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European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateYvette Cooper
Main Page: Yvette Cooper (Labour - Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley)Department Debates - View all Yvette Cooper's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI shall conclude my remarks on this point. The European Court is seriously deficient in a whole range of matters. On the question put by the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil), the idea has been put forward by Martin Howe QC, and I have put it forward myself in the House, of a system of jurisdiction that would be more in the nature of an arbitration, where there might be, for example, retired European Court judges or whoever, who would adjudicate—but on a bilateral basis, not on the basis of a decision taken by the European Court. It is possible to come up with a solution, therefore, but I do recognise the problem.
We are now embarked upon a massive restoration of self-government in this country. This Bill is essential to achieve that, and should be passed without any of the obstacles and frustrating tactics being put in its way.
I rise to speak to amendment 386, which has cross-party support and which I tabled late last night. The Minister said that it was somehow introducing “chaos” into this process. With the greatest respect, after a fortnight in which we have seen the Foreign Secretary, the International Development Secretary, the former Defence Secretary, the current Defence Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary all subsumed in controversies, I think the Government are doing quite well on the chaos front without any help from me. Also, the idea that taking the exit date out and putting it into a different Bill would create chaos when, just five days ago, Ministers did not want it in any Bill at all, makes the Government’s argument look rather silly.
The amendment would require Parliament to vote on the terms of withdrawal through primary legislation before Brexit day. That would mean that exit day would be set in UK law not in this Bill but in a future Bill, either in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that the Government announced yesterday or, if there is no deal at all, through an alternative Bill setting out the terms of departure and presumably whatever implementation plan would be needed in those circumstances.
The purpose of the amendment is not to dispute the Government’s intentions about the timing of exit day; it is simply to ensure that there is a proper parliamentary and democratic process before we get to that date. The central focus is not the date itself but a requirement on the Government to do as they have promised and set out a meaningful vote for Parliament in advance of that date. The amendment would also ensure that Parliament could properly respond, whatever the outcome of the Government’s negotiations, rather than being inadvertently timed out if things were to go badly wrong.
Yesterday, we learned from the Government that there would be a second Bill to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that is welcome. That was the subject of other amendments that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had tabled because we were concerned that Parliament should not give the Executive a blank cheque through this Bill on the implementation of a withdrawal Bill that had not yet happened. Rather less welcome was the Government’s admission that the legislation might not actually happen before Brexit day. Even less welcome was the Brexit Secretary’s admission that the vote on the withdrawal agreement would simply be a take-it-or-leave-it vote, and that therefore if the Government negotiate a bad deal, if they have no implementation plan in place or if other things go wrong along the way, Parliament would simply have to accept that or choose to have no deal at all.
Under the Government’s proposals, Brexit day would be embedded in primary legislation through this Bill, and it would therefore become legally and constitutionally possible for Ministers simply to let us drift towards exit day without Parliament being able to insist on any kind of implementation preparations or any kind of plan at all. Such a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive would be unacceptable. No legislature should ever accept that: certainly not this legislature right now when we were given a hung Parliament by the electorate less than six months ago; and certainly not our Parliament, whose sovereignty has been such a key issue throughout the debates on the referendum.
The amendment would strengthen the democratic process around Brexit and ensure that Parliament could vote on the terms of withdrawal, whether there was a deal or not, before exit day. It would implement the Government’s commitment to a meaningful parliamentary vote. If everything goes according to the Government’s plans and promises, if they get the timetable they want for the transition agreements being agreed in the early part of next year and the withdrawal plans agreed by the autumn, and if we get the kind of deal that the Government have promised, with all the benefits that it will bring, all that the amendment would do would hold the Government to that by implementing their intentions and their timetable. It would hold the Government to what the Brexit Secretary said yesterday was his primary plan for the timetable. It would hold Ministers to that plan on the face of the Bill. It would also prevent the Government from delaying the withdrawal agreement legislation beyond the withdrawal date. It links the timing of exit to the terms of exit in the parliamentary process. It would prevent Parliament from being timed out because it would give Parliament the final say. If the Government’s plans go wrong—I hope they will not—it also gives Parliament a say in how the country should respond. For example, if we end up with no deal at all, if we run out of time—I hope that will not happen—or if the whole thing goes belly up, it gives Parliament a role. It allows for a debate on whether the Government should go back to the negotiating table or just walk away. It allows for a debate about the timing of Brexit day. It allows Parliament to debate and decide, rather than just throwing up our hands and leaving it to Ministers—rather than just drifting along.
My right hon. Friend is making an important point. This morning, she and I both heard the Mayor of London clearly set out the implications of not having a security treaty for the safety of London, let alone the rest of the country, so I wholeheartedly agree with her points.
My hon. Friend is right. That was the evidence we heard. Parliament has a responsibility to have a contingency plan. Whatever it is that we hope might happen over the course of the next 12 months, we have a duty to ensure that we have plans in place for every eventuality and that Parliament itself can take some responsibility.
Right now, with the Government’s amendments made and without my amendment, it would theoretically be possible for us to just drift towards exit day without any substantive opportunity for Parliament to step in perhaps to amend the withdrawal terms in the Bill or maybe to require the Government to change their plan or to go back and negotiate some more. That would be up to us in Parliament to decide, but we will not get the chance to decide under the Government’s current plans.
Has the right hon. Lady noted the sensible comments of the chairman of the Policy and Resources Committee of the City of London corporation? While an orderly Brexit might not be the desired outcome for the right hon. Lady and I, an orderly Brexit with a proper transition and with this House having a proper say is manageable for our financial services sector. However, a disorderly Brexit that was the result of our inability to extend negotiations for a short period if need be, for example, would be a disaster for this country and is regarded by some firms as being on the same level as the threat to cyber-security. On that basis, is it not foolish for the Government or the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) to try to put a leaving date on the face of the Bill?
I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns. As Select Committee Chairs, he and I have both heard evidence about security and wider issues, and I also share with him my personal views about the importance of having a transition period and a smooth process. To be honest, whatever people’s views on whether there should be a transition and on how we should respond to different negotiating outcomes, it should still be for Parliament to debate and to decide before exit day, not after. That is what Parliament should be for. Frankly, the Government would be irresponsible not to give Parliament the opportunity to debate and take a view on the terms and on the timing once they have been agreed.
There is a con in what the Minister said earlier, because the Government actually do recognise that there may be circumstances in which exit day has to be changed. The Minister said that clause 17 will not apply and that somehow it will not allow the Government to change the exit day through regulations after it has been agreed in the Bill, but that is not the advice I have had—it is not the advice the House of Commons Library gave me this afternoon, for example. In fact, the combination of clause 9 and amendment 383 will still allow Ministers to change exit day, if they so choose and if they think it appropriate. That is the impact of the Henry VIII powers throughout the Bill.
We understand why Ministers might want a provision to be able to come back and say that exit day needs to change because we have reached the 11th hour, because the negotiations need to be extended by an extra month or because the process needs to be changed. Ministers have kept that power in the Bill for themselves, but why should the power be reserved just for Ministers? Why cannot Parliament have that power, too? That is the flaw at the heart of the Bill. If in unforeseen or difficult circumstances Ministers need to change the timetable, they can, but Parliament will have no choice, no say and no ability to do so.
Does the right hon. Lady agree that, if Parliament did have that opportunity, it would be taking back control and sovereignty would be returned not to the Executive but to this House?
The hon. Lady is right. We had all those debates about taking back control and parliamentary sovereignty, yet somehow the Minister seems to want to rip it all up. The Government are trying to concentrate huge amounts of power in the hands of Ministers, rather than giving the whole of Parliament a say.
Ministers have to stop infantilising Parliament and treating Parliament as if it is the enemy. The truth is that the sky did not fall in because Parliament had a vote on article 50. The Government told us that it would, and they told us that the whole process would be stopped, but it was not stopped because each and every one of us understands that we have obligations and responsibilities towards the referendum result, just as we have obligations and responsibilities towards the negotiation process that the Government have to conduct on our behalf, and that we cannot directly conduct for them. We know that we have those different responsibilities, and we know that we have to take mature and responsible decisions given the complexity of the situation that faces every single one of us. We just do not think that those decisions should be entirely in the hands of Ministers; we think that the whole of Parliament should have a say on something so important.
My right hon. Friend is making an incredibly powerful speech and argument. Does she agree that having the vote and support of Parliament behind the Government and the action they take would strengthen the Government’s hand in the negotiations with the European Union?
I agree with my hon. Friend, because this should be about the whole of Parliament, just as when we had the responsible debate on article 50. We know it is complex. It is our job and our responsibility in a democracy to deal with that complexity, and not just to abdicate our responsibility and hand it over to Ministers because, somehow, it is too difficult for us in Parliament to deal with. Of course it is not too difficult, and of course we are capable of dealing with the complex situation we face.
