European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with an apology to your Lordships’ House. Because of professional engagements I was unable to be present for the opening speeches of the debate at Second Reading, but I have been able to reassure my Front Bench, and most particularly the Whips, that they can be certain of my presence throughout the Committee and Report stages.

I should like to speak briefly on those amendments, particularly Amendments 6 and 7, that deal with the customs union and the single market. I wish to express my deeply held view that we need to remain members of the single market and the customs union, or something very like them. That is absolutely essential if we are to retain our national prosperity. I agree precisely with what the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said on this subject, and all the analyses thus far bear that out. Indeed, we are seeing current prejudice being caused in terms of reduced investment, reduced growth and reduced spending. You do not have to look into a crystal ball; it is happening now.

Perhaps I may also say—with some regret, because I am talking about colleagues of mine in the other place—that those who have criticised the analysis produced by civil servants have in my view brought discredit upon themselves. As a Minister, I worked with officials for more than 10 years. I never knew or encountered a conspiracy to frustrate the policy of Ministers. I believe profoundly that those analyses were made in good faith and broadly speaking are correct. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that they should be published. They may not be right to the nearest decimal point, but I am certain that they correctly identify the direction of travel. I have never thought that Brexit was a car crash, but I do believe it takes the form of a seriously deflating tyre and will cause the same kind of trouble.

Turning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on Northern Ireland, I wholly agree with him and, if need be, I shall be voting accordingly in the same Lobby as him. We have talked about and agreed to a frictionless border between the Republic and the Province. I do not see how that can be achieved other than by the customs union or something very like it. Those who talk about technology are, I think, talking rubbish. I know of no technology that would achieve that purpose, and if there was such technology, I do not believe it would be affordable by a whole range of smaller businesses.

Incidentally, although it is to digress a little, I think that one of the surprising consequences of Brexit is that we will be asked to consider identity cards for British citizens. Once we have a frictionless border in Northern Ireland and once we have migration—as will happen—how can we operate our immigration controls without identity cards? That will be a very considerable consequence.

I want to make one final point, which echoes one made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. Nothing was said in the referendum that obliges this House or Parliament in general to do something that is deeply prejudicial to our national interest. Nor, indeed, is that the consequence of the general election, which was not, in all conscience, a great triumph for the Conservative Party. From time to time, one has to put one’s assessment of the national interest before any other consideration, most particularly before one’s assessment of one’s party interests. That happens at various times in one’s career. It happened early in my father’s career, 18 months after the Oxford by-election, when he was compelled to vote against Chamberlain. He was much criticised then. It happened at the end of my career in the House of Commons with regard to the second Iraq war, which I deeply deplored. I helped to craft the anti-war Motion and acted as a Teller to make sure that Motion was voted on. Both of us were criticised at the time, but I am bound to say that those criticisms have not survived the historical experiences that we have all seen.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend entirely about putting the country before party. He mentioned that nobody had said that we must leave the customs union and single market, but I recall very well that David Cameron—who I rate enormously—George Osborne and Michael Gove, from different sides, said that we must leave not only the single market but the customs union if we voted to leave.

[Viscount Hailsham]

It is the business of Parliament to form a judgment. We will come to other debates fairly soon—in the next group of amendments—that intend to give Parliament the decisive say. That is our function and we must not shelter behind constitutional niceties in order to refrain from doing our duty. I will certainly do whatever I can to ensure that we remain as close as possible to the customs union—and if I could, I would also frustrate the policy of Brexit.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, the noble Lord concluded his remarks by saying, effectively, that it should be Parliament that decides the terms. I am wholeheartedly in favour of that. It is an essential part of representative democracy, by which I mean that Parliament, at the end of the day, should be in a position to determine whether the terms that have been negotiated are acceptable, whether the absence of terms is acceptable, whether no deal is acceptable or whether we should remain in the European Union. It is Parliament, not the Executive, that should make that decision.

The amendments that have been tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Hain—it is remarkable that I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, having been in disagreement with him for, I suppose, 25 years or so—are absolutely right. Give Parliament the power to determine the exit date and you greatly reinforce the control that Parliament has as to the outcome.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to make clear my unequivocal support for the last three speeches. The critical issue that my noble friend Lord Adonis raised on the interplay between the various clauses that deal with the timing and the possibilities of how that could go wrong and the points made by my noble friend Lord Hain and also the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on the sovereignty of Parliament seem to me to be right at the very heart of what the whole process in this House is about. It is either about us assuming the responsibilities that we are supposed to have and display, or it is about giving Ministers what they have plainly wanted throughout, which is the ability to take decisions irrespective of what Parliament might wish. I hope that Ministers will not be tedious enough to get up and deny that this is what they have been trying to do. At every key stage of this process, whether in front of the Supreme Court or elsewhere, it has been essential to force out of the Government an understanding of the role of Parliament and that Parliament will not be set aside.

Like everybody else, I have of course thought hard about why anybody would put a hard date into a clause of a Bill of this kind. Why would you do it? The answer is that it is a party management issue—and only a party management issue. I am sure that many noble Lords on the Government’s side of the House will recognise that there are costs and disadvantages alongside what they might regard as advantages in taking the steps that they have taken. But the advantage they perceive—which seems to outweigh everything else—is that they can say with conviction to the people who are determined that we leave, crash out, or go any which way out of the European Union that they have set a hard date and have in some sense given certainty by virtue of that. I believe—and I think in this debate the House overall is likely to believe—that the complexities with which this country and this Parliament are faced in trying to deal with this absolutely massive constitutional, economic, security and every other kind of issue means that the setting of a hard date is about as arbitrary a thing as you could conceivably do in the circumstances.

In his response to the last debate, which I regret I found very limited, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said of a number of the amendments that they required reports to be made and the dates for many of those reports were arbitrary. There could scarcely be a more arbitrary date than this date, when almost nothing has been learned so far about the Government’s intentions and when there is absolutely no certainty that we will learn any more about those intentions. The fact is that setting a date makes it more or less impossible to conceive of all the different elements being drawn together with sufficient coherence for any of us to exercise that final act of parliamentary authority that we have all been promised.

I recall just three, four or perhaps five weeks ago, the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, spoke on industrial strategy. He made the telling point that, whenever we deal with people from other countries who have strong industrial strategies, strong industrial histories and a great deal of success in all those, we go about it believing that our native wit and wisdom is so superior to all of them that we can constantly get exactly what we want from them and they will never have a presentable argument to put to us. The noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, quite rightly said that if you look at the countries where we tend to take that view—Germany, Japan, China now and the United States—you come across people who are extremely competent at developing industries and strategies, who have views and will argue for those views and who may very well prevail. In this discussion about what future trade will be like, those arguments will be displayed with great ability and, I have no doubt, will not be the pushover that many on the Government Benches seem to think they will be.

I suspect that one argument that will be made about having a hard date is that it focuses negotiation and is a means of drawing a negotiation to some sort of conclusion. I have said before in your Lordships’ House—and I do not say it to cause offence—that my experience is that, by and large, politicians are not the best negotiators that you ever come across. Many of us have spent parts of our lives as trade union negotiators or general secretaries of trade unions, have done negotiation in government, in the Foreign Office—in my case—and so on or have spent a great deal of their lives negotiating in business and in industry. I say without any doubt in my mind that if I wanted to make my life more difficult in any negotiation, I would say, “Here is the deadline”, and let everybody else stretch me out across the rack that I had made for myself, because that would be the easiest thing that they could conceivably do—and they will do it. If you are in a position of enormous strength, I guess you could say, “Well, we have set a date, we are going to push everybody else along”. But if you are not in a position of enormous strength and if, peradventure, you are in a position of enormous weakness, everybody else will take the maximum possible advantage and they will succeed.

I have heard some of the comments made by others who have business experience, and I draw attention to my entries in the register as well. In business, I have never once seen the weaker party in a negotiation have any advantage out of a fixed deadline. If we ever needed to learn that in spades, we would look at what is happening in Northern Ireland now and the constant setting of deadlines—which has happened in the past—only to find that the people of violence, or the people who have been prepared to allow people of violence to push the envelope further, have always been those who took the greatest advantage of it and made it more or less impossible for anybody else to make real progress.

I hope that we will not trap ourselves in that way. These amendments give us a means of not trapping us in that way, and I urge all noble Lords to give us the best chance we can have, rather than the worst.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

The Government are incoherent on this issue. We therefore have the right to demand clarity before the Bill becomes law. The Bill takes the UK out of the European Union. The Prime Minister has just said that she wants us to stay in many of its foreign defence and development activities. How will that happen and how far are the Government prepared to commit themselves to it? I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my purpose in adding my name to Amendment 12 is to enable the Government, through my noble friend, to explain what arrangements they intend to put in place before Brexit, in order to ensure that the United Kingdom is a full participant in the formulation of foreign and security policies which inevitably will be of great and enduring consequence to us all. The absence of such arrangements would be a conclusive argument against leaving the European Union. Noble Lords should be clear about this: if we wish to punch above the weight that naturally attaches to a country of relatively modest resources, it is because we are part of and not outside the structures of the European Union.

For five years, I had the good fortune to serve in the Foreign Office under the overarching authority of Douglas Hurd. It is much to be regretted that he is not able to participate in this debate. His authority within the diplomatic and international community was great. This was due in part to his patience, his personal integrity, the temperate language that he always employed and his willingness to compromise. He never sought to promote himself by appealing to the wilder fringes of any political party. My noble friend was a model of a Foreign Secretary and I commend his example to all his successors. I digress for a moment and say that I very much regret that this House does not have the opportunity of hearing from Mr Jack Straw and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, both of whom would have made a valuable contribution to this debate.

When working under Lord Hurd of Westwell, I had immediate departmental responsibility for a number of important areas: the collapse of the former Soviet Union; central and eastern Europe, most especially the war in former Yugoslavia; and the turmoil, then as always, in the Middle East. We did, of course, have distinctive political policies on all these matters and we have distinctive bilateral relations with the relevant countries and institutions. But looking back on my time in the Foreign Office I am sure it is true that we made a real difference when we were able to work with our European colleagues and within the framework of collective European policy.

Collectively within the European Union, the United Kingdom was more influential than it would ever have been standing alone. This is not the age of Lord Palmerston or Don Pacifico. If one looks forward to the major international problems that we now face, that judgment remains good. Consider the ambitions of Russia; the ever-increasing power of Asia, especially China; the fact that America is once again detaching herself from the rest of the world and, most notably, Europe; the risk of war on the Korean peninsula; international terrorism; the problems posed by climatic change; the instability in the Middle East and the rise of militant Islam. In respect of all these matters, a collective approach is infinitely more effective than the individual policies of a middling power such as ourselves.

There are also some specific problems to consider. What of our permanent seat at the Security Council? As a member of the European Union, our permanent seat was less controversial than it might have been. Outside the EU, our status as a permanent member will be under increased pressure and, in any event, the status of France will be greatly enhanced.

What about Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands? Outside the councils of the European Union we will not be able to rely on the automatic support of our European neighbours. Further, on any view, our role as America’s principal interlocutor with the European Union will cease. These considerations, by themselves, leaving aside all others, are a good and sufficient argument against leaving the European Union: that is my considered position. However, for the purposes of this debate, these concerns should cause this House to put questions to Ministers. We are repeatedly told by the Prime Minister and others that while we are leaving the European Union we are not abandoning our close ties. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, usefully summarised our position paper, whatever it actually meant. We need more detail. We do not want bland reassurance. “Brexit means Brexit” is a quite meaningless phrase. It is not a policy or even an indication of a policy. Indeed, it is conclusive evidence of an absence of policy. Therefore, I say to my noble friend that this House is entitled to know in detail what arrangements will be put in place before we leave the European Union to ensure that the United Kingdom is a full, active and influential partner in the policy decisions that will certainly affect the lives of our fellow citizens for years to come. I doubt that this House will get a clear answer. I suspect that we will be none the wiser when the Prime Minister makes her long-awaited policy speech at the end of the week.

If decisions were made at last week’s meeting at Chequers, that is welcome. It is almost, though not wholly, true that any decision is better than no decision. However, we are entitled to ask why on earth such strategic decisions were not taken before we triggered Article 50 and not now, with but 12 months or so to go. The absence of any arrangements and procedures of the kind identified in these amendments is by itself a good reason—there are many other good reasons—to reject the policy of leaving the European Union. Therefore, I look to my noble friend to give clear guidance on what procedures and arrangements the Government propose to put in place. This House is entitled to clear and precise answers to these questions, for they are fundamental in character. This is not a time for indecision, fudge, weasel words or lack of clarity. Having our cake and eating it is not an indulgence now available to us.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I had not meant to intervene but since the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, has speculated on my views, I wish to put some things in context. Obviously one seeks clarity but I think there is a certain note of hysteria going around. Only a few moments ago, we had a question and answer session showing just how impotent the EU, and, indeed, any of us, have been in relation to Syria. The EU does not even manage to pay its subscriptions to NATO and has been impotent in relation to Russia’s behaviour recently. However, our own performance as a permanent member of the Security Council, a position from which we cannot be dislodged unless one entirely rips up the charter, has been admirable. If we want to continue to be an interlocutor between the continent of Europe and America, it is not a good idea to shoot ourselves in the foot by being even more uncivil towards President Trump than is absolutely necessary. As far as foreign policy and security are concerned, we are members of the Five Eyes group, which, from what I have read, is rather more efficient in its actions than what is going on in the EU. While we of course want clarity, there is no need to panic. We have to consider what the EU has done historically in relation to foreign policy. Over the last 40 years, it has had as many failures as successes whereas our record has been pretty good.

