National Minimum Wage

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Wednesday 15th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Chris Ruane]

Absolutely. The Conservatives were whingeing when I raised these points, but it is obscene that the Chancellor of the Exchequer scurries off to Brussels to protect the multimillion pound bonuses of British bankers at the same time as he is reducing workers’ rates by £1,600 a year.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Ruane]

No, I will not.

More than 7,000 people have visited me in Parliament since I was elected in 1997. Many have been schoolchildren and sixth formers. I always allocate a good period of time for questions and one of the most common questions is, “What are you most proud of from your 16 years as an MP?” I am most proud of this piece of legislation, which Labour introduced in 1998. It is totemic. It was an indicator at that historical time of what Labour was about and what the Tories were about. We were for the many and they were for the few. I welcome the massive U-turn that the Conservatives have made on that, but it is too little too late.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

I will be even more secure when I have persuaded the hon. Gentleman, as I hope to do. He, being a fair man, will reflect on the fact that his distinguished commission undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the proposals made by Sir John Vickers and his commissioners. Sir John did not recommend that there should be the power to separate. In fact, he has been persuaded by the institution-specific power of separation that his commission proposed, but has reflected in evidence to his commission that to go further and introduce a system-wide power is a separate matter and should come before Parliament in an explicit way rather than, as would be the case here, through a statutory instrument following an independent review.

The proposals before us, most fair-minded colleagues would concede, fall very far short of the degree of scrutiny and rigorous assessment, including by the hon. Gentleman’s commission, that the current proposals have gone through. Parliament would not have the ability to present amendments to proposals and at that stage to take account of the recommendations even of the independent review. So the procedures proposed are less than adequate to the scale of the policy change that would be embodied in them. If we are to be serious about the need to respect the views and the role of Parliament—as I have made clear, these are important matters—we must accept that the only right and proper and democratic way of legislating for full separation is by coming back to Parliament with full primary legislation, including the rigorous process that we have undertaken.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I very much agree with the case that my right hon. Friend is making. Is there not a danger with a fixation on structure, which the review advocated by the Opposition would promote, that we work less on making the existing electrification work and getting the behaviours right, and instead allow a focus on structure and the further review? As with any structure, it is possible to ratchet up, but it is also possible to ratchet down, and it would allow a nibbling of the electrification, which would not be constructive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Barclay]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Professional standards—

‘After section 65 of FSMA 2000 insert—

“65A Professional Standards

(1) The regulator will raise standards of professionalism in financial services by mandating a licensing regime based on training and competence. This must—

(a) apply to all approved persons exercising controlled functions, regardless of financial sector;

(b) specify minimum thresholds of competence including integrity, professional qualifications, continuous professional development and adherence to a recognised code of conduct and revised Banking Standards Rules;

(c) make provisions in connection with—

(i) the granting of a licence;

(ii) the refusal of a licence;

(iii) the withdrawal of a licence; and

(iv) the revalidation of a licensed person of a prescribed description whenever the appropriate regulator sees fit, either as a condition of the person continuing to hold a licence or of the person’s licence being restored;

(d) be evidenced by individuals holding an annual validation of competence;

(e) include specific provision for a Senior Persons Regime in relation to activities involving the exercise of a significant influence over a controlled function under section 59 of the Act.

(2) In section 59, remove “authorised” and insert “licensed” throughout the section.”.’.

New clause 4—Duty of Care—

‘At all times when carrying out core activities a ring-fenced body shall—

(a) be subject to a fiduciary duty towards its customers in the operation of core services; and

(b) be subject to a duty of care towards it customers across the financial services sector.’.

New clause 5—Remuneration reform—

‘Within six months of Royal Assent of this Act the Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, in consultation with the appropriate regulation, lay before Parliament proposals on reform of remuneration at UK financial institutions which shall include incentives to take account of the performance and stability of a UK financial institution over a five- to 10-year period.’.

New clause 7—Protection for whistleblowers—

‘(1) After section 43B(f) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 there is inserted—

“(g) that a breach of regulated activities under FSMA 2000 or the Financial Services Act 2012 has been committed, is being committed, or is likely to be committed.”.

(2) After section 43B(5) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 there is inserted—

“The chairman of the board of directors of any relevant UK financial institution will be informed of any protected disclosure made by a worker which qualifies under the terms of Part IVA of this Act.”.’.

New clause 11—Reckless misconduct in the management of a bank—

‘(1) Within the three months of Royal Assent of this Act the Government shall publish proposals for the creation of a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank.

(2) The new offence in subsection (2) should cover those approved persons who are licensed under a Senior Persons Regime.

(3) The Government shall bring forward further proposals within three months of Royal Assent of this Act for the civil recovery of monies obtained by individuals who have been found guilty of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank.’.

New clause 13—Financial Services Crime Unit—

‘(1) The Treasury shall conduct a review into the creation of a Financial Services Crime Unit and consult on its proposals for the Financial Services Crime Unit’s powers and responsibilities.

(2) The Treasury shall lay its proposals before both Houses of Parliament no later than six months after this Act comes into force.’.

[Stephen Barclay]

In speaking to new clause 2, which I will not press to a vote, I wish to follow the line of argument pursued by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) on new clause 9. He drew attention to the tension created by building up capital while also lending more and used the analogy of driving with one foot on the accelerator and the other on the brake. If I may, I will take a step outside the car. With new clause 2, I wish to draw the House’s attention to a similar, I am sure unintended tension. The Government are taking a positive step forward, because in paragraphs 2.13 and 2.14 of their response to the parliamentary commission’s report, they make the welcome announcement that they accept the premise of reversing the burden of proof. In doing so, however, they will adopt a measure suggested in paragraphs 1170 and 1171 of the commission’s report that will create a potential handicap. A new condition will be attached to using that burden of proof, whereby the regulator must have concluded a successful enforcement action against the firm prior to doing so.

I do not think there can be any doubt about the merits of reversing the burden of proof. It is clear that if the regulator is required to sift through reams of e-mails looking for evidence to incriminate a senior banker, it will be a time-consuming and costly exercise. It is also highly likely that it will fail, because senior executives are not so stupid as to write boastful and wilful e-mails such as we saw from some of the LIBOR traders, who bragged of having their bottles of Bolly. Most senior executives are wise to the risks of e-mails and would not fall into such a trap. It is proportionate and reasonable to argue that senior executives who say that their hands-on leadership is sufficient to justify very high individual bonuses should also, on the other side of the coin, be able to demonstrate that they have personally acted reasonably.

The Government’s announcement that they will reverse the burden of proof is extremely welcome. However, the acceptance of paragraph 1171 of the Commission’s report could lead to a real impediment. If we open the door to personal enforcement, why would a chief executive wish to settle on behalf of their firm? We are trying to make it easier for the regulator to focus in a time-efficient and cost-effective manner on the individuals who should be held responsible, but that will be impeded by the additional requirement for enforcement to be concluded against the firm. The senior leadership whom we want to target will be incentivised to drag out proceedings and impede any settlement with the firm. I do not believe that is the Government’s intention, but I wished to draw the Minister’s attention to it so that the issue could be discussed in more detail and tackled in the other place.

I do not share the confidence of some colleagues who have spoken about the ability of criminal sanctions to operate effectively. They are a welcome tool to have, and many of our constituents would like the golden handcuffs to be replaced with the prison variety. Indeed, the images on US television of white-collar arrests and convictions have a powerful deterrent effect. My concern, however, is that if we look at the individual fines and enforcement to date, we see that the regulator has struggled to reach the evidential level required to prosecute individuals successfully. Now we are suggesting that it will have to meet a higher standard of proof to secure criminal convictions. It is a bit like asking a hurdler who has just failed at one level to jump over a much higher hurdle.

The reversal of the burden of proof is one aspect of what we need, and the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions is another, because it brings with it the power of the headline. The question is, will we fall into the trap that we so often fall into in this House of passing legislation that sounds tough but proves difficult to use in practice? My fear is that the standard of proof required of the regulator to deliver a criminal prosecution will make it a tool that is rarely used.

