(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs ever, it is a genuine privilege to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), whose integrity and honesty have shone through every day we have been debating this Bill.
Order. Forgive me. Before the hon. Gentleman gets under way—I think the Minister is keen to follow—I want to say that a number of Back Benchers wish to contribute. I am very keen that they be fully heard; I do not want the debate to be dominated by the Front Benchers, who I am sure will make succinct contributions.
I will seek to live up to that expectation, Mr Speaker; I do not intend to speak for long.
Amendment 4 addresses one of the six key tests that we set out for the Bill before we could support it. Those tests were not set out simply on Second Reading or in Committee, but 10 months ago, when the White Paper outlining the Government’s approach was first published.
The tests drew support across the House, but sadly the Government have made no significant concessions. In Committee, a meaningful vote for Parliament on the final deal was secured, of course—but against the wishes of the Government and only by decision of the House. Our five amendments at this stage address those other tests: facilitating a transitional period; protecting the devolution settlement; protecting workers’ rights; reining in the Henry VIII powers; and, in amendment 4, retaining the EU charter of fundamental rights in UK law.
The objective of amendment 4, which would retain charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act, has wide support on both sides of the House. It is part of a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice jobs and the economy or rights and protections on the altar of ideology. It is a sensible approach for which I believe there is a majority across the House—one that goes well beyond those who voted for amendment 7 in Committee. It is also a consensus that I think is reflected in the other place, from which I suspect we might see the Bill return with some improvements, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield indicated.
The Opposition support amendments 42 and 43, which would enable UK courts to continue to refer matters to the Court of Justice and to consider CJEU decision to be persuasive. As well as amendment 55, we also support new clause 13, amendments 40 and 41, on clarifying the status of retained law, and new clause 16 on enshrining equality rights, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). We also support new clause 7 on animal sentience and new clause 9 on the acquired rights of Anguillans—an indication of the enormous complexity and range of the issues we face with Brexit. We accept that Government amendments 37 and 38 improve the Bill, but we fear that they do not go anywhere near far enough on legal challenges based on the general principles of EU law, which is why we prefer and support amendment 57, which was moved so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy).
Amendment 4 addresses the concerns we raised in Committee around the charter of fundamental rights and provides an opportunity for the Government to think again. Human rights should not be a dividing line between parties in this House, so even at this stage we hope that the Government, either here or in the Lords, might accept our approach in the amendment and perhaps even accept the amendment today and avoid the vote that we will otherwise be seeking. As we said in Committee, the charter has been critical in developing, strengthening and modernising human rights in the UK. To abandon it risks reducing protections for UK citizens and leaving a gaping hole in our statute book.
The Government claim that the Bill is about legal continuity and certainty in what will become the new category of EU retained law, but all of that EU law is interpreted through the charter, so excluding it would leave our legal system inconsistent and incoherent. To avoid defeat on this issue in Committee the former Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), committed to publishing a memorandum that he claimed would confirm the Government’s case that the charter was unnecessary by identifying where all of these rights could be found in EU retained law or existing domestic law.
Obviously that argument overlooked the main point of the charter, which was to bring all of these rights together in one codifying document, but as an Opposition we were willing to be helpful and awaited the memorandum with interest. We wanted to see a comprehensive document that identified not only the source of each right in the charter but—crucially—how the existing level of effective recourse would be guaranteed. The memorandum was published on 5 December, and it acknowledged that the Government envisaged all these rights being scattered back to their original sources. They are removing the material source of the rights, in the form of the charter, and leaving citizens with the formal source. Now that is a legal way of describing the problem, but I am not a lawyer. It means in effect that it will become more difficult for any UK citizen to assert their rights post-Brexit.
In their defence, the Government insisted that nothing would be lost if we dropped the charter because it created no new rights.
I see the Solicitor General nodding. On this crucial issue, however, the Government’s cover has been blown. For this, I would like to thank the new Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) —I am sorry she is not in her place today—because in an article in The Daily Telegraph on 18 November last year she made our case clearly. She expressed her concern about the charter precisely because it provided new rights. She wrote that it went beyond the European convention on human rights by creating “extra layers of rights”, and she went on to bemoan the fact that these extra rights covered
“everything from biomedicine and eugenics to personal data and collective bargaining”.
I appreciate that her thinking on this will probably be in line with that of her new boss, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, because he relied of course on the extra rights provided by the charter when he brought his own court case against the now Prime Minister asserting his right to personal data.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. In addition to the points he has just made, the Exiting the European Union Committee heard evidence from witnesses who said that something would be lost if the charter was not transferred. Given that the whole purpose of the Bill is to take the law as it is now and make sure it is still there the day after, does he agree that the Government have thus far failed to persuade the House that the one thing that should be left out is the charter of fundamental rights?
I agree absolutely with my right hon. Friend, and I hope even at this stage that Members across the House might join us in supporting amendment 4.
I do not often agree with the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Fareham, but I am delighted to say that in this case I do. She is right that the charter does indeed go beyond the European convention on human rights and that EU retained law will be incoherent without it. Our amendment is necessary, therefore, if we are to achieve the Government’s own stated objective of protecting the rights of UK citizens. This is a crucial issue. The chair of the Government’s own Equality and Human Rights Commission, David Isaac, has said:
“The government has promised there will be no rowing back on people’s rights after Brexit. If we lose the charter protections, that promise will be broken. It will cause legal confusion and there will be gaps in the law.”
These are serious concerns. Human rights should not be a dividing line across the House but should be seen as a British value, and I urge all Members who do not want Brexit hijacked and the rights of UK citizens diluted and reduced to support the amendment.
I want to speak briefly to several of the amendments in this group. In particular, I want to encourage the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) to elaborate on his rather carefully crafted new clause 13, which sets out quite a clever solution to the vexed question of EU retained law. He slightly rushed through his explanation of the new clause towards the end of his speech, but as I understand it, he is suggesting that, rather than treating as a new category of law the whole corpus of 40 years of accrued EU legislation, rights and duties that we all enjoy—or not, depending on how they apply—for the purposes of future amendment or reform of those rights and retained law, certain aspects should be treated as primary legislation and others as secondary legislation.
I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying that issues that fell under article 289 should be treated as primary legislation because they were of greater import, and that if we wanted to amend them again in the future we should do so by Act of Parliament, whereas aspects of retained EU law that related to delegated instruments under article 290 should be treated as secondary legislation, and if there were future reforms of those aspects, Parliament could use the secondary procedure. It would be most helpful if the right hon. and learned Gentleman could give us a little more detail about why he felt that those were the right categories to pursue.
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Commons Chamber1. What recent discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the future status of the UK as a signatory to the European convention on human rights.
The Government have committed the United Kingdom to remaining a signatory to the European convention on human rights for the duration of the Parliament.