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[Lord Goldsmith]

No, I will make some progress on the arguments which matter. As the Constitution Committee of this House said at paragraph 119 of its report, the conundrum is this:

“The primary purpose of this Bill is to maintain legal continuity and promote legal certainty by retaining existing EU law as part of our law, while conferring powers on ministers to amend the retained EU law. If, as the Government suggests, the Charter of Fundamental Rights adds nothing to the content of EU law which is being retained, we do not understand why an exception needs to be made for it. If, however, the Charter does add value, then legal continuity suggests that the Bill should not make substantive changes to the law which applies immediately after exit day”.


I want to examine the reasons that are put forward for not including the charter. The more I look at the arguments, the more convinced I become that the Government have got it wrong. I will not deny that there are issues as to the best way to bring the charter into effect in domestic law, and there are other amendments which will debate that, but Amendment 13A would require the Government to bring forward proposals for its continued application and the route by which the charter can be given effect.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Would the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee whether he is contemplating that the charter should be incorporated into domestic law as a statute, and as such be capable of amendment?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am suggesting that the charter is brought into domestic law in the same way as all the other provisions of EU law will be brought into domestic law by this Bill, if it is passed. That means that they will be subject to the powers in the clauses that will be passed for amendment through orders, if this House and the other place approve that way of doing it. They will also, of course, as always, be subject to amendment by primary legislation. I will come on to this, but it is interesting that special protection is given to the ECHR through the Human Rights Act to protect it as we go forward, but there is no protection provided at all for the rights which underlie the charter. That is one of the deficiencies that are not taken account of in the Government’s proposal.

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[Lord Goldsmith]

I said that I would come back to it, and that is what I intended to do. A number of things have happened since the charter was drafted, as I said on Second Reading. The courts have referred to provisions of the charter and have given them effect. The decision was made to give the charter legal effect, which was not the way we started the negotiation. That is what happened in the Lisbon treaty, but that was not the original intention. That is what we argued against at the time, precisely so as to avoid the situation in which the courts were in a position to give effect to rights that we had not expected them to give effect to. That is what changed. That is why we now have a situation, where, as I have said, in a number of cases the courts have said that the charter has an effect and provides enforceable rights to individuals.

I conclude. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered that the Government’s decision to exclude the charter, while effectively retaining nearly all other EU law, was taken without having undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the implications for the protection of rights. I cannot say whether that is right, but this amendment would require a focus to be given to that so that we can see what the correct analysis is and what the right way to proceed is. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 14A, 20A and 25A in this group, which stand in my name. I apologise for the absence of my noble friend Lord Bowness, who has put his name to a number of amendments but cannot be here because of weather conditions. He has asked me to apologise to your Lordships for his absence.

The purpose of the three amendments standing in my name is to ensure that the terms of the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, are capable of amendment by Parliament. This may be implied by the other amendments, but I think not. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord. While there is a capacity to remedy deficiencies by regulation, there is no capacity to enable Parliament to mount a careful scrutiny and amendment of the charter. Therefore, the purpose of my amendments is to make it explicit that the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment.

I do not want to say very much by way of a general justification for the need to incorporate the charter; I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord who has spoken has much greater expertise than I. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will probably speak. He, too, has much greater knowledge of this than I. I am but a journeyman lawyer and I have never had to wrestle with the charter’s significance in domestic terms. However, I noticed last week in the Times that Professor Bogdanor made a very powerful case for not scrapping the rights. The important thing that your Lordships need to keep in mind is that the charter provides a number of rights and remedies not found elsewhere in our domestic law. That point was made by the noble and learned Lord.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

Yes, I know that is what he has said but I ask noble Lords to think about the impact on those who will lose their assets. That is the point I am making. I agree with my noble friend but my point is: what about the position of those who lose their assets?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am just going to finish this point and then I will give way. It is at that point that Article 17 of the charter comes into play. As the Committee will know, Article 17 provides that property is to be protected and, furthermore, that rights of compensation are to be paid. This is the protection that this House would be very chary about giving away. I give way to my noble friend.

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend will know that Article 1 of the first protocol of the European convention does precisely the same thing.

[Viscount Hailsham]

So there is an overlap, and the question is one of remedies. As my noble friend will know, the remedies under the charter are probably more effective than the remedies under the convention, and that is the point that the noble and learned Lord was making.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My noble friend seems to be saying that we need to incorporate this into British domestic law to protect ourselves from an extremist, wicked Government, but surely if such a Government were elected, one of the first things they would do would be to scrap this law using their parliamentary majority.

[Viscount Hailsham]

That would have to get through both Houses, which would be at least some check on the process. The point I am making is not quite the point that my noble friend has interpreted. I am saying that, if the charter is to be incorporated into domestic law, it has to be the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and amendment, and that is the only basis on which the charter should be incorporated into domestic law.

I accept the noble and learned Lord’s point that a number of aspects of the charter are entirely irrelevant and are hinged on our membership of the Union. Articles 44, 42, 43 and 39 are examples of that. There are also articles in the provision of the charter that many of us would disagree with. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has indicated that she does not like many of them, and I happen to agree with her. I heard my noble friends Lord Howard, Lord Lamont and Lord Blencathra chuntering away, and I agree with them: there are many things in the charter with which I disagree. But I am saying that if it is to be incorporated, it should be incorporated in such a way as to enable this House to scrutinise each and every one of its provisions and amend as appropriate.

I remind the Committee that one reason many noble Lords and others wish to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights is that the judge-made interpretation of the text is incapable of amendment by Parliament. I wish to avoid that criticism being made of the charter if it is to be incorporated. The suggestion in my amendment to make the charter, if incorporated, subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment is perhaps the only example in this sorry business of being able to cherry pick, or to have your cake and eat it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, may I respond to some of the objections that have been raised to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with whose speech I agree entirely?

Many of the objections—those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, are typical—are to the content of the charter or to its implications. The Committee should appreciate that that is not the Government’s position. The Government’s position is not that they seek to exclude the charter because its contents or implications are objectionable. Their position is very clear indeed. If noble Lords read the debates in the House of Commons or look at the report of the Constitution Committee, they will see that the Government’s position is simply that we do not need the charter in this Bill because its contents and implications are already contained in the retained EU law that is being read across through this Bill. So many of the objections that the Committee is listening to are simply beside the point: they are not the Government’s objection to the charter. The Government’s objection to the charter—it is unnecessary because its contents are already part of retained EU law—is, I am afraid, simply unsustainable. I will not take up time on this, because the hour is late, but if any noble Lords are doubtful about it, I simply suggest they read the helpful opinion by Jason Coppel QC, in which he clearly sets out the equality and human rights position. That is the first point.

Turning to the second point, I am always reluctant to disagree with my noble friend Lady Deech, because she taught me law at Oxford, but I have to disagree with her on this occasion. Her objection, as she explained it, and I hope I do not misrepresent her, is that she is concerned that the charter will enable the courts to overturn legislation enacted by Parliament—she is nodding. But I am sure she appreciates that that is inherent in this Bill. The whole point of the Bill is to read across as retained EU law the content of existing EU law that is applicable to this country and to give it—see Clause 5—supremacy. Supremacy means that it takes priority, as in the Factortame case, over anything enacted by Parliament which is inconsistent. So the suggestion that we must oppose the charter because it gives courts that power is simply inconsistent with what the Bill does.

Turning to the third objection, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was concerned about whether the inclusion of the charter would, in some way, give a power that expands the role of the charter further than under EU law. My simple answer to that is no, of course it does not. The charter is being read across only because it is part of existing EU law, and it comes across as retained EU law. It will not have any greater force than it already has as part of EU law.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Cherry-picking.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Not at all. It is curing the curate’s egg and producing an acceptable piece of guidance which has the best bits of both, which is what we need to look for. I am not cherry-picking; I am analysing.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Having your cake and eating it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

No, this is analysis. Let me explain what I would like to do.

I quite like the words of Clause 6(2) as it stands:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard to”,


a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after the exit day because that fits very well with the way we are looking at the position before exit day. It is certainly true that it is a negative way of putting it, but I regard it as a helpful transition to the new situation. However, I do not like the remainder of Clause 6(2) for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. That is where I would like to bring in the passages from the latter part of his formula, which are that a court or tribunal may have regard to such judgments or decisions where it considers them relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law.

I would take out “appropriate” from Clause 6(2), for reasons that have been referred to already, and would leave out the early part of proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 56 where “must” is used. I would prefer “may” to “must”, leaving it to the court to make its own decision regarding whether the matter is relevant.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wilson of Dinton (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 71, I will also speak to Amendments 116, 253 and 257, which are in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Lisvane and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. My noble friend Lord Lisvane has asked me to convey his apologies for not being here to move the amendment himself, but he has to be absent to speak at a memorial service in Cardiff for an old friend. I am sure the Committee will understand that reason.

I feel we are now coming to the heart of the Bill. I confess that, while listening to the debates, I have found myself thinking of the Bill as creating a Frankenstein’s monster. It is sewing together 40 years of EU law, snipped around to fit with this country’s law. Clause 7 gives a Minister of the Crown the power to snip away at EU law and British law to try to get them to fit together. It is a task on a huge scale, and I do not believe anyone, wherever they are working, can quite get their mind round it at the moment or round what the consequences will be.

These amendments would tighten, in two ways, the threshold which the Minister of the Crown has to reach in order to be able to exercise the powers. They would tighten it by providing, first, that the powers could be used only where it was “necessary” to use them, not where it was considered “appropriate”. Secondly, they would give an objective test for whether the use of the powers was necessary, rather than the subjective test of whether the Minister considered it appropriate.

I believe that such changes are needed and would be justified by three things. First, there is the sheer scale of the task being undertaken. Of course, there are limits to the power—it can only be used to correct deficiencies in EU retained law which arise from withdrawal from the European Union and do so in areas which are not excluded by Clause 7(7)—which are important. But there are still huge swathes of law which could be amended under the powers. From listening to a sample of the debates that the Committee has had over the last days, those include human rights, the environment, the welfare of animals—there is very little in the legislation we are dealing with that does not affect most aspects of people’s lives in this country.

The power itself is very broad: to make law which has the status of an Act of Parliament. An extraordinary subsection, Clause 7(5), says:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament”.


We are talking about the power to make Acts of Parliament without going through the processes of Parliament, which I find breath-taking.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

And in an unamendable sense, because it is to be done by resolution—there can be no amendment to those resolutions.

[Lord Wilson of Dinton]

The noble Viscount reinforces the point which I am trying to make. The Explanatory Notes explain that the power also extends to,

“altering Acts of Parliament where appropriate”.

We are talking about the power to make law and to amend existing law. This is the dream of tyrants through the ages. It is something which is repugnant to the history of this country and the development of our legal system. My argument to the Committee is that the House should lean as hard against it as it can, provided that does not get in the way of achieving the desired result of a functioning legal system. We should not leave leeway which allows Ministers to do things which would be policy changes. I am uneasy about the danger that policy changes could come through the use of the power.

When you try to marry 40 years of legislation with British law, there will be endless choices to be made: you could go this way; you could go that way. Policy is tied up in the interstices of quite small decisions about how the laws should be married together. We should lean against anything which encourages policy change and we should focus the Minister’s power exclusively on achieving a functioning legal system, without going wider. If the law as it emerges needs to be improved, it should be improved by separate legislation that goes through proper processes. We should give only the power that is strictly necessary from the point of view of the objects of this legislation.

Another point I draw to the Committee’s attention is the number of people who will be able to make and amend law. I am not a lawyer—I was 50 years ago, but I am not now—but if I read the Bill correctly, it gives the power to a Minister of the Crown, as defined in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975. Section 8 of the Act says that a Minister of the Crown is anyone who holds,

“office in Her Majesty’s Government”.

I have not checked this, but my memory is—it used to be imprinted on me when I was working in the Civil Service—that you can have up to 109 Ministers in the Government, so 109 people are being authorised to make or to amend law. In addition, the Commissioners of Customs and Excise will be given the power to make law and amend law, subject to the restrictions. That is another seven people—a Permanent Secretary and a number of directors-general—being given this power which tyrants dream of.

In addition, I draw the Committee’s attention to where the Explanatory Notes say that the power could include,

“sub-delegating the power to a public authority where they are best placed to deal with the deficiencies”.

So we are talking about giving public authorities the power to make law without going through parliamentary processes and to amend law. What is a public authority? According to Section 14, “public authority” is defined by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. If you read that Section 6, which I will give in its entirety, it says in subsection (3) that,

“‘public authority’ includes … a court or tribunal”.

I ask the Minister: are we seriously proposing to give the power to make law to a court? This is constitutional territory which is completely novel. Paragraph (b) in that subsection says that “public authority” includes,

“any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”.

The proposal before this Committee is that the power to make and amend law within the conditions set out in the clause could be capable of being given to any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature, which in essence is any public servant. I put it to the Committee: is this necessary or reasonable?

[Lord Wilson of Dinton]

Is this reasonable without reference to Parliament, or to the lightest sifting procedure where any recommendations can be made?

I ask the Minister whether he has an estimate of how many people may be given the power to amend law and make law. I would be interested just to know the number. If you have so many people, possibly hundreds, given the power, you should restrict it as much as you possibly can, so far as is consistent with the objects of the Bill.

Why do I think that the phrase “the Minister considers appropriate” is inadequate? First of all, “appropriate” is a word which should be avoided as much as it possibly can. In my last jobs in the Civil Service, I was sometimes faced with proposals that the Minister should be able to do something “when appropriate”. I always reached for my red pen and struck it out.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I would always include it.

[Lord Wilson of Dinton]

I think we are making the same point, which is that it either conceals inadequate thought, or it is devious.

Of course, the truth is that, if you are in government, you want to surround the Minister and yourself with plump cushions of legal protection. The legal phrase is “ex abundanti cautela”. It is about excessive caution—you do not want to take risks. I have to say to the Committee that, in this case, I think the scale of the powers proposed is so extensive that we should lean against giving Ministers plump cushions of legal protection; it should be the strict discipline of an objective test of what is necessary.