We therefore need to consider how we can target individuals, not firms, because that will drive the culture of firms. Currently, where there is wrongdoing, a firm will settle quickly and get a 30% discount. The more junior staff—the heads of the divisions responsible—are quickly exited, and the senior staff wilfully claim blindness, because the most controversial briefings are usually done orally. Reversing the burden of proof will address part of the ill, but through the new clause I wish to draw attention to the limitations of fines on firms, which at the end of the day penalise shareholders and pension funds. Our constituents pay twice—first for the bail-out, and then through the impact on their shareholding.

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[Stephen Barclay]

Does the hon. Lady not recognise that the difficulty with catch-all provisions, such as that for a 10-year period, is that they capture the good as much as the bad? New clause 2 would create targeted regulation to focus on those who have done wrong, instead of a catch-all provision that captures everyone.

[Cathy Jamieson]

I might have been tempted to support new clause 2 had the hon. Gentleman decided to put it to the vote, and I look forward with interest to hearing what the Minister has to say. I understand the issues relating to length of time and the dangers of a catch-all provision but, in the aftermath of the banking crisis, the legal and regulatory structures, and the further changes that the Government promise to introduce, we need to ensure that the banking culture really changes. New clause 5 attempts to ensure that banks think for themselves about how to ensure that their performance is sustainable. Now that the Government have moved to an acceptance of the broad principle, the devil will be in the detail of what they do next. Perhaps the Minister will have more to say on that.

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[Cathy Jamieson]

Again, my hon. Friend makes an important point that this is an all-party stance and that everyone on the banking commission took this issue seriously.

It is worth remembering that in response to a question from the Leader of the Opposition last month, the Prime Minister told the House that he would use this Bill to implement the report of the parliamentary commission. The Leader of the Opposition asked:

“Following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking, can the Prime Minister confirm that he supports its important recommendations on bonuses and criminal penalties, and that he will use the banking Bill to implement them?”

The Prime Minister responded:

“Yes, I do support both those measures...Penalising, including with criminal penalties against bankers who behave irresponsibly— I say yes. Also, making sure that for banks in receipt of taxpayers’ money we can claw back and have a ban on bonuses—I say yes too.”

The Leader of the Opposition then asked a further question, to which the Prime Minister replied:

“We will be using that Bill to take these important steps.” —[Official Report, 19 June 2013; Vol. 564, c. 883.]

I hoped the Minister would have been able to bring forward appropriate amendments or new clauses—or whatever is needed—at this stage, rather than leaving that to elsewhere. I hope he will be able to give us some further information on how the work will be progressed and when he now expects to give us more detail.

New clause 13 relates to the financial services crime unit in the Serious Fraud Office. We raised this issue in Committee, and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East gave an eloquent description of some of the areas that an FSCU would be able to address. This new clause would require the Treasury to report on the establishment of the FSCU and to do so within six months of the Act coming into force.

I fear the Minister might sigh and think, “Here go the Opposition once again, asking for another report to be produced.” Before he says that or any Member seeks to intervene to make that point, I will say that the reason we are asking for these reports to be produced is to ensure that progress is made and that things do not just gather dust on a shelf somewhere.

We know we have to look at the resources available to tackle white collar crime. Financial products are becoming ever more complex, and they are being traded faster, and increased resources could enable specialist police officers to develop their expertise. There are huge financial incentives in looking at developing this, too. It is worth remembering that fraud costs Britain about £73 billion a year, according to the Home Office’s National Fraud Authority. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East recalled in Committee, Andrew Bailey, the PRA chief executive, said it was “more than odd” that bank directors had not faced formal charges over the events leading up to the crisis. The Serious Fraud Office has a bit of a mixed record on tackling the high-profile cases. The Home Secretary was forced to perform a bit of a U-turn on her plans to abolish the SFO. It is clear that the SFO needs to be improved. The LIBOR scandal again shows that misconduct in financial services can have ramifications for traders, for industry, for shareholders, for the reputation of the City and, indeed, for criminal law.

[Stephen Barclay]

I seek to understand the scope of new clause 13 and the financial crime unit. Would it have taken criminal sanctions against the auditors of RBS, who so failed that they required the then permanent secretary of the Treasury to seek a letter of direction?

[Cathy Jamieson]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to learn that I am not going to go into the detail of that case. He has had a career in the banking sector dealing with such issues, and he will be as aware as I am that looking at one case in isolation is sometimes not the best way to appreciate the overall picture. The overall picture is what I am interested in, and why I specifically mentioned LIBOR, because it is already a criminal offence to attempt to fix that rate. We need to seek to ensure that the SFO has the resources necessary to tackle this and to prevent any further scandals.

We have tabled new clause 13 to give Parliament a chance, once again, further down the line to discuss the creation of a new agency, and we hope it would send a firm message to those tempted to engage in criminal conduct. I hope that the Minister may be able to say something more on that in his response. He did not seem to be persuaded in Committee of the need for a new unit or even a subdivision. My recollection is that he took that view, “Its all fraud and there is no need to have a specific unit or part of an organisation dealing with it.”

I think I have covered a number of issues relating to these proposals. Once again, it is important to put on the record the fact that although we have had the opportunity to raise some of these issues in Committee and this evening, it is unfortunate that on Report we are not going to be able to scrutinise the detail of some of the new clauses—it is fair for us to assume that they might have been tabled at this stage. I seek the Minister’s further reassurance that we are going to get the important detail of how he intends to proceed, that we will see as much as is possible of the draft new clauses and legislation as things are taken forward, and that we will have an appropriate opportunity to discuss all that further in this place.

--- Later in debate ---

I was extremely pleased that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Cathy Jamieson), for whom I have tremendous admiration, spoke about new clause 11 only lightly, because it would be unwise for her to press the point behind the measure too strongly, given that it seems to some people that the previous Government idled by and doled out knighthoods, but never thought about jail. Where on earth was the thought for the people who were suffering owing to the scandals that were under way at that time? I was pleased that she did not press her point aggressively because, as we deal with the current problems, it is clear to many of us whose fingers are all over the crime. We do not need an Inspector Luther or a Miss Marple to know that people in government were responsible for setting the framework under which criminal activity was allowed to run unchecked. Many of us believe that it isnot just the bankers who should hold their heads in shame, but the people in charge of regulation at that time.

[Stephen Barclay]

Does my hon. Friend share my incredulity that when David Strachan conducted his review at the Financial Services Authority following the Legal and General case and brought forward his recommendations for a light-touch enforcement regime, the vice-chair of the FSA was Sir James Crosby, who is one of the three figures who are especially criticised in the banking commission’s report? We have a multi-layered, light-touch enforcement regime that often creates a disincentive to the regulator—this is why market abuse often involves criminal sanctions, not civil sanctions. One of the people criticised in the banking commission report actually designed the system that applies to the regulator.

[Richard Fuller]

I am appreciative of that intervention, which adds not only to my body of knowledge, but to the commonly held disgust that, following all these efforts involving the best minds we can put in place, no one is going to jail. In the absence of anyone going to jail, we have gone through all the fraud, all the mis-structured, light-touch regulation and all the mis-positioning of responsibilities without a single person being truly accountable. If there is a point on which I disagree with my hon. Friend, which I rarely do, it is that he said in his speech that financial penalties are likely to be more successful. He might have a point in saying that there will be more successful prosecutions, but the loss of one’s liberty cannot be put in a discounted cash flow—there cannot be a beta high enough. If we want to change behaviour, we have to show that people will go to jail and lose their liberty. If, having gone through the worst financial recession that we have experienced in our lifetimes, not a single person goes to jail as a result of all our work, I do not care that there is a cross-party consensus because, in my view, this is failing the people.

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[Mr Love]

I will comment on the commission’s thought processes on some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned. He will remember, as we all do, the evening on which we set up a special parliamentary vehicle in the wake of the LIBOR rate-rigging scandal. Since 2008, there have been a variety of critical events, including the credit crunch and the recession. All that led to a catastrophic decline in the reputation of the financial services sector. Trust in bankers sank to an all-time low, and frankly LIBOR was the last straw. This was truly shocking behaviour on an unprecedented scale. Something had to be done, and the focus was very much on our terms of reference on standards and culture.

