Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
Main Page: Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted's debates with the Wales Office
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my amendment would add EU directives to the list of relevant instruments that the Queen’s printer must make arrangements to publish. I briefly flagged the point of the amendment when we debated recitals with regard to interpretation and Clause 6(3) on 7 March. Anyhow, in those previous exchanges, and since, in the letter of 13 March from the Solicitor-General to Robert Neill MP, it has been confirmed that recitals have an ongoing role in interpretation of retained EU law. There are several interesting points in the letter and footnotes, but for the benefit of the House I will read out just a small part, which says:
“For example, the Treaty base of EU legislation, its recitals, and the working papers prepared in advance of its adoption, may all be referred to at the moment. Our courts are well-versed in this, and in dealing with the differences that exist between the interpretation of domestic law and EU law. As such clause 6(3) of the Bill should not disturb the existing approach taken by our courts”.
I still have an ongoing concern that I raised regarding post-Brexit loss rights of challenge in court, and on which I have written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, but from the interpretation point of view it is clear that recitals and other parts of directives are available for interpretation. On that basis it seems to me that directives are not just any old other EU instrument; they should have a rank prescribed in the Bill and not left to the possible halfway house of it being done at the discretion of the Queen’s printer or for there to be special rules about their admissibility.
Recitals and indeed whole directive texts and their empowerments will not only be a last resort to reference by the court; it is quite likely that, post Brexit, a lot more notice will be taken of them than previously, especially in those areas where any kind of regulatory alignment is sought. I understand from a ministerial meeting that the Treasury is certainly thinking that way.
What happens if there is no automatic publication by the Queen’s printer? As I said, it could be that the Queen’s printer does it under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 5, but that is not certain, or under part 2 on rules of evidence in Schedule 5, and in particular paragraph 4, where it would be necessary for there to be regulations to enable documents that were not published by the Queen’s printer to be admissible, and they would have conditions around them. It may just be for certification, of course, but that does not reflect the status of this important category of EU instruments from which a great deal of retained EU law derives.
Directives need to be added to the list of relevant instruments, as I suggest in my amendment, or some other provision should be made in Schedule 5 for this important category of documents. If there is a need to make exceptions to publishing some directives or parts of them, those powers exist in paragraph 2, and I agree with the amendment in the next group that it should require regulation to make that exception, but directives should be of a category that is in unless taken out, rather than out but can be opted in. I beg to move.
My Lords, there seems to be a great deal of sense in the amendment, partly because of the provisions of Clause 6, and partly because it is important that the businesses that will be trading into the European Union have ready access to all relevant documents. They will be regulated by directives which set out the principles with which they must comply. The noble Baroness is quite right to move the amendment. Unless there is some compelling reason—which cannot be cost, because that must be very small—I hope it will get a favourable reception from my noble friend.
I was about to come on to that point, as it was raised also by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Directives have been implemented in domestic law—they are already there—so they do not need retaining in and of themselves, which is a distinction that I am trying to make in terms of how the Bill is drafted, but they remain available for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law. They are available for that purpose no matter what the Queen’s printer may do.
That said, sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 1 also allows, but does not require, the Queen’s printer to publish certain other documents and instruments. Since the noble Baroness tabled her amendment, work has progressed further, and I am happy to confirm that the National Archives, which exercises the functions of the Queen’s printer, intends to make pre-exit day directives available online. I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness and ask that she withdraw her amendment.
I thank noble Lords who have supported the amendment. If something is present in the National Archives, I wonder whether that means that it can then automatically be relied on in court without there being any necessity for certification or other requirements. If that was the case, it would fulfil the point that I was trying to make—there are other points that noble Lords have referenced. I did not want it to be that, in order in a court proceeding to reference a directive or draw the judge’s attention to it, one had to remember to go through the certification process, especially if there were a lot of them.
My noble friend is much more an expert than I am on these technicalities, but other noble Lords as well as I have talked about more general accessibility for citizens and businesses. Someone like me knows that I can just put the number of the directive in Google and, hey presto, I get the Official Journal. However, it being in the National Archives is not as good as it being in whatever series is published under Schedule 5. If this is to be done in some voluntary capacity, why is that good enough? Why cannot it be in the Bill? It seems a very British solution: “Oh, well, it’ll be in the National Archives”. No one will be able to find it because they do not know that it is there. It might or might not be okay for the technical purposes that my noble friend is talking about, but it will not be squarely there in a series that can be made known. I cannot understand the Government’s logic.
I thank my noble friend for that intervention. She also made some important points earlier about what has come into our law allegedly from directives. I must say that, since I have been looking at this withdrawal Bill, I have become astonished by what has been done under the European Communities Act, which I do not think I would have wanted if I had gone back and made the European Communities Act again—but that is a digression.