Does the right hon. Lady agree that we simply have not had the debates? That, of course, is not lost on the European Union, and it is also not lost on the people of this country. If we had those debates and if we had a real say on what Brexit will look like, we would begin to form a consensus and we would begin to bring people together across the United Kingdom in getting that good deal, reuniting so many divided communities, families and even friends.
I agree with the right hon. Lady. The truth is that the plans for our Brexit future have to be sustainable and have to command consent. The plans will have implications for many decades to come. They have to give us the chance to heal the Brexit divide across the country from the referendum, and they have to give Parliament the chance to debate the details and to have a proper, honest debate about what it will mean across the country.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that had things gone differently in last week’s debate and had the information been laid before the House, emotions might not be running so high?
Clearly, we need more transparency.
I want to draw my remarks to a close. My amendment gives Parliament the opportunity to indeed take back control. The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) said he wants us to debate in this House how we are governed. Well, then he should vote for my amendment, rather than concentrate power in the hands of Ministers. At a time when we have seen democratic values and democratic institutions undermined and under threat right across the world, we have an even greater responsibility to ensure that there is a proper democratic process and that we follow our obligations that come with the parliamentary Oath we took. So much of the debate we had during the referendum was about parliamentary sovereignty. What my amendment does is make that real.
It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in this debate, particularly as the matters on which I wish to touch very much concern her amendment and some of the others we have had.
I hope that the House will forgive me if I start by dealing briefly with the opening remarks of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). I am sorry he is not in his place, but I hope that he will forgive me if I say that the words he articulated were ones that I could fully understand and appreciate—heaven knows I have heard them often enough from constituents and from right-thinking people who want the best for our country—but that contained simplicities. Those simplicities simply do not match the problems this House faces in disentangling us from our relationship with the European Union. This issue has bedevilled the entire debate on Brexit and remain, and it is one reason why we find ourselves where we are today.
I happen to believe that what we did last year was a great and historic error. I cannot help it, and nothing that has happened since is going to alter my view. I recognise my responsibility as a Member of Parliament to try to give effect to what the public asked for in their response to that referendum. But in doing so, I am certainly not willing to suspend my own judgment, particularly when I have to witness what I see as an extraordinarily painful process of national self-mutilation, which I am required to facilitate. I cannot escape that; that is what I feel, and I am not going to abandon it because I am ordered to do so by anybody else.
With that in mind, I have to say what the right hon. Gentleman is asking for is the desire perhaps of many people in this country, which is to go to bed at night and wake up to find that the whole thing is over and done with. Unfortunately, it is not going to be over and done with for a very long time. The problem we have in this Bill, and on which we have to focus, is how we try to take this risky, dangerous—for our economy, our national security and our national wellbeing—and difficult process to a reasonable outcome. That is the challenge we have got. In doing that, Parliament cannot simply abdicate its responsibility to the Executive. Of course the Executive have to get on with the business of the complex negotiations, but Parliament is entitled to take a check on this at every conceivable stage.
I have to say to my colleagues on the Treasury Bench that the problem is that as the difficulties have piled up—in my view, they were inevitable, predictable and predicted—the tendency has been for everybody to get more and more brittle, more and more unwilling to listen, and more and more persuaded that every suggestion that is being made is in some way a form of treason. I have to say, with the deepest regret, that this culminated last Friday with a mad amendment, which I shall come back to in a moment. It was tabled, I believe, without any collective decision making in government at all and it was accompanied by bloodcurdling threats that anybody who might stand in its way was in some way betraying the country’s destiny and mission. I am afraid that I am just not prepared to go along with that.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateYvette Cooper
Main Page: Yvette Cooper (Labour - Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley)Department Debates - View all Yvette Cooper's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am not alarmed by the fact that the hon. Lady has signed my new clause 53; I am flattered and encouraged. I would expect nothing else from the hon. Lady, who has taken an interest in this area. However, Calais is a sign of failure: it should not be happening. We should be dealing with those children closer to home, or leapfrogging Calais altogether and placing them in places of safety in the United Kingdom, Sweden or France itself. The issue is baffling to me—I have spoken about it many times. If what is happening in Calais was happening in the United Kingdom, our children’s services would be placing those children in a place of safety, not allowing them to remain at liberty and be exposed to people traffickers, sex traffickers and all sorts of other criminals who would harm them.
I want to get back to what my new clause attempts to do. As we leave the European Union and therefore Dublin III, the UK’s different—in this case, slightly more restrictive—immigration rules will provide the only means by which refugee children can be legally reunited with their families. As the UK looks to improve our own laws through the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and to replicate the provisions ensuring that children stranded in Europe can be brought to join asylum-seeking family members in the UK, it is imperative that it should broaden the scope of the definition of “family” in our own British immigration rules so that these are in line with the current European ones. That will allow children to be reunited with close family members, wherever they are. Hence the importance of continuity and of perpetuating the existing situation, which works well; it could work better, but the principle is certainly absolutely right.
The UK’s immigration rules can apply to children anywhere in the world, and they therefore provide a safe and legal route for children, avoiding the need for them to embark on perilous journeys to Europe, which have been discussed. We need to build on this very positive aspect of the rules. The UK should amend its immigration rules on refugee family reunion to allow extended family members who have refugee or humanitarian status—adult siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, as I have mentioned—to sponsor children in their family to join them in the UK when it is in the child’s best interests to do so. That point about the child’s best interests must be absolutely paramount, as it is the basis of all our child welfare legislation in this country. After years of conflict, many of these children have been orphaned or do not know where their parents are, but they may have grandparents, aunts and uncles, or adult brothers and sisters in the UK, who can care for them.
If these changes were made to the UK immigration rules, that would enable children to be transferred from their region of origin and reunited in a regular, managed and safe way. Refugee family reunion transfers would all be processed by UK embassies or consulates, meaning that we could take back control of this process and ensure it works at a speed—it needs to be quicker than it is now—that is in the best interests of the children.
Without the changes, children will continue to be vulnerable in being forced to take dangerous journeys and put themselves at risk. The whole thrust of our asylum policy on looking after these vulnerable children has been to keep them away from such harm. Last year, some 700 unaccompanied refugee children were united with their families using the European system, which is on top of all the other schemes to which the UK currently subscribes.
I hope that my new clause is a helpful probing amendment. I am grateful to the Minister for Immigration, who has met my right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough and me to discuss this issue. He is sympathetic to what we are trying to achieve. I acknowledge that the timing of the new clause might be better in a forthcoming immigration Bill, but it is useful to put it on the record now to get a comment from Ministers about the Government’s intentions at the appropriate time and perhaps with more appropriate wording; the word “appropriate” continues to appear.
My new clause is intended to build on the good work that the UK Government have done for so many thousands of child refugees so far. That good work has resulted from the huge investment—now of over £2.3 billion on Syrian refugees alone—aimed at frustrating the people traffickers and others who would harm these very vulnerable children. Such a change would show that the United Kingdom intends to continue, after Brexit, to be a leading force for humanitarian good outside the EU on the basis of British principles, British attitudes to the welfare of the child and British generosity in looking after, as we have done for so many years, those most in need. This system works, and we must make sure that it continues to work after Brexit.
I rise to speak briefly to amendments 48, 49 and 52 in my name. They have cross-party support, including from other Select Committee Chairs, because they are about safeguarding the role of Parliament and preventing the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive.
Before I talk in detail about those amendments, I want to support new clause 53 and the words of my Home Affairs Committee colleague, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton). He is right that we need to continue with our historical obligations towards refugees and with the principle of family reunion, ensuring that child refugees are not separated from their family and do not lose their rights to be reunited with family members who can care for them, especially when families have been separated by persecution and conflict. He is also right that this is about preventing the people traffickers, the exploitation and the modern slavery that can cause such harm and blight so many lives.
Our Committee has often found evidence that leads us to want the Dublin III process to work faster and more effectively, not for the principles behind it to be ripped up and thrown away. I therefore welcome the fact that, as the hon. Gentleman has said, Ministers have shown an interest in supporting the continuation of these historical obligations. I hope that that will be addressed if not in this Bill, then in either an immigration Bill or in the withdrawal agreement Bill in due course.
The amendments I have tabled to clause 7 address the concern, raised by so many of us, that Parliament is being asked to hand over considerable powers to the Executive without sufficient safeguards. That concentration of powers in the hands of the Executive—a concentration not seen since the days of the infamous Tudor monarch—goes against the very reason why all of us were elected to this place: the legislature has an historic obligation to place checks on the power of the Executive, in order to prevent concentrations and abuses of power, in relation to Brexit or to anything else. It is an obligation that each of us takes on when we swear the oath at the Dispatch Box.
I shall return to the clause 7 versus clause 9 argument a little later.