As a result, the commission had to answer some tough questions, and the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) has posed some of them: why had so few bankers been held to account for their failings? Why had it appeared that bankers pocketed the gains, but passed on the losses to the taxpayer? Why were customers who should have been treated fairly treated in the exact opposite way—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Cathy Jamieson) raised? We tried to answer those questions through three themes that came out in our report. The first theme is individual responsibility.

When all the head bankers came before us, we were genuinely shocked to hear that they denied any responsibility for what happened in their banks. Whether it was ignorance of the serious failings happening under their noses, or because there was collective decision making, the result was the same: no one could be held to account. That, we discovered, was the result of the failure of the approved persons regime, which did not attribute responsibilities to senior staff, who, as a result, could not be held to account.

Two steps are proposed to try to address that problem. First, we have already mentioned the new senior persons regime, designed to ensure that the most important responsibilities are assigned to specific individuals, who will more easily be held to account for them. Secondly, for a much wider group—not every employee, but those who could do serious harm to the bank, or its customers, due to their customer-facing position—we propose a new licensing regime, with a set of banking standard rules that enable them to be held to account.

However, for people to be held to account, we need more effective sanctions, and that is the second theme of the commission’s report. Identification of those responsible under the new regime will provide a stronger basis for the regulator to enforce existing civil penalties, such as fines, restrictions and bans. One of the great difficulties was assigning responsibility; we hope that individual responsibility will address that.

Given the seriousness of the wrongdoings—an issue mentioned in earlier contributions—the commission is recommending two new, far-reaching powers. New clause 2 does not address this point, but under certain conditions, the regulator should be able to impose a full range of civil sanctions, unless the person can demonstrate that reasonable steps were taken to prevent or mitigate the failing. In effect, that does what new clause 2 suggests: it reverses the burden of proof, but only under certain conditions.

[Stephen Barclay]

In essence, the hon. Gentleman is describing the purpose of new clause 2. Earlier, I alluded to the fact that there is a condition that militates against the effectiveness of the new clause: the tool can be used only if there is a successful prosecution, which gets in the way. As much as I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller), does the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) agree that we need to be careful about changing the law retrospectively, particularly on custodial sentences? One of the issues that we are addressing today is how we get it right for the future, and what the sanctions should be.

[Mr Love]

Personally, I oppose retrospective legislation. It was not considered by the commission, which does not make any recommendations on it. I suspect, however, that none of its members would be in favour of addressing these issues in that way.

The other change is the much publicised criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank, which normally carries, as has been suggested, a custodial sentence. Importantly, we have laid down preconditions before a charge of that nature can be brought. There must be a cost to the taxpayer—the bank has turned to the taxpayer to bail it out; or there are consequences for the financial system—stability is critical, and anything that destabilises the system should be subject to a criminal sanction; or there is serious harm to customers. We think that we have framed a big change in the law. Bankers continually ask why they are singled out as the only commercial group that can be charged in that way. It is a delicate balance, and I hope that the Government will look seriously at what we are trying to do.

The third area I want to touch on is remuneration and incentives. The reality is that rewards have been huge, and still are huge for a more limited supply of senior bankers. That incentivises excessive risk taking and, occasionally, misconduct. The commission concluded that risk and reward are still misaligned, particularly when making pay awards over a short period. It therefore sees advantages in making a significant portion of remuneration variable, rather than fixed. We do not have much sympathy for the European solution in relation to that, but we think that reform is necessary in this area. More variable pay should be deferred to take into account changing circumstances at the bank at which the banker works, with power for the regulator to extend the period for up to 10 years. To those who say that that is a long time, many banks have a good year, but then some less good years, and the commission wanted to recognise that that can go on for an extended period.

Regulators should be able to limit or prohibit sales-based incentives. We were shocked at the way in which sales-based incentives were used to create the mis-selling scandals of PPI and interest rate swaps. There was a cascading group of incentives from senior management through to the customer-facing end of the bank, and we think that that made a major contribution to the problems that arose. We want to give the regulator much stronger powers. Where a bank requires taxpayer support, the regulator should have discretionary power to cancel all deferred compensation. It is shocking that, as happened in some banks, they were still paying remuneration to employees after the bank had taken on taxpayer funds.

The issues of conduct and remuneration that I have raised lie at the heart of what the commission thinks needs to be done in respect of culture and standards. These recommendations have been much debated and discussed. We have done everything we can to make them practical and realisable, and I hope that, when there is an opportunity to debate them in the other House, or when they come back to this place, the Government will give serious consideration to those recommendations.

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[Greg Clark]

This summer.

New clause 11 concerns the new criminal offence of reckless misconduct recommended by the parliamentary commissioner. As we have already announced, we agree with the commission’s recommendations and will over the summer draft amendments to create such a legally watertight criminal offence, including compliance with the European convention on human rights. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford suggested, the commission did not recommend retrospectivity, and these provisions are intended to enact its recommendations. I hope that he will understand that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Mr Ruffley) was absolutely right to point out that it was of course this Government who first raised the possibility of criminal sanctions for managerial misconduct in July last year. We are grateful to the commission for its extensive work. We will follow its advice on misconduct committed by persons covered by the regime that is being set up. The commission noted the legal challenges involved in mounting a successful prosecution, but we absolutely agree that the creation of this offence should be justified by the signal that it sends and the potential deterrent effects it can have. We have to make it clear that reckless behaviour by those in charge of our banks cannot be tolerated.

New clause 13 proposes to create a new financial services crime unit. A similar amendment was discussed at some length in Committee. I can assure hon. Members that the Government fully recognise the importance of tackling financial crime. There is to be a dedicated command within the new National Crime Agency responsible for directing the national response to economic and financial crimes. The economic crime command will have a clear remit to reduce the threat from economic and financial crimes, working collaboratively across the different sectors. Substantial progress has already been made in establishing the National Crime Agency and driving early operational success against criminals who seek to engage in economic and financial crimes.

The Government accept the broad recommendations of the parliamentary commission on each of these matters. We will be acting quickly to take the opportunity afforded by this Bill to make amendments that are legally watertight and likely to pass into law in the early part of next year, just six months after the parliamentary commission’s extensive report. In acting in this way, we are keeping faith not only with the recommendations of the parliamentary commission but with the urgency of the need to enact these reforms, which I commend to the House.

[Stephen Barclay]

We have had a full and constructive debate that builds on the cross-party nature of the work of the banking commission. That has been reflected in the consensual tone of hon. Members’ speeches. I am very reassured by the comments of my right hon. Friend the Minister about the Government’s willingness to look at the outcome that new clause 2 seeks, which is in line with the comments made by Members across the House. For that reason, I will not press the new clause to a vote but ask leave to withdraw it.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 4

Duty of Care

‘At all times when carrying out core activities a ring-fenced body shall—

(a) be subject to a fiduciary duty towards its customers in the operation of core services; and

(b) be subject to a duty of care towards it customers across the financial services sector.’.—(Cathy Jamieson.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Corporate Structures and Financial Crime

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Thursday 4th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry]

I am getting to that. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend.

Is it any wonder that KPMG has just reported that in the UK, fraud cases totalling more than £500 million were recorded in the first half of 2013, which is up by more than a quarter on the previous year?

We need a change of culture in our law enforcement agencies. We must equip them with the tools and resources that they need to get on the front foot. Under English law, companies are criminally liable only if it can be proved that a director was personally involved in the wrongdoing. That is an extremely high threshold—a problem to which the hon. Member for Wells (Tessa Munt) referred.

There is a good case for holding companies vicariously liable for their employees’ economic crimes, unless they can demonstrate that they had adequate compliance procedures. The last Labour Government did that in relation to bribery with the Bribery Act 2010. We want to build on that, but this Government want to water it down. They say, for some reason, that rules against bribery are red tape. That stopping people bribing one another can be seen as red tape is beyond belief.