It is interesting that the Government themselves, in their White Paper last March, used the language of necessity. The White Paper twice said that the powers would only be usable “where necessary”. In the cases which it provided where the powers might be used, it used the word “need”: it used the language of necessity; it did not use this language of appropriateness. I think it is only recently, with the sudden alarm that the scale is going to be so great, that the desire for plump cushions has arisen. I think that the Government are backing away from an undertaking only to have the power usable where it is necessary, which they gave in March last year and which they should have stuck to.

There are all sorts of arguments which may be used, such as that the word “appropriate” is used in other legislation. I think that is true, but I do not think that it is justified in this case, where the scale is so extensive. It could be argued that, when faced with a choice, there are different solutions and, therefore, there is no solution which is necessary. That is a flimsy argument—that horse will not run. What we are saying in this amendment is that the power should be used where its use is necessary, not where the solution is necessary.

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The Supreme Court has also said that it is well established that, unlike statutes, the lawfulness of statutory instruments can be challenged in court. Does the Minister appreciate that? Even if a statutory instrument gives Ministers broad powers, the courts have established that they will apply limitations. The broader the power, the more likely the courts are to intervene to ensure that the intention of the law in question is not being altered or undermined.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Not only that, but the more tightly constrained the language of the Bill, the more readily the courts will intervene.

[Lord Bilimoria]

I thank the noble Viscount for that intervention. At the moment, the courts very rarely intervene. They had to intervene with Article 50 being put through Parliament; that was fundamental. This House defeated the Government twice by almost 100 votes each time in two of the biggest votes in the history of our Parliament—614 of us voted in one and 634 in the other. Do we want a situation where this Parliament or the Government are continually challenged by the courts? We do not want to go there, and this is why these amendments are important.

I conclude that the power to amend all EU-derived primary and secondary legislation by the Government without sufficient scrutiny, checks and control, bypassing Parliament, goes against the ultimate supremacy of Parliament itself.

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[Lord Dykes (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow five or six scintillating and convincing speeches, all saying similar things, and I entirely concur with what was said. Therefore, I can be very brief. First, I thank my noble friend Lord Wilson for his remarks. I apologise to him for missing the first minute and a half of his speech because I naively thought that two government Statements would last a bit longer than they did; they were very brief indeed. I surmise that my noble friend referred to my noble friend Lord Lisvane, a very good friend to many of us. I assume he is on onerous public duties in Herefordshire. Sadly, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, cannot be present due to illness. Therefore, two sponsors of the amendment are sadly unable to be here but that in no way weakens the strength of this message for the Government. I hope the Ministers on the Front Bench will listen very carefully to these words.

It is also worth noting that, apart from a later big grouping, this group contains the largest number of amendments of any group since the Committee proceedings began. This is the subject that most exercises the Members of this Committee and, I think too, quite a number of MPs although they are sometimes under much greater pressure for obvious reasons not to say too much about it.

I was very struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said and by what he said representing the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Since I am an amateur and not an expert on these matters, I was impressed by the comments of the Bar Council on its worries about these matters. In paragraph 60 of its general statement, it said:

“Clause 7 empowers Ministers to make regulations to ‘prevent, remedy or mitigate’ any ‘failure of retained EU law to operate effectively’ or ‘any other deficiency in retained EU law’. Clause 7(5) includes an open-ended power to make ‘any provision that could be made by Act of Parliament’. There are comparable Henry VIII powers in Clauses 8(2) (in respect of regulations to ‘prevent or remedy’ any breach, arising from Brexit, of the UK’s international obligations”.


It went on to say in paragraph 61:

“We consider that these provisions (and in particular Clause 7) continue to raise serious concerns both from the perspective of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament and in respect of legal certainty”,


which we sometimes forget. By the way, as the sunset clause possibilities in Clause 8 have been mentioned by at least one speaker, in paragraph 67, the Bar Council adds:

“While we recognise that the Henry VIII power in all three clauses (7-9) is subject to sunset provisions, we do not think that this is sufficient to address the above concerns. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the operation of the amending powers and sunset clauses will need to be carefully reconsidered in the light of whatever is ultimately agreed for any transitional period or under the Withdrawal Agreement”.


I agree with the passionate remarks of my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the dangers facing this Parliament—mainly the other House, of course, but also this one—in allowing these dangerous provisions to go through without any amendment. I anticipate a major expression of unease, to put it mildly, when Report stage comes along. I hope and pray that will be so, and we look forward to the Minister speaking in the framework of that need to assuage our anxiety when he comes to reply.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I rise to speak primarily —subject to pre-emption, whatever that means—to Amendments 73 to 79 and Amendments 117 to 119, which are in my name.

I think we ought to start the debate—although we have started it already—by reflecting on how very wide the powers contained in Clauses 7 to 9 are. They are powers exercised by regulation: mostly by the negative procedure, but some by the affirmative procedure. However—this is the critical point—in both instances, the regulations when laid cannot be amended. That raises an issue that I hope this House will come to on some subsequent occasion, because I have a number of amendments in my name on that very subject.

These powers are very wide-reaching. One way of ascertaining how significant they are—I hope the right reverend Prelate will forgive me if I use the word “significant” in this context—is to look at paragraph 2 of Schedule 7, which lists the provisions that can be made only by the affirmative procedure. I cite a few examples: the creation of a public authority and presumably the powers to be given to it; the transfer of legislative powers from an EU entity to a UK-based public authority; the levying of fees without specific limit, which I am sure noble Lords know we will come to later in Committee; the creation of criminal offences that attract a custodial sentence of up to two years, which, again, we will come to later in our debate; and the creation of powers to legislate or amend existing powers. These powers are not trivial in character. I have not sought to identify the various powers that could be exercised by way of the negative procedure, because their name is legion.

There is one fundamental rule in politics, which I have learned from 31 years in the House of Commons: if you give powers to Ministers and officials, those powers will be abused—sometimes by design and sometimes by inadvertence, but the abuse will happen and that is certain. It is especially so when the powers are created by secondary legislation because the parliamentary oversight is slight and ministerial oversight is often non-existent. So the question your Lordships should be asking—I agree with my noble friend Lord Lang that it is a pity more noble Lords are not asking themselves this question tonight—is whether the language in the Bill is sufficiently tightly drawn to prevent abuse. The answer to that question is manifest to all of us and all noble Lords who have spoken: no. The Bill does not prevent abuse; it enables abuse.

The powers given to Ministers are “appropriate”. That is a weasel word. Nobody is better placed than I to describe it as such. It is a subjective word, very difficult to define in advance, impossible to challenge and non-judicable. That is why, when I was a Minister, I used it often—at the Dispatch Box, in drafting and in correspondence. I knew full well, as does every person who has stood at the Dispatch Box, that “appropriate” means precisely what the Minister wants it to mean. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, is quite right about that. Might I suggest the Corbyn/Johnson test to your Lordships? It is very useful. I look to my side of the House and ask, “How many of your Lordships want to see Mr Corbyn possessed of these powers?” I now turn to the other side of the House, lest noble Lords think I am being partisan, and ask, “How many of your Lordships want to see Mr Johnson possessed of these powers?” The joke is that you can reverse the question and get the same answer.

We should not allow the draft as it is. I accept that the distinction between “necessary” and “essential” is pretty minor. I can live perfectly well with the word “necessary”. “Essential” is one notch higher in the hierarchy of requirement but I accept that “necessity” has been hallowed by legislation in the past. I encounter that word frequently in regulatory law, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, was absolutely right to touch on the point of judicial review. If you use the word “necessary”, it makes things easier to challenge. There have been many appeals in the regulatory framework where the courts have held that the test has not been laid out.

I want to comment on two other amendments I have ventured to propose. Amendments 74 and 117 require the Minister to have “reasonable grounds” for his or her decision on the need to trigger the regulation-making powers. I will be open about this: my purpose is to tighten the test, to make it judicable and to limit the discretion. I would very much like to know from the Minister why he objects to the use of reasonable grounds as the criterion for exercising the power. I am sure he is not going to say that he wants to rely on unreasonable grounds; that is not, I think, an argument he would like to put forward. We are entitled to know the justification.

I have one very small point on Amendment 75, which includes a reference to redundancy. What does that reference add to what is already covered by the retained part of Clause 7(2)(a)? It comes to this: the main issue for this House is to require a test of necessity to be imported into these three clauses and elsewhere in the Bill where the Government want us to accept a lower threshold of need—or, more precisely, put no threshold at all. I regard this as matter of considerable importance and I want to know—as I am sure the Committee does—why the Government want us to prefer a word that gives the maximum discretion to Ministers, but the minimum control and influence to Parliament and the courts.

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[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, these are hugely important amendments. The Minister will have noted that not a single Member of the Committee has spoken in favour of the present position in the Bill. From all sides of the Committee, it has been stated that the Bill, as it stands, is not acceptable. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is not present today, for reasons that we all entirely understand. Noble Lords will recall what he said at Second Reading, when he talked about this as the biggest transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive in peacetime. I entirely agree. I agree with what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Lord Cormack and Lord Lang of Monkton—with whom, or rather under whom, I was privileged to serve on the Constitution Committee, when he chaired it. I agree also with the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. Everybody has taken the same position in relation to that.

Let us look at the key amendment, Amendment 71, to which I am privileged to have added my name, just to note the importance of what it does. It would replace the statement that “the Minister considers it appropriate” with “it is necessary”. As a former Minister, as a former adviser to Ministers and as a practising lawyer, I fully see the significance of that change. I know as a lawyer that if I am able to say to the judge, “All that is required is that the Minister considers it appropriate—how can you say that he did not? How can you second guess that?”, I am home and dry. If, on the other hand, I have to show that it is necessary—not just in the Minister’s decision, not just on reasonable grounds, but that it is in fact necessary—then that is the test that the court has to undertake in order to satisfy itself. The point behind these amendments is that nothing less than that will do to enable this huge transfer of power to the Executive from this House.

I do not need to repeat the remarks made by other noble Lords about how taking back control should not mean taking back control by the Executive—that is not what anybody had in mind. I do not need to repeat the remarks about the number of Ministers that this gives power to. I am not even sure that the figure of 109 is right. I recall, in government—no doubt the Minister will tell me that it does not apply here—that all Ministers can act, and often do act, by their officials. The Carltona principle means they can sign the instruments, so it may mean that the 109 is multiplied manifold. I have no doubts about their good intentions, but this is not what our system requires, and we should not be giving it up in these circumstances.

Other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Dykes, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, have also spoken powerfully in favour of these amendments.

I have a couple of other points to make, as most of what I wanted to say has already been powerfully and clearly expressed by noble Lords. The most important point is the one I started with, which is that the Minister must see the unanimity of view, as it appears at the moment, around the Committee about the change that needs to be made. We can debate whether it is essential or necessary. I rather agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that “necessary” has become a term well understood by the courts and so it is probably the better one to have, but the end aim is the same. That it is not a decision for the subjective view of the Ministers is the other key point on which we agree.

One point that I want to deal with, which has not had much discussion so far—although the noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised it—is Amendment 244A. It proposes that there should be a statement by a Minister as to the need for the change, and it is not simply a policy change. There is merit in that proposal, I would suggest, though not as a substitute for the amendments we are proposing. I draw attention to the similarity with Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, an excellent provision which requires that a Minister has to certify that a piece of legislation is compatible with the convention rights. We see it on the very front of this Bill itself. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, is not in his place. He had a lot of involvement in making sure that that worked, by insisting that when it came to certifying that legislation was compatible, it was not just on a wing and a prayer.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. Taking his point, if you were to combine the certification together with the requirement that the Minister had to have reasonable grounds for triggering regulatory power, then one has a very high degree of protection, does one not?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount. I would go further. First, I would say that the amendment needs to change the test so that it is “necessary”, not “considers necessary”, not “considered on reasonable grounds”. Secondly, the way the Human Rights Act certification works is that it is not enough for the Minister to have “reasonable grounds” that it may be compatible. What is required—at least when I was in government, and as a result of the diktat that was given to the Civil Service—is that the Minister must have legal advice that, more likely than not, the court would agree. I am glad to see the Minister nodding because that means that the same principle is being applied under this Administration as under the Administration in which I was privileged to serve.

Therefore, I take the noble Viscount’s point, but it is important that it is not just a consideration but an actuality based not on reasonable grounds but on fact. Obviously there is some judgment to be made about “fact” but it needs to be clear and there might, in addition, be a role for something like Amendment 244A.

This is the second time today that this Committee has considered the use of the word “appropriate”. Those who were not able to be present may wish to read the report of the earlier debate when we considered the use of the word “appropriate” in rather different circumstances—whether judges could and should rely on European case law in reaching decisions and whether it was enough that they should find it relevant or appropriate. One noble Lord who is not in his place suggested that the judges could use the law if they found it “helpful”. My worry is that that is exactly what the Government think “appropriate” means here. If this power means that Ministers can make regulations and changes because they think it helpful to do so, that is not what this House should allow them to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

If the noble Lord will have a little patience I will get on to that in a second.

If regulations could only make “necessary” provisions, the powers would be heavily restricted to a much smaller set of essential changes. For example, if the Government wanted to change references in legislation from euros to sterling, we would expect such a change to be considered “appropriate” both by the courts and, I hope, by this House, but it might not be considered “necessary”.

We might manage to ensure that our statute book is in a legally operable state, but it would not be in its most coherent form, or arranged in a way that best promotes our national interest. I am sure that this Committee does not intend to restrict the Government from legislating coherently or in the national interest, but that may be the unintended consequence of amendments which swap “appropriate” for “necessary”.

I note that some of the amendments in this group contain wording suggested by the DPRRC in its report on the powers in this Bill. In particular, I was interested in the assertion that:

“The operative test in Clause 7 should be whether it is necessary to deal with the problem, not whether only one solution follows inexorably”.


