(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but I shall make a couple of comments. It is clear that we will have to return to this at the next stage if the Government do not provide any more detail. First, on the role of the Lords in considering Bills such as this, the noble Baroness said—as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said on a couple of occasions—that this is a largely mechanical Bill. Well, it is a mechanical Bill that gives very wide discretion to the Government to design our future relationship with our most important security, political and economic partners. So a House that concerns itself not with whether the principle of the Bill is correct but with the detail is entirely in accord with its role to ask for detail on what that discretion will be used for.
It would be easier to accept that this is a mechanical Bill and not to raise these difficult questions one after another if we had some confidence that the Government actually know what they want in these areas. Part of our problem is that many of us have no such confidence. I do not think that the Foreign Secretary has a clue about what he wants by way of a future relationship with Europe: I doubt whether he has really thought about it for more than three or four minutes. He is too busy thinking about the next anecdote he is going to tell or the next joke he is going to make. His speech last week was a disgrace for a Foreign Secretary: the Prime Minister’s was of an entirely different quality. For a Conservative Party that has always prided itself on its commitment to a strong foreign policy, it must be a real embarrassment that we still have someone in place who is incapable of giving a serious speech on foreign policy. So this House is fulfilling its proper role in asking for detail on the implications of the Bill.
Secondly, I take up what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said: the engine room is important.
My Lords, I think it is against the rules and the spirit of this Chamber to criticise a Member of another place by name. I hope that the noble Lord will see fit to moderate his comments accordingly.
I apologise for being perhaps a little stronger than I should have been in this respect. On the engine room—I wanted to return to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on this—much of the business of multilateral organisations, be it NATO or the EU, is done in working groups and committees. The common foreign and security policy structure has some 40 working groups and committees, including a military committee that has been chaired by a British officer. If we are not in any of those working groups, we will miss out on formulating policy.
There are other details that matter a great deal. I remember the noble Earl, Lord Howe, saying on one occasion, when some of us were following the noble Lord, Lord West, and asking, “Where are you going to find the frigates to make up the carrier groups that we need?” The noble Earl said, if I remember correctly, “They do not necessarily have to be British frigates”. I took him as meaning that they might be Dutch, French, Belgian or whatever. Well, that also needs a certain structure, with certain training mechanisms and certain multilateral commands.
My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments relating to reciprocal issues are key to continuing to protect and assist British citizens after Brexit, including children and protected persons, in ways that hitherto our EU membership and cross-border agreements have provided. In particular these are the European arrest warrant, the mutual recognition of family court judgments, information exchange, Europol and Eurojust.
The Government’s approach to these issues must be agreed in principle with the EU in time to be included in the framework part of the Article 50 requirements and form part of the withdrawal agreement, so a satisfactory approach to these will be key to the future vote on that deal. However, as we have heard from speakers tonight, there seems to be an extraordinary lack of urgency, especially if there is any chance—I am not sure whether this is what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, hinted at—that a standstill transition agreement could not cover these issues. That would make it even more urgent.
I ask in particular about the Government’s urgency, or lack of it, as I began asking Written Questions on this a year ago. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, will remember it very well: it was on St Valentine’s Day last year—I do not think he chose it to be that day, but never mind—that he answered some of my questions on matrimonial and maintenance proceedings. It was very reassuring: he said that the Government,
“recognises the importance of the issues”.
Wow. There was no more than that then, nor indeed on civil judicial co-operation and cross-border disputes and family law when he replied to a similar Written Question in August. I worry about the lack of progress since then.
As the Prime Minister has remarked and others have repeated, keeping our citizens safe is the first mission of any Government. Therefore, like others, I welcome that she used the Munich speech to reiterate her desire to negotiate continued, and in some cases enhanced, co-operation with EU nations and particularly with these bodies and schemes. As we have heard, the amendments cover the Schengen Information System, the European arrest warrant, the European Criminal Records Information System, Europol and Eurojust. Given what we have heard today and in earlier debates, the Minister will recognise the importance of our continued participation in all of those, but also the challenges that that will bring to them in negotiating.