If we change the law on corporate responsibility, we may see an increase in the number of companies that are prosecuted, so we must have a penalty structure that is worthy of receiving them. The highest fraud fine to result from an SFO prosecution is £2.2 million. The highest fine clinched by the US Department of Justice is larger than $3 billion. Why do we not introduce a system in which sentences are based on a percentage of the company’s turnover over the past three years?

Although the SFO’s problems are not entirely down to under-resourcing, resources are important because these crimes are expensive to investigate. Last year, the SFO’s budget was £34 million, compared with £40 million in 2009-10. In 2014-15, it will fall to only £30 million. It is so short of money that it has to go cap in hand to the Treasury whenever it wants to take over a major prosecution. That at least gives the impression that the Chancellor has a secret veto on whether fraud investigations take place.

The US approach of topping up the funds of fraud prosecutors is much more appealing. Where possible, confiscated assets are returned to the victims. The proceeds from the many cases in which the victims cannot be traced are poured into a central fund. Each year, teams of prosecutors bid for a portion of that fund for asset tracing and law enforcement investigations. We have the beginnings of such a system in the UK. We could extend that and put large fines or at least part of them into the pool as well. In these austere times, we need to explore such alternative means of funding.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is eloquently describing the failure of the tripartite regulatory regime that her Government put in place. She is correct that the fines in the UK are a fraction of those in the US. A further failure is that the fines have rewarded other banks. This Government have ensured that the fines that are paid do not reduce the levy so that banks no longer profit from the wrongdoing of other banks. That was the regime that her Government put in place.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but in the time I have available, I would like to look to the future and consider the best method that we have for solving the current problems. I am happy to talk to him at some length outside the debate, because I am committed to the issue and will be interested to hear his point of view.

It seems to me that one good way in which the assets in question can be used, instead of lowering the levy, is to put them into a pool that prosecutors can use in future. That would help to pump up what we are doing. That seems to be a way forward, and I am putting it before the House today to get some sensible responses.

Economic Growth

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Geoffrey Robinson (Coventry North West) (Lab)]

I think that some of us who have sat through this debate find it regrettable that, to a large extent, it has been hijacked by the obsessively anti-European faction in the coalition parties. It is not that Europe is not important, but the debate is about the Queen’s Speech and a reflection on the Government’s record after three years in office. Rather than intruding on the private grief of Government Members caught up in their internal and agonising debates, I would much rather say to those on the Treasury Bench that, in all seriousness, they have to face up to the fact that after a full three years in office they are responsible for the economy: they are responsible for the situation we are in, and they are responsible for getting us out of it. Unless they accept that responsibility, they will never accept the measures that are necessary to find a way out of the chronic situation in which we still find ourselves.

Three years ago, after only a few months into office and after they brought in the cuts that went too far and too fast, the Chancellor was already crowing that the plan was working and the recovery was on track. We know what the recovery was meant to achieve: central to all economic policy is growth. In the three years to date, we were meant to have achieved 6% growth, but have achieved only 1.1%. I wonder whether the Government realised that what they were committing themselves to, and which after three months they thought was working, would achieve only one-sixth of their central economic objective. Those who have doubts about whether they should change course should reflect on that. Had they realised what that would achieve, they would never have embarked on it. The only way forward is to change course. Of course, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) pointed out, to do that would mean going back on so much of what they proclaimed to be absolutely essential, and that is impossible for them to do.

Time is limited for all Members, so I want to concentrate on just two aspects of economic policy where the Government’s incompetence and failure is hard to explain. The first is investment. What the Government call the national infrastructure plan has been variously described by conservative organisations as “hot air”, “complete fiction” and, by the chairman of the CBI, as “lacking all delivery”. Where does this leave investment? One cannot understand the Government’s failure, because there is no cross-party debate on investment or conflict over it. Less still is there any doctrinal argument such as we have on economic growth or financial policy—on the components, predictors or causal factors of, say, bond yields in 30 years and so on. Everybody in the House I have ever heard speak on this has said, “We must have more investment,” because traditionally the UK has not invested in R and D or fixed equipment and plant as much as we should have done or as much as our competitors have done. There is no argument about that.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I am struck by the hubris of the hon. Gentleman, who is a former Paymaster General. The report on the extension of the private finance initiative by the Public Accounts Committee, which is chaired by a Labour Member, found that the previous Labour Government wasted more than £1 billion. Half, or more, of the PFI projects in the housing sector came in at double their original budget. He needs to accept his party’s record on major infrastructure projects.

[Mr Robinson]

Here we go again. I do not know of any major infrastructure project that has not run over budget. As my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman) said, let us see what happens to HS2. They all run over budget. Some terrible PFI deals were done—there is no question about it—but all Government Members ever do is say what Labour did badly. We have admitted that we did many things badly. We failed on certain things, but it will not help to get the Government’s plan going to say, “Oh, look what you did when you were in office.” Nothing could be more pathetic. That is what I am trying to get through to the Government. They are now in charge, and they now have to face up to their own failures and the things that need to be done to put them right.

I come now to what those things are. I have mentioned how the Government budgeted for 6% growth, but in fact have achieved about 1% growth. It could not get much worse than that. Under their national infrastructure plan, they have about 567 projects in the pipeline, ready to go, but in three years they have achieved seven of them, or 1.2%. Everyone agrees that these projects are good ideas, so why can they not get these things done? We own one of the banks outright—I shall come to the banks in a moment—and we have a substantial stake in another, but the Government have created their own business bank. It could be investing in some of these projects, but against a background in which bank lending to businesses has fallen by £4.8 billion in the last quarter alone, they are offering £300 million through the British business bank. It is no wonder they are not getting the projects through. It is no wonder they are failing.

[Stephen Barclay]

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, who is a senior Member of the House, he is just not engaging with the facts. Public investment as a share of GDP will be higher on average over this Parliament and the next Parliament collectively than under the last Government. On housing, which was my previous example, his party’s record was absolutely shocking, whereas our build to rent fund is addressing some of these issues. Action is being taken. He is ignoring his own record as a former Treasury Minister and the action that this Government are taking. It is remarkable.

[Mr Robinson]

The Chancellor produces that tired statistic every time we mention investment. Let us take construction. The last time the level of house building was this low was in the 1920s. Overall, the level of construction has fallen 11% in the last year. This is against a background of a chronic need for the jobs and growth that investment can supply. We need a major uplift in the level of investment. It is higher, marginally, than it was 10 years ago, but so it ought to be. It is pathetic that Government Members continue not to face up to the reality of the failure of their own programme. As long as they do not, they will not succeed. Would the hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) really have embarked on this plan if he had known that, instead of 6% growth, we would end up three years down the road with 1% growth? Would he? Of course not: nobody on the Government Benches would have done that, and if they had, they would have needed their brains tested—perhaps they need them tested anyway. That is the truth of it.

Then we come to the failure of Merlin and the question of the banks. Instead of making the Royal Bank of Scotland a national bank to invest in such projects, all the Government want to do is flog it off ahead of time. That will be another failure to add to the long list. This is a Government of failure who will not admit it, and therefore they will not put things right.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. Ducks go quack, cows go moo and Conservatives hate regulation of the market. It is part of their ingrained DNA.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I will make a bit of progress and give way in a minute.

There is not enough in the proposed legislation on the safety of the banking system, not enough to rebuild consumer confidence, not enough to reform the high-risk banking culture and not enough to support growth and create a banking system that serves the needs of our economy. Too often, Ministers sound as though they are acting like shop stewards for banking executives desperate to retain bonuses that are many multiples of their salaries. Instead, Ministers should roll up their sleeves and put the taxpayer, the consumer and the UK economy first.

I want to address some of the issues the Minister raised about the detail of the Bill. First, on banking safety and protections for the taxpayer, Labour believes that a reserve power for full separation is needed, not just the firm-by-firm approach that the Government have conceded. Stopping short on backstop powers will reduce the chances that ring-fencing will succeed. Ministers are ignoring the commission’s conclusions, claiming that it would be wrong to give the regulators full separation powers, but the commission is scathing in its report today, saying:

“The Government has erected a straw man which it has then successfully demolished, because we made no such recommendation”

in the first place.