I thank the Attorney General for his answer, and I am reassured by it, but, as he will know, earlier this week the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights described the Prime Minister’s comments after the appalling attack on London Bridge as “a gift” to every despot
“who…violates human rights under the pretext of fighting terrorism.”
Will the Attorney General recognise the danger of playing politics with human rights, and accept that the Government need to desist from doing it?
The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that I do not accept that that is what is happening. What I think the Prime Minister was saying is something with which I would expect every Member of the House to agree, namely that human rights involve a balance: there is a balance between the human rights of all the different people in our society. Everyone has the most important human right of all, which is to live their life unabated by those who wish to do them harm through terrorism. What the Prime Minister was saying—rightly in my view, and, I hope, in the hon. Gentleman’s—was that we must ensure that that balance continues to be struck correctly, and that is what we will do.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman makes an important point. This Government made a manifesto commitment to keep free access to museums to ensure that access is available to young people, whatever their background.
Local authorities should recognise the huge benefits that investing in arts and culture can bring. Many already do, and are building successful partnerships to deliver arts and culture, and to develop new models of working together.
The Government really ought to recognise the importance of investing in local authorities to deliver these services but, given the crisis in their funding, philanthropic giving is playing an increasingly important role. The Minister will be aware, I think, of the success of “Going Public”, which is a Museums Sheffield initiative on private giving. Will he agree to meet me and Museums Sheffield to discuss what more can be done on that front?
Yes, I would be delighted to, not least because the best local authorities are increasing their investment in arts and culture, as they see its value in strengthening the sense of place and ensuring that arts are available to all. There is no excuse for not doing so.
The Prime Minister has recently restated her personal, and the Government’s collective, commitment to tackling domestic violence and abuse. My colleagues in Cabinet and I will work together to take that forward. That work will include considering how we can support the CPS in bringing prosecutions against perpetrators of domestic violence.
Ashiana, which is a great Sheffield charity working on domestic violence in the black, Asian, minority ethnic and refugee communities, has raised its concerns with me over the appallingly low prosecution rates for female genital mutilation and honour-based violence. The Attorney General will know that there have been no successful prosecutions for FGM. I am sure he shares my concern about that, but what is he going to do about it?
I do share the hon. Gentleman’s concern about that. He may be aware that there are often considerable evidential difficulties in proving these offences in court, but that does not mean that we should not bring appropriate cases before criminal courts and seek to gain convictions. The Crown Prosecution Service will continue to do that. In relation to domestic violence more broadly, he may know that the volume and conviction rate of prosecutions are rising, on the basis of the last year for which we have figures compared with the year before, but he is right to point out specific areas where we need to do better.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberCan we please speed up? I want to get to the hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), who is the last questioner, and progress is frankly too slow.
5. What steps the Government have taken to improve the conviction rate for rape and serious sexual offences.
The CPS has undertaken a considerable amount of work to place priority on the improvement of rape prosecutions.
I thank the Solicitor General for his admirably brief reply. He will know that despite claims of the highest number of convictions ever, convictions for rape, domestic abuse and other sexual offences have fallen. I work closely with Sheffield Rape Crisis, which tells me that there is a real postcode lottery in support for victims, and if victims are not supported they are less likely to come forward. What discussions has the Solicitor General had with the Home Secretary to ensure adequate funding for sexual violence advisers?
With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s specific question, I work regularly with colleagues in the Home Office to look at a wide range of measures that need to be put in place to give support to victims of sexual offences. I remind him that in terms of absolute volumes, conviction rates continue to rise and are the highest ever. I assure him that the CPS has now engaged 102 specialist prosecutors in its RASO—rape and sexual offences—units to place proper priority on the swift and effective prosecution of these serious cases.
(9 years ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a shame that the hon. Lady makes that comment. While we are in the position of having to pay that VAT, it is right that we use it to provide additional support for the services in question, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Will Quince) on coming up with the idea. The hon. Lady is quite right that we need those specialist services, but it is not that many weeks since the Labour party voted for a 10% cut in police funding. The Conservative party has maintained police funding, which will make sure that victims of these horrendous crimes get the support they need.
7. What steps she is taking to reduce gender economic inequality.
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said at our party conference last month, we cannot have true opportunity without real equality. I am very proud that we now have more women in work, more women on boards and the lowest pay gap on record across the UK, but we must continue to make progress. Women will be the main beneficiaries of the new national living wage and the rise in the personal allowance.
I thank the Minister for that response, but as she acknowledged in response to an earlier question, the overwhelming majority of care workers are women, and they face low pay, zero-hours contracts and non-payment of travel time as a consequence of financial pressures on the sector. Professor Martin Green, the chief executive of Care England, among others, is clear that yesterday’s announcement by the Chancellor will not plug the funding gap in the care sector. What will the Minister do to secure a fair deal for care workers?
One of the greatest things we can do is introduce the national living wage, which will proportionately benefit more women than men, and employers in the care sector and other employers will have to pay it.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising an issue in which I take a personal interest—the use of British sign language and other means for deaf people to participate in all aspects of our mainstream life. To parenthesise for a moment, I am sure that he would be interested in the work that I am doing to explore why deaf people cannot serve on juries, for example. It seems to me wholly ridiculous, but that is the position at the moment. Perhaps we can talk about that offline.
A British sign language interpreter is of course arguably a reasonable adjustment that is provided under an employer’s duty towards staff with a disability under the Equality Act 2010. That would be part and parcel of a person’s work; so to use it as a basis for suggesting lack of fluency would be wholly wrong and self-defeating. It is important to remember that people with disabilities, with reasonable adjustments, increasingly form part of the mainstream workforce. The provision is not designed to cut across that.
I think we all benefit from the fact that people with different ethnic origins work in our public services. Whatever they sound like and wherever they are from we welcome them all; but it is important—and they would agree—that we make sure there is a basic standard, to ensure that all sections of society have the fullest confidence in our public services. The measure goes a long way to protect our public servants.
I concur with the point that the Solicitor General makes, but I did not necessarily recognise the figures he gave earlier as a description of the problem. They were census data, which did not necessarily relate to the issue. However, let us assume that there is a problem. Is the Minister not concerned that what he wants to do will be undermined by the cuts of the order of 30% in the adult skills budget since 2010, which have had a direct impact on the courses in English for speakers of other languages that give people precisely the skills he is looking for? In the spirit of his proposals will he make representations to his colleagues in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to increase that budget?
The clause inserts a new section in the Immigration Act 2014 to provide a power to impose a charge on employers sponsoring non-European economic area skilled migrants. In addition, it contains provision for regulations to be made regarding the charge. The immigration skills charge will help to address current and projected skills needs in the UK economy and contribute to reducing net migration. The intention behind the charge is to encourage employers to think differently about their recruitment so that, where possible, they recruit and train up resident workers.
I do not disagree with the principle, which is right, but I wish to explore some of the detail.