Amendments 3 and 4 were also tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend. The Government agree with his goal of ensuring that instruments under the Bill are accompanied by all the information that the House, the public and, indeed, the sifting committee need in order to understand what they can do and why. We also agree that more can be done to ensure that the House has the proper opportunities to scrutinise the instruments. As I have said, the Government have therefore accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, and we will also table amendments to address long-standing concerns about information. The Government believe that the proposed committee represents an option that balances our concerns about the ability to plan and the limited time available before exit day with some Members’ well-stated and long-standing concerns about the efficacy of the scrutiny of negative SIs in this House. Those amendments will address the unique challenge posed by the secondary legislation under this Bill, ensuring that the Government’s reasoning on procedure is transparent to the House and that the House can recommend that any negative instrument should instead be an affirmative one.
Beyond all that, the Government have tabled amendment 391 which will require that explanatory memorandums are alongside each SI and include a number of specific statements aimed at ensuring the transparency of SIs that are to come, and act as an aid to this House, providing more effective scrutiny. These statements will explain, for instruments made under the main powers in this Bill, what any relevant EU law did before exit day, what is being changed, and why the Minister considers that this is no more than is appropriate. They will also contain information regarding the impact of the instrument on equalities legislation. The wording of our amendment and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne differs from that proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, but, as he has said, he has put his name to it and I am pleased that we are therefore able to move forward.
I turn now to the issue of what is necessary and amendments 49, 65, 205 to 208, 216 and new clause 24. Amendments 49 and 65 bring us to the important debate about whether the power in clause 7 should allow necessary corrections or appropriate corrections. “Necessary” is a very strict test, which we would expect to be interpreted by a court as logically essential. Where two or more choices as to how to correct EU law are available to Ministers, arguably neither would be logically essential because there would be an alternative. Ministers therefore need to choose the most appropriate course. If two UK agencies, such as the Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority, could arguably carry out a particular function, the Government must propose which would be the more appropriate choice. Also, if the UK and the EU do not agree to retain an existing reciprocal arrangement and the EU therefore ceases to fulfil its side of the obligations, the UK could decide it is not appropriate for the UK to provide one-sided entitlements to the EU27; it might not be legally necessary for the UK to stop upholding one side of the obligation, but it might not be appropriate for us to continue if the EU is not doing so.
It is my understanding that the Minister is saying that courts that were told that Ministers had two options, both of which might be necessary solutions to a particular problem, would therefore say that neither passed the necessity test because Ministers had chosen between the two of them. That sounds utterly ludicrous as a way in which the courts would make a decision. Will the Minister elaborate by providing a case law example of a situation where the courts have been given such a necessity test and have decided to rip up all necessary options on the basis that there were too many necessary choices?
I will see whether, before I sit down, my memory can be jogged on an example of case law, but I am only a humble aerospace and software engineer and I do not mind saying to the right hon. Lady that I have sometimes observed that we dance on the head of a pin over particular words. In order to protect the law and the public purse, I think the Law Officers would require me to take appropriate advice from lawyers on the nature of these words and to abide by it as we proceed through the legislation.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateYvette Cooper
Main Page: Yvette Cooper (Labour - Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley)Department Debates - View all Yvette Cooper's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Arrangements for withdrawing from the EU—
“Notwithstanding any powers granted under this Act, no Minister of the Crown may agree to the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union referred to in Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union until Royal Assent is granted to an Act of Parliament—
(a) authorising the Minister to agree to an exit day to be specified in the Act,
(b) authorising the Minister to agree to those arrangements that will apply after exit day, the arrangements to be specified in the Act.”
This new clause would ensure that a separate Act of Parliament would be required for Ministers to determine exit day and to set out the arrangements that will apply after exit day.
New clause 19—Publication of the Withdrawal Agreement—
“The powers for Ministers set out in section 9 shall not come into force unless and until a final withdrawal agreement made between the United Kingdom and the European Union has been published and copies placed in the Libraries of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.”
This new clause would ensure that the wide-ranging powers for Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement set out in Clause 9 of the Bill cannot come into force until the withdrawal agreement has been published.
New clause 38—Status of Irish citizens in the United Kingdom—
“Before making any regulations under section 9, the Minister shall commit to making available to Irish citizens lawfully resident in the United Kingdom after exit day any status, rights and entitlements available to Irish citizens before exit day, inclusive of and in addition to their status, rights and entitlements as EU citizens.”
New clause 66—Parliamentary approval for the outcome of negotiations with the European Union—
“No exit day may be appointed under this Act until the terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, including leaving the EU without an agreement, have been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause is intended to establish that Parliament has a meaningful vote on the terms of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
New clause 68—Terms of withdrawal: approval by Parliament—
“(1) The Government shall not conclude any agreement on terms of withdrawal from the European Union, or on the UK’s future relationship with the European Union, until those terms have been approved by resolution in both Houses of Parliament.
(2) Approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament must be sought no later than three months before exit day.”
This new clause would require the Government to seek Parliamentary approval for its exit agreement with the EU at least three months before exit day.
New clause 69—United Kingdom withdrawal from the EU—
“(1) Subsection (2) applies if either of the conditions in subsection (3) or (4) is met.
(2) The Prime Minister must seek an agreement with the EU on one or more of the following—
(a) extending the negotiations beyond the two-year period specified in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union; or
(b) agreeing that negotiations over the final terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU may take place during a negotiated transitional arrangement which broadly reflect current arrangements and which begins immediately after the Article 50 notice period expires and the EU treaties cease to apply to the UK; or
(c) any other course of action in relation to the negotiations (with the EU over the withdrawal of the United Kingdom) which has been approved in accordance with this section by a resolution of the House of Commons.
(3) The condition in this subsection is that no Article 50 withdrawal agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and the EU by 31 October 2018.
(4) The condition in this subsection is that an Article 50 withdrawal agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and the EU but the proposed terms of withdrawal have not been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament by 28 February 2019.
(5) Nothing in this section may be amended by regulations made under any provision of this Act.”
The intention of this new clause, which could be amended only by primary legislation, is to specify the actions that should be taken if the Government does not secure a withdrawal agreement by 31 Oct 2018 or that Parliament does not approve a withdrawal agreement by 28 February 2019.
New clause 75—Implementing the withdrawal agreement (No. 2)—
“(1) No powers to make regulations under this Act may be used for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament detailing how implementing the withdrawal agreement will be achieved through primary legislation.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) and (2), “implementing the withdrawal agreement” may include any necessary provision for a transitional period after the exit day appointed for section 1 of this Act.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) and (2), “implementing the withdrawal agreement” must include any necessary provision to ensure that any citizens of any EU Member State who are lawfully resident in the UK on any day before exit day can continue to be lawfully resident after exit day on terms no less favorable than they currently enjoy.”
This new clause is intended to ensure that primary legislation is used to implement the withdrawal agreement, including maintaining EU citizens’ rights.
Amendment 7, in clause 9, page 6, line 45, at end insert
“, subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”
To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.
Amendment 355, page 6, line 45, at end insert “, subject to—
(a) the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament, and
(b) an affirmative resolution passed by the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly, approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”
This amendment would require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by both Parliament and by the devolved administrations.
Amendment 361, page 7, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations under this section may, notwithstanding sections 1 and 5(1), make provision to replicate, for such an implementation period as is provided for in the withdrawal agreement, any aspect of the operation of EU law in the United Kingdom.”
The amendment would make clear that aspects of EU membership, such as the automatic effect of EU law and enforcement and adjudication mechanisms, can be maintained for an implementation period if the Government agrees to do so as part of the withdrawal agreement.
Amendment 142, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(e) remove, reduce or otherwise amend the rights of any citizen of an EU Member State who was lawfully resident in the UK on any day before 30 March 2019.”
This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of EU citizens living in the UK.
Amendment 47, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the terms of the withdrawal agreement have been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
Amendment 196, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Union’s Political and Security Committee after exit day.”
Amendment 197, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a signatory to all agreements signed through the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.”
Amendment 198, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council.”
Amendment 199, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.”
Amendment 227, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of the UK leaving the EU single market on the forecast to the UK’s public finances.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the UK public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 228, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of exiting the EU single market on levels of GDP growth.
(3B) Any assessment under subsection (3A) shall set out an assessment of the impact of exiting the EU single market on levels of GDP growth in—
(a) Scotland,
(b) Northern Ireland,
(c) England, and
(d) Wales.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the levels of GDP growth in the UK and in each part of the UK, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 229, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of ending freedom of movement on the UK’s public finances.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom ending freedom of movement on the UK’s public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 230, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the broadened responsibilities of the UK Treasury following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the broadened responsibilities of the UK Treasury following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 300, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of, and participation in, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and
(b) the strategy has been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would prevent the Government using any delegated powers under Clause 9 until it had secured Parliamentary approval for its proposals to replace any provisions that cease to apply as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of Euratom.
Amendment 55, page 7, line 9, at end insert
“or until the withdrawal agreement has been published and legislation proposed in the 2017 Gracious Speech in relation to customs, trade, immigration, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear safeguards and international sanctions has been published.”