I first highlight that I do not believe that these amendments break up the necessity process in the way that the committee intends. I also question the merits of breaking up the necessity test in the way that the committee suggests. In its report, the committee cites the example of a deficiency in which there is:

“A requirement to collect and send information that will no longer be accepted by the EU”.


The committee states that it,

“is clearly a deficiency that it is necessary to remove from the statute book: it cannot be right to retain a redundant legal duty that amounts to a waste of time, effort and public money”.

However, I question whether this change is strictly necessary, or whether it is merely appropriate. The committee asserts that it cannot be “right” for this arrangement to continue—and I agree with it—but is it strictly “necessary” that it be removed? What great harm, after all, would be done if the information were still sent? The statute book would continue to function, albeit illogically and not in the public interest. But is it necessary, in a strict legalistic sense, to have the statute book working logically and in the public interest, or are all our changes merely appropriate? In these sorts of instance we cannot with any certainty predict the way in which a court might rule. It is precisely to guard against such a decision that the Government cannot support the suggestion made by the committee.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Is the Minister saying that he will not accept these amendments because he might be defeated in court? If so, that is a thoroughly bad reason.

[Lord Callanan]

I think I have made my position clear on that but, nevertheless, I also said that we are listening and endeavouring to satisfy the concerns of noble Lords.

Amendments 73, 119 and 141 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and also spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lang, meanwhile used “essential” rather than “appropriate” to limit the discretion of Ministers in exercising the delegated powers. This really is very similar to the amendments which propose the use of “necessary”. I think that a court would likely interpret the meaning of “necessary” and “essential”—in this context—in much the same way and, therefore, I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Will the noble Lord help this Committee as to the distinction in law between a fee and a charge? At the moment, I am rather puzzled.

[Lord Turnbull]

I am about to get to that. There are other fees and charges which, as a matter of policy, raise more than enough to cover costs and these should be treated as taxes. I think that in the national accounts, even if the words “fee” or “charge” or “levy” are used, statisticians look at the facts of the case. If there is this surplus generated beyond the simple covering of costs, then it would be classified as a tax.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham]

What about fees and charges? Are they the same?

[Lord Turnbull]

If something generates a surplus, it is equivalent to a tax and should be covered by the same legislative understandings about taxes.

There is a third category, where a conscious policy relates the fee not according to how much it costs to administer that piece of service to a business or a household but to something like wealth or income. The most egregious example of this was the recently introduced change in the schedule of probate charges, where larger estates are being asked to pay not what it costs to administer the probate but according to the size of the estate, producing charges many times greater than the pure costs. We need to decide in this amendment whether all fees and charges should be treated as taxes—that would be the simplest thing—or whether it is possible to make a distinction between those fees which are purely covering costs and those which go beyond, either in the total or in their social distribution. I hope that the Minister will agree to come back to this House with amendments which make that distinction.

The issue will resurface when we get to Amendments 348 and 349, which deal with Schedule 4, where we have the possibility that secondary legislation could be used to introduce fees and charges by a body that was itself created by secondary legislation. I should say that that would put us not just in double jeopardy but jeopardy squared. We are going to have to deal with the problem of these two points in our work on the Bill.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 86 and 127. I will be very brief because the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has described the problem we have over fees, charges and legislation. I remember that, when I was on the board of Transport for London and we brought in the congestion charge, it was the alliterative nature of the word “charge” that led us to use it, rather than any legal definition. So my answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is that there may well be legal definitions but I think they are now observed in the breach on many an occasion.

[Viscount Hailsham]

The community charge was clearly a tax and not a fee.

[Baroness Kramer]

The noble Viscount gives a superb example. We can think of parking charges and a whole wide variety. That is why it is really important that there is clarity over when a statutory instrument is the appropriate mechanism and when, frankly, it is not. The Bill as it stands does not give that clarity.

I also put my name to these amendments for another reason. Most in this Committee will remember the time of the tax credit debacle, a major policy change that most of us regarded as a change that should have been introduced as part of a welfare Act. The Government sought to accomplish that through a statutory instrument attached to a Finance Bill. Because of the nature of charges and money-type instruments, it is very possible to use them to affect very broad policy issues and not just the narrow issue of revenue raising. That is why Amendment 127, for example, is an important amendment, as are others in this category. We are all concerned about the inappropriate use of Henry VIII powers, since this Government have actually tried to use these to achieve those much broader policy ends in the past. We have to be sure that we are not leaving a mechanism by which that could be repeated, because that really would be a coach and horses through many of the concerns and issues that have been raised.

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[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

With some timidity, may I offer a cruder and less specialised perspective, somewhat along the lines of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler? Taxation and mandatory fees and charges are surely, in principle, cardinal to the social contract and the liberty of the subject—that is, the subject cedes liberty as part of a democratic deal. In the past when monarchs have attempted to impose taxes, Parliament has continually rebelled. It is Parliament’s job to decide taxation, fees and charges, through primary legislation. I deeply support these amendments.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, most notably Amendment 86, the lead amendment. The first thing to perhaps acknowledge is how wide the power is in Clause 7. I acknowledge that the Minister will make this point. The power proposed under Amendment 86 would be governed by the overarching provisions of Clause 7, but it is also fair to point out that Clause 7 has a very wide scope. If one looks at Clause 7(3), one sees that the Minister has a power to enlarge the interpretation of the legislation in question.

The second point is that if one looks at paragraph 2 of Schedule 7, one finds that a fee—an important word in this context—imposed by a public authority can be created only by the affirmative procedure. What the Committee needs to address, however, is the distinction between a fee and a charge. The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, suggested a difference, which I think was that a charge involves a surplus, so that perhaps it should be treated as taxation. But I am not sure that definition is recognised by law.

[Lord Turnbull]

I do not think I was making a distinction between fees and charges—they are just words. They broadly mean the same thing and both suffer from the same defect.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I am sorry if I misunderstood him, but I understood that he sought to suggest that a charge that creates a surplus in effect amounts to a tax. However, I am bound to say that if he is right and these things are essentially the same, that creates a very major problem. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 says that an instrument that allows the imposition of a fee by a public authority can be created only by affirmative resolution. But then, I ask rhetorically, what about a charge? If the fee is governed by the affirmative resolution procedure and a charge is not, we are in an extremely difficult situation. What is a charge? Incidentally, I am not sure this really helps the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, but if one goes to paragraph 6 of Schedule 4, one finds the phrase “fees or other charges”, which rather suggests to me that there is a distinction between a fee and a charge.

I have a number of specific questions for my noble friend the Minister. First, what is the difference between a fee and a charge? Secondly, related to that, does the provision of paragraph 2 of Schedule 7, which insists that a fee can be imposed only after the creation of a power by an affirmative resolution, also apply to a charge? If it does not, we have a wonderful situation whereby the fee can be imposed only if the power is created by a statutory instrument of the affirmative kind but that is not true of the charge.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

May I throw another word into this taxation Scrabble? What about the word “contribution”? Most of us in this House have paid national insurance contributions for most of our lives. Is that a tax, a charge, a fee or a contribution?

[Viscount Hailsham]

The point is a very sound one, although of course most of us no longer pay national insurance contributions. There is of course another word that one could use, which is “imposition”, as in a financial imposition. The real truth is that we are entitled to a proper definition.

Having focused on some specific narrow points, I would just like to look at one or two general ones. The first is the point that I made on Wednesday, and I shall keep a firm grip on it: any power given to Ministers and officials will be abused. That is an absolute cardinal rule of politics. Secondly, the degree of ministerial and parliamentary control on any statutory instrument is minimal. I speak as one who has considerable authority for saying that: for 10 years I was a Minister and I do not know how many scores of statutory instruments I signed off, but it must have been a very large number.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Too many.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

My noble friend Lord Forsyth was also guilty, I hasten to say; we were the same in that respect.

The third point is that statutory instruments are not amendable by either the negative or the affirmative procedure. Moreover, and this is the point that we dealt with on Wednesday, the regulation-making power is triggered if the Minister thinks it appropriate. I remember very clearly the way that my noble friend Lord Callanan dealt with the argument that we should delete “appropriate” and insert “necessary”. He did not like it, but he is left with this: if a Minister, by affirmative or negative resolution, thinks it appropriate to levy an imposition—a charge, a contribution, a fee—on a citizen, he can do that. I regard that as a very unhappy state of affairs and, should this come to Report, I will not be supporting it.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I was once estimably advised by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull. I want to look at this amendment from the point of view not of the civil servant but of the Minister. I think your Lordships’ House has already understood how difficult it would be for a Minister to understand what he could or could not do under this part of the Bill. First of all, he would have to turn to the modern equivalent of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, to ask him what the distinction between a fee and a charge was, and I am not sure that the noble Lord’s equivalent could be entirely precise as to what that distinction was because it is almost impossible to tell.

The noble Lord sitting next to the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, got up and pointed out the word “contribution”. Of course when talked of in terms of national insurance a contribution is manifestly a tax, but it does not cover the cost of the service to which it is actually appended. It must therefore be possible to have a fee that does not cover the cost but is in fact a tax. That suggests that this part of the Bill—I do not speak of any other part—has not been entirely well thought through.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 86, 126, 127 and 155—in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Turnbull, Lord Lisvane and Lord Higgins—concern Clauses 7, 8 and 9 and the ability to provide for taxation or fees and charges under those powers.

Let me start by saying that the Government are aware of the concerns of many noble Lords about the raising of fees under these powers. On Report, we will look closely at how we can resolve those concerns. Let me explain the various issues, beginning with Clauses 7 and 9. I am glad to be able to reassure noble Lords that the restrictions in Clause 7(7)(a) and Clause 9(3)(a) already prevent Ministers establishing charges of a type that would involve any element of taxation or tax-like provision under these powers. Beyond that specific issue, I want to set out the Government’s intentions with regard to those fees and charges.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Will my noble friend tell the Committee what, in his view, is the essential difference between a fee, a charge and a tax? The Committee must understand the expressly defined difference.

[Lord Callanan]

If my noble friend will stay with me, I will come on to that. Beyond that specific issue, I will set out the Government’s intention with regard to fees and charges. We have included the powers in Schedule 4 to provide for fees and charges in order to be clear and transparent. It is, however, necessary for the powers in Clauses 7 and 9 to interact with existing regimes to correct deficiencies within them, and to properly modify them to reflect the withdrawal agreement. Without prejudice to our negotiations, an example of such a correction might be modifying a fee in relation to the authorisation of a credit rating agency so that the fee becomes payable to the UK financial regulators rather than the European Securities and Markets Authority. That might be argued to amount to the imposition of a new fee.

The requirements to pay new fees and charges established under Schedule 4, and the ability to modify existing regimes, will depend on deficiencies being properly corrected and on functions being transferred. Clauses 7 and 9 are not primarily aimed at imposing fees, and they cannot impose other kinds of charges, but sometimes that will be part and parcel of the correction. In answer to the questions about fees and charges from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the other poachers turned gamekeepers—if I may refer to them as that—on the Privy Council Bench, a fee is a payment only for a service received. By a charge, in paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 7, we mean anything which goes beyond cost recovery. Clause 7 cannot create a charge. In addition, creating either a fee or a charge is subject to the affirmative procedure.

The argument against a tax restriction—

[Lord Lisvane]

Before the Minister responds to that point, could he also answer my question? He has sought to make a distinction between a fee and a charge. Could he explain why, at page 761 of the latest edition of Erskine May, there is no distinction made between fees, charges, impositions, contributions or anything else of that sort? The test which is set out there, and is reflected in the current practice note from the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel—available on its website—is whether or not those payments are,

“akin to taxation in their effect and characteristics”.

I suggest that an additional test needs to be applied to the template which the Minister has offered.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am sorry for my noble friend, but he did say that both the fees and the charges were subject to the affirmative procedure. I know that the fees are, but I am not sure where in the Bill I find the provision that charges are subject to the affirmative procedure. Will he tell the Committee?

[Lord Callanan]

I do not have the specific clause in front of me, but I am sure that is the case and I will write to the noble Viscount about it. I am not an expert on Erskine May and the precise legal definitions, but I will have a look at the matter towards which the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has pointed me.

The argument against a tax restriction on Clause 8, made by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is altogether different. The Clause 8 power is predicated on the fact that when we leave the EU, without further action we may inadvertently end up in breach of certain international obligations which have been affected by our EU membership, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out was said in the other place by my honourable friend Robin Walker. It is possible that some of these obligations may be in the field of tariffs, although it is, of course, impossible to know the full picture until our future relationship with the EU has been negotiated. If Clause 8 had a tax restriction as the other main powers do, we may not have the capability to remedy these breaches in all circumstances. As I hope noble Lords will appreciate, we are committed to international relationships and a key part of that is ensuring that we are fully compliant with our international obligations.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

What about “appropriate”?

[Lord Callanan]

It would be totally appropriate and, indeed, necessary to do so in the circumstances. We are in a difficult position in that we are trying to plan for all eventualities. It is one of those powers that we hope we will never use because, of course, we want, and seek, a good agreement with the EU.

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[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I had intended to stand up before the noble and learned Lord sat down to respond to his kind invitation. Perhaps it would be to the benefit of the House if I note that, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, this issue has been debated previously in the debate on the sanctions Bill. As with the issue we debated last Wednesday—the appropriate test for the use of delegated powers—the solutions found in the sanctions Bill are at the forefront of our minds in this regard and we intend to meet noble Lords to discuss the issue over the coming weeks. I will set out the Government’s views at the conclusion of the debate on this group of amendments. I very much look forward to hearing what noble Lords have to say but I thought it would be helpful to say this at the start.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, in view of what my noble friend has said, I can be very brief. I support the first four amendments in this group, to which I have set my name, and have ventured to put forward a sort of default position in my Amendment 340. As the Committee will appreciate, the purpose of the first four amendments is to ensure that the regulatory power now under discussion cannot be used to create a criminal offence, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has set out very clearly the reasons for this. Amendment 340, which stands in my name, is the default position, so that if by any evil chance this Committee or your Lordships’ House decided that it was right to create a criminal offence, it should be one that does not attract a custodial sentence.

