avoided because of the swift reaction. So I think we have got the risk part of the sentence planning really sufficient while in custody.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, that is correct, even—[Inaudible] —reached the halfway point, because legislation dictated that we had no option but to do that. The intelligence we had gathered on his antisocial behaviour and radical behaviour in prison led the Security Service to believe that they were right in following and monitoring him upon his release so extensively. That would be the case in this situation as well. I believe that, with this Bill, at the two-thirds point, people must go through a parole process.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: That is a really valid point, and these concerns have been expressed from the frontline. I can give you an example. At the moment, if we are going to extend the sentences, and we are going to insist that the most serious offenders spend the entire sentence in prison, that will increase headroom in the high-security estate. Also, it incentivises people not to behave correctly or to go on deradicalisation courses.
For example, at the moment, we have funding, and we should have open three separation centres, but we have only got one, with a small number of the most influential and serious terrorist offenders, in play. That leads to serious concerns from my members who are in that separation centre at HMP Frankland, because we are now in a situation where the prisoners who are housed there are not engaging with staff whatever. We have had a really violent assault on a prison officer, and there is nowhere to transfer those prisoners to if they show violence towards staff or if they become a security risk. That is why we need more separation centres open, especially with the implementation of this Bill. More concerningly, there is now no incentive for good behaviour.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I think the separation centres are the key. We need three open because, as you are all aware, the rise of the far right is a real concern for the security services. It would be unwise to put high-profile far-right extremist offenders in the same separation centre as Islamist extremist offenders, with staff stuck in the middle. That is the key point here.
To come to your point, what can we do to incentivise people to take part in deradicalisation courses if they know they are going to serve their full sentence? All we can do on the frontline is our best, and that is to try to engage with people, get to know them and encourage them to take part in deradicalisation. We involve imams and community groups to come in and speak to these people. We just keep chipping away, because it is down to the individual. Only the individual can change. We can encourage them to change. We can give them the ideas to change and the courses to help them change, but it is down to the individual. The biggest fear from the frontline is, “If I know, as a terrorist offender, that I am going to serve my full sentence, and I am not going to get any chance of early release, I might totally disengage, and that might reinforce my radical views, which leads me to a disruptive life inside.” That is the biggest fear.
Chris Philp
I understand, although, of course, if they step over the criminal threshold, they will be prosecuted. Equally, there is no value in people pretending to engage with deradicalisation programmes just to secure early release, so we need to be mindful of that risk as well. Thank you, Mr Fairhurst.
The Chair
We have until 10.25 am for this session. Professor Acheson, thank you very much for joining us. Would you like to introduce yourself and your organisation briefly, please?
Professor Acheson: My name is Ian Acheson. I used to be a frontline prison officer, so I would like to be associated with the comments that were made this morning. They are the unsung heroes of our criminal justice system, often overlooked and certainly undervalued. They do an amazing job.
I worked in the Prison Service as an officer and then as a governor. I left it and joined the Home Office via the Youth Justice Board, where I was the senior civil servant responsible for the Contest strategy, our counter-terrorism strategy, among other things in south-west England. After that, I joined the Equality and Human Rights Commission as the chief operating officer and I left public service then. I now work for a variety of organisations, including the Counter Extremism Project, which is an international non-profit organisation that looks at ways of countering violent extremism. I am also a visiting professor at Staffordshire University School of Law, Forensics and Policing.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Acheson: The Prison Service, as we are all aware, is under a great deal of pressure, certainly in England and Wales. The backdrop is what I would describe as a significant decline in all sorts of metrics of good order, discipline and control across most, but not all, prisons. That provides a backdrop of instability, which is germane to your question. We need to have stable, well-run prisons with suitable and sufficient numbers of staff present to set the tone, to be able to control the environment and certainly to be able to spot and intervene early when they see signs of extremist-related behaviour, whether from prisoners imprisoned under terrorism legislation or others who look like they are being drawn into violent extremism.
One of the problems that I have with the system is that we do not seem to have an assertive and challenging approach to managing terrorist prisoners, or ideologically motivated prisoners, from the start of their sentence to their last day in community supervision. The system is fraught with problems of handovers between the Prison Service, the Parole Board and the probation service. I do not believe that that system of managing a particular set of prisoners with some unique characteristics is the right way of proceeding.
I would like to see a dedicated unit, if you will—I recommended that in my 2016 report; unfortunately it was not one of the recommendations that was taken forward—that manages offenders end to end, from literally the first night in custody to the last night of community sentence, and that has a detailed biographical understanding of a prisoner. That involves specialists, psychiatrists, theologians and various people intervening but managing that prisoner all the way through into the community.
Mark Fairhurst mentioned the importance of reintegration after custody for terrorist offenders. In some respects, integration is the key challenge as well. At the moment, the state has a monopoly on the management of terrorist offenders after custody in terms of MAPPA, where the probation service, the police and the Security Service manage the security aspects. There are no other organisations, apart from some voluntary organisations that are involved in the desistance and disengagement programme. We do not have any community involvement in the resettlement of terrorist offenders and their reintegration in the community. That is a big issue that needs to be addressed.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Acheson: In relation to terrorist offenders, for example, the situation feels to me as though, as long as they are not creating any problems, they are largely left alone. When they start to create problems, there are alternatives, which could include segregation, administrative penalties or incentives and earned privileges penalties. In extremis, if they are subversive—this was one of my recommendations that was taken forward, as you might be aware—separation centres exist for them.
We need to make sure that we look at it from the sentencing point. To illustrate it like this: what is really important is that we have got some sort of baseline measurement for a judge, after a conviction, to inform sentencing. We do not have that at the moment. We do have pre-sentence reports, I understand that, but we do not have a sufficient level of granularity or expertise put into that plan, which is the baseline measurement of dangerousness, for any terrorist offenders.
As you are aware, they are a very heterogeneous group. They resist being compartmentalised. We have people who murder people who are losers and we have people who murder people who are university graduates. There is an enormous variety and it resists generic sheep dip-style approaches. I am afraid I would categorise healthy identity intervention as one of those processes that I do not think works. We need to go back to having this baseline measurement at the start, managed by one unit all the way through that is frequently looking at whether dangerousness has increased or decreased, and devising and managing interventions to meet that individual pathology, that individual terrorist profile.
I am aware that Lord King has said in Parliament that you are recruiting some prison imams to take part in ideological interventions. That is very good news—so, theological, psychological, family-related and substance misuse. It is important to look at these people as individuals if you want to reduce their dangerousness. It is important to look at that dangerousness as early as possible, with the right people managing it all the way through.
As I have said before—I do not want to repeat myself—I think the system is far too fractured at the moment. We are only talking about 220-odd offenders at the moment, with the Government making what I think is the fairly optimistic estimate of an extra 50 as a result of the new legislation. It will increase because of the police and security services’ ability to spot people further and further upstream from actual terrorist incidents. That number will increase, but it is still a manageable number and it is still worth while investing significantly.
I am not a great fan of the statistic that is bandied about that says that only 5% to 10% of terrorist offenders reoffend after custody. That is a proven reconviction for a terrorist offence. That is a very lazy proxy for damage. If you apply that to our number of offenders, that means there are another 11 Sudesh Ammans in the system. That is completely intolerable and unacceptable. I do not think we should be comforted by the fact that some research is showing us that recidivism is fairly low. There is research in Europe that says that the period immediately following release of a terrorist offender is the period of most risk. That does not fit the profile of the Westminster bridge attacker, who waited for 11 or 12 months before something mobilised him into murdering two young people. We have to apply a very individualised, very assertive and challenging approach.
You talked about incentives and so on earlier with Mark Fairhurst. I think that might be looking at it in slightly the wrong way. I have a bit of a problem with the philosophical and organisational fitness of the Prison Service, the probation service and the Parole Board to manage these particular offenders. They are ideologically inspired offenders. We must insist they adopt civilised values, not look at it as a thing that needs to be rewarded. That is very difficult. I am not suggesting it is simple.
Just to avoid any misunderstanding, in my specification for separation centres, I specifically designed a regime—and suggested this to the Prison Service—that was not punitive and which was, as I have described it, a humanised approach. We cannot talk to dead terrorists; we can talk to live ones. We can find out an enormous amount. We can influence them an enormous amount with the right skills and the right staffing to be able to have a good sense of how dangerous they are and influence them towards disengagement, or desistance if disengagement is not possible.
The Chair
I suspect that your evidence is extremely useful to the Committee, but I have to ask for slightly shorter answers, please.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: That is a crucial question. Probably one of the starting points—this has been touched on by some of the others who gave evidence—is how the UK sits in terms of the international approach to dealing with terrorism among violent extremist offenders. Overall, you would probably argue that the UK’s approach is seen as one of the better available approaches and enjoys what is seen internationally as a good success rate. I know that that is difficult to consider in the context of the attacks that took place in Streatham and London Bridge, but overall the UK’s system for dealing with terrorist prisoners is seen as one of the more effective ones available internationally.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: The approach has transformed a lot in the past 10 years. There has been a variety of ways in which it has changed. I am particularly looking at the approach in England and Wales here. First is the development of specialised risk assessment tools and frameworks for dealing with terrorist prisoners. There was recognition in the 2000s that the existing risk assessment tools did not work well with terrorist prisoners and that they needed something that was more specialised to more reliably assess risk with them. This led to the development of the extremism risk guidance 22+—the ERG—which is a bespoke risk assessment tool now used in England and Wales. In my view it has genuinely enhanced and transformed risk assessment for these prisoners, making it much more viable compared with what it had been prior to the introduction of this programme.
Tied into the development of the ERG has been the development of a number of interventions. The healthy identity intervention has already been mentioned, and desistance and disengagement has been flagged as well. The healthy identity intervention draws on the ERG, so the two of them are linked to some degree. HII has come in for criticism, but it is actually a much better intervention than perhaps it gets credit for. It tackles a lot of the issues that we are concerned about in terms of offender radicalisation. I have had the opportunity of being able to interview prisoners before and after they have gone on this programme, and certainly in many cases I have seen a transformational change in prisoners.
The other factor—this has also been raised in other testimony before the Committee—relates to post-release behaviour by prisoners. We have an extremely low reoffending rate for terrorist prisoners in the UK, which we should not dismiss out of hand. If we could get similarly low levels of reoffending for other types of offenders, we would be extremely happy.
Failures with interventions—such as a prisoner taking an intervention, being released and then reoffending—does not mean that the intervention itself is useless or ineffective in the majority of cases for people who use it. We should reflect that all the interventions used in the prison system, for a whole range of offences, have their failures. This does not mean that we should stop using them or abandon them or view them as unhelpful in the majority of cases.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: It is a complicated question. In general, I agree with Mark Fairhurst’s point that the potential for early release is an important incentive for behaviour in custody. If we lose the potential for early release, we are losing a tool from the toolbox, and we need to question whether that is sensible, or whether there are advantages in keeping it in some shape or form.
Does false compliance happen? Yes, it certainly does, but if we look at reoffending stats, compliance seems to be genuine in most cases. Nobody has a 100% effective intervention for dealing with these types of prisoner or any other type of prisoner, so we should never expect an intervention to be 100% accurate. However, the stats suggest that what is happening in prison with most terrorist prisoners is currently effective, and so if we are making changes to the regime and to the interventions, we need to have a careful think about what the knock-on consequences might be.
Personally, I prefer still to have the potential for early release at some stage as a tool in the toolbox for these serious offenders. I think it can make a difference in some cases. From my perspective, the Parole Board usually brings a serious and considered assessment of the available evidence in a particular case, which is often very welcome. Again, by removing that from the equation, are we losing something that has value?
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Silke: The problems are relatively new. My view is that they work far better than most members of the general public want to think. Again, the proof is in the very low reconviction rates that we see after people have been released. If it is working in the vast majority of cases, that is an encouraging sign. If there are failures, we need to look into that. One thing that the Bill does not do in its current format is try to identify what is different about the failures compared with the rest of the prisoners who are being released—what went wrong in their cases compared to the others? I am not sure that we are getting at that at the moment.
The evidence base around both risk assessment and interventions for terrorist prisoners is in development. It is massively better today than 10 years ago, and I think it will continue to improve. I know that the Ministry of Justice is involved in a range of programmes to improve the evidence base around ERG and healthy identity intervention, which I strongly welcome. Many Governments are involved in similar efforts overseas.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Fourth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 30th June 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 June 2020 - (30 Jun 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, in our line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I thank the shadow Minister for his opening remarks, in which he expressed general support for the objectives of the Bill. I hope that we can, as he said, provide an example of constructive cross-party working, although I am sure he will have many questions about the detail. As the shadow Minister has said, and as the hon. Member for Coventry North West said in her speech, the threat that terrorism poses is a serious one, and one of our heaviest responsibilities as Members of Parliament is to protect our fellow citizens from such attacks, but in a way that is lawful, fair and just.
Amendment 35 seeks to specify a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in making the terrorist connection, as clause 1 does. I am happy to confirm for the shadow Minister that existing criminal court procedure already requires the criminal standard of proof to be met in making a determination of a terrorist connection, or indeed any finding of fact in relation to sentencing. If, after conviction by a jury, there is a finding of fact to be made by the judge prior to sentencing in what is known as a “Newton” hearing, under existing procedures the criminal standard of proof is applied. On the request that the shadow Minister and his colleagues make, I am happy to confirm that it is already inherent in the operation of our criminal justice system, and rightly so, for all the reasons that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Coventry North West have outlined. I trust that on the basis of that assurance they will see fit not to press the amendment, given that the provision they call for is already enshrined in law.
One further point: both the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Coventry North West raised the question of what happens if the judge makes an error or exhibits some form of conscious or unconscious bias. That is extremely rare, but, if it did happen, there are of course appeal rights against both the sentence and any erroneous finding of fact associated with it. If a defendant or, by this point, an offender who has been convicted feels that the sentence is genuinely unfair or that an unfair determination has been made of a terrorist connection, they can appeal, so a safety mechanism by way of appeal also exists. I hope that on that basis the shadow Minister will not press the amendment to a vote.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. He believes that the matters are already covered in existing law, but perhaps he will accept that later in the Bill we will be discussing how we make sure that what has happened over a period of time has in fact demonstrated that the judges have got it right. In other words, we will revisit this matter with a view to seeking a form of review of how the legislation is working to ensure that we do not have the particular problems that might well be possible. I am also grateful to him for reminding us that in criminal proceedings we still have an appeal process in this country, and I am sure that that would operate appropriately. On the basis of what the Minister has said and on the basis that we will seek reassurance through a review process later in the Bill, I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for his detailed exposition of some of the risks that we must seek to navigate and overcome. For justice to function, we must make sure that it is truly even-handed and fair in assessing anyone who comes before the court, regardless of their background, race or religion.
Taiwo Owatemi
Is the Minister not concerned that, without proper consideration of the impact of the Bill on many BAME communities, relationships between these communities and authorities may worsen?
Chris Philp
Let me come on to that point, which is the substance of the amendment. The amendment calls for an assessment prior to the clause coming into effect; it does not ask for an assessment afterwards but beforehand. I submit to the Committee that the impact assessment published with the Bill and the accompanying equality statement, which looks specifically at questions of racial and religious discrimination—or the potential for those things to happen—has already thoroughly analysed the Bill’s potential impact. That detailed analysis, which obviously included a review by Government lawyers and others, concluded that nothing in the Bill would unlawfully discriminate against people of a particular ethnic or religious background within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010.
Of course, the provisions in the Bill are simply based on a measure of criminality—has somebody committed a specified offence? Is there a terrorist connection? Nothing in any of those provisions is biased for or against anyone from any particular background, as is the case with all laws that Parliament passes.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister says that nothing in the Bill would lead to further discrimination. I should hope that that would be the case for any legislation we pass. However, the fact remains that there are certain groups within our society—BAME and other groups—who are disproportionately disadvantaged in the legal system. The amendment asks the Minister to recognise that there could be even more of that as a direct result of the provisions of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Where there are concerns of the nature of those raised in the Lammy review, which I think the shadow Minister or the hon. Member for Coventry North West mentioned earlier, the Government are committed to responding to those. Indeed, in a sense, we are in the wrong room in Parliament today to raise that, because there was an urgent question earlier on exactly that topic, to which the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) responded.
The Government are committed to acting in response to the Lammy review to make sure that no unconscious biases discriminate against any particular group. I have not had a chance to read the Hansard of the debate, and I suspect the shadow Minister has not either, but based on the conversations that I have heard taking place in the Ministry of Justice, I think that the Government generally and the Ministry of Justice in particular are committed to taking action where needed. I would have expected the response of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham to the urgent question an hour or two ago to have confirmed that.
Alex Cunningham
The fact remains that the Lammy review talked about a whole range of provisions that were supposed to be implemented, but very few of them have been. Some have been partially implemented and others have not. Can the Minister simply accept that we are failing as a Government and a Parliament to ensure that discrimination does not exist in our system? We are simply not taking the action to do that. Does he further accept that the more legislation we have where particular groups of people, BAME or otherwise, feel that they are being discriminated against, the greater the discord in society?
Chris Philp
Recent events obviously tell us how important it is to maintain social cohesion and confidence in the criminal justice system. The hon. Gentleman raises a point that goes far beyond the scope of the Bill, but it is a fair point none the less. If he listens to what my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, my fellow Justice Minister, said in the House of Commons Chamber earlier, he will see that the Government are resolved to act where necessary to address issues of that kind.
The substance of the Bill is obviously public protection. It makes no distinction between any kind of terrorism, whether rooted in a twisted religious ideology or a far-right ideology, or terrorist acts committed for any other reason. The Bill, as with all Bills, as the hon. Gentleman says, is even-handed between different kinds of offence and different kinds of offenders. Where we need to do more systemically, not just in relation to the Bill but across the whole range of the criminal justice system, to make sure that everybody gets a fair hearing and fair treatment, the Government will do that. I hope that the response of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham to the urgent question earlier will give assurance on that point. No doubt there will be many more opportunities to debate it.
Chris Philp
On the specific question of amendment 36 to clause 1 and amendment 42 to clause 21, which call for an impact assessment prior to the commencement of those clauses, I repeat what I said earlier. We have already done that. It has been published as the impact assessment together with the Bill and the equality statement that went with it. The obligation being requested by the amendments has already been discharged, but of course we must remain mindful, as the shadow Minister eloquently said, of potential unconscious biases. We must be vigilant and make sure that our justice system is not in any way besmirched by them. I am confident that the measures my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham laid out earlier will achieve that.
Alex Cunningham
I am sorry that the Minister would not give way, because I wanted to press him on that particular matter. We have several days of debate, so we have plenty of time to deal with these issues. It is a bit disappointing.
Chris Philp
I apologise; I did not realise that the hon. Gentleman was trying to intervene. Had I realised, I would, of course, have given way.
Alex Cunningham
Fair enough; I accept that.
The Minister was talking about how the Bill is important for public protection and I agree. It is essential to protect the interests of the public, but if the Bill results in a growing number of terrorists in prison, and if we are releasing into the community people who are still radicalised—or even new people who they managed to radicalise when they were in prison—perhaps public protection will not gain in the way that the Government hope.
I accept the Minister’s statement that he believes the law covers that, but I am disappointed that we cannot accept that a review, although it might cost a few pounds and take some time to commission, would at least give us some information to enable us to understand how well or how badly the legislation is working. I accept what he said, however, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We touched on many of the purposes of clause 1 in our debate on amendments 35 and 36. Very briefly, clause 1 seeks to give judges the power to make a factual finding after conviction that a particular offence has a terrorist connection, to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, as has been discussed, rather than simply referring to a fixed schedule of offences. If, for example, somebody commits an offence that is a serious offence but is not currently on the list of terrorist offences, the finding of terrorist connection can none the less be made. That has consequences in the rest of the Bill, and we will debate them in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 2
Meaning of “serious terrorism offence”: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The purpose of clause 2 is to create new categories of offences in relation to the new serious terrorism sentences. It defines the meaning of a “serious terrorism offence” in England and Wales, so that a sentencing court can establish whether an offender has committed a qualifying offence for the purpose of applying the serious terrorism sentence, which we will discuss more in due course.
The clause will amend section 306 of the sentencing code to include a new category of serious terrorism offence, with two subsets of offences: those in part 1 of schedule 17A, which specifies offences with a life penalty that are terrorist or terrorist-related; and those in part 2, which specifies offences with a life penalty that may be found to have a designated terrorist connection further to section 69 of the sentencing code, as amended.
Clause 2 inserts new schedule 17A into the sentencing code that is currently making its way through Parliament, so that those offences can be identified as serious terrorism offences by the sentencing court for the purposes of setting a serious terrorism sentence or, alternatively, an extended sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 3
Offences relevant for provisions of this Act relating to Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 3 has essentially the same purpose as clause 2. Clause 2 applied to England and Wales; clause 3 does essentially the same thing in relation to Northern Ireland, by amending article 12 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
There is a specific point on this and some other measures in this Bill pertaining to Northern Ireland: they will require a legislative consent motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly. To start as we mean to go on, and so that I do not have to ask the Minister this at every juncture, will he outline what representations he has received from the Northern Ireland Executive, specifically the Justice Minister? For the benefit of the Committee, will he also set out what it means to have to go through the legislative consent motion process?
Chris Philp
Under the Sewel convention, where a provision in UK legislation touches on a matter that is devolved to one of the nations of the United Kingdom, one applies for a legislative consent motion. Most of the Bill, relating as it does to terrorist offences, is reserved to the UK Government, but some relatively limited elements of it touch on matters that are ordinarily devolved. For them, we will of course seek a legislative consent motion under the Sewel convention. In that context, we have made contact with the Scottish Government in Holyrood and with the Northern Ireland Administration—in particular, with Justice Minister Naomi Long. We have entered into fairly extensive correspondence, which is ongoing, about the provisions in the Bill. The Justice Minister in Northern Ireland has raised various matters, which she has asked questions about, asked for clarification about and wanted to discuss further. Those discussions and that correspondence are ongoing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 4
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 4, page 5, line 32, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”
Ruth Cadbury
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. As others have said, it would have been better if there had been proper risk assessments of a number of aspects of the Bill, because many clauses do not seem to be evidence-based. We know that we have funding problems within the prison system. We know that we have, as we heard this morning, disjoints between various elements of the course through the system for offenders. There is an awful lot of work to do, and there are a number of respects in which I do not feel that the Bill is fit for purpose. It would have been better if it had been based on proper evidence of what works to reduce the threat to the public and improve rehabilitation.
Children have long been treated differently in sentencing considerations, and the amendments would enable particular considerations for young adults, particularly of their maturity. Mr Hall, the independent reviewer, was concerned that, unless these considerations are taken into account, we risk locking people up for too long, building bitterness and a refusal to engage in the prison system, and actually, on eventual release, potentially a greater risk. He considered that longer and more punitive sentences do not in themselves ensure that people are less dangerous on release, and that while extending sentences for serious offenders may, of course, keep them out of our harm’s way for a temporary period, we do not want them to leave prison more dangerous than when they entered.
Early release provides prisoners with the incentive to behave and show that they are capable of reform. We heard powerful evidence that prison staff are at increased risk of harm where hope is lost. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North said, many studies show that young terrorist offenders are much more likely to reform than older offenders, yet the Bill treats a young adult who has just turned 18 the same as an older offender. Are the Secretary of State and the Minister concerned that the Bill effectively gives up on those offenders?
We need to look at the evidence, not the tabloids. We need a flexible response that is offender-based, and it must be tailored. If we really want to enable rehabilitation and reduce the harm to the public, I hope that the Minister will consider the amendment.
Chris Philp
I will speak to the amendments relating to younger offenders. There are a couple of things to be clear about first of all. For the sake of absolute clarity, offenders who are under the age of 18 are not subject to the 14-year minimum prison sentence. Only offenders over the age of 18 are subject to those provisions. The amendments relate to offenders aged between 18 and 21, so we are discussing a very specific cohort.
I agree and concur with many points that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth made about rehabilitation, and about the increased opportunity for rehabilitation for younger people. It is of course the case that younger people are more open to change—particularly as their brains mature—than older people, and it is right that we try to work with them to achieve that. I would not dispute that as a general principle, but clause 4 as drafted applies to an extremely small subsection of those offenders aged between 18 and 21. It by no means applies to the generality of offenders, including terrorist offenders, aged 18 to 21. It applies to that narrow subsection who have committed a serious terrorist offence, as we have discussed already, but it also requires a finding by the judge, following a pre-sentence report—something the shadow Minister referred to in his amendment and in his speech—of dangerousness. What a finding of dangerousness means in law is that there is a significant risk of the offender causing serious harm by committing further serious terrorism or other specified offences.
There are already two hurdles to jump: a serious terrorist offence, followed by a finding of dangerousness based on a pre-sentence report. However, there is also a third hurdle that must be jumped before a younger offender aged 18 to 21 would fall into the scope of this clause, which is that, at the time of committing the offence. they were aware, or should have been aware, that their offence was very likely to result in or contribute to multiple deaths. That is a well-established test dating back to section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. We are talking about an extremely small subsection of offenders aged 18 to 21 and a very small subsection even of terrorist offenders—those who meet all three of those criteria.
Alex Cunningham
I wonder whether it really is true that it is such a small cohort of offenders, because the Bill opens up the number of offences that can be considered severe enough for this sentence to be passed. There may currently be very few, but this new law extends the offences quite considerably—in fact, in some ways, it leaves it quite open for people to determine that a terrorist offence or a terrorist connection is involved. Surely there is more opportunity now for people to be serving this sort of sentence.
Chris Philp
The provisions open it up for judges to make a finding of a terrorist connection, but the impact assessment for the Bill refers to a potential increase in the prison population of 50 people. Of course, that is for all ages over 18; if we consider how many of those estimated additional 50 places might be occupied by people aged between 18 and 21, one might reasonably assume that the number at any one time will certainly be less than 10 and possibly even less than five. That is an estimate, but none the less, it appears in the impact assessment.
Alex Cunningham
It might be helpful, as the Bill progresses, if the Minister could publish some of the facts and the evidence for the claim he has just made about the 50 people and the relatively small number of younger people.
Chris Philp
I think the number 50 appears in the impact assessment, and I would be happy to look into the basis for that estimate. As for the number of younger people, that was something that I spontaneously generated, based on the fact that we are talking about a three-year range from 18 to 21, whereas the number of offenders will generally cover all ages, from 18 upwards.
The point I am making is that, while I accept the generality of what the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth say about the need to have hope and to have an opportunity to rehabilitate, we are talking about a very small number of very serious offenders, who have been assessed as dangerous following a pre-sentence report and who have engaged in activity likely to cause multiple deaths. In those very serious circumstances, I think it is appropriate, and I think the public would also think it is appropriate, that we protect the public for an extended period, as this Bill does.
If we are talking about other offenders, including terrorist offenders who do not meet that level of seriousness—there are many—all the comments made about rehabilitation and the chance to reform do legitimately apply. Indeed, we heard in evidence earlier today that the proven reoffending rate on release for that sort of offender is between 5% and 10%, which is an extraordinarily low figure compared with other cohorts. That suggests that the rehabilitation work done in prison is effective, as I think our last witness this morning suggested.
It is important, given the assessment of dangerousness that is made, that the pre-sentence report fully reflects the offender’s ability to change and the changes to the brain and so on that take place around the early 20s. That is a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, who is not with us this afternoon as he is attending the Justice Committee, has made to me. I will discuss with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer)—I would not like to get my north, south, east and west muddled up—who is the prisons and probation Minister, whether there is any more we can do to make sure that these pre-sentence reports fully reflect the points that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth have made about people’s ability to change. Those points are relevant in the context of assessing dangerousness, because if someone is undergoing changes, they may be less dangerous than someone who is fixed in their ways. I will take up that point with my hon. and learned Friend.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister may well be considering whether he is prepared to take the risk with this small cohort of people. As my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth outlined earlier, these individuals, who could reach middle age before there is any prospect of the state being off their back, are susceptible to further radicalisation in prison and might radicalise others. Surely, therefore, there is an element of risk that needs to be considered so that we can try to balance things.
Chris Philp
The cohort that I have described are dangerous, have been found to be dangerous by a judge following a pre-sentence report and have tried to kill multiple people. With this very small number of very dangerous people, who are endangering the lives of our fellow citizens, it is appropriate to prevent them for an extended period of time—a minimum of 14 years—from attacking our fellow citizens in the future. It is a truly exceptional and small cohort.
Speaking of the word “exceptional”, if there are circumstances in relation to these people that a judge thinks are truly exceptional—some extraordinary extenuating circumstances—and that, despite the fact that they have done the terrible things I have described and despite the finding of dangerousness, merit different treatment, the judge has open to them the possibility to make a finding that there is an exceptional circumstance and can derogate from the 14-year minimum. We would expect that to be extremely unusual—indeed, truly exceptional, as the word implies.
Given how dangerous and damaging this very small number of people are, and given our obligation to protect the public, this measure is couched appropriately. There is the ability to not make a finding of dangerousness, having read the pre-sentence report. There is also the ability for the judge to find that an exceptional circumstance applies. That provides more than adequate protection, bearing in mind how dangerous these people are.
As for other offenders, however, I take the point about the need to rehabilitate; rehabilitation is often successful, as we have seen from the figures. As I said, I will talk to my hon. and learned Friend the prisons and probation Minister to make sure that all the relevant information is collected in probation reports, which will help a judge when making a determination on the question of dangerousness.
I would like to briefly respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth about indeterminate sentences and throwing away the key, as she put it. Of course, the coalition Government legislated—I think it was in 2012—to get rid of the former sentences of imprisonment for public protection, which had been introduced in the early 2000s, whereby people could be left in prison forever, despite not having been given a life sentence. Those sentences were replaced with extended determinate sentences, so the coalition Government, which of course was Conservative-led, legislated to remove, or significantly reduce, that problem of locking people up and throwing away the key, which the hon. Member referred to in her speech.
I hope that I have explained why this measure is appropriate, bearing in mind the small numbers and the extreme danger that these people represent, and I express my support for the Bill as it is currently drafted.
Chris Philp
In my response to the amendment, I described the effect of the clause and the tests to be applied. If those tests are met, the minimum sentence of 14 years will be imposed, followed by a licence period of not less than seven years and not greater than 25. I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged 21 or over: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 5, page 7, line 35, after “25 years.”, insert—
“(5) Where—
(a) a prisoner is subject to a licence for an extension period under this section, and
(b) the qualifying period has expired,
the Secretary of State shall, if directed to do so by the National Probation Service, order that the licence is to cease to have effect.
(6) Where—
(a) the prisoner has been released on licence for an extension period under this section;
(b) the qualifying period has expired; and
(c) if the prisoner has made a previous application under this subsection, a period of at least twelve months has expired since the disposal of that application,
the prisoner may make an application to the National Probation Service under this subsection.
(7) Where an application is made under subsection (6) above, the National Probation Service—
(a) shall, if it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the licence should remain in force, direct the Secretary of State to make an order that the licence is to cease to have effect;
(b) shall otherwise dismiss the application.
(8) In this section, ‘the qualifying period’, in relation to a prisoner who has been released on licence, means the period of ten years beginning with the date of his release.”
The main area of concern that has led to the amendment relates to the maximum 25 years on licence specified by the Bill. We of course accept that we cannot have a cliff-edge situation whereby someone leaves prison without any further monitoring, particularly offenders in this cohort. There must be a licence period once the offender leaves prison. The issue is whether a licence period of up to 25 years is reasonable and whether it is a proportionate way of addressing the problem. There is also the concern over the lack of any review mechanism.
A licence for 25 years is equivalent to a licence for life. As well as severely curtailing the human rights of the offender after they have already completed their full custodial sentence, a licence for life also fundamentally constrains their ability to play an active part in society. For example, it would be a constant barrier to employment and—who knows?—perhaps new relationships. We would essentially be telling people that there is no point in them rehabilitating or contributing to society, because they will always be under suspicion—always under the careful watch and restriction of the state. A life on licence reduces individuals’ capability to reform and take positive action. It can have a detrimental impact on the joys of life that can keep an individual on the straight and narrow.
There is also the issue of the administrative burden on an already overworked National Probation Service, which has a financial cost, and which requires additional trained probation officers to deal with those released on licence. I would be interested to know where the idea for a term of 25 years on licence comes from. Is the Government’s intention simply that anyone convicted and sentenced to a determinate sentence of 14 years, with 25 years on licence, should have a life sentence, with the state constantly on their case and without any prospect of being released from it? If so, the Minister should say so. Can he confirm that there is logic in the period that he has decided on? Has he looked at the costs and at whether 20-year licenses, which would naturally be less expensive for the state, might be just as effective?
As I have said, the main area of concern that these amendments address is the maximum 25 years on licence specified by the Bill, which is effectively a licence for life under an indeterminate sentence for public protection. However, unlike the licence for life, the Bill does not allow for the licence to be terminated in certain circumstances. That creates an issue of unfairness, as well as a huge administrative burden, at a cost to the public purse.
I agree with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, who said:
“determining whether a 7-year, 15-year or 25-year licence is appropriate at the point of sentencing for dangerous individuals who have committed the most serious offences may be asking courts to engage in guesswork.”
I personally would not feel confident in making such a decision. Would the Minister?
As I said earlier, there is a concern about existing case law and guidance available for sentencers on identifying terrorism connections when sentencing. We cannot expect sentencers to feel truly comfortable and informed if the frame of what licence they can impose is so broad. It is worth reiterating that a 25-year licence period is not so different from a licence for life. However, whereas licences for life imposed on imprisonment for public protection prisoners could be terminated in appropriate cases, that does not apply to serious terrorism sentences. It feels like the principle of rehabilitation is again being somewhat missed.
I spoke earlier this afternoon about young people. Is it the Minister’s intention that they are effectively to remain on licence until within a few years of the state retirement age? A 14-year term for a 20-year-old means that they will be 59 before they are free of the licence. Will the Minister clarify the merits of 25-year licensing and address young people in particular?
I am a strong believer in people doing their time for violent offences, but with a strong focus on rehabilitation. Our amendment would give them some hope that their good behaviour has paid off after time. Perhaps we need to give people sight of a future where they would live their lives in a very different way—an honest and crime-free way. What, if anything, can the Minister offer those people—particularly younger ones?
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister posed a question: why a maximum of 25 years? Therein lies the answer.
Alex Cunningham
Maybe I misunderstood, but I thought the 25 years was mandatory.
Chris Philp
No, it is a maximum. The licence period is between seven and 25 years; within that, the judge has discretion to choose the most appropriate length of time. The point that I was about to make is that it is up to judicial discretion to decide the appropriate length of time. We ask the judge to make that determination, as we do when setting any licence condition. That is the way the licence system works at the moment. The judge sets the licence period at the point of sentence.
The shadow Minister, quoting the independent reviewer, asked, “How can the judge know in advance what a suitable length of time may be, looking potentially as far as 25 years into the future?” The answer to that question is that although the licence period cannot and in my view should not be varied by the Probation Service acting administratively—that is for the judge to decide—the Probation Service can, and frequently does, vary the terms of the licence conditions; as an offender behaves better over time and matures, or as their radical or criminal behaviour more generally changes as they get older, the licensing conditions can be and are relaxed. The Probation Service does that as a matter of routine, and I would expect and hope for that to happen as time passes.
Were we to give the Probation Service the ability to change the length of licence period, it would be overriding a judicial decision, which is wrong in principle and would possibly infringe article 6 of the European convention on human rights, which says that the Government should not be allowed to interfere with or alter a sentence handed down by the court.
The shadow Minister mentioned the arrangements for terminating licence conditions for indeterminate sentences—that is, the old imprisonment for public protection I referred to previously. As the name implies, those IPPs are indeterminate and indefinite. A judge has not imposed a time limit, so they could go on for the duration of somebody’s life. Some termination mechanism is needed.
Where a judge has made a decision—and it is up to the judge to choose, at their discretion, somewhere between seven and 25 years—it is right that licence condition is applied for that length of time. However, to reassure the Committee and the shadow Minister, I should say that the Probation Service can, as appropriate, relax and change those licence conditions as time passes. That is the right way of handling the issue.
Alex Cunningham
I accept the Minister’s explanation and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have covered many of the operative provisions. They are rather similar to the ones we debated in clause 4, in relation to people under the age of 21.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Serious terrorism sentence: Scotland
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 6, page 8, line 10, at end insert—
“(ea) the court does not impose an order for lifelong restriction under section 210F of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and”.
This amendment disapplies Clause 6 if an order for lifelong restriction, a sentence unique to Scotland, has been imposed.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. Before I move to the specifics of amendment 43, I will say by way of preface where my party and I are coming from. As the Minister is aware, we recognise that it is the duty of not just a Government to keep their citizens safe and secure; it is the obligation of all who serve in Parliament. At the outset, we have given the Government our assurance that any opposition will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism that we now see, sadly, all too regularly in our communities, is addressed and that we keep our people as safe as they can be.
Some issues concern us. The burden of proof has been mentioned in terms of TPIMs. The balance of the burden of proof has been an issue for over 40 years, since my involvement in the law—and, in a way, since the legal profession and legal systems came about. We recognise that there is good reason why there has to be some distinction when it comes to terrorism and that standards that might normally apply in a wider criminal trial cannot be expected, especially with regard to TPIMs. However, there still has to be an element of proportionality, and we have to ensure that we protect the rights of those who face considerable periods of loss of liberty. That is why we have concerns and are watching the situation.
Sadly, the issue disproportionately impacts BAME communities; we are conscious of that. It is clear that we are required not only to protect our people from terrorism—and, indeed, to punish those who perpetrate it—but to prevent it from happening in the first instance. If we have a system that is perceived, whether it in fact is or not, as prejudicial and impacting harshly, even sometimes deliberately, on one community, issues arise. Those of us old enough to remember the consequences of internment in Northern Ireland will realise that a community’s feeling of being discriminated against can be a recruiting sergeant rather than the method of preventing such recruitment.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian for his constructive comments at the beginning of his speech. As the shadow Minister said, in many respects the work on the Bill demonstrates Parliament and public life at its best, as we work together to protect our fellow citizens throughout the whole United Kingdom. Protecting our fellow citizens from violent attack is, thankfully, a principle on which we all agree, regardless of our differences on various other topics that often come before us. I am grateful for the constructive approach of the hon. Member for East Lothian, accepting, of course, that he wishes to discuss further points in due course, a few of which he mentioned.
There is clearly a question about how this legislation interacts with the order for lifelong restriction, which is applicable in Scotland. Indeed, the sentence that a Scottish court might hand down in the absence of this legislation could conceivably be longer—lifelong, as the name implies—than the period required by this legislation. The Government essentially accept the principle that there is an interaction that requires further work, and—let me be clear—further amendment.
On the detail of how the interaction will work best, discussions are ongoing between Ministry of Justice officials and officials in the Justice Directorate in Scotland about the technicalities. For example, although the clause as it is drafted would make it possible for an OLR to be imposed and, therefore, a lifelong restriction to be in place, we would lose the 14-year minimum sentence. What we would like to try to achieve technically is an amendment that preserves the concept of the 14-year minimum, but allows the lifelong restrictions to apply thereafter if a Scottish judge sees fit.
Those technical discussions are taking place. If the hon. Member for East Lothian or his colleague, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, wish to participate in those technical discussions, they are welcome to do so.
The fact that we would lose the 14-year minimum is problematic, but I accept the principle that an amendment is needed. If we can put such an amendment together quickly enough, we will be happy to bring it forward, in consultation with the hon. Gentleman, on Report. If we cannot get it ready fast enough for that, perhaps their lordships will be kind enough to consider making an appropriate amendment down at their end of the building.
I hope that my comments illustrate that I recognise the validity and the reasonableness of the point being raised. I hope that we can find a way to amend the Bill to preserve the 14-year minimum but not take away any ability that Scottish judges currently have to impose longer restrictions, should they see fit.
Kenny MacAskill
I am happy to accept that parliamentary drafting has its complexities; it is a skill way beyond my level of competence, but I appreciate the difficulties that go with it. I am happy to accept the undertaking given by the Minister, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 6 has the same operative effect as clause 5 has in relation to England and Wales.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 7
Serious terrorism sentence: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 7 and associated Government amendment 31 essentially do all the things we have just debated in relation to England, Wales and Scotland, but apply to Northern Ireland. The Government amendment is to ensure that we interact with Northern Irish sentencing law in a consistent way. It is rather the same issue that we debated a moment ago in relation to Scotland, where similar thinking clearly needs to be developed a little further. Government amendment 31 makes, I think, five technical changes to ensure that the measures that we have already debated apply consistently and coherently in Northern Ireland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for guilty pleas: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 8 relates to a reduction to the minimum custodial term for a serious terrorist sentence where the offender makes a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity. Ordinarily, when such a guilty plea is entered for most offences—not quite all, but most—a discount of up to 33% of the sentence is possible. However, reflecting the very serious nature of the offences we are debating, the clause limits the discount for an early guilty plea to 20% of the custodial term. By way of illustration, if a 14-year minimum were imposed—it could be more, of course—the reduction could be to 11 years and 73 days, but no less. Practically, that is implemented by inserting a new subsection into section 73 of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for guilty pleas: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 9 has the same effect as the one we have just discussed, but in relation to Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for assistance to prosecution: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 10 provides for the court to apply a reduction to the custodial term for a serious terrorist sentence in England and Wales from the 14-year minimum in cases where the offender assists the prosecution. It does so by inserting a new subsection into section 74 of the sentencing code. The subsection notes that nothing in the STS sentencing provisions affects the court’s ability or power to take into account the extent and nature of any assistance given to the prosecution.
In keeping with the approach to all other sentences, including other minimum sentences and mandatory life sentences, there is no maximum reduction rate in relation to the flexibility that I have just described. While we are determined to ensure that serious terrorists receive the appropriate penalties for their offending, it is also important to ensure that an incentive remains for guilty offenders to assist the prosecution with other cases it may be pursuing.
This is a well-established process within the sentencing procedure across the whole United Kingdom. It can, and indeed often does, play a pivotal role in helping our prosecutors and the police to secure guilty verdicts in other, often more significant, related cases where the defendants may be a higher risk to the public than those in the case under direct consideration. We think it appropriate to continue that judicial discretion in cases where defendants assist the prosecution and where that assistance may help to convict other, even more dangerous people.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Fifth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 2nd July 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 July 2020 - (2 Jul 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Lady is right up to a point, but some of the people under discussion will not have been responsible for killing people. A lot of them are covered by the charge of plotting, and there is the new range of terrorist offences. The crimes to which she refers are already covered by legislation. People who commit such terrible crimes are already subject to a life sentence, so in this particular situation we are talking about a different category of people.
I was saying that we need to understand what these changes mean for offenders, the Prison Service and society. For example, does the necessary amount of specialist prison provision required to incarcerate these offenders actually exist? That is not just about the number of prison places; it is about having the expertise available to manage and engage these offenders. We heard a lot of evidence from Mark Fairhurst about the need for proper provision and the fact that, at the moment, we have only one centre to deal with these particular terrorists. We are supposed to have three such centres, but we do not yet know when the Government will come forward and tell us when the new centres will be up and running.
What are the Minister’s proposals for housing younger offenders? Again, we need the prison places, but we also need the support services. Do they already exist, or is he proposing to develop more of them? If he is going to develop more of them, when will they be available? Even in the next two or three years, based on the Minister’s numbers, perhaps 20 or 30 young people will need specialist accommodation. They need specialist support services. Where are those services coming from? They do not exist at the moment, as I hope that the Minister will acknowledge, so will he ensure that they will in future so that we can for and deal with these people appropriately? We must not have a situation in which younger offenders—albeit among the most serious ones, as described by the hon. Lady—end up in the adult prison system because there is nowhere else for them to go.
I would welcome a specific comment on the issue when the Minister responds. I know that he has some tidying-up amendments for later in the development of the Bill, but I want to understand specifically what will happen with younger offenders and whether it is possible that some of them will end up in the adult estate.
It should be clear to the Minister why he should not be shy about commissioning analysis better to understand the issues that we face. Everyone talks about the importance of data and making decisions based on evidence. The amendment provides the Minister with an opportunity to do just that, and the Opposition are pleased to offer the Minister our assistance.
Also, if the Minister had the analysis, it would be easy for him to demonstrate to the House that he had got his decisions right. When he faced challenges from the Opposition on the success or failure of his new measures, he would have the analysis at his fingertips. I know that, financially, the Justice Department is skint. It has suffered heavy cuts disproportionate to those for other Departments during the past 10 years or so, and we have seen the results of that. The latest figures show that the number of criminal cases yet to reach the courts has now exceeded half a million, with hundreds of thousands more tribunal cases also outstanding. Perhaps it is the lack of resources that has meant that the Lord Chancellor cannot crack on and plan Nightingale courts to go alongside the Nightingale hospitals—the money to do so simply is not available. He did write to me yesterday, telling me that some additional money will be available. But it is a very small amount of money compared with the challenge that the system faces. This Minister’s accepting the amendment might result in the use of some resources, but the right action in this respect could save considerable sums in the longer term, and as I have made clear, the Justice Department really needs the resources.