I represent the University of Sheffield, which is involved in apprenticeship training. As I understand the proposals, the money raised from the charge will go to the Consolidated Fund to assist in addressing the skills gap in the UK. The university’s Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre, which has been held up as a model by the Government, is involved in higher apprenticeship training, much of which is undertaken by academics who are recruited through the tier 2 route. It appears nonsensical to make a levy on the University of Sheffield and other universities and educational institutions for recruiting tier 2 workers who are actively involved in filling the skills gap. What does the Minister think about that issue?
Similarly, we have received representations from the British Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing about the position in the health service where, because of skills shortages, the Government and the NHS are actively recruiting from abroad. Given the financial pressures on the NHS, does it make sense to levy a skills charge on it? Perhaps that is not the Government’s intent and I have misunderstood the provisions of the Bill, in which case I will be grateful if the Minister can clarify the position on both those points.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 3—Time limit on detention—
In paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 after subsection (4) insert—
“(5) ubject to regulations under subsection (6), a person detained under this paragraph must be released on bail in accordance with Schedule 5 to the Immigration Act 2016 after no later than the twenty-eighth day following that on which the person was detained.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision to vary by category of person the time limit under subsection (5).”
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am very pleased to be speaking to new clauses 1 and 3, were tabled by the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller), a Conservative. I was delighted to have the opportunity to add my name to them so that they can be debated by the Committee. I think we are moving into new territory here, and I hope that the cross-party consensus that is reflected in my decision to support the clauses will be reflected in our deliberations.
In the previous Parliament I was pleased to serve as vice-chair of an inquiry into immigration detention on a panel that included the hon. Member for Bedford, along with other colleagues from the Government Benches, including the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) and a former Conservative Cabinet Member, the right hon. Member for Meriden (Mrs Spelman). Opposition Members were in a minority on the inquiry panel, which drew parliamentarians from both Houses, including many with huge experience such as a retired Law Lord and a former chief inspector of prisons.
The inquiry was brought together by the all-party group on migration and the all-party group on refugees. Our recommendations, which were prepared after eight months of deliberation, included the limits on detention contained in new clauses 1 and 3. The recommendations were endorsed by the House of Commons on 10 September. The new clauses therefore build on the work of the inquiry and provide expression for the will of the House by introducing limits on indefinite immigration detention. This is not a particularly controversial proposal: we are unusual in this country in having no limit on administrative detention for immigration purposes.
Sadly, we have become increasingly dependent on detention, and that has been the case under successive Governments. This is not a party political point. Detention takes place in immigration removal centres, and the clue for their purpose should be in the name. They are intended for short-term stays, but we have become increasingly reliant on them, and as the use of detention has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, so has the size of the estate. In 1993, there were 250 detention places available in the UK; by 2009 the number had risen to 2,665, and by the beginning of this year it had risen to 3,915. The number of people entering detention in the year to June 2015 was just over 32,000—up 10% on the previous year. In contrast, Sweden, a country that in most years receives something like three times the number of asylum applications—I accept that immigration detention does not simply relate to asylum; nevertheless, there are much larger demands on that much smaller country—has 2,893 places, while Germany has just over 4,300.
Home Office policy, which is a good starting point, states that
“detention must be used sparingly”.
The reality is clearly different. Members will be aware of a number of high-profile incidents in immigration removal centres, including deaths and allegations of sexual assault. That was reflected in the evidence heard by our inquiry. In our first oral evidence session, we heard from non-governmental organisations and medical experts. Most powerfully, we heard from people who were at that time in detention centres via a phone link to immigration removal centres.
One young man from a disputed territory on the Cameroon-Nigeria border told us his story. He said that he had been trafficked to Hungary as a 16-year-old, where he was beaten, raped and tortured. He managed to escape and eventually made his way to Heathrow using a false passport, which was discovered on his arrival. He was then detained. We asked him how long he had been detained for. He told us that he had been detained for three years in the immigration removal centre. His detention conflicts with three stated aims of the Home Office: first, that those who have been trafficked should not be detained; secondly, that those who have been tortured should not be detained; and, thirdly, that detention should be for the shortest possible period.
New clause 1 seeks to put those Government aims on torture and trafficking in the Bill, and to add victims of sexual violence and pregnant women to the category of people not to be detained. Her Majesty’s chief inspector of prisons, Nick Hardwick, following an unannounced inspection of Yarl’s Wood immigration removal centre earlier this year, said to the Government:
“Procedures to ensure the most vulnerable women are never detained should be strengthened and managers held accountable for ensuring they are applied consistently.”
Following a case that was reported on 6 October, I understand that the Home Office is reviewing its policy on the detention of pregnant asylum seekers. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification on where that review stands.
New clause 3 seeks to deal with the wider issue of indefinite detention, the impact of which was a constant theme of our inquiry, and about which we received some striking testimony. Time and again we were told that detention was worse than prison. Initially, a number of us were puzzled by that, because we were not talking about the criminal justice system—many of those people demonstrate in due course that they have the right to be here—but those who were detained said that people in prison at least know when they will get out. As one former detainee told us:
“The uncertainty is hard to bear. Your life is in limbo. No one tells you anything about how long you will stay or if you are going to get deported.”
Medical experts told us that the sense of being in limbo and the hopelessness and despair leads to deteriorating mental health. One told us that those who are detained for more than 30 days have significantly higher mental health problems.
However, it is not just the impact on those who are detained. A team leader at the prisons inspectorate told us that the lack of a time limit encourages poor caseworking and lazy procedures in the Home Office. He told us that one quarter of the cases of prolonged detention that the prisons inspectorate had considered were the result of inefficient casework. That is not because it was inappropriate for people to be released. Despite being called immigration removal workers, we found—this is an important point—that most people who leave detention do so for reasons other than being removed from the UK. According to the latest statistics produced by the Government, more than half the detainees are released back into the UK. The system is therefore not only bad for those involved, but expensive and a waste of public resources, at a time when the Chancellor is looking for savings. Detaining someone costs £36,000 per year. Alternatives to detention, proved to be more effective in other countries, are significantly cheaper; so alternatives driven by imposing such a limit would save taxpayers’ money.
The recommendation to set a maximum time limit in statute, which new clause 3 would introduce, would not simply right the wrong of indefinite detention, but change the culture endemic in the system. By doing so, it would meet the aims of the Home Office’s own guidance, which is about detention being used more sparingly and only as a genuine last resort to effect removal. The proposed limit of 28 days reflects best practice in other countries and is workable for the Home Office, given that in the first three quarters of 2014 only 37% were detained for longer. It also reflects evidence about the mental health impact on those detained for more than a month.