There are two outstanding points: whether you need to do anything to get it into court for technical purposes; and what the visibility is for citizens. I must say that anybody who thinks that our legislation is at all visible should go on to the government website and wander around it. If they are hoping to find out what the current law is, the first thing they will see is that the site is not up to date. I find it a far sight easier to find up-to-date European law, but again, I digress.
With the proviso that it may be necessary to return to this—possibly the Government will bring forward an amendment or provide further explanation—I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this is very important and the noble Baroness is entirely justified in getting a little worked up about it. I spent 40 years, almost to the day, in the other place. I never had a ministerial office and I was always deeply suspicious of Ministers exercising arbitrary power and of any measure that extended the opportunity for Ministers to exercise such powers. My noble friend Lord Hailsham intervened in the debate earlier this week to remind me—not that I needed reminding—of the importance of the Back-Bencher. The Government must always be answerable to Parliament. Giving a Minister an extra arbitrary power, be it in ever such a small degree, enables them to evade answerability to the elected House.
We are fortunate to have committees—the Constitution Committee and the committee of which the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Tyler, are members—that act as watchdogs on behalf of this House and Parliament. As this Bill leaves our House, which it will do in a month or two, and goes back to the Commons, it must have been tightened up in as many particulars as possible so as to guarantee as much power as possible to the elected House.
My Lords, I will speak to the amendment in my name, in case other noble Lords want to come in on it. It relates to Part 2 of Schedule 5, on the rules of evidence. It is about regulations again, but in a different part of the schedule. I am sensitive to powers that potentially change what may or may not be available as evidence. This is a constitutional point, especially if it means disappearing cases or defences. I therefore find the provision in paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 5 too wide. It permits regulations under paragraph 4 to modify any provision made by or under any enactment made up to the end of the Session in which this withdrawal Bill is passed. That is basically all legislation until then.
I have tried to work out why this provision is needed and what it could do if abused, for that is the standard that we must measure against. In many discussions on wide powers, Ministers have protested good faith. Many of your Lordships have not doubted them but have still wanted safeguards, while others of your Lordships, including distinguished privy counsellors on the government side, have warned—or maybe confessed—that Ministers will abuse powers and have likewise suggested safeguards. This is all part of the “appropriate” versus “necessary” argument.
I was struck last Wednesday that, when the boot was on the other foot, the Government were less keen on having to rely on trust. About devolution, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said:
“If we look to the issue of consent, rather than consultation, let us be clear that it is not a question of trust but of constitutional propriety”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 403.]
I accept that the context is different, but the point that many of us have been trying to make about many powers in the Bill is just that: it is a matter of constitutional propriety between the Executive and Parliament and, indeed, the freedoms of the people.
Here we have another such power, even if it is small. It does not seem right that rules of evidence for admissibility could be changed, maybe quite widely, by amending any Act of Parliament, not necessarily limited to the consequences of Brexit. I have suggested adding a limitation, which would not allow use of the power for reducing the scope of what is admissible except for the purpose of replacing EU references with domestic ones. I thought that limitation was additionally relevant because the power to amend all pre-Brexit legislation seems to be perpetual. I was first inclined just to delete it, but I hope that my amendment will give the Minister an opportunity to clarify the kind of circumstances that are envisaged for the power, why it should be perpetual and whether some limitation could be envisaged to address my concerns.
My Lords, I have a brief observation on Amendment 355. I agree entirely with the points of principle that have been articulated by my noble friend Lord Cormack, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Let me make a practical point. If the Minister makes an exception and gets it wrong, people dealing with the European Union may find themselves non-compliant with regulations that are in force and thereby exposed to some form of penalty or disadvantage. The advantage of the amendment is that it would reduce that possibility by a small degree. It is worth guarding against the risk if we can.
It is a little difficult to predict specific examples. Many of your Lordships have had experience of ministerial positions. I imagine that if an anomaly were brought to the attention of the Minister that something was not going to apply; it was no longer relevant; it did not fit in the new framework of what will be a body of UK law, the Minister would be reasonable in trying to ensure that that element, whatever it was, did not appear to make its way via the Queen’s printer on to what is perceived to be the body of law for the UK.
Some may argue that that is inherently flawed and a deeply suspect way for any Government to behave. In the extraordinary situation in which we find ourselves— I suggest that outside of wartime this situation is unprecedented—common sense has to be applied. There has to be a proportionate way of balancing legitimate interests in the constitution with the practical need to make sure that we do not create nonsense in the statute book.
Surely this comes about when the Government are dealing with the so-called deficiencies and then coming out with the statutory instruments to make those right. Why can you not identify it at that stage and make it part of the regulation? That is the point at which the comparison with what does not work in EU law is made. Why cannot it be part of that regulation? Whether it is under Schedule 5 or something else as the empowerment does not really matter, if it is properly done.