Legal Advice: Prorogation

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Wednesday 25th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

There is nothing wrong with expressing robust critical views about a judgment. In so far as it imputes an inappropriate or improper motive, then it is wrong. I think it is a question of wording and of being careful with one’s language, but I took that remark, in so far as I saw it reported, simply to be a robust criticism of the judgment and nothing more—to which my right hon. Friend is entitled.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Ind)]

I have absolute respect for the integrity and competence of the Attorney General. In the light of what he has told the House this morning, can he guarantee absolutely that—save potentially a few days before a Queen’s Speech—there can be no question of his permitting Her Majesty’s Government to have a Prorogation between now and 31 October this year?

[The Attorney General]

What I can undertake to my right hon. Friend is that there will be no Prorogation that does not comply with the terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Report stage: First Day: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

There is also the point that, if we are scrutinising that after it has happened, that is not a lot of use. That can alert Parliament and the public to problems that the new law might create, but if it has been agreed under the rules, it is law and we have to do the best we can and live with it.

Having sat through quite a few debates on the Floor of the House—in Committee, and on Second and Third Readings of Bills—while being a Member of Parliament, I do not think I have ever seen a Bill that has been so extensively debated, dissected, discussed, analysed and opposed. A huge amount of work has gone in to proposing a very large number of detailed and rather general amendments, discussing the philosophy, principles and technical matters in considerable detail.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Before he moves on to another point, does my right hon. Friend agree that the narrowness of the Henry VIII clauses has actually been very considerably intensified by the amendments tabled on Report to clause 7(1) and 7(2)?

[John Redwood]

Yes, I agree. I think the Report stage may even produce some agreement between my right hon. Friend, me and our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that improvements have been made in that respect, with some powers for Ministers being narrowed and the House having an even bigger role. I am perfectly happy that that has happened.

The wider point I want to make is that this very extensive, forensic and thorough discussion could be a model for other legislation. It is interesting that MPs on the whole do not get as interested in other legislation as they have done in this Bill. The Lords should take into account the fact that, on this occasion, the Commons has done its work very extensively and thoroughly, and has considered a very wide range of issues in amendments. I am sure that the Lords will take that into account when it comes to have its important deliberations on this legislation.

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[The Solicitor General]

I wish to speak in support of amendments 37 and 38 in the name of my colleagues in Government.

I will try and answer the question that was put to me by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who has been getting frustrated in these debates about the somewhat technical nature of ministerial responses. Well, this is a very technical Bill. Like its illustrious predecessor, the European Communities Act 1972, it is a Bill of constitutional importance; it is a framework Bill. It is not—I stress this, because it is most important—it is not a Bill that seeks to convey a policy or a particular aspect of policy that we have discussed today. It is a framework that is designed to ensure that the law that is applied up to exit is downloaded in as clear and proper a way as possible because, to be consistent with the rule of law, the law needs to be accessible, it needs to be clear and it needs to be well understood. That is the fundamental basis of my concern about today’s amendments—that in seeking to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law after exit, not only do we sow potential confusion but we fundamentally misunderstand what that charter means in the first place.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The Government have introduced welcome amendments to clause 7. While my hon. and learned Friend is talking about clarity, I just want to ask him to confirm, at this early stage in his remarks, that the Government will bring forward the amendments that we were hoping for, and that I think my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I were, if not promised, at least led to expect, when clause 6 is discussed in the other place.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. If he had sufficient time at his disposal, he might have seen the evidence that I gave to the Constitution Committee in the other place, in which the issues in clause 6 were discussed—the interpretive provisions that he and I and others debated in Committee.

May I come back to the fundamental point about the charter? It was never intended to create new rights. It was a document that reaffirmed rights that already existed in EU law.

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[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. That is the gravamen of the concern. The Government are given too much discretion to decide what they consider is appropriate, rather than what is necessary for the purposes of the Bill.