We need to be quite plain about what we are talking about. The Bill as presently drafted enables the Minister, if he deems it appropriate and subject to the affirmative resolution, to create a criminal offence that attracts a custodial sentence of up to two years. Two years is not an insignificant period, and it is very important that one reminds oneself that the test is whether the Minister thinks it is appropriate. Furthermore, we must go on reminding ourselves that the procedure—that is the affirmative resolution procedure—is simply not subject to amendment. So this is, in effect, the power to introduce a criminal offence which attracts a custodial sentence by fiat or declaration. I find that profoundly unattractive.

As a former Minister who signed an awful lot of statutory instruments, I know that the degree of ministerial oversight is extremely limited. As I said, if this Committee decides that a criminal offence should be creatable in this way, then surely it should not attract a custodial sentence of any kind.

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, my name has been added to a number of the amendments in this group and I appreciate the Minister’s intervention, which should make this debate fairly short. I want to take up an earlier point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley: he said that he thought some of the speeches were too long and bordering on filibustering. That set a little alarm bell ringing in my mind. I have sat in on some of the debates and I have read others, and I think that this Bill is being handled by this House in the appropriate way that it deserves. Some of the speeches, from all the Benches, have been among the best I have heard in parliamentary debate.

The Minister, in referring to his Privy Council Bench, said that they were poachers turned gamekeepers. I say, en passant, that I look on them as sinners turned penitents, but that is a matter of taste really.

As I say, there have been some magnificent debates, but I worry where we are going on this. Sometimes I wonder whether the Ministers are adopting the tactics of the great boxing champion Muhammad Ali. His “rope a dope” strategy was to take all the punishment in the early stages and then have his own way in the later stages of the fight.

I hear what many noble Lords have said—the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, among them—that of course the House of Lords can go only so far with its opposition in the face of the Commons. The contribution from the father of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who warned of an elected dictatorship, comes into play here. So too does something I have mentioned on a number of occasions over the past 20 years that I have sat in this House: this House has the right to say no. We must ask ourselves why successive Governments, some with very large majorities in the House of Commons and some who have reformed this House from time to time, have left it with the right to say no. The reason is that unless we retain the right to say no, we would become a debating Chamber and the Government could simply use their Commons majority to force things through willy-nilly, regardless of whether or not we oppose them. I realise that, in some areas, we bow to the wishes of the elected House, even when we do not want certain things to go through.

As happened in the past two sittings of this Committee, we have discussed in great detail two very important constitutional issues: the right to impose taxation and, now, with this group of amendments, the right to create criminal offences. The proposals go to the very heart of our constitutional settlement and, in my opinion, to the very heart of the responsibilities of this House. Therefore, although I appreciate that a considerable promise was made at the opening of this debate, I say this to Ministers and to colleagues who have made outstanding speeches: regarding our red lines about the right to impose taxation and to create criminal offences, somewhere down the line, if what the Government come up with is not satisfactory, in our responsibility to defend the constitution this House must reserve the right to say no.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, this Bill gives UK Ministers powers to make statutory instruments that would include the power to amend the founding Acts of devolution without requiring the consent of the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Scottish Parliament. These powers could be used in relation to policy areas, as noble Lords have said, that are the responsibility already of Welsh Ministers, Northern Ireland Ministers and Scottish Ministers. The assumption is that the UK Parliament would legislate to alter their powers. Obviously, there may be times when this is pragmatically acceptable, but what is not acceptable or reasonable is that, under the provision as drafted, the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly are not required to give their consent.

I wish to speak simply and briefly, referring specifically to my experience as a Wales Office Minister, as a Member of the Welsh Assembly for 12 years, as a Minister in Wales and as a Minister for Northern Ireland in this House. It is safe to say that I have seen it from both ends of the telescope. It has been unthinkable from the start of devolution that UK Ministers would progress in these circumstances without the consent of the devolved Assemblies and Parliament. It has been an early-established principle of devolution that that did not happen. There has on occasion been sabre-rattling but it has not happened because that principle was established.

I am pleased to see the amendments of my noble friend Lady Suttie in relation to Northern Ireland because we are in danger of behaving as if the phase of devolution in Northern Ireland has passed. It is important that the Bill caters for the resumption of devolution in Northern Ireland.

I am pleased to hear from the Minister that the Government are planning changes. However, I know that he has too much respect for devolution to be happy with the situation in which he finds himself today. It is a muddle, a mess, and almost provocative. I certainly would not for one second lay this at the Minister’s door, but it is almost provocative to leave it to the last minute so that, effectively, the opportunity for government amendments in Committee has been lost. I am sad that we are in this situation because it is becoming increasingly negative, when we could go forward in a positive manner. I have tremendous respect for the Minister, his experience and his belief in devolution; I hope his replies will reassure us.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my intervention will be extremely brief. I was entirely persuaded by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said. To allow the Westminster Parliament to interfere with the constitutional settlements already agreed without the consent of those constitutional Parliaments or Assemblies is a recipe for disaster. It will stir up nationalist opinion in a way that we would be very well advised to avoid.

The only other point I will make is that the mechanisms for making these changes are unamendable. The Scots Nats in the House of Commons would be active in arguing that it was profoundly wrong to have a regulation before the House—if it was ever before the House, and that is extremely questionable, as we know well— which they could not amend. I can think of few things more calculated to fracture consent and fragment the union.

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[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

I have not spoken on this Bill at all yet. I have made a point of not speaking because I understand the pressure on the Government, but I want to raise one issue—trusted trader status. The Government have told us that they intend to establish such a system on the border of Northern Ireland and southern Ireland. We are told that an exemption will apply to small and medium-sized enterprises involved in cross-border trade. The Government say that it is possible to manage the allegation that there will be substantial fraud under such a system. First, where can we find a definition of what constitutes a small or medium-sized enterprise? It is very important that we know that in advance. Secondly, do we know what percentage of trade will fall under that description? Thirdly, when they talk about “managing” a system, what kind of management arrangements do they intend to set in place to ensure that fraud does not take place? Finally, what will happen when it comes to customs entries for those firms that are not covered by trusted trader status? Will the clearance and entry arrangements for their goods going over actually be on the border posts? I presume that if some businesses are exempt then there must be some actual control on the border itself. These issues need to be answered at a very early stage in the procedure. I have truncated much of what I wanted to say, but I want to get this on the record this evening.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My intervention at this stage will be extraordinarily brief. What I say about Amendment 104 also applies to Amendments 105 and 106, which are in the two subsequent groups. There is a great deal of merit in requiring these reports, but there is no reason at all why they should be linked to the initiation of the regulations: that is slightly misconceived. The noble Lords, and my noble friend, who put their names to the amendments are lacking ambition. They should require these reports to be published, in any event, before Brexit day. As the Committee knows, later on in this debate we will come to the issue of parliamentary control. Parliament can only exercise full control if it is in possession of facts, and the facts will be furnished by these reports. Those noble Lords, and my noble friend, are right, thus far, in linking it to the institution of regulations, but they should be ambitious and, on Report, require these reports before Brexit day. If my noble friend does that she will find me with her.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, given transport’s essential role in supporting the UK economy, transport issues should be given high priority by the Government in this Bill and other legislation relating to Brexit. It does not seem to have had that level of importance attached to it. Amendment 104 requires that no regulations should be laid that would amend UK-EU border transport procedures unless Ministers can demonstrate that the new procedures will not increase delays to freight transport. I appreciate the sentiments of my noble friend Lord Hailsham. I will take his comments under advisement on Report because, as he said, this is such an important issue.

The time sensitivity in modern logistics and UK supply chains means that retaining a seamless supply-chain process is of significant economic importance. Customs clearance, as well as passenger entry mechanisms to the UK from the EU, including on the island of Ireland, should be as seamless as possible. If the UK leaves the EU, the current system whereby all trucks can operate through the EU on the basis of a one-page document, and without requiring specific permits, may well not continue. UK-based road haulage businesses have benefited considerably from the EU principles of free movement, which has meant that UK lorries and their drivers can cross borders and operate within other parts of the EU. The Government’s own statistics suggest that 85% of the lorries operating between Britain and the other 27 EU countries are owned by businesses in the other EU 27 countries rather than the UK. In order for these international commercial arrangements to continue if we leave the EU, specific arrangements will be required that have not yet been negotiated. As far as I am aware, this cannot be achieved through our domestic legal system. It is a separate issue from the customs union and depends on access in some form to the single market. If we leave the EU without proper agreements in place or if we fail to maintain full regulatory alignment, road haulage, especially from the UK and Northern Ireland to Ireland, will face barriers. This does not fit with the aim of frictionless trade and our commitments under the Good Friday agreement, notwithstanding the comments of my noble friend Lord Robathan.

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Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

109: Clause 7, page 6, line 27, at end insert “or which have effect after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day”

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to the three amendments in my name, Amendments 109, 134 and 188. These are intended as sunset clauses but, as I do not want them to be sunrise clauses, I intend to be extraordinarily brief.

Those of your Lordships who have been in Committee during debates on Clauses 7 to 9 will know that I am very unhappy about the process those clauses attract. For example, the powers within those clauses are very widely drawn, the scope is considerable, the regulations are made by secondary legislation with very limited scrutiny, both parliamentary and ministerial, and they are triggered by a test—the test of appropriateness—which I regard as wholly unsatisfactory. For all those reasons, my view is that the regulations made under the regulation-making powers should die two years after Brexit and should, if necessary, be replaced by primary legislation. That is my suggestion to the Committee, and I hope it commends itself to your Lordships. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 111, 137 and 192 in this group and share the unhappiness that has just been described. Mine is a narrow but, I think, important point.

The thrust of most of the amendments in the group —not the noble Viscount’s—is about consultation and transparency. You do not have to spend long working in Parliament to realise that scrutiny very much depends on the input of stakeholders—I hate the term but I cannot think of a better one at this time of night. They assist us to understand how things work in practice, both with technicalities and wider issues. That is not to say that I do not have great admiration for parliamentary counsel and the lawyers working in the departments, who are most concerned with statutory instruments, but my amendments would require consultation on the regulations provided for by Clauses 7 to 9. This should all be a co-operative venture, with stakeholders contributing at an early stage, not least for the reason that the regulations are statutory instruments and not open to amendment, so you have to get it right from the very start.

I was a member for some time of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which received a lot of very valuable representations—lobbying, if you like. I suspect we will not hear comments in support of Amendment 228 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, about the Cabinet Office code, but I support the application of the code to the regulations. We may well be told that of course the code will apply. I have to say that in my time on the committee, we undertook quite a lot of work on the application of the code in practice and were quite critical of the responses we received from the Cabinet Office. One of our criticisms was that when consultation was undertaken—which it was not always—on the statutory instruments we were considering, the Government did not publish the responses to the consultation before they published the statutory instrument, so the work was not as helpful as it should have been.

Other amendments in this group are more detailed. Mine is not very elegant. I am not proprietorial about it but I wanted to raise the subject because some provision is necessary and, if I may say so, appropriate. It is a step that is very easy to miss out and I hope we will not be told that all the regulations in question are simply about technicalities and that stakeholders would have nothing to add to the exercise. Practitioners in almost every area may see what is workable in proposals being put forward, as well as substantive points.

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[Baroness Goldie]

People are bellowing “End!” in my right ear and I know which side my bread is buttered on.

I have spoken at length but I hope I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns. I urge the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, this group of amendments has enabled the Committee to identify matters of considerable importance. I think that the Committee will say to my noble friend that she has tried to be helpful. We do not always agree with her but we are grateful to her for the way in which she has responded. Important issues have been raised with regard to statutory instruments and consultation with stakeholders. These matters will be addressed later on in future sessions of this Committee. The hour is late and, with the consent of the House, I would like to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 109 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Given the disproportionate impact of leaving the EU on a no deal basis or on terms that are unacceptably bad for manufacturing, agriculture and all the services, will the Minister also confirm that the devolved legislatures will be allowed to scrutinise, comment on and vote on any final deal put to Parliament? If Parliament is not to be allowed a meaningful vote along the lines that I have outlined, that only increases the pressure for the final package to be referred back to the people for their endorsement or, indeed, their rejection.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 216 and 217 in my name. I will come to the detail in a moment, but for present purposes suffice it to say that these amendments, individually and collectively, would give to Parliament—here I acknowledge the primacy of the House of Commons—a decisive and conclusive say over the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. It is for Parliament, not the Government, to determine whether we leave the European Union and, if so, on what terms. If Parliament thinks it appropriate that that decision should be tested by a second referendum that would be wholly appropriate. These conclusions are wholly in accord with our constitution and history, and are, in my view, quite unchallengeable.

I acknowledge that the amendments might be clumsily drafted; I am no parliamentary draftsman. So I say to your Lordships that if others on Report draft different positions that are more happily phrased but achieve the same purpose, I shall be pleased to rally behind them.

My purpose now is to explain in greater detail the nature of these amendments and the reasons behind them. I turn to the text of the two amendments. They are inevitably cast in the statutory language and I do not want to test your Lordships’ patience by going through each clause. I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I summarise them. My intention is that Parliament shall have the decisive say over the outcome of the negotiations. In that determination, the House of Commons must have primacy. Its decisions must be conclusive. This House does not have the authority to reject Brexit—only the Commons can do that—but we can encourage and facilitate that process. That is what these amendments enable.