This amendment would ensure that powers to Ministers to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement cannot be exercised until such time as the withdrawal agreement has been published along with the publication of associated legislative proposals on customs, trade, immigration, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear safeguards and international sanctions.
Amendment 19, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) Regulations under this section will lapse two years after exit day.”
Although the power conferred by this clause lapses on exit day, there is no sunset clause for the statutory instruments provided under it. This would make all such statutory instruments lapse two years after exit day and require the Government to introduce primary legislation if it wanted to keep them in force.
Amendment 74, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has signed an agreement with the EU guaranteeing that the UK will remain a permanent member of the EU Single Market.”
Amendment 75, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has signed an agreement with the EU guaranteeing that the UK will remain a permanent member of the EU Customs Union.”
Amendment 116, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until such time as the terms of the withdrawal agreement have been approved by a Ratification Referendum, giving voters the options of supporting the terms of the withdrawal agreement, or remaining in the EU.”
This amendment seeks to ensure that Ministers cannot make and use secondary legislation for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement until such time as that agreement has been approved by a Ratification Referendum.
Amendment 143, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until such time as the Government has signed an agreement with the EU that maintains and guarantees the existing rights of EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU, as of 29 March 2019.”
This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of both EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU.
Amendment 156, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section unless the requirement in section [Status of Irish citizens in the United Kingdom] has been satisfied.”
Amendment 224, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for the UK to retain access to the EU’s Emissions Trading System markets after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy to retain access to the EU’s Emissions Trading System markets after withdrawal.
Amendment 225, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for the UK’s continued participation in the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for the UK to continue participation in the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative after withdrawal from the EU.”
Amendment 231, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a statement setting out a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Bank.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Bank.
Amendment 232, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a statement setting out a strategy for retaining membership of the European Investment Fund.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Fund.
Amendment 238, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking the maintenance of UK membership of the European Food Safety Authority on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Food Safety Authority.
Amendment 241, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking the preservation of reciprocal healthcare agreements on existing terms as under social security coordination regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
(6) Any changes to regulations in subsection (5) shall only be made after—
(a) the House of Commons has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5),
(b) the Scottish Parliament has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5),
(c) the National Assembly of Wales has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5), and
(d) the Northern Ireland Assembly has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy for seeking to ensure that reciprocal healthcare arrangements continue after the UK leaves the EU.
Amendment 242, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Medicines Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Medicines Agency.
Amendment 243, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work.
Amendment 244, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Chemicals Agency after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Chemicals Agency.
Amendment 245, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Single Sky Agreement on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Single Sky Agreement.
Amendment 246, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Aviation Safety Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 247, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of the European Maritime Safety Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Maritime Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 248, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of ERASMUS on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of the ERASMUS scheme after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 249, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain access for the UK to reciprocal roaming charge agreements on existing terms as under Regulation 2017/920, after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would seek to ensure that roaming charges do not come into effect after exit day for UK citizens in the EU and vice versa.
Amendment 250, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of Creative Europe on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of Creative Europe after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 251, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has made a formal request to President of the European Council that the UK continues membership of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the UK to make a request to the President of the European Council for continued UK membership of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 252, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has published a strategy for reaching an agreement with the EU to enable the UK to have continued access to Passenger Name Records after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to have access to Passenger Name Records after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 253, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Schengen Information System after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Schengen Information System after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 254, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have continued access to the European Arrest Warrant.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Arrest Warrant after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 255, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROPOL.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROPOL after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 256, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROJUST.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROJUST after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 257, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Criminal Records Information system with the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Criminal Records Information system with the EU after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 258, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Prüm Council decisions relating to fingerprint and DNA exchange with the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Prüm Council decisions relating to fingerprint and DNA exchange with the EU, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 259, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the False and Authentic Documents Online (“FADO”) internet-based image archiving system.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the False and Authentic Documents Online (“FADO”) internet-based image archiving system after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 260, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to participate in the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs Administrations of 1997 (“Naples II Convention”).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to participate in the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs Administrations of 1997 (“Naples II Convention”), after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 261, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 262, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for ensuring that lawyers registered to practise in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland shall not lose their right of audience at the European Court after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable British-registered lawyers to continue to appear before the Court of Justice of the European Union, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 263, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for ensuring that lawyers from England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland shall not lose their status of legal profession privilege concerning communications with regard to proceedings before the European Court, after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to ensure that communications from British-registered lawyers with regard to proceedings before the European Court continue to be covered by legal profession privilege, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 275, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament an agreement with the Scottish Government for the freedom of movement of EU citizens in Scotland to continue after exit day.”
This amendment would facilitate the continuance of free movement in and out of Scotland after exit day.
Amendment 276, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for continued participation by the United Kingdom in the common European Asylum System.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for continued participation by the United Kingdom in the common European Asylum System, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 343, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for a food standards framework after withdrawal from the EU, before making any regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement.
Amendment 351, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out plans that seek to secure continued clinical trials agreements as under EU Regulation 536/2014 after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would ensure harmonisation of clinical trials across the EU Member States will continue in the UK after the UK leaves the EU.
Clause 9 stand part.
New clause 7—Consultation—
“The Government shall follow the principles set out in the Cabinet Office Code of Practice in respect of public consultation in advance of regulations being made under powers granted by this Act.”
This new clause would commit Ministers to abiding by the existing Cabinet Office code of practice on consultations in respect of regulations to be made under the Bill.
New clause 12—Social, employment and environmental protection—
“Any rights, protections, liabilities, obligations, powers, remedies and procedures which exist immediately before exit day in the fields of—
(a) social and employment law, and
(b) environmental law
will not be amended through any regulations made to deal with deficiencies or withdrawal unless approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament or by Act of Parliament”
This new Clause would ensure that social, employment and environmental laws cannot be changed by the order-making powers delegated to Ministers without a vote in Parliament.
New clause 57—Citizens’ Jury on Brexit Negotiations—
“(1) A citizens’ jury shall be established to enable UK citizens to be consulted on the progress of negotiations between the UK and the EU on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, and the approach outlined in UK Government White Papers.
(2) The citizens’ jury shall in total be composed of exactly 1501 persons.
(3) Members of the citizens’ jury shall be randomly selected by means of eligibility from UK citizens on the current electoral register as registered on the date of this Act receiving Royal Assent, with allocation across the nine UK Government Regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland weighted by population, and a stratification plan, with the aim of securing a group of people who are broadly representative demographically of the UK electorate across characteristics including whether they voted Leave or Remain.
(4) The jury will be broken down into individual sittings for each of the nine UK Government Regions in England, as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
(5) The sittings will be for no more than 72 hours at a time, facilitated by independent facilitators, and if required, by electing fore-people from within their number.
(6) Membership of the jury will be subject to the same regulations and exceptions as a regular jury, but membership can be declined without penalty.
(7) The citizens’ jury will be able to require Ministerial and official representatives of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations to give testimony to them to inform their work, and to have the power to invite other witnesses to give evidence as required.
(8) The citizens’ jury shall publish reports setting out their conclusions on the negotiations and UK Government White Papers.
(9) The first report from the citizens’ jury shall be published within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and subsequent reports shall be published at intervals of no more than two months.
(10) Costs incurred by the citizens’ jury shall be met by the Exchequer.”
Clause 16 stand part.
Amendment 226, in schedule 7, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to the application of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive in the UK.”
This amendment would make any changes to the application of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive in the UK subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.
Amendment 235, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the rights of workers in the UK.”
This amendment would require that the rights of workers currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 236, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning rights for disabled people in the UK.”
This amendment would require that the rights of disabled people currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 237, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning annual leave rights,
(h) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning agency worker rights,
(i) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning part-time worker rights,
(j) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning fixed-term worker rights,
(k) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning work-based health and safety obligations,
(l) makes changes to EU-derived legislation concerning state-guaranteed payments upon an employer’s insolvency,
(m) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning collective redundancy rights,
(n) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning terms and conditions of employment rights,
(o) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning posted worker rights,
(p) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning paternity, maternity and parental leave rights,
(q) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning protection of employment upon the transfer of a business, or
(r) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning anti-discrimination.”
This amendment would list areas regarding workers’ rights where changes to EU-derived law could be made only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 293, page 39, line 33, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations appointing any exit day may not be made unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require regulations appointing an exit day to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 328, page 39, line 42, leave out sub-paragraphs (6) and (7).
This amendment, and Amendments 329 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 329, page 41, line 15, leave out sub-paragraphs (10) and (11).
This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 155, page 42, line 17, at end insert—
“(3A) A Minister cannot make a declaration under sub-paragraph (2) unless they have satisfied themselves that they have sufficiently consulted—
(a) relevant public authorities,
(b) businesses,
(c) people, and
(d) other organisations
who are likely to be affected by the instrument.”
This amendment would require that, when using the urgent cases provision in the Bill, the Minister must first consult with businesses and other relevant organisations.