While we heard from Munich the desire for this comprehensive agreement, it is time for the Minister to offer a bit more detail and clarity sooner rather than later. It is about the direction of travel or the objectives. It does not undermine any negotiations for us, not just our Parliaments, to know what the Government want to do. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, it is time for the Government to move from intention to reality. These issues, as has been touched on just now, are partly held up by an obsession with red lines around the ECJ. They cannot be allowed to stand in the way of some logical and sensible solutions to these problems. These issues are too important to be left to a divided Cabinet. At the moment I see a pantomime horse, or Dr Dolittle’s pushmi-pullyu, being pulled in two different directions, mostly about red lines that are immaterial to the issues we have been discussing. I hope we can hear about some direction and some practical steps from the Minister, particularly on how these negotiations are taking place.
I thank all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have contributed to what has been a fascinating debate. I reiterate the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the outcome of our negotiations with our partners in the EU delivers continued close co-operation on internal security matters.
There are parallels between the effect of Amendment 13 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and that of Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, which was debated previously, in so far as they both seek to discuss the future relationship with the EU, which is, of course, subject to the negotiations. The noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to prevent the Government from bringing regulations into force until agreed procedures for continued participation in EU internal security measures have been approved by both Houses. The Government have already committed to providing Parliament with a meaningful vote on any final deal. This will give Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise the future relationship between the UK and the EU in all these areas. For this reason, it is our view that the amendment is not needed.
I must come back to the points made by my noble friends Lord Hamilton and Lord Lamont. Many noble Lords have pushed me and asked for further detail and clarification on the negotiations. This Bill is negotiation agnostic; it is not concerned with the negotiations. I understand why people want clarification in all those areas, but, of course, when we have reached an agreement, it will be the subject of future legislation that noble Lords will no doubt want to comment on in great detail. However, I will attempt to answer as many questions and go into as much detail as I can. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, may be a little disappointed yet again, but I will do my best.
Can the Minister answer the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as to which Minister is taking the lead in the security negotiations?
I will come to that later in my speech, but I will answer that question.
In that same paper, we made it clear that we value the operational benefits that we derive—I was struck by the comments on this from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and on how valuable many of them are. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to many of them, too, including the passenger name record directive, the second generation Schengen Information System and the European arrest warrant. There is also ECRIS, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and all the various acronyms that go with many of these JHA matters. They are all to do with the systematic exchange of information with our EU partners—for example, on criminal records—which helps to deliver fair and robust justice. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. He referred to Interpol. I assume that he meant Europol, but, for the avoidance of any doubt, I should say that we continue to co-operate in the same way with Interpol.
We made it clear that we want to agree future arrangements in this area that support co-operation across a range of EU measures and agencies, and to avoid operational gaps for law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the UK and the EU. The level of co-operation that we want to sustain goes beyond the specific tools and measures highlighted by the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. We have described the legal instruments here as a “toolkit” that can provide cumulative benefits. We have also indicated that we want our future partnership with the EU in this area to be dynamic, allowing us to co-operate if necessary in new ways in the face of evolving threats.
The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, highlights the respective roles of domestic courts and the CJEU. We made it clear in our future partnership paper on security, law enforcement and criminal justice that a future agreement in this area would need to provide for dispute resolution. Let me give a little more detail on that.
On leaving the EU we will bring to an end the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK. There are a number of existing precedents where EU agreements with third countries provide for close co-operative relationships without the CJEU having direct jurisdiction in those countries. The UK will engage proactively to negotiate an approach to enforcement and dispute resolution that meets the key objectives of the UK and the EU. We also published a separate future partnership paper on enforcement and dispute resolution last August, addressing many of those points and setting out the Government’s approach to these issues.
The House has of course debated this issue on a number of occasions, particularly earlier this month, on 8 February, in the debate on the EU Committee’s report on judicial oversight of the European arrest warrant. The withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will implement the withdrawal agreement in our domestic law. In addition, the Government have already committed to provide Parliament with a meaningful vote on any final deal. This will give both Houses of Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise again the future relationship between the UK and the EU. We need to be able to work with the EU to respond quickly and effectively to the changing threats we face from terrorism and serious organised crime. In negotiations, we will be seeking to agree the best possible way to continue our work alongside our European partners in support of our common goals and shared interests. We are absolutely committed to securing the close relationship that the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford, Lady Kennedy and Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, want to see—and on that basis I hope that they will not press their amendments.