I have no doubt that, later in the debate this afternoon, a Minister will rise to reassure me and others that the Government would never do anything inappropriate, but I think we know what we all think about that. And I am talking not just about this Government; all Governments, particularly when afforded too much Executive power, will seek to abuse it—that is in the nature of the Executive.

In Committee, I was rather struck by a sweeping statement by the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who said that, apparently, we all know what “appropriate” means and that the courts will know what it means. If that is so, why does the Minister not tell us what “appropriate” means in this context? Many distinguished lawyers have said that the courts will not know, and the judiciary themselves have expressed concern about the breadth of discretion given to the Government by the use of the word “appropriate” rather than the word “necessary”.

The matter has been raised by the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, which recommended that the power in clause 7

“should only be available where Ministers can show that it is necessary to make a change to the statute book”.

I have no doubt that an amendment on that will be forthcoming in the House of Lords, but as I said earlier in the debate, it is important that this democratically elected and accountable House debate these matters and that we get some colour from the Government on their position.

The issues raised by the amendment have also been referred to by the Scottish Parliament’s Finance and Constitution Committee, which has produced an interim report on the Bill and supported the recommendation. I think that I am right in saying that the report was supported by a number of Conservative Members of the Scottish Parliament, so this is not really a party political issue. I do not want us to withdraw from the EU, but I recognise the need for this legislation if we are going to do so, and this amendment seeks to circumscribe Executive power.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I can see the hon. and learned Lady’s point that, in the light of the changes that the Government have made to clause 7, it may be appropriate to change “appropriate” to “necessary” in the schedule. However, will she confirm that her amendment 49 does that for devolved authorities’ Ministers, not for the Crown, and that that comes later in the sequence of amendments?

[Joanna Cherry]

Yes. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It would not be very consistent if I thought that the British Executive should not get sweeping powers but the Scottish Executive should. All these arguments about curtailing Executive power apply to all Governments in these islands, not just to this Government. At the moment—my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) will address these matters later—the Scottish Government are getting precious few powers in relation to these matters, and that is a grave concern. However, others will address that later.

The Solicitor General said he had listened with care to what was said about this issue in Committee, so what will Ministers do about it? Have they spoken to the judiciary about this? Have they taken on board the judiciary’s concerns about the scope of discretion granted to them and their fear of that, given recent politically motivated attacks on the judiciary? Have Ministers taken on board the concern expressed on both sides of this House and by many organisations outwith it about the broad scope of the powers currently afforded?

As I said, I have no doubt that these concerns will be raised in the Lords, but now is the time for the Government to tell this democratically elected and accountable House what they are going to do to circumscribe the exercise of Executive power in this Bill.

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[Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)]

The biggest scandal about clause 11 is that the UK Government know that it is completely unacceptable; they are just not brave enough to admit it. Ministers, Tory MPs and civil servants have privately—and publicly, sometimes—acknowledged how extremely ill-advised it is to remove the power of the devolved Governments over devolved areas. This UK Government committed to introducing amendments on Report to address this, but where are they? Where is the Government’s acknowledgement that they have got this wrong?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

No doubt the hon. Lady will develop her argument, but will she just clarify something? It is not the case, is it, that anything is being removed from the devolved authorities? It is a question of whether things that currently reside in Brussels should be devolved rather than returned to Westminster.

[Anna McMorrin]

There are things that are devolved and on which we work with the EU, and we do not want those devolved areas returned centrally to the UK Government, as part of a power grab, rather than to our devolved Administrations. The Welsh Government are clearly arguing that case, and so are the Scottish Government.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

I read the right hon. Gentleman’s new clauses, and I can understand where he is coming from. If one looks at the totality of the amendments and new clauses in today’s debate, one sees that they are all trying to do, roughly speaking, much the same thing. The question is not the exact route that is adopted, but how the Government respond to that challenge. I do not want to take up more of the House’s time, but—

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

In case my right hon. and learned Friend is coming to a conclusion, I want to ask him this question. I think we all hope that the Government will propose some mechanism for sifting, but does he intend to make a binary distinction between delegated legislation, which could mean exclusively negative resolution, and primary legislation? Alternatively, is he willing to accept, as I think I would be, the possibility of a sift that involves allocating some tasks to the affirmative resolution procedure, and only some others to primary legislation?