Amendment 154, page 42, line 31, at end insert—
“(7) For the purposes of this paragraph “urgent” has the same meaning as “emergency” in Section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.”
This amendment would limit the circumstances in which Ministers can use procedures for urgent cases to circumstances in which there is a serious threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom.
Amendment 51, page 43, line 26, leave out paragraph 6
This amendment is linked to New Clause 3 to require the Government to implement the withdrawal agreement through separate primary and secondary legislation rather than through this Bill.
Amendment 294, page 44, line 37, after “section 17(5)” insert “, other than regulations to appoint an exit day,”
Consequential to amendment 293.
Amendment 295, page 45, line 5, after “section 17(5)” insert “, other than regulations to appoint an exit day,”
Consequential to amendment 293.
Amendment 344, page 45, line 11, at end insert—
The intention of this amendment is that tertiary legislation under the Act should be subject to the same parliamentary control and time-limits as are applicable to secondary legislation.
Amendment 58, page 45, line 23, leave out “urgency” and insert “emergency”
This amendment would remove the wider latitude currently allowing Ministers to make regulations without Parliamentary approval “by reason of urgency” and instead only allow such executive action “by reason of emergency”. An emergency is a situation that poses an immediate risk to human health, life, property, or environment.
Amendment 330, page 45, line 40, at end insert—
“Scrutiny of regulations made by Welsh Ministers
11A (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this Act of the Welsh Ministers must be made in accordance with the procedures from time to time set out in the Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales for the scrutiny of regulations under this Act.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) applies to statutory instruments made by the Welsh Ministers acting alone and to statutory instruments made by the Welsh Ministers acting jointly with a Minister of the Crown.
(3) The Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales may set out different procedures for the making of different statutory instruments or for different categories of statutory instruments under this Act and, for the avoidance of doubt, may empower the Assembly or a committee of the Assembly to decide which of those procedures is to apply to an instrument or category of instruments.
(4) For the purposes of section 11A of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, and any other provisions of that Act referred to in that section, the provisions set out from time to time in the Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales for the scrutiny of regulations under this Act shall be deemed to be provisions of an Act.”
This amendment would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 301, page 46, line 18, at end insert—
“12A Any power to make regulations under this Act may not be exercised by a Minister of the Crown until 14 days after the Minister has circulated a draft of the regulations to the citizens’ jury appointed under section [Citizens’ jury on Brexit negotiations].”
The intention of this amendment is to provide for a citizens’ jury to be consulted before regulations are made under this Act.
Amendment 223, page 46, line 29, at end insert—
“14A Any power to make regulations in this Act relating to the oil and gas sector may not be made without—
(a) consultation, and
(b) an impact assessment, a copy of which must be laid before Parliament.”
This amendment would require consultation and an impact assessment before legislation affecting the relating to the oil and gas sector is changed by regulations made under the Act.
Amendment 331, page 48, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (4).
This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 329, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
That schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Amendment 29, in clause 17, page 13, line 34, leave out subsections (1) to (3)
This amendment would remove a widely drawn delegated power, which covers anything that happens as a consequence of the Act.
Amendment 99, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) Regulations under this section may not limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”
This amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 17 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
Amendment 100, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”
This amendment imposes the same restriction on the regulation making powers under Clause 17 as applies to other regulation powers in the Bill.
Amendment 296, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.
(9) Regulations made under this section may not amend or repeal retained EU law.”
This amendment would place restrictions on the power to make consequential and transitional provision.
Clause 17 stand part.
I rise to speak to new clause 3, which has cross-party support, but also amendment 7, which does something similar to my new clause, albeit, I confess, in a rather more elegant way. I defer to the drafting powers of the former Attorney General in drafting his amendment.
This, on day seven in Committee, is really where we get to the crunch on this Bill. There are two big anxieties about the content of the Bill that finally come clashing together in clause 9. The first is the sweeping use of secondary legislation through Henry VIII powers, which, regardless of one’s views on the overall legislation, have caused some unease in all parts of the House because of the way in which they concentrate power in the hands of the Executive and cut deep into our historic role in Parliament to hold the Executive to account. The second anxiety is about getting the final Brexit deal right and about making sure that Parliament has a real, meaningful say on the deal, which will define our country for generations, and that we decide together what “taking back control” should mean.
Clause 9 is where those two anxieties come crashing together, because it allows a huge concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, and it does so over the final withdrawal agreement on the outcome of Brexit. Notwithstanding the commitments that the Prime Minister has made today and the written statement that we have seen, the reality is that clause 9 would allow Ministers to start to implement a withdrawal agreement entirely through secondary legislation and to do so even before Parliament has endorsed the withdrawal agreement.
Many of us hear what the right hon. Lady says about the Henry VIII clauses and the power grab, but does she not accept that the quid pro quo of that is that, while many in this House were quite happy for the EU to conduct a power grab, they seem less trusting of their own Government when it comes to these clauses?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about parliamentary sovereignty, which was indeed a key issue that was debated in the referendum. In fact, many people argued in the referendum that what they were doing was bringing sovereignty back here, from having shared sovereignty with the EU. I do not think we are arguing that sovereignty should be handed over in a concentrated way to a small group of Ministers instead. That is the responsibility on us. We know that of course there are times when Parliament needs to give Ministers power on our behalf to use through secondary legislation, but we should do so cautiously and sensibly and make sure that the right safeguards are in place. That is the problem with the Henry VIII powers in this Bill, and not just in clause 9 but in clause 7. The challenge, too, is that we are being asked to do that on an issue that will define our country for generations. Each and every one of us will be judged on what we did in this place to get that Brexit deal right.
Does the right hon. Lady agree that it is most welcome that, since my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) tabled his amendment 7, it has been agreed that there does need to be an Act of Parliament? Is not the weakness of clause 9 that there is still no trigger requiring the consent of Parliament to the withdrawal agreement before the regulations can be laid and used?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is exactly right, and that is why we have a cross-party interest in these issues. Not only is there no trigger on the face of the Bill—clause 9 will still allow Ministers this huge concentrated power to go ahead and implement the withdrawal agreement without Parliament’s agreement—but there is also a second difference, certainly for me in what Ministers have set out so far, about how a meaningful vote should take place. I want to come on to that as well.
New clause 3 says that Parliament will not yet give the Government permission to use secondary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that instead the Government must set out their plans for primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement. If secondary legislation is needed at that time, as part of the implementation process, those powers should be taken in the withdrawal agreement Bill—the second Bill—so that Parliament is not just handing over a blank cheque, but is deciding what powers are needed and making sure that the proper scrutiny and checks and balances are in place at that time.
I do not think this is really a controversial proposal. It is basically saying that Parliament should hand over no more power to the Executive than it needs to and should not hand over power to the Executive until it needs to and until it knows what is going on. New clause 3 also has the effect of requiring a meaningful vote in primary legislation on the withdrawal agreement before it can be implemented. That is not really a controversial proposal either. It simply says that we should have a proper vote on the most important thing to pass through Parliament in a generation—and a meaningful vote in primary legislation, as is fitting for something so important—and that we should do so before and not after we give Government the powers to start implementing it.
Amendment 7, which was tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), has broadly the same effect. Rather than removing the powers from clause 9, it simply says that they cannot be used until a statute or primary legislation has been passed supporting the withdrawal agreement. Again, that means that Parliament does not blindly hand over powers to the Executive in a trusting way without knowing what the consequences will be or what the agreement looks like.
The whole point of this Bill is that it is taking back power to this country and this Parliament, so that we can decide for ourselves what will happen. All the significant powers in the Bill are subject to the affirmative resolution and those that are not will now be subject to a sifting committee. We are recovering from a situation where, as members of the European Union, we had handed over all these decisions, lock, stock and barrel, to the European Union, so the Bill is a massive improvement, and to dress up this attempt to reverse Brexit as an argument in favour of parliamentary sovereignty is nothing but cant.
Oh my, what Stalinism is this?—that any attempt to disagree with the way in which this Bill is drawn up is somehow a betrayal of Brexit! What rubbish! How insecure are Members who object to any changes in the Bill, if they cannot see that it is Parliament’s job—a job that they argued for when they stood up and tried to defend parliamentary sovereignty—to take some responsibility by scrutinising legislation and proposing amendments to it? That is all we are doing now. We are putting forward an amendment to the way in which the Brexit process—the withdrawal process—should take place. The idea that this somehow undermines the referendum decision is just a load of rubbish and the hon. Gentleman well knows it, and if he had any better arguments, he would put them, rather than using something that is so ridiculous.
The argument that we have heard from the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald) and the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is really quite ludicrous. They opposed what they described as a power grab by Brussels—by the European Union—while we were members of the European Union. They now seem to be advocating a power grab by the Executive, although they said that they wanted to take back control for the legislature of this country. If taking back control does not mean taking back control for the legislature, why on earth did we have the referendum in the first place?