Amendment 99, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, would prevent regulations made under Section 7(1) of the Bill from diminishing the protections in relation to “protected persons” set out in Part 3 of the Criminal Justice (European Protection Order) (England and Wales) Regulations 2014. As I understand it, the amendment seeks to ensure that the relevant authorities in England and Wales will continue to recognise and act upon European protection orders made in remaining member states after exit day, whether or not those states act on ours.
The EPO regime, established by an EU directive of the same name and implemented in England and Wales under the cited regulations, which came into force in 2015, is essentially a reciprocal regime. It requires the relevant designated authorities in the different member states involved to act and to communicate with each other in the making of an order and in its recognition and enforcement—and also, indeed, in any modification, revocation or withdrawal of one. It is not possible for us to regulate from here to require the relevant authorities of remaining member states to act in any particular way. As such, if we are not in a reciprocal regime we will no longer issue EPOs to remaining member states, since it would be pointless to do so, and nor will the authorities in those member states issue them to the UK, for the same reasons.
In short, absent our continued participation in the EPO regime, or in some proximate reciprocal arrangements in its place, these regulations will be redundant; they do not work unilaterally. This amendment therefore pre-empts the outcome of the negotiations, potentially requiring the retention of redundant legislation. It would not be right to create a false impression by retaining redundant legislation. I am happy to be clear, however, that if the forthcoming negotiations produce an agreement to continue access to the regime established under this directive, or something like it, appropriate steps and legislation will be brought forward to implement it at that time. This will encompass the protections for protected persons. We will, of course, consider that at that stage. Meanwhile, for now, there is no practical point or purpose in having such an amendment or these provisions.
I shall answer some of the other points that were made. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked me about the O’Connor case and about extradition to the UK from Ireland. I am sure that the House will understand that I am somewhat limited in what I can say on this matter; it is a live case at the moment. Suffice it to say that we are monitoring it closely, but it would be wrong to speculate on its impact before the case is concluded. Once it is, we will be happy to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I think it was, asked how we could reconcile the principles set out in the Prime Minister’s Munich speech, first on UK sovereignty and secondly on the ECJ. As the Prime Minister said:
“The Treaty must preserve our operational capabilities. But it must also fulfil three further requirements. It must be respectful of the sovereignty of both the UK and the EU’s legal orders. So, for example, when participating in EU agencies the UK will respect the remit of the European Court of Justice. And a principled but pragmatic solution to close legal co-operation will be needed to respect our unique status as a third country with our own sovereign legal order”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked about justice and home affairs in the implementation period. We welcome the EU’s position that the UK should continue to participate in existing justice and home affairs measures where it has opted in. We also want to ensure that the UK and the EU can take new action together against unforeseen incidents and threats during that period. For those reasons, we want to be involved in new measures introduced during implementation where that is appropriate. He also asked about the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich. I confirm that she was talking about all the justice and home affairs measures he mentioned—the EAW, ECRIS, Europol and all the other appropriate acronyms.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about the European arrest warrant and about the chance of a successful outcome compared with Norway. We value our co-operation through the EAW as it provides a faster and cost-effective way of handling extradition and helping us tackle cross-border criminality. With regard to Norway, our starting point for negotiations on future co-operation will be different from that of either Norway or Iceland, where a bilateral agreement is also in place. Of course, our starting point is different from theirs in so far as our extradition arrangements will be fully aligned with those of the EU at the point of our exit since we operate the same tool. That was not the case with Norway and Iceland when they joined.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, asked where we are in the negotiations and who is doing them—which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, was also interested in. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU is responsible for conducting negotiations in support of the Prime Minister. He is supported by the core negotiating team, which is made up of senior officials from a range of government departments. In response to his question about contacts, officials are engaging now and constantly with EU counterparts on a range of issues—but I come back to my earlier point that it would not be appropriate to give a running commentary on these discussions. We approach the next round of negotiations with optimism.
Can the Minister tell us if the European Union has appointed anybody to represent the 27 other countries in conducting the other side of treaty negotiations?