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point, but I wonder whether we are in danger of straying into another topic. There is an issue about the operation of the mechanism for implementing the changes and taking us out of the EU. I keep confidently hoping that the Government will be able to respond positively to that by having an adequate sifting mechanism for Parliament. Even when that has taken place, the changes envisaged for EU law are, as far as I can see, of a semi-permanent or permanent character. They are about the nature and quality of the law that we have decided to bring in, rather than the manner in which we have decided to do so. New clause 55 is very similar to new clause 25, tabled by the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), and they seek to look at the matter in slightly different ways. The question is how the Government will respond.

That raises, perhaps, a more fundamental issue about the process of debate in this House, on which I hope the Government will be able to provide some reassurance this afternoon. I do not know how other hon. Members found it, but I found yesterday hugely instructive, not because it led to some votes—it did so, but let us leave the votes out of it—but precisely because it gave us the opportunity to have a cogent and sensible debate about problems on which, as we proceeded, we began to perceive that there might indeed be a degree of consensus. The problem is that we always run up against the sense that if the Government come to the Dispatch Box and say, “This is very interesting, and we will think about it,” but we do not do something about it then and there, we may lose our opportunity ever to do something about it. We will, of course, have the opportunity of Report stage, should the Bill have one.

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[Peter Grant]

It would certainly be worrying if any major power was able to use dirty tricks to influence the result of a democratic process in any country. It may be worth remembering that it is not that long ago that David Cameron pleaded with Vladimir Putin to interfere in another referendum to ensure that he got the result he wanted. It is important that, if we are going to criticise and call out foreign interference on behalf of our opponents, we should also be prepared to call out foreign interference in our favour.

It is important for the people I represent and the nation that has sent me to this Parliament to be one of its representatives that we seek to retain as much as possible of the benefit of European Union membership, even after we have been forced to temporarily leave it, so we should seek to reverse the Government’s unilateral decision on membership of the single market and the customs union. Plaid Cymru’s short amendment would help to do that by ensuring that, even after leaving the EU, the Government have no authority to leave the European economic area without a further vote of this Parliament.

The first benefit of that would be that the 4 million would be able to relax, if the UK Government say today, “We got it wrong. We’re staying in the European economic area and in the single market.” All the worries about settled status and all the paperwork that people have to go through just to guarantee the rights that they already have would stop, as would all the concerns about how we square the circle of borders or no borders at different stages between the UK, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland if Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom remain in the single market and the EEA.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Can the hon. Gentleman explain what on earth he is talking about has got to do with the two clauses under discussion?

[Peter Grant]

I am speaking to amendments on the amendment paper, if the right hon. Gentleman would care to look at them.

I have no great expectation that the Government will accept either Plaid Cymru’s amendment or the SNP’s proposed new clause, which will be decided at a later date, but I want to continue to remind them and their Back Benchers, as well as Opposition Back Benchers, that we do not have a final, irreversible decision on the single market. We might not even have an irreversible decision on the European Union, but we certainly do not yet have an irreversible decision on the single market and membership of the European economic area.

There is a way in which the Government can extricate themselves from the mess that they have created for us; end the torment of 4.5 million people who still do not have an absolute legal guarantee that their children will be allowed to finish at the school at which they have already started; ease the daily growing concerns of businesses the length and breadth of these islands that do not know whether they will be allowed to import raw materials or export finished goods; and ease the concerns of our public services that their essential workers, including care workers, nurses and doctors, may not be able to continue to move here to serve our people. It is all right for the bankers, of course, because there will be an exception for them. They will have free movement, but nurses, doctors and care assistants are apparently not important enough.