Taken separately or collectively, the amendments enable Parliament to approve or reject Brexit whether or not terms have been agreed. They enable Parliament to require the withdrawal of the Article 50 notification and the UK to remain within the European Union, which is indeed my preferred outcome. If Parliament thinks it appropriate, these amendments provide for a holding of a referendum either to test public opinion or to ratify a parliamentary decision. That is wholly correct. Most importantly, the amendments enshrine and protect the primacy of the House of Commons. Without going into detail, although I happily would, the method is set out in subsections (7) and (8) of Amendment 216 and subsections (5) and (6) of Amendment 217. These provisions are based on the Parliament Acts, suitably modified to deal with resolutions.

I will explain the differences between Amendments 216 and 217. Both are designed to ensure full parliamentary control over the outcome of these negotiations. Amendment 216 is simple and is based on a cross-party amendment which was tabled during the European Union (Notification of withdrawal) Bill. Its basic attraction is that it has achieved all-party endorsement. Amendment 217 is a little more complex. It is more explicit in its provisions for the withdrawal of the Article 50 notification: it enables the holding of a second referendum and deals more fully with what should be done in the event of no deal. However, in substance these amendments are designed to achieve the same result: namely that these decisions are to be taken by Parliament, primarily the House of Commons, and not by the Government.

Let me briefly explain the fundamental justification for these amendments. I believe that Brexit is the single most disastrous peacetime decision that we have taken since at least the end of the 19th century when we failed to offer effective home rule to southern Ireland. Indeed, I am inclined to think that Brexit is even graver than that. I do not think that the referendum of 2016 was authority for Britain to leave the European Union, whatever the terms or in the absence of terms. The electorate neither could nor did know what the outcome of the negotiations would be. In my view, the proper interpretation of the referendum is that it was an instruction to the Government to negotiate the best exit terms that could be achieved. However, that leaves open the fundamental question of who will determine whether the terms, or the absence of terms, are an acceptable basis for leaving the European Union. In my view, the only proper answer to that question is that it is for Parliament to make that decision, and, if Parliament thinks it appropriate, the decision should be tested or ratified by a decision of the electorate expressed in a second referendum.

In most political careers, and certainly my own, party and national interests are not seen to be dramatically divergent. Occasionally, they are. The debate in 1940 which led to the fall of Chamberlain is perhaps the most dramatic of recent examples. Going back in history, the decision of Sir Robert Peel in 1846 to repeal the corn laws was another. I happen to believe that we now face another such moment. None of us should put party interest before our assessment of what is right for our country. Our decisions may lead to the fragmentation of existing party structures—I hope not—but our duty is to put our country first. Whatever the cost to our respective parties, we must give Parliament the decisive say on the outcome of these negotiations. That is the purpose of my two amendments and I commend them to this Committee.

[Lord Patten of Barnes (Con)]

This debate should be what I think is called a “no-brainer” for anybody who believes in parliamentary sovereignty. I do not want to add to what has already been said on the subject. I find myself in the curious position, for the first time in my life, of beginning a speech by quoting the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. As the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out, his description of the—in many respects admirable—Mansion House speech was spot on: here we are, going down this flower-strewn path, from a position where we were members of the European Union with loads of opt-outs to one where we want to be outside the European Union with as many opt-ins as you can get on the back of a lorry. It is called a “bespoke” deal. I do not have many bespoke suits—most of mine are off the peg and on to the floor—and I think that it is more an “off the peg and on to the floor” deal.

However, it was after the Mansion House speech that the most significant question that anyone asked the Prime Minister was raised. After questions from all the “trusties”, a German journalist got up and asked the Prime Minister: “Is it all worth it?” The Prime Minister, perhaps excessively honestly, did not reply directly but just pointed out that we had had a referendum which had to be honoured. I think that some others, including some of her supporters, would have put the point rather differently. They would have said that it is of course worth it because—to use a phrase which has occurred again and again in this debate—we are going to take back control. I think that most of them would at least in principle have conceded that taking back control means this Parliament—the House of Commons and the House of Lords—having control.

I have been struck as we have sat through these debates by the elephant in the room: the person who in many respects is more responsible for us being here and having this debate than anybody else, the regularly occasional leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, Mr Farage. When Mr Farage talks about taking back control and when some of our tabloid newspapers talk about it, they do not mean Parliament having that control—they mean them; they mean a populist way of running this country. I spent some time this morning looking at Dicey—I have not done that since I was an undergraduate. I looked too at what I think is the best book on the rule of law, by that great jurist and great man, Tom Bingham—I recommend it to noble Lords. I read again what he says about parliamentary sovereignty—the keystone of our constitution. When people talk about taking back control, what they should mean is Parliament having that control. When they talk about a “meaningful vote”, they should not mean a vote which does whatever they want. A meaningful vote does not mean that it cannot make any difference to the whole process of Brexit, which was more or less said the other day by the Secretary of State, David Davis —who had said that there would be a meaningful vote.

I hope that it is not unparliamentary for me to make this comparison, but the Secretary of State increasingly reminds me of a character in a PG Woodhouse novel, of whom it is said, “He’s like one of those people in a Tolstoy novel, living in those dreary birch woods, who’s just chopped up his wife, thrown the baby down the well, goes to the cupboard, opens the cupboard and finds that there’s no vodka in the bottle”. That is the position in which our negotiators are increasingly finding themselves.

On the constitution, the Secretary of State seemed to be absolutely clear: we must have a meaningful vote, but you cannot actually change what happens. It is important for this House to give an absolutely clear message that parliamentary sovereignty in our system is what happens in this House and, above all, in the House of Commons—I agree with what my noble friend Lord Hailsham said on this. This is an occasion when a lot of us will have to make speeches and say and do things which we never imagined we would have to in our political careers. I hope more people in future will take the advice of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and follow their conscience on this issue and assert the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, we support that. It is particularly important for the new SIs that will deal with functions hitherto carried out by EU bodies and which therefore will not be part of the normal, ongoing scrutiny that may have happened for many years. It is particularly important that these should be by only the affirmative procedure, as the word “modification” can only mean an increase.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

In order to indicate cross-party support, I will say that I support this amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I am just wondering whether the noble Lord who moved this amendment is thinking that the House of Lords should not reject an SI outright once it has been confirmed by the House of Commons but should ask that it be reconsidered, and whether that should be the only option apart from approving it.

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 247 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, to which my name is attached. This is a pragmatic amendment, intended to make the provisions of the Bill more workable. As such, it should be acceptable to noble Lords on both sides of the Brexit argument, and perhaps even to the Government. Given that so much legislation is moving over to being enacted by statutory instrument, the case for looking into the ways of making instruments amendable now becomes an urgent challenge and will become increasingly so as the Bill goes forward.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, spelled out the detail of the amendment, including very helpfully the precedents, perhaps I could just give an example of where the power to amend SIs would be useful. Take, for example, Clause 7(6)(b), which enables Ministers to establish new public bodies to undertake functions now carried out by the EU. The provision of such a power by order would require the relevant SI to specify precise details for the workings of the new body, such as its objectives, duties, powers, members, resources and accountability. Parliament might be happy for such a new body to be established but might want to change some of those details, which it could not do under our current procedures and which could only be triggered by rejecting the SI in its entirety, thereby subjecting the process to potentially long delays—exactly what the Government want to try to avoid. Having a process to allow amendment would be swifter and provide more acceptable legislation.

These powers would be used in exceptional circumstances, and it is not proposed that they should cover other Brexit legislation—although a strong argument could be made along those lines. But given the ominously growing use of unamendable orders to force legislative change through Parliament, there is a case for undertaking a far more rigorous review of the statutory instrument system. Since this facility could save time, which may be of the essence in regard to Brexit legislation, I would have thought that Amendment 247 should appeal to both sides, to Brexiters and remainers alike. I commend it to the Committee.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 248 in my name. Because of the lateness of the hour I will speak briefly, but throughout these debates the Committee has repeatedly expressed concern about the scope and nature of the SI procedure. Time and again, noble Lords in Committee have said, “This is not amendable. We cannot change what is proposed. This is government by fiat and declaration”. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, and I spent many years in the House of Commons, where we lamented the fact that statutory instruments could not be amended. It is a great defect in our constitutional process. Statutory instruments are a form of legislation; in fact, they are a form of legislation by fiat or declaration—and that is an extraordinary thing in a parliamentary democracy.

The amendments that I have tabled have just two objectives: one is to assert the primacy of the House of Commons, which must have primacy in these matters, and the other is to say that legislation should be amendable. As two propositions, they are wholly unobjectionable. What are the objections, if there be any? Actually, they are the objections of the Executive throughout the centuries: it makes life for the Government rather more difficult. As a parliamentarian, I am bound to say that I do not find that a very impressive argument.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I think that that is what the amendments seek to achieve and, as this House has said again and again, the whole idea was meant to be to bring back decision-making to Parliament.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is right about this, because the noble Baroness’s amendment would give power to Ministers by regulation to extend or vary the exit date. What the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is saying, and what I must say I agree with, is that the power should be in the hands of Parliament and that Back Benchers should have the opportunity to trigger the process.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

There is a series of amendments in the group, and I hope that when we get to Report we will have one that does exactly what is clearly felt will be needed. The importance of our amendment is to get rid of this absolute fixed date that is there at the moment—and not in the original Bill. It was introduced in one of the few amendments made in the Commons, not for the national interest but for a slightly more partisan reason.

Article 50 provides:

“The Treaties shall cease to apply … from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification”—


unless, of course, the 27 agree to extend the period. Thus the UK would not automatically leave after two years if, for example, the final deal had not yet come into force.

It could be that that itself sets a later date; it could be because the European Parliament had vetoed the deal in January. What would happen in that eventuality? I think it unlikely, but the Government always tell us that we must be prepared for any eventuality, and we should be prepared for that, given the red lines that the European Parliament has been setting down. Guy Verhofstadt told Andrew Marr on television that it meant that, if it did veto the deal, we would leave with no deal—in other words, as we have all said a number of times, trading on WTO terms, with no transition and no safeguards for citizens.

I doubt very much that, should the European Parliament decide that it did not want to agree with the deal, the Governments of the 27, let alone the Government of the 28th, would simply settle for that and say, “We give in—come out on WTO terms, with no concern for EU citizens”. My guess is that there would be rapid and rather complicated negotiations, which is particularly important given that in January next year we know jolly well that when it comes to our customs at Dover, our procedures for registering EU nationals, new VAT forms, agreements on aviation and the export of live animals, and checks on foodstuffs and all manufactured goods, none will be ready by the time of March next year—let alone the situation in Northern Ireland being resolved.

So undoubtedly at that stage, if the European Parliament did vote it down, we would definitely need a period of breathing and talk to get things back on track. If just another week or two would make a difference, surely that should be possible without having to live with the date written into the Act. What could also happen, even without the European Parliament, is that discussions could be going on and agreement could be very close—just days away—and we surely would not want the Act to stop those discussions taking place. Setting that date in stone must be unhelpful to say the least.

The Government think that they can agree the substance of our future partnership with the EU before October this year, but the report from the other House from the exit committee said that,

“it is difficult to see how it will be possible to negotiate a full, bespoke trade and market access agreement, along with … other agreements, including on foreign affairs and defence”,

by October. It suggested that,

“the Government should seek a limited extension to the Article 50 time to ensure that a Political Declaration on the Future Partnership that is sufficiently detailed and comprehensive can be concluded”,

before we enter the transition period. The same report states:

“If a 21-month transition … period is insufficient time to conclude and ratify the treaties/agreements that will establish the Future Partnership or to implement the … technical and administrative measures along with any … infrastructure at the UK border, the only prudent action would be for the Government to seek a limited prolongation to avoid unnecessary disruption”,


and that the withdrawal agreement should therefore,

“allow for the extension of the transition … period … with the approval of Parliament”.

We can do that only if the date is in our hands and not fixed in the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who is not in his place, has said that saddling yourself with deadlines is crazy. Had he been here, I would have said that it was not as crazy as writing Article 50 itself—but, as he is not here, I clearly would not say that. The date was put in the Bill to satisfy some Back Benchers who had no involvement with these detailed talks or with the task of implementing the final deal. So let us get it out of the Bill now, untie the Government’s hands and give them a better chance of negotiating a satisfactory way of extraditing ourselves from what is otherwise, I fear, a looming nightmare. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

My noble friend makes very good points, which will be a subject for discussion when we see the proposed withdrawal treaty. However, this is all the more reason why Parliament should not commit itself now to a date in advance of knowing the basis on which we are going to withdraw. The arguments for taking the date out of the Bill are compelling. It is not sufficient that only a Minister has the power to change the date. It is crucial for Parliament itself to be in charge of setting the date, once it has agreed the terms of departure.