My hon. Friend is exactly right. Let me say to the Conservative Members who seem to be suddenly so keen to give away powers from Parliament to the Executive, that part of our historic tradition has always been our objection to concentrations of power, and indeed our relationship with the EU was a sharing of power rather than a concentration of power. I realise that people objected to that, and this debate is not a rerun of the referendum; it is about how we implement the referendum result. However, it is also—or should be—about Parliament having the confidence to say, “We do not believe in concentrations of power, and we think that each and every one of us has a responsibility to do what we, as elected parliamentarians, think is right, and get the best Brexit deal for the country.”
The power that the Executive will have in making regulations under the clause will be subject to Parliament, because secondary legislation comes to Parliament. These regulations are of a different order of magnitude from regulations made by the European Union, which can be made by qualified majority vote against the will of the British Government and are automatically British law. So this is, in fact, restoring parliamentary oversight to the making of laws.
The hon. Gentleman has himself been a strong advocate of the responsibilities and powers of Parliament, but it does not take long for him to become completely lost down a sidetrack and start talking about what our relationship with the EU has been for very many years. The point is that this process is about how that relationship will change. We know that it is due to change as a result of the referendum and the article 50 negotiations, but the responsibility for all of us is to determine how it should change. The hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do, and as well as every other Member in the House, that the giving of powers in secondary legislation concentrates powers in the hands of Ministers, and does not receive the same scrutiny. Furthermore, this is not just about the concentration of power through clause 9; it is also about the process through which the Government want to make the decisions on the withdrawal agreement in order to trigger clause 9.
I assume that the right hon. Lady has read clause 9. Does she share my concern about the fact that some people seem not to have done so? Am I right to conclude that the clause means that the Government negotiate a withdrawal agreement—arguably one of the most important things that have happened for decades—which will not come to us here, but will be implemented by Ministers? As the Bill stands, that is it: apparently there will be no further involvement of this sovereign Parliament.
I do agree, and I think that goes to the heart of our concern.
It ought to be possible for the Government to agree to my new clause 3, or to amendment 7. Let us think about the points that they have already made. First, they have recognised that there is a problem if too much power is concentrated in the hands of the Executive. They said so yesterday during the debate on clause 7, and I think that they recognise the importance of safeguards on the use of Executive powers. Secondly, they have said that there will be a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement. I welcome that, but I think there is still a difference between us on what counts as a meaningful vote. Thirdly, they have said that there will now be primary legislation on the withdrawal agreement, and I welcome that as well. If we put all those three things together in the right way—the commitment to primary legislation, the commitment to a proper vote and say for Parliament, and concern about the concentration of powers—we get amendment 7 or new clause 3. It is the same thing.
Following the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), may I ask whether the right hon. Lady agrees that the statutory instruments that we are discussing relate to matters of constitutional significance—matters of the sort that we normally only debate on the Floor of the House? It would be wrong for those matters to be dealt with in Committee when the House has not necessarily even agreed to the withdrawal agreement.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right. This is not the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which was all about minor and detailed changes and consolidating legislation through secondary legislation—or that, at least, was its intention. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, this is about hugely constitutionally significant legislation and changes that will affect the course of events in this country for generations.
The right hon. Lady mentioned the different definitions of a “meaningful vote”. Does she agree that a vote that took place at a point at which, for instance, Parliament could not say to the Government, “What you have negotiated is not acceptable” would not constitute a meaningful vote?
The right hon. Gentleman is exactly right. The timing of the vote matters, but so does its constitutional status. That is why I think it immensely important for this to be a statutory vote.
Let me explain why the Government’s words and the Prime Minister’s words—in the written ministerial statement, in various letters and so on—are not enough, and why we need to vote on either amendment 7 or my new clause 3. First, the Government’s unwillingness to put their promises on the face of the Bill is a problem. Parliament needs commitments in legislation before we can give the Executive such strong powers—such constitutional powers—and we need that commitment on the face of the Bill before and not after we do so. Secondly, there is still a difference between us on what counts as a meaningful vote. Without either new clause 3 or amendment 7, it would still be possible for Ministers to offer only a vote on a motion on the withdrawal agreement, and that indeed is the Prime Minister’s intention. The written ministerial statement published this morning says:
“This vote will take the form of a resolution in both Houses of Parliament and will cover both the Withdrawal Agreement and the terms for our future relationship.”
Does the right hon. Lady share my concern about the fact that the vote on the motion of both Houses will come after the ratification of the treaty, and the fact that this House has no power or ability to change treaty terms under the ratification, which renders any vote on the motion meaningless?
I think the hon. Lady is right. The Minister will be able to clarify this later, but I think it is a key point that the vote on the primary legislation— on the implementation of the Bill—will not happen until after the treaty has been ratified. I think that there is still some confusion about whether the vote on a motion, or a resolution, will happen before or after the ratification of the treaty, but the main point I want to make about the weakness of trying to do this simply through a resolution is that it is the primary legislation that counts, and it is clear from what the Minister has said, and what has been said in the written ministerial statement, that the primary legislation vote, the statutory vote, will not happen until after the ratification and the whole legal process have been completed.
The written ministerial statement makes it very clear that the meaningful vote will come after the negotiations have been concluded, but before ratification. That is precisely why it was published today.
I think that there is a big difference between us on the word “meaningful”. I shall be happy to give way to the Minister again, but I think that he should clarify the position, and confirm that the only vote that we will have before the ratification of the treaty is a vote on a motion.
We are talking about a “take it or leave it” deal, and about a “take it or leave it” vote on the completed deal. That is the only thing that is there, even in the written ministerial statement; and there is no guarantee in the legislation, by the way. The Minister is not proposing to put that on the face of the Bill. Even if we take the written ministerial statement in good faith, and even if we rip up our commitment to putting things on the face of the Bill, all that the Minister has given us is the possibility of a vote on a motion, not a vote on primary legislation before the ratification of the treaty.
I would not take any consolation from what the Minister has said. The formal process of ratification of a treaty, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, is that the treaty is laid before the House by a Minister, and if the House has not annulled it within 21 days, it goes ahead. However, we can only have a vote on annulment if the Government allow it, and in recent years they have regularly chosen not to do so. It is perfectly possible, consistent with what the Minister has just said, that the only vote we would have—and this may be what he means by a meaningful vote—is the vote on annulment, which is a “take it or leave it”, completely meaningless vote.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that goes to the heart of this: in the end, the power is still concentrated in the Executive’s hands, whether it is the power to give us a vote on the treaty at all or the power over the timing of any of these votes. That is all still in the Government’s hands, with no reassurances in the Bill, and then there is still only this proposal simply to have a vote on a motion, not a vote on statute with all the scrutiny that brings.
I am conscious of time; I will give way again, but many Members want to speak in this important debate.
Has my right hon. Friend given any thought to the consequences of the possibility, under the Government’s proposed procedure, of this House voting in favour but the other place voting against the motion?
That is clearly a possibility, but I think we should trust in the maturity of Parliament. It is possible for people to vote in different ways, but we have long-standing processes between our two Houses for resolving differences and debating them. My problem is that we are not actually being given the opportunity to have those proper meaningful votes through legislation, and instead we just have these motions, which have no constitutional status.
Can the right hon. Lady confirm that it is Government policy that this place will be given, to use their expression, a meaningful vote? For example, as the talks progress, some hon. Members might say, “Well, hang on a moment; my pharmaceutical industry is being excluded from this arrangement on trade under this particular head of agreement.” That is an example of doing something “meaningful”—the ability of those of us in this place, acting on behalf of our constituents, to change some of the drift of the negotiations, to get a deal that suits everybody in our country.
I agree: it is hugely important that this vote has the proper status in Parliament, as well as our being able to debate the detail.
The point about a potential difference between the House of Lords and the House of Commons again makes me concerned that the Government are toying with only allowing a vote on an annulment motion, presumably tabled by the Opposition rather than the Government, on the original treaty, because then they would have sanction under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which determines what happens if there is a difference between the Lords and the Commons. So, again, I spy a rat.
My hon. Friend is right, and that again shows the importance of having these commitments in the Bill, so that there can be no doubt and no possibility of the Government using clause 9 to start implementing an agreement on which there has been no meaningful vote.
Can the right hon. Lady explain how the timing will work? If there is to be legislation to approve a withdrawal agreement before March 2019, what happens if the agreement is reached too late to allow that legislation to go through all its stages—[Interruption]—or is this a plan to delay the Brexit date?
I thought part of the way through the hon. Gentleman’s intervention that he was finally coming up with a sensible point. I have no control over the timing of the Government’s negotiations; I hope that they and the EU will get on with this quickly, because in particular we need the transitional agreement pinned down as early as possible, as businesses need certainty—and they need that as much in my constituency as in the hon. Gentleman’s. So I hugely hope there will be plenty of time for all these debates to take place. In the event that, against the Government’s will—they have said they do not want this—it ends up being a late deal, Parliament should have the opportunity to ask the Government to extend article 50 for a couple of months, to be able to implement it properly. In fact, the Government will have to do that anyway, because they will not be able to bring clause 9 powers through fast enough not to have to do so.