Deprivation of liberty should never be a decision taken lightly or arbitrarily. Decisions are taken by relatively junior officials, with no automatic judicial oversight. With no time limit in place, it has become too easy for people to be detained for months on end, with no meaningful way to challenge their continued detention. The introduction of a time limit and the reduction in reliance on detention represents a significant change—it is in line with what happens in other countries, but it is a significant change for us. Therefore, in order to detain fewer people for shorter periods of time, the Government will need to introduce a much wider range of community-based alternatives.
In the report of the inquiry panel that I mentioned earlier, we gave a number of examples of such alternatives from other places, including the United States—we are not talking about countries that might be perceived as a soft touch. Indeed, Australia, a country whose immigration system is often held up as an example of toughness, has also developed constructive, effective and much cheaper alternatives to detention. Those alternatives allow people to remain in communities while their cases are being resolved, including when making arrangements to leave the country. Not only are the alternatives better; as I have said, they also cost less and are more successful, because they have higher compliance rates in terms of people’s willingness to return.
There is a recent UK precedent. When the coalition Government committed to reduce the number of children detained, they introduced the family returns process. The House of Commons Library described its design as
“to encourage refused families to comply with instructions to depart from the UK at an earlier stage, such as by giving them more control over the circumstances of their departure”—
and it worked. There has been a dramatic fall in the number of children detained, and the Home Office’s own evaluation of the scheme found most families compliant with the process, with no increase in absconding.
We have had a wide-ranging debate on an area of policy that is challenging and difficult. I say that because a significant proportion of those in immigration removal centres will be foreign national offenders. There has been a lot of discussion about asylum claimants, but if someone has made a claim for asylum, they should be receiving humanitarian protection. Hon. Members will equally know, for example, that we have suspended the detained fast track—a decision I took—to ensure that appropriate issues about vulnerability can be properly reflected in the arrangements.
There is a real challenge, about which I caution hon. Members, because if the official Opposition vote for new clause 3, they will be voting for a change of their policy. I note that exclusions were previously advanced for foreign national offenders and other groups, in recognition of some of the complexities and other challenges in this matter. People will seek to frustrate their removal at all costs. That is why, regrettably, there will always be a need for some level of immigration detention for when individuals fail to comply with requirements to leave the UK, seek to frustrate their removal or seek at times to use time limits as a means to string things out, because they know that they may gain advantage. Having said all of that, we are clear that detention should be used sparingly and only as a last resort.
We take our duty of care to those who are in detention seriously, for example, through healthcare and other provision. I recognise the reports on the issue of vulnerability to which I will come on, but there are many people working in immigration removal centres day in, day out, doing a tough and challenging job. In commenting on a number of the points made today, I put on the record my appreciation for those who are doing that tough job that supports our immigration centres and seeks to ensure that detainees are treated in a just, fair, appropriate and dignified way.
I underline that alternatives to detention should be used where possible, and I recognise that more can be done. The Bill and its new powers are part of the wider work to ensure that the Home Office has the right measures to manage individuals who are not detained and to ensure that they leave the UK when they no longer have any rights to be here. I continue to give great thought to ensuring that we provide an effective system that delivers value for money and seeks the departure or removal of increasing numbers of people who have no right to be here. There is the balance between enforced removal and encouraged or facilitated departure and we have already debated that broadly in respect of family groups.
New clause 1 would introduce a statutory prohibition on the detention of pregnant women and victims of torture, trafficking and sexual abuse. I note the generous way in which the hon. Member for Sheffield Central sought to recognise that it was my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) who, on Second Reading, tabled an amendment on this issue. Along with many other Members of the House, he is tireless in his work on issues of immigration and detention and takes such matters seriously. I pay tribute to the former Member, Sarah Teather, who chaired the all-party group on refugees. While we did not always see eye to eye, I never doubted her focus and determination to ensure that the issues were considered by the House. I know that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central was part of that all-party group and continues that work.
I can tell the Committee that we take such issues extraordinarily seriously and they weigh heavily on Ministers when we seek to deprive people of their liberty. Therefore, in our approach we seek to ensure that detention is part of a removals process, which at times has to take into account issues of public protection as well. The issues of safeguarding and vulnerability are very much in our minds and that is why my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary commissioned Stephen Shaw, the former prisons and probation ombudsman, to undertake an in-depth review of how the Home Office treats vulnerable people who are detained. As I indicated, that is why I suspended the detained fast track, because I could not be satisfied that safeguards were operating effectively.
The Committee will be aware that we have received Mr Shaw’s report and are considering our response to that important issue. We are actively considering the report’s recommendations and we will come back to the House in due course to report on that.
I think that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central was seeking a timeframe from me. We are not seeking to delay; we are considering those issues carefully, but I want to get it right and come back to the House with an appropriate response that recognises the thorough work that Mr Shaw has undertaken.
I thank the Minister for his comments on that specific issue. Will he come back to the House with a response to that review before the Bill has completed its journey through both Houses?
I can certainly tell the hon. Gentleman that I wish to ensure that we publish the report and the Government’s response before the Bill completes its passage through Parliament. Equally, I want to ensure that we come back when we can. It is important that we reflect properly on the report and the recommendations, which we are actively doing.
During our debate on bail, I made it clear that vulnerable people should not normally be detained under immigration powers. I reiterate that point now. This approach is our published policy. We have a clear list of individuals who are not normally suitable for detention unless there are exceptional circumstances in play. The list includes pregnant women, the elderly, and those who have been identified by the competent authority under the national referral mechanism as victims of trafficking and torture. It is unlawful to act in a way that is contrary to our published policy.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of mental health and release from detention. He asked whether there would ever be circumstances where a high-risk individual may need to be released from immigration detention because of their poor mental health. I can confirm that there will be some cases involving mental health issues where an individual should not be detained under immigration powers, no matter how high the risk and no matter how imminent the removal. In those cases, the right course of action will normally be to transfer to the appropriate authorities.
The new clause lacks definitions of the relevant exclusions and, as such, would be open to broad interpretation, so it contains weaknesses. Such an approach could leave the Home Office open to damages. For example, if a woman was pregnant at the point of detention but not aware of the fact or chose not to disclose her pregnancy, the Home Office could be sued for damages after the fact. It is an unfortunate reality that, in some cases, individuals will not comply with the requirement to leave the UK and their removal must be enforced, which often requires a short period of detention.
I am mindful there might be a vote in the Chamber in a few minutes, so I will try to be brief. I accept the Minister’s point that this is a complex and difficult area of policy, but evidence from other countries demonstrates that statutory limits on administrative intervention can and do work effectively. There is a case to be made for the limit suggested in new clause 3 and the specific exclusions suggested in new clause 1.
I underline the breadth of support across the House on this issue. That was evident in the inquiry and in our debate on 10 September, when 25 Members from all parties represented on this Committee—and more besides—spoke. The House, as a result of that debate, endorsed the recommendations.