Our ask is simple. We believe that there are real benefits for the Government in carrying out the analysis described in the amendment. Let us have in Parliament the evidence suggesting that these measures are a necessity and actually keep the public safe. I hope that the Minister will take these points and accept that longer sentences do not necessarily reduce the risk of reoffending. Several of our witnesses made that clear and even suggested that minimum sentences may in fact be counterproductive. The Minister might be reluctant to adopt the amendment—I will be surprised if he is not—but I look to him to come up with answers to the real issues that it covers.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Good morning. It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mr McCabe. Let me start by responding specifically to the amendment, and then I will try to pick up one or two of the more general points that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, raised in his speech.
Amendment 39 does not propose any very wide form of analysis, aspects of which the hon. Gentleman referred to. It in fact proposes a very specific form of analysis, which is an impact assessment on the effect of these minimum term orders on other offences. It asks us to do an analysis that says, “If we introduce a minimum 14-year term to be served by those with life sentences, what effect will it have on unrelated offences? What effect will the minimum terms have on unrelated offences in relation to non-terrorist crimes?” If I may respectfully say so, given that the Bill is about terrorist offences and nothing in the Bill has any impact at all on non-terrorist offences, I do not think that the analysis proposed by amendment 39 is particularly germane. The Bill will not make any difference at all to any other, non-terrorist offences, so I do not think that analysis would have any results or effect.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate the Minister giving way so early in his speech. The Bill creates a host of new offences, which will capture more people. It is important that he addresses the effect on other offences, which could all of a sudden become terrorism-related offences and therefore be subject to a very different sentencing decision by a judge in a court.
Chris Philp
My reading of the term “other offences” in line 3 the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is offences not caught by the scope of the Bill.
Let me turn to the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked and the numbers he raised. We have published an impact assessment and equalities assessment, as we discussed at some length in the previous sitting. He asked where I got the numbers of younger offenders from. I now have some information about the under-18 cohort, which he and other Members are concerned about. Currently, there are only three terrorist offenders in prison under the age of 18. I hope that illustrates the very small numbers involved.
On the question of whether we are unreasonably widening the scope of what constitutes a terrorist offence, my judgment is that most terrorist offences would be caught under the existing list of terrorist offences. It would be relatively unusual for a terrorist act to be committed outside the current list of offences, and for it to be necessary to make the terrorist connection. It could happen, and we are rightly legislating for that, but the existing list of terrorist offences is relatively comprehensive, so I do not think that the scope increase that the hon. Gentleman is referring to will have a dramatic impact on what are already small numbers. It is of course important that we give the judge the opportunity—the power—to make that connection where somebody commits an offence not on the current list; it is logically conceivable that that could happen.
Let me turn to the number—the 50. We can extrapolate how many of those 50 are aged between 18 and 21, as we discussed in the previous sitting. I do not think that number is the annual flow or the number of convictions per year. As I understand it, it is the impact on the total prison population. Given that these sentences are quite long, one would expect that the annual flow into the system affected by these serious terrorism sentence provisions would be somewhat lower than that.
Those numbers illustrate powerfully that we are talking about an extremely small number of people. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford said in her well-pitched intervention, we are talking about people who have committed a serious terrorist offence and have been found to be dangerous—in other words, the judge thinks that they pose an ongoing, serious risk to the public. Their actions either caused or were likely to cause multiple deaths, and, in the context of clause 11, the judge views the offence as so serious that a life sentence is appropriate. I hope that gives the Committee a clear sense that these numbers are extremely small and, thankfully, particularly small in relation to young people. We should take this opportunity to pay tribute to the tremendous work that our counter-terror police and the security services do to keep those numbers so very small.
Other remarks were made about funding. That is probably outside the scope of the clause, but I will address it very briefly, if I may have your indulgence for one minute, Mr McCabe. I am sure that if I stretch the bounds of your indulgence, you will call me to order. Counter-terrorism funding rightly increased substantially earlier this year in response to the enhanced level of threat. Spending on Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service of course includes work on rehabilitation, and that also received a significant funding increase in the spending review in September 2019. I am sure that everyone here would welcome that increase in expenditure.
The shadow Minister mentioned a number of outstanding cases in the legal system. I think the number he quoted relates to magistrates courts. Of course we are in the middle of—hopefully coming towards the end of—a serious pandemic, which inhibited the operation of the courts system. Prior to the coronavirus epidemic, waiting times in the magistrates court were about eight weeks. The outstanding case load in the Crown court was certainly a great deal lower than it was in 2010. Obviously, coronavirus has caused an increase in the outstanding case load. We are working hard to address that with the new Nightingale courts. There are, I believe, 10 sites working on extending sitting hours. By the end of July every court in the country will be back up and running, and we are rolling out the cloud video platform, so that hearings can take place by video. I commend to the Committee the court recovery plan that was published two or three days ago. I hope that that demonstrates the herculean national effort currently under way to reduce the outstanding case load that has built up during the coronavirus epidemic.
Alex Cunningham
I most certainly welcome the increased expenditure in the area in question. It is essential that the Government look to increasing it further, because there is no doubt, from the evidence the Committee received, that the system is not adequate to receive the people who will be caught up in the range of new laws. It was good to hear the Minister try to clarify some of the numbers. The figure of only three people aged under 18 is significant. However, according to the analysis, there would be up to 50 people a year, over a long period. Does the Minister want to correct me?
Chris Philp
I will double check that number, but my understanding, which I will check, is that as a consequence of the measures the total prison population will increase by 50, which is different from an extra 50 people extra flowing in each year. However, I will come back to the hon. Gentleman on that.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate that, but I thought I read it was 50 per year. I may of course be mistaken, but I look forward to the Minister clarifying that.
If the vast majority of criminal offences are committed under existing legislation, I wonder why we are here, other than to increase the determinate sentence to 14 years. Perhaps in a later speech the Minister will return to the matter. We may well return to it in future, but for the moment, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 11, as we have been discussing, amends section 323 of the sentencing code, which makes provision for the setting of a minimum term—a tariff—for discretionary life sentences. It will make sure that, where a life sentence is handed down to an adult offender who is convicted of a serious terrorist offence—which can be considered as a serious terrorism case—for the purpose of setting a minimum term, the provisions of this clause will apply.
The minimum term in a discretionary life sentence is the period that must be served in custody before an offender can be considered for release by the Parole Board. Offenders who are subject to a discretionary life sentence are subject to a life licence following the release. Clause 11 adjusts section 323 of the code so that, where the court considers an offender who requires a life sentence for their offending and has committed a serious terrorism offence, as found in schedule 17A to the sentencing code, an equivalent consideration is made to that for the serious terrorism sentence by requiring the court to consider it as a serious terrorism case.
A serious terrorism case is one where an adult offender has committed a serious terrorism offence and meets the criteria that we discussed previously for a serious terrorism sentence—that is, the court considers them dangerous; they present a serious future risk of harm, which in this context means the prospect of death or serious personal injury resulting; and in the opinion of the court they meet the risk of multiple death condition, which we discussed earlier in connection with serious terrorism sentences. The clause therefore requires the courts to set a minimum term of 14 years, unless exceptional circumstances apply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Minimum punishment part for serious terrorism offenders: Scotland
Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This clause has the same effect as the previous clause, which applied to England and Wales. This applies to Scotland, and will have effect by inserting a new section 205ZB into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Minimum tariff for serious terrorism offenders given life sentences: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 13 has the same effect as the previous two clauses, except in relation to Northern Ireland. It will amend the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Minimum custodial period for serious terrorism offenders given indeterminate custodial sentences: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 14 also relates to Northern Ireland. In this case, it applies to Northern Irish offenders who receive an indeterminate custodial sentence, ensuring that the 14-year minimum custodial period applies to them as well. The clause will have effect by amending article 13 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Additional offences attracting extended sentence: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This clause sets out a number of offences that, from the commencement date of this provision, will be included in the list of offences eligible for receiving an extended determinate sentence in England and Wales. Adding these offences will ensure that the sentencing regime in England and Wales is consistent in the type of offences it considers serious enough to be eligible for an extended determinate sentence. To make this change, the clause adds the offences specified within the provisions to part 1 of schedule 18 of the sentencing code. These offences all carry a maximum penalty of life, and include the making of explosives, developing biological weapons, endangering the safety of aircraft, using nuclear materials and hijacking or destroying ships. As such, they are of comparable seriousness to other offences already in scope for the extended sentence. Adding these offences to the list will correct the anomaly created by their omission and will ensure that these serious offences and others are eligible for an extended sentence as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Increase in extension period for serious terrorism offenders aged under 18: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 16, page 16, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) Section 255 of the Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
“(3) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 256(4)(b)(iii)—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(4) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (3).”
(6) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(7) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”.
Chris Philp
I must say, the shadow Minister has painted for me a truly horrifying picture, namely membership of the Liberal Democrats followed by crushing defeat at a general election. Let that be a lesson to anyone who, like my former hon. Friend the Member for East Surrey, considers anything so foolish as a move to the Liberal Democrats. Looking around this Committee, that is something we can all agree on.
The first question raised by these amendments is whether there is an option for an extension period other than eight to 10 years. I am looking at amendment 40 to clause 16(3)(b). The way the legislation is currently drafted allows the judge the discretion to choose the extension period—the licence period—of anything between one and 10 years. All that these clauses do is increase the maximum from eight years—as it is now—to 10 years, but that is not mandatory; the judge can choose to have an extension period as low as one year. The choice for judicial discretion that the shadow Minister is calling for already exists without the amendment. Instead of the choice being between one and eight years, as it is now, the choice will become between one and 10 years, as we propose, but judicial discretion will still exist.
The pre-sentence report that the amendment calls for will exist already. There is always a pre-sentence report for offences of this nature. In deciding what length of extension period is appropriate, the judge will already have due regard to that pre-sentence report. They will also have due regard to that pre-sentence report in making their finding, or otherwise, of dangerousness.
On the question of a review of how things are going, I certainly do not fear any sort of review after the event. We have a standing procedure that legislation should be reviewed after—I think, typically—three years, to see how it is functioning. I would expect this legislation, as other legislation, to be subject to that same scrutiny process. I am sure that no one in the House would be shy to propose changes if, in due course, anything appeared to be amiss.
On that basis, in particular the first two points—
Alex Cunningham
I realised that the Minister was getting to the point at which he would sit down, but I asked specifically for him to address the issue of how young people who have committed this type of offence will be accommodated on the estate. Can the fears expressed by many individuals be properly addressed?
Chris Philp
Such young people will not move on to the adult prison estate until they turn 21, so that immediately provides some reassurance, I hope. The more general point that the shadow Minister makes, and has made before—and our witnesses made—is on the importance of rehabilitation. They are points well made. We should not simply lock people up and throw away the key; even with such serious offenders, who will rightly spend a great deal of time in prison, we should work on rehabilitation.
Part of the additional resources announced in the September 2019 spending review and this year’s March Budget will go to Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I have spoken to the Prisons and Probation Minister about young people, an issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury has also raised with me, and it is an area where effort, focus and attention are being paid, and will be further in future. That point about rehabilitation is well made, but it is being addressed. I am sure it is a topic that Members will return to. I have forgotten whether this is an intervention or a speech, but on that basis, I politely and respectfully ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendments.
Alex Cunningham
It is lovely to have a guarantee from the Minister that no young person will end up in the adult estate—
Alex Cunningham
The Minister qualifies that by saying “under the age of 21”. I appreciate that, and I assume that the word “guarantee” can be applied in this particular circumstance, despite the fact that some of our witnesses were concerned that we do not have sufficient facilities within the system to house 18 to 21-year-olds and some even younger than that.
In an earlier debate, I believe on Tuesday, the Minister appeared to accept that the pre-sentence report regime could be improved. In fact, he made a commitment to speak to his colleagues in the Home Office, to see whether they might find ways to ensure that the pre-sentence report covers some of the issues that I raised in Committee. We have not heard from the Minister about that, but perhaps in a later speech we will.
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Gentleman has greater experience of this area than I do, and I bow to his superior knowledge, but the important thing is that we look carefully at the reports, in particular in relation to that cohort of young people, to ensure that every single opportunity is presented to the judge so that the judge gets the right answer. With that, although we will return to the issue of young people at a later stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
As we have discussed, the clause extends the maximum possible licence period for serious terrorist offenders aged under 18 when given an extended sentence of detention. It gives the courts the option to increase the maximum—I say maximum—extended licence period from eight to 10 years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Increase in extension period for adult serious terrorism offenders aged under 21: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 17 has the same effect as the previous clause, but applies to offenders up to the age of 21. It does that by amending section 268(4) of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Increase in extension period for serious terrorism offenders aged 21 or over: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 18 has the same effect—raising the maximum licence period to 10 years. This time it applies to offenders aged over 21 in England and Wales, and it makes that change by amending section 281(4) of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Additional terrorism offences attracting extended sentence: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The clause sets out a number of offences that will be included in the list of offences that are eligible for receiving an extended determinate sentence in Scotland, from the date of commencement. The offences to be included are terrorist offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years, which is specified in part 1 of schedule 5ZC, and non-terrorist offences carrying a maximum penalty of life, as specified in part 2 of that schedule, in cases where a terrorist connection has been found by the court under section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It also applies to under-18s convicted of terrorist and terrorism-related offences in Scotland. The clause makes that change by amending section 210A(10) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and inserts a schedule into that Act.
Alex Cunningham
We have talked a lot about numbers in this Committee. Will the Minister enlighten us on how many people will be caught up in these provisions?
Chris Philp
These provisions relate to Scotland. In order to avoid providing the Committee with erroneous information, it would be safest if I write to the hon. Gentleman with that information.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5
Terrorism offences attracting extended sentence: Scotland
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
The schedule is consequential to the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 5 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 20
Extended custodial sentences for serious terrorism offenders: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The clause does two things. First, it adds all serious terrorism offences to the scope of the extended sentencing regime. Secondly, it increases the maximum extended licence period for those who receive an extended sentence for serious terrorism offences. I should say that the clause applies to Northern Ireland, and the clause essentially does the same thing as the previous few clauses on extended sentence length and adding some additional offences. That will ensure that there is a consistent approach across the United Kingdom in terms of both offences that are tracked and extended sentences—in the case of Northern Ireland, extended custodial sentences—and that the courts may impose up to a 10-year licence period, should they find that appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Offences attracting special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 21 substitutes schedule 6 to the Bill for schedule 13 of the sentencing code. It is designed to ensure that, in all circumstances, specified terrorist offenders will spend at least 12 months on licence following their release, even when they are released at the very end of their custodial sentence. It does that by updating the offences that attract a custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern in England and Wales—the so-called SOPC sentence. The updated schedule includes all terrorist offences that carry a maximum penalty of over two years, and it replaces the specified non-terrorist offences that can attract a SOPC when committed in a terrorist capacity with a clause that includes any offence that is determined to have a terrorist connection under section 69 of the sentencing code in the SOPC regime. The changes made to the clause are applicable to those who are convicted of an offence on or after the day on which that provision comes into force, which is the day after the Bill gains Royal Assent.
Adding those offences to the SOPC regime will mean that the court will now be required to impose such a sentence where extended determinate sentences have been considered but not imposed. All such offenders will no longer be eligible for a standard determinate sentence. That is because the time spent on licence—the Bill introduces a minimum of one year—is very important for rehabilitating offenders, as the shadow Minister has said, as well as for protecting the public.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6
Offences attracting special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
It is consequential to the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 6 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22
Special custodial sentence for certain terrorist offenders aged under 18 at time
of offence: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
These are relatively technical amendments. The purpose of Government amendment 16 is to apply the same period of rehabilitation to the new sentence for terrorist offenders of particular concern as that currently applied to sentences in respect of grave crimes under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The rehabilitation period is specified in section 5 of that Act and varies depending on the length of sentence given. It begins on the day the sentence is completed, including any time spent on licence.
Government amendment 29 amends the statutory instruments referred to above in order to align the new special sentence of detention for terrorist offenders of particular concern for under-18s with sentences imposed under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Those are the central amendments.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
Can I just be clear? For certain offences, under-18s will be treated in exactly the same way as adults when being sentenced. If I have got that wrong, can the Minister please explain?
Chris Philp
No. The rehabilitation periods are different and lower for children—quite rightly, for the reasons we debated earlier. All we are doing is creating consistency between the rehabilitation period for adults who commit the various offences and the rehabilitation period for children who commit various offences. We are not making the rehabilitation period the same for children as it is for adults.
The purpose of clause 22 is to address a gap in sentencing options for those under 18 who commit a terrorism offence where custodial sentencing options are limited to a maximum two-year detention and training order, due to the offender not meeting the criteria required to impose long-term detention for offences punishable by less than 14 years in custody.
The new sentence ensures that those convicted of a terrorist offence—we are talking about the serious terrorist offences—spend a substantial period of time on licence to enable that very important rehabilitative work to be undertaken in the community, and to limit the risk that they may pose to the public. That will also ensure greater consistency between the approaches towards sentence and release for under-18s and adults, although under-18s will of course be typically serving shorter prison sentences.
Under the current framework, some terrorist offences can attract only a detention and training order of up to two years, with only half that being served in detention, or an extended determinate sentence where the child is considered dangerous and the sentence is at least four years. That is a consequence of the fixed-term sentences under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, and they are available only for specified offences. Terrorist offences are not a specified category.
As some terrorist offences carry a maximum sentence of less than 14 years, the only custodial sentencing option is therefore the detention and training order. Essentially, the clause fills the gap between those two sentences by creating the SOPC-type offence for under-18s. Of course, the length of sentence will be entirely a matter for the discretion of the judge, and the judge will have the pre-sentence report available in making that determination. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury said in his intervention, that pre-sentence report will include considerations regarding not just the offender’s chronological age but their mental maturity. Judges will of course continue to have discretion to ensure that they are balancing the offender’s maturity with the appropriate kind of sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 23 operates in Scotland, and essentially ensures that there is always a fixed licence period of at least one year when someone is released, so that people are not released without any licence supervision afterwards. We have talked about the reasons: both to facilitate rehabilitation and to protect the public. The clause is given effect by the insertion of new section 205ZC into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
The Chair
The question is that clause 23 stand part of the Bill. As many as are of that opinion, say aye.
The Chair
To the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it, the ayes have it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7
Offences attracting terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Scotland
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Very diplomatic, Mr McCabe. Schedule 7 is consequential to the previous clause. It sets out the terrorist offences within the scope of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, and will be inserted as schedule 5ZB to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
The Chair
The question is that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill. As many as are of that opinion, say aye.
Chris Philp
I thank the Committee for its rousing endorsement of the previous schedule.
The purpose of clause 24 is to make amendments to provide for a new terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period. This is necessary to ensure an approach consistent with Northern Irish law. The Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 is amended to ensure that any offender may have the length of their terrorism sentence reduced by any relevant period spent in police detention or custody. There are further amendments, with broadly similar objectives, made to the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
More generally, clause 24 seeks to make amendments to terrorism sentences in Northern Ireland in a way that is consistent with the measures we have discussed already. The structure of sentences is a little different in Northern Ireland, hence the slight differences in this clause, but the offer is in effect that the minimal one-year licence period is the same as those discussed already for England, Wales and Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Corresponding provision under service law
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 25 introduces schedule 8, which makes the equivalent provisions under service law to certain sentencing provisions made by this part. It covers an equivalent of the serious terrorism sentence, including relevant term reductions for a guilty plea and for assistance to the prosecution, as we have discussed, as well as minimum term orders and provisions equivalent to those in clauses 8 and 9, and changes to the special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern, including the creation of an equivalent sentence for youth offenders.
The clause is necessary to ensure that the provisions in this Bill, which strengthen counter-terrorism sentencing, are applied to all jurisdictions in the UK, including the armed forces.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Corresponding provision about sentencing under service law
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Schedule 8 and the two Government amendments are technical changes that relate to the application of this law to the services, which I mentioned in the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 8 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 26
Increase in maximum sentences for certain terrorist offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 26 increases the maximum penalty for three terrorism offences, to ensure that the punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime involved. The three offences are: membership of a proscribed organisation, under section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000; supporting a proscribed organisation, under section 12 of that Act; and attending a place used for terrorist training, under section 8 of that Act. In all three cases the maximum penalty applicable will be increased from 10 to 14 years.
It will, of course, remain a matter for the sentencing judge to decide on the appropriate sentence, but given how serious the offences are we feel it appropriate to give the court the ability to issue a sentence of up to 14 years if, on the basis of the evidence and the pre-sentence report, the judge sees fit.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Sixth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 2nd July 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 July 2020 - (2 Jul 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
I will make a few preliminary points. As usual, please switch electronic devices to silent, and teas and coffees are not allowed in the room. I remind the Committee of social distancing rules. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members sent any copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 27
Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
It is a great pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. The clause is the first clause in part 2 of the Bill, and is one of the most important sections. It removes the prospect of early release for the most dangerous terrorist offenders in England and Wales. The provision is central to the core aims of the Bill—namely, ensuring that the most dangerous offenders serve their full sentence, to reflect the serious nature of their crimes and to protect the public from them. Some of the recent terrible terrorist atrocities have powerfully demonstrated the awful consequences that can follow the early release of a terrorist offender who goes on to reoffend, sometimes with tragic and fatal effect.
The clause amends section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, under which relevant terrorist offenders are currently referred to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of their custodial term, to be considered for discretionary early release. The clause would exclude a particular class of the most dangerous offenders from discretionary early release if they receive an extended determinate sentence; if that sentence is for a terrorist or terrorist-related offence; and if that offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Only if those three conditions apply is the prospect of discretionary early released removed, and those offenders instead serve their full custodial terms.
This is an important measure to protect the public. The only way to be certain that someone will not reoffend is if they are in prison. Of course, after release, offenders who have served their full custodial term under the provisions of the clause will then be subject to the extended licence period that we discussed this morning, which can now be as long as 10 years. During the extended licence period, work on rehabilitation can continue and public protection can be maintained. It is not as if offenders are simply let out and we forget about them; the licence conditions and monitoring will be extremely important. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Ruth Cadbury
The Bar Council is a very authoritative body that needs to be listened to when we are introducing legislation that affects issues such as sentencing.
On the POA point, Peter Dawson pointed out clearly, in relation to violence against prison officers, that when hope is lost and the atmosphere and the management of prisoners gets much more difficult, we have nowhere to move terrorist prisoners who are already in specialist separation centres. He said that removing hope of early release increases that risk. I would like the Government to commit to a review if the proposal is implemented in this way. Obviously, we support the motivation behind it.
I have one more question for the Minister. Might the option for this sentence, with the loss of early release, lead to unintended consequences in charging and sentencing? Would sentencers avoid it and impose a lesser sentence? I am sure that the Government do not intend that.
Chris Philp
Let me briefly respond to one or two of the points that the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth made. She referred to the fact that if the sentence is served in full, there obviously will not be a Parole Board assessment prior to release. She asked about the risk assessment that would take place. I asked Mr Fairhurst from the Prison Officers Association about that in our evidence session on Tuesday morning. Even where there is no Parole Board involvement because release is automatic, there are a whole load of other review and evaluation mechanisms that can be used—for example, multi-agency public protection arrangements, careful monitoring by the prison staff and prison governor, and involvement by the National Probation Service in preparation for the release point. With the example of the Streatham offender, those kinds of risk-assessment measures led to a security services team monitoring him, which obviously had the result that it did. That is an example, as Mr Fairhurst said in evidence, of the risk assessment process working very effectively. That is what we would expect to happen in cases in which release is automatic.
The hon. Lady also asked: what happens when hope is lost? What if a prisoner is in prison and there is no prospect of early release? Does that not mean that it will be hard to get them to behave well? I want to make some points in response. First, the vast majority of prisoners, who have committed a range of offences, way beyond terrorist ones, are serving standard determinate sentences and are released automatically—typically at the halfway point—without any Parole Board intervention. The vast majority are subject to automatic release at a particular point. The second risk, particularly in relation to terrorist offenders, is that of false compliance, if they think that by pretending to comply with the deradicalisation programme, they might get released early. That is not necessarily an entirely healthy incentive and we should be mindful of that possibility.
Chris Philp
The operative provisions of clause 28 are very similar—in fact, they are identical—to those in clause 27, except that they apply to Scotland. Practically, that is given effect by amending section 1AB of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. The substantive effect of this provision is exactly the same as that for clause 27, which we have just debated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clause 29
Further provision about release of terrorist prisoners: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This is another consequential provision, which makes sure that the measure in clause 28 that we have just approved operates consistently in relation to the administration of licence periods for serious terrorism sentences and terrorism sentences for fixed licence periods in Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Restricted eligibility for early release of terrorist prisoners: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 30 and the amendments to it essentially apply to Northern Ireland. Some months ago in Parliament, we debated the provisions to end the automatic early release of terrorist prisoners. Committee members will recall that at the time we did not apply those provisions to Northern Ireland. But having carefully considered, in particular, the European convention on human rights and common law retrospectivity provisions, we are now comfortable that those principles are not infringed by applying the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions to Northern Ireland, and this clause does so.
Amendments 33 and 34 are consequential on those changes. Amendment 33 ensures that terrorist prisoners who will serve longer in custody as a result of the Bill are not released early for the purposes of deportation under the early removal scheme in Northern Ireland. That is a consequential point. Amendment 34 ensures, for offenders who will be newly eligible for parole commissioner-considered release through the provisions of this Bill in Northern Ireland, that that is done in accordance with the parole commissioners’ existing rules. That brings Northern Ireland fully into conformity with the rest of the United Kingdom.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. The main focus of my contribution to the Committee as the shadow Security Minister will be on part 3 of the Bill, but for reasons obvious even to the untrained ear, I have been asked to speak on some of the Northern Ireland aspects of the Bill.
May I crave your indulgence for a moment, Mr Robertson? While the Committee has been sitting, it has been announced that the largest ever law enforcement operation in the UK took place today. Operation Venetic has seen 746 arrests, with £54 million of criminal cash seized, along with 77 firearms and 2 tonnes of drugs. The whole Committee will want to pay tribute to Lynne Owens and the National Crime Agency and all the police forces involved in that fantastic operation. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]
I am always concerned when I hear Ministers talk about Northern Ireland being brought into “conformity” with the rest of the United Kingdom, because although it is an integral part of the Union, and that is indisputable under the terms of the various agreements that have been reached, it is not the same as other parts of the United Kingdom, particularly when it comes to measures relating to tackling terrorism, because there is a long history there that has evolved over how to address that, particularly when it comes to sentencing, rehabilitation and the particular licensing arrangements that there are.
I have had, as I know the Minister has had, extensive discussions with the Justice Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive on this clause in particular. We have tabled a new clause to ask for all the provisions to be reviewed, so I do not intend to speak on all the Northern Ireland measures contained herein until that is debated, but I did think it important to draw attention to this matter, particularly after discussions with Naomi Long on behalf of the Northern Ireland Executive.
There is real concern about the retrospective removal of the automatic right to release. The Justice Minister in the Department is very clear that that will require amendments to sentence-calculation processes and, critically, the power of the Department to refer cases to the parole commissioners and the powers of the commissioner to direct early release for offenders subject to determinate custodial sentences. The concerns can be condensed down to some key points.
The first is about—I was interested to hear what the Minister said about this—attracting legal challenge on ECHR-compatibility grounds. There is a belief in the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland that these measures will attract that. In addition, there is concern that the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland will be a respondent to any challenge that is made in the Northern Ireland High Court or subsequent proceedings in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, which could be a significant drain on its resources.
There is concern about the risk of destabilising the separated regime. The Committee might not be aware that paramilitary prisoners or those convicted of terrorist offences in Northern Ireland are separated. They are held in specific circumstances and subjected to specific programmes, on the basis of their perceived paramilitary affiliation.
Another worrying element is the potential increased risk to the safety of prison staff as a result of the reaction to these measures. In recent years we have seen David Black and Adrian Ismay, two prison officers in Northern Ireland, murdered by dissident republicans. That is something that we need to be very cognisant of: in making laws here, we have a direct impact on the people who we are asking to carry them out. They have to live in the community in Northern Ireland and face the threat that they, along with our brave police officers and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, do every day.
There is also a concern—shared by colleagues from the Democratic Unionist party as well as by the Justice Minister—that this has the potential to lead to currently serving terrorist offenders being released without licence supervision. It undermines the public protection arrangements currently in place and goes against the ethos and principles of the Northern Ireland sentencing framework. In taking these measures to avoid a cliff edge in England and Wales, we may inadvertently introduce a cliff edge to Northern Ireland that is mitigated by arrangements that are already in place there.
There was a more general concern about the erosion of the principle of judicial discretion to set appropriate custodial and licence periods. I thought it important that the Committee heard those concerns, because we, as the official Opposition, share some of them and want to work, as we always have done, in a bipartisan manner—not just on issues of national security, but on matters pertaining to Northern Ireland. It was important from that perspective and because we do not have Northern Ireland Members here to make those arguments. We do have, after years of painstaking effort by Governments of all hues, the restoration of the Executive, so it was important that the Minister of Justice for Northern Ireland—in addition to the influence she is bringing to bear in discussions with the Minister—had those concerns publicly recorded with the Committee.
Chris Philp
Let me briefly reply. I echo the hon. Member’s comments about the operations today. Our police and security services do fantastic work, and the huge operation today is an example of that work at its very best, so I join him in thanking them and congratulating them on the tremendous work they have done.
On Northern Ireland, the hon. Member is quite right: we are currently having detailed conversations with Naomi Long, the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland. As he says, it is very good news that the functioning Executive has been restored—it is good for Northern Ireland and good for us in Westminster to have a body that we can have dialogue with. Let me assure him that the dialogue is ongoing; it touches on many of the issues that he raised.
On the risk of legal challenge, the hon. Member will know that there has already been a legal challenge to the TORER Act that we passed back in February, and that is subject to a judgment that we await; I will therefore not comment on that any further. What I will say—in fact, I have said this to Naomi Long—is that we will certainly support the Northern Ireland Department of Justice in any litigation that it gets involved in. We have obviously done a great deal of work in preparing for that case; we would be happy to make that available and to support the Department in every way. We would not want it to be, as the hon. Member has suggested, burdened by having to defend cases. We will certainly stand with it and help practically with preparing for those cases, so that they do not unduly drain what I know are quite limited resources. I can give him a direct assurance on that. More generally, we are involved in detailed discussions, which are continuing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 31 simply makes the same provisions that we discussed in clause 27 for England and in clause 28 for Scotland, applicable also to Northern Ireland. I do not propose to go over those provisions again; they are in substance the same.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders:
England and Wales
Chris Philp
As we discussed in evidence last week, the Government—and the Committee—fully recognise that polygraph testing does not provide definitive information that meets a burden of proof that a court of law would expect to be met.
We did hear, however, compelling evidence from Professor Grubin that polygraphs provide a great deal of utility in two areas—first, in causing offenders being questioned while a polygraph is being applied to disclose more information than they otherwise would. He gave some compelling statistics, showing that a high proportion—from memory, something like two thirds—of offenders questioned with a polygraph being applied made a disclosure of information, which is a far higher figure than would ordinarily be the case. It is helpful to get people on licence to disclose information that is useful in working out whether their licence conditions are being adhered to.
Secondly, if a negative polygraph result follows in answer to particular questions, the principal consequence is further investigation by the probation service or, if appropriate, the police. Only if those further investigations yielded new evidence or new facts would further action follow. Polygraph evidence would never be admissible in a court of law, and there is no intention of that, because we heard clearly that although it is helpful, it is not definitive in a way that we would wish evidence submitted to a court of law to be definitive.
That approach is already enshrined in section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007, expressly disallowing the admissibility of polygraph evidence in court, but it is also covered in the equivalent provisions made for the devolved Administrations in this Bill, particularly clause 33 in relation to Scotland and clause 34 in relation to Northern Ireland. The Bill and the law in general are clear about how polygraph evidence should be used.
On amendments 49 and 50, and the use of “may not” as opposed to “must not”, I think that the phrases have the same meaning. “We may not do something” means the same as “we must not do something”—it is an express prohibition. I am sure it is helpful to put my view of that on the record, and I hope that the Committee concurs. It is categoric that something that may not be used cannot be used, and must not be used in any circumstances.
In support of clause 32 standing part, this is a useful additional tool in the hands of the probation service. It is used already with sex offenders in England and Wales. Professor Grubin provided very informative evidence—certainly the most entertaining evidence that we heard during our earlier proceedings. He made a powerful case for the way in which polygraphs, used properly, carefully, with the right training and with acknowledgment of their limitations, add something to the monitoring process. Therefore I think it is appropriate to include the measures.
Kenny MacAskill
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I am not going to debate “may” or “must”, which seems to be becoming a tautological argument. I am happy to accept the Minister’s assurance, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I would say two things about a pilot. First, as I said before, polygraph use has been running for a number of years now for sex offenders in England and Wales, and it has been found to be useful. It is used quite widely around the world, as Professor Grubin mentioned in his evidence.
In particular, the use of polygraphs for monitoring licence conditions is designed first to prompt the disclosure of information and secondly to provide information that might be followed up. Bearing that in mind, I do not think that the biting effect of the polygraph findings is of sufficient severity to require further pilot work, particularly as the technique is used already.
As to BAME communities, that is something we debated at some length a short time ago, as the hon. Gentleman said, but I would observe that the application of the technique applies to everyone equally, regardless of colour and creed.
In relation to the review, there is a standing convention that legislation is reviewed three years after coming into effect. I am sure that the effectiveness of the provision will form part of such a future review.
Alex Cunningham
That is very helpful. I will not press the new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We recognise that, as the hon. Gentleman has said, there is no operation of polygraph currently in Scotland. In considering the commencement provisions, it is the clear intention of the UK Government to work extremely closely with the Scottish Government to determine when they are operationally ready to introduce polygraph testing into the toolkit that probation services have. We would not want to trigger implementation too early.
Over the past week or so, we have heard evidence showing the benefits that polygraph testing can bring. However, we are aware that time is needed to prepare operationally for those benefits to come into effect. Although we recognise that some elements of the implementation of this are devolved—as I say, we are going to work extremely closely with the Scottish Government on those—ultimately, provision for dealing with terrorism matters remains a reserved power of the UK Government, so it is appropriate that the commencement provision remains one that is exercised by the UK Government. However, I repeat my assurance to the hon. Member for East Lothian that we will work extremely closely with his colleagues in the Scottish Government—in particular those in the Justice Directorate, his old Department—to make sure nothing is done prematurely, or without being ready for it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 34 essentially has the same operative effect as the clauses we have already discussed in relation to polygraphs, except in relation to Northern Ireland. For the benefit of anyone listening in Northern Ireland and that of the hon. Member for St Helens North, we will work very closely with Naomi Long and the Northern Ireland Government on this, in the same way that we will work very closely with the Scottish Government. We recognise that they are not doing this already, and before we commence the provisions, we will need to make sure that the Northern Ireland Government are operationally able and ready to use them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Polygraph licence conditions in terrorism cases: supplementary provision
Kenny MacAskill
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 35, page 33, line 8, after “State” insert
“after consulting with Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice”.
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult with the Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Department of Justice when making regulations under clause 35(1).
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian for his comments. I wholly concur with what he said about the importance of training and carefully managing who conducts these tests and how they conduct them. In evidence, we heard from Professor Grubin in some detail of the critical importance of training. Without the proper training, method and the right questions, the entire process is essentially worthless and could potentially lead to false results. I accept the spirit of the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
To reassure the hon. Gentleman, in clause 35(3)(a) there is a reference to “other matters”. I explicitly assure him that that includes things such as training. The Secretary of State will address those matters in detail in the regulations, as they are addressed in the current regulations made under the existing legislation that applies to sex offenders. Identical or similar measures relating to training will be included in those regulations.
In relation to the question of confidentiality, which I have previously touched on, disclosure of any information obtained by polygraph testing will be shared only with governmental partners, particularly law enforcement agencies. It will not be disseminated or disclosed any more widely. I hope that assures the hon. Gentleman about the detail that the regulations made under clause 35 will go into. They will most certainly address the issues that he is properly raising.
Kenny MacAskill
I am happy to accept the Minister’s reassurances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
Again, I will be brief. I am aware that an amendment that I have tabled cannot be selected for debate, so I am content to address clause 35 stand part instead.
We accept that polygraphs have their uses, albeit very limited. Most notably, we recognise that polygraph examinations have been used with some success in the management of sexual offenders since 2013 by the National Probation Service. The Minister spoke about that and convinced us that, for that reason, we do not need a pilot for the Bill.
However, as has been said over and again in the evidence sessions and in debate, they are far from 100% accurate. While they give an indication, when used in the right conditions, that can detect traits associated with lying, they are far from infallible. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph examinations on high-risk offenders who have been convicted of terrorist offences or offences related to terrorism. Specifically, it allows for mandatory polygraphs to be taken three months post release and every six months thereafter unless the test is failed, after which the offender would have to take them more regularly.
However, the Government seem shy of spelling out the detail of how their proposed regime will work, leaving it to secondary legislation in the shape of regulations, which are mentioned in subsection (9). I, for one, am always a little wary of the Government when they opt for that route.
The Minister needs to provide a robust explanation of why he does not want that detail in the Bill. Is it a case of having insufficient detail at this stage to work out exactly what he wants to achieve with polygraph testing, or does he share everyone else’s reservations about the application of the test? I hope that he will explain why there has to be a delay. I am sure that if the Minister looked at the legislation relating to the application of polygraph tests to sex offenders, he could cut and paste the wording, and tidy it up to suit this legislation, so there is no excuse for it not being in the Bill.
The Ministry of Justice has committed to a review of the value of polygraphing terrorist offenders and those convicted of offences related to terrorism after two years, which we very much welcome. However, as I said earlier, we would welcome that kind of commitment in the Bill, and a clear statement that people with protected characteristics will be covered specifically. It would help the Committee were the Minister to spell out how he expects such a review to be conducted, what he expects out of it, and whether he would adopt the need to achieve the specific things that I have spelled out.
I reiterate that Labour does not object to the use of polygraphs as set out in the Bill, but we should see the detail from the Government on exactly what they want to do. They ought to spell it out in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that, and perhaps accept that it would be an easy job to cut and paste from the other legislation and to table an amendment on Report that provides the clarification we seek.
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister asks why we do not specify in the Bill the full detail about how the polygraphs will be used, and why that will be done in secondary legislation. Of course, that is extremely common. It is usual for matters of great detail to be done via secondary rather than primary legislation, in order to avoid, in the first instance, filling the Bill with a great deal of operational matters.
There is also the possibility that operational best practice may change in due course. If scientific evidence develops, or as practice evolves, there may be things that we could do differently or better. Clearly, if it was set out in primary legislation, it would take a great deal of time to change the detail. We would have to wait for a Bill to come before Parliament with the matter in scope, which could take some years. There are quite a few things that the Government have been wanting to do for a while, and we have been waiting three or four years for the right Bill to come along, including some in the Ministry of Justice. Of course, such changes can be made more deftly and more quickly by secondary legislation.
If the shadow Minister wants to see the sort of detail that he can expect, the existing regulations made under the 2007 Act to implement polygraph testing for sex offenders will give him a great deal of information. Obviously, we will study those very carefully when making regulations under clause 35. If he wants further detail, he can certainly find it in the existing regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 36 covers the release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom. The clause refers to schedule 11, which, as we shall discuss in a moment, sets out arrangements for the release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom, so that their release provisions are consistent with those sentenced in the United Kingdom. In essence, it extends the provisions that we have debated already to ensure that people who are repatriated to the UK are affected by those provisions just as much as people who were here when convicted and when serving their sentence. I am sure that everybody would agree that that kind of consistency is extremely welcome and extremely important.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11
Release on licence of repatriated terrorist prisoners
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Schedule 11 gives effect to the clause 36 in a number of technical ways, which I do not propose to go through in detail. It ensures that the clause has practical effect in law.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 11 accordingly agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Seventh sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 7th July 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2020 - (7 Jul 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson, and to follow the hon. Member for St Helens North. Before I speak to the specifics of amendment 58, which I do not intend to press to a vote—it is very much a probing amendment—I will reiterate the position of the Scottish National party on the Bill.
We recognise that it is the duty of any Government to keep their citizens safe and secure, and all who serve in Parliament have an obligation to assist in that endeavour. We have already given the Government our assurance that we will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism is met and that we keep people in all communities across these islands as safe as is reasonably possible. However, we are also mindful of our duties as parliamentarians to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her constructive tone. Before she gets into the detail, will she tell us whether the Government in Holyrood will grant a legislative consent motion for the Bill?
Joanna Cherry
As the Minister knows, discussions about that are ongoing. He may take it that the constructive approach that I am indicating on behalf of the Scottish National party applies across the board, including the party in government in Scotland. He is aware from our discussions that there are certain concerns the impact of aspects of the Bill on devolved matters. They were addressed last week by my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian in respect of the order for life-long restriction and the question of polygraph testing. We wish to be constructive on those matters, and that will be the approach of my colleagues at Holyrood.
Today I am focusing on TPIMs, which are a reserved matter. It is fair to say that my colleagues in Holyrood and Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Minister, have expressed some of the concerns that I am about to elaborate on. Like the hon. Member for St Helens North, my essential concern is that we have not yet seen the case for change—the case for lowering the standard of proof. We do not believe the Government have made that case, and in so saying we are in good company.
Our amendment 58, like the official Opposition’s amendment 69, seeks to raise the standard of proof, albeit it using a slightly different formulation. It is a probing amendment, but in truth, we believe that the standard of proof should stay as it is, because we do not think a case has been made out to change it. We also believe that that is where the balance of the expert evidence that this Committee has heard lies.
It is important to remember that, as has been alluded to, the changes in the Bill align the TPIMs regime more closely with its predecessor, the control orders regime. It is also important to remember that the concerns about control orders were widely shared across the House by Members from all parties. Those concerns are legitimate, because TPIMs restrict some of our most fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom to have a private and family life. All these fundamental freedoms are restricted when somebody is sent to prison and convicted, but with a TPIM the person involved does not need to have been convicted of any crime for those freedoms to be restricted.
A TPIM is really just a step away from imprisonment, and depending on the package of restrictions, it can amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which for the time being at least is still a part of our domestic law. As none of the exceptions to the right to liberty in article 5 is applicable to the TPIMs regime, if the package of restrictions around a TPIMs regime amount to a deprivation of liberty, article 5 of the ECHR is breached. It is vital, therefore, that the TPIMs regime remains subject to the strictest of safeguards.
The current safeguard whereby a TPIM can only be imposed on the balance of probabilities is something that the Government are seeking to reduce considerably. We are concerned that the low threshold is disproportionate, and we do not think the Government have made out the case for lowering the threshold. It may well be that lowering the threshold would ease the administrative burden on the Government in terms of the evidence that is required for an application for a TPIM to be granted, but easing administrative burdens is not a sufficient reason to lower the standard of proof so drastically.
As I said, I will not push amendment 58 to a vote today, but if the Government continue to fail to deliver any compelling justification for their action, I anticipate that when the Bill returns to the Floor of the House, similar amendments will be tabled and there may even be a vote on whether this change should be made. The concerns that I am expressing are widely held. The hon. Member for St Helens North has told us that they are shared by the official Opposition and by the respected bodies that he listed. I know that some Conservative Back Benchers also share these concerns. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, is anxious, regarding this change as a lowering of the safeguards in relation to TPIMs. I am indebted to that Joint Committee for assisting me in my understanding of these issues.
Perhaps the most significant evidence this Committee has heard was from the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. He has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point in time.”
I would submit that, notwithstanding the intervention on the hon. Member for St Helens North, we have heard nothing in evidence that has convinced Mr Hall QC otherwise. I asked him whether the Government had given him a business case or a justification for lowering standards of proof. He replied:
“I have obviously had discussions, but I have not been able to identify a cogent business case.” ––[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15, Q31.]
That is what is missing here.
The lack of cogency or reasoned argument for the need for change mirrors the lack of appropriate evidence or justification that was presented to the House on Second Reading. If we look at the impact assessment, we see that certain questions are posed, such as:
“What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?”
However, the answers given to such questions relate solely to convicted offenders, with only a later reference to the policy objective to “better protect the public” and a link to the issue of
“individuals of terrorism concern outside of custody.”
Then, there is a vague explanation that the Bill will allow for more effective intervention when that is required. On the changes to TPIMs, the impact assessment says that they
“will enhance the ability of operational partners, such as counterterrorism policing, to manage the risk posed by individuals subject to TPIMs.”
It says that the change to the standard of proof will simply
“help ensure that operational partners are better able to impose TPIM notices on individuals where there is a requirement to protect national security.”
No further justification is given.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. Let me once again welcome the shadow Minister to his well-deserved place on the Opposition Front Bench.