It is clear that the commission wants a full separation power only after a full review and decision by Government and Parliament—perhaps it was being inadvertently misrepresented by the Treasury—so it would be far more sensible to legislate now, not just if one or two individual banks misbehave, but in case ring-fencing as a whole fails across the sector. Indeed, we see cross-sector failings, as LIBOR illustrates, so it is not enough to have a half-done backstop. Stopping short will deliver only half the backstop measures that we need and will have corporate lawyers across the City rubbing their hands with glee at the prospect of litigation against regulators who might want to intervene on a case-by-case basis. However, given the possible views of the other place, I suspect that the Government will eventually be forced to change their mind.

Let me turn to leverage and the risk-weighting of assets, which has been introduced as an antidote by regulators to the high-risk, high-reward culture that was pervasive in banks before the crisis. However, the risk-weighting process has been partial and, in some cases, self-defining by the banks, and in the EU the zero risk-weighting attributed to some palpably risky sovereign debts has brought the system into some disrepute. The Basel committee published new evidence in January highlighting the major variants between jurisdictions and banks on this issue. Regulators and the Bank of England need to get a grip of this, but as a counter-balance we also need protections against the over-extended vulnerability of bank balance sheets. That is why the leverage ratio powers need to be clearly set out in the Bill and phased in ahead of the European Union plans for the end of this decade, which is one of the main recommendations and conclusions of the Vickers report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

If the hon. Gentleman’s analysis is correct, he will no doubt join us in the Division Lobby to institute the recommendations on leverage from the parliamentary commission. Is that his intention? Will he join us in supporting our amendments? I will give way to him if he wishes to answer that question, but I do not think he does. That is a shame, because I know that he feels strongly about these matters, but I can detect the gagging influence of the Treasury Whip as he texts the message “Be careful: Jesse Norman is on his feet again.” Forgive me, Mr Deputy Speaker, I meant to say the hon. Gentleman. The alert has gone out that rebellion is in the air.

We need more protections to deal with standards and culture, and we need to make sure that whistleblowers in the banking sector are given protection. We also need to set up a financial crime unit within the Serious Fraud Office, using some of the resources that are flowing from the fines. We probably also need to deal with the statute of limitations issue, going beyond the three years to give the regulators additional powers.

[Stephen Barclay]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

I think I ought to make some progress, and I want to talk about the need for the banking system also to enhance our economic prospects, support enterprise and growth, and maintain the supply of credit to the economy. Those are some of the issues that our constituents are concerned about for the future. Nothing in the Bill looks forward at the challenges facing business or the economy more broadly. So we want to see urgent action—ideally in the Budget, but if not in this Bill—that improves the operation of the funding for lending scheme to ensure that lending to small business is prioritised. We called for that last summer when the scheme began, but since then net lending to business has fallen further and further still. It is very important that we take this moment to improve and adapt the funding for lending scheme in this way. We must recognise that we have had the failure of Project Merlin and we have had credit easing, which was given eight months to do the job. So funding for lending is the third scheme that the Chancellor has tried and we have to make sure that it is changed in a way that makes these things work.

Even if the Government eventually create a fully formed Bill, we need regular parliamentary oversight of how ring-fencing and the new structures are working. As the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards says today:

“The Government’s proposal for the periodic review to be conducted by the regulator is wholly inadequate.”

We also need to have more than the one-and-a-half-hour, rubber-stamping Committees to scrutinise the detailed secondary legislation, which is why we advocate a super-affirmative order-making process to give time for the Treasury Committee and others to examine the technical detail of the changes in respect of the clauses and the orders that flow from them.

We want a Bill that makes banking safe and protects the taxpayer, but this one falls short in several areas. We want a Bill that improves banking standards, enhancing probity and conduct, and reforming the culture of banking, but this Bill contains none of those changes yet. We want a Bill that helps to rebuild consumer trust and choice, supporting more competition, new entrants, mutuality and consumer switching. We want a Bill that creates a banking system that supports jobs and growth, and maintains the supply of credit to the economy. The Opposition will not oppose the Bill on Second Reading today, because reforms are clearly needed, but too many important policy changes are still conspicuous by their absence. After such a big global crisis, and so many scandals and inquiries, the Government have no excuses and they need rapidly to populate this shell of a Bill with some real substance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

It is always a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom), and, Mr Deputy Speaker, to be the last speaker to catch your eye before the wind-ups.

The Father of the House spoke about one of his speeches in 1984, so I took the liberty of having a look. If the House will indulge me, I will quote from it:

“There has been a great deal of talk about capital. Of course that is important, but vastly more important than that is expertise, integrity and judgment.”—[Official Report, 16 July 1984; Vol. 64, c. 68.]

Indeed, there was much expertise, integrity and judgment in my right hon. Friend’s remarks, and in essence I want to focus my comments on them. The Bill addresses structure and it is right to learn the lessons. Of course there was too much leverage in the system. No one would think that the level of liquidity available to the banks at a time of crisis was adequate, and there has been much work by regulators and central bankers since the 2008 crisis to address that. What there has been rather less of, however, is a willingness to tackle culture.

While I commend the Government for the Bill’s focus on leverage, and on dealing with the well-measured suggestions of my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and his commission, we should be clear on what the Bill is not doing. It will not stop retail bank failures, such as Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley; it will not stop investment bank failures, such as Lehman’s; and it will not stop the regulatory failures of universal banks, as we have seen with the anti-money laundering and sanctions abuses or the LIBOR abuses by some of our largest banks. The Bill does not address the shadow banking world—the £200 billion of risk that is currently carried in private equity. Most of all, the danger of today’s debate is that we do what is so often the case after a regulatory crisis: we focus on solving the problem we have just had. We are not talking about the impact on banks if we lose control of interest rates, which we all hope will not be the case. The focus is on the structural failures relating to liquidity and capital, and that has been the tenet of the debate.

[Jim McGovern]

Why would it be wrong to focus on our recent problem?

[Stephen Barclay]

Of course that is not wrong. I said that the Bill is welcome, and that it is a positive response to the commission’s report. The focus on leverage and liquidity is absolutely right, and that is why I pay tribute to the work of central bankers and regulators. I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman was listening to my remarks. The danger is that we focus on the past and do not anticipate the future. There is a need for flexibility, and for that the Bill needs to tackle culture. The paradox is that individuals in banks are motivated by big bonuses, which drive their behaviour, yet when things go wrong, we do not have their corollary, which is big fines against individuals. That might be the sort of thing to grab people’s attention when they become aware of issues.

I am glad that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) is back in his place, because he missed addressing that point in his remarks—it is a shame he would not take interventions from me. Under his Government, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, probably the most-debated Act for many years, created a rulebook of more than 6,000 pages. He spoke about the need for more regulation and suggested that Conservative Members had failed because of the lack of regulation, yet we had 6,000 pages of it. The issue was that the regulation was not enforced.

It is even worse than that, because the hon. Gentleman actually allowed a regulatory regime that included things such as guaranteed bonuses. Not only would somebody get a bonus if they performed well, but they got a guaranteed bonus even when the bank collapsed. When the financial crisis hit in 2008, contractually the banks were signed up to guaranteed bonuses, so they were still doling out money under the enhanced regulatory regime to which he referred—true socialism in action.

It gets worse. There was a fines system that incentivised banks to profit from the wrongdoing of other banks. When a bank was subject to a regulatory fine, the money went not to the taxpayer in the form of funding good works or to customers of the bank affected, but to the other banks in the form of lower levies to the regulator. When a bank committed a wrongdoing, therefore, other banks in the sector profited. This is the regulatory regime on which we are now being lectured.

Let me give another example on structure: the collapse of RBS. After 10 months of the brightest minds in our Treasury—I am sure they are the brightest minds—looking at this issue, they still could not rely on the books. So untrustworthy was RBS’s auditing that the permanent secretary to the Treasury had to send for a letter of direction from the Chancellor saying, “I can’t rely on the books. It’s such a mess, Chancellor, you’ll have to give me a letter of direction.” We will not take any lectures from the Opposition, therefore, about their regulatory regime or the mess in which it has left our constituents, who are the ones footing the bill.