On the Minister’s point about foreign national offenders and the wider caveats in new clause 3, not all foreign national offenders are necessarily a risk to public safety, and issues around that need to be addressed. I accept his point that there may be a lack of precision in how the new clause is drafted. For that reason, I agree not to press new clauses 1 and 3 on the understanding that he will, as he indicated, actively come back to us with the results of his consideration of the Shaw review. We will then have an opportunity to come back to the issue while the Bill proceeds in a way that achieves the objectives of the new clause, but perhaps in a better crafted way. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClause 31 deals with the important issue of rights of appeal relating to persons who claim to have a right to remain in the United Kingdom on asylum or human rights grounds, but whose claim has been refused. It has long been established that, in some cases, a person can be removed and deported before an appeal is brought or heard. Indeed, the previous Labour Government introduced powers in 2002 to certify claims that were defined as “clearly unfounded” such that persons bringing unfounded claims could be removed before bringing their appeal. That was extended to deportation in 2007. Then, in 2014, it was extended further so that arguable claims from foreign national offenders could also be certified when deportation pending appeal would not be in breach of that person’s rights under the European convention on human rights or the rights of any other person affected by the decision.
The context is important in this debate, because the proposed change builds on the success of previous alterations, which have represented an incremental approach. The 2014 framework was recently confirmed in the Court of Appeal—we will no doubt explore some of the issues relating to that judgment in due course. The changes have had a positive operational impact, with the accelerated deportation of hundreds of foreign criminals, which is why one of this Government’s manifesto commitments was to remove the limitation that the power can be used only for those subject to deportation—mainly criminals—so that all individuals who have sought but been refused a right to remain in the UK on human rights grounds can be removed more swiftly. Clause 31 delivers on that commitment. It is our policy to ensure more effective removals and to prevent people whose applications have been refused from remaining in the UK and potentially accruing article 8 rights after it has been decided that they have no right to be here.
The power to certify that an appeal must be brought from overseas when that would not breach human rights was introduced in the Immigration Act 2014 for persons liable to deportation—largely foreign national offenders, as I suggested a moment ago. Subsections (2), (3) and (6) of clause 31 extend the scope of the existing power to all human rights claims. Importantly, the power will not apply to asylum claims, meaning that all asylum appeals, except those that are clearly unfounded, will continue to be heard in the UK. The certification power cannot be used in cases when removal pending appeal would create a real risk of serious, irreversible harm or other breach of human rights, such as when there is a claim under article 2, the right to life, or article 3, freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. We are largely dealing here with cases that relate to article 8 and to a person’s family or private life. I emphasise that each case will of course be assessed on an individual basis, taking into account the impact of certification on family members, including children.
The power will not normally apply to unaccompanied children. Many unaccompanied children make asylum claims anyway, so this power is irrelevant to them. When an asylum claim is refused, a child will be granted leave until they are 18 years of age, unless adequate reception arrangements are in place for their return to their home country. When a child has been in the UK for seven or more years, they can be granted leave to remain on the basis of their private life rights when it would not be reasonable to expect them to leave the UK.
The Solicitor General is at pains to point out that the power would not normally be used on children, so I guess that he has taken account of the evidence that we received from the Children’s Society and others expressing such concerns. Why have the power at all if it is not intended to be used?
It is envisaged that the power could be used on certain occasions in the case of a much older child or young person. Particular circumstances could allow, on a case-by-case basis, a particular resolution, but it is envisaged that in the vast majority of cases that would not apply and it would be exceptional if it did.
Will the Solicitor General clarify that point? We are straying into the territory of our previous debate, on how to define age. He said “much older”. What does he consider to be much older? Where does that threshold kick in?
We are talking about the 18-month period between 16 and a half to 18 years of age. That is the period we are dealing with. I have already made the point about age in previous debates, but I will develop the point I was making just now. For example, if a 17-year-old who lives in the UK with members of their wider family has made a human rights claim to stay that has then been refused, and if they have parents or family in another country to whom they can return and successfully establish their life there, these provisions might apply. To develop the general point about the interests of children, the welfare of children will continue to be a primary consideration in decisions by virtue of statute under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, so each case will be assessed depending on individual circumstances.
The debate focuses on an important principle, which we need to consider fully. The main drift of the Bill is aimed at illegal migrants, but legal migrants will be the group mainly affected by the removal of appeal rights. We received a lot of evidence on the issue. The Law Society said that it felt that it would be
“an unjustifiable incursion into Article 8 rights.”
Although the Immigration Act 2014 introduced the principle of deport now, appeal later, that was on deportation cases where people had appealed serious crimes. The Court of Appeal has determined that that regime was lawful. There are some caveats in the case of Kiarie, cited by the Solicitor General, including the caveat on the principle of real risk of serious irreversible harm. The Court of Appeal said
“the real risk of serious irreversible harm is not the overarching test”.
Nevertheless, that regime was determined as lawful under the 2014 Act, but this provision extends that regime to all migrants making human rights appeals, regardless of any illegality or criminality and whether it has been established or even suspected. That is a fairly fundamental step for this Parliament to take. The Law Society made the point, very strongly, in its evidence:
“Restrictions on Article 8 rights which may be deemed justifiable in one context (for example, national security) cannot be extended to other contexts without further justification.”
We have not really received that justification. The Government have not made the case for the additional rights.
Using the test of serious irreversible harm or a breach of human rights as the only exception to an out-of-country appeal sets an extraordinarily high bar for vulnerable appellants seeking to contest removal from the UK. I come back to the point about the 42% success rate, which we discussed. We can debate where the responsibility lies. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras made it clear that we are not suggesting that this is all the fault of the Home Office. It may be the result of incomplete documentation or down to lawyers, as the Solicitor General suggested. Nevertheless, a substantial number of people are successful. The effect of this provision is that people who have committed no offence, who would in fact be granted the right to stay in the UK, will be forced to leave for an indeterminate period. In some cases, that would expose them to significant risks and would mean separation from their families. We are not talking about short periods. I represent the multicultural heart of Sheffield, where we have people who owe their origins to 120 countries and speak 160 different languages, so I have a fair amount of casework in this area.
We know that immigration appeals are currently taking about six months; a year or more is not unusual. There is no significant indication that that will improve. With such delays, out-of-country appeals would cause real disruption to family life, with potential longer-term consequences, for people who will, in significant numbers, ultimately be given the right to remain. Apart from anything else, as the Law Society pointed out, if the current appeal success rate is maintained, this could be a very expensive measure for the Government, and the taxpayer, because successful appellants could seek compensation over the enforced separation from their families.
In addition, the provisions could have a perverse impact on UK nationals. The Law Society again pointed out that, ironically, the spouse of a national of an EEA member, except the UK, would retain a full in-country right of appeal, whereas the spouse of a UK national would have to leave the country. The Daily Mail has clearly not picked up on that one. There are some perverse impacts, which I am sure the Solicitor General will want to comment on.