The speech given a few moments ago my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford outlined with incredible power how important it is that we in this House and in government discharge our duty to protect the public. I thank her for sharing the experience that her friend Louise had 15 years ago today. I ask her to pass on the House’s thanks to Louise for the bravery and fortitude she showed on that day and subsequently, and for sharing her experience with the Committee. Hearing direct first-hand testimony of the kind we did a few moments ago brings to life how important this topic is and how seriously we must take our responsibility to protect our fellow citizens, so I ask my hon. Friend to pass on our thanks to Louise.
It is, of course, right that we take this moment to remember the 52 members of the public who lost their lives 15 years ago, and the 784 who were injured and who will often carry not just physical scars, but mental and psychological scars for many years to come. The shadow cast by terrorism is not just a physical shadow; it is a psychological and emotional shadow.
I turn to clause 37 and the proposed amendments. The first point I want to make, beyond reiterating that protecting the public is our primary duty, is that TPIMs are not something the Government, Ministers or the police reach for first. The first option is always to prosecute where we have evidence to do so, and that is what happens in the vast majority of cases—criminal prosecution before a judge and a jury, to the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, is the preferred and first option. We should always keep that in mind. We fall back on TPIMs only where we believe there is a real threat to the public and where they are in fact necessary. The word “necessary” appears in the original 2011 legislation, and that test of necessity is not being changed by this new Bill. It is a last resort.
The hon. Member for St Helens North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West both asked about the business case. Why are we introducing this change, and what is the need for this measure? I will begin by answering that question directly. As we have briefly heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, the answer is best found in the evidence that the Committee heard on the morning of Thursday 25 June from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques. I asked him something twice in general terms, and then he answered more specifically. I asked him twice whether this legislation will
“make the public less or more safe”.
He answered very clearly,
“yes, I believe it will make the public safer.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 20, Q48.]
To be absolutely sure, I asked him again whether it will make the public safer. He said:
“That is the view of the security services…that is their clear view.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q50.]
Conor McGinn
The witness did say that. The Minister might recall that I then pushed the witness on the specifics of it, and he said he was talking about the totality of the package contained within the Bill—more specifically around sentencing, rather than what was proposed around TPIMs.
Chris Philp
I will elaborate on the questions a little further. Question 50 was specifically about TPIMs and the burden of proof. To clear that up, I will read question 50 in full—it is not very long. “For those three reasons”, which I will go through in a moment,
“you are being categorically clear with this Committee and with Parliament that the proposed lower standard of proof”—
which we are now discussing—
“would be a benefit to the police and the security services, and that it would make the public safer.”
I was expressly referring not just to TPIMs but to the standard of proof. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques replied:
“That is the view of the security services…that is their clear view.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 22, Q50.]
He was answering specifically on TPIMs and on the burden of proof in question 50.
Joanna Cherry
If the evidence of the assistant chief constable and the three examples are so central to the Government’s business case, why were they not in the impact assessment and why were they not mentioned on Second Reading, when others and I were probing the Minister? For instance, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who is Chair of the Justice Committee, asked for the justification for the change. It seems to me the Government are seizing on this now as a justification. If it is the justification, flesh it out, put it in a business case but also, answer the question: why was it not there originally as a justification?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her intervention. First, some of the details I am about to take the Committee through were mentioned on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and I expressly mentioned the possibility of people returning from conflict zones such as Syria. In response to repeated interventions from the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), I gave the justification in general terms, which have been borne out subsequently by the detailed evidence.
Joanna Cherry
The problem of people returning from Syria, which I accept, is a significant one that has existed for a number of years. Is the Minister saying in terms that the current TPIM regime—the current standard of proof—has prevented the security services from dealing with the problem of people returning from Syria? If that is what he saying, he should say so in bald terms, rather than seizing on something after the fact to justify this significant change.
Chris Philp
I will finish dealing with the hon. and learned Lady’s previous intervention and then I will answer her second one. She was asking why the case was not made more fully on Second Reading. I said it was made in general terms and the example of Syria was given. I will come on to that in a moment. The reason we have witnesses appearing before Public Bill Committees is precisely to serve this purpose: to bring out the detail and let them give their testimony to the Committee and the House. The detailed testimony given by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques on the morning of 25 June is precisely why we have witnesses. It is serving the function it should have done, which was to give the Committee and the House the details they asked for on Second Reading and which hon. Members are asking for today.
I turn to the detail of Tim Jacques’s testimony and give the specific and precise reasons why he and the security services believe this is important, one of which is the Syrian example, which I will elaborate on in just a moment. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s first reason for why the lower standard of proof is necessary to protect the public is that we may find that there are individuals whose
“risk profile is rapidly increasing”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 20, Q49.]
If someone’s behaviour is quickly changing they may go from posing a potential threat to an actual threat to actually offending very quickly. He says that it is that rapid change of circumstances that necessitates a lower burden of proof. He then goes on to give a second reason, which was mentioned by the hon. and learned Lady a moment ago, which is the threat of somebody returning from overseas. He says that where someone has been overseas—for example, in Syria—it is extremely difficult, as one can readily imagine, to gather evidence that would meet the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, if someone has been operating in Syria, there will typically be no signals intelligence or eye-witness testimony, because it is very hard to get witnesses from Syria to come here, and there will be no results of other forms of surveillance: all the evidence that would normally be presented in a criminal prosecution enabling somebody’s guilt to be established beyond reasonable doubt. It is difficult—impossible, I would say—to achieve that when someone is returning. That is why, in those thankfully relatively rare circumstances, we might need to work to a lower standard of proof and reasonable suspicion in order to protect the public.
The hon. and learned Lady essentially said that people have been going to Syria for five years now, and indeed returning for four or five years. We heard in evidence from both Jonathan Hall and Tim Jacques that, historically, there have not been any examples where a TPIM was desired but not obtained owing to the burden of proof. In fact, that observation applies more generally and not only to the Syrian example. Let me directly answer the criticism immediately.
It is true, I accept, that there have been no occasions historically when a TPIM was desired but not granted owing to the burden of proof that currently exists. However, we are not seeking simply to cater for circumstances that occurred historically; we seek in this legislation, and as parliamentarians, to cater for risks that may arise in the future that may not have arisen in the past. The absence of such risks having happened in the last five or six years does not establish definitively that they will not happen in the future—such a risk might arise in the future. Indeed, the assistant chief constable effectively said that he thinks that is possible, which is why he is advocating for the lower burden of proof.
We must cater for risks, not historical certainties. That is why the evidence of the assistant chief constable is so important and why the Syrian example is a good one, even though historically we have not been inhibited. We might be in the future. A few moments ago, we heard a powerfully eloquent description of the devastating consequences that follow when the public are not protected.
Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out a third reason in his evidence concerning sensitive material—material that is gathered covertly, or the disclosure of which might prejudice investigations or the security services:
“The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q49.]
He says that, with a lower standard of proof, that disclosure would be required less frequently so there would not be such a requirement to disclose sensitive information.
In answer to a question posed by both Opposition Front-Bench shadow Ministers, Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out the business case powerfully in those three examples that I have just taken the Committee through.
Joanna Cherry
I have the greatest respect for the assistant chief constable and for the assistance he was able to give the Committee, but in a court of law we would call that hearsay evidence. He is not actually dealing with seeking TPIMs. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who is charged by the Government with the responsibility of overviewing all this, said that there is no cogent business case.
Can the Minister explain why the independent reviewer is not convinced by the assistant chief constable’s three examples? Mr Hall said that he has had discussions with the Government—presumably the Government have put those examples to him if they are so central to the business case. Can the Minister explain to us why the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is not convinced that there is a cogent case?
Chris Philp
I was not present at those meetings, so I cannot comment on what was discussed. However, the hon. and learned Lady has herself already observed that Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s critical testimony was ventilated in such details—publicly at least—for the first time in his evidence; of course, Jonathan Hall gave evidence just before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. As I say, I was not privy to the conversations that took place between Jonathan Hall and my colleagues in the Home Office, so I do not know what case was presented to him, but I do know that the case presented by Tim Jacques was, at least in my view, compelling.
Chris Philp
Before I move on to the second leg of my support for these measures, I will of course give way to the shadow Minister, who wants to intervene.
Conor McGinn
To echo what the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said, the evidence of the assistant chief constable was incredibly useful—he is hugely respected across law enforcement. But he was one witness. He made it clear, in response to the Minister’s questions about TPIMs, that it was the view of the security services that the lowering of the standard of proof might have “utility” when it came to the examples that he outlined—but he was also clear that the police are not the applicant.
Chris Philp
I have made this point already, in response to an earlier intervention, but at question 50 I asked the assistant chief constable expressly about TPIMs and the burden of proof. He expressly said that it would make the public safer—he was talking there not about the generality of the Bill, but about TPIMs specifically. Of course, I welcome the fact that in more general terms he feels that the Bill will help, but that question related specifically to TPIMs.
Chris Philp
The assistant chief constable said:
“That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q50.]
Although he was not applying for TPIMs, he is a senior police officer involved in counter-terrorism policing, he had been briefed by the security services before giving evidence, and he is responsible for monitoring and managing TPIMs subsequently. To dismiss his evidence as hearsay—the hon. Gentleman did not, but the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West did—is rather unfair, given that he had the briefing from the security services in front of him when he gave evidence and given the close role he and counter-terrorism police play in managing and monitoring TPIMs.
Joanna Cherry
There is no insult in saying that someone’s evidence is hearsay; it is simply that they are giving evidence about what someone else has told them. I am not undermining the witness in any way, but he is only giving evidence about what he has been told. Let us look at what he said at question 58, when I said:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
He responded:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
As I said to him, that is an important answer, albeit that it is hearsay. He is telling us that MI5 has said, in respect of two of the examples that the Minister is giving us as a justification for this significant change, that in no case so far has the current standard of proof been a blocker. Does that not perhaps explain why we have three distinguished Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation supporting the existing standard of proof, rather than this Government’s variation?
Chris Philp
I have already accepted, a few minutes ago, that there have not been any historical examples. That was clear from the evidence. I also said, in response to an earlier intervention on Syria, that just because there have not been any historically—we are talking about very small numbers—does not mean to say that there will not be such a situation in the future. We need to guard against potential future risk. That is what we seek to do.
Let me go on to the second plank of my rationale for why this proposed burden of proof is appropriate. It is because there are significant mitigants to any risks of abuse of process, miscarriages of justice or inappropriate behaviour. I rest my case for those mitigants on two legs or stands.
The first is that we do not need to hypothesise about how a Government—any Government—might behave with access to TPIMs, or control orders, with a lower standard of proof. As the hon. Member for St Helens North pointed out, we had control orders, passed by then Labour Government in 2005, which had the lower standard of proof—the reasonable suspicion. Those persisted for approximately six years, from 2005 to 2011. During that period, 52 control orders were issued. On the morning of 25 June, I also asked Jonathan Hall whether he was aware of any misuse in that six-year period—I said seven then, but it is six—when the lower burden of proof prevailed. He said:
“I am not aware of any misuse”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 7, Q9.]
I also asked him whether he was aware of the Government ever having misused the powers or used them without care and circumspection; I actually asked whether, as far as he could see, the Government had used the powers “with care and circumspection”. He said:
“I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 6, Q5.]
So the control orders, as they were then, operated with a lower standard of proof for six years with no abuse or misuse identified.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised a question about ECHR article 5 compliance and whether the lower burden of proof would potentially infringe that. I checked that during the debate. During the six years when 52 control orders were used, at no point, despite some challenges, were they found to be not compliant with the ECHR. The Committee can satisfy itself that when they operated previously, they did so without abuse and were not struck down as an instrument as a whole by the court.
The second set of mitigants is to be found in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, in which the Committee probably knows there are five conditions, labelled A to E, that have to be met for a TPIM to be granted. We are seeking to amend only one of those five conditions, condition A, which pertains to the burden of proof in so far as it touches on terrorism-related activity.
The four other conditions still have to be met and are not being changed by the Bill. For example, condition C requires the Secretary of State to reasonably consider “that it is necessary”—I labour that word “necessary”—
“for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism”.
The Secretary of State must be satisfied that there is necessity. It must not be done on a whim or because it might or may be required. It must be necessary. That is in section 3(3) of the 2011 Act, which is not being amended.
In section 3(4), condition D makes a similar point that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider
“that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity”.
Again, it uses the word “necessary”—not “possible”, “maybe” or “might”, but “necessary”. It is a very strong word.
Moreover, in section 3(5), condition E says that the Secretary of State must seek permission from the court, as described further in sections 6 and 9 of the Act. They must go to a court of law and make sure that it feels it is reasonable that a TPIM should be granted. At the outset, there is judicial oversight of the process. The Home Secretary cannot, just by a stroke of a pen, give out a TPIM and thereby restrict someone’s liberty. That is a serious matter, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West has already said. There is judicial oversight of the process. I say again that four of the five tests laid down in section 3 of the 2011 Act are not changing. They will stay the same.
Moreover, those subjected to a TPIM have a right of appeal against it. The 2011 Act, which, again, is not being amended, provides that they can go to a court if they feel that a TPIM has been unreasonably imposed, unreasonably varied or unreasonably extended. They can ask a court for relief and the court proceedings can carry on according to the principles used in judicial review. Beyond the simple question of burden of proof around terrorist-related activities, there are those further protections in the Bill and from the courts.
I will conclude, Mr Robertson—always welcome words during one of my speeches—by saying that the powers are used sparingly. There were 52 of the old control orders in total over six years, but at any one time no more than 15 were ever in force. As the shadow Minister has said, as of November last year there were five TPIMs in force, although I think that we heard in evidence that the number might subsequently have gone up to six.
We use such powers very sparingly, for the reason that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West mentioned: they touch on an individual’s liberty. However, they are occasionally, in the words of the Act, “necessary”—necessary to protect the public, necessary to protect people such as Louise who might otherwise be killed, injured or traumatised and necessary to protect our fellow citizens. It is for those reasons of necessity that I respectfully say that the clause as drafted is an integral and an important part of the Bill.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
TPIMs: extension of time limit
Chris Philp
Allow me to explain why the current two-year maximum does not work from a security services perspective. As matters stand, if a TPIM comes to the end of two years and thereby automatically lapses, a brand-new application has to be made, requiring completely fresh evidence, without simply reusing the evidence used at the outset. New evidence must be obtained, which takes some time, particularly if during the two-year period of the TPIM, the subject has been careful to behave themselves, which is the purpose of the TPIM in the first place.
We have had examples of a gap caused by the renewal requirement. Jonathan Hall acknowledged that in answer to my question in his evidence on 25 June,. I asked him about gaps when TPIMs had expired and he said that he had found a couple of examples. He added:
“In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.”
In response, I said:
“It is fair to say that the risk would have existed in that 12 to 16-month period.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q2, c. 6.]
I was not asking about things that had actually happened; I was asking about risk—what might have happened. In response to that point, Jonathan Hall replied, “Yes.”
I went on similarly to ask Assistant Chief Constable Jacques whether a risk might exist in that gap. He said:
“Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q51, c. 21.]
We therefore have clear evidence, from both the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, and counter-terrorism expert Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, telling us that the gap that follows the two-year expiration of a TPIM poses a risk to the public. It is right that in the Bill we seek to close that risk by allowing for carefully considered annual extensions.
In terms of protecting the subject and ensuring that the extensions are not used unreasonably, let me make the following comments to reassure the Committee and, I hope, the whole House. First, the old control order regime did not have the two-year limit. In the period when the control orders introduced by the Labour Government in 2005 were enforced, 30 lasted for two years or less, eight lasted for between two and three years, four lasted for between three and four years, and only three lasted for between four and five years. The clear majority lasted for less than two years. Only a small number—15, according to the figures that I have—lasted for more than two years, and the bulk of those lasted for three or four years. Once again, when the powers are available, they are used circumspectly and sparingly.
Further protections are laid out in statutory provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which will continue. The first is found in section 11 of the Act, which requires the Secretary of State to keep TPIMs under review, in particular conditions C and D, which I mentioned earlier. That is given practical effect via a quarterly review process, once every three months, in which the security services and counter-terrorism police participate. Secondly, there is an ongoing right of appeal by the subject laid out in section 16 of the 2011 Act. Section 16(1), which will continue in force, says that if
“the Secretary of State extends or revives a TPIM”,
the right of appeal will apply, so every time a TPIM is extended, the subject, if they think the extension is unreasonable, has the right to go to court to seek protection.
Given that the current gap is posing a risk to the public, as Jonathan Hall and Assistant Chief Constable Jacques very clearly said, and given that there are good and strong safeguards in place, I believe that the provisions in clause 38, allowing considered, thoughtful annual extensions, serve the purpose of protecting the public.
Joanna Cherry
I am not going to speak to amendment 64, but I will speak in support of Labour’s amendment 61 when we get to it.
Chris Philp
Amendment 61 seeks to introduce a higher standard of proof—the balance of probabilities—if a TPIM is to be extended beyond two years. We debated at some length the relative merits of reasonable suspicion and the balance of probabilities in relation to clause 37, so I do not propose to repeat those arguments at great length. However, I hope I established in my previous remarks the importance of the reasonable suspicion burden of proof, rather than the balance of probabilities.
On the issue of extension, I gave the reasons why it is important to avoid this two-year cliff edge a few minutes ago, during the debate on amendments 60 and 64. I also drew attention to the protections that exist, particularly the review process in section 11 of the TPIM Act, which is an internal process that goes on on a quarterly basis. I also drew attention to the right of appeal under section 16 of the same Act. Every time one of these orders gets extended by a year, the subject has a right to go back to the court if he or she feels they are being treated unreasonably and unfairly. For all those reasons, I think the annual renewal process, with a right of appeal should the subject feel the renewal is unreasonable, provides adequate protection.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for St Helens North, asked about counter-terrorism resources. As I am sure he is aware, counter-terrorism police expenditure was significantly increased earlier this year. The police have a great deal more resources than they had previously, and as Assistant Chief Constable Jacques said in evidence,
“Neither we nor the Security Service envisage a large increase in those numbers—
the numbers of people on TPIMs—
“as a result of the provisions in the Bill”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q49, c. 20.]
although as the shadow Minister said, some may endure longer. We are absolutely committed to making sure the resources required are available.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 38, page 34, line 33, at end insert—
“(ab) after subsection (3)(b) insert—
(3A) Where a TPIM notice has been extended under subsection (3), the Secretary of State must review, at 6 monthly intervals, whether it is appropriate to issue a revocation notice under section (13)(1).
(3B) A review under subsection 3A will include a memorandum to—
(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force;
(b) the Security Service,
(c) the Secret Intelligence Service, and
(d) the Government Communications Headquarters
outlining a tailored exit strategy.
(3C) A ‘tailored exit strategy’ under subsection (3B) shall include—
(a) an assessment of the individual’s current security threat, which must include an assessment of the current evidence and investigative steps as provided by the bodies listed in subsection (3B);
(b) a plan for agencies and public services to engage with the individual to promote rehabilitation for the duration of the TPIM; and
(c) a plan for how TPIM measures may be removed if no new evidence of terrorist related activity is provided.”
An amendment to require the Secretary of State to specify a provisional exit strategy for a TPIM notice, upon any renewal beyond the two-year mark.
It always struck me as a strange and inflexible design flaw of TPIMs that they had a set limit of two years. My right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, who chairs the Select Committee on Home Affairs, reminded the House on Second Reading that
“Control orders were set for a year but could be renewed”,
but
“TPIMs were fixed at two years.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 229.]
As far back as 2011, my right hon. Friend was raising concerns about what that would mean for the small number of people who might be extremely dangerous after two years, and what provisions would be in place to ensure the public were protected.
It would be good to introduce a measure of flexibility to TPIMs, but my concern is that by doing so that way, the Government leave a very open-ended approach, which could see cases effectively kicked into the long grass, often at great expense and with no realistic strategy for resolution of any kind. When imposing a TPIM, we must always have sight of what resolution is—whether prosecution or the removal of the notice—rather than the idea that we can indefinitely extend the TPIM and leave those who are subject to them in a sort of terrorism-suspect limbo.
The amendment seeks to address the open-ended nature of the Government’s changes by requiring the Secretary of State to specify what we have called a provisional exit strategy for a TPIM notice upon any renewal beyond the two-year mark. Under the provision in the amendment, the Secretary of State would be obliged to undertake a review every six months to set out whether it is appropriate to issue a revocation notice and to draw up, with police and security services, a tailored exit strategy. That strategy would involve an assessment of the individual’s current security threat, which should be the most fundamental and overarching aspect to the TPIM; a plan for agencies and public services to engage with the individual to promote rehabilitation for the duration of the TPIM if possible; and a plan for how TPIM measures can be removed if no new evidence of terrorist-related activity is provided.
It is not in anyone’s interest to allow individuals to remain indefinitely on TPIMs, not just for their own sake but for that of wider society because, crucially, they should be brought to justice and put through the judicial process. As Jonathan Hall said:
“There is the risk that, once a TPIM has been made and someone has been identified as a risk, that takes priority—in other words, the TPIM is the best way of protecting the public—over trying to get criminal evidence to prosecute”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 17, Q37.]
Having heard the wide-ranging evidence from witnesses, as well as what the security services and others have said, I am in no doubt that that is far from being the motivation of anyone involved in overseeing a TPIM, but those are important points to bear in mind none the less.
The idea of an indefinite TPIM means that someone convicted of a terrorist offence could conceivably be free of constraints before someone who is placed on an enduring TPIM. As we legislate in this place, we need to be cognisant of the potential for that to occur, which would be quite perverse and bizarre, albeit quite unlikely. The idea of leaving someone subject to a TPIM indefinitely is not cost-effective for the taxpayer and, notwithstanding all the amendments that we have tabled, does nothing to tackle the issues that have brought the individual to the point that they are subjected to the TPIM—namely, entering dangerous extremism and being suspected, as the lower standard of proof would say, of becoming engaged in criminal and terrorist activity.
I worry that the indefinite TPIM discourages a move towards seeking a conviction when that is appropriate, and increases the risk of individuals slipping under the radar over time if their cases are not regularly reviewed by those tasked with implementing the TPIM. An exit strategy would keep that small number of cases at the forefront of the Secretary of State’s mind and would ensure that, if there were enduring or extended TPIMs, we would not allow them to become indefinite beyond that which is reasonable.
Chris Philp
On the point about potential perpetuity TPIMs, once again I assure the Committee that history from the old control order regime teaches us that the number of TPIMs enduring beyond two or three years is exceptionally small, and the subject always has a right of appeal to the court. On the question about reviews and the exit strategy, which is the topic of the amendment, the Government essentially agree with the comments about their importance but, in fact, that is precisely what happens already. I have referred to the fact that section 11 of the TPIM Act requires the Secretary of State to keep under review whether conditions C and D are being met—that is, whether there is terrorist-related activity or whether the public need to be protected. That is given practical effect by a TPIM review group, a so-called TRG, that meets on a quarterly basis. The topics that it discusses are exactly those that the shadow Minister quite rightly and eloquently laid out a few minutes ago, including the exit strategy.
That was reviewed and commented on in the 2018 report of the then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Max Hill QC, who is now, of course, the Director of Public Prosecutions. In relation to the TPIM review group’s activity, he said that
“the TRG meets at three-monthly intervals”,
which is twice as often as the amendment calls for, and that
“very careful consideration is given to every aspect of the TPIM in force, including…the individual measures, each in turn…the exit strategy, in other words timely preparation for returning the TPIM subject to his”—
or her—
“home life at the end of the TPIM.”
I am delighted to be able to say to the Committee that exactly the review mechanisms, including the exit strategy, that the shadow Minister is calling for are already in place and were validated by the then independent reviewer, Max Hill, in 2018.
Conor McGinn
I do not have anything to add except to say that that was a rare example of a probing amendment that probed and received assurances, so I do not seek to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I will be brief, because we have discussed at some length the question of extensions and an exit strategy. I echo the comments about section 10 of the 2011 Act. As the shadow Minister said, section 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the relevant chief officer of police as to whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a terrorism-related offence before imposing a TPIM. The chief officer must then consult the relevant prosecuting authority. Once the TPIM has been imposed, section 10 says that the chief officer
“must ensure investigations of the TPIM subject’s conduct is kept under review throughout the duration of the TPIM with a view to prosecution for an offence related to terrorism if the evidential threshold can be met”.
Essentially, I think that what the hon. Gentleman reasonably asks for is enshrined in section 10 of the 2011 Act. I point again to the operation of the TPIM review group, to which I referred to in the previous debate, which meets regularly every three months and has input from police and the security services to do exactly what the shadow Minister asks.
On oversight and reporting, the hon. Gentleman mentioned the ISC. I believe it will be constituted soon, but that is not in my gift or purview. I think the most suitable person to oversee, monitor and scrutinise the activities of the Government in this area is the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whom we have all been quoting very frequently. He clearly does a very energetic and active job in this sphere.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
TPIMs: variation of measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 39 inserts an additional ground for variation into section 12 of the old TPIM Act that I have been quoting from. By virtue of that, it will be possible for the Secretary of State to vary the relocation measure in a TPIM notice, if considered strictly necessary,
“for reasons connected with the…effective use of resources in relation to the individual.”
The new ground for variation will apply only where the individual has already been relocated away from their home address and where the national security reason for requiring relocation still exists.
Conor McGinn
I want briefly to draw the Minister and the Committee’s attention to the fact that, when these relocation orders were previously challenged by those subject to them, one sixth of those cases were upheld. In introducing this measure, the Government need to ensure that their legal processes are very robust in that regard.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
TPIMs: extension of residence measure
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 40, page 36, line 31, at end insert—
“(c) after paragraph (1)(5) insert—
‘(5A) Where the Secretary of State has imposed on an individual a requirement to reside at a specified residence which is shared with another individual or individuals, the Secretary of State shall provide for an assessment to be made of the suitability of these individuals to reside together.’”
Requirement for a report on approved premises putting offenders in shared accommodation together.
This amendment puts forward a requirement for a report on approved premises putting offenders in shared accommodation together. That is an issue of real concern: the most effective sentencing policy or preventive intervention can be meaningless, frankly, when pitted against the pressure, manipulation or radicalisation that a vulnerable person might be exposed to from a friend, associate or, sadly, even a family member.
We heard throughout the witness sessions that custody can only have a protective impact by taking that particular person off the street, so to speak, for that specified period, and that it is on release that they are exposed. As Peter Dawson, from the Prison Reform Trust, said,
“people are going to be released, and that is when the risk arises”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 35, Q79.]
The importance of positive relationships cannot be undervalued. As Mr Dawson said,
“particularly after a long sentence, a stable home and relationships with people who have kept faith with you and who have belief in your future are absolutely the things that help someone as a mature person.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 36, Q82.]
All the evidence supports that view, so it is also the case that negative association and exposure to extremist pressure within shared accommodation carries real risks, particularly for young offenders.
We are therefore tabling this amendment to ensure that:
“Where the Secretary of State has imposed on an individual a requirement to reside at a specified residence which is shared with another individual or individuals, the Secretary of State shall provide for an assessment to be made of the suitability of these individuals to reside together.”
It would be pointless and perverse for the state to designate specific accommodation as part of a directive, only for that accommodation and those contained therein to be a major influence on increasing reoffending risks. Due diligence must be done on the appropriateness of the residence and those individuals.
The state cannot be responsible for ordering someone into a dangerous or radicalising environment; that would undermine all the other measures contained in the Bill. Therefore, I hope the Government will reflect on this amendment. I do not intend to push it to a vote, but I felt none the less it was important to move it.
Chris Philp
Relocation measures are on occasion a very important way of protecting the public. As Jonathan Hall said in his evidence to us on 25 June:
“Relocation is an important power. It is regrettable, in the sense that it is a very strong measure and causes a lot of disruption, but I am quite satisfied that in a small number of cases it is needed.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 18, Q40.]
The necessity of relocation on occasion is not in dispute.
In relation to the point that the shadow Minister makes about not putting people into multi-occupancy premises, let me say that the Government and the police never put people into multi-occupancy premises—that is to say, we do not impose a requirement on the subject to reside with other individuals. They would never be put into accommodation with other people, for all the reasons that he mentioned.
Of course, we do regular risk assessments of TPIM subjects, including via the auspices of the TPIM review group that I mentioned a little earlier, which meets quarterly. The group looks not only at the issues we have talked about previously to do with exit strategy and so on, but at various other matters, including the relocation measures and how those are working.
As I have said previously, a former Independent Reviewer Of Terrorism Legislation has commented positively, saying that these quarterly TPIM review groups entail robust discussion of every aspect of the TPIM, including residency, and consider every individual part of that TPIM in turn. I hope that gives the shadow Minister the assurance he requires that people are not compelled to live in multi-occupancy premises, with the potentially adverse consequences that may flow from that.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
TPIMs: polygraph measure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
It is worth reminding the Committee that the purpose of using polygraphs in this context, rather like the monitoring of licence conditions that we discussed earlier in our proceedings, is simply to seek to prompt new disclosures that might otherwise not happen, or to elicit an indication that might suggest that further investigation by the relevant authority should be undertaken. The purpose of using polygraphs is nothing more nor less than to achieve those very limited objectives.
The provisions of the new clause might be somewhat beyond the scope of the Bill, because it would apply not just to the people we are talking about here, but to sex offenders where polygraphs are used. When the Domestic Abuse Bill receives Royal Assent—it had its Third Reading last night—it would apply to domestic abuse offenders as well, so the scope is significantly beyond just terrorism.
The central point of the new clause is to ensure is that people under the age of 25 have some kind of counsellor present during a polygraph test. The main assurance I can give the Committee and the shadow Minister is the fact that, as we heard from Professor Grubin in his compelling evidence, the people who administer the polygraph tests are highly trained. The regulations that we already use in relation to sex offenders, and that are likely to form the basis of the regulations here, require high levels of training and quality assurance for those who administer the tests. They are expert people who are selected and trained very carefully, and they use their powers and authority in a carefully managed and circumspect manner. I hope the fact that the person who administers the test is well trained and carefully regulated gives the Committee and the shadow Minister confidence that the proposed additional measure of having a counsellor present is an extra level of protection that is essentially nugatory, bearing in mind the expertise of the person doing the test in the first place.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister, apart from the fact that he does not think the safeguarding is necessary, has just made a grand speech in support of my amendment. He has recognised very clearly that, although there may be experts, there are issues that need to be addressed. He actually talked about how the scope of the amendment would go far beyond the issues covered in the Bill. That is a good thing. Why should young sex offenders or young offenders covered by the Domestic Abuse Bill not also have the protection of having a counsellor present at their session? I will not push the new clause to a vote, but I believe that the Minister needs to start to focus very specifically on young people. We will return to the issue of young people on Report, because the Minister seems to dismiss the fact that a small number of young people are different. He does not recognise the difference. We will withdraw the new clause for now, but we will most certainly return to this issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
TPIMs: drug testing measure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 42 adds a new drug testing measure to schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011. A TPIM subject will be required to submit to drug testing by way of providing a relevant sample. Under the clause, testing is limited to testing for the presence of specified class A and class B drugs. These drugs are the same as the class A and class B drugs specified in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The definition of “permitted sample” sets out an exhaustive list of the non-intimate samples that may be taken, mirroring the definition of “non-intimate sample” in section 65 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Drug testing under the clause may be carried out only by a constable at a police station, but the clause contains a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing additional or alternative testers and places of testing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
TPIMs: provision of information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 43 amends an existing measure and inserts a new measure into schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011 to allow the Secretary of State to require the TPIM subject to provide additional information.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Additional offences attracting notification requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 44 amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 by adding a breach of TPIM notice and a breach of a temporary exclusion order to the list of terrorism offences that attract registered terrorist offender notification requirements. That ensures that individuals convicted of those offences on or after the day that the Bill comes into force will be subject to registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison. That will support the police to manage the ongoing risk posed by such individuals, and to take mitigating action as is necessary to protect the public.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in terrorism cases
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 45 introduces schedule 12, which amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to allow the police to make a direct application to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order in terrorist-related cases. That will streamline the application process and is intended to support an increased use of SCPOs in the circumstances I have just described.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 46
Serious crime prevention orders: review of operation of police powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 46 requires the Secretary of State to review the operation of the changes to the Serious Crime Act 2007 made by clause 45, and to publish a report on the outcome.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Eighth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 7th July 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2020 - (7 Jul 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 47, page 40, line 17, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (support for persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) for the words from ‘within the period’ to the end substitute ‘by 1 July 2021’.”.
This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy, which will have to report by 1 July 2021.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I know that, over your distinguished years in this House, you have taken a keen interest in home affairs, so it is particularly appropriate for you to chair this session.
I said on Second Reading that, as well as what in the Bill, we are concerned about what it does not contain. The Government have missed a real opportunity to expound upon their wider strategy for tackling extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. This is most acutely felt in the proposal, in effect, to remove the statutory deadline for a review of the Prevent strategy that was announced some 19 months ago. We know that Prevent has been a crucial part of this country’s counter-terrorism strategy. In giving evidence to the Committee, Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques said:
“Prevent is a critically important part of our role; it is absolutely vital. It is controversial, and has been controversial, but we engage in it, we operate, and we protect the public through Prevent every day.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 25-26, Q66.]
I find myself in full agreement with all that, because it is a vital tool and also, as the ACC acknowledged, one that has an element of controversy, or certainly dispute, around it.
It is hugely disappointing—not, I must add, solely to Opposition Members, but to civic society and, crucially, to those dedicated individuals who deliver the policy on the frontline—to now see a real lack of purpose and clarity regarding the programme’s direction under this Government. The independent review was legally bound to report to the House by 12 August this year, but it is obvious that this deadline is going to be missed, resulting in a further lack of clarity and, sadly, I suspect, a further question mark around the credibility of the programme itself. To make matters worse, the Bill now actively seeks to remove any deadline at all.
The independent review was announced last January— 19 months ago—following a long-running campaign by Opposition Members and civic society, but it has since been delayed and postponed. We believed then, and we believe now, that a wide-ranging, robust review is the right approach. By now, that review should have been finished and reported to Ministers. In fact, that should have happened two months ago; if anything, the Minister should now be preparing to come before the House to give the Government’s response to it.
Frankly, it begs a question about competency at the Home Office that things have been allowed to get to the present stage. We would of course have been willing to accept mitigations that might have been needed because of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on tight deadlines. However, we have already had dithering and false starts over the period of the review. The fact that the Government are now seeking to remove the statutory deadline, and leaving little indication of when we are to expect completion, leaves the explanations that we have had to date from them with little or no validity.
The Government have said that they would like the report to be completed by next summer; in that case, why not accept my amendment and put that on the face of the Bill? I do not think that I am being unreasonable in saying that we are allowing the Government a year from now—19 months into the process already—by which time it should have reported. We are being constructive in granting another year, and I do not think that it is reasonable for the Government to respond, “Well, you’ll just have to take our word for it.” I am afraid that we have not been able to rely on the Government to meet previous deadlines. The amendment would reinstate the statutory deadline for an independent review of Prevent by 1 July.
As I stressed on Second Reading, the introduction of the Bill before the Prevent review under the 2019 Act has even reported makes it clear what a quantity of time has been wasted. Lord Carlile was initially appointed to lead the review, but he stood down. That is important. I have huge respect for him. I have spoken to him in preparing for the Bill Committee and he has an exceptionally valuable contribution to make to the debate. Lord Carlile’s having to stand down from the review was nothing to do with his integrity or ability; it was to do with the appointment process. It is important that the Opposition say that and make it clear. It was unfortunate and a pity; it was also avoidable. I hope that the Government have learned lessons from that about putting robust mechanisms in place for the appointment of independent reviewers of something that is as controversial and critical as Prevent. I felt that it was important to say that we thank Lord Carlile for the work that he did. We also thank Lord Anderson and the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, for the work that they do.
It is not beyond the bounds of reason, but the Minister cannot see that the amendment is constructive. It it would simply put into the Bill something that he says the Government would like to do, which is to report by next summer. We need some clarity about it. We need to end the continuing speculation about Prevent, which threatens to undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the programme. We need some coherence and surety about its centrality to the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy. The best way to get that is for the Government to commit to completing the review, not a month or even six months from now, but a year from now. That is eminently doable and reasonable.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I agree entirely with the points that the shadow Minister made about the importance of the Prevent review. It is a critical assessment, which the Government welcome, and we look forward to receiving it. As the hon. Member for St Helens North said, the original deadline, set out in previous legislation, was August this year. To state the obvious, that deadline will be missed. The two reasons for that are, first, the coronavirus epidemic, and, secondly, the resignation of Lord Carlile, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned.
Lord Carlile was appointed last summer, so he would have had a year to do his job, but unfortunately he stepped down in December owing to legal challenges about the manner of his appointment. I am able to confirm that a full and open competition is being run for a replacement. The closing date for applications was 22 June—a couple of weeks ago—and the applications will be assessed by an independent panel. I hope that gives the shadow Minister the assurance he sought on questions of process.
Given that the process of appointing Lord Carlile’s successor has not yet concluded because the application deadline was only a couple of weeks ago, completing the review will be challenging, but we want it to be done by the summer of next year, as the shadow Minister says. We would like to see it completed by August 2021, and that is the objective that the new chairman or chairwoman will be given. However, to put the deadline in primary legislation risks repeating the mistakes that we made previously: a deadline was set out in the statute, and for reasons that were not foreseeable at the time—first the resignation of Lord Carlile, and secondly, the coronavirus epidemic—it became impossible to meet that deadline. If unforeseeable circumstances arise again and something unexpected happens that causes another delay, we do not want to fall foul of a statutory deadline that requires primary legislation to correct.
The obligation to complete the review remains in statute. It is a statutory obligation that must be fulfilled, and that remains, but putting a deadline on it as we did before risks our falling into the same trap twice. I hope that the shadow Minister will accept the clear statement of intention to get this done by August next year. The applications were taken in an open process, and they will be assessed by an independent panel, so the process issues will not re-arise. Our commitment is absolute. On the obligation to put this in statute, the deadline could be problematic if something unforeseen happens again.
Conor McGinn
Unusually in our discussions, I cannot accept the Minister’s explanation. I do not think an explanation has been given for the delay between Lord Carlile’s standing down and the beginning of the recruitment process for a new independent chair, which could have predated the coronavirus pandemic. Given one would expect that some preparatory work was done in the period that Lord Carlile was in post, which would inform the new chair’s review, any suggestion that it might not be completed by next summer is hugely concerning.
The fundamental point is that we have been reasonable about it. We have accepted some of what the Government have said about wanting to do this properly, wanting to ensure it is fully independent, and wanting to respect the ongoing recruitment process, but as for giving it from now until 1 July next year to ensure it reports before Parliament goes into summer recess, to give surety and clarity to the wider public, to civic society who take an interest in such matters, and fundamentally to the people we charge with carrying out Prevent and implementing its strategies on the ground, I do not think they should have to wait any longer than is necessary. So I am afraid that, despite what the Minister says, I feel obliged to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
We now come to a series of relatively technical parts of the Bill and various technical Government amendments. I will go over these as quickly as I decently and reasonably can.
Clause 48 introduces schedule 13, which contains consequential and related amendments to bring the Bill’s provisions into effect. It will enable the Bill to function as intended across the legislative frameworks in the United Kingdom, as well as introducing several additional required measures related to the Terrorist Offenders (Restrictions of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions we have discussed already.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13
Consequential and related amendments
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 10, in schedule 13, page 102, line 22, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
6A In section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners to make the best use of the places available for detention, subject to certain exceptions)—
(a) in subsection (1)(a), after “protection” insert “, a serious terrorism sentence”;
(b) in subsection (1A), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(ca) references to a serious terrorism sentence are to a sentence under section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code;”.
Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)
6B In section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (power of courts to order hospital admission etc)—
(a) in subsection (1A), for “273, 274” substitute “268A, 273, 274, 282A”;
(b) in subsection (1B), after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) a sentence falls to be imposed under section 268A or 282A of that Code if it is required by section 268B(2) or 282B(2) of that Code and the court is not of the opinion there mentioned;”.”
This amendment excludes an offender serving a serious terrorism sentence from the possibility of early release under the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and provides that a requirement to impose a serious terrorism sentence does not prevent a court from ordering the offender’s detention in hospital in cases where the offender suffers from a mental disorder.
Chris Philp
Amendment 10 amends section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and it is to exclude the serious terrorism sentence in England and Wales from the power of the Secretary of State to make an order to release certain prisoners, as may be necessary in emergency circumstances. Amendment 11 amends section 264 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, so that a serious terrorism sentence for those aged between 18 and 20, which is a sentence to detention, shall be for the purpose of the section considered as a sentence of imprisonment. These are all consequential to clauses that we have debated previously.
Amendment 12 is in several parts, but essentially it amends section 15 of the sentencing code, which provides for committal of dangerous offenders to the Crown court so the serious terrorism sentence is included and the court has power to commit. The purpose of the second part of the amendment is to ensure that the principal guidelines duty, which requires the court to consider any relevant guidelines that apply under section 59 of the sentencing code, is amended to include a reference at subsection (2) to the serious terrorism sentence, clarifying that the duty is subject to the provisions of the serious terrorism sentence that we debated a few days ago. The purpose of the third part of the amendment is to amend section 120 of the sentencing code, which provides the Crown court with the power to fine an offender instead of, or in addition to, any other sentence in disposal.
Amendment 13 inserts a reference to the serious terrorism sentence into section 262(3) of the sentencing code, referring the court to section 399 of that code.
As you will have gathered, Mr McCabe, these are technical or consequential amendments to various measures we debated earlier in the Committee’s proceedings.
Amendment 10 agreed to.
Amendments made: 11, in schedule 13, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“(9) In section 264(7) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of provisions about consecutive sentences of imprisonment to sentences of detention), for “or 266” substitute “, 266 or 268A”.”
This amendment ensures that the provisions in section 264 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (dealing with treatment of consecutive sentences) will apply in relation to serious terrorism sentences including such sentences of detention in a young offender institution.
Amendment 12, in schedule 13, page 103, line 23, at end insert—
“(1A) In section 15 (committal for sentence of dangerous adult offenders)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—
(1A) This section also applies where—
(a) on the summary trial of an offence specified in Schedule 17A triable either way a person is convicted of the offence, and
(b) the court is of the opinion that the circumstances are such that a serious terrorism sentence (see section 268A or 282A) may be required to be imposed.”;
(b) in subsection (6), for “a specified offence” substitute “an offence”.
(1B) In section 59(2) (provisions to which duty to follow sentencing guidelines is subject), after paragraph (g) insert—
“(ga) sections 268B and 282B (requirement to impose serious terrorism sentence);”.
(1C) In section 61 (sentencing guidelines: extended sentences and life sentences)—
(a) in the heading, after “extended sentences” insert “, serious terrorism sentences”;
(b) after subsection (2) insert—
(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where a court is required to impose a serious terrorism sentence for an offence.
(2B) In determining the appropriate custodial term for the purposes of section 268C(2)(b) or 282C(2)(b) (serious terrorism sentences: appropriate custodial term exceeding 14-year minimum), section 60 applies to the court as it applies to a court in determining the sentence for an offence.”
(1D) In section 120(2)(a) (exceptions to the general power to fine offender convicted on indictment), after sub-paragraph (ii) (but before the final “or”) insert—
(iia) paragraph (ba) (serious terrorism sentences),”.”
This amendment makes amendments to certain provisions in the Sentencing Code, which are consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence.
Amendment 13, in schedule 13, page 104, line 10, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 262(3) (circumstances in which detention in young offender institution required), after “mentioned in” insert “—
(a) section 399(ba) (serious terrorism sentences);
(b) ”.”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes an amendment to section 262 of the Sentencing Code consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 13, page 104, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes an unnecessary consequential amendment.
Chris Philp
The purpose of the amendments is to remove unnecessary consequential amendments, which included a reference to a serious terrorism sentence in sections 273 and 274 of the sentencing code, which was advanced when the Bill was presented to Parliament. Paragraph (a) is removed to ensure legal clarity and the effect is to remove these amendments from the Bill.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Amendments made: 15, schedule 13, page 105, line 6, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes an unnecessary consequential amendment.
Amendment 16, schedule 13, page 106, line 11, at end insert—
“Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (c. 53)
10A In section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it forms part of the law of England and Wales (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—
(a) in subsection (1)(d), after ‘or section 250’ insert ‘or 252A’;
(b) in subsection (8)(f), before ‘of the Sentencing Code’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
This amendment and amendments 17, 18, 20 to 22, 24 and 27 to 29 add consequential amendments to ensure that young offenders given the new type of sentence introduced by clause 22(2) are treated in the same way, for various statutory purposes, as those serving an ordinary sentence of youth detention.
Amendment 17, schedule 13page 106, line 23, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33)
12A In section 25(5) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (restriction of bail for certain offenders: interpretation), in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘the relevant enactments’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 18, schedule 13, page 106, line 25, at beginning insert—
“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 38(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (youth justice services to be provided by local authorities), in paragraph (i), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
(3) In section 41(5)(i) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (accommodation that may be provided under agreement with the Youth Justice Board), in sub-paragraph (ii), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 19, schedule 13, page 106, line 25, leave out “of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 18.