[Mr Richard Bacon (South Norfolk) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to listen to my hon. Friend, who, unlike many in the House—particularly in the Opposition, but also, I fear, on the Government Benches—as a former financial regulator actually knows what he is talking about, which is a dangerous thing here. In September 2007, when Northern Rock collapsed, the Treasury did not even know if it had the power to take it over, which was something of an indictment of thousands and thousands of pages of regulation. Does he agree that it might not be a coincidence that John Pierpont Morgan and Nathaniel Rothschild, the founders of two of the most successful banks in the 19th century—JP Morgan and NM Rothschild —had a considerable personal interest and stake at risk in those institutions if things went wrong?

[Stephen Barclay]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he is right because, as I know from my time in banking, people in banks are usually aware of the problems, but there is a perverse incentive—a short-termism—that says, “If the rewards are delivered short term, but the risk is unlikely to crystallise”—

[Chris Leslie]

I believe that the hon. Gentleman was director of regulatory affairs at Barclays bank from 2006 right up, I think, until the general election. Will he assure the House that he was not aware of any of the LIBOR issues that took place under his watch?

[Stephen Barclay]

Once again the hon. Gentleman has got his facts plain wrong, because although I was—[Interruption.] We can all see that he has had a quick read, but as so often with Labour politicians he has not understood what he has read. I was director of regulatory affairs in the retail bank and, as anyone knows, the retail bank was not responsible for LIBOR. That was an investment banking issue.

[Chris Leslie]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Barclay]

Unlike the hon. Gentleman, who repeatedly refused to take interventions, I will happily take another.

[Chris Leslie]

I did take a fair few interventions. If the hon. Gentleman was the director of regulatory affairs at Barclays bank from 2006 until the general election on the retail side, was he aware of the mis-selling of payment protection insurance?

[Stephen Barclay]

Once again the hon. Gentleman has not listened to the answer. I was actually head of anti-money laundering and sanctions for half the period, so once again he is getting the basic facts wrong. It is interesting that he does not want to debate the issues. He does not want to debate the fact that there were guaranteed bonuses or a fines system that incentivised the wrong things. He does not want to debate the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) correctly pointed out, we had a Treasury that was not even aware of its own powers. We also had a tripartite system in which it was unclear who was in charge. We then had Treasury officials looking at banks and their assets without being able to rely on what was under their noses. That is the legacy that Labour left us.

[Chris Leslie]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Barclay]

No. I have taken two interventions from the hon. Gentleman and he did not do well with either. I want to make progress, because I am conscious that time is moving on.

I shall return to the comments made by someone who, unlike the hon. Gentleman, speaks with professional expertise, namely the Father of the House. He was correct—as he is on so many issues, but particularly this one—to talk about the danger of focusing on structure and not rooting out conflicts of interest. That is at the heart of the point I want to make about individual accountability, linked to conflicts of interest—about the awareness, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk pointed out, of those in institutions who know where the risks are and how they are incentivised to speak up. On Thursday we will have a debate on the NHS and the fear of whistleblowers to speak out. Many of the issues in the NHS are similar to what we have seen in our banks. Let me give the House an example that makes the point highlighted by my hon. Friend. So far, the two biggest fines imposed on any individuals in banking were imposed on two Northern Rock executives. On both occasions they were less than those individuals’ bonuses the preceding year. How are people incentivised to do the right thing in our financial sector when they can see such short-term benefits from wrongdoing and very little downside risk?

I very much endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) said about empowering consumers by having portability in the system and grass-roots pressure. However, we cannot rely on that alone—I do not think she would suggest for a minute that we could—to address the regulatory failures or the asymmetry of information that customers face.

[Jim McGovern]

I became an MP in 2005, and between then and about 2009, I do not think any business people approached me. Since then, however, a lot of them have approached me to express their grievous concern about keeping their businesses going. I have to say that I am struggling to understand what the hon. Gentleman means, and I think the people in my constituency who have started small businesses as joiners, bricklayers or whatever would also struggle to understand him. Will he please make his point in lay terms?

[Stephen Barclay]

Yes, I can address that question head on. It is logical to have introduced measures to try to manage risk in the financial sector, but we are requiring banks to retain more and more assets at the same time as asking them to lend more. We are therefore asking them to do two conflicting things, as well as introducing a structural fix that innovative people will often be able to find ways around. For example, the shadow banking sector is not affected by this kind of proposal. If we want to address innovation, to be flexible and to move with the market, and retrospectively to impose fines for wrongdoing, we would be far more successful if we changed the culture than if we imposed rigid rules.

In many ways, I agree with the hon. Gentleman, in that we all have constituents who complain that the banks are not lending, but perhaps that is an issue for another day. There are many areas in which the banks’ behaviour is wrong, but we cannot change the culture through rules alone. We had more than 6,000 pages of rules, but that did not achieve the right culture. We can achieve it by having individual accountability, and one of the best ways of doing that is through personal fines.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman read the Daily Mirror today, as I did; I always try to avail myself of the Daily Mirror. On the front page, there was a story about the “Fat cat in the hat”, who is a former Barclays executive, according to the report, and it must be true because it was in the Daily Mirror. The point is that it is individuals like that, where there is alleged wrongdoing, who are able to keep their bonuses and keep their profits. That does not send the right message on culture. Rules are too blunt a tool.

If we want to change the banks, the Bill is extremely welcome, but I hope that the very constructive proposals put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester will be given further consideration. There is much to support in the Bill, however.

[Mark Garnier]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Chancellor’s measures stating that the fines levied on RBS should be taken from the bonus pool go some way towards addressing the point that he makes?

[Stephen Barclay]

Those measures are a step in the right direction, but they will also catch the legitimate people, rather than focusing on those who have done wrong. There will be no means of clawing back from wrongdoers. Let us take the example of Sir James Crosby. To what extent would he face retrospective clawback? He is long gone, and he has taken the money.

[Andrea Leadsom]

Is not this exactly the issue that we have been debating over the past week, with the EU proposal to cap bonuses? That would have the unintended consequence of pushing up salaries, which are notoriously difficult to claw back. Does my hon. Friend agree it would be much better to put in place a proper compensation scheme, perhaps through statute, that was determined by the banks themselves and that ensured clawbacks and full accountability?

[Stephen Barclay]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One-size-fits-all rules often capture the good but are insufficiently robust to deter the bad. Yes, the Bill is welcome and takes constructive steps forward, but we also need to see more measures from the Treasury on individual fines.

[Mr Bacon]

There are some people here who are not interested in the debate, but they can go away if they want to. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way; I have now caught up with those on the Labour Front Bench in terms of interventions.

I heard from 27 employees of Lloyds bank who were caught by the temporary ban on bonuses. Some of them were getting bonuses of only £2,000, so that was quite unfair. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker) might have suggested that senior bankers and bank directors should be required to post personal bonds. Does my hon. Friend agree that that would go some way towards dealing with the problem?

[Stephen Barclay]

My hon. Friend is right. We have to introduce into the system a position in which those at the top who are getting the biggest rewards also face the biggest risks. Some colleagues have talked about criminal sanctions, but the burden of proof is such that it is often difficult for the prosecuting authorities to get sufficient evidence to make it an effective tool. I am not against that, but it is often not an effective tool in practice. We need to ask how we can get to a situation where we do not catch those on £2,000 bonuses and those who have done no wrong, and do not set in place a whole load of rules that fetter innovation or deter business, but where we do create a stick and a deterrent for those who have abused the system and know they are still on the hook for significant financial loss. Those are the people most motivated by big fines in the first place; we should have a correlation between the bonuses and the fines.

In conclusion, the Bill is constructive and welcome, but we need to hear much more from Treasury colleagues about individual accountability, not just structures.