Is it not far more likely that the Government will have to do that long before then, because everyone, including the Brexit Secretary, recognises that it is simply not possible to get everything agreed within the next year, plus a few months?
That may be the case. It is clearly not what the Government want, and many of us want the certainty early on. Either way, in the end, however, the timing of the article 50 process will be determined by the Government and the EU states together, but Parliament should be able to put its view to the Government, and Parliament so far in this process will be given no choice in that and no opportunity to have its say.
There is another problem with doing this through a resolution. It is not a fit and proper way to decide something so constitutional to simply do it through a resolution or motion of this House, especially when the Government have shown, in their attitude to Opposition day motions and to resolutions they have lost, that they do not give those sorts of motions and resolutions much status and significance at all, and they do not have constitutional or legal status.
It is only fitting, therefore, for us in this Parliament to say that we should do this through statute, but that is also the most important way to make sure the vote is meaningful. As several Members have said, a motion being put to Parliament that, as the Brexit Secretary has suggested, basically says, “Vote for this deal, whatever it is, or leave with no deal at all,” in the end is not a meaningful vote for Parliament. If Parliament is being given the choice of endorsing the deal the Government have come up with, whatever it is, or alternatively saying in effect that we want no transitional agreement, no security co-operation—nothing at all—and we want to just go straight off the edge of a cliff, that in the end is not proper scrutiny and not a proper meaningful vote. It also provides no incentive for Ministers to have to make sure that what they negotiate can get support in Parliament.
At present, the Government have more incentive to come up with a deal that will get the support of the European Parliament than the support of this place. That is not on; that is not acceptable. It is unacceptable that they have more incentive to focus on the interests of the European Parliament than they have to focus on the interests of, and the potential to build consensus in, this Parliament. That is why we need a vote on statute; that is why we need a statutory vote; and that is why we need either amendment 7 or new clause 3, to have a meaningful vote before, not after, the treaty is ratified.
The right hon. Lady talked about a delay of perhaps a couple of months, but if the treaty is not right in the eyes of this Parliament, a couple of months could turn into a couple years, and, indeed, some people would like it to be a couple of decades. Therefore, she talks about a meaningful vote, but what about the meaningful vote of the people of this country, who voted last June to leave the European Union? We need to get this done as quickly as possible, to deliver what the British people voted for.
We had a referendum on whether or not Britain should leave the EU. That referendum has taken place; that decision has taken place; and Parliament has respected that decision. Despite how individual Members might have voted in that referendum, or on which side we might have campaigned, as a whole Parliament has respected that referendum result. The referendum did not decide how we leave the EU, however, or what the Brexit deal or transitional agreement should be. That is the responsibility now for the Government in negotiations, but also for this Parliament.
I point out to Members who claim that somehow we cannot have a parliamentary debate on this because it is an internationally negotiated deal—because, somehow, it is a done deal—that Parliament must be able to have a say in this process and we should trust Parliament to be mature and responsible. A lot of Conservative Members said that if we let Parliament vote on article 50, the sky would fall in because it would somehow stop the Brexit process, rip up the referendum result and get in the way of democracy. But actually, the Members of this Parliament know that we have a responsibility towards democracy. We have a mature responsibility to our constituents to defend the very principles of democracy. That is exactly why many of us, including me, voted for article 50, to respect the referendum result, but we do not believe that we should then concentrate powers in the hands of Ministers to enable them do whatever they like. We have a responsibility to defend democracy and those democratic principles. It is our responsibility as Members of Parliament to have our say and to ensure that we get the best deal for the country, rather than just give our power to Ministers.
The right hon. Lady might agree with me that what causes more consternation overseas among those observing what is going on are the signs that we as a Parliament and as a Government seem from time to time to completely lose our marbles and get involved in polemical arguments that are far removed from the actual matters that we are supposed to be discussing.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is exactly right, and I will defer to him to set out his amendment and describe its impact. The idea that we should make a confidence issue out of every single adjustment to the Brexit process or to the withdrawal Bill is just nonsense.
If we have a Bill before Parliament, it has to be possible for Members of Parliament to table amendments to it and to vote on them. In a hung Parliament, that is even more the case. The Prime Minister asked for a mandate to do all this her own way, but she did not get it. She got a hung Parliament. That puts even more responsibility on us all to work together to find something that will build consensus across Parliament and across the country. In a hung Parliament, the Government sometimes lose votes because Parliament has to do its job to build the right kind of consensus and to get the right kind of outcome.
In the end, this is all about Parliament and democracy. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to our constituents not to hand over, share or give up our authority and our sovereignty, but to exercise our responsibility to get the very best deal. For centuries, Members of Parliament have fought tooth and nail to defend democracy and the powers of Parliament against Executive power. We cannot be the generation that just rips that up and hands over all the power to the Executive. We have a responsibility—now more than ever, given the gravity of the decisions before us—to use that power responsibly and to try to build consensus. To be honest, if the Government cannot build a broader consensus in Parliament, there is no chance of their building a broader consensus in the country, and if they cannot do that, we will end up with everybody rowing over the Brexit deal for a generation to come. For the sake of all of us who want to get back to discussing our schools, our hospitals and all the other issues that face our Parliament, I urge Ministers to accept either amendment 7 or new clause 3, and to start trying to build a consensus that can get us a sustainable Brexit deal.
I rise to support new clause 3 and amendment 7. As mine is the second name attached to amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is mainly responsible for it, I also incline to the view that it is slightly the better drafted, but I will support either proposal if one or both are put to the vote.
I might well succeed in being reasonably brief, because I agreed with every word of the speech made by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and I will not repeat what she said. A welcome note of cross-party consensus exists across a large part of the House, and it represents the cross-party consensus that is in favour of what is lazily called a soft Brexit and of having the best possible close relationship with the European Union after we leave.
The main issue in this debate seems to turn on what we mean by a “meaningful vote”, which relates to our discussion on the role of parliamentary sovereignty in a situation of this kind. I accept that today the Prime Minister—not for the first time—promised us a meaningful vote, but she later went on to qualify that slightly by talking about the need for statutory instruments to be brought forward during the period of the Bill, within the extraordinary powers that the Bill gives Ministers to enact, by regulation, even changes to British statute law. We have to be clear what a meaningful vote is, and the key is the timing. It is quite obvious that if the British Government are to be responsible to the British Parliament, the vote must take place before the Government have committed themselves to the terms of the treaty-like agreement that is entered into with the other member states. Any other vote will not be meaningful.
Please, allow me to continue. It is also perfectly possible, as the right hon. Member for Leeds Central knows, because he is a fine logician, for the other side in the EU negotiations to reject such alternative terms. We therefore hit the question that he cannot evade: under those circumstances, is he or is he not hoping—the Opposition spokesman made what he was hoping for perfectly clear—that Parliament will have the right to tell the Government that they cannot leave on terms that Parliament does not accept? I really think that that is important, if we are to be honest about this, because that is what the right hon. Gentleman and the Opposition spokesman are suggesting.
I have no doubt that it is also what the right hon. Lady who is now seeking to catch my eye wishes to suggest. I will let her do so, and then I shall give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford).
The logic of the right hon. Gentleman’s position is that he wants to rule out any possibility for Parliament even to ask the Government to go back to the negotiating table. Of course he is right that, in the end, this is about a negotiation, and the 27 other European countries will have a view and such a negotiation will take place. The logic of his position, however, is that he wants to rule out any say for Parliament at all, or any attempt by Parliament to ask the Government to try to get a different or better deal, or to change the terms, and that makes absolutely no sense at all for anybody who believes in the role of Parliament.
First, the right hon. Lady has said nothing to contradict my point about what she and other Labour Members are arguing, and secondly, as a matter of fact, that is not a correct characterisation of my position. I am perfectly happy that Parliament should ask the Government, if there is time, to go back and reconsider the terms they are negotiating. I have no problem with that at all. The question is what happens if they cannot succeed in negotiating those terms and, in the end, we reach that crunch point.
No, I am going to make some progress.
Nor is there any getting around the long tail of technical, regulatory secondary legislation that we will need to get through if we want to provide the legal certainty that will make for a smooth Brexit.
I will give way to the right hon. Lady later, and I am coming on to talk about her amendment.
I just want to address the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about illustrations of what this power will be used for, because I hope that that will serve to assuage some of the concerns. The power could also be used to legislate, for example, for the status of goods that have been placed on the UK market at the time of our withdrawal, subject, of course, to what we agree with the EU on that. That could include a whole range of very technical, detailed measures to ensure that EU products continue to be made available in the UK, with no additional requirements on relabelling; to define what is meant by “placed on the market” for those products that benefit from the measures agreed; or to establish measures to facilitate continued oversight of those products. Again, these examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. However, I hope that I have at least addressed the kinds of cases that we are talking about, and also given an idea of the scale and volume of the technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for exit day. Clause 9 will make an important contribution to a smooth Brexit in precisely those areas.