Michel Barnier is the EU chief negotiator. I thought that that was fairly obvious.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about no deal. Of course, we approach these negotiations not expecting failure but anticipating success. We are confident that continued practical co-operation between the UK and the EU on law enforcement and national security is very much in the interests of both sides, so we approach these negotiations anticipating success. We do not want or expect a no-deal outcome. However, a responsible Government should prepare for all potential outcomes, including the unlikely scenario in which no mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached. That is exactly what we are doing across the whole of government. The UK uses and benefits from a range of international information-sharing tools in the area of security and law enforcement, which are by no means limited to EU mechanisms but include bilateral and multilateral channels, including Interpol and the Council of Europe.
I hope I have answered all the questions—
Do I understand the Minister to be saying that the people conducting the trade negotiations will deal with the security stuff as well? Is that what he is saying? Are there no lawyers on the other side to conduct the negotiations on behalf of those 27 other countries? What is the situation?
There are lead negotiators on each side but they are supported by a whole range of officials and Ministers from various departments. David Davis is our negotiator, Michel Barnier is the EU’s negotiator, and they have different members in each of the teams—
But is the withdrawal agreement the same thing as the treaty or are they separate?
No, the treaty will be a separate piece of legislation when we negotiate it. I hope I have tackled most of noble Lords’ questions and they will be able to withdraw or not move their amendments.
May I just ask the Minister about his comments on the European Court of Justice? Is there anything in the case law of the ECJ that justifies the Government’s reluctance for it to continue to be the dispute resolution procedure for the matters we are discussing?
We have been clear that respecting the Brexit vote means delivering on having control of our own laws. Our Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of our own laws and it would not be appropriate to submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of a foreign power.
The Magna Carta was imposed on King John by the Barons, as I understand it—the Barons being Members of this noble House. The House did not exist in that form, but it was imposed by the Lords and the Barons. The House of Commons passed the Bill of Rights 350 years ago and imposed it on the sovereign, guaranteeing our rights to free elections, no taxes without parliamentary approval and free speech. The Bill of Rights passed 350 years ago by this Parliament formed the basis of the United States Bill of Rights and Bills of rights of other countries around the world.
Then just 70 years ago, we used our unique experience to write the European Convention on Human Rights—largely written by British lawyers. We wrote that for countries which had no history of our fundamental freedoms and had suffered the evils and degradations of National Socialism. What I am saying is that the worst indictment I make of the EU is that it seems to have destroyed the belief among parliamentarians, noble Lords and Members of Parliament that we are capable of governing ourselves and writing our own law.
There is nothing of any value in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is not already covered in UK law or the European convention. If we find some great new right in the future and decide that freedom of thought must become a law, are we incapable in this House, in the other place and as British parliamentarians of drafting that? Are we so enfeebled and incapable that we cannot do it? If the Barons could do it 800 years ago, Members of Parliament 350 years ago and the British Government and parliamentarians did it for Europe 70 years ago, are we so incapable that we cannot do it now?
The people of this country voted to bring back control of our laws because they believed that Parliament was capable of making better laws than the EU. They believed that we are better at deciding on our essential rights than an ECJ judge from Bulgaria who has a law degree in Marxist-Leninist law—I have checked on that, and he has got a degree from Sofia on Marxist-Leninist law.
I happen to agree with the British people. I see the incredible wealth of talent in this House, with noble and learned Lords and Law Lords, and I trust our courts. We do not need nor want this charter. Let us wear once gain the mantle of our predecessors in the Lords and Commons, who gave us every freedom that has been worth fighting and dying for for the last few hundred years. We need the courage of the electorate, who trusted us to make our own laws once again. We should not let them down.
I will make a point that has not been made before. The charter has never been scrutinised by this House. If it had been, we would not have this lack of clarity. I have more confidence in the ability of our Supreme Court to protect us than I have in the ECJ. Bearing in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, what a failure the charter has been across Europe. The Roma are being persecuted, migrants are not getting proper treatment, the leaders of Catalonia are being locked up and extremist, right-wing parties are on the march. Freedom House is marking down European countries; they are sliding away from human rights. I am not proud of the charter; it has not worked in Europe. We are much better off with something home-grown and administered by our Supreme Court.