Amendment 20, schedule 13, page 106, line 32, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c. 43)
13A (1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 62(5) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences in relation to which electronic monitoring conditions may be imposed on release), in paragraph (d), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(3) In section 62A(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from power to require imposition of electronic monitoring condition), in paragraph (b), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(4) In section 64(5) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences in relation to which drug testing requirement may be imposed on release), in paragraph (d), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(5) In section 64A(8) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (power to require attendance at drug testing appointment: interpretation), in paragraph (c) of the definition of ‘sentence of imprisonment’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 21, schedule 13, page 106, line 36, at end insert—
“Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
14A In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), in paragraph (h), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 22, schedule 13, page 107, line 21, at end insert—
“(6A) In section 263(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences of detention to which provision about concurrent terms applies), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 23, schedule 13, page 107, line 22, leave out from “264” to “after” on line 23 and insert “(as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (consecutive sentences)—
(a) in subsection (6A)(a),”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 24.
Amendment 24, schedule 13, page 107, line 24, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (7), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
(8) In section 327(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences attracting risk assessment measures for sexual or violent offenders), in paragraph (b)(v), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
15A In section 45(1) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (victims’ representations and information: interpretation), in the definition of ‘relevant sentence’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 25, schedule 13, page 107, line 26, at beginning insert—
“(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 27.
Amendment 26, schedule 13, page 107, line 26, leave out “of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 27.
Amendment 27, schedule 13, page 107, line 29, at end insert—
“(3) In section 213(3A) (as substituted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of section 253 of the Sentencing Code), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(4) In section 227(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (minimum sentence for certain firearms offences), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 28, schedule 13, page 107, line 36, at end insert—
“Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
17A In section 45(1)(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (sentences attracting notification requirements), after paragraph (via) (but before the final ‘or’) insert—
‘(vib) detention under section 252A of the Sentencing Code (special sentence for terrorist offenders of particular concern aged under 18),’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 29, schedule 13, page 110, line 36, at end insert—
“Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991/1505)
18A In regulation 5(1) of the Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (custodial sentences disapplying section 25 of the Children Act 1989), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Youth Justice Board for England and Wales Order 2000 (S.I. 2000/1160)
18B In article 4(2) of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales Order 2000 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (functions exercisable by the Youth Justice Board concurrently with the Secretary of State)—
(a) in paragraph (a), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’;
(b) in paragraph (m)(ii), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/223)
18C In regulation 1(3) of the Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (interpretation of Regulations), in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘penalty’, after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794)
18D In regulation 160(5) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from disqualification for imprisonment: interpretation), in paragraph (c), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/379)
18E In regulation 96(6) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2013 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from disqualification for imprisonment: interpretation), in paragraph (c), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Children (Secure Accommodation) (Wales) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 2015/1988 (W.298))
18F In regulation 14(a) of the Children (Secure Accommodation) (Wales) Regulations 2015 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences of detention disapplying section 119 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 47, schedule 13, page 110, line 36, at end insert—
“Part 4A
Amendments in relation to sentencing under service law
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (c. 53)
18G (1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5 as it forms part of the law of England and Wales (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—
(a) in subsection (1)(d), after ‘or section 209’ insert ‘or 224B’;
(b) in subsection (8), in paragraph (f) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
18H In section 32(1A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (sentences excluded from early release of prisoners to make the best use of the places available for detention), in paragraph (ca) (inserted by Part 2 of this Schedule), at the end insert ‘, including a sentence passed as a result of section 219ZA of the Armed Forces Act 2006’.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)
18I (1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 38(4) (youth justice services to be provided by local authorities), in paragraph (i), for ‘or 222’ substitute ‘, 222 or 224B’.
(3) In section 41(5)(i) (accommodation that may be provided under agreement with the Youth Justice Board), in sub-paragraph (ii), for ‘or 222’ substitute ‘, 222 or 224B’.
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c. 43)
18J (1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 62(5) (sentences in relation to which electronic monitoring conditions may be imposed on release), in paragraph (g), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
(3) In section 62A(4) (exceptions from power to require imposition of electronic monitoring condition), in paragraph (c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(4) In section 64(5) (sentences in relation to which drug testing requirement may be imposed on release), in paragraph (g), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
(5) In section 64A(8) (power to require attendance at drug testing appointment: interpretation), in paragraph (f) of the definition of ‘sentence of imprisonment’, after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
18K In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), in paragraph (h), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)
18L In section 237(1B) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (service sentences to be treated as equivalent sentences in England and Wales) —
(a) omit the ‘and’ before paragraph (e);
(b) at the end of that paragraph insert—
‘(f) references to a sentence of detention under section 252A of the Sentencing Code include a sentence of detention under section 224B of that Act;
(g) references to a sentence under section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code include such a sentence passed as a result of section 219ZA of that Act.’
Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)
18M (1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 188 (power to pass consecutive custodial sentences), in subsections (2)(b) and (4)(b), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(3) In section 209 (sentence of detention for offender aged under 18), after subsection (7) insert—
‘(8) This section does not apply if the Court Martial is required to impose a sentence of detention under section 224B.’
(4) In section 210 (place and conditions of youth detention), after ‘209’, in each place it occurs (including in the heading), insert ‘or 224B’.
(5) In section 211(4) (cases in which detention and training order not required), after ‘221A’ insert ‘, 224B’.
(6) In section 213(3A) (as substituted by the Sentencing Act 2020 and as amended by Part 4 of this Schedule) (application of section 253 of the Sentencing Code), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(7) In section 219A(1) (availability of extended sentence for certain violent, sexual or terrorism offences), after paragraph (d) (but before the final ‘and’) insert—
‘(da) the court is not required—
(i) by section 268B(2) of the Sentencing Code (as applied by section 219ZA(4) of this Act) to impose a serious terrorism sentence of detention in a young offender institution for the offence or for an offence associated with it;
(ii) by section 282B(2) of the Sentencing Code (as applied by section 219ZA(7) of this Act) to impose a serious terrorism sentence of imprisonment for the offence or for an offence associated with it;’.
(8) In section 223 (meaning of ‘the required opinion’)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) ‘The required opinion’ for the purposes of section 219ZA is the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of—
(a) further serious terrorism offences or other specified offences; or
(b) further acts or omissions that would be serious terrorism offences or other specified offences if committed in England or Wales.’;
(b) in subsection (4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), after the definition of ‘serious harm’ insert—
‘“serious terrorism offence” has the meaning given by that section;’.
(9) In section 224A (special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern)—
(a) in subsection (1) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), in paragraph (d)—
(i) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert ‘, or”;
(b) after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Where an offence is found to have been committed over a period of 2 or more days, or at some time during a period of 2 or more days, it must be taken for the purposes of subsection (1A) to have been committed on the last of those days.’
(10) In section 227(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (minimum sentence for certain firearms offences), for the words from ‘, the reference’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the reference to a sentence of detention under section 250 of that Code is to be read as a reference to a sentence of detention under section 209 of this Act, and
(b) the reference to a sentence of detention under section 252A of that Code is to be read as a reference to a sentence of detention under section 224B of this Act.’
(11) In section 238(6) (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (offences aggravated by terrorist connection)—
(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (a);
(b) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) the reference in subsection (4)(c) to an offence not specified in Schedule A1 includes a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is not specified in Schedule A1, and’;
(c) in paragraph (b), for “(1)” substitute ‘(5)(b)’.
(12) In section 246 (crediting of time in custody), in subsection (6)(a), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(13) In section 256(1)(c) (cases where pre-sentence report to be considered), after ‘219(1),’ insert ‘219ZA(1)(d),’.
(14) In section 260 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (discretionary custodial sentences: general restrictions) —
(a) in subsection (1)—
(i) for ‘This section applies’ substitute ‘Subsection (2) applies;
(ii) after paragraph (c) insert—
(b) in subsection (4B), before paragraph (a) insert—
‘(za) section 268C(2) or 282C(2) of the Sentencing Code, as applied by section 219ZA of this Act (serious terrorism sentences for offenders aged 18 or over),’.
(15) In section 261 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (length of discretionary custodial sentences: general), in subsection (1), after paragraph (b) insert—
‘(ba) section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code as a result of section 219ZA (serious terrorism sentences),’.
(16) In section 262A (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of section 329 of the Sentencing Code)—
(a) after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) In subsection (4A)—
(a) paragraph (a) has effect as if, for “252A”, there were substituted “224B of the Armed Forces Act 2006”;
(b) paragraph (b) has effect as if, after “265”, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006”;
(c) the words after paragraph (b) have effect as if, after “278”, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.’;
(b) after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Subsection (5A) has effect as if, at the end, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 219ZA(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006.’;
(c) in subsection (4)—
(i) after the paragraph (a) treated as substituted in subsection (7) of section 329 of the Sentencing Code insert—
(ii) after the paragraph (d) treated as substituted in subsection (7) of section 329 of the Sentencing Code insert—
(17) In section 374 (interpretation of Act), in the definition of ‘custodial sentence’ (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), in paragraph (b), for ‘or 221A’ substitute ‘, 221A or 224B’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
18N In paragraph 5(1)(a)(iv) of Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (service sentences of youth detention attracting notification requirements for terrorist offenders), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Sentencing Act 2020
18O (1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 225 (restriction on consecutive sentences for released prisoners), in subsection (3)(c)(vi), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(3) In section 241 (period of detention and training under detention and training order), in subsections (6)(b)(ii) and (7)(c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(4) In section 248(4) (meaning of ‘relevant sentence of detention’), in paragraph (c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(5) In Schedule 27 (transitional provision and savings), in paragraph 16(2), for the words from ‘, the reference’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the reference in section 224A(1)(d)(ii) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 to an extended sentence under section 266 or 279 of the Sentencing Code includes a reference to an extended sentence under section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
(b) the reference in section 224B(1)(c)(ii) to an extended sentence of detention under section 254 of the Sentencing Code includes a reference to an extended sentence of detention under section 226B of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.’”
This amendment makes amendments to enactments which are consequential on the provisions of Schedule 8 to the Bill (changes to the sentencing regime under service law corresponding to those made to the sentencing regimes in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland).
Amendment 31, schedule 13, page 116, line 7. at end insert—
“Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 29 (N.I.))
30A In section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (as amended by Part 8 of this Schedule) (length of custodial sentences to be reduced for periods already spent in custody), after ‘Article’ insert ‘13A(6),’.
Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27))
30B In Article 6 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (as amended by Part 8 of this Schedule) (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences), in paragraph (9)(b), after ‘Article’ insert ‘13A(6) or’.
Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1985/595 (N.I. 4))
30C In Article 44(1A) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (sentences requirement to impose which does not prevent making of hospital or guardianship order), in sub-paragraph (c), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24))
30D (1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In Article 2(2) (meaning of expressions), in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, after ‘13(4)(b)’ insert ‘, 13A(6)’.
(3) In Article 4(1) (power to grant absolute or condition discharge subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(4) In Article 10(1) (power to make probation order subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(5) In Article 13(1) (power to make community service order subject to sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(6) In Article 15(1) (power to make combined probation and community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
30E In section 45(3) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Northern Irish sentences attracting notification requirements), in paragraph (a), after sub-paragraph (iii) insert—
‘(iiia) a serious terrorism sentence under Article 13A(6) of that Order (offenders under 21 convicted of certain serious terrorist or terrorism-related offences),’.”
This amendment makes amendments to various enactments which are consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence in Northern Ireland by clause 7.
Amendment 32, schedule 13, page 117, line 24, at end insert—
“Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 29 (N.I.))
31A In section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (length of custodial sentences to be reduced for periods already spent in custody), after ‘14(5)’ insert ‘or 15A(5)’.
Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27))
31B In Article 6 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences), in paragraph (9)(b), after ‘centre’ insert ‘, a sentence of detention under Article 15A(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008’.
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24))
31C (1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In Article 2(2) (meaning of expressions), in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, for ‘or 14(5)’ substitute ‘, 14(5) or 15A(5)’.
(3) In Article 4(1) (power to grant absolute or condition discharge subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(4) In Article 10(1) (power to make probation order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(5) In Article 13(1) (power to make community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(6) In Article 15(1) (power to make combined probation and community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
31D In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), after paragraph (l) of that section as it forms part of the law of England and Wales and Scotland, and after paragraph (m) of that section as it forms part of the law of Northern Ireland, insert—
‘(n) a sentence of detention under Article 15A(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
31E In section 45(3) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Northern Irish sentences attracting notification requirements), in paragraph (a), after sub-paragraph (iv) insert—
‘(iva) a sentence under Article 15A(5) of that Order (offenders under 21 convicted of certain terrorist or terrorism-related offences),’.”
This amendment adds consequential amendments to ensure that young offenders given the new type of sentence introduced in Northern Ireland by clause 24 are treated in the same way, for various statutory purposes, as those serving an ordinary sentence of youth detention.
Amendment 33, schedule 13, page 119, line 34, at end insert—
“Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 (c. 21 (N.I.))
35 (1) In section 55(2) of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 (prisoners who may be removed early from prison if liable to removal from the United Kingdom), for the words from ‘serving an’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) who is serving an extended custodial sentence under Article 14 of the 2008 Order, or
(b) to whom Article 20A of that Order applies.’
(2) In the case of a person—
(a) who has been removed from prison under section 55(2) of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 before the amendment made by sub-paragraph (1) comes into force, and
(b) to whom Article 20A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 applies,
subsection (3) of that section continues to apply to the person despite that amendment, but as if for the words ‘has served the requisite custodial period’ there were substituted ‘becomes entitled to be released in accordance with Article 20A of the 2008 Order’.”
This amendment excludes terrorist prisoners subject to the restricted regime for early release in Northern Ireland introduced by clause 30 from early removal from prison for the purpose of removal from the United Kingdom.
Amendment 34, schedule 13, page 119, line 34, at end insert—
“Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 (S.R. (N.I.) 2009 No. 82)
36 (1) The Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 are amended as follows.
(2) In rule 2(1) (application of the rules), after ‘Articles 18’ insert ‘, 20A’.
(3) In rule 7(2) (persons who may act as representatives of prisoner only with consent of Chief Commissioner), in paragraph (b), for the words from ‘sentenced to’ to the end substitute ‘who —
(i) is on licence having been released under Article 18 or 20A of the 2008 Order, or
(ii) is a person to whom Article 18 or 20A of that Order applies and who is on licence having been released under Article 20 of that Order;’.
(4) In rule 25 (application of rules to recalled life, indeterminate and extended custodial prisoners)—
(a) in the heading after ‘custodial’ insert ‘and terrorist’;
(b) in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘an indeterminate custodial or extended custodial prisoner’s case’ substitute ‘the case of a prisoner who was released on licence under Article 18 or 20A of the 2008 Order’.
(5) In rule 26 (short custodial terms)—
(a) for paragraph (1) substitute—
‘(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where—
(a) the Department of Justice refers to the Commissioners—
(i) the case of an extended custodial prisoner under Article 18 of the 2008 Order, or
(ii) the case of any prisoner under Article 20A of that Order, and
(b) the relevant part of the prisoner’s sentence is less than 26 weeks;
these rules shall apply subject to the modifications made by rule 25(a).’;
(b) after paragraph (2) insert—
‘(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the “relevant part of the sentence”—
(a) in the case of an extended custodial prisoner to whom Article 18 of the 2008 Order applies, means one half of the appropriate custodial term of the sentence as defined by Article 14(4) or 14(6) of that Order;
(b) in the case of a prisoner to whom Article 20A of that Order applies, has the meaning given by paragraph (9) of that Article;
and in determining the length of that part any reduction required by section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 is to be taken into account.’”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes amendments to Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 which are consequential on the new arrangements for restricted early release of terrorist prisoners provided for in clause 30 of the Bill.
Schedule 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 49
Power to state effect in Sentencing Act 2020 of commencement of amendments made by this Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I will do my best to rouse more enthusiasm for clause 49 than its predecessor, schedule 13, managed to provoke in the Committee. I fear it may be an uphill task.
Clause 49 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the sentencing code to incorporate changes to provisions made by the Bill using the power contained in section 419(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020. It is needed so we can, if required, ensure a consistent approach is taken to the amendment of the code, and the Bill, once enacted.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Power to make further consequential provision
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 50, page 41, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) In the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000—
(a) in section 77 (supplementary and consequential provision), at the end insert—
‘(3) The provision which may be made under subsection (1) in relation to section 61 of this Act (abolition of sentence of detention in young offender institution etc) also includes provision amending or repealing—
(a) any provision of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020,
(b) any provision of an enactment that was inserted or amended by, or by regulations made under, the Counter- Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020’;
(b) in section 78(2) (meaning of ‘enactment’), after ‘in this Part’ insert ‘other than section 77(3)’.”
This enables the power in section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 to make amendments consequential on the abolition by that Act of sentences of detention in young offender institutions to be used to deal with references to such sentences inserted by the provisions of this Bill.
Government amendment 1 enables a power in section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. This power is to make any amendment that arises as a consequence of sentences of detention in a young offender institution being abolished by the Act. Should the DYOI be abolished, the power will be used to deal with references to DYOI sentences inserted by the provisions of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The amendment in the name of the Minister seeks to amend clause 50 to make reference to sections 77 and 61 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. Despite his introduction, it is unclear what the Minister’s intentions really are. As members of the Committee will be aware, sections 59 and 61 of the 2000 Act allow for the abolition of the special sentence for the detention of a young adult in a young offender institution. The explanatory note to the 2000 Act—passed under a Labour Government, mind you—sets out the policy reason behind that:
“it is now widely accepted that 18, and not 21, is the age of”
maturity, and
“there is no logic in having a separate sentence for those aged between 18 and 20 years old, and those aged 21 and over.”
That almost kills my arguments of the last few days—but it does not, because, despite the provisions being in place for two decades, the 2000 Act to which the amendment refers is yet to be implemented. I, for one, am quite happy about that, but it prompts the question of why the Government’s amendment draws on a 20-year-old piece of outdated legislation. What is the Minister’s intention?
In the 20 years since the 2000 Act was passed, a considerable amount of work has been done on the age of maturity, and it is now widely accepted, as I have said on numerous occasions, that 25 is considered by many to be a more suitable age of maturity. As such, it would be deeply concerning if the Government had any ambition at all to enact the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. The impact of doing so would be that offenders as young as 18 would be held in prison alongside adults potentially double their age or more. That could be hugely damaging, not only to the individuals but to the hope of rehabilitation too.
The Minister has provided the Committee with a guarantee that he has no intention of housing young offenders caught up in the provisions in the Bill alongside adult prisoners. Many may see this as a technical matter, but there are some very real dangers, as I have alluded to, and I am sure the Committee would welcome a further reassurance from the Minister that the Government have no intention whatsoever of using the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act to imprison young people alongside adults.s
Chris Philp
I understand this to be a technical amendment to ensure legislative consistency between the Bill and the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. I am not aware of any plans to change the current detention arrangements. I do not believe that the reference is designed to pave the way to do that. It is just a technical amendment to ensure legislative consistency.
Alex Cunningham
Will the Minister be specific? He says he does not think that there is any intention, but it could lead to young people being imprisoned alongside adults. Will he give that assurance to the Committee again? Not understanding or not being aware of something is not good enough.
Chris Philp
I am not the Prisons Minister, I am the Courts Minister, but I am not aware of any plans at all in the Ministry of Justice to change the current detention arrangements. None have been brought to my attention, either generally or in connection with the Bill. I can go and double-check with the Prisons Minister, and I will write to the hon. Gentleman, if he would like me to do that.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 50 gives the Secretary of State the power to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions by regulation, in relation to provisions in the Bill, by secondary instrument.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Extent
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 51 explains the territorial extent of the provisions in the Bill, which we debated quite extensively, because many of the clauses applied separately to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, owing to the different legal systems in the three jurisdictions. The Bill contains provisions that extend to all of those areas. Provisions that change existing legislation are applicable only to the territories to which the existing legislation extends. Certain provisions can also, in some circumstances, be extended to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, as per the powers specified in this measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Commencement
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 52, page 42, line 8, at end insert—
“, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zf)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 4 to 6.
Government amendment 8.
Chris Philp
These are more technical amendments. Amendment 2 allows the changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clause 21 and schedule 6 of the Bill to apply to the service courts, which we debated earlier. Amendment 8 also allows changes made by the Bill to the Sentencing Act, which come into force on Royal Assent or two months later, to apply to the service courts. Amendment 4 allows changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clause 1 and schedule 1 of the Bill, which apply to the service courts as well as civilian courts, to be brought into force separately if necessary for the service courts. Amendment 5 should be read in conjunction with amendment 6 to allow changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clauses 11 and 15 to 18 of the Bill, which apply to the service courts as well as civilian courts, to be brought into force separately for the service courts.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 52, page 42, line 23, leave out sub-paragraph (vii) and insert—
“(vii) Parts 8 and 9 of that Schedule.”
This amendment and amendment 7 correct a drafting error and provide that Part 8 of Schedule 13, which makes amendments consequential on clause 24 of the Bill, comes into force at the same time as clause 24.
Chris Philp
Amendment 3 is designed to correct drafting relating to the early commencement of the Bill’s provisions in clause 52, and amendment 7 is designed to correct a drafting error at clause 52 of the Bill, again concerned with commencement provisions.
Amendment 3 agreed to.
Amendments made: 4, in clause 52, page 42, line 26, at end insert
“, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(za)”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
5, in clause 52, page 42, line 30, leave out “18” and insert “10”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
6, in clause 52, page 42, line 30, at end insert—
“(ea) section 11, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zb);
(eb) sections 12 to 14;
(ec) section 15, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zc);
(ed) section 16, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zd);
(ee) sections 17 and 18, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(ze);”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
7, in clause 52, page 42, line 46, leave out sub-paragraph (iii) and insert—
“(iii) Part 7 of that Schedule.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 3.
8, in clause 52, page 43, line 2, at end insert—
“(za) section 1 (and Schedule 1), as they have effect for the purposes of section 69 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zb) section 11, as it has effect for the purposes of section 323 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 261A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zc) section 15, as it has effect for the purposes of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code as applied by sections 219A and 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zd) section 16, as it has effect for the purposes of section 256 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(ze) sections 17 and 18, as they have effect for the purposes of sections 268 and 281 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 219A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zf) section 21 (and Schedule 6), as they have effect for the purposes of Schedule 13 to the Sentencing Code as applied by section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);”
This amendment provides for certain of the sentencing provisions of the Bill to be brought into force by regulations so far as they apply for the purposes of service law.
9, in clause 52, page 43, line 4, at end insert—
“(c) Part 4A of Schedule 13 (and section 48 to the extent that it relates to that Part).”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides for the new Part 4A of Schedule 13 (see amendment 47) to come into force by regulations made by the Secretary of State (reflecting the position for the provisions to which the
Clause 52, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 53 gives the shortened title for the Bill when it is cited, which will be the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Review of deradicalization programmes in prisons
“(1) Within one year of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a comprehensive review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on the effectiveness and availability of deradicalization programmes in prisons.
(2) The review must include an assessment of the following matters—
(a) the effectiveness of existing programmes at reducing radicalization and terrorist offending;
(b) how individuals are assessed for their suitability for a programme;
(c) the number of individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme;
(d) the number of individuals assessed as not requiring a place on a programme;
(e) the average length of time individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme have to wait to start a programme; and
(f) whether there is sufficient capacity and resource to meet demand for places on deradicalization programmes in prisons.
(3) The review must consider how the provisions of this Act have affected the matters listed in subsection (2).”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause requires a review of the impact of the Act on deradicalization programmes in prisons.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
We have talked in great detail about the many provisions in the Bill, but we have also talked about the many missing provisions, best evidenced by my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North, who discussed Prevent and the need for an end date for the report on its effectiveness to come into place.
One key area where we could do better in is the deradicalisation programmes in prison. While the minimum sentencing for terror offences has been increased, there is a suggestion that we could simply be delaying inevitable further offences unless we take action to use the offender’s time in prison to deradicalise them. We can only do that if there is an effective deradicalisation programme in place.
We have heard evidence that few people convicted of terrorism offences go on to commit further crimes, but some do. We have also heard evidence that these programmes are not entirely fit for purpose; perhaps, with these new longer minimum sentences, they really need a good overhaul. That is why the new clause has been tabled: to ask the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the impact of the provisions of the Bill on the effectiveness and availability of deradicalisation programmes in prison. Perhaps the Government could just tag it on to the Prevent inquiry and get two for the price of one.
The impact assessment for the Bill claims that longer incapacitation of terrorist offenders will enable
“more time in which to support their disengagement and rehabilitation through the range of tailored interventions available while they are in prison.”
However, the amount of time during which individuals have access to deradicalisation programmes in prison is not a key factor in determining their success or otherwise; rather, it is the effectiveness and the availability of the programmes in prison that has come under increasing scrutiny.
We need to know what is happening in prisons. What programmes are being delivered, who are they delivered to, who are they delivered by, when are offenders undertaking the programmes, how many deradicalisation programmes one offender in for a minimum sentence is expected to cover, and how is the success of programmes delivered? Those are just some of the questions that such a review would look into.
We need to understand the effectiveness of the programmes, where they work, where they do not and what can be improved. Currently, the main deradicalisation programme in prisons is called the Healthy Identity Intervention, which delivers one-to-one, individually tailored sessions. It is supplemented by the Desistance and Disengagement Programme, which can be offered to both prisoners and those released on licence.
Neither the Healthy Identity Intervention or the Desistance and Disengagement Programme courses have undergone any form of evaluation process to date, so perhaps the Minister will agree that a formal review is long overdue. It is a key part of our justice system, and rehabilitation should be at the centre of that, because people are released back into society. Putting someone back into society who has not been rehabilitated simply increases their chances of reoffending.
I remember the evidence from some of our witnesses—in particular from Mark Fairhurst who, at the start of his evidence, spoke of the role of key workers, the Parole Board and a range of professionals working with the offender. It was all very positive and very much to be welcomed. He went on, however, to say that an extended sentence, where an offender serves their whole sentence in prison,
“incentivises people not to behave correctly or to go on deradicalisation courses.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 69, Q145.]
All the more reason why Ministers should understand more about how the deradicalisation system works for the offender and for society.
I would particularly like to see data on the average length of time for which an individual has been assessed as needing to undergo a deradicalisation programme before they actually undertake it. I am concerned that in such cases time is of the essence. The offender is likely to feel incredibly hostile to a system that has just imprisoned them. There cannot be an indefinite wait for them to be put on to a programme if they are willing to do it. Not getting on with it just allows more time for further radicalisation and mistrust of the legal and justice system.
In addition to that evidence, Professor Andrew Silke, who has studied efforts to deradicalise those in prison for terrorism offences, has reported that some prisoners who said that they were willing to participate in a programme were never put on one before their release. That could easily be rectified. We cannot and must not take chances. We need to ensure that the programmes are readily available as and when they are needed, and that there are no delays due to capacity issues or availability.
Where insufficient resources or structures are found in prisons, the Secretary of State must take action to resolve that. They must provide the resources to ensure that it is not a lottery and that no risks or gambles are being taken on the rehabilitation of a terror offender. It is really surprising that the Bill has nothing to say on what measures will be taken to ensure that effective deradicalisation programmes are available to individuals in prisons who need them. Arguably, simply by increasing the length of time that people spend in custody the provisions of the Bill risk further alienating them and giving them grounds for grievance against the authorities, placing them at greater risk of radicalisation.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. I have no doubt that she is correct. Young people are far more able to change their ways and benefit from the programmes. It is therefore essential that these programmes are in place. That is why I have spent most of my time in the past couple of weeks talking specifically about young people and how they differ from older people.
We all agree that rehabilitation is desirable and preferred, and a core cog in our justice system. Let us commit ourselves not only to talk about it, but to learn about it and ensure we deliver an effective system. The evidence so far to the Committee has suggested that it is not always effective. We need to deliver on that.
I am hopeful that the Minister will accept that a review is needed and that we need a greater understanding, just as we will have with the Prevent strategy. We need that greater understanding to ensure that the terror offenders have the support—and it is support—that they need in prison, so that when they are released into society, they can be the sort of citizens that we need them to be.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this extremely important issue. As we heard in evidence a couple of weeks ago, most people who come out of prison having served a terrorism sentence do not go on to reoffend, as the shadow Minister said. I recall that the figure we were given was that only 5% to 10% of those prisoners released go on to commit subsequent terrorism offences. Thankfully, that is a low rate of recidivism, although it is very serious when it happens.
The shadow Minister asked why there are not more deradicalisation measures in this legislation. That is because most of our deradicalisation work and programmes are done operationally inside the Prison and Probation Service; they are not specified in legislation. Let me say, however, that a great deal is being done in this area. The Healthy Identity Intervention programme is one area to which the shadow Minister has referred.
We have doubled the number of specialist probation officers. As per earlier legislation, we are creating a new counter-terrorism assessment and intervention centre, set up as part of the new counter-terrorism StepUp! programme; it represents a major shift in our capability to intervene with terrorist offenders, including young terrorist offenders in exactly the way the shadow Minister was discussing earlier.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister was in full flow and doing very well, but I am interested in the statement he made that the Government have already doubled the probation capability in this area. I invite him to explain what he meant by that statement and say what the timescale is for this new centre, which sounds as if it is on the money.
Chris Philp
The proposals that have been made will double the number of probation officers who specialise in counter-terrorism and deradicalisation work. The new counter-terrorism assessment intervention centre will do the work I was just describing, including identifying the risk people pose and getting the right specialists to work with them to reduce their risk while they are in prison. That has to be the right approach. That is a significant change and evolution in the way in which we deal with this particular cohort.
The shadow Minister mentioned the programme that is already in place—the Healthy Identity Intervention programme—which I think has merit as well.
It is a one-to-one programme that supports desistance and disengagement from extremism by targeting the social and psychological drivers of that behaviour. That intervention is delivered by highly trained psychologists and probation officers in prisons, but also—critically—with offenders on licence after they have left prison.
2.45 pm
The work being done already is valuable; the enhanced work via the new counter-terrorism assessment intervention centre that I described will go even further. I hope that illustrates the direction of travel. We want to do more in this area, for the reasons discussed, and ongoing evaluation of that will be part and parcel of the Government’s approach. There will be the normal three-year review of the legislation, of course—I suspect I may make that comment more than once as we discuss the coming 11 new clauses. That standard three-year review will be a useful and valuable checkpoint to see whether the measures that I have just described are having the desired effect.
Alex Cunningham
I would say that 5% to 10% of people reoffending in a terrorist way is 5% to 10% too many.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is nodding his head. He may have misinterpreted what I am trying to achieve with the new clause. He was saying that he does not want the detail of how we do deradicalisation in the Bill, but that is not what I am asking. I am asking for a review of how the process is working in prisons; I am not asking for details on how deradicalisation is done to be in the Bill.
The Minister originally said that the probation capability had already been doubled within the service, but in response to my intervention he said that that was a plan yet to be properly implemented. He also talked about the specialist centre, but did not answer the question of what the timescales were. There are an awful lot of unknowns here.
The Minister said that he hoped that what he had to say indicated or illustrated the direction of travel. It did, but we do not seem to be getting anywhere fast, and for that reason I wish to press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
When I became shadow Justice Minister for courts and sentencing, one of the things that I was most interested in was how our justice system treats women in particular. We know that women are less likely to commit violent offences and make up about 5% of the overall prison population in the UK—although, having said that, I should say that the figure has doubled in recent times. Is that because women are committing more violent offences than ever before? No, it is not. According to Women in Prison, 80% of women entering prison have committed a non-violent offence. In 2017, 30% of all prosecutions of women were for evading the television licence fee. Just 4% of prosecutions of men were for the same offence.
We can debate the failures and merits of imprisonment as an effective or even moral punishment for a non-violent offence, but we are here to talk about counter-terrorism and sentencing. We want to put the issue down of the differences in sentencing between men and women. We need to consider the impact of our policies on all people. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a review of the effects of the Bill on women, including the differential effects on sentencing, on the release of terrorist offenders, and on the prevention and investigation of terrorism. The review must also consider the impact of the Bill on the physical and mental health of women.
Many women lose their homes and possessions when going to prison and are consequently released homeless. We often focus much on sentencing and punishing people for their crimes, but we do not do nearly enough, or invest anywhere near enough, to ensure that people get on the right track when they leave prison. When they leave prison and are homeless, and perhaps imprisonment has damaged relationships with their family and friends, they may feel that returning to crime is their only option. If an individual returns to crime because they do not have the support to build a better life for themselves, it is we who have failed.
The issue is not just about accommodation and material possessions. Only 9% of children whose mothers are in prison are cared for by their fathers in their mother’s absence. Just 5% of children remain in their family home when a mother goes to prison. We cannot apply a one-rule-fits-all approach, because one rule does not fit all, and we must recognise the difference in circumstances, outcome and impact that sentencing women has compared with sentencing men.
The review would help us as lawmakers to establish where further policy developments are needed to address any unexpected or undesirable impacts of the new legislation. That could then have an impact on the length of sentence that a woman terrorist received. We would like to know the impact on children if a mother is sentenced to prison for a terror offence. What happens to children to ensure that they do not develop a distrust of the justice system, which can lead to radicalisation? How do we introduce measures that are sensible, proportionate and smart?
I hope that the Minister will be able to tell me what research the Government have done on how approaches to women’s sentencing and licensing differ from those of men in the context of the Bill, and how the Government are recognising and acting on that difference.
Chris Philp
To state the obvious, the measures in the Bill apply equally to men and women. No distinction is made between them. A full equalities assessment was undertaken as part of the preparation for the Bill and has been publicly published. Indeed, it suggests that men will far more affected by the Bill than women, because far more men, unfortunately, commit terrorist offences.
That assessment of gender impact in the context of the Bill has been undertaken already, but Ministers and other public servants operate under further statutory obligations that will ensure that the Bill is implemented in an even-handed manner. For example, section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 places a duty on Ministers and the Department to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other prohibited conduct. Moreover, article 14 of the European convention on human rights is engaged.
I understand that there are wider issues to do with sentencing and how female offenders are treated. Those are perfectly legitimate questions, but as far as the Bill, which is about terrorism, is concerned, men and women are treated equally. We have had the equalities impact assessment already and, for the purpose of terrorism legislation, that goes far enough. I am sure that we will debate on many occasions the wider questions of sentencing and prisons policy in relation to men and women, but as far as this Bill is concerned, that has been adequately addressed.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. If the Government recognise all their other statutory obligations in relation to women, that is a positive thing. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 3
Financial impact assessment report
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three years of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a report on the financial impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) That report must separately consider the financial impact of—
(a) extended sentences on the prison estate;
(b) extended licence periods;
(c) any increased staffing resources required for Her Majesty‘s Prison and Probation Service;
(d) the extended offenders of particular concern regime; and
(e) adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ licence conditions.
(3) The report may consider other financial matters.
(4) The report must compare the financial impact of the Act with the Impact Assessment for the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill published by the Ministry of Justice on 18 May 2020.”
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 3 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the financial impact of the provisions of the Bill. In that report, the financial impact must be considered, as set out in new clause 3, as consisting of:
“(a) extended sentences on the prison estate;
(b) extended licence periods;
(c) any increased staffing resources required for Her Majesty‘s Prison and Probation Service;
(d) the extended offenders of particular concern regime; and
(e) adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ licence conditions.”
As the Minister knows, Labour backs the Bill, but we are a little disappointed at the Minister’s considerable reluctance to examine the consequences of the Bill with the reviews and reports that we have called for—not to take up his time, but to inform him and his successors. Above all, however, we know that for the provisions in the Bill to be implemented and effective, there needs to be the resource behind it and the financial support to address the issues that we have raised in Committee, even if they are not addressed in the final Bill, such as deradicalisation programmes.
The Ministry of Justice has estimated that the Bill will only result in an extra 50 prisoners and reckons that the cost will be contained to around £16 million a year. During an earlier discussion last week, we talked about numbers—about which numbers were right and which might be difficult or misunderstood. The Minister replied:
“We can extrapolate how many of those 50 are aged between 18 and 21, as we discussed in the previous sitting. I do not think that number is the annual flow or the number of convictions per year. As I understand it, it is the impact on the total prison population. Given that these sentences are quite long, one would expect that the annual flow into the system affected by these serious terrorism sentence provisions would be somewhat lower than that.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 2 July 2020; c. 133.]
When I challenged him on that number, asking whether it was an annual number or in fact the total number over a long period of time, he said:
“I will double check that number, but my understanding, which I will check, is that as a consequence of the measures the total prison population will increase by 50, which is different from an extra 50 people extra flowing in each year.” ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 2 July 2020; c. 134.]
Alex Cunningham
I will give way when I am ready, but I am going to refer to the Minister’s letter, because he has written to me; I appreciate that he took the time to do so. He said in that letter:
“Our impact analysis has identified that, in steady state, the provisions may result in fewer than 50 additional prisoners per year, and fewer than 50 additional probation caseload. These are based on historical volumes of convictions and assumes that trends in sentencing remain stable. These impacts relate solely to the effect of longer periods in custody on the number of prison places required, and longer periods on licence with their associated effects on probation caseloads, not to an increased number of sentences.”
I believe that there is a recognition there from the Minister that there is a cumulative effect and that the number is not less than 50; in fact, there could be considerably more people in the system, particularly after a given number of years, and perhaps especially so after 10 years.
I now give way to the Minister.
Chris Philp
I think what I said in my original speech and intervention was correct. As a result of the changes in the Bill, we think that at any one time there will be 50 more people in prison than would otherwise be the case. I think I said that in my original speech, and it was correct.
Alex Cunningham
That leaves me rather confused. The Minister says that his original speech was correct, and I assume that he is also saying that his letter to me was also correct, but as far as I can see those two things conflict. In his letter, he said that
“Our impact analysis has identified that, in steady state, the provisions may result in fewer than 50 additional prisoners per year”.
I emphasise that: “per year”. He goes on in his letter to give a bit more detail; perhaps quoting this will be helpful. He says, in a paragraph towards the end of his letter that I will read in full:
“For further insight, the most recent Home Office statistical publication on the ‘Operation of police powers under terrorism legislation’ shows in the year to December 2019”
—that is, in one year—
“there were 65 individuals charged with a terrorism or related offence, of which 2 (3%) were under age 18 and 10 (15%) were aged 18-20. Twenty-two of those charged were convicted in 2019, of which 1 (5%) was under 18 and 4 (18%) were aged 18-20. We do not expect the Bill to have a notable impact on such small volumes.”
That was the number of charges per year, and 22 people were convicted in 2019. If 22 people are convicted in each of the next four or five years, that is 100 additional people alone. I cannot quite understand what the figures really are. Are they correct in the letter or in the Minister’s original statement to the House?
Chris Philp
I think they are correct in both. There is the stock, and there is the flow. The stock is the number of extra people in prison as a consequence of the measures, which could be 50. The flow is the number of people going into prison each year who might be affected by these provisions, which will be less than 50.
On the numbers that the hon. Member just quoted—the various convictions that occur—not all of those will necessarily be affected by the provisions in the Bill. I realise there are a lot of numbers floating around, but those figures are internally consistent. I would be very happy to sit down in a cold, dark room and go through them again. There is consistency.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for that intervention. I think it is I who needs a dark room somewhere to try to settle my head on this issue, but it would be a good idea if we could have specific clarification from the Minister at some time in the future.
I acknowledge the relatively small numbers—very small numbers—in this illustration of young people, but it does not matter whether it is one young person or a hundred. We need to treat them in a very different way from the way we treat people in the adult population, either by allowing them to have a counsellor present when they undergo a polygraph test or through the way that pre-sentencing reports are prepared for them prior to sentencing.
Bearing in mind that we do not know what numbers we are playing with now, can the Minister tell us whether the financial cost that has been identified for the new provisions will cover the additional cost of housing prisoners; the additional cost of creating spaces for new prisoners; the additional cost of having more than one specialist centre; the additional cost of having further specially trained prison officers; the cost for probation services of expanding the sentence for offenders of a particular concern regime; the impact of longer licensing on the National Probation Service; the new use of polygraphs; and the impact on youth offender teams? Such measures always have ripple effects, so we ask the Secretary of State to lay before the House within three years a report on the real financial impact of all these things.
There should never be an issue of resources when it comes to justice matters. We should ensure that prisons are properly staffed and that those staff are properly supported, be it for their personal security or to provide them with adequate services when they suffer mental illness as a result of their job—services that we heard are currently inadequate.
We should recognise the challenges that the justice system is facing. The Minister has tried to reassure us that the Government have a handle on the crisis in the courts, with hundreds of thousands of cases yet to reach them. Justice is being chronically underfunded. The Lord Chancellor simply does not have the resources he needs to do his job properly, so I struggle to have much faith that the measures in the Bill would be properly backed up financially.
I am sure the Minister will try to reassure me that all will be well and that there is plenty of cash to meet all the costs that the Bill will result in. Good! He could demonstrate his confidence in his statement by commissioning the report covered by this new clause.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to respond to the points that the shadow Minister has just made. I think I answered the points about numbers in my intervention on his speech, so let me speak to the financial cost. The financial cost of the measures proposed in the Bill has been comprehensively assessed in the impact assessment. Because the numbers are so small—an increase in the prison population of 50, or far fewer than 50, per year—the actual financial impact will be extremely small in the context of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s budget. Let us remind ourselves that around 80,000 people are in prison, so an additional 50 will not represent a substantial impact in that context
When discussing the previous new clause, I spoke a little about the wider deradicalisation work, the new team and the increased investment in specialist officers who work with radicalised prisoners. An extra £90 million for this year was announced for counter-terrorism policing—catching people in the first place and preventing terrorist atrocities from taking place—which is a substantial increase in spending on exactly the police who are active in this area, so the resourcing is being increased. The total budget for the prison and probation service is substantially higher this year than last year, which I think will be welcome.
On a review, the Bill will clearly have a very small financial impact on the prison and probation service’s total budget. Were we to review this along with the other 11 proposed reviews before us, we would do nothing but reviews all day. The financial review will probably be well caught up in the general financial reviews we conduct anyway and the debates we have on prison and probation funding. I do not think a further review would shed any additional light on that.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause asks for an oral statement, not a review. The Minister is probably relieved that he would not have to carry out yet another review, but on the basis that he is not carrying out any, I do not know why it has proven a problem to him.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an oral statement to the House of Commons on the effects of the provisions of the Bill on the functions of the Parole Board. The statement must be made before the provisions come into force relating to the life or indeterminate sentences for serious terrorism offences and the removal or restriction of early release for terrorist prisoners. It must also explain the intended role for the Parole Board in the release of prisoners affected by the matters in subsection (2); what, if any, expert assessment of such prisoners will be undertaken before they are released; who will carry out any such expert assessments; and whether any steps will be taken to compensate for the loss of intelligence gathering from a reduction in Parole Board interviews.
The Minister may well say that there is no need for such a report or statement, most likely because he has sacked the board from its role in relation to offenders given indeterminate sentences. That would be sad, and I hope the Minister will take some time between now and Report in a couple of weeks’ time to reflect on how the Parole Board’s expertise could have a role in the assessment and rehabilitation of this particular group. The Parole Board has an unparalleled wealth of experience in managing offenders and assessing risk. We must ensure that experience is used, rather than abandoned.
As well as being asked to assess risk, the Parole Board plays a vital role in providing an incentive for prisoners to reform, and to respect each other as well as prison officers. It also provides intelligence vital to the work of the police and security agencies. I know that the prospect of early release is a key tool—probably the key tool—in the work of the Parole Board, but that is not a good enough single reason to turn our backs on it. The Bill intends to do away entirely with the Parole Board for those convicted of serious terrorist offences, yet we have been given no specifics as to what will replace its role. The Ministry of Justice assures us that no prisoner will be released back into the public realm without being risk-assessed, but we have heard no further detail as to how those assessments will take place, who will carry them out, or how frequently they will be conducted. Quite simply, the Bill removes a vital piece of the rehabilitation and monitoring of prisoners, and nothing has been offered to replace it.
Those who work for the Parole Board are experts in their field, and there is huge concern among Opposition Members that no assessor will be able to meet the standard of scrutiny currently offered by the Board. Ad hoc assessments conducted by unknown persons using unknown methods is just not good enough, and risks leaving us with prisoners released into communities under the supervision of services that will not have the benefit of the expertise that Parole Board members bring. That is an unacceptable risk, and we need assurances from the Government about what their plan is. Can the Minister explain what these assessments will look like, what qualifications the assessor will have, and how they will be appointed? Can he also explain the rationale for removing the Parole Board’s role, and why he thinks this new system that has yet to be clearly defined is better placed to carry out those assessments? Parliament deserves to understand the rationale behind these Government plans.