[Cathy Jamieson (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab/Co-op)]

We have had a wide-ranging debate and heard some useful, thoughtful and constructive contributions. Everyone has had the opportunity to make all the points they wanted to—except, perhaps, for the Father of the House, who understandably bemoaned the fact that he had only 12 minutes. He might well be disappointed not to have been here at a later stage of the debate to give us the benefit of his wisdom, as he certainly gave us an interesting contribution.

We heard the maiden speech of the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mike Thornton). He paid tribute to his predecessors in the traditional style, but raised a number of important points, not least of which was about bank lending and particularly the lending scheme for small businesses.

I would like to pick up some of the general points and themes running through the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) gave a comprehensive opening speech from the Opposition Front Bench. Other Members picked up the point that he made that we cannot have any repetition of the actions that led to the taxpayer bail-out. The actions and attitudes of the bankers meant that the banking sector—or individuals in it, as many hon. Members have said—thought that it was okay to retain the profits privately when the sun shone, to use that metaphor, but to let the losses fall to the public purse when the rainstorms arrived. We simply cannot allow a repetition of such risks to taxpayers in the future. That is why the banks must be reformed here in the UK, and further reformed in the EU and across the world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East outlined—it was echoed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern)—our financial sector is larger than most. The greatest global financial centre is in the City of London, and there are important centres in Edinburgh and across the UK, so we have to take any additional steps required to guard against any risk of future collapse.

My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East also spoke eloquently about the passage of the Financial Services Act 2012, which sought to address some regulatory shortcomings. Many hon. Members will have heard him during the course of the Public Bill Committee speaking eloquently—and, I have to say, frequently—about many of the issues that we are looking to this Bill to address. He highlighted a number of them, including concerns about LIBOR.

I hope that the hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) will take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East. The hon. Gentleman talked a lot about regulatory shortcomings, but we need to remember how members of the public and ordinary people in the street will view this issue. People in the banks were culpable; they were individuals who somehow thought it was all right to take those risks and—[Interruption.] I hear the hon. Gentleman say, from a sedentary position, that it was our system. At the end of the day we can have systems, we can have regulatory reform, we can have all those rules in place, but if the culture and the attitude of the people involved do not change, that will simply lead to more problems in the future. Members on both sides of the House have recognised that today. I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who, I understand, previously had a career in the banking industry and, indeed, in regulation, does not seem to accept that individuals as well as systemic failures bear some responsibility.

[Stephen Barclay]

rose—

[Cathy Jamieson]

I am happy to be corrected if I have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Barclay]

The hon. Lady seems to be misrepresenting the entirety of my speech. The whole speech was about the need for individual accountability. I said that under the system established by the hon. Lady’s party, there was no such accountability. That is why Sir Fred Goodwin walked away with his huge bonus untouched. Under that system, there were no real fines and no individual accountability. That is the essence of it.

[Cathy Jamieson]

I understood the hon. Gentleman to be blaming the regulators rather than the individuals who were involved in the wrongdoing. Let me repeat that, notwithstanding the amount of regulation that is introduced, if there are people who are intent on wrongdoing, we need to address the culture and the expectations in banking. I think that members of the public expect us to do that.

A number of important points were made at the outset of the debate about the timing of the Committee stage. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East, and a number of those who intervened subsequently, expressed concern about the fact that the Bill provides such a slim framework for further secondary legislation, largely by Treasury order. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) described it as an “Is this it?” sort of Bill, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) called it a mini-Bill.

The Minister seemed to suggest that we would have adequate opportunities not only to scrutinise the Bill itself, but to scrutinise and respond to whatever other measures or recommendations were made by the parliamentary commission at a later stage. I think that how, when, and where that scrutiny will take place remains rather uncertain. The hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), the chair of the commission and of the Treasury Committee, asked for two days to be provided on Report, but it seems that Ministers did not consider that appropriate, or did not wish to do so. That is serious, because the Bill is very thin as it stands, and a great deal of work will be needed in connection with the secondary legislation. We ought to have every opportunity to scrutinise not just the good work that has already been done by the commission, but what it will do in future.

The commission report has helpfully provided us with a series of amendments and explanations of why they are important. It has also provided us with information on why the members of the commission feel that certain amendments should be proceeded with even if the Government do not agree with them. I think that we should have an opportunity to look at those amendments properly. I think that the public would expect us, having given the responsibility to the commission to make recommendations, to pay proper attention to them, and would expect the Government to take heed of them.

It is hard for the public to believe that things have changed when they perceive that a massive bonus culture is alive and kicking, and that has been reflected in the debate. A number of Members pointed out that debates of this kind may appear to be technical, and concerned very much with the rules and regulations. People watching may wonder how it affects their everyday lives. A number of hon. Members made the point that we have to ensure that we use the opportunity of legislation to rebuild consumer confidence, but we also have to talk about financial inclusion and diversifying the sector, and we have to change the culture of high-risk banking and see an improvement in standards, because that is what people expect legislation and the change to deliver. We also want action to support growth and to create a banking system that serves the needs of our economy, a point well made by hon. Members on both sides of the House.

LIBOR (FSA Investigation)

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

It is entirely up to the Treasury Committee to decide how it wishes to conduct its business.

This Government are introducing far-reaching changes to our regulatory system and the structure of our banking system. It is far from clear that that receives the support of the shadow Chancellor. He has gone out of his way to point out what he thinks are the flaws in the Financial Services Bill, and he has gone out of his way at the Dispatch Box to defend the tripartite system that he designed. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) talks about all-party consensus; let us have all-party consensus on clearing up the mess that the previous Government presided over.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

First, I declare that before I joined the House, I worked for Barclays—[Laughter]—and before that, the FSA.

As the Chancellor may recall, I wrote to him on 7 February calling for a change in the way fines were treated, and for an amendment to paragraph 16 of schedule 1 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, so I welcome his announcement that other banks will not profit from the wrongdoing of banks that have breached rules.

I turn to an issue that the former Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), picked up: the ability to take enforcement action against senior managers, particularly at executive level. Lord Turner set out in his RBS report the difficulties of that, in terms of the evidential level required. Can the Chancellor update the House on when a response, in the form of a discussion paper from the Treasury, will be forthcoming? Will it be before the summer recess?

[Mr Osborne]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for sharing his CV with the House. [Interruption.] At least he did not work for the shadow Chancellor. The answer to his question is that we are publishing the consultation next week.

Jobs and Growth

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my colleague on the Public Accounts Committee, who I always feel puts the “Great” in Great Grimsby.

A number of Members raised the issue of credit for small businesses. The hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) focused on that, without wanting to give a specific solution, as did her colleague, the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie), and, on the Government Benches, my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South (Mr Binley). But the debate so far has not focused on one of the chief impediments to credit for small businesses: the high capital requirements imposed on banks, which makes it expensive for banks to give credit to small businesses, particularly those deemed to be high risk. To put that in context, at the moment around one quarter of Royal Bank of Scotland’s corporate book is designated as high risk.

It is not just a small sector of the small business and corporate market that is having difficulty accessing credit. The reason for that really goes back to the financial crisis. I think that the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) was correct, following the collapses of 2008, to take a more risk-averse approach to capital requirements, and that led to the requirements we see today. The point I want the House to focus its attention on is whether we can bring greater urgency to the resolution mechanisms that apply to banks, including looking at living wills so that purchasers are in place if a bank gets into trouble, enabling others to step in and take the liability on and away from the taxpayer. If we take the liability from the taxpayer and give banks greater security by pooling assets through insurance mechanisms, we can take a less risk-averse approach to capital requirements. That, in turn, means that banks will be under less pressure to call in loans.

One of the consequences of banks calling in loans is the forced sale of assets, with businesses selling at a time not of their choosing and when the price is not right. Currently, when businesses seek credit to expand, often only short-term credit is available. Banks do not want to lend for the long term in case there is a deterioration—the eurozone is the most visible risk—and by lending short term they can churn loans and impose brutal charges. The impediment to businesses that want to expand and take on additional staff—a business’s biggest overhead is usually employing staff—is the lack of capital. Seeking that capital is therefore difficult. Banks do not want to lend because of the costs that they incur, and if they do lend they pass the costs on to small businesses through brutal charges and wide spreads in interest.