My Lords, if I appear faint in my defence of the Bill it is due to a lack of food rather than a lack of enthusiasm. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to this important debate and set out the Government’s position. I will start by making it clear that we are listening carefully to the debates on this issue, and will continue to do so.
The Government agree that protecting our rights and liberties as we leave the EU is of critical importance and it is only right that every detail of our approach is scrutinised. This has been a wide-ranging debate about human rights after exit, but it is worth remembering that the amendments before us relate specifically to the charter and the question of what role, if any, it should have in domestic law when we are no longer a member of the EU.
I maintain that the approach in the Bill to the charter as a document is absolutely right, and that the Bill in this respect is in no need of improvement. However, as many noble Lords have pointed out, that approach cannot be separated from the Bill’s approach to the general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights. In response to the strength of feeling conveyed not just in this House but in the other place, the Government are looking again at these issues. These are highly technical issues in some respects but they are undoubtedly important, so we will look further at whether this part of the Bill can be improved in keeping with some of the concerns that have been expressed. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lamont referred to an observation made by the Secretary of State himself that, if there were specific examples of rights which were not otherwise covered, we would examine them to ensure that the rights were not lost. However, that is not the case. On the specific question of whether the charter should be kept, our view remains that not incorporating the charter into UK law should not in itself affect the substantive rights from which individuals already benefit in the United Kingdom. This is because the charter was never the source of those rights.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, anticipated that he might be reminded of his previous remarks on the matter, and I see no reason to disappoint him. In 2008, when this House debated the then European Union (Amendment) Bill, he was absolutely clear that,
“the charter was never intended to be applied directly to member states in dealing with those matters that member states have the competence to deal with. It was always intended to constrain the European Union institutions … the United Kingdom’s position, like my position, has always been that the charter affirms existing rights, it does not create any new justiciable rights in any member state and does not extend the power of the courts. Moreover, in many cases the charter rights are based on national laws and practices and so they must mirror the extent and content of those national”,—[Official Report, 9/6/08; cols. 426-27.]
laws.
The noble and learned Lord observed that he had nevertheless then encountered the incorporation of the charter into the Lisbon treaty in 2009. Perhaps that was a game changer. I remind him of his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee in 2014. At that time he referred back to his previous statements and publications with regard to the charter and went on to say that, as he had there explained, the fundamental point was to provide a clear and accessible statement of existing rights and therefore constraints on the power of the EU to legislate.
As the noble and learned Lord’s previous remarks help to make clear, the charter is only one of the elements of the UK’s existing human rights architecture. It reaffirms rights and principles that exist elsewhere in the EU acquis, irrespective of the charter, and the Bill sets out how those rights and principles will continue to be protected in UK law after exit.
The noble and learned Lord referred to a number of issues, such as the case of Benkharbouche in 2017 in the Supreme Court. In that case the court found that there was a breach of Article 6 of the convention but it also referred to Article 47 of the charter in the context not of rights but of remedies. One has to bear in mind the distinction between rights and remedies.
The noble and learned Lord posed three questions in the context of previous observations about the charter. First, he talked about there being no loss of substantial protection. It is inevitable that leaving the EU will result in changes to the current arrangements, but certainly we do not accept that this in itself will result in a loss of substantive rights.
Secondly, he referred to the procedural protections that will be excluded. When we leave the EU, a person can still rely on sources that are reaffirmed in the charter. I emphasise “reaffirmed in the charter”, as he himself observed in 2008 and 2014. Procedurally there may be differences but we do not consider that that can be a basis for incorporating the charter into domestic law. Indeed, we absolutely stand by what has been said by the Prime Minister: it is not necessary to retain the charter to ensure that rights are protected.
The noble and learned Lord also referred to the body of the charter, beginning with Article 1, and suggested that these rights were contained only in the charter. I simply observe that on 5 December last year the Government published a very detailed paper setting out, as it were, a comparison of the rights in the charter and where they can be found elsewhere—in the convention, in the principles of EU law and in our own common law. The noble and learned Lord referred to Article 1, which concerns the right to human dignity. I remind him that there is a long series of case law both from the ECJ, as it then was, and from the European Court of Human Rights going back to 1995 in which, for example, the convention court emphasised that the very essence of the convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. That has been repeated in a whole series of cases since then. These are well-established rights and they were well established when they were brought together into the charter.