Chris Philp
The changes we made back in February, through the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, extend the remit of the Parole Board. Previously, terrorist offenders who were released early at the half-way point when serving standard determinate sentences would have been released with no prior consideration by the Parole Board. Now, the Parole Board will consider them prior to release at the two-thirds point, or subsequently if not referred at that point, so those changes dramatically expanded the Parole Board’s involvement with terrorist prisoners. Secondly, the Parole Board will of course still be involved with terrorist prisoners serving indeterminate sentences.
There is one remaining cohort: the very small minority of serious terrorist offenders who we have been debating during consideration of this Bill, those who will serve their full sentence in prison and will not be considered by the Parole Board prior to their release. The shadow Minister asked about the process that will take place in relation to that small minority of prisoners. As we touched on while taking evidence, a whole range of measures are taken to make sure those prisoners are properly managed and risk-assessed. The existing multi-agency public protection arrangements are at the core of that: they have been well-documented and well-reviewed, including by Jonathan Hall, so we know exactly what they are. Those measures also include the work done by the Prison and Probation Service, both in prison and afterwards on release, and work done in conjunction with CT policing.
Where the Parole Board will not be involved in a prisoner’s release decision, all those agencies will continue to be heavily involved in their risk assessment, working with the prisoners on deradicalisation where that is possible and managing them in prison and then in the community afterwards where it is not possible. I think we asked one of our witnesses, although I forget which one, whether they had confidence in those arrangements—MAPPA, the prison service, the probation service and the police—and the witness was very clear that they did. I have confidence in them as well.
Taiwo Owatemi (Coventry North West) (Lab)
Once again, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.
I speak in support of new clause 5, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, which calls on the Secretary of State to review the effect of the measures in the Bill on children and young offenders. Much of the new clause relates to young offenders, and I agree that the impact of this Bill on them must be huge. We simply cannot treat young offenders in the same way as fully matured, grown adults, who fully understand their actions. The impact on their mental and physical wellbeing should be a fundamental consideration on how we carry out justice in this country.
The new clause also leaves room to consider the more general impact on children who are not accused of a crime. Children are often victims in the pursuit of justice, when they have done nothing to deserve the situation or warrant being the victims of a crime. All too often, children of offenders will pay the price for their parents’ crimes. This crime will also have serious effects on women. Only 9% of children whose mothers are in prison are cared for by their fathers, in the absence of their mothers. Only 5% of children remain in their family home when their mother goes to prison. A fifth of women prisoners are lone parents before imprisonment.
I am not aware of the background of Members in this Committee, but I cannot imagine how it must be for a child to see their parents taken away from them for a long period of time and having to live in a different way, with different people. Victims of crime never deserve to be so. It is imperative that this House recognise the true impact of our legislative decisions and how they affect the most vulnerable, in this case children. We support this new clause on that basis.
The young offenders of today do not have to be the reoffenders of tomorrow, but we need to make an effort and carry out the research to stop that happening. There will be children and young offenders caught up in terror crimes. It would be naive of us to think that there is any crime that children cannot be drawn into, but we have a choice about how we respond. We have the opportunity to ensure that they are not defined by the actions of their youth and that the actions of others will not disproportionately affect their lives.
I hope that the Minister will be able to support this new clause, as we do, and act to acknowledge that we must put the focus on how children and young offenders are treated and impacted.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West for moving the new clause, and for the eloquence and passion with which she described its various component parts.
The Bill already treats people under the age of 18 very differently from those aged over 18. It has different provisions, as we have already debated. Therefore, people who are children in the legal sense of the term—people who are under the age of 18—are already treated completely differently by the Bill, compared with those over the age of 18.
In relation to those aged between 18 and 20, 18 and 21, or 18 and 24, depending on where the line is drawn, there is clearly a wider debate to be had about the way that their brains mature and about the opportunity to reform those people, compared with people who are a little bit older. However, in the context of the Bill, I emphasise that we are talking about the most serious terrorist offenders. We are not talking about the average 20 or 21-year-old. We are talking about people who have committed the most serious terrorist offences.
It is worth reminding ourselves what level of severity has to be met before somebody gets the mandatory 14-year minimum term, all of which gets spent in prison. To qualify for that sentence, it has to be a serious terrorist offence. The offender has to be found to be dangerous—a finding that the judge makes on reading a pre-sentence report, so the judge can take that into account. It has to be an offence—one of the most serious offences—that ordinarily carries a life sentence. Most chillingly of all, it has to be an offence where there was a risk of causing multiple deaths, and the person carrying out the offence would have known or should have known about that. So we are talking about offences of the most exceptional gravity.
Ruth Cadbury
I entirely accept the important point that the Minister raises and how the issue is about severity. However, Labour Members keep raising the point about maturity. Whether it is stealing apples or being involved in planning a major terrorist incident where loss of life is potential or actual, maturity is an issue. As colleagues have said several times, and there is a raft of evidence, young people under 21—they get more mature as they get nearer 25—are at risk of coercion and radicalisation, and their very immaturity draws them into these crimes, however severe. All we ask in this new clause is that there should be a review and that maturity should be taken into account, in the same way that it is now taken into account in the context of sentencing those over 18.
Chris Philp
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention and the sentiments behind it, but I am not sure I entirely agree that this very small number of offences can be compared with the theft of apples. We are talking about a tiny handful of people who have committed the most serious offences where multiple people could have been killed and where the judge has found that the offenders are dangerous. Had they simply been misled, or coerced even, it might be open to interpretation as an exceptional circumstance, although we expect the exceptional circumstance derogation to be extremely rare—as the name implies, it is truly exceptional. Should truly exceptional circumstances exist, there is that opportunity open to the judge, but it would have to be truly exceptional.
To emphasise again how small the numbers are, the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, reading out my letter when we debated a previous clause, said that, last year, in 2019, of the 22 people convicted of terrorist offences, only four were aged between 18 and 20, and not all of those would meet the criteria for the serious terrorist sentence that we are talking about, so the numbers are microscopically small, thankfully, for those aged between 18 and 20. There is also the exceptional circumstance override, and we are talking about offences of the most serious kind, which have to pass three or four different hurdles before qualifying for the assessment that we have just described. In that context, where the offending is so serious and the risk so grave, the approach being taken is a reasonable one, but I accept the more general point about maturity in other, less serious contexts.
On the question of a review, given that the numbers are so very small, I am not wholly convinced that a bespoke review is the right thing to do, but, of course, there will be a regular review, as I might say frequently in the coming clauses, at the three-year mark, where it is right that the matter gets considered.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised some points that will require consideration. It might well be that nobody at all aged 18 to 20 ends up being affected by this measure, in which case it will be a pretty short consideration. Mandating it by statute is not necessary. There are other review mechanisms. As we saw when we debated the Prevent review earlier, if we have too many statutory reviews, we end up tripping over our own shoelaces by failing to meet all the deadlines that we have created.
The questions are serious. I understand and respect them. We will need to debate them in future, quite properly and rightly, but putting this measure in the Bill is a step that we do not need to take this afternoon.
Joanna Cherry
I thank the Minister for taking on board some of the points that I have made. In response to his points, first, I accept that this is only for the most serious terrorist offences. I completely accept that, and I accept that the numbers of children and young people who are so sentenced may be very small, but the important thing is that, if we have a young person or child convicted of a serious terrorist offence, and given the evidence we have heard about the opportunity to deradicalise and rehabilitate, there is all the more reason to try to make sure that that opportunity is taken.
All we are asking for is a review. If it turns out that the numbers are small, as is expected, it will not be a complex or time-consuming review. Although I am not going to push my new clause to a vote, I anticipate bringing it back to the Floor of the House. I would appreciate it if the Minister, in the spirit in which he responded, could take the evidential concerns away and consider what could be done specifically to measure the impact of this legislation on children and young offenders across these isles. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Review of legislation: Northern Ireland
“(1) On an annual basis from the day of this Act being passed, a report that reviews the application of the provisions of this Act in Northern Ireland must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament by the Secretary of State.
(2) Annual reports under subsection (1) must be produced in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive —(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that all measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland shall be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive, and a report shall be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for introducing new clause 7, which would, along with other proposed new clauses, create a veritable snowstorm of statutory reviews. I appreciate the comments he made about the tools available to the Opposition, which I hope not to have to avail myself of in the near future—who knows what might happen?—but I would say that the Opposition have many tools at their disposal, which they frequently use, including debates, questions, parliamentary questions, Freedom of Information Act requests, and so on and so forth. There is no shortage of methods, quite rightly, by which any Government may be properly held to account by Parliament.
On Northern Ireland particularly, we fully recognise that it has a unique history and that terrorism is interwoven into some parts of that. We have taken very careful time—a great deal of time—to make sure that we have not in any way interfered with or unpicked the very important provisions in the Belfast agreement, because we do not want to do anything that interferes with or undermines that very important agreement. However, matters of national security and terrorism are reserved matters and, as far as possible, we would like to have a consistent position, which is broadly speaking what the Bill seeks to do.
I understand there are issues of sensitivity, which the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, Naomi Long, has raised with the Ministry of Justice here in London; it sounds as if she has also raised them with the shadow Minister. As I said in response to an intervention on our very first day of line-by-line consideration, we are in the process of having a very detailed, in-depth dialogue on those issues and are going through them one by one. Whether it is before or after the Bill is enacted, as I hope it will, I put on the record that we will always engage sensitively and deeply with the Northern Ireland Administration and, of course, the Government in Scotland in these areas, recognising how important they are to all parts of the United Kingdom. I assure the hon. Gentleman that that will be done with sensitivity and receptiveness.
On a statutory obligation to conduct a further review, I have mentioned my general position. Given Parliament’s ability to question and debate, to FOI and so on and so forth—there is no lack of scrutiny—I do not think that a further statutory review would add anything to the process. I accept the point, however, that we need to keep a close eye on these matters and be in continued and close dialogue with all our colleagues in the various Administrations, in Belfast and Holyrood in particular.
Conor McGinn
I thank the Minister for his comments. The only part I would challenge is the claim that there is no lack of scrutiny in Parliament, as we have a body that is tasked with overseeing scrutiny and overviewing all these matters that has not yet been reconstituted—the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is clear to me from discussions with colleagues in Northern Ireland, and given the dialogue that the Minister has had with the hon. Member for East Lothian and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that he is acting in good faith and is keen to resolve any outstanding matters with the devolved legislatures. It is important to put on record that that is very much the message that I have received. I encourage him to continue those discussions.
The Minister is right to assert that it is clearly a reserved matter, but there are elements that require a legislative consent motion, which will be difficult to get through the Northern Ireland Assembly. If the Justice Minister has reservations about it, one can only imagine what other parties in the Assembly and the Executive might have to say. I encourage him to continue those discussions. I am happy to assist him in finding a resolution and a way forward, because it is important that we get it right. On that basis, I will not press the clause to a vote and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Lone terrorists: Review of strategy
‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must be conducted by a person who meets the criteria for qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court, as set out in section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
(3) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) counter-terrorism policy;
(b) sentencing policy as it applies to terrorist offenders;
(c) the interaction and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), “public services” includes but is not limited to—
(a) probation;
(b) the prison system;
(c) mental health services;
(d) local authorities; and
(e) housing providers.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’—(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that the Government orders a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists including, but not exclusively, current counter-terrorism and sentencing policy.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Conor McGinn
I do. My hon. Friend has eloquently outlined the development of the terrorist threat and its changed dynamics, as well as the fundamental point that hatred and terrorism does not discriminate. It is not homogeneous, because it is perpetrated by different people with different motives, nor does it discriminate, because fundamentally other people are hurt by it.
In asking for this, we are saying to the Government that those three attacks in different places, perpetrated by different people with no connections, over a relatively short space of time, provide evidence of a new and increasing threat. Coupled with the increase in right-wing extremism and the manifestation of that through referrals to Prevent and arrests, that needs to be looked at very carefully. Things have moved on since Lord Anderson’s very good report in 2017.
It is time that the Government looked at that again to identify the issues Lord Anderson raised and what they have done to break down some of the barriers that he identified in 2017 that were preventing us from apprehending these people at various junctures throughout their journey—from starting out with an extremist ideology to, on their own, as lone actors, committing the most heinous crimes, causing the types of suffering, hurt and heartache that were expressed so eloquently earlier today.
Chris Philp
The hon. Member for St Helens North has raised an important matter: the problem of lone wolf attackers acting outside recognised group structures. We have seen, in those incidents that he referred to, the terrible impact of the actions of those people who, while they are acting alone, none the less cause devastating consequences for the victims of their actions. We should take the threat they pose extremely seriously.
Since those first two events—at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham—we have moved to change the law in a number of areas. First, we introduced emergency legislation—the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020—which came into force on 26 February. As we know, that ended the automatic early release of terrorist prisoners and instead moved their release point to two thirds with Parole Board consent or later if not given, followed by the period on licence. We have legislated today to ensure that there is at least a year on licence, even where they serve their full term. That was one element of the response to those events to which the hon. Gentleman referred.
Of course, this legislation we are debating is part of that response, making sure that those most serious offenders are physically prevented from harming the public by incapacitation, which is a second important element of the Government’s response. The third element was a review of the MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements—which the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor commissioned in the aftermath of the Fishmongers’ Hall attack from Jonathan Hall QC, whom we met a couple of weeks ago, to see what more we can do to ensure that those agencies are working together where opportunities arise to identify somebody who might pose a threat to the public. That work was extremely important.
It is worth saying that in the three years since March 2017, 25 different attacks have been foiled so, while it is of course a tragedy that any attacks at all happen, the measures taken have disrupted, foiled and prevented 25 atrocities that might otherwise have taken place. Now would be a good time, in that context, to extend our thanks and gratitude to counter-terrorism police and the security services, who have done that work to keep us and our constituents safe these past few years.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about the need to be vigilant on this topic is well made. My colleague the Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and—
Chris Philp
The hon. Member for St Helens North is more familiar with parliamentary constituencies than I am. My hon. Friend the Security Minister is working on this and I am sure, in a spirit of cross-party co-working, he would be willing to sit down and have a chat, possibly a confidential chat, with the hon. Gentleman about the work that is going on in this area.
It is a good topic to debate and to think about. I have made my views on statutory reviews clear and I will not repeat them, but this is a topic that Parliament should be considering. We have been discussing it ourselves, because these threats do exist and we need to do everything we can on prevention, not only through policing, but through other forms of intervention. The spirit of the hon Gentleman’s comments is one I embrace and agree with, while very gently and politely resisting another statutory review.
Conor McGinn
I was going to put the new clause to a vote, but I thank the Minister for his very generous offer—
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 9 would require a mental health assessment of an individual who has committed a terror offence to be carried out annually for the duration of their sentence and their term on licence. It would also require that where a mental health condition is found, or where there has been a deterioration of a mental health condition since the previous assessment, the Secretary of State must take measures to treat the mental health condition.
I am not a mental health professional and I do not claim to understand the psychology behind why somebody commits or plans to commit an act of terrorism, but it strikes me as eminently sensible to carry out regular mental health assessments of those who have committed an offence under the Bill, not because there is any correlation between having a mental health condition and committing acts of terrorism, but because mental health conditions can turn people into who they are not. By treating mental health conditions, we can provide support and reduce the chance of further criminal acts being carried out when a prisoner is released.
This is not just about preventing terrorism; it is about how we treat each other as people. It is common for people to wander down the wrong path. Of course, some paths are much more dangerous than others and it is right that people are appropriately sentenced for their crimes, but I can only imagine what it is like to be in prison for years on end. A few hours in my local Holme House Prison in Stockton is certainly enough for me. I cannot fathom what impact being in prison for a long sentence has on an individual’s mental health year after year, and time spent in prison without receiving treatment can make an existing mental health condition much worse. The individual released into society after their prison sentence has been served is left to struggle with their mental health condition. It is a recipe for disaster, but we can take simple precautions to address the problem.
Prisons and the Government have a duty of care for the physical and mental wellbeing of people in our prisons, and they should stay on top of any identified mental health conditions in order to best support offenders in their rehabilitation, so that they can make the most of deradicalisation programmes and rejoin society without any mental health illnesses blocking their way. That way, we can ensure that we have covered all the bases, that we are providing what should be basic necessities, such as mental health treatment, and that we are helping people on their way to becoming citizens who can contribute positively to society.
I recognise that mental health services in this country need much more resources, and they are often inadequate for people in the general population. That is another task for the Government: to establish high-quality mental health services for all. The new clause could take the pressure off community health services in the longer term by ensuring that people convicted of terrorist charges are as healthy as they can be when they return to society. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Chris Philp
Let me again thank the shadow Minister for raising a very important point. We know mental health can often contribute to, or perhaps even cause, significant portions of offending, including some elements of terrorist offending—not all terrorist offending, but certainly some. It is certainly an important area that we need to be very conscious of.
It is already a fundamental aspect of the health and justice system that we have processes in place to identify, assess and then treat offenders with a wide range of mental health needs, both in custody and throughout the criminal justice process. The intervention that the shadow Minister calls for is already inherent in the way the system operates. The NHS long-term plan already stipulates that all prisoners, not just terrorist prisoners, receive an early reception screening and an assessment within the first 24 hours of entry into the prison system, followed by a second screening within seven days. Decisions about whether to provide mental health treatment are made on the basis of identified clinical need. The mental health teams that work in this area have clear clinical pathways describing such referrals. Prisoners in custody, but also those out on licence, are monitored for mental health issues. Where mental health problems are identified, they are referred and treated, including if there is a change in their condition—a deterioration, as the new clause describes it.
Regarding the capacity to provide treatment, I am sure that as constituency MPs we are all aware of the importance of building mental health treatment capacity. I was pleased that over the past year or two, recent announcements in relation to NHS funding have included a lot more funding for mental health treatment facilities in the NHS, which will treat prisoners as much as they will treat people who are not in custody. The spirit of the new clause is an entirely reasonable one, but it is already inherent in how the system operates that people are medically screened and monitored, with appropriate treatment following, as it should. I acknowledge the importance of identifying and treating mental health conditions in all offender cohorts, including terrorist offenders.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his helpful response, but if mental health services in prisons reflect mental health services in wider society, I am worried, because we know how inadequate mental health services across our country currently are. That is something to which the Government need to give extra attention. The Minister has talked about extra investment in mental health, which is welcome; however, even though I will withdraw the new clause, I suggest that at some time in the future he comes to the House and talks about some of the issues around mental health in prisons, so we can gain a greater understanding of what is and is not happening. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Review of legislation: National Probation Service
“(1) Within 18 months of enactment, the Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the impact of the provisions in the Act on the National Probation Service.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) the probation support provided to offenders convicted for terrorist offences;
(b) how probation support provided to offenders convicted for terrorist offences has varied since implementation of this Act;
(c) the—
(i) type; and
(ii) number
of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service to work with terrorist offenders;
(d) the—
(i) training;
(ii) assessed skill level; and
(iii) assessed experience
of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service to work with terrorist offenders;
(e) the turnover of probation staff;
(f) the average length of service of probation staff;
(g) the non-staff resources provided to manage offenders convicted for terrorist offences; and
(h) the adequacy of the operating budget of the National Probation Service.
(3) A report under subsection (1) may make recommendations to improve the probation support to terrorist offenders.
(4) Where a report has made recommendations under subsection (4), the Secretary of State shall respond within 2 months.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report under subsection (1) before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I would be doing a disservice to the many probation officers and others working in the service if I did not raise the issue of what has happened to our probation service in recent times. I am personally delighted that probation is no longer out there with a load of private organisations, but has been brought back in house. I hope that the necessary improvements will take place so we can deliver an effective probation service in future.
New clause 10 would require the Secretary of State to commission and publish a report on the impact of the Bill’s provisions on the National Probation Service, its support for terrorist offenders and various specialist staffing and resource matters, and to respond within two months to any recommendations made in the report.
The work of the probation service is to assess and monitor risk, but it is also to provide support while trying to change an individual’s mindset so that they have a second chance, are less likely to reoffend, and can take up a positive role in society. It is true that terror offences can pose problems in this area: many individuals convicted of such offences are motivated by strong political views and actively do not want to change. This is one of the reasons why it is appropriate to have specialism within the probation service. At the same time, it is important to not lose sight of the rehabilitative purposes of probation, even if those sometimes have to be secondary to the risk management purpose.
Let us remember that there are particular issues that affect the rehabilitation of terror licensees, even if they are strongly engaged with desistance. Those include rejection by family and community, a sense of hopelessness and that they will never be trusted again, and fear on the part of educational and volunteer organisations and employers. Community-led organisations that do not focus exclusively on terror licensees sometimes have the best chance of getting honest and sustained engagement from that challenging group. If no one is ever speaking to those people in such a way that their barriers come down, how are we actually going to know what is going on? How are we going to know what interventions are needed to stop reoffending?
Very long licence periods such as those proposed in the Bill are, in practice, very similar to life or other indeterminate sentences, and have the same consequences for probation staff and for the rehabilitation prospects of licensees. They increase workloads for highly specialist and rare probation staff and can make rehabilitation and risk assessment more difficult by reducing the incentives to engage and co-operate. Specialist probation officers are thinly spread and consequently hold very high case loads of terror-related cases—more than 120% the normal rate. That level is appallingly high and the Government recognise that it needs to come down.
Research shows that more time spent with offenders is essential for proper assessment and rehabilitation, but that is not possible with such high case loads. More time requires more money. I have already addressed the need for financial reports on the impact of the Bill in new clause 3. The very long licence cases, such as lifers and those with indeterminate sentences, are a special challenge for probation staff because they never really come off their case loads, even as more new cases are constantly added.
On Second Reading, the Secretary of State referenced doubling the size of the probation terrorism unit. However, as I said earlier today, it is not clear exactly what difference that will make to the service’s capacity, given that the provisions in the Bill will change demand in ways that are hard to predict. It is not even clear what he meant by doubling the unit. I hope the Minister will tell us a little more. I invite him yet again to tell us what that means, what the Government are going to do and when that is going to happen.
Longer licences will significantly increase demand on the probation service, while ending some early releases could help to spread the resource. The general issue with increasing the number of probation specialists is that they can only be recruited from experienced staff. In recent years, the service has been hollowed out and huge amounts of experience lost. Lots of generalist roles will need to be backfilled with newly qualified staff before the more experienced staff can move into specialist roles.
I have a host of questions for the Minister this afternoon. What modelling has the Department done of the expected net effect of the changes the Bill makes on the total probation case load in the years and decades to come? How many new staff will be required to join the terrorism unit to manage the increasing case loads? That will have to be factored into the current recruitment drive. Have the Government assessed the extent of overtime and emergency working that may be needed in the terrorism-related probation unit until sufficient numbers of trained staff are available? Have Ministers considered the consequences for standards of monitoring and for staff welfare and retention? Will the Government commit to reducing the case load of specialist probation officers, not just in line with other probation staff, but by significantly more in recognition of currently higher case loads and the difficulty of those cases? Will they set up a strategy and targets to achieve that?
As there is with other counter-terror work, there can be a lot of secrecy around the work of counter-terror probation staff. Our professional officers do their best in the most difficult of circumstances and often go beyond what can reasonably be expected of them, yet mainstream probation staff often have little knowledge or confidence in their ability, for example, to recognise the early signs of extremism. It may turn out that some recent incidents have occurred despite contact with non-specialist probation staff. Not every probation staffer can be a specialist, so there may be a need for some amount of counter-terror training for all, so that signs can be spotted even where no terrorist link or offence has been identified in the past. Will there be counter-terror training for all probation officers? The growth in far-right extremism may mean that we need more people to be able to spot that early on. Have the Government considered establishing counter-terror as a more formal and funded specialism in probation, like integrated offender management?
We have already talked about the impact of the Bill’s removal of early release and the fact that that might lead to lower engagement with rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes. That would make the task of probation staff even harder. The National Probation Service needs some serious attention from the Government, but I hope that, having brought the service back totally in-house now, we will see those improvements in future.
Without an effective and fully funded service, the intentions behind the Bill fall to pieces. That is why we have tabled the new clause requiring the Government to review the impact of the Bill on the National Probation Service. We cannot simply increase the responsibility and case load and consider the matter closed, because if there are more than the estimated 50 new prisoners, we will have other things to consider. There will be the longer sentences and longer licences as well, all creating more work, but without the resource to back it up. Let us be clear: effective probation working is essential to monitor the risks that offenders on licence pose; it is no less essential than counter-terror policing or intelligence work, yet the probation service is again under-resourced at a much lower level, and is paid far less attention than some other services.
I have asked the Minister a wide range of questions and I look forward to his detailed responses. Ultimately we need him to tell us exactly what action his Government will take to sort out the issues raised and ensure that the National Probation Service can get on with its day-to-day role, before we turn to the particular issues raised by the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clearly, the probation service is important and I pay tribute to the thousands of men and women who work in that service helping to rehabilitate offenders, and by so doing keep the public safe. Several questions have arisen, some of which would probably be better directed at the Prisons and Probation Minister, but I will attempt to answer some of them to give the shadow Minister a flavour of what is going on.
First, in terms of overall resourcing levels, the spending review last September laid out a significantly increased funding package for the Prison and Probation Service, which is, as we speak, flowing to the frontline. Another spending review is coming this autumn, and the hon. Gentleman will no doubt study that carefully to see what is in it for the Prison and Probation Service, and indeed the Courts and Tribunals Service, but the spending review last September was good news for the probation service in terms of financial support.
The shadow Minister also referred to community rehabilitation companies coming in house. The restoration of a comprehensive National Probation Service run directly by the Ministry of Justice is something that I suspect everybody involved in the criminal justice system will welcome, and it will provide an opportunity to do a lot more with the offender cohorts that the hon. Gentleman referred to in his speech.
Earlier this year—I think it was in January—a host of announcements were made in relation to counter-terrorism, one component of which was the extra £90 million for counter-terrorism police. It was also announced that we would double the number of specialist probation officers who focus on terrorist prisoners. We will also be creating the new counter-terrorism assessment and intervention centre that I talked about a little earlier. I am not sure whether all prison and probation staff will have counter-terrorism training. I will have to let the hon. Gentleman know, but given that only 200 or so prisoners out of a population of approximately 80,000 are in for terrorist offences, he can draw his own conclusions about the numbers. However, I will check with my colleague, the Prisons and Probation Minister, and come back to him on that specific point.
In relation to the new clause itself and the desire for a review of the probation service, once again there are already good mechanisms in place to review the probation service. I point in particular to Her Majesty’s inspectorate of probation, whose duty it is to conduct on an ongoing basis—not just after 18 months, but the whole time—precisely the kind of review that the new clause calls for. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is content to rely on the excellent work that Her Majesty’s inspectorate of probation does in conducting the analysis that he calls for in his new clause.
Alex Cunningham
I very much welcome the increased resources that the Minister says are flowing into the frontline, but everything that we have heard from him today suggests that that is a work in progress. We do not yet know how many new probation officers are being trained; we do not know when the new centre to which he alluded will open; and we do not know how we will end up with more than one facility to accommodate terrorist offenders in future.
I hope that the Minister will consider writing to members of the Committee to tell us exactly where we have got to with all the new investment and where the money is being spent; how many probation officers we had before the funding was made available and how many we have now; and what the timeline is to complete the doubling of the resource in the service. Similarly, I would like to understand when the new facilities will actually be available, because if we are going to accommodate people in prison for a longer time, we must ensure that there are appropriate centres.
I see no sense in pressing the new clause to a vote. As the Minister said, people out there are working extremely hard and we pay tribute to them, but we must always be mindful that, due to the lack of resource, the probation service is not operating in the way that professional officers would like. I hope that the Minister’s confidence in the new resource package will bear the fruit that we all want to see. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Review of legislation: Effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation
‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of agencies working to manage an individual who is serving a sentence affected by this Act.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) the effectiveness of the transition when an individual who is serving a sentence affected by this Act is transferred from the responsibility of one agency to another;
(b) the procedural safeguards that are put in place to ensure an effective transition; and
(c) the processing and transfer of information and intelligence from one agency to another.
(3) For the purposes of this section “agencies” includes but is not limited to—
(a) police;
(b) the prison system;
(c) intelligence services;
(d) probation services;
(e) mental health services;
(f) local authorities; and
(g) housing providers.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(5) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Chris Philp
I sense a certain appetite for brevity, so I will endeavour to achieve that in my response. I entirely agree with the points about the importance of inter-agency working. Many different agencies will encounter offenders or potential offenders at different times, and it is of course critical that they work together.
For that very reason, following the terrible attacks at the end of last year, the Government commissioned Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to carry out a review of the effectiveness of multi-agency public protection arrangements—exactly the kind of cross-agency working to which the shadow Minister refers. I believe that report is now with my colleagues, who are carefully considering its findings. We will publish the report, which is on exactly the topic that the shadow Minister wants us to review, at the earliest opportunity, so this may be an area where the shadow Minister not only gets a report but gets it perhaps earlier that he would otherwise have expected, which is a nice note to end on.
The shadow Minister is quite right that cross-agency working is important. We intend to make sure that it happens in the effective way that it should, and Jonathan Hall’s report will be an important part of that.
Alex Cunningham
Success at last. I can leave the Committee Room a happy man. I will not press the new clause to a vote, but it is important. Communications are central. Across all public services, we see a lack of communication leading to all manner of horrors in our society—children dying, terrorists recommitting offences; all manner of things happen because the communication is not right. It is clear that the Minister understands the importance of this. I look forward to Jonathan Hall’s report; I am sure that it will be good bedtime reading. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Chris Philp
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. Before you conclude the final sentence of this Committee proceeding, I shall quickly take this opportunity to thank all Committee members for their service over the last few weeks in considering this incredibly important Bill, which touches on the safety and security of our constituents. Nothing more powerfully illustrated that than the very moving speech given earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford on the experience of her friend Louise, which I think all of us will vividly remember. It reminds us how important the work we are doing here is.
I believe that, with this Bill, we are taking a significant step forward, largely in a spirit of cross-party co-operation from all corners of the House, as it should be for something as important as national security and the safety of our constituents. Of course, we have our differences elsewhere, but on this topic we seem to be mostly on the same page, which is extremely welcome.
I thank everyone who has supported this process. I thank the Whips on both sides for getting us through the Bill a little earlier than expected, which is welcome. I thank Mr McCabe and Mr Robertson for chairing the Committee proceedings with such aplomb, and for correcting the shadow Ministers and me when we occasionally erred from the path we were supposed to be following.
I thank the witnesses who took the time to give us evidence earlier in the proceedings. It was genuinely useful, and the fact that we spent a lot of time in our earlier debates dissecting that evidence shows just how illuminating it was. I do not think any of us will forget Professor Grubin, but I certainly will not be volunteering to hook myself up to any of his machines in a hurry.
Chris Philp
Do not tempt me.
Finally, I thank the phenomenal public servants who have supported the preparation of the Bill and the wider work that goes on, in particular members of my private office—I can see Andrew sitting over there—and all the people working in the policy, legal and financial teams at the Ministry of Justice. They are incredible civil servants who have been working so hard to put this Bill together, including working over the weekend to respond to the various amendments that arrived on Friday. A huge thank you to everyone in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office for the work they have done on this Bill.
It is appropriate to conclude by thanking those people on the frontline in the constant struggle to keep us and our fellow citizens safe—the police, the Prison Service, the probation service and the security service. Our thanks is due to them most of all. On a daily basis, they put themselves in harm’s way, to keep us safe. I put on record my gratitude to those outstanding public servants.
Alex Cunningham
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I would like to reflect what the Minister has said and, first and foremost, thank you and Mr Robertson for conducting our proceedings professionally and getting us through the business quickly.
I also specifically thank the Clerks to the Committee. They understand the things that I am trying to say and they can put them into the jargon that is required to appear on the amendment paper. I am very appreciative of that. I have come to the realisation that they understand more about what I am trying to get across than I do myself.
I thank Committee colleagues for some robust debate and a few corrections along the way. I thank the staff who had to work over the weekend. I pass on my thanks to them and I am sorry if I was the cause of all that additional work. At least we had reasonable responses from the Minister, and I welcome that. With that, I will simply sit down.
Tuesday 21st July 2020
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
17:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 189 / Noes: 335 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. I am terribly sorry, but we have to move on now.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
Many hon. Members today have reminded the House that our first duty as Members of Parliament is public protection. The very moving contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), and the story of her friend, Louise, who was caught up in the terrible terrorist atrocity of 7 July 2005, very powerfully reminds us of that. On that awful day, 52 members of the public were murdered and 784 were injured.
We have heard powerful testimony from other Members who have had personal, first-hand experience of terrorism, including the hon. Members for North Down (Stephen Farry) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), whose family members suffered at the hands of terrorist murders. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) said that in her professional career prior to coming to this place, she had first-hand experience of the victims of terrorism. That testimony should remind us how important our duty is. By taking this Bill through Report stage, we are discharging that duty to our constituents.
It is worth pausing to say how constructive the discussion on this issue has been, on a cross-party basis, on the Floor of the House here today and previously at Second Reading and in Committee. It is an example of this House and our political system working at its best. Members from all sides of the House can be very proud of the way we have conducted the debate on this extremely important Bill.
Let me turn now to some of the comments raised by colleagues this afternoon, starting of course with my opposite number, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), who gave a characteristically detailed speech opening the proceedings. He started by commenting on new clause 1 on the probation service, which stands in his name and those of his hon. Friends.
Let me just take the opportunity to reassure him and other Members, once again, that probation service resources were significantly increased in the spending review last September. Moreover, earlier this year, counter-terrorism police resources were increased by £90 million and we are in the process of doubling counter-terrorist specialist probation officers, in addition to those very large numbers who have been given special training.
In addition, we are deepening multi-agency public protection arrangements. We are also establishing a counter-terrorism step-up programme, so I believe our work in the probation sphere is something all of us can take great confidence in.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is right to mention the additional funds and so on that have been forthcoming, and we very much welcome them, but we have a probation service in crisis. Would he like to comment specifically on the fact that there is a high sickness rate and a 10% vacancy rate? How on earth can they do their job properly if we do not have sufficient of them?
Chris Philp
Numbers in the prison and probation service have been increasing over the past few years. As I said, a great deal of extra money was provided in September last year, and that will most certainly have a further positive impact.
I move on to new clause 2, which the hon. Gentleman also commented on, and the question of deradicalisation. We heard evidence in the Public Bill Committee on 30 June, which some Members will recall, from Professor Andrew Silke, Professor of Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield University. He told us that, overall, he thinks that the UK’s approach to deradicalisation,
“is seen as one of the better available approaches…internationally”. ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 84, Q175.]
That is, again, something we can take great confidence and pride in. Initiatives such as the healthy identity intervention programme, which Professor Silke expanded on at some length, are very effective. That is one of the reasons why reoffending rates for these terrible terrorist offences are only between 5% and 10%.
The shadow Minister asked about financial impact. I confirm, once again, that the cumulative impact on the total prison population will be less than 50 prison places, and the cumulative impact on the probation service will never be more than 50 places. To put that in context, there are about 80,000 people in prison and about a quarter of a million people on probation. On the financial impact, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned, the figure he had in mind may not have been quite accurate. The financial impact, according to the impact assessment, is a one-off cost of £4.2 million at the outset, followed by £900,000 a year thereafter, because these numbers, thankfully, are so small.
Jim Shannon
The Minister and everyone in the House will be aware that there have been three attacks in the last eight months carried out by those who were in prison and came out. Does the Minister feel that the investment that the Government are giving here will help to address that issue and will reduce those things happening, which is what we all want to see?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I believe that the measures that we are taking in the Bill, the additional resources given to counter-terrorism policing and the changes we made back in February in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 will provide exactly the protection he is asking for against ruthless terrorists of the kind he is describing.
On the question of reviews, which new clauses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 speak to, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker) pointed out, we already have quite a large number of reviews under way. There is the MAPPA review, being conducted by Jonathan Hall QC. There is, of course, Her Majesty’s inspectorates of prisons and probation, which produce frequent reports themselves. There is the Prevent review, which we will debate in the second group of amendments and, of course, there is the standard three-year review after legislation. With great respect, I think we have a lot of reviews going on. The numbers involved with this legislation are small, and I feel that it will be more than adequately reviewed by the mechanisms I just laid out.
Young people have been mentioned by many Members, in connection with new clause 6 and other clauses. The Bill recognises that those under the age of 18 are different, and no new minimum sentence is applied to them. It is up to the judge to decide in each case, and according to individual circumstances, what is the appropriate sentence for someone under the age of 18. There is a great deal of judicial discretion, for all the reasons laid out by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and others.
I understand the arguments that have been advanced about the ability to reform and rehabilitate those over the age of 18, and possibly extending that into the early 20s, but the cohort of offenders that we are addressing this afternoon is, thankfully, very small—a handful of offenders between the ages of 18 and 21 who have committed offences of extraordinary seriousness. These are terrorist offences where a life sentence can be imposed, where a judge has made a finding of dangerousness based on the facts and a pre-sentence report, and where a risk of causing multiple deaths was present. Given that small but serious number of offenders, I think a 14-year mandatory minimum sentence is appropriate. Rarely, there is the ability for judges to find exceptional circumstances, but when offences are that serious, it is right to take that action and protect the public. There may be other debates to have another time about how quickly people mature and how we should account for that, but for that small and dangerous cohort it is neither the time nor the place to advance that argument.
On legislative consent motions, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West for her comments about Government amendments 9 to 16, and the changes made to orders for lifelong restriction. She properly raised that matter in Committee, and we fully acknowledged the points that she and her colleagues made, and are delighted to fix the issue this afternoon. On the application of polygraphs in Scotland, as she said, we are in discussion with the Scottish Government. We are edging ever closer to a point of blissful—I almost said “blissful union”—perhaps I should say “blissful unity” to avoid aggravating the question. We are edging towards a position of blissful agreement, and I hope we reach that in the near future.
Some Members questioned the use of polygraphs more generally. We took extremely compelling, and at times entertaining evidence from Professor Grubin, who is a worldwide expert in this area. Contrary to what one Member said, polygraphs are not untested, and 5,000 such tests have been used in connection with sex offenders in England and Wales. In between 60% and 70% of cases, the use of a polygraph elicits information that would not otherwise have come out. That is either because the offender volunteers it—they know a polygraph is going to be used and they volunteer information that they would not otherwise have provided—or because it prompts a negative reading and a follow-up investigation can occur.
I emphasise that nobody is recalled to prison as a result of a negative polygraph test, and nor are they deemed to have breached their licence conditions. It simply prompts further investigation, and while not always accurate, such tests have been found to be useful in prompting that disclosure or further investigation. In that context, I draw the House’s attention to one of the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall’s notes on this topic. On 4 June, paragraph 23, he stated:
“I therefore concluded that polygraph testing is likely to be a valuable additional means of gathering information relevant to terrorist risk for terrorist offenders on licence.”
Jonathan Hall thinks that polygraph tests are an effective and good idea.
On Northern Ireland, the hon. Members for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), for Strangford and for North Down raised the question of applying the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions retrospectively to Northern Ireland. The UK Government believe that that is a lawful thing to do—that it does not infringe article 7 or any common law principles. We believe that terrorism measures are reserved and that we should treat the United Kingdom in those matters as one, but they do engage parts of the LCM mechanism, and we are therefore in detailed discussions with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister, Naomi Long. I had an hour-long conversation with her earlier this week and, again, we hope to make progress on that point in the coming week or so; I think she will come back to me in the very near future. I stress that these provisions affect terrorist prisoners on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland equally. They do not seek to penalise or victimise any one side or the other; they apply equally, and I ask Members to keep that important point in mind.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) on the Opposition Front Bench. I have a lot of sympathy with what he said, and I hope the Minister will address the points he made, because we want to be constructive. We all support the overall thrust of the Bill, but my concern, as Chair of the Justice Committee, is that we do not do anything—albeit inadvertently and for good reasons—that undermines the checks and balances that are a normal part of the criminal process.
That is why the change in the burden of proof in relation to TPIMs needs more justification put behind it. Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, is highly regarded in this field, and the Minister has quoted him with approbation on a number of occasions. In this instance, he does not regard the case as being made out. If the Minister takes a different view, with respect, we need something more substantial as to why that is the case. There may be good reasons, but it cannot be done on a purely speculative basis. It cannot be on the basis that it may be useful to have this wider test. It might engage some people outside the jurisdiction in ways that we cannot currently in terms of gathering evidence and intelligence, but that case has to be made. Having voted on two occasions to increase the burden of proof to where it currently is, I would like to have a pretty clear sense that there is a compelling reason for reversing those decisions—and there may be, but I think the Minister owes it to us to set that out, and we need Mr Hall to set out why he comes to a different view. We may be persuadable, but it is important that the case is made and that the House understands that.
I accept that there is an overall three-year time limit on the working of the Bill, but I am concerned that, without a time limit, the TPIM will become the default mechanism and more like a control order. We surely all ought to recognise that, wherever possible—wherever proper, admissible evidence can be obtained and proceedings can be safely and securely brought—if people have done the vile things that we are talking about, which pose a real criminal threat to the security of this country and its people, the normal and proper course ought to be to prosecute through the normal due process. An alternative means of dealing with this should only be undertaken in the most exceptional circumstances. I can see that there may sometimes be such circumstances, but again, that case needs to be spelt out.
The third issue that I wish quickly to deal with is polygraphs. The Law Society takes the view that the suggestion of the use of polygraphs in some of these circumstances is more to persuade people psychologically —that is the phrase it uses in its briefing—against breaching the orders. That may be valuable in itself, but we ought to be wary of the limits of polygraphs’ usefulness. There are mixed views in academic, scientific and legal circles about the reliability of polygraphs. I do not have a fixed view about them, but I think we should approach their use with caution and proportionality.
Sir Robert Neill
I am always happy to give way to my hon. Friend and near neighbour.
Chris Philp
My hon. Friend and south London neighbour is kind for giving way. Let me reassure him on his point about the limits of polygraphs. We understand and accept that they have limits, which is why a negative polygraph result on its own can never result in a recall to prison or licence conditions being deemed to have been broken. All a negative polygraph result could do is prompt further investigation by other means, which I hope provides him with the reassurance he seeks.
Sir Robert Neill
That is a very helpful reassurance for today’s purposes, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the Minister said that. It is an important point, and I am glad that he takes this on board. Sometimes, for the best of reasons, there can be a mission creep with these measures, which could lead to a broader spread of their use in the criminal justice system, and that would be a matter of concern. If he says that the use is very specific, I accept his word on that, but it is important that we continue to keep this under review and do not have unintended mission creep. As we all know, it is often easy to present perfectly benign and reasonable reasons for doing something that departs from the normal checks and balances, but it then becomes entrenched and permanent and spreads.
In that spirit, I take the Minister’s assurance, but he will understand why it is important that that issue is debated and that reassurances are given that the overall integrity of the justice system will not be affected by these changes. That has dealt quickly with the issues that I sought to raise. It was perhaps a record brevity, but I hope that brevity does not reduce the import of the issues raised.
Chris Philp
I thank the Members who have contributed to a very thought-provoking debate this afternoon. I would like to reply, if I may, to some of the points that have been raised. I will start with the first question raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), about a lone actor review—new clause 8. I know he has had what I hope was a lengthy and fruitful conversation with the Minister for Security earlier today. He will of course be aware that the Prevent review we have been talking about touches on this, but the MAPPA review will also significantly engage with this topic.
I have been endeavouring to obtain a firm date for publication during the last few minutes. I am afraid the best I can do from this Dispatch Box at the moment is to say that it will be soon—as soon as practical. I hope it will be within the timeframe the hon. Gentleman was asking for, but I am afraid I cannot give him a precise date. However, it is imminent, and we will do it as soon as we possibly can. I believe the MAPPA review will cover many of the issues that the shadow Minister has been raising in relation to the lone actor threat that he and his colleagues have been discussing.
Let me turn to the substantive questions about TPIMs that arose both this afternoon and in Committee. Let me start with what the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) termed the business case or the operational case: why are we proposing to lower the burden of proof? The hon. Members for St Helens North and for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the same question.
The best answer I can give the House to that question—what is the business case for changing the burden of proof?—is the evidence given to the Bill Committee by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, one of the national counter-terrorism policing leads, who had been briefed by the security services prior to giving his evidence. In his evidence, which is available in Hansard, he gave us three reasons why a lower burden of proof—a reasonable suspicion—would be better and would protect the public. The first reason he gave is that, where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing, there may not be time to establish the higher burden of proof before a threat or a risk materialises. Secondly, he said that where somebody is returning from abroad—for example, from Syria—it is very hard to establish an evidential base that, on the balance of probability, someone has been involved in terror-related activity because, by definition, getting evidence from somewhere like Syria it is very hard, if not impossible. The third reason he gave was where sensitive material needs to be relied on: disclosing that material to get to the balance of probability would potentially endanger sources—confidential sources—and it is clearly easier to get to the reasonable suspicion standard without disclosing the material. Those are the three reasons he gave. [Interruption.]