Even if, for political reasons, the Government cannot ask their Back Benchers to support amendments either today or during later Committee sittings, I ask them to think very carefully about what I am saying. There has not been a referendum to leave the single market, so the situation can be changed by the will of this Parliament and the support of the Government. They do not have to go back on their promise to respect the result of the referendum to leave the European Union, but they can reverse the headlong charge towards the cliff edge and make sure that the Bill actually delivers what it is supposed to deliver, and that means we have a soft landing instead of falling off the cliff edge in March 2019.

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[The Solicitor General]

With respect to the hon. Lady, I do not agree with her analysis. We will carry out more detailed scrutiny of clause 5 and schedule 1 at a later stage, but I reassure her that clauses 2 and 3 will create certainty which, as I have said, is vital.

We drafted clause 2 in a deliberate way. We have drawn it more widely than to cover just domestic legislation created under the 1972 Act as it will also apply to any other domestic primary or secondary legislation that implements EU obligations. It will apply to any related domestic legislation, any domestic legislation relating to law that will be retained under clauses 3 and 4, and indeed any domestic legislation that is otherwise related to the EU or the European economic area. That ensures that all that legislation will form a part of what we define as retained EU law.

We have done that for two reasons. First, it means that this legislation, where relevant, will be interpreted in the light of pre-exit case law—the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union—and the general principles of EU law, which are provided for in clause 6. That is vital to ensure not only that we save the legislation, but that we provide for it to operate in precisely the same way as it did before, which will prevent legal uncertainty about how such provisions should be interpreted.

Secondly, our approach ensures that to the extent that deficiencies might arise in any legislation as a result of exit, they can be corrected under powers in the Bill. Saving the domestic legislation under this clause will therefore reduce the risk of uncertainty and increase continuity as to the law that applies in the UK. It will also mean that we avoid the famous cliff edge that many hon. Members are worried about when we leave the EU.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I do not want to pursue further the questions about clause 6—we will talk about them anon, and we talked about them yesterday—but while very many of us have no objection to anything my hon. and learned Friend says about the way in which existing law will be incorporated under clauses 2 and 3, does he accept that the issues raised by Members on both sides of the Committee are about the mechanisms by which the Bill seeks to achieve what he describes as correcting deficiencies, but could also be used to do much more than that? Does he therefore accept that the only thing we are currently debating is the mechanism to ensure that more than correcting deficiencies is not done by the technical means of statutory instruments under the negative procedure?

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[The Solicitor General]

I am sorry, but I need to make progress. I want to deal with the proposals tabled by hon. Members, including the Opposition spokesman.

I will say a little about how we will deal with converted law, which was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. Converted law will become domestic legislation. It will not automatically have the status of either primary or secondary legislation. Indeed, as has already been referenced, paragraph 19 of schedule 8 sets this out:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, any retained direct EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation”.

We all know—including the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), the shadow Secretary of State—about the consequences in terms of incompatibility, the power of the courts and what the House can do to rectify legislation. I think that is an enhancement. It is a welcome initiative and I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman shares my view about that.

Where there are existing pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, which is capable of amending retained direct EU legislation such as converted regulations, the converted legislation is to be treated as secondary legislation for the purposes of scrutiny procedures under those pre-exit powers. In other words, we might bring something down to this place and transpose it. We used to use the term “gold plating”, but it has somewhat gone out of fashion now, and I think the Government improved their processes over the years. However, there have been powers to vary, and, in effect, that will be treated as secondary legislation—no change, really, because the House already had those powers with regard to scrutiny.