I want to reassure noble Lords that substantive rights protected in the charter are, and will continue to be, protected elsewhere in UK law after we leave the EU, most notably in convention rights, in retained EU law, in the common law and via specific statutory protections such as those in our own equalities legislation. I have already mentioned that the Government published a detailed analysis providing guidance about how substantive rights found in the charter would be reflected in domestic law after exit.
Reference has been made to various legal opinions and that of Jason Coppel QC, who has had a number of name checks this evening. I can only implore noble Lords to look at the very detailed analysis the Government have produced. I also note that some of the references to Mr Coppel’s opinion involve references to his concern that Ministers might change rights, for example, or that the procedures will be affected. However, that is not to say that the fundamental rights underlying the charter are not found elsewhere.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord quite rightly draws our attention to the distinction between rights and remedies, but he will agree that rights are not helpful unless there are remedies. If we were scrutinising the charter and the source of its rights to establish whether we were satisfied that the rights and remedies could still apply, we might, for instance, have noted that the sources of Article 1 mentioned in the analysis would not confer an enforceable right on individuals after exit day. That is the JCHR’s analysis of the analysis.
I hope that the Minister can answer the question asked, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Kerslake, about why we have combined the two debates—one about the charter, its rights and wrongs and whether it is good or bad, and the other about the mechanisms. We have heard so often from the Government Front Bench that this Bill is about mechanisms. Why are the Government not using the mechanism they have themselves designed to give them the opportunity, and to give the Committee the opportunity, to consider the substance calmly after the chimes of midnight?
Quite simply because, as I indicated earlier to the Committee, the rights underpinning the charter exist elsewhere than in the charter and it is not necessary to incorporate the charter into domestic law in order to find those fundamental rights in our domestic law after we leave the EU.
I am sorry to interrupt, but the analysis by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to which the noble Baroness referred, which is an analysis of the Government’s analysis, identified a number of rights that are not there other than in the charter. Does the noble and learned Lord reject the JCHR’s analysis?
We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost.
Clause 5(5) makes it clear that, notwithstanding the non-incorporation of the charter, retained EU law will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent with the underlying rights. I hope that addresses to some extent the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. Interpretive provisions will retain a means by which we can look at these rights in the proper context.
With regard to those who have expressed concerns about this Bill resulting in a loss of substantive rights, I repeat—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has done, at least prior to his recent Pauline conversion—that it is not necessary to retain the charter to retain those fundamental rights. If we see that there is a potential loss of such fundamental rights, we will address that, and that is what we have indicated.
I put it to the noble and learned Lord that there is no other area of retained EU law where the Government have carried out this exercise or said that we do not need to read across a particular provision because it is already in domestic law. Why are they making an exception of the charter?
Because this is the only case in which we have identified that situation. There is no other reason for proceeding in this way except for that.
If, as the noble and learned Lord said on numerous occasions in his reply, the rights established in the charter are already there in our domestic law, what is lost by keeping the charter? If those rights are already there, the Government cannot be worried about anything if they retain the charter.
I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.
There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.
In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.
Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.
We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—
The noble and learned Lord is right in that assertion, but it does not follow that retained European law should not be read across in the form of the charter as well as its other features on exit day. Lots of things will change over time. Parliament will no doubt amend retained European law so that it ceases to be retained European law, but the Bill is about legal continuity and what the situation is on exit day. For this purpose, surely the Minister should accept what is being proposed.
I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.
As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.
Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.
I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.
I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.
My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord give us any indication of when he thinks that that exercise will be completed?
The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.
At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have taken part in the debate. It has been wide-ranging, as we anticipated it would be. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. I shall obviously not spend long on what I say now, given the hour. As we approached midnight, I was looking around the corner to see whether a pumpkin would arrive with horses. I was not sure whether it would be for me or for the noble and learned Lord opposite.