If our Front-Bench team can accelerate some of the special mechanisms that are available through the pooling of risk, through living wills and through identifying purchasers, we will avoid some of the risk that we saw with the Royal Bank of Scotland. Scandalously, for example, after the Treasury undertook 10 months of intensive work, Sir Nicholas Macpherson could not rely on what the balance sheet said the assets were valued at. The scale of the regulatory collapse that we faced and the continued uncertainty of the risks means we now need to put in place those resolution mechanisms if we are to get credit flowing into the small-business sector.

Let me give an example from my own constituency to bring this issue to life. Just this week, a business got in touch, telling me that its site was cramped and that it had borrowed just under £2 million to expand. Its turnover is up, and its profits are up, to £500,000 a year, but it can get only short-term loans on that £2 million. It cannot therefore expand its staff, despite the opportunities its new site offers, because of the spread of interest and the brutal charges attached to that £2 million loan. So I say to our Front-Bench team, let us speed up the resolution mechanisms, reduce the charges from banks lending to high-risk businesses and, as a result, let the credit flow to those businesses so that they can expand and deliver the jobs and growth that Members on both sides of the House seek to achieve.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Banking (Responsibility and Reform)

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Umunna]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. We should, of course, spare a thought for the employees whom she mentions.

It matters because, as the Governor of the Bank of England said last month, people have seen an extraordinary squeeze in their living standards, but the institutions and bankers at the centre of the crisis that created those problems are not only not suffering a gigantic squeeze on their living standards but continue to get very high remuneration, in part because the taxpayer has been forced to step in and bail them out.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Can the hon. Gentleman explain why, under the regulatory structure introduced by his Government, banks were able to hire staff on guaranteed bonuses totally unconnected with future performance, and why not a single individual in any of the five largest banks was subject to a fine? The two largest fines imposed on Northern Rock executives were less than the bonuses that they had received the preceding year.

[Mr Umunna]

On guaranteed bonuses, there is an element of contract in that, in terms of the arrangements between individual banks—[Interruption.] Will the hon. Gentleman listen and let me finish the point? There is an element of contract that provides for a bonus, but also an element of discretion. The fact that large bonuses were being paid out regardless of performance is, of course, what people outside Parliament object to.

Financial Services Bill

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain). I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for what is a very good Bill. It displays the diligence and expertise that he brings to his ministerial duties.

I am sure that the Financial Secretary would be quick to recognise—and here I have some sympathy with the line pursued by the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls)—that no regulatory structure is a panacea for regulatory risk. We saw that with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and the Bank of England. The Bill does not address the core lesson from the recent regulatory failure, which is the failure of capital and liquidity rules. In essence, what we are debating is the supervisory arm of an EU regulatory policy agenda. Fortunately, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) is not in his place or he would be intervening at this point.

For all the strengths of the Bill, I will touch on three areas where I fear the expectations of our constituents may be raised, but where the regulator may not have the power to meet them. The first is the extent to which the Financial Conduct Authority will have an interventionist approach and its objective of promoting competition. The second is its ability to achieve speedy resolution, which was addressed briefly by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). The third is whether it will achieve effective enforcement against individuals and whether there should be strict liability. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Matthew Hancock) touched on whether there should be criminal sanctions, a point that was floated in Lord Turner’s RBS report but not answered. If time allows, I also wish to put forward a proposal on which there may cross-party consensus about how fines imposed when there is a regulatory breach are redressed and what is done with the funds.

I would be grateful if my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary addressed the risk-tolerance of the new consumer regulator. There has often been a misconception that regulators are about ensuring zero failure, and I would welcome some sense of the point at which the new regulator will be judged as having failed to intervene, and what size and scale of failure in the regime is tolerable.

On the competition objective, some Members have referred to the lack of a power for matters to be referred directly to the Competition Commission. They have to be referred via the Office of Fair Trading. There is potential for two regulators to have different interpretations, and therefore for duplication of costs and confusion about where the power of one regulator ends and that of another starts.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster touched on the need for speedy resolution. To take the example of payment protection insurance, a firm can appeal to the regulator and seek a 90-day review, and then it can have the decision judicially reviewed, which can stretch things out for about a further 18 months. A firm can stretch out proceedings in a mis-selling case for tactical reasons, so that it can use the funds in question in the short term. The thoughts of my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary on that would be welcome.

The key issue, which always arises in my constituency, is the sense of grievance that there has not been enforcement action against individuals. That was at the heart of the Treasury Committee’s reason for requiring a report from Lord Turner, but nothing in the Bill really addresses the issue. It does not say whether there will be strict liability, and there are no proposals to frame criminal sanctions. For what it is worth, I believe they would be very difficult to frame.

Within banks, the real problem is that senior executives protect themselves through complex management structures, such as by devolving control functions lower down the organisation so that there is a buffer between them and the decision making and they are knowingly blind. Risk functions often report into finance directors, meaning that there is a potential conflict of interest, and compliance officers often get to shape meetings with supervisors, notwithstanding the more intensive regime that the regulator is currently following.

A key issue that we need to address either in this Bill or in future legislation is how individuals at the top of banks are held accountable when there are mistakes. My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary might need to have discussions with the Lord Chancellor about that, because judicial review and the risk appetite of the tribunal need to be addressed. Given their judicial nature, those points fall within the Lord Chancellor’s responsibility. They go to the heart of whether people get a sense of justice being done when there are serious failures.

I move on to a matter on which I would welcome comments from both Front Benchers in the winding-up speeches, and on which there could be scope for positive reform. That is what happens when a firm pays a regulatory fine. It may surprise Members that currently, under paragraph 16 of schedule 1 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, when there is a fine for a regulatory breach the money does not go to good causes, or even to the Treasury—my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary might think that the Treasury is a good cause in itself. It goes towards reducing the levy paid by other financial firms. When a bank breaks the rules, it reduces the levy for other banks. Over the past two years, such money has amounted to £166 million. I know that a number of Members are keen on financial education—the all-party group on the subject is the biggest in the House. Perhaps such a fund could be hypothecated for use in a more constructive way, and I would welcome comments on that in the winding-up speeches. I recognise that firms are contributing more to financial education now, but it is odd that they benefit from the regulatory breaches of other firms.

I shall conclude, because I am aware of the time limit and want to allow time for others to contribute. The Bill is a good one, but as I said at the beginning of my speech, there will be failure. When there is, an independent report is the most reasonable of expectations. It is instructive that Lord Turner is not a neutral player. Will the Minister clarify how much his report cost to compile? I would like scope in the Bill for an independent report in future if we are in the unfortunate position of having a further regulatory failure. That the Treasury Committee had to seek private experts so that it could comment on Lord Turner’s report speaks volumes. That small matter could be tightened up in Committee.

Overall, this is an excellent set of measures, and I will have great pleasure in supporting my right hon. Friend the Chancellor in the Lobby this evening.

Royal Bank of Scotland (FSA Report)

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Monday 12th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The hon. Gentleman makes some important points. It is important that shareholders play a more active and engaged role in businesses in which they have a holding. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has commissioned John Kay to conduct a review of long-term interest in business and business investment. We need to strengthen corporate governance in boards, as they clearly were not sufficiently robust in their challenge to executives. One of the things that has happened in the FSA is that a much more robust approach is being taken to understanding and examining people who want to hold positions of significant influence in our major banks, including those who want to become board members. That is a good way not only of raising the quality of people in the boardroom, but of ensuring that they are robust enough to stand up against a dominant and aggressive chief executive officer.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend ensure that the rules allow enforcement action against incompetence? The point being missed by Labour Members is that there are more than 6,000 pages of FSA rules. There is no shortage of rules, but they do not allow enforcement against incompetence; they allow it only against dishonesty. That is what has fettered the hand of the FSA and what angers my constituents, who are aggrieved that individual directors of RBS have not faced sanction.

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point and he speaks with some experience, having worked with the FSA. We need to look carefully at the fit and proper person test for people becoming registered with the FSA to ensure that they are good quality, and can do the job properly and competently.