I also want to touch on the specific area of trafficking in relation to labour exploitation, which we debated earlier. We received powerful evidence from the charity, the Anti-trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It made the point of how difficult it would be for many of the clients it supports to challenge a negative human rights decision if the client was overseas. It said in written evidence:
“Our client group would be unlikely to have the resources or familiarity with modern technology to allow us to take instructions by skype or keep in regular contact with them. As many clients who fall into exploitation have little or no education they could not be expected to maintain any written communication with us or to draft any documents needed for an appeal themselves. Victims of trafficking are often submissive, frightened of authority figures and find it hard to establish relationships of trust.”
It goes on to say:
“Face to face relationships are essential when working with individuals who have been subject to abuse and exploitation.”
Across the House, Members are concerned about those individuals. That was the background to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in which Members of the House across party were involved. That is a serious consideration we should take into account.
I draw attention to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the position of children. We again received powerful evidence from the Children’s Society, which made the point that even for those who are able to bring an appeal from abroad, notwithstanding all the difficulties and challenges, children will be subject to damaging and unnecessary disruption in their lives during the process. I am sure the Solicitor General will come back on how this will work in practice.
The Children’s Society expressed real concern that the Government have not protected unaccompanied children in this provision. In relation to unaccompanied children, we talked earlier about the age range. The Children’s Society made the point that
“This provision could see more cases involving unaccompanied children or young people over 18 who claimed asylum alone as children, being certified for an out-of-country appeal.”
Its next point relates to the age twilight zone that the Solicitor General referred to:
“According to Home Office statistics, of the young people who applied for asylum as unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and received an initial decision in 2014, 85 young people were refused and their claim was certified. 67 of those were over 18 at the time of the decision while 18 were minors at the time of the decision.”
We know from the extensive debate about age that we had in the Modern Slavery Bill Committee that some of those young people do not know how old they are, so there are all manner of loopholes that they can fall through.
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are talking about young people who have been through, in many cases, deeply disturbing experiences, and it is not surprising that they might not know their age. They have come from countries such as Sudan, which was one of the countries mentioned in the Home Office statistics that I referred to a moment ago. The Children’s Society states that the provisions in the Bill
“would mean that more children and young people would not be able to appeal their claim in the UK”.
It makes the point:
“Without a multi-agency best interests determination process currently in place to assess the full impact on welfare, children could be returned to countries and circumstances where they may be at risk of serious harm including sexual abuse, neglect, homelessness, violence, forced marriage”
or
“forced recruitment as child soldiers”.
We are talking about very serious circumstances, and I urge the Government to give those points the attention that they deserve.
I am extremely grateful to all hon. Members for having made the debate a considered and wide-ranging one, which is what the topic deserves. First, I say to all hon. Members who—I make no criticism—pray in aid the human element that of course they are right. We all stand here as human beings and some of us, including me, as parents. It would take a heart of stone not to recognise that, in the myriad different cases, we are dealing with people and their lives.
That is why the role of decision makers, and the discretion that they have, is so important in assessing the evidence and coming to a reasonable conclusion. We call that due process. It is something that we treasure as part of our rule of law, and it is something of which we are rightly proud. I do not believe that our proposal does anything to undermine those important principles, and I will explain why. I will not repeat everything that has been said, but I will encapsulate it in the following way. The Court of Appeal has looked at the concept of out-of-country appeals and reminded us of our duties under the European convention, and I am satisfied that the procedures that will be used will guarantee the basic and fundamental rights of fairness and due process that we are so proud of.
The hon. Member for Rotherham said that she was not a lawyer. I think we are all lawyers in this place. This is the High Court of Parliament, and we are the law makers, so she is a lawyer and I am glad to welcome her into the fold. As somebody with whom I have worked well in the past on other Bills, I know that she comes to this with an entirely appropriate frame of mind and a genuine passion for doing the right thing not only by her constituents, but by people who are either affected directly by the legislation or part of our wider community, who want to see our enforcement system working well. There is a huge public interest, which we must not forget when we deal with these matters.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I will get full clarification about the funding of applications in a moment and will come back to her.
If I may develop my point about the quality of decision making, several improvements have been made since 2010 in order to simplify policy and guidance. The introduction of a number of quality audit processes allows for the ongoing refinement of operating processes, which strengthens and enhances decision-making quality. The accumulation of those measures means that we now have tools and processes that help caseworkers to make more efficient, effective and fairer decisions in line with the relevant immigration rules and Home Office policy and guidance. I accept that there is still a way to go, but progress is being made.
Since 2010, UK Visas and Immigration has put in place measures to ensure the continuous review of its operations, so that proper feedback mechanisms can further improve quality and we ensure we make the right decision first time as often as possible. For example, UKVI has placed a focus on decision quality at the centre of caseworking objectives, introducing a quality objective in all caseworker objectives within performance appraisals. When it comes to ranking performance, the marking of quality assessment is an essential part of that process. Such measures are being put front and centre, which helps to answer the genuine queries and concerns of constituents, including mine.
The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North alluded to that. I am grateful to him for asking a number of parliamentary questions—in recent hours—about statistics that he regards as important indicators of the success or otherwise of measures that have been introduced in recent years. I note that some of the questions refer both to the power relating to EEA nationals and to section 94B. I am not making a criticism, but he asks a comprehensive range of questions, and we are today purely dealing with section 94B and not EEA nationals. Replies will be provided as soon as possible, but we must take care in reading across data from foreign national offender cases to all human rights cases. I think he would accept that. The case law clearly states that public interest is stronger when it comes to criminal cases, although there is of course a clear and strong public interest in the removal of any individual who has no right to be in the UK. I promise him that he will get answers to his questions.
The hon. Gentleman made the point about the best interests of children, which he wants in the Bill. May I give him some comfort? We already have primary legislation—section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009—that puts children’s best interests into print and are the guiding principles for decision makers when it comes to cases involving children. That is a sufficient safeguard, together with the guidance that we have debated and discussed, which will address the legitimate issues that he raises.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the difficulty of appealing from abroad. I accept, as did the Court of Appeal, that an out-of-country appeal will be, in many cases, less advantageous to an appellant than an in-country appeal. As I have said before, article 8 does not require the appellant to have access to the best possible appellate procedure or even to the most advantageous one. It requires access to a procedure that meets the essential requirements of effectiveness and fairness. I pray in aid the statistics that the Court used and that I mentioned this morning to give Members reassurance that we are in a situation in which there is not an obvious and clear detriment to appellants, bearing in mind the entry clearance statistics, which always involve out-of-UK appeals.
I want to seek to confirm what seemed to be an extraordinary acknowledgment from the Solicitor General that out-of-country appeals would be prejudicial to the opportunity for an appellant to make as good a case as if it were in this country. That is a fairly significant step to take, as we said in relation to people who are likely in the long term to be successful, who have committed no crime and have proper rights. So is he acknowledging that this is prejudicial to their interests?