Timing is the crucial issue. Given that there are many examples of an accelerated process being used to get primary legislation through this place on many different matters, including in a single day when that has been necessary, why would it not be possible, if time was starting to run out, to have a very simple one or two-clause Bill that would do the bits of things on which the Minister needs to get agreement and to put the secondary powers in place, and therefore at least have a vote on primary legislation? Why is it not possible to do that very quickly to deal with the concerns that have been expressed?
It is just not practicable. I will come on to address the timeframe for how we are going to approach the agreement, the meaningful vote on a resolution, and then the withdrawal agreement Bill.
This has been a thoughtful debate that has shown the strength of this House, but the thoughtfulness and strength of this House are exactly why the House needs to have a meaningful statutory vote on the withdrawal agreement before the extremely extensive powers in clause 9 are used. The Minister had an hour on his feet; we have had six hours of debate today and many months of debate beforehand, and he still has not come up with a manuscript amendment to clarify what he will do, nor have we had a commitment yet from the Government that the vote will in fact be a statutory one. The only reason that the Minister could give as to why there should not be a statutory vote on the withdrawal agreement was the timing, and yet there are so many examples of when this Parliament has used expedited procedures to get a statute in place just as fast as any resolution.
My understanding is that the Minister has just said that the Government will use clause 9, and will start legislating statutory instruments, long before the due day; it is just, having been legislated, they will not come into force until the due day. That is some kind of concession, but does the right hon. Lady agree that something better might be arrived at in the later stages of this Bill?
I certainly think that something much better is needed, because the powers in clause 9 are unprecedented, and Parliament should not hand over such unprecedented powers to the Executive blindfold, without our knowing what the withdrawal agreement will be. There have been so many examples, whether it is the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013, the Police (Detention and Bail) Act 2011, the Loans to Ireland Act 2010, the Mental Health (Approval Functions) Act 2012, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 or the Northern Ireland (Ministerial Appointments and Regional Rates) Act 2017, Act after Act that has been through an expedited process—they can be done within a week. We can do this if we need to. Timeliness is not a problem.
That is why we need a vote, and that is why Ministers should just stop arguing. They should either ditch clause 9 and agree to new clause 3, or agree to amendment 7.
In order to support the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9
Implementing the Withdrawal Agreement
Amendment proposed: 7, page 6, line 45, at end insert “, subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”—(Mr Grieve.)
To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateYvette Cooper
Main Page: Yvette Cooper (Labour - Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley)Department Debates - View all Yvette Cooper's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am afraid that I disagree. My Scottish colleagues have been behaving with extraordinary good sense, particularly their leader, Ruth Davidson, and my colleagues here at Westminster. Perhaps I have misunderstood some aspect of the hon. Lady’s question. Far from seeing them as supporters of crazy ideas in the context of Brexit, I think that they have consistently shown a moderate common sense in trying to understand the wider United Kingdom position and Scotland’s distinctive position, and trying to take this forward. If I may say so, they are exactly the sorts of allies I want in the course of the work that I will continue doing in this House.
I have spoken quite enough and I thank the House for its indulgence.
I rise to speak to amendment 10, which stands in my name and those of colleagues across the House. I think this follows logically from the wise words that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has just delivered to the House. Like him, I support new clause 17, and I also want briefly to mention new clause 1 and amendment 44.
From the start of the Bill’s passage through the House, my concern has been about how it concentrates power in the hands of a small group of Ministers. Be we liberals, communitarians, socialists or conservatives, in this House we are democrats all. It goes against all our British political traditions to concentrate power in the way the Bill still does—even after the amendments have been made—over decisions that could affect our children and grandchildren for generations to come. The referendum decided that we will leave the EU, but it did not decide how, and those decisions should not be so concentrated in the hands of a small group of Ministers, especially in a hung Parliament.
In Committee, we often went one step forward and then two back with regard to the interests of parliamentary democracy. That is why further amendments are needed today. Ministers did agree to the amendments put forward by the Procedure Committee, which will give Parliament a bit more of a say over whether the affirmative or negative procedure is used for secondary legislation, but Parliament will not be able to insist on which procedure is followed or that changes should be made in primary rather than secondary legislation. That is why new clause 1 is so important.
The Bill would still allow a small group of Ministers to take away workers’ rights and equality rights, which have been hard fought for over generations and hard won through this place, and they would be able to do so with hardly any say from Parliament. Therefore, those of us who have been part of the fight for greater equality and for workers’ rights for many years cannot just stand by while those rights are diminished. Nor should any of us, whatever our view, be part of agreeing to the wide scope of ministerial powers still embedded in clauses 7 and 9, allowing Ministers to do simply “as they consider appropriate”. Amendments 44 and 2 are important attempts to limit those powers to what is necessary, and Parliament has a responsibility to do so. I hope that those in the other place, whose job is to scrutinise the Executive and stand up for Parliament, will consider these matters very seriously when the Bill reaches them.
Parliament has agreed that there should be more democratic say over the withdrawal agreement itself. The previous amendment 7, which was agreed to in Committee against the wishes of Ministers, made it clear that we must have a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement. It said that that vote should apply not to a motion, but to a statute, and that we should be able to take a decision before the treaty is ratified, not after, and before implementation starts. I know that Ministers have considered rowing back on that, and I strongly warn them not to do so. They should respect the spirit of our debates and the views of this House.
Several Government amendments relating to the date on which we will leave have undermined that meaningful vote. My amendment 10 seeks to deal with the conflict between the previous amendment 7, which was passed, and the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and the Government. Those amendments on the date would bind Parliament’s hands and concentrate powers with Ministers when it comes to considering the final withdrawal agreement and as we come to the supposedly meaningful vote.
In Committee, we debated the fact that it was unwise at this stage in the negotiations to include the date in the Bill, because that could make it difficult to handle late problems in the process or to renegotiate any aspects of the agreement if we get a bad deal. It also restricts Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and call for changes, if necessary, once we see what the Government propose as the final deal. Suppose, for example, the transitional arrangements miss out something that is extremely important for our security, or for a sector of our economy. Parliament should at least have the chance to debate that and decide whether it wants to call on the Government to go back and try to negotiate a further change, or propose adjusting the timings—even for a few months—while the issues are sorted out. The Bill, as it stands, prevents us from doing so, and it could mean that Parliament is simply timed out. It would force us back to the very situation that Parliament rejected when it passed the previous amendment 7. In other words, Parliament would basically have to choose between the Executive’s deal and no deal at all. That is not a meaningful vote.
The amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for West Dorset do not help, because they allow the date to be changed, but only by Ministers—not by Parliament, even if Parliament takes a different view from the Executive. In addition, they allow the date to be changed only if an alternative date is included in the withdrawal agreement, so if Ministers agree an alternative date with the EU, they can use secondary legislation to change the date in our legislation, too. That is not on, because it will effectively give the EU Parliament more of a say than this Parliament over whether the date should be changed. That is hardly taking back control.
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way in this tight debate. The negotiation before Christmas came down, in the end, to the Ireland question. Does she accept that allowing enough flexibility, as many of the amendments do, is crucial to the final, icing-on-the-cake deal?
My hon. Friend is right. It is immensely important that we get these decisions right. I have proposed, in amendment 10, that the date should be settled in Parliament in the statute that provides for a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement. It is the obvious and logical consequence of agreeing to the previous amendment 7, which requires a vote on a statute. Let us set the date for departure in that statute, rather than in this Bill. I propose that when we get to the withdrawal agreement, we confirm the date, because the terms and timing of departure should go hand in hand. In that way, we do not concentrate all the power in Ministers’ hands.
We need to make sure that when Parliament has a meaningful vote, we have proper transparency and a debate on the decision, and that is why new clause 17 is so important. The Government have ruled out membership of the single market and the customs union. Everyone recognises that the single market issues are complex, linked as they are to questions of immigration and how we deal with future rules. That makes it even more important for Parliament and the public to be able to scrutinise the Government’s decisions on those complex issues. To do so, we need to know the facts and the impact on the economy and our constituencies.
On the customs union, the issues are more straightforward, but the need for transparency is the same. Being in the customs union is immensely important not just for Northern Ireland, but for manufacturers across the country, especially across the north and the midlands. The Prime Minister, we understand, has had special meetings with City financiers about what they need from the Brexit deal, but what about Yorkshire manufacturers in my constituency? Where is their chance to have their say on the customs arrangements that they need? Where is the opportunity for us all to see the impact of not being in the customs union, the impact of decisions about the single market, and the impact on jobs in our constituencies before, not after, we vote on the withdrawal agreement? The ramifications of these decisions are immense.
The amendments are about strengthening the power of Parliament, no matter what kind of Brexit we think is best, and no matter what our politics or party membership. The amendments are about the health and resilience of our democracy, and about us all working together to get these crucial decisions right.