I am always an optimist in these matters. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, did the noble Baroness on the Front Bench a great disservice when he said that he knew in advance what she was going to say. We know that the noble Baroness is highly emollient and listens to debates in the House. She is not her noble friend Lord Callanan, who just reads from the script and is totally unresponsive to the mood of the House. We have great confidence that the noble Baroness will say that she has listened to the compelling arguments which have been put to her, particularly from her ducal colleague; that she is going to depart from the words in her script; that Her Majesty’s Government will consider this matter on the basis of the overwhelming weight of arguments which have been put in this Committee and that she will be delighted to accept the amendments on the Order Paper this afternoon.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 344 and 346 in my name. First, however, I find overwhelming the arguments in favour of Amendment 334 which have just been articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, my noble friend and other noble Lords. It is a grave mistake to put the exact date of departure into statute. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, rightly said that that was not the Government’s original position. Amendment 346 is brought forward with a rather different motive and is broader in its purpose. Not only do I want to give Parliament the decisive say on the exit date; I want to give Back-Benchers the decisive ability to trigger that process. I simply do not trust the Front Benches on this matter. If Back-Benchers in the House of Commons want to stop a hard Brexit; if they want to stop Brexit; if they want to stay in the European Union—which is my position—I want to enable them to put down a resolution which requires a debate on precisely those terms. That is why Amendment 346 expresses, perhaps clumsily, the idea that at least 150 Back-Benchers could table a Motion requiring the holding of a debate on exit. My purpose is simply to enable Parliament to say no to Brexit if that is its wish. By giving this decision on the date to Parliament, we are strengthening the arsenal available to parliamentarians to stop this unhappy process coming to the final end of Brexit. I believe that is a national disaster and Parliament should be able to stop it. It is in that sense that I speak to the amendments in my name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cormack]

Very simply, I am talking about the fact that the Bill, as it is before the Committee, has a specific date in it. The purpose of these amendments—tabled by my noble friend the Duke of Wellington and others—has been to give the flexibility that the Bill does not allow at the moment. I am surprised if my noble friend cannot see that. I am not arguing against the prudent and excellent speech made by my noble friend Lord Tugendhat. He made the point as effectively as anybody could. Therefore, let us try to unite on Report around an amendment that will give the additional flexibility that changes in the other place have not given.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Does my noble friend assent to the proposition that Back-Benchers in the House of Commons should be able to trigger the process, as well as Ministers?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my amendment would add EU directives to the list of relevant instruments that the Queen’s printer must make arrangements to publish. I briefly flagged the point of the amendment when we debated recitals with regard to interpretation and Clause 6(3) on 7 March. Anyhow, in those previous exchanges, and since, in the letter of 13 March from the Solicitor-General to Robert Neill MP, it has been confirmed that recitals have an ongoing role in interpretation of retained EU law. There are several interesting points in the letter and footnotes, but for the benefit of the House I will read out just a small part, which says:

“For example, the Treaty base of EU legislation, its recitals, and the working papers prepared in advance of its adoption, may all be referred to at the moment. Our courts are well-versed in this, and in dealing with the differences that exist between the interpretation of domestic law and EU law. As such clause 6(3) of the Bill should not disturb the existing approach taken by our courts”.


I still have an ongoing concern that I raised regarding post-Brexit loss rights of challenge in court, and on which I have written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, but from the interpretation point of view it is clear that recitals and other parts of directives are available for interpretation. On that basis it seems to me that directives are not just any old other EU instrument; they should have a rank prescribed in the Bill and not left to the possible halfway house of it being done at the discretion of the Queen’s printer or for there to be special rules about their admissibility.

Recitals and indeed whole directive texts and their empowerments will not only be a last resort to reference by the court; it is quite likely that, post Brexit, a lot more notice will be taken of them than previously, especially in those areas where any kind of regulatory alignment is sought. I understand from a ministerial meeting that the Treasury is certainly thinking that way.

What happens if there is no automatic publication by the Queen’s printer? As I said, it could be that the Queen’s printer does it under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 5, but that is not certain, or under part 2 on rules of evidence in Schedule 5, and in particular paragraph 4, where it would be necessary for there to be regulations to enable documents that were not published by the Queen’s printer to be admissible, and they would have conditions around them. It may just be for certification, of course, but that does not reflect the status of this important category of EU instruments from which a great deal of retained EU law derives.

Directives need to be added to the list of relevant instruments, as I suggest in my amendment, or some other provision should be made in Schedule 5 for this important category of documents. If there is a need to make exceptions to publishing some directives or parts of them, those powers exist in paragraph 2, and I agree with the amendment in the next group that it should require regulation to make that exception, but directives should be of a category that is in unless taken out, rather than out but can be opted in. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, there seems to be a great deal of sense in the amendment, partly because of the provisions of Clause 6, and partly because it is important that the businesses that will be trading into the European Union have ready access to all relevant documents. They will be regulated by directives which set out the principles with which they must comply. The noble Baroness is quite right to move the amendment. Unless there is some compelling reason—which cannot be cost, because that must be very small—I hope it will get a favourable reception from my noble friend.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, it is indeed striking that directives are not included in Schedule 5, part 1, paragraph 1(2). The reason may be that directives are given a very odd status under Clause 4(2)(b), which we debated on a previous day. Under Clause 4(2)(b), retained EU law does not include rights which arise under an EU directive when they are,

“not of a kind recognised by the European Court or any court or tribunal”,

in this country,

“in a case decided before exit day”.

We debated the complexities, the uncertainties and, as I see it, the unsatisfactory nature, of the clause. Is that the reason why directives are not included in Schedule 5, part 1? If not, what is the reason?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, may I first of all, in English, thank all who have contributed to the debate? I know that to some it may seem anorak territory, but knowing where to find law and being able to access law are matters of fundamental importance. Before coming to the specifics of Amendment 354 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, it may be useful to provide some context for the debate.

Part 1 of Schedule 5 serves an important purpose, which was picked up by, among others, the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Bingham centre. Specifically, it is a recognition of that vitally important factor of the law being publicly available and accessible after exit day. Part 1 therefore provides for a combination of duties on and powers for the Queen’s printer to help to ensure that this happens.

I will be clear about what the provisions involve. There are differences between how part 1 of Schedule 5 is sometimes described and what it actually does. It is designed to ensure that retained EU law is sufficiently accessible but it does not, for the avoidance of doubt, impose a duty on the Queen’s printer to identify or publish retained EU law itself, or any subset of it. Instead, it imposes a duty on the Queen’s printer to make arrangements for the publication of the types of EU instrument that may become retained direct EU legislation, being regulations, decisions and tertiary legislation. It also requires the publication of several key EU treaties and confers a power on the Queen’s printer to publish other related documents.

I recognise the important issue the noble Baroness seeks to highlight by her amendment. Directives are an important part of EU law at the moment, and may be relevant to retained EU law in some cases, but they are not covered by the duty to publish which I have just outlined. That duty is focused, as I explained, on instruments that may become retained direct EU legislation, which of course in terms of the Bill directives cannot.

[Viscount Hailsham]

People trading in the European Union need to know the status of the requirements that they have to adhere to when they are trading into the European Union. Directives can be relevant to that.

[Baroness Goldie]

I was about to come on to that point, as it was raised also by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Directives have been implemented in domestic law—they are already there—so they do not need retaining in and of themselves, which is a distinction that I am trying to make in terms of how the Bill is drafted, but they remain available for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law. They are available for that purpose no matter what the Queen’s printer may do.

That said, sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 1 also allows, but does not require, the Queen’s printer to publish certain other documents and instruments. Since the noble Baroness tabled her amendment, work has progressed further, and I am happy to confirm that the National Archives, which exercises the functions of the Queen’s printer, intends to make pre-exit day directives available online. I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness and ask that she withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendment in my name, in case other noble Lords want to come in on it. It relates to Part 2 of Schedule 5, on the rules of evidence. It is about regulations again, but in a different part of the schedule. I am sensitive to powers that potentially change what may or may not be available as evidence. This is a constitutional point, especially if it means disappearing cases or defences. I therefore find the provision in paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 5 too wide. It permits regulations under paragraph 4 to modify any provision made by or under any enactment made up to the end of the Session in which this withdrawal Bill is passed. That is basically all legislation until then.

I have tried to work out why this provision is needed and what it could do if abused, for that is the standard that we must measure against. In many discussions on wide powers, Ministers have protested good faith. Many of your Lordships have not doubted them but have still wanted safeguards, while others of your Lordships, including distinguished privy counsellors on the government side, have warned—or maybe confessed—that Ministers will abuse powers and have likewise suggested safeguards. This is all part of the “appropriate” versus “necessary” argument.

I was struck last Wednesday that, when the boot was on the other foot, the Government were less keen on having to rely on trust. About devolution, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said:

“If we look to the issue of consent, rather than consultation, let us be clear that it is not a question of trust but of constitutional propriety”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 403.]


I accept that the context is different, but the point that many of us have been trying to make about many powers in the Bill is just that: it is a matter of constitutional propriety between the Executive and Parliament and, indeed, the freedoms of the people.

Here we have another such power, even if it is small. It does not seem right that rules of evidence for admissibility could be changed, maybe quite widely, by amending any Act of Parliament, not necessarily limited to the consequences of Brexit. I have suggested adding a limitation, which would not allow use of the power for reducing the scope of what is admissible except for the purpose of replacing EU references with domestic ones. I thought that limitation was additionally relevant because the power to amend all pre-Brexit legislation seems to be perpetual. I was first inclined just to delete it, but I hope that my amendment will give the Minister an opportunity to clarify the kind of circumstances that are envisaged for the power, why it should be perpetual and whether some limitation could be envisaged to address my concerns.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I have a brief observation on Amendment 355. I agree entirely with the points of principle that have been articulated by my noble friend Lord Cormack, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Let me make a practical point. If the Minister makes an exception and gets it wrong, people dealing with the European Union may find themselves non-compliant with regulations that are in force and thereby exposed to some form of penalty or disadvantage. The advantage of the amendment is that it would reduce that possibility by a small degree. It is worth guarding against the risk if we can.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister remarked that the previous amendment was slightly nerdish and that we were dealing with technical issues. That is absolutely the role of this House. We are intended to deal with the details of Bills. We have already spent more time on the Bill, before we have reached the end of the Committee stage, than the House of Commons spent on all stages. That is appropriate—and necessary.

We should not underestimate how far these technical, constitutional, nerdish issues have resonance outside. I have seen the term “Henry VIII powers” in the columns of the Yorkshire Post. I should tell the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that I found myself last Saturday addressing several thousand people in Leeds on a Stop Brexit march. In a short speech, I mentioned in passing that the House of Lords had just defeated the Government on a question relating to Euratom. A great cheer went up from the crowd. Until that point, I would have thought that there were at most 200 people in Yorkshire who understood what Euratom was—most of them medical doctors of one sort or another. If several thousand people think that the question of Euratom is important, we should not underestimate the public and those who care about detailed issues in the Bill, in particular executive control versus parliamentary sovereignty and the extent to which the Government may be taking powers in the Bill that a future Government of a different complexion might use and abuse. These are not entirely nerdish and technical matters; they are actually rather important politically.

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I thank all who have contributed to this debate; very important points have been raised. This subject may be academic and technical but the issues are important—and to me, they are actually very interesting. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that I think there are a lot worse ways of spending a wet Wednesday morning than looking at these issues.

In responding to Amendment 355, I would like to take the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach, and explain why we do not consider it necessary or practical to require the making of secondary legislation. Taken together, paragraphs 1 and 2 mean that the Queen’s printer has a duty to publish all relevant instruments in respect of which it has not received a direction. The direction-making power, therefore, is already clearly limited in its scope. I acknowledge the concern, as articulated by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, that the direction-making power in paragraph 2 is akin to allowing Ministers to change the law by proclamation. The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, colourfully referred to that. However, the Government respectfully disagree with that characterisation. The power in paragraph 2 to exempt the Queen’s printer from the duty to publish in relation to certain instruments or parts of instruments is, I would submit, a targeted, common-sense provision to enable the Minister to narrow what is—as I hope I have explained in my previous remarks—the necessarily wide task of the Queen’s printer.

This power does not enable a Minister, by decree, to determine what is or is not retained EU law, nor is it designed to prevent some aspects of retained direct EU legislation being published. I would remind the House that any directions under paragraph 2 must be published. So there is no secrecy here; the process is transparent. I did note the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that there was an absence of detail on the mode of publication. I have no specific information about that. I would imagine that it would follow existing practice. However, I shall certainly undertake to write to him about that aspect.

The National Archives is already looking at how the various directions to the Queen’s printer will be made available on legislation.gov.uk, to make access to them easier still.

Accordingly, the Government do not consider that this direction-making power can fairly be characterised as an alarming extension of executive power, or as setting an ominous precedent for the future. The law needs to be made publicly available—that is a given—and we need a proportionate way to achieve this. A targeted, carefully circumscribed power for a Minister to give directions in relation to a body is not unprecedented or harmful. I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, was deeply concerned about the operation of this provision, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was, I think, predictably suspicious. So let me try to provide an illustration.

For example, under Section 92 of the Energy Act 2013, the Secretary of State may direct the Office for Nuclear Regulation as to the exercise of its functions, generally or specifically. In 2017, the Secretary of State did make such a direction as to the supply of information in relation to the nuclear safety of civilian nuclear installations. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that that direction was published online, so it was readily visible and accessible. The alternative option put forward in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, would be to require any such directions to be made in secondary legislation. Such an approach would in our view be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. It would also impose an added burden to the volume of regulations which we can anticipate following from this legislation.

[Viscount Hailsham]

If it has to be done by regulation, it gives this House and the other place at least a theoretical possibility of saying that the Minister should not make the exception, because the regulation or directive is, in fact, retained EU law. The citizen must be in a position to have access to what is relevant retained EU law. If it is not done by regulation, there is no way of challenging the Minister’s decision on that point. Surely, is that not objectionable in principle?

[Baroness Goldie]

This is all about trying to ensure that the statute book does not become cluttered with material which is irrelevant, not competent under the Bill and not within the scope of retained EU law as we have defined it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer]

Surely there is nothing wrong with a Minister proposing that something is not relevant and appropriate, but to make the final decision on that with no capacity for challenge is completely out of order. That is not a responsibility that should be placed on any member of the Executive.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Before my noble friend responds to that, I wish to make a similar point. If a direction is published, that is after the event; whereas if it has to be done by regulation, that in effect gives everyone the right to say that the Minister has got it wrong. That would be prospective rather than retrospective. Does the regulation procedure not have that advantage? It gives people the right to say the Minister has got it wrong.