The words I used are the words of the Court of Appeal—not as advantageous—but that does not mean prejudicial. The points that the hon. Gentleman raises are a summary of the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the process itself, which I will try to help with in due course, but there is a difference. If the Court had come to the conclusion that there was a clear gap—an injustice gap—for individuals, I am sure the decision of the Court of Appeal would not have supported the submissions made by Lord Keen, the Advocate General.
On the point raised by the hon. Member for South Shields, I will write to her and set out the position in full. The point made by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about going further and using the statute to exclude children from the scope of the power is, with respect, an unnecessary step to take for the reasons that I hope I have clearly outlined about the necessary protection that children enjoy under section 55 and the guidance. I do not think that going a stage further would serve any particular purpose, however well intentioned.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised important points. I want to try to do justice to them in turn. First, I will deal with the issue he raised about the important report by the Children’s Commissioner. I remind the Committee that the power does not represent a blanket approach. It allows caseworkers to individually consider the impact on individual children—that human element that he prayed in aid so powerfully—and the range of possible effects that a decision to certify might have.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAbsolutely. As we heard in evidence from several experts, social cohesion will be affected by such measures.
Clause 19 further extends the powers of those who work at our airports and ports of entry. It will allow them to curtail leave, rather than simply determine whether leave has been given and act accordingly. It will create a nervous, unpleasant environment for those who have the correct paperwork and have gone through the correct process. Due to the new power, they will still have a nervous wait to find out whether they are able to pass through the gates and live and work here. Although this measure may affect only a small number of people, we need to be concerned about the effect that our fears about illegal migration have on people who have the right to live and work here.
Amendment 209, which is supported by Liberty, attempts to limit the speculative searches that are conducted by certain authorities to determine immigration status. As has been detailed and discussed, schedule 2, paragraph 2 of the 1971 Act sets out a power that is ostensibly to deal with individuals on arrival in the UK for the purpose of determining whether they have or should be given leave to enter or remain, but it has been used by the Home Office as justification for conducting speculative, in-country spot checks involving consensual interviews. The amendment would limit that power to examination at the point of entry.
The power to conduct stop-and-searches away from the confines of a point of entry derives from a decades-old case, Singh v. Hammond, when the Court of Appeal concluded that such a search can take place away from the place of entry if there is suspicion that the person is here illegally. That is all well and good, but the power has been somewhat abused. Home Office immigration officers have been conducting intrusive searches when they believe that a person of foreign origin is nervous about being in the presence of an immigration official. Such behaviour is detailed in the “Enforcement instructions and guidance” booklet. Chapter 31, in particular, highlights the need to curtail that sort of behaviour.
In considering the amendment, we should note that there is no free-standing right to stop and search people to establish their immigration status. I know the Government are keen to secure strong social cohesion in our communities, but such intrusive stop-and-searches have no regard for community relations. They should worry us all, and we should take action on them by passing the amendment.
I rise to speak to the objectives of amendment 209, as I understand them. They take us back to the intentions of the Conservative Government in 1971, whose Immigration Act 1971 created the opportunity to search to demonstrate immigration status at the point of entry to the country, which seems sensible, but not away from the border. [Interruption.] The Solicitor General is expressing some doubt about that, and I would be happy to pursue the matter with him. The power has been developed gradually by the Home Office, often without sufficient regard for the sort of community relations that we share a concern about.
As the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North pointed out, Liberty expressed concern when such speculative street and transport hub-based searches began in 2012, largely outside tube stations. Concern was expressed when what was then the UK Border Agency suspended such operations across the country and reviewed its guidance, but then reinstated them. The guidance was amended again in 2013 following the reaction to street searches.
I am grateful to all the hon. Members who took part in this useful debate, which has helped to tease out some of the important issues that underline the extension of powers in this part of the Bill. I am sure that will be a common theme in our debates on subsequent amendments.
I will make it clear at the outset that while it is interesting to hear analogies between the new power and stop-and-search, this is not a stop-and-search power; it is a different type of power. It is important to draw that distinction, because while it is important to talk about tensions in communities and to understand the reality of the circumstances in which immigration officials operate, it would be wrong to hurtle helter-skelter down that route without analysing precisely what we are talking about.
We are talking about a power to ask questions of an individual that has to be based on a reasonable suspicion. It is therefore not a speculative fishing exercise and it should never be based on the random prejudice of what someone looks like. Immigration officers must comply with their duties under the Equality Act 2010. Stopping and examining individuals by means of racial profiling is not in accordance with their public sector equality duty pursuant to section 149 of the Act. They are bound, like any other public body, to stay within the law.
As I say, we are both concerned that we get this right. Are we not playing with semantics when we say that this is not stop-and-search? We could call it stop and check, but does it not have all the characteristics of stop-and-search? Is the Solicitor General satisfied with the definition of “reasonable suspicion” in chapter 31 of the enforcement instructions and guidance, which I cited? Does it not give enormous latitude?
Importantly, we have to remember that we are dealing with powers that relate to a potential civil consequence as opposed to a criminal one. Therefore, it is important to draw a distinction between the stop-and-search powers and this particular competence. There will be joint crime reduction operations—commonly known as CROPs, another unfortunate acronym, for which I apologise—where, for example, somebody is stopped on the underground for fare evasion and is then referred to immigration officers. That is intelligence-led enforcement. It is not about the sort of random checks that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central illustrated very eloquently and with proper concern—a concern that I share. I do not want that sort of culture to be spread through the use of these powers. As a result of duties under the Equality Act and due to of the importance of community impact assessments made before operations, which have to be signed off by a senior official in the rank of assistant director, some of the practical safeguards are in place to deal with the sort of mischief and problems that he and other hon. Members have identified.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for raising the Singh v. Hammond case. It is important to note that that judgment of 1987—it is now nearly 30 years old—says:
“An examination…can properly be conducted by an immigration officer away from the place of entry and on a later date after the person has already entered…if the immigration officer has some information in his possession which causes him to enquire whether the person being examined is a British citizen and, if not…whether he should be given leave and on what conditions.”
There we have it—the basis of action.
I anticipated that the Solicitor General might cite that case, which is the basis for the extension of powers. In reaching a view on that, the Court of Appeal said that
“the case does turn very much on its own facts”.
That case involved an immigration amnesty and an immigration officer’s specific and defined suspicion of identity deception. It was very narrowly drawn by the Court of Appeal and does not give a legitimate basis for the much wider use subsequently.