To pre-empt the intervention that I sense the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West is brewing, I accept that it is true historically—looking back—that there has not been an occasion on which the security services wanted to give a TPIM but could not do so because of the burden of proof. There is no such historical example, and I freely concede the point. I suspect that was the topic of the intervention. [Interruption.] Sort of. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) said in an intervention, we have to deal in this House not just with what has happened in the past but with what might happen in the future.
We have been clearly advised by Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, and through him by the security services, that this measure is necessary to protect the public. When the assistant chief constable gave evidence on 25 June, I asked him explicitly whether the lower standard of proof would make the public safer. He answered, categorically, that yes it would.
Joanna Cherry
The Minister anticipates my objection, so perhaps I can refer him to what the assistant chief constable said in response to me during the evidence session on 25 June. I asked:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
and he replied:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
Chris Philp
As I said, I accept that. There have not been any historical cases where the standard of proof has been a blocker, but we have been categorically advised by the security services, speaking through Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, that it might occur, and that these proposals will make the public safer. He said that categorically, and I do not think that the House could, or should, disregard such clear advice. In relation to Jonathan Hall’s comments, I suspect that he may not have heard the evidence that I read out. He gave evidence to the Committee immediately before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. His evidence was new to the House and to Parliament, and we did not have it on Second Reading. We do have it now, however, and we should have careful regard to it.
A number of Members raised questions about civil liberties, and not wishing to intrude on an individual’s freedom, and I will directly address those points. I will do so with reference to the original Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. By lowering the burden of proof, we are changing only one of five limbs. The other four limbs remain exactly as they are, and one of those, laid out in section 3 of that Act, states that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider whether the TPIM is “necessary”—I use that word carefully—for purposes connected with protecting members of the public. Subsection (4), condition D, states that the Secretary of State must consider whether a TPIM is
“necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity,”
That test of necessity goes far beyond the reasonable suspicion referred to in the first limb. The requirement for necessity is unchanged.
The hon. Member for St Albans said that this measure could be introduced on a Minister’s whim, and that a Minister could impose a TPIM with the sweep of a pen. I say to her gently, however, that that is not the case and there are judicial safeguards in the 2011 Act. For example, section 6 of that Act states that when a TPIM notice is given, the Secretary of State must go to the court and make an application, and the court has to verify or validate that the TPIM is reasonable, and certify that it is not “obviously flawed”. There is judicial certification.
Section 16 of the 2011 Act provides for a right to appeal. If the subject of a TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, or that the TPIM is unjustified, they can apply to the court in a process akin to a judicial review, and apply to have it overturned. There are judicial safeguards to protect individuals from unreasonable actions by the Government.
In the many years that TPIMs have been in operation since 2011, and in the six years when control orders were in place from 2005, the numbers used have been small. There were never more than about 15 to 20 control orders in force at any one time, and we heard evidence that as of today only six TPIMs are in force. That is a very small number, as they are used only in exceptional circumstances. When I asked Jonathan Hall whether he believed that any Government, including the previous Labour Government or the more recent Conservative Government, had ever abused the power provided by TPIMs or control orders, he answered that no, he was not aware of any such abuse. I would add that a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, has expressed support for the measures in this Bill.
Let me turn to the issue of time and how extendable TPIMs are. They currently expire after two years. We propose to make them extendable in one-year increments, as were the old control orders passed by the then Labour Government and indeed supported by some Members in this House this afternoon. We heard evidence from Jonathan Hall that there was risk where a TPIM ended after two years, as there could be a gap. He knew of two real cases where that occurred, with a gap of one year in one case and a gap of 16 months in the other before a new TPIM could be obtained. That is because we have to get fresh evidence; we cannot rely on the old evidence and we have to wait for somebody to do something wrong again to give us the grounds to renew the TPIM. Max Hill, when he was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in 2017, said that some terrorists were “biding time” waiting for the TPIM to simply time out.
In fairness to the last Labour Government, even though the previous control orders could be extended year by year, in practice most of them were not: 30 of them were for less than two years; eight were for between two and three years; four were for between three and four years; and only three extended for between four and five years. Again, the subject can apply for judicial review if they think the TPIM extension is unfair, so a judicial protection is in place.
I have two quick final points to make. In terms of prosecution, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst asked about, there is a duty under section 10 of the 2011 Act that requires the Secretary of State to seek prosecution where appropriate. On Prevent, let me say that the statutory obligation to carry out the Prevent review remains. There have been some delays, because the independent reviewer had to be replaced and then we had the coronavirus pandemic. Our commitment to do it remains in statute. Obviously, specifying a date caused a problem before, and we do not want to repeat that mistake. We hope and expect that this will be done by August of next year, but we feel that, given the experience of the recent past, putting that date in the Bill would simply be setting a bear trap. So I hope that I have laid out the case for resisting these amendments.
Conor McGinn
In the brief time available, I wish, first, to thank the Minister for addressing some of the concerns we have raised, not just today on Report, but through a thorough examination of the Bill in Committee. Although Labour Members wholeheartedly support robust action to keep our country and our citizens safe, and to tackle terrorism and its causes, it is the duty of any responsible Opposition to examine fully the Government’s proposals. I feel that we have done that, with the assistance of Scottish National party and Liberal Democrat Members, those from other parties in the House, and colleagues on the Back Benches.
The Minister and the Government should listen carefully to the very personal testimony given by my hon. Friends the Members for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana) and for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and indeed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott). Although I might not have agreed with her on every crossed t or dotted i, or even on whole words or sentences on occasion, she does speak with the voice of years of experience in this House and a commitment to these issues. She also, like Members who spoke from these Benches, speaks authoritatively and with great passion on behalf of the constituencies and communities she represents. The Government should listen to them, which was why I made the points I did about the importance of not only getting this Prevent review right but getting on with it, to give the clarity and confidence needed, and to address some of the challenges and controversies associated with it.
I was hoping that we might receive a commitment from the Government to publish their MAPPA— multi-agency public protection arrangements—review before we got to consideration in the House of Lords, because it is important, given the removal of the statutory deadline for Prevent and given that the Opposition have proposed a review on lone actors, to have some timeframe on that. I appreciate and understand that the Minister has made valiant efforts to do that, but I regret that it has not been forthcoming to date. I hope that in considering the request for a review on lone actors, the Government understand that we do so in a constructive spirit.
Chris Philp
The Lord Chancellor has appeared, as if by magic, behind the Speaker’s Chair and has indicated to me by eloquent gesticulation that the MAPPA review will indeed be published before the consideration of the Bill in the other place.
Conor McGinn
I thank the Lord Chancellor and the Minister for that commitment. The robust exchanges we have had have been in the context and spirit of working constructively on a Bill of huge importance, which is concerned with keeping our country and its citizens safe. Our proposals for that review are in keeping with that view. We await to see what the MAPPA review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation comes forward with. Colleagues in the other place will no doubt wish to scrutinise that. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Amendment proposed: 30, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must —
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”.—(Alex Cunningham.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
May I take this opportunity to thank hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their careful scrutiny of the Bill thus far? I am very grateful to everyone who contributed to the debate on Second Reading, in Committee and today on Report. I would especially like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), whose impassioned speech regarding her friend Louise, who was caught up in the horrors of the 7/7 bombings 15 years ago this month, reminded us of the importance of the work we are doing here. I am particularly grateful for the co-operative and constructive spirit in which these debates have taken place, and for the broad support received for the Bill so far. That, I think, is testament to the fact that Members recognise overall the intent and purpose of the legislation, which are to protect the public and to keep our country safe. Those are the first and foremost duties of any Government.
There have been some differing opinions on certain measures in the Bill. They have enriched the debate and deepened our understanding of not just the intention behind the measures, but current practice. We have heard questions about the changes we are making to terrorism prevention and investigation measure notices—or TPIMs, as we know them. Let me say to the House that prosecution, or deportation in the case of foreign nationals, will always be our preference for dealing with terrorists, but there will continue to be a small number of cases where, despite the best efforts of the police and security services, that will not be possible. In those circumstances, TPIMs remain a vital risk management tool. A lower standard of proof will allow for TPIMs to be considered for use in a wider variety of cases and will better protect the covert sources and methods that are vital to the investigation of terrorist threat.
The Home Secretary considers very carefully the intelligence held by our security services, as well as consulting the police on the case for prosecution, before deciding whether a TPIM is necessary and proportionate. The Government have no desire to keep individuals on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. Removing the two-year time limit for a TPIM ensures that where subjects pose an enduring risk, we will be better placed to restrict and prevent their involvement in terrorism-related activity for as long as is necessary.
Further safeguards will remain in place. The courts will be able to consider permission hearings on whether the decision to impose a TPIM was obviously flawed and prevent the Home Secretary from doing so where that is the case. Subjects will continue to have a right to appeal any decision to extend the TPIM or vary any of its measures. The quarterly TPIM review group meetings will continue to provide regular oversight of every TPIM, including reviewing its ongoing necessity, whether prosecution is a possibility, and, indeed, the exit strategy for the subject of the measure.
Some concerns have been expressed about the removal of the statutory deadline for completing the independent review of Prevent. I must emphasise that the commitment to completing that important review continues and will remain in statute. We want the review into our strategy for safeguarding those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism to be completed as soon as possible, but we also wanted to run a full and open competition to appoint a new reviewer and to attract as broad a range of applicants as possible. Designing and running that process takes time, and I want to ensure that the new reviewer has an opportunity to decide how best to run the next phase of the review and has enough time to analyse the evidence, develop robust recommendations and, critically, can engage as openly, fully and widely as possible with communities, civil society and others. That will all take time if it is to be done properly, and we cannot fully predict whether events might have a further impact on the timings of that review, particularly in the context of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic, which, frankly, could present further practical challenges to how it could be conducted over the coming months. We should therefore avoid the risk of removing the reviewer’s ability to respond to and mitigate those events both foreseeable and unforeseeable.
For those reasons, while I fully understand the desire to put a new deadline in the Bill, there would, in my judgment, be a significant risk in doing so. It could have the unintended consequence of reducing the impact of this vital review, which I know Members across the House do not wish to do. We should not confuse our desire to give the reviewer the flexibility and time they will need with any question about a lack of commitment to it. I say again to the House that we want it to be completed along with a Government response as quickly as possible, and certainly no later than August of next year.
There has been much debate and discussion about the Bill’s provisions relating to polygraph testing, and I recall a lot of interest in the media when we announced the Bill and its details. I would like to be clear about what these measures seek to achieve and what they do not do. First, on their efficacy, the Committee heard compelling and detailed evidence from Professor Grubin, a leading expert in this field, who has attested to their reliability and their value. They are well established in this country already, having been used thousands of times on sex offenders, and they have been independently evaluated. Secondly, on their purpose, they are an additional risk management tool that can allow probation officers to test compliance with other licence conditions. They are not there to catch offenders out, and the results will most certainly not be used in criminal proceedings against the offender. We have already shown our intention to introduce polygraph testing elsewhere for use with domestic abusers, so we are not taking a novel approach for terrorist offenders. It is another way in which we can help to protect the public.
Finally on this issue, we recognise that they are currently used only in England and Wales, which is why the polygraph provisions relating to terrorist offenders on licence will not come into effect automatically. We will continue to work with Ministers in the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to provide advice and support to put the necessary infrastructure in place before polygraph testing can be conducted there. I am grateful for the continued co-operation of those devolved Administrations. I recognise the complexity and sensitivities of legislating across three jurisdictions’ sentencing frameworks. Right hon. and hon. Members have indeed reminded us of the need to tread carefully, and we do so. I would like to give reassurance that the Government are committed to ensuring that the measures in the Bill can work effectively throughout our United Kingdom, but I do not apologise for the determination, because we have to ensure our citizens are safe from terrorist offending whether committed in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland
I will pause at this moment to thank all those members of the Bill team who have worked so hard to bring the Bill to this stage. Most notably, I am profoundly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) for his stewardship both on Report and in Committee. Indeed I thank all the team both in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office—some of whom are in the Box today—for working collaboratively together. They have served Ministers and indeed the House diligently when it comes to the need to marshal all the clauses in a way that could withstand the most appropriate and thorough scrutiny. I am grateful to them, and I am happy to put it put that on the record here rather than via a point of order, which I think I did on a previous occasion when you were in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for that, too.
The United Kingdom has one of the strongest counter-terrorism systems in the world, but we continue to face a terrorist threat in this country that is complex, and that is diverse and rapidly changing. The House has rightly noted the growing threat that we face from right- wing extremists. Since 2017 we have foiled 25 terrorist plots, including eight plots planned by right-wing extremists, but we are not complacent. We have already established a joint extremism unit to strengthen the partnership of work across the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Of course, there is much more to do, and there will regrettably always be unfinished business.
We are on track to recruit an additional 20,000 police officers to boost frontline capability. That is why we have increased the budget for counter-terrorism policing by £90 million this year, compared with last, taking the overall CT police funding to over £900 million, and we are developing an ambitious programme to strengthen joint working between our police and our security services, which will leave terrorists with no place to hide.
As I have said on many occasions and will continue to say, public protection is our first duty. The comprehensive package of measures introduced in the Bill, on top of the investment that we are making and the programme we are putting in place, demonstrates, I firmly believe, our deep and enduring commitment to that duty.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I rise only briefly to state my strong support for the Bill. I should declare that prior to my election, I was the magistrate member of the Sentencing Council and a non-executive director of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. Accordingly, I was honoured to be a member of the Public Bill Committee for this legislation.
As we have heard several times during the debates on the Bill, the overarching responsibility of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and one of the five set out purposes of sentencing is to protect the public, and that is rightly the priority of the Bill. Terrorist attacks cause carnage, murdering indiscriminately and injuring wantonly. The Bill sends a very powerful message to those who seek to bring terror to the lives of innocent people. It demonstrates the contempt in which we hold those who seek to kill and maim to further their warped ideologies. A minimum sentence of 14 years to be spent entirely in custody is a clear signal that if someone commits a serious offence linked to terrorism, they can expect to spend a hefty proportion of their life locked up, and rightly so.
I, too, am a firm believer in rehabilitation, and the Prison Service has worked incredibly hard to devise and implement deradicalisation programmes, but I think most people would acknowledge that there is considerable scope for further improvement. Several times during the Committee’s evidence sessions, we were told that the reoffending rate of terrorists is low—perhaps just 3% —somehow implying that we therefore do not need such lengthy sentences as proposed in the Bill, but that surely misses the point. Even one terrorist reoffending is one too many, because even one terrorist attack can kill hundreds of people. In cases of terrorism, we cannot take risks.
The Bill also sends a strong message to the public that this Government are absolutely committed to protecting lives and minimising the chance of terrorist attacks taking place. The changes to TPIMs reflect the needs of the Security Service to have every tool to keep us safe. When Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, the deputy senior national co-ordinator in the UK’s counter-terrorism policing, gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, he stated:
“Protecting the public is our No. 1 priority and sometimes that means we have to intervene regardless of evidence, because the risks to the public are so great.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 26, Q69.]
Our priority must be to support our Security Service and police in the heroic work they do day in, day out, often at considerable danger to themselves in their constant quest to thwart would-be terrorists from wreaking their havoc. We owe it to them to give them what they need to keep us safe.
Finally, it is vitally important that the courts take immediate note if and when the Bill is passed. I hope that sentencing guidelines can be introduced quickly to reflect the clear will of all sides of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison.
Robert Buckland
On that point, my hon. Friend will be assured to know that the Sentencing Council is putting work in train in any event to revise the terrorism guidelines and this Bill, should it become law, will no doubt form part of its work.
Rob Butler
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for reassuring me of that. I know from having served on the Sentencing Council that its members will diligently proceed with their efforts. That work will surely reflect, as I was saying, the clear will of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison, to give greater opportunity for rehabilitation, to reflect the seriousness of their crime and, most importantly, to protect the British people.
Robert Buckland
I think it would be the right thing to do to allow our hon. Friend to compose himself for a moment as he remembers and shares with the House the horror of the effects of terrorism. We remain indebted to him and are always grateful to him for sharing his observations and we entirely understand how he must feel when he is reliving those moments.
Jim Shannon
I thank the Secretary of State very much for intervening. I do recall John Birch, Steven Smart, Michael Adams and Lance Corporal Bradley. I often think of the families of those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and of those who were injured. We owe so much to those families. Every MP in this House has a responsibility to keep their constituents safe, as others have said, which we all adhere to and I thank them for that. Today, our Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who, I have to say, I am very impressed by—I mean that honestly—and also the Secretary of State have come in here and ensured that the protection of all the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been cemented in legislation, and I thank them for that. We welcome the Government’s commitment and we thank all in the Committee for their work and the Clerks for their administration to deliver the Bill. Madam Deputy Speaker, thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Monday 21st September 2020
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this Second Reading debate on what has been widely acknowledged as an incredibly important Bill. I join other noble Lords in welcoming, on “the worst list since the lavender list”, my noble friend Lord Vaizey and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It struck me that one person’s success is another’s disappointment, because I wanted the Diamond synchrotron to go in the north-west. It obviously ended up near Oxford, but it was very good listening to my noble friend.
The right reverend Prelate recounted the dreadful night of the arena bomb in Manchester. I reflected on his feelings about how Manchester came together after that; it really did. He talked about the bee; I carry the bee around on my lanyard at all times. It certainly defined a moment in Manchester’s history that will never be forgotten.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, talked about the rise of the far right, and of course we cannot forget about that; it really is on the rise in this country. Just as we talk about Islamist terrorism, we cannot forget about that. I also say to my noble friend Lord Sheikh that I will respond to his letter as soon as I possibly can; I apologise to him. I also apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, because at times, unless I am going deaf, I could not hear her very well. I shall look at Hansard and respond to her in due course if necessary.
Noble Lords including the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Thomas of Gresford, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, talked about the new serious terrorism sentence with a 14-year minimum. Of course, the sentence will be for the courts to impose on the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders who would otherwise receive a life sentence—those who have committed an offence involving a high likelihood of causing multiple deaths. It is right that we set a minimum that reflects the seriousness with which we take these offences. By having both a minimum custodial sentence of 14 years and a minimum licence period of seven years, and up to 25 years, we will keep the public safer by ensuring that dangerous terrorists serve longer in prison and are subject to longer periods of supervision and monitoring in the community.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, talked about the discount sentence. While the maximum reduction for a plea at the first reasonable opportunity is 33%, the position in sentencing law is different for offences that carry a mandatory minimum sentence. By applying a maximum reduction of 20% for an early guilty plea in the case of serious terrorism sentences, we are taking an approach consistent with the provision for other minimum sentences, such as those for firearms offences and third-strike burglary.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the evidence used to determine that longer sentences deter radicalisation. The rationale for this Bill is primarily about public protection, as noble Lords have said. Longer sentences and more onerous licenses are part of a package intended to ensure that offenders who commit serious terrorist acts are incapacitated for longer and better supervised on release. Longer sentences will provide both better protection for the public, by incapacitating terrorist offenders, and more time to support their disengagement and rehabilitation through the range of tailored interventions available while they are in prison.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, asked me for an update on the announcement of additional funding for CT probation prison programmes, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, alluded to this too. We are doubling CT specialist staff and dedicating resources to provide enhanced training to identify and challenge extremist behaviour. The National Probation Service has already developed specialist teams for the management of terrorist offenders, but the additional investment we are making will take this further and recruitment is already under way. These specialist, trained probation officers will be able to deliver enhanced levels of offender management for those high-risk, complex cases.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked for the estimate of additional probation expenditure. There are three effects on probation case loads that contribute to the additional costs expected. The first is the serious terrorists, and terrorism-related offenders, likely to receive an extended sentence. They would either face a 14-year minimum term, or be required to serve all of their sentence in custody, in steady state, and this may result in fewer than 50 additional probation case loads, at a cost of less than £100,000 annually. The second is expanding the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime to cover more offences. This would increase probation case loads by fewer than 50 offences at a cost of about £100,000 annually. The third, adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ license conditions, would affect fewer than 150 offenders at a cost of about £400,000 annually in steady state. This totals an estimate of additional £600,000 annual cost for probation in steady state.
The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Ponsonby, have asked what HMG are doing to ensure that the Parole Board has the resources, training and so on to improve decision-making capability. The board has a cohort of specialist members, trained specifically to deal with terrorist and extremist cases, including retired high court judges, retired police officers and other experts in their field. We continue to work with the board, the police and security services to ensure that the parole system as a whole is fully equipped to deal effectively with these cases.
The noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlisle, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, lamented the removal of the Parole Board referral for serious terrorists. Dangerous terrorist offenders should serve a sentence that truly reflects the seriousness of their crimes. Removing the prospect of early release for these offenders sends a clear message that this Government will treat this kind of offence seriously. By ensuring that they will spend longer in custody, our Prison Service will have more time to manage and reduce the risk that these offenders present to the public when they are released from prison. Prison governors and HMPPS public protection casework officials have extensive experience in setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders on behalf of the Secretary of State, and will continue to be informed by the recommendations of probation officers and the multi-agency public protection panels in place to ensure their safe and effective risk management on release into the community.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester all talked about the vulnerability of children. Noble Lords will know that we have a separate youth justice system for children and the courts will always consider their specific needs when sentencing. However, we know that age is not a barrier to becoming involved in terrorist acts. That is why we have taken steps to ensure a degree of consistency between our approach to adult and youth offenders. The changes we are introducing to the EDS will remove the possibility of early release for the most dangerous offenders, allowing for the effective monitoring of risk factors over a longer period to limit the threat posed on release. The special sentence for offenders of particular concern will ensure that children who commit a relevant terrorist or terrorism-related offence cannot be released without a period of supervision in the community, maximising the time available to support their desistance from further offending.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and, to a certain extent, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester talked about the malign influence on children vulnerable to exploitation by adults—particularly, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said, online. That is why 47% of the projects that the Government funded in 2018-19 worked in partnership with communities to reduce the risk of radicalisation. They were delivered in schools to increase young people’s resilience to terrorists and extremist ideology in all its forms.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey talked about the online harms White Paper. Like him, I am looking forward to it becoming a Bill, and some of the problems that it will tackle, particularly online, for children and young people.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, talked about Northern Ireland and a possible separate sentencing approach. We think there should be a unified approach to the sentencing and release of terrorist offenders across the UK. We do not discriminate between types of terrorism. Any terrorist offender, regardless of their ideology or proclaimed motivation, and whether their offence was committed in England, Scotland or Northern Ireland, should be subject to the same sentencing and release regime.
There has been much discussion of the standard of proof. We are reducing the standard of proof from “on the balance of probabilities” to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” to support the use of TPIMs as necessary and proportionate to protect the public from terrorism-related activity. Only last year, Parliament took the step of updating the counterterrorism legislative frame- work through the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, because pathways into terrorism have changed and, in some cases, accelerated. Much radicalisation now takes place online, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said, and the operational pace for the Security Service and police is faster than ever seen before. Lowering the standard of proof will help to ensure that a TPIM can be considered as an option to manage the threat in a wider range of cases, where it is necessary to do so. For example, this change will assist in circumstances where an individual has been to Syria to fight for or assist a terrorist organisation but evidence of their activities there is hard to gather. Should they return, prosecution is the Government’s strongest preference. However, if there are evidential difficulties and the burden of proof required by a criminal court—beyond reasonable doubt—cannot be satisfied but there is a reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity, lowering the standard of proof will ensure that a TPIM can be considered as a risk-management tool to protect the public.
Noble Lords will, rightly, want to debate where the balance between civil liberties and public protection best lies. However, the Government are clear: we must ensure that the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing can make full use of the tools available to them to manage the risk posed by those involved in terrorism.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about the removal of the two-year time limit. The Government have no desire to keep individuals on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. This change will ensure that, when subjects pose an enduring risk, we will be better placed to restrict and prevent their involvement in terrorism-related activity for as long as necessary. This provision mitigates against the possibility of TPIM subjects “riding out” the current maximum of two years with no change to their extremist mindset, and it removes the prospect of a cliff edge being created whereby a TPIM is removed but the subject of the TPIM represents an enduring risk.
In cases of well-connected extremists, it will also multiply the benefits of the TPIM by reducing individuals’ capability of conducting terrorism-related activity, dismantling their networks so that they are ineffective at inspiring and influencing others to commit acts of terrorism, and reducing the wider long-term threat from others who might have been influenced by the subject were it not for the TPIM measures. This change will also assist with longer-term risk management, providing more time to meaningfully pursue deradicalisation and space for subjects to adopt different lifestyles and move away from their previous extremist contacts.
As is the case now, recommendations as to who should be subject to a TPIM will be provided by operational partners in the first instance and will therefore be underpinned by suitable operational experience and expertise. Where we cannot prosecute, deport or otherwise manage an individual of terrorism concern, a TPIM will be considered, if necessary, as a means to protect the public. I am confident that the changes that the Bill will make will strengthen the toolkit available to our operational partners, while continuing to ensure that robust safeguards remain in place to protect the civil liberties of those subject to the measure.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked me to cite examples, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asserted that there has not been an occasion where security services which wanted to use TPIMs could not do so. That was cited in the House of Commons and it is true, but the Bill provides, as it should do, for future situations that could well arise, as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier said. As I am sure noble Lords will know, the tests include not just the “reasonable suspicion” test but the following: that some or all activity is new terrorism-related activity; that the Home Secretary reasonably considers that a TPIM is necessary; and that the Home Secretary reasonably considers each TPIM measure to be necessary. In addition, the court must give the Home Secretary permission to impose a TPIM. Therefore, the decision is not based solely on that one test.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asked for the Government’s view on the amendment proposed by PCC David Jamieson that would give PCCs and local mayors an oversight role in the operation of TPIMs. The Home Office already works very closely with the police before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime. The process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with the relevant local police force and that community impact assessments are kept up to date. The Bill already contains a clause that will allow a TPIM subject’s relocation measure to be varied where necessary on operational resource grounds. Therefore, David Jamieson’s proposed amendment for an additional role for PCCs and local mayors in TPIM processes is, respectfully, not necessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who of course has great experience in this area, cited radicalisation in prisons and gave the example of Usman Khan, but he will know that I will not go into that individual’s case. My noble friends Lord Vaizey and Lord Risby, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—and, by turn, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—questioned the success of rehabilitation programmes in prisons. HMPPS delivers a formal programme—the Healthy Identity Intervention —in custody and in the community. In addition, the prison strand of the Desistance and Disengagement Programme was rolled out to prisons in 2018. The DDP provides a range of intensive, tailored interventions and practical support designed to help in rehabilitation.
Measuring changes in behaviour is obviously and notoriously hard, especially in such a small cohort relative to the size of the prison and probation population in England and Wales. Our intervention programmes have a robust research and evaluation mechanism built into them. Evaluation and research will be at the heart of the new CT assessment and rehabilitation centre announced by the Government earlier this year.
In terms of scrutinising the effectiveness of disengagement, we have consistently evaluated the effectiveness of our work and have taken action where appropriate. The department regularly reviews its approach to make sure that it is appropriate and proportionate to the risk presented by terrorist prisoners and people on licence. This will be a core mission for the new CT assessment and rehabilitation centre, which will lead the evaluation, development and delivery of our intervention approaches. In addition, the independent reviewer of Prevent—on which more later—will consider the work of the desistance and disengagement programme.
The noble Lord, Lord Mann, talked about the CST and other voluntary organisations that have been very successful in identifying people who wish to do harm to our communities. I absolutely pay tribute to the CST. I have seen its work in action and have seen how it has worked with other organisations, such as Tell MAMA. It is also involved in countering hate crime towards the LGBT community. I hope that its work goes on for many more years to come.
On terrorist offenders leaving prison, as noble Lords have alluded to, throughout a sentence we oversee multiagency end-to-end supervision, which includes regular risk assessments. All terrorist offenders released on probation are closely managed by the National Probation Service, and the highest-risk offenders, including terrorist offenders, are managed through the multiagency public protection arrangements—MAPPA.
I am aware of time; I hope that noble Lords will bear with me for a couple more minutes. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, asked about women’s de-radicalisation programmes. She will know that all convicted terrorist prisoners, including at the small number of women’s prisons, can access the rehabilitative interventions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked me about the Acheson recommendations. In our 2016 response to the Acheson report, the Government accepted eight out of the 11 principal recommendations. Following the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist attack, the MoJ Permanent Secretary commissioned an urgent review of progress against these recommendations. The review found that the department has delivered against all the recommendations that the Government accepted. This progress includes the establishment of separation centres to hold the most subversive extremist prisoners and to safeguard the vulnerable against their malicious ideology.
Over 29,000 prison staff, including all new recruits since January 2017, have received enhanced extremist awareness training. Arrangements are also in place to systematically remove extremist literature from prisons, and enhanced vetting arrangements for prison chaplains of all faiths are also now in place. Through the CT “step up” programme, the department will continue to build on this track record with increased resource and reform across these important areas.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked where we are up to with the MAPPA review. He will know that the terms of reference were published in January 2020 and that Jonathan Hall’s report was published on 2 September. He found that it
“is a well-established process and did not conclude that wholesale change is necessary.”
He made a number of recommendations; we will set out more about our response in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, challenged me about who Prevent is protecting. It is protecting the individual who needs to be safeguarded against being radicalised into terrorism. It is also protecting the people that might be harmed, both the individual and those around him or her. On the review, given both the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, having to stand down and how Covid has come to try us this year in respect of the work we can do, an incomplete or rushed review might well have been produced had we not removed the deadline through this Bill. The interviews are taking place later this month and will be followed by an announcement as soon as possible. The Government want the review to conclude by August 2021, but we do not want to constrain the reviewer’s ability to complete a comprehensive assessment, given the uncertainties associated with the current circumstances. Confirmation of the timescales will be agreed with the new reviewer and set out in the terms of reference.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, asked whether Parliament will consider revised Prevent terms of reference. The answer is no. There were also a couple of questions on polygraph testing; if noble Lords are amenable, I will respond to those in a letter as I have gone well over my allocated time. With that, I beg to move.
Tuesday 26th January 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 129-I Marshalled list for Committee - (21 Jan 2021)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes references to offences in the Space Industry Act 2018 from Schedule 17A to the Sentencing Code (serious terrorism offences). References to those offences will instead be inserted on their commencement by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (see the amendment at page 108, line 11) so that they are dealt with consistently by the Sentencing Act 2020.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I hope that the Committee will allow me to take a moment to thank the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their very warm words of welcome, which I appreciate.
Amendment 1 is a minor technical amendment that removes references to offences in the Space Industry Act 2018 from Schedule 17A to the Sentencing Code, which deals with serious terrorism offences. References to those offences will instead be inserted, on their commencement, by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 so that they are dealt with consistently by that Act. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I understand from the Minister that this is a minor amendment. I too welcome him to his position. He has been very helpful to me both on this Bill and on the Domestic Abuse Bill, with which we are dealing almost simultaneously. I have a couple of minor questions for him. First, what would happen if this amendment were not put in place? How would that have affected the position, and what could the consequences have been? Secondly, what level of consultation has he done externally to ensure consistency in Sentencing Codes and parliamentary Acts?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord. To answer his two questions, I say that this is essentially a tidying-up matter because of the different pace of legislation going through Parliament at the moment. The question of what would happen if this amendment were not made is an interesting one. At the very least we would be left with inelegant legislation, and I know from my previous incarnation that inelegant legislation is bad for Parliament but very good for lawyers, so let us try to make it as elegant as we can while we are at it. Much of the consultation on this matter preceded my involvement in this Bill and indeed my introduction to this House, but I am aware that there has been very significant consultation. Of course, if the noble Lord wishes to raise any particular points with me, my door is always open to him.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments at page 53, line 44, page 95, line 4 and page 95, line 37 are consequential on the removal of Clause 34.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 3, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 73, 74 and 75. I will also signal my intention to propose the removal of Clauses 33, 34 and 35.
Clause 33 was intended to provide explicit provision so that Scottish Ministers might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Clause 34 was intended to provide explicit provision so that the Northern Ireland Department of Justice might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Scotland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but Scottish Ministers have broad powers to set licence conditions under Section 12(1) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. Northern Ireland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but the Department of Justice has broad powers to set licence conditions under Article 24 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 and Rule 3(2)(e) of the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence Conditions) (Northern Ireland) Rules 2009.
Through discussions on the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly on the provisions of the Bill, it became apparent that while this clause would enable a fully comparable UK-wide approach to polygraph testing on licence, pursuit of this provision in Scotland and Northern Ireland was not strictly necessary and could result in Scottish and Northern Irish Ministers withholding their consent for the Bill. The Government remain of the view that polygraph examinations are a useful additional tool in supporting the effective management of terrorist offenders, and we hope that the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly will see the demonstrable benefits of its introduction in England and Wales.
This Government will continue to legislate on reserved matters but, as an expression of our respect for the existing powers of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in relation to the setting of licence conditions, and as a demonstration of this Government’s reasonable approach to those discussions, we have now agreed to remove the provision on the clear understanding that, should this Scottish Parliament or Northern Ireland Assembly or a future one change its view on polygraph testing, it will be able to implement the measure without additional legislation being required.
Clause 35 was intended primarily to provide supplementary provisions to Clauses 33 and 34 that would restrict the circumstances in which the devolved Administrations could impose mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for certain terrorist offenders. As a result of the removal of Clauses 33 and 34 from the Bill, Clause 35 is no longer needed. The clause was intended to ensure that regulations could be made to ensure that polygraph conditions were confined only to those offenders’ licences where it was necessary and proportionate to do so, to ensure standards for the examinations and that appropriate records and reports kept in relation to testing were consistent across the UK. Polygraph examinations are already carried out on sexual offenders in England and Wales. The conduct of those polygraph examinations is governed by rules made under Section 29(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007. Amendments 2, 3, 17, 18, 21 to 26 and 75 are consequential on the removal of Clauses 33 to 35.
Amendment 73 is necessary to ensure that the measures that permit introduction of polygraph testing in a licence condition for terrorist offenders in England and Wales are commenced two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent. Previously, when explicit provision was sought and set out for Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as for England and Wales, we had agreed that the provision should be commenced via regulation to allow sufficient time to develop the relevant infrastructure in those jurisdictions. As explicit provision is no longer made for those jurisdictions through this Bill, and polygraph testing is already used by the probation service for sex offenders in England and Wales, the same delay is not now required. As such, the usual commencement of two months after Royal Assent is appropriate. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have many reservations about the value of polygraph tests. They rely on measuring several physiological processes—pulse rate, blood pressure, perspiration and so on, the changes that may take place in the course of questioning. However, the emotional and physiological responses recorded may arise from such factors as simple anxiety about being tested or fear of being judged deceptive, or a host of things—perhaps the state of one’s digestion after food. There is an inherent ambiguity in the physiological responses. The reluctance to use polygraph evidence is precisely because the response may mimic the response expected of a person seeking to deceive.
What is meant by “failing” the polygraph test? Failing the test means exhibiting a certain physiological response to a question. What is truth? The examiner cannot know whether that response means that the answer is a lie. However, there is no punishment for failing the test—whatever that means—or for exhibiting that response. That does not breach the terms of the offender’s licence. The individual will not be returned to prison. Alterations may, however, take place in the conditions of his licence, and those could be onerous.
The irony is that, in the course of questioning, the person being questioned may provide information truthfully that will have an adverse effect on him. He has not failed the test because his body does not react to his telling the truth, but he has provided information that may lead to his punishment. He has of course lost his right to silence, a right first developed in the late 17th century as a check to arbitrary rule. It has been regarded over centuries as fundamental to the fairness of the criminal law in this country and in the common-law countries all over the world.
Faced with the terrorist atrocities that we have seen in this country, the loss of the right to silence may seem a worthwhile price. Obviously that is not the immediate view in Scotland, nor in Northern Ireland. Let us face the dilemma: the proposals for England and Wales do not involve imprisonment for a lie but possible imprisonment for telling the truth or, since it is mandatory to answer the questions, even for remaining silent. Faced with legal and moral issues such as this, the drafters of the Domestic Abuse Bill, which is proceeding this week here also, as the Minister will know, decided that it was appropriate to proceed with a three-year pilot before finally rolling out the use of polygraphs generally in that field. Why is a different approach taken in this concurrent Bill?
It is interesting to note that the case studies in the MoJ memorandum on these proposals indicate that the information provided led to warrants being issued and physical evidence obtained in the offenders’ respective homes to contradict what they had said. However, there is no indication how often that has occurred or how many times such activity has proved nothing, and nothing has come of it. Will the Minister deal with that in his reply?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
Like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I too have considerable doubts about the reliability of polygraph material. This series of government amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, indicate some degree of shambles on the part of the Government. They are withdrawing the polygraph provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Had they consulted the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive prior to the initial publication of the Bill, they would have seen what the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive had to say about them.
In the light of what was said by those two Governments, why did the UK Government introduce these provisions? It is plain from what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, is saying that the Scottish and Northern Irish Administrations do not want them. There is a reference to the various provisions that might allow them to introduce them as licence conditions. However, neither of the Administrations have indicated that they want these powers, so why on earth were they introduced in the first place and when was it that the UK Government decided to respect those views? If they did not consult those two Administrations before, why not?
Separate to that, on the use of polygraphs, what advice have the Government sought from police forces in England and Wales? To what extent would those police forces be confident about using polygraph testing?
Moving on, the effect of Amendment 73 would be that Clause 32, which sets out the conditions for polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in England and Wales, would come into force two months after Royal Assent rather than by regulations. Why have the Government reduced the degree of scrutiny available to the introduction of polygraphs by removing the need for regulations? Separately, what provisions are available in the Bill to stop the use of polygraphs if they prove to be ineffective?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for setting out their various points. I turn first to those made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. On the effectiveness of polygraphs, as I said in my introductory remarks, they are used elsewhere in English law in relation to sex offenders. There is therefore a body of evidence as to their utility. On what “failing” means and the consequences of failure, it is important to remember, as I think the noble Lord appreciates, that offenders who are subject to testing cannot be recalled to custody for failing a polygraph test. They can be recalled for making disclosures during the test that reveal that they have breached other licence conditions, or that their risk has escalated to a level at which they can no longer be managed safely in the community.
On the right to silence and other Human Rights Act rights, I am sure that the noble Lord will recall that during the course of the sex offender pilot of the polygraph system, an offender challenged the imposition of testing on Article 8 grounds, but that was rejected by the courts. No further challenges have been made since then and we are therefore confident that this is compliant with the Human Rights Act and the rights contained therein.
On the remark that there is to be no pilot scheme, I will make two points. First, this is not the initial use of polygraphs in English law because they are already used in connection with sexual offences. Secondly, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient numbers of relevant offenders to carry out a pilot that would produce meaningful results.
I turn to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. It is rather odd to be accused of presiding over a shambles when we have actually listened to the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in our discussions with them. On whether police forces are able and ready to use polygraphs, they are of course already being used in circumstances related to sexual offenders. Therefore, this testing is not entirely new to them. The regulations that will govern polygraph testing have been set out and we do not think that it will be an ineffective tool.
I hope that I have responded to the various points raised. If noble Lords feel that I should provide further information on any of them, they know that we will of course continue to have discussions about these matters.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 53, line 41.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, concluded his remarks by saying that the amendment was “testing the rationale” of these sentences, and that is indeed clearly the case. The first amendment reduces the minimum term in custody and the second increases the period on licence. Both the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Marks, referred to these as “no-hope sentences”. I understand the sentiment they expressed on these extremely long and very serious sentences being given to children—but they are not really no-hope sentences, are they? YOT and, more likely, probation and the Prison Service will have been working with these people for many years to give them hope that, when they get out of prison and are on licence and, eventually, off licence, they can go on to lead a constructive life.
Now this is a very tall hurdle. I understand that; we are dealing with the most serious sentences that one can imagine. Nevertheless, that is the role of probation and it is very important, I would say, for the young person to see that there is hope at the end of the period, because it is far more likely that, if they see that hope, they will engage constructively with people in prison and carry on that constructive intervention when they leave on licence. So I have some questions for the Minister. What assessment has been done of the likelihood of reform of offenders—is there any data on that? Also, what is the number of young offenders now in custody who are likely to be in custody as a result of this legislation? Are there any examples of where longer custodial sentences have helped young people to go on to lead lives in which they no longer offend?
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to stand and answer points made by the noble Lords who have spoken. I first acknowledge their great experience and wisdom in the field, and the evident compassion that underpinned their observations to the Committee. I know that at least two of them have had the experience that I have of acting for a very young person charged with a crime of the greatest magnitude and severity. I can tell from the way in which their questions were framed that they are aware of the extreme sadness at the loss of potential that the advocate finds when acting for a person in such a position. I hope that noble Lords appreciate that I am fully aware, from the perspective of legislation, of the awkwardness and difficulties attendant upon arriving at an appropriate sentence for these most serious of crimes.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
The noble and learned Lord very briefly answered the questions on consultation from my noble friend Lord Thomas. I hope he has in his brief the answer to the headline question of whether consultation was undertaken with probation and what its views were on the balance between custody and licence.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
Will the noble Baroness confirm that she is referring to the probation service?
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
I appreciate that there are levels and areas of probation. The question extends to all parts of those who provide probation services, but the central probation service, offender management, is probably more relevant to this than local probation services.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
If I may, I will respond to the noble Baroness’s question in writing.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, again I thank all who have spoken on these amendments, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. His response was sympathetic, in that he fully recognises the position of young offenders exposed to these extremely long sentences. In return, as he recognised, we accept the seriousness of the offences that are to be visited by these serious terrorist sentences. It is right that they merit an extremely serious response. But even for the most serious offences there ought to be room in a scheme of punishment for rehabilitation, particularly of young offenders who commit these offences in their youth but are serving sentences for many years to come.
My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford spoke of, and asked about, the arbitrariness of the choice of the 14-year term. Of course, he has had a lifetime of practising in the criminal courts. He has many years of experience of judges exercising their discretion, and those years have left him with a favourable view of judicial discretion—a view which I share.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, questioned the formulation that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I put that a sentence of 14 years of immediate custody offers no hope, because, he said, of the availability of help within a custodial setting. I regret that I do not agree with his optimism. Very long periods in custody allow offenders in custody no hope, or very little hope indeed. It is otherwise with time spent on licence, when a great deal of help in rebuilding their lives is available to offenders, from the probation service and other services and, we would hope, also from services to help deradicalise young offenders.
The question of rebalancing, which the Minister also accepted that these amendments were about, was explored and will be explored further between the Minister and my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I invite the Minister and the Government to consider whether more discretion could be left to the sentencing judge to permit that judge to impose a minimum term in custody of less than 14 years—we suggest 10—and to recognise that there is scope for a longer period on licence to enable young, or young middle-aged lives at that stage, to be rebuilt. In urging the Government to take that position, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Thomas, have explained their thinking behind the amendment to replace “exceptional” with “significant” to give more discretion to the judge. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, in any event a judge will explain the reason for finding exceptional or significant reasons for reducing a sentence.
My questions are for the Minister. What does he believe are exceptional circumstances, and what exceptional circumstances would justify a lesser sentence? In what circumstances would such lesser sentences be appropriate?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained, this amendment seeks to amend and change the circumstances in which a sentencing court could impose less than the 14-year minimum term for a discretionary life sentence imposed in a serious terrorism case by changing the circumstances from “exceptional” to “significant”. I respectfully agree with the noble Lord that the logic of his amendment would also apply to Clause 4. However, I respectfully disagree over whether such an amendment is appropriate.
The purpose of Clause 11 is to ensure a consistency of approach when sentencing those convicted of serious terrorism offences. It would not be appropriate for a court to be able to impose a life sentence with a lower minimum term for a serious terrorism offence other than where there are exceptional circumstances. If the circumstances of the offence and offending are such that the court imposes a life sentence, and unless there are exceptional circumstances, there should be no possibility of the offender being released earlier than someone given a serious terrorism sentence. That is what Clause 11 achieves.
By contrast, the amendment would remove that consistency, so that the court could consider a wider range of circumstances when setting the minimum term in a discretionary life sentence than when doing so for a serious terrorism sentence, although all other circumstances would be the same. While I accept that there is a distinction, in that the prisoner serving a life sentence may be considered for release only after the minimum term is served, it would be unprincipled for him or her to be released earlier than a counterpart serving a serious terrorism sentence.
A number of questions were asked about “exceptional circumstances”. That is a principle already established in sentencing legislation. It is used, for example, in connection with minimum terms that can apply to certain firearm offences. I must respectfully decline the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for a Minister to gloss from the Dispatch Box what “exceptional circumstances” might or might not be. It is a phrase used elsewhere in statute and known in law. Those are straightforward English words and it would not be appropriate or even helpful for me to gloss them on my feet at the Dispatch Box.
By contrast, I respectfully point out to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that as far as my research has indicated—I am happy to be corrected if I am wrong—there is no existing “significant circumstances” principle in sentencing legislation. Therefore, if accepted, the amendment would create an entirely new test, which in our view is unwarranted and likely to lead to litigation, which cannot be in our interests as parliamentarians in passing this Bill.