[Baroness Goldie]

Well, I have listened with interest to these contributions. We will certainly reflect on what has been said. I understand the desire of the Chamber to get some whiff or wind of what the Minister might be contemplating and I can certainly undertake to look at what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham have said. I was going to go on, if I may be permitted to do so, to try to cover the point about secondary legislation, if I can pause for breath to do that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I serve as the legal assessor to regulatory panels and in the course of that, we have to address the meaning of the word “necessary”. The panels that I work with, as a general proposition, have no difficulty in identifying the meaning of that word. It is also used as useful protection for people because it is a higher threshold than “appropriate”, “desirable” or a range of other words that are used. I say to the noble Baroness that in my experience as a regulator, “necessary” does not constitute a difficulty along the lines that she has suggested.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I completely accept the long experience that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has. I referred specifically to time in case there is a financial crisis. That is when regulators have to resolve institutions fairly quickly in co-operation with one another. That is a danger that we face at this point—10 years into the last one.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

49: Before Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Parliamentary approval of the outcome of negotiations with the European Union
(1) Without prejudice to any other statutory provision relating to the withdrawal agreement, Her Majesty’s Government may conclude such an agreement only if a draft has been—(a) approved by a resolution of the House of Commons, and(b) subject to the consideration of a motion in the House of Lords.(2) So far as practicable, a Minister of the Crown must make arrangements for the resolution provided for in subsection (1)(a) to be debated and voted on before the European Parliament has debated and voted on the draft withdrawal agreement.(3) Her Majesty’s Government may implement a withdrawal agreement only if Parliament has approved the withdrawal agreement and any transitional measures agreed within or alongside it by an Act of Parliament.(4) Subsection (5) applies in each case that any of the conditions in subsections (6) to (8) is met.(5) Her Majesty’s Government must follow any direction in relation to the negotiations under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which has been—(a) approved by a resolution of the House of Commons, and(b) subject to the consideration of a motion in the House of Lords.(6) The condition in this subsection is that the House of Commons has not approved the resolution required under subsection (1)(a) by 30 November 2018.(7) The condition in this subsection is that the Act of Parliament required under subsection (3) has not received Royal Assent by 31 January 2019.(8) The condition in this subsection is that no withdrawal agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and the European Union by 28 February 2019.(9) In this section, “withdrawal agreement” means an agreement (whether or not ratified) between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU and the framework for the United Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union.”

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I am in danger of repeating myself, in the sense that I now rise to move this new clause—which I am glad to say has attracted support from many parts of this House. This amendment is designed to ensure that the future of our country is determined by Parliament and not by Ministers. The Prime Minister and other senior Ministers have promised Parliament a meaningful vote; and in a parliamentary system of government, parliamentarians, and in particular Members of the House of Commons, have a right and a duty to determine what is meant by “a meaningful vote”. When the negotiations are concluded, both country and Parliament will be asked to consider the outcome, terms or no terms. The question that will then arise is what should be the role of Parliament, and in particular that of the House of Commons. My view is as follows.

If terms have been agreed, the choices available to Parliament, and in particular to the House of Commons, should obviously be to accept or to reject those terms. If the decision is to reject the terms, Parliament should have the right to suggest further negotiations—I should be rather chary about that, but it should have that right; or to determine that we leave the European Union without terms—that is, to crash out; or to determine that we stay in the European Union on the existing terms. In the event that no terms have been agreed, the same choices should be available to Parliament: that is, to accept that the country should leave the European Union on no terms; or to determine that the country should stay in the European Union on the existing terms; or to request further negotiations, although I am chary about that. In other words, whatever the outcome, terms or no terms, this country’s future should be determined by Parliament, ultimately by the House of Commons, and not by Ministers. In a parliamentary democracy, that is what ought to be meant by “a meaningful vote”.

So, we need to ask ourselves: what is on offer from the Government? Those who were present in Committee will have heard my noble friend Lord Callanan set out the Government’s position. He did so frequently and with clarity and we are indebted to him. On 14 March, my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes—I am glad to see him in his place—asked this direct question:

“Perhaps we are not being as intelligent as we should be. In the phrase ‘a meaningful vote’, what does the word ‘meaningful’ mean?”


Noble Lords may think that that was a very sensible question. He got rather a curious and surprising answer. The Minister said:

“We have never used the term ‘a meaningful vote’”.—[Official Report, 14/3/2018; col. 1650.]


He was, of course, mistaken. The phrase “a meaningful vote” has been used by the Prime Minister, Mr Davis and other senior Ministers on many occasions. I am indebted to the House of Lords Library for examples, which I would happily share with my noble friend should he require them. However, given that my noble friend has, throughout these debates, always adhered very strictly to the script in his ministerial folder—he is not a Minister who goes off-piste—his response troubles me. The Government must not be allowed to dilute or in any way move away from previously given commitments, however meagre they may be.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I have a very strong sense that this House wants to move to an early decision. I confine myself, therefore, to making one substantive point. It is to my noble friend Lord Howard, because what he said underpinned many of the arguments articulated by other noble Lords. He said, “The House of Commons will have its say, the House of Commons will have its way”. It underpins his argument, but it is not government policy—that is the point. The Government’s policy, as was brought out by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is “this agreement or no agreement”. That it is not letting Parliament have its say. The truth is, if we want Parliament to have a truly meaningful vote, we have to insist on it. That is what this new clause is about, and I wish to test the opinion of this House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Will my noble friend help the House in one respect? I am trying to understand whether the amendment in any way obliges the Government to do anything or in any way prevents them doing anything. It seems to me entirely neutral in its effect. Can he help us?

[Lord Callanan]

I think I covered that in what I said earlier: we believe it to be unnecessary and pointless.

Going back to my noble friend Lady McIntosh’s questions, the second question she asked me was about contracts of employment of staff employed in those agencies. Of course, these are a matter for those agencies, but the rights of those UK citizens, as UK citizens in other EU countries, are guaranteed in the agreement we reached with the EU in December. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked me about the membership of agencies ending in March 2019. As set out in the agreement reached in March, during the implementation period common rules will remain in place and the UK may continue to participate in EU agencies where the presence of the UK is necessary and in the interests of the Union or where the discussion concerns acts addressed to the UK and its citizens.

In conclusion therefore, while I fully understand the intentions behind the amendment, I do not believe that anything would be gained from its acceptance in the Bill, apart from confusion.

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, Amendment 110 stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. It would quite simply prevent any sections of the Bill, when it becomes an Act, from commencing until the UK Government have adopted the negotiating objective of securing continued EU citizenship for UK citizens. I do not wish to rerun the arguments for continued EU citizenship which I presented during Committee. I would, however, point out that there was a massive response on the electronic media to that debate, overwhelmingly favourable to the viewpoint which I presented. This told me that the subject is very close to the hearts of thousands of people in these islands and is one which the Government should ignore at their peril.

Since Committee, the Minister has kindly allowed me to meet him to discuss these and associated matters. I was grateful to him for that and I better understand from where he comes on the issue. I hope that he likewise understands from where I come, even if he does not agree with my viewpoint. Of course, some of the legal challenges are still being pursued and we await their outcome. I would, however, like to respond to two concerns raised during Committee.

The first is the issue of reciprocity and whether EU nationals should be offered British citizenship. Regardless of my personal opinion, this is not what is proposed in this amendment. My argument is that it would be illegal under international law and European law for the UK or the EU to take away our European citizenship from those of us who already hold it. For those who are not currently European citizens—for example, those who will not be born until after Brexit—I believe that we will need to negotiate a form of associate European citizenship. This is, in fact, what I understand the negotiator on behalf of the European Parliament, Mr Guy Verhofstadt, has been calling for. That would require a provision to be negotiated into the withdrawal agreement. Whether or not we offer some form of associated British citizenship to EU nationals would therefore be a matter of negotiation at that time. I very much hope that the Minister can assure the House that such an option has not been explicitly ruled out.

Secondly, may I address the issue of whether there is a solid precedent? I want to reiterate the Irish example, which I explored informally with the Minister earlier but which is still material. Following the creation of the Irish Free State—now the Republic of Ireland—and Northern Ireland, a comparable situation occurred. Irish citizens who reside in the UK, while remaining Irish citizens, are permitted to enjoy all the benefits of UK citizenship, including freedom to take up residence and employment in the UK, and to play a full part in political life, including voting in parliamentary elections and seeking membership of the national legislature—that is, becoming a Member of Parliament. Am I not right in asserting that this state of affairs will not be affected by the UK leaving the EU? Can the Minister confirm whether this is a correct interpretation?

The Irish state also offers citizenship to all residents on the island of Ireland; people resident in Northern Ireland can therefore choose British, Irish or dual citizenship. This is an example of citizenship being on offer to those residing outside the granting authority’s jurisdiction and, I suggest, is therefore pertinent to the case I am making.

When Plaid Cymru sent a letter to the Prime Minister setting out its position on this matter, it was supported by the leaders of other parties including the SNP, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, by a range of legal experts and by a host of organisations which are concerned about this matter. My party secured an Opposition day debate on this issue in the House of Commons, which passed without division a Motion on this matter—in fact, the first Motion that Plaid Cymru has ever succeeded in getting the House of Commons to pass in that way. The debate was well attended and support came from the Labour and Conservative Benches and from SNP, Liberal Democrat and DUP MPs. In other words, there was a broad consensus in favour of the objectives being discussed, which are crystallised in this amendment.

The Minister may not be in a position to accept this amendment, as no doubt he will shortly tell us. But if he takes such a line I hope that he will also take the opportunity to assure UK citizens that in the negotiating process, the Government will seek to achieve the fullest possible agreement on a wide range of citizen-related issues and that this worry, felt by so many, should be overcome if a successful negotiation does transpire, leading to an agreement. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I have often been in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, in the course of these debates but I hope that he will forgive me on this occasion if I do not go with him. I wholly agree with the underlying sentiments that he has expressed; my concern is with the word “objective” because it is very difficult to define at any one time what an objective truly is. Some are stated and some are unstated—and even if stated, they may not represent the true state of mind of the person making the statement. The problem with an amendment of this kind is that it is capable of giving rise to litigation. I just do not see how a court could ever seriously determine whether the objective of a Government at any one time was sufficiently truly stated to give rise to the remedy which I know will be sought by the litigants. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, although I agree strongly with his underlying sentiments, I do not think this is the way to achieve that objective.

[Lord Dykes]

My Lords, notwithstanding the very reasonable sentiments just expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I think that I would be among others in paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for the way in which he has taken the initiative on this subject. It is becoming increasingly complicated with the approach of the so-called exit day—whatever date that may be in legislation and so on—and, therefore, we need to think very carefully about this. Although this was a long time ago, I recall that the Maastricht treaty bestowed on citizens of each member state individual citizenship as EU citizens, too. It was a solemn and profound moment when that was announced many years ago in 1992, and it was made much of, mostly in the other member states but also in Britain as well. A lot of British citizens who were working abroad were delighted at the idea of being citizens of the European Union as well, which added to their obvious practical freedom of movement, although that was not essential to it.

We have now got to be very careful to make sure that the Government respond to the civilised and reasonable request for them to expand their minds a little bit into thinking about this matter, because it will be quite complicated. There is the question of the Irish Republic’s offer, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the special status that may emerge in Northern Ireland, not deliberately, according to the DUP, but accidentally. It is not much to their liking that a special status would be accorded to people there and they would remain individuals citizens of the EU. Is this a matter of collective bestowal of citizenship because of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, or is it now a matter of it being an individual proclivity if the right was there, given that there are exceptions to the idea that you have to be within only one member state to be a citizen and you can apply for citizenship from outside? It therefore may be that the very act of applying for citizenship and continuing to have the protection of the ECJ as individuals because of the bestowal of European citizenship would need to be included in this wide examination. It is a very complicated matter and should not be excluded from people’s mind and, mostly, the Government’s mind. They may be very unwilling to consider these matters, but they need to do so and we are grateful for this amendment and this debate.

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[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I am sure that the noble Lord was not among those jeering when I was trying to make my points earlier and that his advice to his colleagues will be well received. He said, “Take it down a notch”: he is proposing that we fly in the face of the biggest democratic vote in our history and that, as unelected Peers, we ask the House of Commons to consider a matter which has been considered before and not concentrate on what we are here for, which is improving the legislation in front of us.

The noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, said that this is sort of connected to the Bill. There will be an opportunity for us to consider this matter at the end of the negotiations. The Government have promised to bring forward legislation on the agreement and have promised a vote in both Houses on this matter.

[Viscount Hailsham]

A meaningful vote.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My noble friend says “A meaningful vote” from a sedentary position. By that he means a vote to reverse what the British people voted for in a referendum. There will be a vote on the negotiation and on the agreements which have been reached. I urge this House not to undermine the position of the Government in their negotiations or that of the Prime Minister by seeking to argue that her objectives cannot be achieved.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

It may be for the convenience of the House if I remind your Lordships that we are debating Amendment 70 and the other amendments in the group. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, spoke to Amendment 84, which is grouped with Amendment 70 —but agreeing to Amendment 70 is the question before the House.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I support Amendment 70, moved by my noble friend Lord Lisvane. May I express the hope that it serves as a precedent for use in other legislation? The parliamentary control of statutory instruments is notoriously inadequate. I speak with a considerable degree of experience, having lived through some 31 years of statutory instruments. We know that far too much legislation is passed through this House without any sensible scrutiny, discussion or amendment. I personally have always argued for the amendment of statutory instruments. I ventured to put forward proposals in Committee on this Bill. They did not make any progress, and I know full well that they will not do so in this Bill now.

However, the suggestion put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is a useful first step in that it would require Ministers to explain why the negative procedure has been adopted. Furthermore, it would give Parliament the opportunity to transform a negative procedure into an affirmative procedure. While the affirmative procedure is far from perfect, it is a great deal better than the negative procedure and, on that basis, it is very much a useful first step. I support the noble Lord’s amendment and I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that I have a strong support for her proposal, too. It seems to me that transparency is a very good idea—but I will make one caution, if I may. There will be times when statutory instruments take an emergency character, and the 10-day limit could cause a serious problem. That will need to be addressed if her amendment makes further progress.