The hon. Gentleman’s interpretation is interesting. I am sure it would be an attractive submission to make were the issue to be revisited, particularly in litigation. It is nearly 30 years since that case. Since then, the Home Office has relied on it. There has been no attempt by a Government of any colour to redefine things and go back to what he would describe as the original 1971 position. There must be a very good public policy reason for that; that reason is simply that it is entirely reasonable to allow the immigration authorities to have a little more time and space, based upon a reasonable suspicion, in which they can question a person who they reasonably suspect might be an illegal immigrant. The published guidance reflects the Singh v. Hammond judgment. It makes it clear that before any inquiry begins, there has to be reasonable suspicion.
My concern is that if the power of examination is limited only to the point of entry, we could have—perversely—an increase in people being arrested, because the power to ask questions is, as I said, not a power of arrest, but a different type of power. It allows people to give a reasonable explanation before we get to the stage of any apprehension or arrest, which I think is a good thing. I would not want to see a perverse situation where, in effect, the immigration authorities are shooting first and asking questions afterwards. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that that sort of approach would definitely inflame the situation and lead to the perverse consequences that we all worry about.
My understanding of what I prefer to call “full searches”—full non-intimate searches is probably the correct term—is that they are never done to a male by a female or to a female by a male. That has been the case for a considerable period, and probably ever since PACE. I might be wrong, but that is certainly my understanding from years of using the code of practice in my work as a criminal practitioner, prior to my entry into the House.
I want to deal with the question of what precisely we mean here. My hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset adumbrated the point that this is not about an intimate search. This is not a search of body orifices—for example, the mouth. It is what we would describe as a non-intimate search. More importantly, it is not the rather horrific image that might be created in our minds of someone completely unclothed being searched. That is not what happens. The individual must not at any stage be completely naked, so searches have to, in effect, take place with regard to each item of clothing in turn. Of course, that involves looking between the clothing and the skin, because experience sadly teaches us that important documents can often be concealed there, but at no time is the individual humiliated to the extent that they are left without any clothes on at all.
I do not question for one moment the Government’s intention or the guidance, but does the Solicitor General accept that the context makes a big difference? For example, at Yarl’s Wood, which I know the Government have concerns about and are reviewing, allegations were made as recently as January this year by the charity, Women For Refugee Women, about the treatment of women. Until issues with practice on the ground in detention centres are adequately resolved, the best intentions in the world are at risk, are they not?
This is one of the most important functions that we as a Committee can perform: not having artificial debates but putting on the record the concerns, using the evidence we have as Members of Parliament or, indeed, from our observation of important events at places such as Yarl’s Wood, then seeking clarification from Ministers. I hope that my colleague the Minister for Immigration feels exactly the same way I do—that this is an opportunity for the Government to put on the line what we expect the standards to be when it comes to non-intimate full searches.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Commons Chamber1. What recent discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Justice on proposals for reform of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. What steps he plans to take to ensure that proposals for reform of the Human Rights Act 1998 meet the UK’s domestic and international human rights obligations.
The Justice Secretary and I meet regularly to discuss important issues of common interest, including on domestic and international human rights law. I am not, as the House knows, able to talk about any legal content of those discussions, because, by convention, whether the Law Officers have given advice or not is not disclosed outside government.
The hon. Gentleman is right to a certain extent, but of course he will have to wait for the proposals that the Justice Secretary will make on human rights reform. The other point for the hon. Gentleman to bear in mind is that it is not just the Court in Strasbourg that protects the human rights of British citizens. The British courts do, too, and I believe we can rely on the robustness and good sense of British judges to protect those rights.
Because so many people in my constituency had written to me expressing their concerns about the Government’s plans on this issue, I organised a meeting during the recess. The dozens of people who came along had one simple question, which I hope the Attorney General will be able to answer: which of the rights currently contained within the Human Rights Act would he and the Government wish to see excluded from a British Bill of Rights?
Again, as the hon. Gentleman has heard me say, he will have to wait for the precise proposals we are going to make. It is worth pointing out that the rights he is talking about are found not in the Human Rights Act, but in the European convention on human rights. The Government have made it clear, as I have on previous occasions, that we do not object to the content of the convention—we object to the way it is interpreted.
I am open to working with all organisations in order to stamp out this hate crime. I am lucky enough to hold two Government jobs and am able to bring them together on this particular issue and provide £2 million of funding to pilot projects across the country to work with schools in order to stamp out unacceptable homophobic, biphobic and transphobic bullying. The secret seems to be to take a whole-school approach, with everybody from the head to the teachers and pupils knowing exactly that that sort of behaviour is unacceptable.
18. What steps she is taking to increase the number and accessibility of women’s refuges.
We are committed to making sure that no victim of domestic abuse is turned away from the support they need. In July the Chancellor announced an additional £3.2 million to increase specialist accommodation support for victims, including refuges, and to provide more help for victims to access that support.
During my annual community consultation over the recent recess, lots of women constituents raised concerns about the future of refuges, recognising that local authority funding was being stretched to breaking point, particularly in big cities such as Sheffield. The Government’s recent £10 million cash injection is a sticking plaster that will only delay closures. Will the Minister use the forthcoming spending review to put in place a long-term funding solution for the national network of refuges?
I reassure the hon. Gentleman that our goal is to ensure that no victim of domestic abuse is turned away from the support they need. We have recently carried out, along with the Home Office, a review of domestic abuse services, and its emerging conclusions will feed into the spending review and the updated Home Office strategy on tackling violence against women and girls. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, all future funding will be dealt with in the forthcoming spending review.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons Chamber1. What recent discussions he has had with his Cabinet colleagues on implementation of the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations on human rights.
6. What recent discussions he has had with his Cabinet colleagues on implementation of the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations on human rights. [R]
7. What recent discussions he has had with his Cabinet colleagues on implementation of the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations on human rights.
The answer to the latter part of the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. On the first part, I do not support the Human Rights Act, but I do support the European convention on human rights. There is a misunderstanding here, perhaps on his part and certainly among some of his Labour colleagues, as the abolition of the Human Rights Act does not mean the abolition of human rights. The Conservative party is in favour of human rights and we have a proud record on human rights. What we do not agree with is the mess his party made of the relationship between this country’s courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg—we will do something about it.
May I follow up on the Attorney-General’s response to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) by asking whether he agrees that last week’s ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that British courts can hand down whole-life sentences without breaching human rights is a fine example of dialogue between our courts and Strasbourg? As we mark the 50th anniversary of Winston Churchill’s death, will the Attorney-General join me in celebrating the European convention as Churchill’s legacy and one that provides vital protections that we would be unwise to deny our people?
I welcome clarification from the European Court of Human Rights on whole-life tariffs, but I remind the hon. Gentleman that it is not just the outcome of these cases that can be problematic but the time, effort and taxpayers’ money spent defending them. He is quite right that the convention is an excellent document; there is very little to disagree with in it. The problem is the way in which the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted that document. Once again, the Conservative party will do something about that, but, as far as I can tell, the Labour party in government would do nothing whatever about it.