As far as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is concerned on judicial discretion, we are really talking about the extent of the judicial discretion and whether the test should be “exceptional” or “significant” circumstances. The question is not to the existence but to the extent of judicial discretion. As part of the Government’s recent White Paper, A Smarter Approach to Sentencing, we have committed to changing the criteria for other minimum terms for repeat offences to reduce the occasions on which the court may depart from the minimum custodial length.
For those reasons, I do not consider the amendment to be necessary or appropriate, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken, and to the Minister for his response. However, I am bound to say that I found it disappointing. He is absolutely right to state that “exceptional” has a clear meaning in law and is used elsewhere. It was to that meaning that I alluded when I said that the use of “exceptional” puts the judge in a straitjacket. It is for that reason that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is right to seek a little more latitude, because the sentence is so long and the circumstances may be very varied.
The Minister did not deal with the point that the circumstances can relate not only to the offence but to the offender. They may cover a very wide range. Therefore, it is our position that more discretion is called for. He is right that it is the ambit of the discretion with which this amendment is concerned. I invite him to reconsider it. While he does, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, about the benefits of pre-sentence reports. They are, and always have been, when available, important in the context of sentencing generally. They are a sophisticated tool, bringing before a court matters that may not be known to the sentencing judge in the absence of a detailed report on the background and motivation of an offender, and their potential to be rehabilitated in future. In not requiring such a report, which covers all the matters mentioned in this amendment, Parliament would be taking a retrograde step and excluding elements that may be important in determining the length of any sentence or extension period.
The amendment complements Amendment 6 that I introduced earlier, by giving the judge not only increased discretion in passing sentence, but also the material on which he can correctly and sensibly exercise that discretion. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who described such a report as a very healthy safeguard. I urge the Government to accept the amendment for that reason. It is a question of giving the sentencing court the material upon which to make an informed and sensible decision from everybody’s point of view.
Finally, I commend the words in the amendment that provide for a review of the workings of the clause, including the amendment. I fear that we are legislating in some haste in relation to the Bill, and a review of how it is working, particularly this clause, would be extremely helpful.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for introducing this amendment, although I hope to persuade him that it is in fact misconceived.
The amendment deals with Clause 16, which relates to an increase in the extension period for terrorism offenders aged under 18. As my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton said a few moments ago, I am sure it is common ground across the Committee that when dealing with such young adults one has to have the greatest care and consideration. Having said that, as my noble friend Lord Robathan reminded us, this is a matter of public safety. I respectfully endorse nearly all the comments that he made; I say “nearly all” because, in a debate where so many lawyers are speaking, I understand the temptation for someone who is not a lawyer to say that they are “only a layman”, but my noble friend is not “only” anything. With that slight quibble, I respectfully take on board everything that he said.
The amendment would require the pre-sentence report to take account of the offender’s age and consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to 10 years might be more suitable than an extended sentence of detention. The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament each year on the effectiveness of increasing the maximum extension period of the extended sentence of detention from eight to 10 years.
The nature of an extended sentence is that it comprises a custodial term and an extension period for the purposes of public protection, as defined in Section 256 of the Sentencing Code. The effect of the amendment would be fundamentally to alter the nature of the sentence by proposing an alternative to that extension period.
The amendment is also not necessary and, I say with respect, perhaps misunderstands the provision. I assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the clause simply provides for a new maximum licence period of 10 years in serious terrorism cases rather than the current eight. This is not mandatory; it is available for use at the court’s discretion, and it will remain possible to apply a licence period of any length between 12 months and 10 years.
For a youth offender to receive an extended sentence for a serious terrorism offence, the court will be required to consider a pre-sentence report. I therefore agree to that extent with the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the utility of such reports. In preparing the pre-sentence report, the youth offending team officer will always consider the offender’s age and circumstances in order to recommend an appropriate sentence. The Bill does not change the way in which pre-sentence reports are done.
However, time spent on licence is crucial for both monitoring and managing offenders in the community as well as giving them the opportunity to change their behaviour. Therefore, providing the courts with the option of imposing a longer period of supervision on licence for the most serious terrorist offenders is an important element and component of the Government’s efforts to protect the public from the risks that terrorist offenders pose while enabling a longer period to support rehabilitation.
In that context, I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of throwing red meat to anyone or anything, be it dangerous dogs or the tabloids. This, however, is a proper and proportionate response to the very significant danger that some offenders present. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, so I call him.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, there is a strong connection between the Domestic Abuse Bill and this Bill to the extent that both lie on my desk and I have the honour and privilege of dealing with both in your Lordships’ House. However, they present very different issues. I do not want to talk too much now about the Domestic Abuse Bill, but the structure of that Bill, which encompasses both civil and criminal consequences, is very different—indeed, I might say vastly different—from the subject matter of this Bill, which is extremely serious terrorism offences. If the noble Lord has any particular comments on the interrelationship between the two Bills, I am dealing with them both, as I say, and I am very happy to speak to him further about that. However, that is my response on the particular point that he has raised. My respectful suggestion to your Lordships’ Committee is that the analogy, while tempting, is false.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has participated in this short debate. I am very grateful to those who have supported my position, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Although he did not intend to, I think the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, also supported my position but was very keen to establish how clear-eyed he was. I do not think that people like myself—who are saying that, before a court sentences someone who is under 18, it should have the benefit of a pre-sentence report that asks the question, “Having regard to the person’s age, are there better ways to provide public protection?”—are necessarily that starry-eyed.
I was very hopeful that the Minister would persuade me that I was wrong, but I am not sure that he fully grasped the nature of the amendment. Section 255(1) of the Sentencing Code says that an extended sentence of detention for someone under 18 is available, while Section 255(2) says that the pre-sentence report requirements apply as they normally would in relation to sentencing someone under 18. My proposal is not to change the basis of the sentence; it is to say that, in that pre-sentence report, the pre-sentence reporter should have regard to the question of whether there are alternatives that could provide better public safety. If there are, the pre-sentence reporter should refer to them and the judge should take them into account.
I also agree strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, that in an area like this it is useful for the Secretary of State to consider how well or badly a particular sentence is going so that they consider what should happen to it in future.
I very much hope that the Minister will consider what I have said about what the actual import of my amendment is, because he appeared to be dealing with an amendment that had a different import. I very much hope that he will reconsider his position. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that new section 205ZC of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 does not apply where an offender aged under 18 is sentenced to detention without limit of time for a terrorism offence.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 9 in this group. Both are minor technical amendments to Clause 23. Amendment 8 would make a minor amendment to Clause 23, which introduces the terrorism sentence with fixed licence period in Scotland. The amendment would add the sentence of detention without time limit to the “waterfall” list of sentences of imprisonment and detention that a court can impose in relation to an offence. This would ensure that the new terrorism sentence was available only where a court did not impose a sentence in this list, which includes the indeterminate sentence of detention under Section 208, making the order of sentencing options clear.
Amendment 9 would simply remove a now redundant reference to new Section 205ZC(6) in subsection (4) relating to the new terrorism sentence introduced in Clause 23 due to an amendment to that provision on Report in the Commons. Subsection (4) defines the meaning of the aggregate term in relation to a sentence of detention in respect of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, as it applies to offenders of at least 16 years of age but under 21. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Minister’s words brought to mind many waterfalls that I know and love in Scotland, but I will forgo the opportunity to comment on Scottish criminal law. I am sure that both these minor and technical amendments are perfectly justified and I have no more to say about them.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for the clarity with which he introduced these two technical amendments. Perhaps I may ask two questions. First, on Amendment 8, what would the implications have been had this amendment not been made? I was not clear from what he said whether it would change any position. Secondly, in relation to Amendment 9, how many further convictions would have been included without the decision to limit the availability of the new sentence to cases of conviction on indictment?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, the purpose of the amendment was to reflect the approach adopted across England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. The “waterfall” approach means that courts can impose the new sentence only where they do not impose, for example, a life sentence or an extended sentence. Within the Scottish sentencing framework, this waterfall includes the sentence of detention without time limit, which was unintentionally omitted during initial drafting of the clause. As I said earlier, subsection (6) in the previous version of the Bill was amended during the Commons debate. The amendment would simply remove a reference to a provision that no longer exists.
Just as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is aware of attractive waterfalls in Scotland, I am aware of attractive waterfalls in Wales. I hope that some day soon we will be permitted to discuss them in a friendly fashion together.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a consequential amendment required as a result of the amendments already made to the Bill to limit the availability of the new terrorism sentence introduced by Clause 23 to cases of conviction on indictment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, my Amendment 35 is in this group. I agreed with everything my noble friend Lord Hunt said when he introduced his amendment. My amendment is different in detail, but the overall approach is the same—that is, to have a realistic and timed review of the various approaches to the Prevent programme which the Government is embarking upon.
I got an interesting briefing on this debate from the probation officers’ trade union, Napo. It made a couple of points, which I will repeat. It said that in the offender management and custody model, it indicates that a high-risk offender should get one hour of individual contact per month with a probation officer. A probation office’s staff have a minimum of 70 clients, so it is impossible for them to meet that requirement. The central point that Napo made in the briefing was that, when one reviews approaches and puts down procedures, the reviews need to result in practical change on the ground, otherwise they are destined to be repeated without effective change.
I was very interested to hear the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who was a very effective Minister. He talked about his experience in that role. He also, interestingly, talked about the status of prisoners when they are in prison. I occasionally visit prisons, and I have visited Belmarsh on a couple of occasions. Belmarsh is a prison within a prison and there is undoubtedly status for the people on the inside prison; you can tell it from the tone of voice of the prison officers when they talk about the facility they are involved in managing. There is status to be gained through the way you are treated while in prison. I unfortunately know that to be true through friends of friends whose children have ended up in prison. There is a status to be gained within prison, which sometimes young men cannot have when they are outside prison.
I welcome the review of terrorism legislation by Mr Hall. I also note that it is Mr William Shawcross who has been appointed to review the Prevent programme, and I know he has extensive experience on this matter. The purpose of both these amendments is to tease out the progress and practical changes which the Government hope to make through reviewing the Prevent programme.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their amendments, which bring us to a very important set of issues. I discern that the Committee is united in believing that data is necessary in order that we might, as much as possible, develop and devise schemes by which deradicalisation can be accomplished. The Government do not think that a new strategy for rehabilitation and disengagement nor a review of the current delivery is beneficial at this time. However, to reassure noble Lords, I want to briefly set out the important work being done in prisons and probation to turn terrorist offenders away from extremism so that they can be released safely. The Government have a clear strategy for rehabilitation programmes for terrorist offenders. The important work in prison and probation here delivers against the Contest strategy, which was recently refreshed and published. Since then, significant work has been done to strengthen our approach to rehabilitation and disengagement of terrorism offenders. This strategy applies to all terrorism offenders, not only those who will receive the new serious terrorism sentence or be subject to the changes made by Part 1 of the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, explained, Amendments 11, 13 and 14 are intended to retain the current release provisions for under-21s sentenced to an extended determinate sentence for a serious terrorism offence. As has been mentioned, the Fishmonger’s Hall and Streatham attacks revealed the devastating consequences of releasing terrorist prisoners too early. In the Bill, we are changing the release arrangements for all offenders convicted of serious terrorism offences to ensure that the most dangerous and serious terrorist offenders serve their full custodial term, essentially for two reasons—first, to reflect the severity of their crimes but, secondly and perhaps more importantly, the intention to preserve lives.
The amendment seeks to draw a distinction in release policy between those aged over 21 and those younger. However, the Bill will introduce changes to release for both adult and youth offenders sentenced for serious terrorism offences. The extended determinate sentence already operates in the same way for adults and youths in every other aspect, and because the nature of the offending and the threat posed is so severe, these changes should align with that pre-existing approach.
For those aged under 18, instances of terrorist acts occur, although, thankfully, they are rare. I shall come back to that point later. Among those under-18s are some who are capable of extremely serious offending and present a real threat to the public. They are the dangerous few youth offenders that these provisions aim to capture. This measure, therefore, is about offenders who have been deemed dangerous by the court. That also means that, when sentencing the offender to an extended determinate sentence, the judge would have already taken into account age and other relevant factors.
In that context, I turn to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. As to the possibility of change, one has to remember that this measure is about public protection and applies only to the most serious young offenders who have committed terrorist offences that carry a maximum sentence of life and have been deemed dangerous by the court.
We are alert to the point on prisoner management and have carefully considered it. There are a number of programmes within prison to make sure that the sentences proposed here do not adversely affect prison management within the institution. Although, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, correctly said, the prisoner is likely to end his sentence as an adult, the fact is that even when sentenced at the time, the nature of the offences mandate the sort of sentence we now propose.
As to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on radicalisation in the prison system, there are, as my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart pointed out, a number of interventions in the prison system designed to prevent radicalisation. They are extensive. I will not go over the points that he made earlier but I repeat and endorse them. As I said—I said that I would come back to this point—the number of young offenders in this regard who have been radicalised in prison is extremely small. We are alive to the noble Lord’s point, but do not believe that that is a reason not to proceed in the way in which the Bill is currently drafted.
Finally, and only because I wish to reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that I read all his amendments with extreme care, these seem to be technically defective, given that the wording is to be added after the close of quotation marks and, on the face of it, would appear to apply only to new Section (2A)(iv), and affect only the provisions related to service personnel. However, I hope that I have approached his amendments on their merits. For those substantive reasons that I have set out, I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw or not move his amendments.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for the careful way in which he dealt with my amendments. I fully accept and am guilty of the technical error he identified. He was kind to deal with the merits of the three amendments. I very much hope that the Government will reflect on what I and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said because it is a considerable mistake to treat the under-21s the same as those who are 21 or over, particularly with regard to public safety. We will return to this matter at a later stage. With the leave of the Committee, I will withdraw my amendment.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This is a significant debate. There are two circumstances that one has to consider. First, when one is dealing with a terrorist prisoner who is over 21, should the Parole Board, in the circumstances set out in Clause 27, have the power to direct early release? As I understand it, the effect of the Bill is that in certain specified circumstances early release is not possible for over-21s. Although it is hard, we are dealing with very dangerous situations. I am not sure that we would object to that, but I would like it to be clear: are we dealing in this amendment with the possibility of early release? If we are, then apart from those who are under 21 at the date of conviction, we would not wish to change the provisions of the Bill.
The second situation is where what the Parole Board is being asked to do is to either determine or advise on what the release conditions should be for somebody who is going to be released in any event. In those circumstances it would seem sensible for the expert risk assessors to determine not whether they should be released but what the conditions should be. I would be interested in the Minister’s views on both situations I have posited: one where we are dealing with early release, the other where we are dealing with conditions only.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, in this amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, whose experience in this area is profound, proposes replacing Clause 27 with an amended set of provisions. Certainly as I read them, their effect—and to deal immediately with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—is to provide that all prisoners subject to an extended determinate sentence or a serious terrorism sentence would be eligible for relief by the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of their custodial term. In concept, therefore, this is similar to the intention tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, which he referred to— we will come to it shortly—as he opposes Clause 27 standing part of the Bill. With this amendment, the noble Baroness goes further: to replace Clause 27 with a new provision. If I may say respectfully, the noble Baroness is correct to identify that without Clause 27 there must be some replacement provision included to provide the legislative authority to release those sentenced to the new serious terrorism sentence.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) (V)
My Lords, we have had interesting debates on both this and the previous group. In closing the previous group, the Minister said that the proposed lack of involvement of the probation service in this particular group of prisoners was a consequence of the sentencing structure and was not a reflection on the Parole Board itself. I understand the point he has made, but what has been said repeatedly on both groups is that there is expertise in the Parole Board. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked whether there were two elements here. One is the possibility of early release, while the second is a point raised again just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the conditions of release for a prisoner who has served their whole term. I do not understand why that level of expertise should not be accessed when considering these types of prisoners.
I shall make a couple of other brief points which are different from those which have been made by other noble Lords. They arise from briefings that I have had from the trade unions. The Prison Officers’ Association believes that removing hope from prisoners puts its staff at risk. It is a point that the association makes repeatedly and is an important one to feed into this debate. The second point has been made by the National Association of Probation Officers—that is that the workload of probation staff working on the ground in prisons is so high that they are not managing to deliver to their required standards. They are being allocated around 70 prisoners each. I understand that the Minister has talked about these various programmes, and I know that we are talking about a very extreme group of prisoners. Nevertheless there is the practical working position of prison officers, probation staff and others in prisons to consider in trying to make these institutions work and to reduce recidivism when prisoners are released.
Even so, both the group of amendments we are speaking to now and the previous group illustrate the potential for changing the Bill to bring the Parole Board back in. That would reduce the potential risk to the public.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, the Committee will appreciate that there is a significant overlap between this and the previous group. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and indeed no other participant in this debate, will regard it as discourteous if on some occasions I take as read, as it were, points that I made in the previous debate. If the Committee finds it helpful, I propose to say a few words about each of the clauses and schedules to which objection has been taken and then come back to address some of the particular points raised by participants in the debate.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I apologise for any inconvenience caused by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and me not speaking in the last group, where our names were included in the speakers’ list in error.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, addresses the serious question of the impact on prisoners who have no prospect of being released early or of being released at all, something that the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, spoke about in an earlier group, as did my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
Some indication of the potential impact comes from a report in the Times, dated 20 January 2021, on inmates at the only remaining isolation unit for extremist prisoners in Her Majesty’s Prison Frankland. These isolation units were designed to keep the most dangerous ideological prisoners away from the general prison population so that they could not radicalise vulnerable inmates, as other noble Lords have mentioned in today’s debate. One of those units was mothballed before it was opened, another is empty, and the one at Frankland houses five prisoners out of a capacity of eight. There are currently about 200 terrorist prisoners in the UK.
According to the Times, a report by the independent monitoring board at the prison says that inmates in the unit have become more entrenched in their views, that they are refusing to co-operate or to engage in activities and programmes—except for the gym—and that they are distinguished from other prisoners by a lack of progression. They display antagonism and hostility to staff, with one of the prisoners responsible for a serious assault on a prison officer in the centre.
Locking people up with no incentive to behave or co-operate is likely to be counterproductive, and the Times report supports that assertion. We support the amendment.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would require the Government to report on whether the removal of Parole Board consideration of certain prisoners’ release impacts their behaviour in prison. We return once again to the quite proper desire of the Committee for objective data to allow proper evaluation of the usefulness of measures. The point is an important one, but the Government do not think that a review and a report such as the amendment proposes would be practical or beneficial at this time. I will set out why in brief terms.
To carry out such an exercise would require there to be clearly defined factors influencing prisoner behaviour in custody, against which one could evaluate the distinct impact of the prospect of Parole Board consideration in a sentence. Such an evaluation method is simply not feasible. It would be impossible to measure the behavioural effect of a prisoner sentenced under provisions in this Bill expecting a future Parole Board hearing, compared to a counterfactual in which the Parole Board would consider the case. The amendment goes further, implying that the removal of Parole Board referral for some cases could impact on prisoner behaviour more widely. This would be even more impracticable to assess.
The policy intent across these measures is clear; the sentences available to the courts for terrorism offences should be proportionate to the gravity of these crimes and provide confidence for victims and the public. In some cases, this will mean that terrorist offenders spend longer in custody before release. To provide some reassurance further to what we have given from the Dispatch Box this afternoon about what will be done in that additional time in custody, I will make two remarks.
First, there is the hard work of prison staff with prisoners in their care, whatever their sentence or release arrangements. As your Lordships will have gathered, we deploy specialist counterterrorism staff to work with terrorist offenders, and we are recruiting more of these officers than ever before through the counterterrorism step up programme.
Secondly, the new counterterrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre, which your Lordships have heard about from the Dispatch Box, will drive the development, innovation and evidence-based delivery of our rehabilitative interventions. The centre will transform our capability to intervene effectively with terrorist offenders, including those sentenced under this Bill and those who will be released automatically. The Bill will be scrutinised in the usual way, including a statutory review after three years.
I now turn to contributions from Members in this short, but hopefully valuable, debate. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb; she succeeded in doing from her Benches what I was unable to do from the Dispatch Box earlier in answer to a direct request, by identifying Mr Shawcross in his new post. I hope the noble Baroness will accept my further assurances as to the seriousness with which the Government take the points she raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, in an elegant allusion to the values of the town clock at Tredegar, drew our attention to the important work of the Parole Board. We on this side share the noble Lord’s high estimation of the Parole Board. I promise, on behalf of myself and my noble friend and colleague, that we will reflect carefully on the observations made by the noble Lord and by others in the course of debate.
Tuesday 9th February 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 129-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (4 Feb 2021)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 16 would introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to arrange for an independent review of the impact of Clauses 1 to 31 in the first year of the Act coming into force. I must respectfully disagree that this amendment is necessary. As the House has heard in Committee, the Government already have an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, and his remit covers the Bill. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to, he has announced his intention to conduct a review in prisons, which we welcome. He has already shown his expertise and engagement with the Bill in its entirety by providing detailed comments on its provisions—contributions that I know this House and those in the other place valued highly. We have every confidence that he will continue to provide valuable and important scrutiny following its enactment and through the prisons review which he will be undertaking. I therefore disagree that there is any need to appoint another reviewer to focus on just some of the Bill’s provisions.
That said, I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others indicated particular concerns by specifying the areas which such a review ought to consider. I shall take these points in turn, which I hope will assuage noble Lords’ concerns. First, there is the question of the impact of longer sentences—or a longer proportion of the sentence spent in custody—on prisoners’ rehabilitation as a result of the Bill. I start by reflecting that within a year of the Bill’s commencement, the impact of longer sentences will not yet be available for us to analyse. Importantly, however, the rationale behind longer custodial sentences for the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders is one of public protection, which is this Government’s primary concern. Ensuring that these offenders are incapacitated for longer meets this ambition. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke of the crucial importance of the hope of reform and rehabilitation, and we on this side share that hope. It is not that we consider that rehabilitation is unimportant; it will remain central to the work that is undertaken with terrorist offenders in custody.
Second is the question of the Government’s ability to protect other prisoners from radicalisation within the prison estate and the use of separation centres to this end. These issues are raised in reference to the Acheson review recommendations. I assure the noble Lord that most extremist prisoners are and should be managed in the mainstream prison population, with appropriate conditions and controls.
Across the entire prison estate, we have, and seek to maintain, robust case-management processes to manage the risks posed by extremists and to prevent them radicalising others, including co-located offenders. The Government, however, have designed separation centres to hold the most subversive extremist prisoners, preventing them spreading their malicious ideology to other prisoners. These centres were never intended for use with significant numbers of terrorist offenders, as this would undermine their main purpose: to separate the most dangerous from those most vulnerable to radicalisation. The Government use these centres only when it is necessary and, for reasons of national security, the Government do not confirm the numbers of prisoners in individual separation centres.
Finally, I note that the Bill will be subject to the usual practice of post-legislative scrutiny three years after the Bill receives Royal Assent, as is the case for all legislation. In light of this, and the existing position of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who already has authority to review this legislation, I do not believe this amendment to be necessary.
Amendment 34, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to lay a report within three years on the financial impact of the provisions of the Bill, specifically detailing the effects of extended sentences and extended licence periods; the expansion of the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime; the use of polygraph testing as a licence condition; and, as a result of these measures, any increased staffing resources required in Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I appreciate from the terms of the amendment that there is a concern to examine the cost of these measures when set against the impact assessment already published by the Government.
I make the point that numbers of terrorism offences are so low, comparatively speaking, that the impact of the measures the Bill puts in place is minimal. The impact of licence periods will depend on judicial discretion in setting them and, if the impact assessment carried out and published by the Government was inaccurate, that would be shown up by the process of post-legislative scrutiny. I cite to the Committee a number of figures to inform what I have just said. On 31 December 2020, there were 78,180 in the prison population. The impact assessment estimates the impact of the measures will be around 50 additional cases at any one time. On 30 September 2020, there were 222,657 cases on the probation caseload. The Bill’s impact assessment estimates that the impact of the measures will be around 50 additional case at any one time. The additional polygraph testing as a licence condition is estimated to affect fewer than 150 offenders at any one time, at a cost of about £400,000 annually in steady state.
Therefore, our impact assessment and the figures that support it estimate that the measures in the Bill will have a minimal impact on the prison population and the probation caseload of fewer than 50 additional cases at any one time. This impact, though small, will build up gradually over time and so will not be felt immediately. We are therefore confident that these changes will not have a substantial financial impact on Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that the Government are already providing funding to support our legislative changes: an increase of £90 million in funding for counterterrorism policing this year; an increase in the resources dedicated to training front-line prison and probation staff through the counterterrorism step-up programme; and an immediate £500,000 package for the Victims of Terrorism Unit. The Government will continue to publish data on prison population and probation caseloads, and we will carry out an internal review on polygraph testing. I do not believe that a legislative commitment is required or necessary to review the financial impact of these measures.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, spoke also to Amendment 36, which would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to lay a report on the potential impact of the Bill’s provisions on prison capacity. Again, I respectfully draw his attention to the impact assessment the Government published alongside the Bill, which has already made that assessment. The estimates I have already spoken of are based on recent trends in overall numbers of terrorist offenders being convicted. As the cohort of offenders affected by the Bill is small, these changes will have only a minor impact on prison capacity. We will always provide places, of course, for those sentenced to custody.
In addition to the impact assessment, as I have said, the Government routinely publish data on prison population statistics. I do not believe that a legislative commitment will provide any greater opportunity for scrutiny in this respect. It is worth underlining that the Government’s ambitious programme of improvement in this area—the counterterrorism step-up programme—will put more specialist staff in prisons, working directly with prisoners on rehabilitation, as well as providing intelligence and monitoring of such prisoners. This will make our prisons, and ultimately our streets, safer, an ambition that I am sure noble Lords will support. I know that that is a matter of agreement across the Committee. This programme will be important to ensure that prisons can manage any increased demand from terrorists serving longer in prisons in the near future. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to legislate for a further assessment of the potential impact of these measures.
The noble Lord spoke also to Amendment 38, which would insert a new clause placing a statutory requirement on the Government to review all measures in the Bill that relate to Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive. This review would be required annually and to be published as a report and laid before Parliament. First, I assure him that in developing the Bill, despite the fact that terrorism is a reserved matter, we have carefully considered Northern Ireland’s unique history with terrorism and taken great care not to tamper with provisions enshrined in the Belfast agreement and, particularly, the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. Furthermore, when we have found concessions viable, we have made them, as we demonstrated through our removal of clauses providing for polygraph testing in licensed conditions, following assurances from the Northern Ireland Executive that they are satisfied that the legislative power to use such measures exists already. That said, I remain of the view that we need to take a robust approach to terrorist offending wherever it occurs in the United Kingdom and whatever ideology it aligns itself to. We must avoid a two-tier approach to the sentencing and release of terrorists across the United Kingdom.
The most recent data shows that in 2019-20, there were just 14 convictions for terrorism-related offending in Northern Ireland, and just six in the previous year. With numbers at that level, I submit that there will be too little information on which to base an annual review. The same amendment was raised in the other place, and I respectfully remind the noble Lord that the opportunity already exists for the House to review the Bill’s impact in the relevant committee three years after it receives Royal Assent, through the post-legislative scrutiny process. A review clause of this nature is therefore not required. Reviewing the impact of a Bill after three years will provide a more meaningful opportunity for review. For these reasons, I am not persuaded of the benefit of an annual review of the Bill’s measures in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 39 would insert a new clause placing a statutory requirement on the Government to report on the impact of the provisions in the Act on the National Probation Service 18 months after its enactment. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that we have considered fully the impact on the National Probation Service of the measures in this Bill, which we consider to be low. We set out the impact in full in the published impact assessment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendment at page 29, line 14 are consequential on the removal of Clause 35.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. He has covered much of the area with which I am concerned in these sensible probing amendments. The next amendment, Amendment 20, which talks about piloting polygraph tests in this area, deals in effect with the same concerns.
My understanding of the position that the Government are advancing is that we are now concerned only with England and Wales because they deleted the Scotland and Northern Ireland provision that was there before. In effect, they are applying the principles in the Offender Management Act 2007 on polygraph tests. Therefore, the first question is: should one put a polygraph condition into the licence conditions of a terrorist offender? As I understand it, a polygraph condition is that the offender has to agree, if asked, to a polygraph. Will it be automatic that such a condition will be imposed for terrorist offenders? What will be the basis on which such conditions will be imposed?
We on this side are very keen that the authorities should have every reasonable tool that they can to try to prevent terrorist offenders, including those who are released on licence. I am keen to probe whether this particular provision contributes to that. As I understand it from the Government’s proposal, the purpose of the polygraph sessions that will be included in the licence condition will be only to monitor the offender’s compliance with the other conditions of his licence or improve the way in which he is managed during his release on licence.
In relation to the first of those two—monitoring compliance with the other conditions of his licence—does that mean that it will be used to see whether he is in fact complying? If he fails a polygraph test, could that be a basis for recalling him to prison on the basis that he has failed to comply with the other conditions of his licence? If it is the Government’s intention not just to rely on the failure of a polygraph test before recalling an offender to prison, where is that reflected in the statute or in the Bill?
In addition to those questions, to what extent is the Minister worried that, if somebody passed a polygraph test, it would lead the authorities not to make further investigations about an offender’s possible breaches of compliance of the conditions of his licence? Additionally, in relation to the second purpose of polygraph testing—namely, to improve the way in which he is managed during his release on licence—can the Minister give us some examples of what that would mean in practice?
Can I deal with the legal use of the answers to polygraph tests? Section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007—this has already been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—says that evidence of
“any statement made by the released person while participating in a polygraph session; and any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination”
cannot be used against that released person for any offence. In answer to my question, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, can the Minister confirm whether that means that those two things can be used in relation to proceedings against somebody else? It would appear from Section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007 that they could be. Can they be used on their own for recall proceedings, or are recall proceedings simply an administrative act—in which case, the question of whether they can be relied on alone to justify a recall arises?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, in responding to the amendment and the various points put to me, I will bear in mind and seek to avoid falling into the trap of being one of those “pesky lawyers” that, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded us, still exist.
In that regard, let me turn to the substance of the amendments, particularly Amendment 19 put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This amendment seeks to amend Section 30 of the Offender Management Act, which relates to the use of polygraph evidence in criminal proceedings. I understand that the noble Baroness and others may have concerns that evidence gathered from the conduct of polygraph examinations could be used against a third party in a criminal trial. I know that we covered this yesterday in the Domestic Abuse Bill, but I want to take a moment to record my thanks to those in my department who arranged the learning session for a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I understand that they found it helpful and informative, which perhaps indicates that those sessions could be used more often. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Committee that it is neither the intention nor the effect of the polygraph testing provisions of the Bill that they will be used in criminal proceedings against third parties.
In response to the specific point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, we do not harbour any desire to go further than the provisions in the Bill.
Polygraph examinations are now well established as a risk management tool in England and Wales. They have been used successfully, as the Committee has heard, with sex offenders since 2013. In the context of terrorist offenders, which I acknowledge represents a different cohort, they are—if I can put it this way—an additional tool in the toolbox. They will be used, to respond to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so as part of the assessment of the risk offenders pose in the community while on licence and how that risk can best be managed.
As I made clear to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, yesterday in the Committee sitting on the Domestic Abuse Bill, Section 30 of the Offender Management Act makes clear that
“any statement made by the released person while participating in a polygraph session; and any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination”
may not be used in criminal proceedings in which that person is a defendant. While that section does not expressly provide for such information to be precluded from use against others in criminal proceedings, which is what this amendment seeks to achieve, I do not believe the amendment to be necessary.
This is because, although there may be circumstances where information obtained through the polygraph test relating to a third party can be passed from probation to the police to make further investigations, the polygraph material would not be suitable for use as evidence in its own right against a third party. Any allegation against a third party would ultimately need to be tested in court. The court would have to consider, among other things, whether the polygraph evidence was admissible in such other criminal proceedings and the effect of the hearsay rule. While that would ultimately be a matter for the judge in the particular case, noble Lords will appreciate the great difficulties that would be presented by the hearsay rule.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that sex cases are different from terrorism cases. He is of course right, but he was also right to say that what is presented by terrorism cases is a difficult and challenging task. That is why, to use my earlier metaphor, this is another tool in the toolbox which we would like the services to have available to them. In that regard, I can assure Members of the Committee that polygraph testing will not replace any other risk assessment tools or measures, it is an additional source of information that would otherwise not be available. On that basis, I would invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw the amendment as it is unnecessary.
I turn now to Amendments 19A and 19B, which are tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The amendment to Clause 35 would require regulations relating to the conduct of polygraph examinations to be subject to the affirmative procedure. Perhaps I may remind the Committee that we have already tabled our intention to remove Clause 35 from the Bill, alongside Clauses 33 and 34 dealing with the introduction of polygraph testing as a licence condition in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as part of our efforts to secure legislative consent from each Administration. We covered this in the first sitting of the Committee. It does not reflect a change in policy for England and Wales. As I have said, we firmly believe that polygraph testing is an additional and useful tool.
In that regard, polygraph examinations will be used to monitor compliance with licence conditions based on what has happened and will not ask about future behaviour. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who put to the Committee an example of the type of questions that might be asked. She was right to frame those questions in the past tense. A polygraph examiner might ask, for example, “Did you enter those premises?”, if that was something which had been prohibited by the licence conditions. The question would not be, “Are you going to enter the premises next week?” The questions look at what has happened and past behaviour rather than future intent. They are not used as a way of trying to catch offenders out, but as a measure to identify the extent to which the person on licence is complying with the conditions of the licence.
Although I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded the Committee, that giving evidence in court can be a stressful experience, it was interesting to note that he pointed out that we have provided special measures for vulnerable witnesses in the Domestic Abuse Bill. As I understood it, he used that as an example of a case where we recognise that giving evidence can be stressful. Of course, we have also provided for the polygraph examination of the perpetrators of domestic abuse in that Bill. Just as it is in the Domestic Abuse Bill, it is also here; it is an additional tool in our toolbox.
I come to a question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I think was repeated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton: if a person who is subject to a polygraph examination “fails” a question, can they be recalled immediately? There are two parts to the answer and let me give both. First, what do we mean by “failing”? We use the term as a form of shorthand, and the Government factsheets use it because they are written in what we hope is plain English so that members of the public can understand them, but it is not the correct professional term. The correct terminology that is used by examiners in reports is whether there is a significant response or no significant response. That more nuanced term makes it clear that we are not dealing with a question of passing or failing here; rather it is about whether the examination results indicate that the response has been truthful or not.
That is why, coming to the second part of the question, we do not recall offenders to custody on a significant response in itself. In answer to the question put to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that is not in the Bill, but it is firm policy. Therefore, “failure”, a term that the Committee will now appreciate is a form of shorthand, does not by itself or by default trigger a recall. Where it is safe to do so—for example, with the addition of new licence conditions—the offender can continue to be managed in the community. However, if a disclosure is made which indicates that the risk has escalated beyond the point where the offender can be managed safely in the community, they can be recalled to custody.
Lord Robathan (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for not adding my name, which I put down to speak but not on a particular group. Yet again, I find myself as the only person taking part in the debate who is not a lawyer. I shall come back to that later.
In layman’s terms, I joined the Zoom call on polygraph testing last week, to which other noble Lords referred, and it was extremely useful. I thank Heather Sutton from the probation service, Professor Don Grubin and others for laying it on because it explained to me what polygraph testing is. They explained straightaway that a polygraph is not a lie detector but an additional tool to enhance the safe and effective risk management of offenders and could not be used as evidence.
I did, in fact, ask why sex offending was used as the only precedent for using polygraphs on terrorists. I think that I sort of understood the response, which was that it was a question of denial. That is what they sought to find out. It was a very useful teach-in session.
That is why I am slightly puzzled that we are discussing these amendments. As I said, I am not a lawyer. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, reminded us that law can be a gift that keeps on giving. We were reminded of that only at the weekend. We heard from three Liberal Democrats. I think they all said—the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, certainly did—that you cannot use a polygraph test as evidence. If you cannot use it as evidence against the specific person against whom you have done the test, surely by implication it cannot be used as evidence against somebody else. My noble friend the Minister specifically pointed to hearsay. It seems that we are slightly arguing about angels on the head of a needle: it will not be used, so why on earth are we arguing about it? This was presented as a probing amendment, but it seems to be probing something that we do not really need to probe
The point of polygraph testing is that, as an additional tool, we would get away from the case of Usman Khan at Fishmongers’ Hall, who had convinced his mentor, Jack Merritt, that he was de-radicalised. Jack Merritt believed in him and his redemption, and Usman Khan killed him. Surely we should use these additional tools if they have any substance or credibility. From what we heard in the teach-in last week, polygraph testing has some credibility.
Let us please back the use of an additional tool until proved otherwise, because frankly we are dealing with something that I guess probably none of us in this Chamber or on this call understand. We do not understand why somebody would get into an aeroplane, train for months in the United States and then fly that aeroplane into the twin towers. We do not understand suicide bombers. We do not understand the radicalisation that takes place in these people, so surely we should give the Government every tool they can possibly have. I certainly back them on this.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the question put to me by my noble friend. As I said, that is precisely what the Government seek to do: to provide an additional tool for the management of these offenders. The point he made regarding deradicalisation is, if I may say so, very perceptive. It is a difficult part of the overall structure we are putting in place in the Bill, as we have in other legislation.
I am delighted to hear that my noble friend found the teach-in session helpful. I am particularly grateful to him for putting on record the names of the people who presented it. I know that they put a lot of work into putting it together.
The only point I would respectfully disagree with my noble friend on is one that I had cause to point out to another Member of your Lordships’ House—I think last week. One must really stop apologising for not being a lawyer. I think my noble friend did it twice. I pointed out last week that what is regarded as a cause for apology in this House is generally regarded as a badge of honour everywhere else. The question put to me by my noble friend exemplifies how this is a matter for lawyers and non-lawyers.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, at the briefing by the MoJ, I was one of those who volunteered—at some point when we are able to travel again—to undergo a test, because I would like to experience what it is like. I sound a note of caution about the use of private—sometimes confidential but certainly private—sessions. They are terrific and helpful, but only so far; I do not believe that they can take the place of public debate. I could respond at some length to the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, but it would be outside the scope of the amendment. The purpose of scrutiny and its place in the development of legislation mean that it must be undertaken in public. I do not mean to sound too pompous in saying that, but it is something that I believe very profoundly.
The Minister apologised for being a pesky lawyer, but I think that being a pesky lawyer or an activist lawyer is a badge of honour. I disagreed with the comment of my noble friend Lord Thomas that people would not want to apply polygraphs in criminal proceedings. I can imagine that there are a lot of situations when people in court think that they would very much like to apply a polygraph to some witnesses—but that is by the by. I have told myself that I would not take up too much time with this response, because we have a lot of amendments to get through.
Inevitably, perhaps, this turned into a more general debate. On the specific amendment, we are told that it is unnecessary, and that what one might take—I cannot think of the right term— from a polygraph would be unsuitable for use in court, because it would be hearsay. I shall have a look at that after today, but I think that there is a little bit of circularity in all that. Certainly, in the real world, the questions that might be asked would, I am sure, provide material for the police, if not the prosecution—but that is a common-sense response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I wish either that this group had been grouped with the previous group or that I had spoken in the previous group, as we seem to be going over the same ground. Can I also push my luck, at the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, as an out and proud non-lawyer and wonder out loud whether lawyers feel somewhat threatened that there might be a machine more able to tease out whether someone is telling the truth or not, or even to tease out a disclosure, than a lawyer? I do not believe lawyers need to worry. I feel this group and the previous one turned into an extension of the teach-in. But I shall press on.
Amendment 20, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to which my noble friend has added her name, calls for a review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders based on a pilot scheme. I take a slightly different view to my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Marks, probably because they are pure Liberal Democrats, unlike me, who am contaminated by 30 years’ experience as a police officer.
Yesterday, in discussion on the use of polygraph testing in the Domestic Abuse Bill, the Minister talked about how polygraph tests were used. I join other noble Lords in saying how helpful the teach-in on polygraph testing provided by the Ministry of Justice was, and I thank the ministry for it. In that presentation, if I recall correctly, we were told that the tests are 80% to 90% accurate, on the basis of tests carried out on sex offenders. The tests measure physiological changes that occur if someone is trying to think of a wrong answer about an experience they have had in the past. People usually instinctively think of the truthful answer before they offer a dishonest alternative, and this produces physiological changes that the tests pick up. The evidence suggests a dishonest response cannot be used in court, and it is not used to recall someone to prison, but it might prompt further investigation by the police. Failing the test is not a replacement for any other form of risk assessment.
From the notes I made at the time, which take me back to giving evidence in court as a police officer, polygraph tests also prompt disclosures that might not otherwise occur. If such a disclosure indicates the subject has breached their licence conditions or is a threat to the public, this can result in prison recall. In short, disclosures can result in immediate sanction, but failing the test can only lead to further investigation.
Although polygraph tests have been used on a large number of sex offenders and have, therefore, been thoroughly evaluated, it will be more difficult, even with a pilot, to evaluate use with terrorists, as there are far fewer of them. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford mentioned the right to silence, recalling what we were told in the teach-in. The difference here is that these are convicted offenders on licence, who have no right to silence. However, the science is the same whether we are dealing with sex offenders or terrorists, and polygraph tests are useful where there is a pattern of behaviour rather than a single act. It is, therefore, anticipated that their use in terrorism cases will be similarly effective. There has already been considerable experience of using polygraph tests and evaluating the results, somewhat at odds with the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. But in agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, I think that it is true to say there has been very limited, if any, experience of using polygraph tests in connection with terrorism offences.
I feel sure that the Government will use polygraph testing with terrorists and, as we will hear in a later group, those subject to TPIMs, on a trial basis, as they intend to do in relation to domestic abuse. But the opportunities to evaluate their effectiveness with terrorists will be more limited, because, as I said, the numbers are considerably smaller. I am sure the Minister will say whether I got that right.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, on the face of it the purpose of this amendment, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is to provide for a pilot of polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in the UK and for a report to be prepared and laid with a recommendation on commencement before the provisions are commenced. I appreciate, however, that the debate has gone a little broader than that, and I will try to respond in my remarks to all the points put to me. I should say at the outset that I am impressed by the note-taking ability of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has obviously not diminished with time. I hope that the notes which he took are consistent with not only what he was told at the meeting, as I am sure they are, but with what I said on the previous group and what I am going to say on this group as well.
Polygraph examinations have been used successfully in the management of sexual offenders by the National Probation Service since 2013, following an initial pilot. Offenders involved in the pilot stated that, although they did not like being tested, for many it helped them modify their behaviour and comply with other licence conditions. While I therefore respectfully agree with the comments of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, that we are on a learning curve, we are in fact someway up the curve, if I may put it in those terms. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was right to remind us of Clause 35(1), which provides for regulations in this context. The breathalyser is a good example, as put before the Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, of how we must always in the criminal justice field avoid being shy of using technology where it is available. The question is how it is to be used; it is in that context that I come to the questions put to me by the Members of the Committee.
Having put that provision in place for sexual offenders, the independent evaluation of mandatory testing on sexual offenders carried out by the University of Kent produced extremely positive results. As the Committee is aware, we have since rolled out polygraph testing in that context. We must therefore be wary of two things. First, we must be wary of the trap of saying that because something might or might not be used in “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, it should form no part of the criminal justice system. “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, which I think has now stopped, can look out for itself. My concern is to ensure that we have proper provisions for polygraph testing in the criminal justice system.
The second thing we must be careful of, if I may respectfully say so, is not to fall into the trap of thinking that anything which comes from the United States of America is inherently suspect in the criminal justice field. I would gently point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the American Polygraph Association’s standards are those of an international professional association for polygraph examiners. That association carries out research and provides accredited training for examiners. It also provides mandatory professional development training, which all examiners must complete every two years to maintain their accreditation. Its standards are used by examiners across the world, and the Government want to ensure that those standards are maintained for examinations conducted on terrorist offenders.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendments at page 94, line 15, page 94, line 29 and page 94, line 41 are consequential on the removal of Clause 33.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(b) in paragraph (a), for “that Act” substitute “the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a further consequential amendment to section 23A of the Terrorism Act 2000 needed as a result of Clause 1 of the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 42 to 65 inclusive and to Amendments 69, 71, 72, 74 and 76. I make four very short points. First, the hour is late and getting later. Secondly, these are all technical and consequential amendments. Thirdly, we have placed an explanatory note for each of them, which I am sure Members of the Committee will have looked at. Fourthly, I propose to set out in a letter, which I shall place in the Library, a more detailed analysis of the admittedly somewhat arcane and, in many cases, technical and consequential nature of these amendments. I hope that in those circumstances, I can draw my remarks to a close there. Obviously, if noble Lords have specific questions, I will attempt to answer them now, but otherwise, I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, since requests to speak after the Minister are delivered to the Deputy Chairman of Committees by forked stick, perhaps I might comment on the earlier group concerning the review. Mr William Shawcross’s report on compensation for Libyan-backed terrorist atrocities in Northern Ireland was discussed on Monday. It was received by the Government last May but not published, as we have discussed. I hope that any review or report in the field that we have been discussing will not similarly be kept clutched to the Government’s bosom.
I have considered the government amendments to this schedule, and I am satisfied that they are consequential to amendments to legislation made necessary by this Bill and do not contain in themselves any questions of principle. I would not be surprised, given the complexity of the Bill, if other amendments emerged in the course of time.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
The only amendment I would like to mention is Amendment 60, which amends Section 250 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 so that, according to the explanatory statement,
“the Parole Board will set the licence conditions for all prisoners to whom section 247A of that Act applies (restricted eligibility for early release) whose release is directed by the Board.”
Is this dealing with licence conditions where there is no right to early release or with licence conditions where there is a right to early release? If so, what is the effect of the amendment? It is the only amendment in this group that looked as if it might be doing something substantive. If the Minister would like to write to me, I will quite understand.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick. In response to the specific point put to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in one sentence, the change is needed to ensure that there was clarity over the authority for setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders, whether serving standard, determinate, extended or other sentences. I shall include an explanation of the amendment in my letter. I hope that satisfies him; if he wants any further information, I would of course be happy to provide it.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
2A_ In section 44(2)(e) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (provisions subject to review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation), for “Schedule 1” substitute “Schedules A1 and 1”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amends the list of terrorism legislation which is subject to review by the independent reviewer to include the new Schedule A1 inserted into the Sentencing Code by Schedule 1 to the Bill.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(1A) In section 1(3A) (release of short-term, long-term and life prisoners serving concurrent sentences), for “section 1A” substitute “sections 1A and 1B”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of new section 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 made by the amendment at page 123, line 6.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
In moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I shall speak also to Amendments 67 and 70, also in his name. These amendments are intended to modify Scottish provisions on sentencing with the intention of providing that, throughout the United Kingdom, terrorist offenders serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences. They are made necessary by an aspect of Scottish sentencing practice that does not appear elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
The three amendments, taken together, make provision for technical sentence calculation adjustment. They clarify how terrorism sentences will operate when served consecutively with non-terrorism sentences. The amendments come at the end of a positive engagement with the devolved Government; as a result of that engagement, the Scottish Government have now tabled a legislative consent Motion in respect of this Bill.
As I said in the course of these brief remarks, the amendments are technical in nature and I shall be happy to place detail of them and their implications in a letter in the Library of this House. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for moving these amendments and for pronouncing “Tredegar” correctly. I am sure that the noble Lord who hails from, or has a connection with, Tredegar, will be happy with his pronunciation as well. I have looked at these Scottish provisions. I agree that they are technical, and I really have nothing to add.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I too am grateful to the four Ministers for the care and good humour with which they have dealt with it all. Of the three amendments, Amendment 66 looks entirely technical. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, says, Amendment 67 deals with a situation where you have a non-terrorist sentence and then, consecutively, before or after, a terrorist sentence. I cannot work out how you deal with that situation for the purposes of licences as a result of this amendment. Hopefully, that will be explained to us—for reasons that may be entirely my fault, it is not entirely clear to me from the wording of the amendment. As I understand it, Amendment 70 again deals with the position of consecutive sentences; and again, the effect of that is not entirely clear to me. It might be significant, because what we are dealing with are very long sentences. So I hope that the noble and learned Lord will explain this when he comes to write his letter to us. I am very much obliged.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I will undertake to provide that explanation on what are, as all the speakers who have kindly commented on the provisions have remarked, matters of a technical nature.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(3) In the heading of section 1A, after “to” insert “certain”.(3A) After section 1A insert— “1B Prisoners serving consecutive sentences including at least one terrorism sentence(1) This section applies where—(a) a prisoner has been sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment which are to be served consecutively on each other,(b) one or more of the sentences (the “terrorism sentence”) was imposed in respect of an offence within section 1AB(2), and(c) the sentences were imposed on the same occasion or, where they were imposed on different occasions, the prisoner has not been released under this Part at any time during the period beginning with the first and ending with the last of those occasions.(2) If the prisoner is serving a terrorism sentence and a sentence imposed in respect of an offence that is not within section 1AB(2) (a “non-terrorism sentence”), the terrorism sentence is to be served (or, where subsection (7) applies, treated as being served) after the non-terrorism sentence irrespective of when the sentences were imposed.(3) Where subsection (2) applies, the prisoner is to be taken to begin serving the custodial part of the terrorism sentence (or first such sentence) as soon as the prisoner has served the custodial part of the non-terrorism sentence.(4) If (but for this section) the prisoner would have been released on licence under this Part in respect of a non-terrorism sentence, the period during which the prisoner would have been on licence under this Part is to be served concurrently with the custodial part of the terrorism sentence.(5) The prisoner may not be released under this Part in respect of the terrorism sentence unless and until the prisoner has served the aggregate of—(a) if the prisoner is serving a non-terrorism sentence, the custodial part of the sentence, and(b) the custodial part of each terrorism sentence that the prisoner is serving.(6) Subsection (7) applies where—(a) a non-terrorism sentence is imposed on the prisoner (the “new sentence”), and(b) the prisoner has already served part of the custodial part of a terrorism sentence (the “served part”).(7) The prisoner is to be treated as having served—(a) where the served part is less than the custodial part of the new sentence, such part of the custodial part of the new sentence as is equal to the served part,(b) where the served part is equal to the custodial part of the new sentence, the custodial part of the new sentence,(c) where the served part exceeds the custodial part of the new sentence—(i) the custodial part of the new sentence, and(ii) so much of the custodial part of the terrorism sentence as is equal to the amount by which the served part exceeds the custodial part of the new sentence.(8) Nothing in this Part requires—(a) the Scottish Ministers to release the prisoner in respect of any of the terms of imprisonment unless and until they are required to release the prisoner in respect of each of the other terms of imprisonment,(b) the Scottish Ministers or the Parole Board to consider the prisoner’s release in respect of any of the terms of imprisonment unless and until the Ministers are or the Board is required to consider the prisoner’s release, or the Ministers are required to release the prisoner, in respect of each of the other terms. (9) If the prisoner is released on licence under this Part the prisoner is to be on licence, on and after the release, until the prisoner would, but for the release, have served a term equal in length to the aggregate length of the term of imprisonment of any non-terrorism sentence and the term or, as the case may be, terms of imprisonment for the terrorism sentence or sentences less the period mentioned in subsection (10).(10) The period is—(a) any period served concurrently in accordance with subsection (4), and(b) if (but for this section) the prisoner would have been released unconditionally under section 1(1) in respect of a non-terrorism sentence, the period equal to one-half of the term of that sentence.(11) Where a prisoner to which this section applies is released on licence under this Part (other than a licence under section 3AA), the release is to be on a single licence which is to be subject to such conditions as may be specified or required by this Part in relation to all the sentences in respect of which the prisoner has been so released.(12) In this section “custodial part”, in relation to a term of imprisonment means a period equal to the part of the term that (but for this section) the prisoner would be required to serve before—(a) the Scottish Ministers are required to release the prisoner under this Part, or(b) the Parole Board is first entitled under this Part to make a recommendation that the prisoner be released on licence under this Part.(13) In this section—(a) references to a non-terrorism sentence include references to two or more such sentences that are treated as a single term by virtue of section 27(5) (whether imposed before, after or both before and after a terrorism sentence), and(b) where subsection (7) applies, the references in that subsection to the “custodial part of the new sentence” include references to the custodial part of the single term.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts new section 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. New section 1B makes provision where a prisoner is serving consecutive sentences including at least one terrorism sentence to which section 1AB of the 1993 Act applies, including provision consequential on the amendment of section 27 of the 1993 Act made by the amendment at page 125, line 15.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(i) Part 3 of that Schedule, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(hb);(ia) Part 4 of that Schedule;”Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 44, line 11.
Wednesday 3rd March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 169-I Marshalled list for Report - (26 Feb 2021)
14:00 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 1 - Ayes: 126 / Noes: 281 - Amendment 1 disagreed.
16:58 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 16 - Ayes: 316 / Noes: 267 - Amendment 16 agreed.
17:13 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 18 - Ayes: 103 / Noes: 300 - Amendment 18 disagreed.
17:51 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 21 - Ayes: 106 / Noes: 292 - Amendment 21 disagreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I understand that the intent of this amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to do two things: first, to introduce a role for the Parole Board where, otherwise, the changes in the Bill would make its role superfluous; and, secondly and at the same time, not to reintroduce eligibility for early discretionary release for this cohort.
I will begin by outlining briefly the effect of the amendment in a little more detail. It would replace Clause 27, which restricts early release for offenders convicted of a serious terrorism offence—that is, those listed in Schedule 2 to the Bill—who receive an extended determinate sentence, or EDS, or a new serious terrorism sentence so that they instead serve the full custodial term of their sentence. In its place, the amendment would insert a provision that would change the release provision for all terrorist offenders sentenced to an EDS. Further, and while I understand that this may not be the noble Lord’s intent, this amendment would also apply to those currently serving an EDS for a terrorist offence.
The replacement release provision in the noble Lord’s amendment would continue to restrict early release, but there is an important difference. At the end of the custodial term, the scheme set out in the amendment would instead refer the offender to the Parole Board. The Parole Board would then determine whether the offender represents a grave risk to the public and whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender continues to be imprisoned. Under the scheme in the amendment, this consideration would continue annually until release was granted, or to the end of the extended licence period, when the offender would then be released, unconditionally, into the community. The effect would therefore be that, if release were not granted until the end of the extended licence period, there would be a cliff edge and the offender would at that point be released unconditionally into the community. There would be no period of supervision and reintegration. For the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that is a matter of concern.
I have carefully considered the proposed changes, especially as they arise from an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope I may be permitted to say that contributions from him on this subject always merit the most careful consideration, and I can assure both him and the House that I have done so in this case. None the less, having undertaken that careful consideration, I must set out the Government’s view that the changes to the release provisions for the EDS, as set out in the amendment, would be contrary to safeguards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law governing sentencing and release. That case law is usefully summarised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this country in Brown v Parole Board for Scotland—we seem to be referring to Scottish cases everywhere today. It is reported at [2017] UKSC 69, in particular the discussions between paragraphs 49 and 55. While every decision of the Supreme Court is obviously a decision of a strong court, that court, for which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, spoke, contained three former and current Presidents of the Supreme Court.
The reason the proposal would be contrary to the case law is that the EDS comprises two distinct parts. The first is a punitive component—namely, the custodial term—imposed for the length a judge considers commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. The second is a separate preventive element—namely, the extended licence—imposed to protect the public from the danger posed by other, future, yet to be determined serious offending. To that extent, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who was right to draw attention to the question of serious risk to the public. That is what the second part of the EDS does.
If the Government were to detain EDS prisoners into their extended licence period for reasons related to their initial offending, that detention would be contrary to the nature and intended purpose of the community supervision component of the sentence, and contrary to the court’s order imposing the EDS. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, for the Supreme Court, put it in the Brown case,
“the purpose of detention during the extension period is materially different from that of a determinate sentence.”
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that this amendment would require further development, either in the form of a new sentence or by further alteration to the existing EDS regime. I am grateful for that acceptance. However, I must state that the Government would not support such a proposal, because there is no need for such a new sentence. The EDS and the new serious terrorism sentence are deliberately structured to do two things: to provide punishment and, separately, to aid public protection and reintegration through the licence period. We have no desire to change this overall approach or, to use the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to change the architecture.
For those who are not dangerous, the sentence for offenders of particular concern sufficiently caters for release with a role for the Parole Board and yet without the risk of an unsupervised cliff edge, which the amendment would introduce. I understand, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, that the amendment is born of a desire to introduce a role for the Parole Board. But there is no role for the Parole Board here because it is not necessary. There is no early release and no parole so, accordingly, there is no role for the Parole Board. That is, therefore, my answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who asked why there is no role for the Parole Board. It is for the reasons I have just given. While I suspect that my answer may not leave him persuaded, I hope it means that he is no longer perplexed.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we are saying that the alternative can do a better job than the Parole Board. I accept that, as the premise behind that question would admit, some Peers consider the Parole Board the only qualified body to deal with the specialised nature of setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders. But in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I must respectfully reject that approach. The reason the Parole Board is responsible for setting licence conditions when it directs the prisoner’s release is that that is part and parcel of the Parole Board’s decision that the offender can be safely released and managed in the community. The Parole Board decides that the offender can be released and, as part of that, decides the licence conditions that will govern such release.
However, with an EDS for a serious terrorism offence and the serious terrorism sentence, there is no provision for early release before the end of the custodial period. The corollary of that proposition is that release at the end of the custodial period is automatic. Where release is automatic, there is no reason why the Parole Board specifically should consider licence conditions.
Furthermore, offenders will be subject to management under MAPPA—Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—through which the police and the probation and prison services work with other agencies to manage the risks posed by offenders living in the community in order to protect the public. In cases under the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—and TACT-connected cases, that involves the probation service, the releasing prison, counterterrorism police, security services, the Joint Extremism Unit of HMPPS, and social services.
With the creation of the national security division of the National Probation Service, we will see even greater specialism in making such recommendations. That ensures that professionals with a detailed knowledge of the offender are involved in identifying the licence conditions which are necessary and appropriate. The key point is that that happens regardless of whether the final decision-maker on setting the licence is the Parole Board or HMPPS—the governor. While ultimately the board or the governor makes the decision, that decision is always directly informed by those with intelligence of and expertise in managing the offender. I therefore assure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the process is no less rigorous and the outcomes are no different.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked a specific question about our discussions with the Parole Board. We have shared the Bill with the Parole Board and discussed its implications with it, but there has not been a formal consultation, if that is what the noble Lord was driving at in his question.
For those reasons, which I hope I have explained clearly and fairly, I remain of the view that there is no role for the Parole Board where there is no consideration of early release. That point, combined with the issues I have explained around the legality of this amendment from an ECHR standpoint, leads me to consider this amendment unnecessary. I therefore respectfully urge the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw it. Of course, I am happy to continue our conversations with him about this matter, as I am sure we will continue to benefit from an exchange of views about other matters in the Bill also.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have spoken in this debate, to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their broad support for what I have suggested, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his detailed response.
When I was at school, I had a teacher who taught us about different forms of argument, one of which is entitled “argumentum ad maiorem”—argument using a greater authority. In those days, I suppose it was something like “Because Sir Winston Churchill said something, it must be right.” The Minister’s argumentum ad maiorem was about the case of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland, which, it will not surprise your Lordships to know, I have read.
I do not propose to embark on and bore your Lordships with a legal moot about that case. I say simply that I respectfully do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, despite his eminence as a lawyer, about the effect of that case on my proposal. I believe that my proposal, because of the change of the architecture that I suggested, including the fact that the sentencing judge would clearly refer to the potential extension provisions at the time of sentence, would come within the judgment of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(a) a sentence of imprisonment imposed under section 205ZA of the 1995 Act (serious terrorism sentence),(b) a sentence of imprisonment imposed under section 205ZC of that Act (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period), or(c) an extended sentence imposed under section 210A of that Act in respect of a terrorism offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the scope of new section 26ZA of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 by making it applicable also in relation to a person who is serving an extended sentence under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in respect of a terrorism offence.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, in order to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences when they are imposed consecutively to other sentences, we introduced several amendments in Committee. Following these changes, we are now making a series of minor, technical amendments to provide further clarification and to ensure that the legislation will operate as intended.
The amendments have a variety of complementary effects but, taken together, they ensure that new Section 1B, which was introduced in Committee, operates effectively within the Scottish jurisdiction. Given the complexity of the amendments, we have continued to consider their effect with the Scottish Government, resulting in these final amendments, which have been agreed by all parties.
Many of the amendments simply insert the relevant terminology into the new clauses and deliver consequential changes to ensure the smooth operation of Section 1B. The overall effect is to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period when they are serving multiple sentences, including for non-terrorism offences, and that offenders who receive multiple sentences for terrorist offences—and therefore multiple licences—will serve only one, aggregated licence period.
I draw your Lordships’ attention specifically to Amendment 31, which ensures that the sentence calculation provided for in Section 1B will apply retrospectively. This will provide clarity in calculating release dates where sentences for both terrorism and non-terrorism offences are imposed, ensuring the effective application of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in all cases.
Should noble Lords wish to see an individual breakdown of these amendments and their effect, I would be happy to place in the Library a letter in terms similar to the one I issued following Committee to explain the purpose of each one. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.
Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.
I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.
We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.
I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this very short debate. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the number of prisoners affected by this in relation to the International Criminal Court. I do not have that information to hand, but I undertake to supply it to the noble Lord.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, raised the lateness in the stage of proceedings at which this amendment has been tabled. I acknowledge the complexity of the statutes involved and the alertness of those in my office, the Advocate General’s office, and in the Scottish Government who are monitoring the position. There has been useful and effective collaboration between them. I will look into the matter raised by the noble and learned Lord and see whether I can provide any further detail as to why these points were identified only at this stage. If I can identify anything specific, beyond my general answer relating to the complexity of the relevant provisions, I will provide it to the noble and learned Lord in writing.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment excludes sections 1AB, 1A and 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 from the scope of new section 26ZA(3) of that Act.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group would all require the Secretary of State to commission independent reviews into various aspects of the operation of the Bill and to lay the resulting reports before both Houses of Parliament. I welcome the considerable appetite for scrutiny of these measures and for the accumulation of data—the facts and statistics that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, sought. I acknowledge the appetite for review, to which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, referred. However, while I welcome these things, I must respectfully disagree that the amendments are necessary.
First, as acknowledged within the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the Government already have an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, whose remit covers this Bill. Indeed, he has announced his intention to conduct a review of matters within prisons, which we welcome. The benefit of an independent reviewer is that he will not be constrained by the specifications of government and can decide what is most appropriate for his consideration. We have every confidence that he will continue to provide valuable and independent scrutiny following the Bill’s enactment and through the prisons review that he will be undertaking. I remain of the view that there is no need to appoint another reviewer to focus on just some of the provisions of the Bill.
The amendments indicate some areas of particular concern, which I shall seek to address with greater specification. On Amendment 12, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has noted a particular interest in the rehabilitation of terrorist offenders while in custody. As he told your Lordships’ House in relation to an earlier group of amendments, he and others, including the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Carlile, attended the briefing held by officials in the Joint Extremism Unit. I have heard that at least some noble Lords found that a helpful exercise, and I hope others did as well. I understand from engagement, and from the contributions made from the Floor today, albeit electronically, that there was a healthy discussion and a recognition that there is no simple cure or metric for this matter; indeed, that was acknowledged in a contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, on an earlier group of amendments.
It is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of intervention programmes in changing behaviour for any offenders but especially within such a small cohort. Efforts in our prison system to deradicalise and rehabilitate offenders in custody are ongoing, and techniques are developing constantly. However, while rehabilitation will remain central to the work undertaken with terrorist offenders in custody, that goes hand in hand with risk management.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has again raised the question of the Government’s ability to protect other prisoners from radicalisation within the prison estate, and the use of separation centres to this end. The risk was identified that such persons might otherwise become kingpins, looked up to by other persons in the prison estate. We have a set of specialist operational controls for managing counterterrorism risk in custody, as well as a number of population-management controls available for use across the entire prison estate.
I assure the noble Lord and the House that most extremist prisoners can, and should, be managed in the mainstream prison population with appropriate conditions and controls. That having been said, we take the risk of radicalisation within the prison estate seriously and, where deemed necessary, we have used, and will use, the separation centres available to us to prevent persons spreading malicious ideology to other prisoners.
In bringing to a close my submissions on this amendment, I acknowledge on behalf of the Government the anxious and thoughtful concern expressed by the noble Lord and others, following a very constructive series of engagements.
Amendment 13 would require the Government to commission an independent review and publish a report into the use and operation of polygraph testing in the licence conditions of terrorist offenders. Today and, more importantly, in Committee, we discussed in some detail the matter of polygraph testing. As I am sure noble Lords now understand, it is not intended to be used as a stand-alone measure but as part of a package to provide a further source of information to test offenders’ compliance with their conditions of licence. It is not to be used as something to catch an offender out in breach.
That said, I recognise that the use of polygraph testing as a licence condition is a novel matter for the House, which is why the Government have committed to conducting and publishing a review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders after a two-year period, which will provide more meaningful results and report on most of the criteria outlined by the terms of the amendment. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who dwelt specifically on this material in the course of her submission.
I will make one further point on this amendment. The terms have specified that the review may make recommendations on
“regulations, rules and codes of practice”.
Clear rules governing the use of polygraph examinations in a licence condition will be laid by statutory instrument. We currently anticipate that these will be those already in place for the use of polygraph testing in licence conditions for sex offenders, as set out in the Polygraph Rules 2009, which specify the qualifications expected for polygraph examiners, how a polygraph examination should be recorded and how those examinations will be reviewed.
Our review will of course inform whether these require amendment or tailoring in light of factors presented by the specific cohort, so I assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who moved the amendment, and those noble Lords who spoke on it that our plans for the introduction of polygraph testing already account for this concern.
Amendment 24, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to
“commission a review and publish a report”
into a number of measures, most of which are not directly addressed by provisions in the Bill, in the first year of it coming into force. While I recognise the desire to test for unintended consequences of the Bill, I politely disagree that a review on these terms and within this timeframe would be either necessary or add to what is already under way.
I want to set out briefly why, taking each part in turn. Proposed subsection (1)(a) would require a review into
“the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists”.
There is a great deal of work under way to target the terrorist threat, including that of lone terrorists. I point the noble and learned Lord to the Security Minister’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute in November 2020.
The Government’s response to the recent terrorist attacks has been comprehensive and informed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s analysis. The Government will shortly bring forward policing and crime legislation to implement a number of recommendations from Jonathan Hall QC’s independent review of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—MAPPA—when it comes to the management of terrorism, matters connected with terrorism and offenders of terrorism concern within the community.
The Government recognise that independent analysis can be useful in terms of challenging existing practices and processes. That is why the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, QC, was asked to oversee the operational improvement reviews following the attacks in 2017. I submit that now is not the time for another review.
As part of the constant, ongoing review and improvement of our counterterrorism systems and processes, the CONTEST unit, based in the Home Office, undertook an internal review of lone-actor terrorism last summer, working with operational partners and departments from across government. The review’s findings are sensitive and will not be published, but they have been shared with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee.
Proposed subsection (1)(b) refers to
“the effectiveness and availability of deradicalisation programmes in prisons”.
As I have said, it is difficult to measure their effectiveness, but the primary intervention, the Healthy Identity Intervention—HII—has been accredited by a panel of experts and is informed by the best available evidence. We have also conducted an evaluation of the HII pilot study to assess implementation and delivery. This is publicly available on GOV.UK, and a short-term outcome evaluation of the HII is under way. Although this has been delayed due to the impact of Covid-19, we are committed to publishing it once it has concluded.
We remain committed to keeping our interventions under review and developing the evidence base, which is what so many of your Lordships who have spoken on this matter have sought. As I have said, we will establish a new counterterrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre, which will not only help us to develop knowledge and evidence but will bolster our capacity to deliver interventions by recruiting more specialist psychologists and trained chaplains.
The Government plan to make an oral Statement that will explain more fully the important work to rehabilitate terrorist offenders in prison, including an overview of the new centre’s strategy and programme of work. I hope that noble Lords will agree that these demonstrate this Government’s commitment to transparency and sharing as much as we can.
On proposed new subsection (1)(c) in the amendment, in relation to the polygraph, as I mentioned earlier in this group, we will be conducting an evaluation of its use after two years. This will add to our evidence of its effectiveness and value, which has already been established through independent evaluation, and I submit that a further review is not needed.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, on that last point, I take it that the post-legislative scrutiny referred to is separate from the review of polygraph testing after three years, to which the Minister referred. On that, while I take his point about parliamentary scrutiny of regulations, codes of practice may not be statutory and therefore not subject to that sort of scrutiny. Might the Minister take back the suggestion that, following the very helpful sessions that the MoJ arranged during the course of the Bill on a number of matters, for which we were very grateful, Ministers might consider communicating with—and possibly even consulting—noble Lords in framing the review in three or so years’ time? I do not expect him to make a commitment now, but I would like to put that idea in his and his colleagues’ heads.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that that suggestion has lodged in my skull and will have been noted by others, and we will come back to it in due course. On her specific question on whether the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill is distinct from the review of polygraph testing, I am happy to confirm that that is the case.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, this has been a helpful debate as it has moved forward the process of keeping these new provisions under parliamentary scrutiny. I am very grateful, as I expect all noble Lords are, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for the comprehensive and careful way in which he set out the work of evaluation and research into the evidence concerning the treatment and punishment of terrorist offenders, and the arrangements for them within the prison estate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed the need for constant review. She warned us of the possible dangers of long-term imprisonment and the risk of radicalisation. As well as making a number of points and raising questions about polygraphs, my noble friend Lady Hamwee stressed the distinction between the “talk tough” language of the Government and the more considered, balanced and careful language of officials and Ministers that we hear in private. My noble friend called it “nuanced”. I add that the careful and cautious language she spoke of is also the language of nearly all the professionals in the system to whom we speak, be they in the Prison Service, probation service, inspectorates or elsewhere.
The important point is that longer sentences, while they may be necessary, are neither the only answer nor a complete answer. The “talk tougher” approach, leapt upon with enthusiasm by the press, has struck many of us as having had too little consideration. In his response, the Minister demonstrated that he certainly is determined to take an evidence-based and cautious approach to the issues raised by the Bill, including polygraph testing.
I accept the Minister’s point that the inclusion of these amendments in the Bill is not essential to provide that the work, which he described to us in some detail, is consistently explained to parliamentarians in both Houses. The important point about reviews, which I invite him and others to bear in mind—though not to lodge in their skulls—is that reviews which report to Parliament enable noble Lords here and MPs in the other place to consider and weigh up the evidence as it becomes available.
The Minister was completely right that there is no simple cure, but it is an important part of the role of Parliament to consider the evidence as it develops. The Bill puts before us a set of new and radical measures of particular severity. They need to be kept under constant attention. On the basis that they will get that attention because of work done by the Government and promulgated to Parliament, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(4A) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) limits the extent within the United Kingdom of any provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006. (4B) Subsections (1) and (2) of section 384 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (extent outside the United Kingdom) apply to the armed forces provisions as those subsections apply to the provisions of that Act.(4C) The following are “armed forces provisions”—(a) a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006;(b) an amendment, modification or repeal made by or under this Act of—(i) a provision of or made under the Armed Forces Act 2006,(ii) a provision that amends, modifies or repeals a provision of, or made under, that Act, or(iii) any other provision, so far as the provision is applied (by whatever words) by or under that Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that provisions of the Bill which have a limited extent within the United Kingdom (such as amendments of the Sentencing Code) have UK-wide extent so far as they are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006. It also provides for the provisions of the Bill that relate to the armed forces to extend, or be extended, outside the United Kingdom in the same way as the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
My Lords, I apologise for the short break in proceedings while I came back to my place. I am afraid that the convention of not moving while the Chair is standing, and social distancing, do not go too well together.
This rather technical amendment to Clause 48 clarifies that the provisions of the Bill have UK-wide extent in so far as they are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006. That is the burden of proposed new subsection (4A). The amendment also rectifies an oversight in the original drafting of the Bill, to make Section 384 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 apply to provisions in the Bill if they amend or modify the Act, and when they are applied by that Act. This means that they will extend to the Isle of Man and the British Overseas Territories, except Gibraltar, and can be extended to the Crown dependencies. That is the burden of proposed new subsection (4B). That ensures that the same version of the Armed Forces Act 2006 will be in force in all the jurisdictions to which that Act extends.
I apologise for the fact that this amendment has not been brought forward until now. That was an oversight, but I hope that noble Lords will accept that it was an understandable one, given the number of issues that the Bill deals with, and their frequent complexity. The interrelationship between sentencing provisions and armed services issues adds a further element of complexity. The amendment itself, as I have said, does those two things, in proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B). I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, Clause 48 deals with the extent of the Bill. It provides that
“A provision of this Act which amends, repeals or revokes an enactment has the same extent within the United Kingdom as the enactment amended, repealed or revoked.”
Under subsection (2), provisions that do not amend, repeal or revoke an existing enactment extend to all four nations—England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland—save for two limited exceptions, in that Clauses 21(2) and 44(2) are of a limited nature, referring to retrospectivity.
It is not easy to extract the purpose of Amendment 26. Someone in the Ministry of Justice has concluded that there are problems under the Armed Forces Act 2006. Proposed new subsection (4A) suggests that, in the context of jurisdiction under the Armed Forces Act 2006, all the provisions of the Bill extend to all four countries. This is so even if an amendment repeals or revokes a provision of an existing Act that does not have that extent.
Under proposed new subsection (4B), the provisions of the Act extend outside the United Kingdom to the extent set out in Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act. That section applies to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and overseas territories excluding Gibraltar. British Overseas Territories do not include Cyprus, Belize or Gibraltar itself, which is specifically excluded. Those are all venues where I, as chairman of the Association of Military Court Advocates, know that courts martial take place.
Those are three places, and I am sure there are more, where courts martial take place—not to mention Germany, where the facilities have ceased. Courts martial can, of course, take place anywhere in the world, if properly constituted, and if charges for service offences are brought against anyone who is subject to the Armed Forces Act.
Terrorism exists outside the overseas territories. I would very much welcome clarification as to what happens if a court martial is held outside the United Kingdom, but not within those overseas territories to which the Armed Forces Act applies. I cannot help feeling that I am missing something, but the statement attached to the amendment is not at all clear—even though it states that the purpose of the amendment is to clarify the position. I look forward to the Minister doing so.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I endorse the question so clearly put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Despite the clear explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I am still struggling with this amendment. Can he tell us the sort of problem that proposed new subsection (4A), which Amendment 26 seeks to insert into the Bill, tries to deal with? What is the lack of clarity with which he was concerned? Can he also indicate whether there are any implied provisions put into the Armed Forces Act by this Bill?
Proposed new subsection (4C)(a) specifies:
“a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
Can he indicate what sort of provision that is aimed at? I would find it really helpful, in relation to proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B), to have an example of a problem that these two provisions would solve.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their contributions and questions. The position, so far as I can assist the House now, is that the amendment ensures that the provisions of the Bill which amend, modify or are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006 have the same extent as that Act. That Act extends to the UK, Isle of Man, and British Overseas Territories, excluding Gibraltar, and can be extended to the Crown dependencies.
The Armed Forces Act 2006 is the main piece of primary legislation that establishes a service justice system. It uses a modified form of sentencing law of England and Wales for sentences imposed by the court martial, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, stated. The burden of the amendment is to ensure that the Armed Forces provisions in the Bill have the same extent as the Armed Forces Act 2006. This would ensure, therefore, that there is a correlation of the area over which the provisions apply.
On the specific question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on what would happen outside the territories covered by the Armed Forces Act, I am conscious that I would probably be straying into MoD territory rather than MoJ territory. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, will allow me to write to him on that so he gets an accurate and complete answer.
As to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on whether there is an implication in the Bill that is caught by proposed new subsection (4C), perhaps I can send him a letter on that, rather than risk getting the answer wrong, I am tempted to say that these are standard words used in Acts of Parliament about what is implied, but I understand the burden of his question and, if he will permit me, will send him a written response. I hope that I have responded to the points put to me and I commend this amendment to the House.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
(a) in subsection (3A),”Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 121, line 5.
Thursday 11th March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 169-I Marshalled list for Report - (26 Feb 2021)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, as the UK Government have made clear throughout all stages of the Bill, we are committed to working closely with the devolved Administrations on this legislation to ensure that the important changes made by the Bill will make the UK as safe as possible from the threats posed by terrorism.
While terrorism and national security are reserved matters, some of the provisions of this legislation engage the Sewel convention, both in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. I am pleased to confirm to the House that the Scottish Parliament, on the advice of the Scottish Government, has passed a legislative consent Motion in support of the Bill. However, despite lengthy and continued engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, it has decided not to proceed with recommending that legislative consent be given for the Bill by the Northern Ireland Assembly.
I am grateful for the collaborative engagement from officials in both the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive’s Department of Justice, which has provided essential support in the development of this legislation. While on this occasion legislative consent has not been secured from the Northern Ireland Assembly, I reassure noble Lords that the UK Government will continue, as they always have done, to engage with the Northern Ireland Executive and seek legislative consent support for all future Bills which engage the LCM process in the Northern Ireland Assembly. On behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I would like to take a brief opportunity to thank noble Lords. We have limited time, but I want to give some thanks for their interest and contributions thus far to the progress of the Bill. I am grateful to noble Lords across the House who have contributed eloquently to the debates on Second Reading, in Committee and on Report.
Some strong and differing opinions have been expressed on certain provisions in this legislation. I am grateful for the scrutiny that that has brought, and especially for the co-operative and constructive spirit in which the debates have taken place. I am equally grateful for the broad support that most of the measures in the Bill have received so far.
I particularly thank, at this point, noble Lords from the Labour and Liberal Democrat Front Benches, who contributed a number of important interventions to debates on measures in the Bill, particularly on polygraph examinations and the work to deradicalise and rehabilitate terrorist offenders in the prison estate. I am especially pleased that so many noble Lords found the discussion in the House, and the complementary briefing sessions on these subjects, both thought-provoking and helpful. I hope that the House is now confident of the intention behind these measures and is reassured that the Government keep this important work under continuous review.
Noble Lords have contributed to a rich discussion on the changes being made to terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs, as we usually call them. The Government remain clear on the importance of strengthening this vital risk management tool, and we are grateful to all Peers who have spoken on the issue, especially those on the Liberal Democrat and Labour Front Benches, and also the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for their thoughtful contributions to debate.
The amendments made in this House to the TPIMs provisions, tabled by the Government and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will now be considered by the other place, and I look forward to returning to this matter when the Bill comes back to this House. Members of this House have recognised its importance, and we have discussed openly the complexity and challenges that dealing with terrorism poses.
The Government are confident that the Bill will strengthen the approach taken to the sentencing and release of terrorist offenders, by ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders will spend longer in custody, properly reflecting the seriousness of the offences they have committed. Crucially, it will improve the Government’s ability to manage and monitor terrorist offenders when they are released. This will ultimately provide better protection for the public and keep our country safe. For all these reasons, I hope that the Bill will progress quickly through the other place, and I look forward to discussing it further on its return to this House.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the words expressed by all the speakers. First, I in particular thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. He is right that I am something of a neophyte when it comes to the work of this House, so thanks from him, with his extensive experience, is especially well received. He was also correct to draw attention and pay tribute to the other two members of the ministerial team and the officials who worked on the Bill. My noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay did a lot of the heavy lifting, and my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton was, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew put it once in Committee, the other half of the Government’s twin strike force. I am very grateful to both my colleagues for everything they have done.
As I mentioned the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, I benefited personally—I know we all did—from his experience, both in this Chamber and in our discussions outside, and I am confident that they will continue on other legislative matters.
Finally, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his comments. Of course, we had some differences on certain issues in the Bill, but they were differences of principle; both sides were, I hope, well and fairly argued; and I am sure that those discussions and debates also led to a better Bill in the end. The noble Lord was part of a triple strike force, and he was right to mention his colleagues, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who also did a lot of work in this regard. I see the time, and therefore conclude my remarks there.
Monday 22nd March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 22 March 2021 - (22 Mar 2021)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Lords amendments 2 to 17.
Lords amendment 18, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (e) in lieu.
Lords amendments 19 to 77.
Chris Philp
We had a very constructive debate on the Bill when it passed through the House last year, and I am delighted to speak to it again this evening.
Lords amendment 18, in the name of Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes a new upper time limit of four years for the duration of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure. The Bill as originally drafted sought to remove the current two-year limit and instead enable a TPIM to be renewed annually for as long as necessary. Having carefully considered the amendment tabled by Lord Anderson and consulted with him, the Government, in disagreeing with the amendment, have tabled amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, which set a five-year limit instead of a four-year limit.
I am given to understand that the noble Lord Anderson is content with that, and we believe that it represents a reasonable compromise between a desire to set a reasonable limit on the maximum duration of TPIMs and protecting our fellow citizens. We heard evidence from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques during the passage of the Bill that occasions have arisen when there has been a cliff edge and people have posed a risk to the public after the expiry of a TPIM. The Government believe that a five-year hard time limit is, ultimately, a reasonable compromise.
Of course, TPIMs are reviewable on an ongoing basis. They are reviewed and renewed, and if somebody ceases to be a threat, the TPIM will be discontinued. Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, there is not only an ability to have regular review hearings under section 9 but a right to appeal to the courts under section 16 for people wishing to challenge a decision for their TPIM notice to be extended. Given Lord Anderson’s agreement that five years rather than four is reasonable, I hope that the House will consent to our proposed amendments (a) to (e) in lieu.
Lords amendment 17 was a concession made in the Lords, and the Government will therefore support it. It elevates the burden of proof required before imposing a TPIM from reasonable suspicion, as originally proposed in the Bill, up to reasonable belief, which is a slightly higher standard of proof. Again, I hope the House will agree that this represents a reasonable compromise between this House and the upper House. The Government believe that with that slightly higher standard of proof, we can still keep our fellow citizens safe, and we feel that Lords amendment 17 strikes the right balance. We will therefore be supporting it, and it is backed up by Lords amendment 19, which creates an ongoing annual review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation of the use of TPIMs, commencing for the first time next year.
I do not want to detain the House long with the other amendments, because there are a total of 77 and I do not wish to go through all of them one by one. [Hon. Members: “Go on!”] I can hear that there is enthusiasm for that, but I am going to disappoint the audience by not going through each one individually. I will just say that a number of them relate to the devolved Administrations. In particular, we have removed the polygraph clauses from Scotland and Northern Ireland, because the legislative power already exists there, should those Administrations wish to use it. We have also made some technical changes concerned with single terming in Scottish law, and some technical amendments that are consequent on the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill.
In summary and conclusion—always a popular phrase—I think we have now arrived at a good set of measures, which will protect the public while also respecting and protecting fundamental rights. I therefore commend these amendments to the House.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the Minister, and I will not detain the House long or speak to each of the 77 amendments. However, there are some issues that I want to raise. I will start by thanking the Minister; I know we had a robust exchange today across the Dispatch Box, and I am sure we will have many more, but his conduct in speaking to and informing me over the course of not just this weekend, but the passage of the Bill, has been exemplary. I want to acknowledge that.
Clearly, we also want to thank those across counter-terrorism, policing and the security services and all their partners who selflessly put themselves in harm’s way to advance the effort to keep people safe. Following the horrific events of Fishmongers’ Hall, Streatham, Reading, and the Manchester Arena attack and others like it, I think that everyone across this Chamber acknowledged that there was a clear need for a change, both in legislation and approach. These Lords amendments, and particularly those that the Government have accepted, speak to the heart of that, and it is why we welcomed and supported this Bill in principle all along. It has returned to us from the other place in better shape, and I am pleased to see that some of the proposals that we made in Committee have influenced it.
However, even as amended, it is arguable whether any of what the Government have brought forward in the Bill would have had a significant role in preventing any of those attacks. I do not think there are many new tools here, if any, that the Government did not already have at their disposal. Since the passage of the Bill began, we learned that the perpetrator of the Fishmongers’ Hall attack was deemed a high-risk, category A prisoner before his release, and that there was intelligence suggesting he might be planning an attack. We know that the perpetrator of the Reading attack had been released from prison only two weeks previously, following a 17-month sentence for affray and assault, raising concerns about the influence and consequences of radicalisation in prisons, and that the ongoing inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack has already identified some serious questions about how terrorist suspects are monitored, as well as aspects of security around major events. We know that the number of offenders on licence for terrorism-related convictions recalled to prisons is steadily rising for 2020; up to just June of that year, it had doubled from what it was a decade before. That is why it was surprising for me to find out that the Government do not have any idea how many terrorist suspects are rearrested following their release after previously being arrested or charged.
On the specifics of the amendments, particularly Lords amendment 17, Lords amendment 18 and amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, the Government initially rejected our call for a review of so-called lone wolf terrorists last summer. We have since learned that they have, in fact, conducted one, but they are not willing to share the results or make clear the impact or actions that have come out of it. I have asked for a briefing on it and have not heard back. I do not think that is in keeping with my experience of my relationship with the Minister and his colleagues, and I hope that we can find a way to resolve that. [Interruption.] The Minister says from a sedentary position that it is a different Minister. He is right, but it is the same Department, and I trust that now and again they cross each other’s paths and liaise on matters relating to the Home Department.
We note the announcement in last week’s integrated review that the Government intend to set up a new counter-terrorism operations centre, but there is nothing in this Bill about that, and we have little detail about how it fits into current structures, where it will be based, who it will be accountable to and what it will do. Of course we then have the ongoing review of Prevent. Things move quickly in the sphere of counter-terrorism, and it is important that the police, the security services, their operational colleagues, this House and, above all, the British public have confidence that the Government are adapting to emerging threats and, indeed, pre-empting them. Tough talk is fine, but we need to see it matched with tough action.
In Committee, we tabled amendments that would, for example, have led to additional judicial oversight and an even higher burden of proof, and compelled the publication of an exit strategy for TPIMs. I think I argued rightly that it is not in the interests of anyone to allow individuals to remain on TPIMs indefinitely, not least in terms of bringing them to justice.
On the issue of the burden of proof, we want TPIMs to be robust but flexible. That is why we struggle to see the logic in lowering the standard of proof, whether from a procedural, administrative or operational perspective, because no prior TPIM request had been rejected at that threshold, proving that it was no impediment. That is why we tabled an amendment that would have raised the standard of proof, like the Government are proposing now some nine months later, to try to find a middle way on “reasonable and probable grounds”. The provisions before us now effectively retain that higher standard, and of course we welcome that.
We acknowledge the work of colleagues in the other place on Lords amendment 18 and the amendments in lieu in the Minister’s name. We welcome the fact that the Government have responded to our concerns and those raised by hon. Members across this House and, indeed, those in the other place, accepting the general principle of Lord Anderson’s amendment but making the limit of a TPIM notice five years rather than four. We accept that; it is a good concession. As I said before, however, we will endeavour to monitor its workings and impact as we move forward.
Again, we acknowledge the Government’s response to issues raised about the use of the polygraph. That is welcome too, and I appreciate the Minister’s engagement on that with the official Opposition and colleagues from other parts of the UK.
Finally, we welcome Lords amendment 19. We believe that the framework around TPIMs will undoubtedly be improved and enhanced by the input of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
We will always be uncompromising in tackling terrorism and, in that spirit, willing to compromise and work constructively with the Government. That has been our approach throughout the Bill’s passage, and it is good to see that, in large part, the Government have listened to our concerns. However, I raise those questions, particularly because, as the Minister will be aware, this is a fast-changing environment and we need to be responsive. Getting that right is of the gravest importance for us all. Alongside scrutinising and, as appropriate and without apology, criticising the Government, I will always commit to working together where we can in this endeavour.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I am afraid we have not been able to establish the link with Jim Shannon, so we will go straight to the Minister.
Chris Philp
I think I can say with some confidence that we will hear from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) on another occasion, which I look forward to very much.
May I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks, and I think the thanks of the whole House, to the security services and the police, who do so much to keep us safe in what are often very difficult and dangerous circumstances? I also thank the shadow Minister, the Front Bench spokesmen for the Scottish National party and the other parties, and the Chair of the Justice Committee for the very constructive way in which they have engaged in the passage of the Bill. I will respond briefly to one or two points that were raised.
The shadow Minister was looking for briefing on, I think, lone actors. The Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) would be the Minister to give that briefing. Obviously, he has had some health problems recently, but I hope that, through his private office, we can get that arranged as soon as he is back to his regular duties.
One or two questions were asked by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) about the five-year time period. I would emphasise that there are very few TPIMs in use. At the time we took evidence last year there were only six in use. Moreover, the subject has a right of appeal, as I said, under section 16 of the TPIM Act, so there are protections in place.
The hon. Gentleman also posed a question about evidence on the need for five years, rather than four years. As the shadow Minister will recall, we took evidence from assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, who said that there is a risk if the TPIM is terminated too early and somebody slips out. It takes time then to re-gather evidence to reimpose a new TPIM. He mentioned two examples: one where it took 12 months and another where it took 16 months. We are very keen to avoid that sort of situation, so I think there is good evidence.
Let me conclude by saying that the Bill is a very important measure. It constitutes decisive action to keep our fellow citizens safe from the scourge of terrorism. We saw in Streatham, at Fishmongers’ Hall and elsewhere how much of a threat former terrorist prisoners can pose on release. The Bill is designed to protect the public from those risks. I commend it to the House.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to.
Lords amendments 2 to 17 agreed to.
Lords amendment 18 disagreed to.
Government amendments (a) to (e) made in lieu of Lords amendment 18.
Lords amendments 19 to 77 agreed to.