It follows, then, that where there are not pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, we will look case by case at the converted law and determine how it is to be treated. This is the point that has been made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others: how are we to determine what is what? As I have said, I am keen to ensure that all concerns are properly listened to, and that when we come to further amendments on further days, the Government give full consideration to how to create that mechanism and in what form the House, and indeed the other place, would like it to be administered.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

My hon. and learned Friend may be saying what I had hoped he was going to say. May I ask him to be a little more specific? Does he mean that, in due course and in their own time, the Government will come forward with—if I might put it this way—a triage amendment that settles a process for distinguishing between technical deficiency amendments and substantive amendments, and the way in which either is treated?

[The Solicitor General]

We are going to continue the dialogue, listening extremely carefully. Indeed, there might be a form of words that we can agree on that satisfies this place. Let us not forget that primary legislation is not the only way we can create this mechanism. There are Standing Order provisions of the House that the House jealously protects and preserves, and the Government are mindful of the need not to trespass on the exclusive cognisance of the House.

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[Mr Leslie]

I was a member of the International Trade Select Committee in the last Parliament and recommended that we be a member of EFTA. It is certainly something to consider. It is necessary that we be a part of those alliances if we are to retain some of the trading benefits and links we have. If we want to avoid a cliff edge and a mountain of work, starting from scratch again, we have to retain our membership of the EEA and, at the very least, have a proper assessment from the Government of the costs and benefits of leaving. To do otherwise would be deeply irresponsible.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There is a danger in Committee that we get sidetracked into rehashing the whole of the Second Reading debate, and I certainly want to avoid that at all costs. Moreover, I have no basic problems with the structural phrasing of clauses 3 and 4, unlike clause 6, which we debated yesterday and will be discussing further anon.

I want first to put on the record what I think my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, in a helpful series of exchanges with various Members, has already confirmed and then to point out one interaction with clause 6. I understood him to say that at an appropriate point, either on Report or in another place—on Report, I hope—the Government would come forward with some mixture, to be decided, of changes to Standing Orders and changes to the Bill to ensure some process for Parliament to sift, or to have sifted on its behalf and then reported to it, all the proposed amendments to existing EU legislation incorporated or saved under clauses 3 and 4, and indeed any others.

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[John Redwood]

Clauses 2 and 3.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Sorry, clauses 2 and 3. I do apologise. My right hon. Friend accurately corrects me, and I hope that Hansard notes that correction.

If that is therefore what my hon. and learned Friend said, I have nothing further to add to it. However, I want to point up one connection with the useful discussion we had yesterday about clause 6. The more I have thought about this over the past few weeks, the clearer it has become to me that the ultimate resolution to the problem of the unrestrained abilities of the Supreme Court under clause 6(4)(a) is to make it clearer in the Bill that the method by which any change in the snapshot legislation that my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, was talking about should be made not by the Supreme Court, but by Parliament. The point is that, so far as there is fundamental change, and in particular so far as there is fundamental change in the interpretation of the plain words of directives, regulations and treaties, it should be made by primary legislation.

That puts primary legislation in the right place, and hence puts the Supreme Court in the right place, because the Supreme Court is there to interpret the common law, which this is not, and to interpret statute, which this could and should be, and it can certainly also interpret European law using European principles except to the extent that, through statute, this Parliament has changed those things.

That would be a perfectly recognisable pattern. As I mentioned yesterday, it is not my ideal pattern, as I would like to unwind in the Bill a good deal of the expansive interpretations of the European Court of Justice that have gone before exit day, but I recognise that the Government might not want to do that. It does not worry me if they do not, because this Parliament, post-Brexit, will have the ability to do it, which is, from my point of view, even speaking as someone who on balance was a remainer, the big advantage of exit. We will be able to make those decisions as a Parliament through the proper process of primary legislation.

By coming forward with the package that I think my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General offered the Committee a little while ago in this debate, he will also point the way to at least a great part of the solution to the problems of clause 6. While we are at it, just as a bonus, we have not yet debated clause 5—assuming I have my numbers right—but we will do so anon. When we do, we will hit exactly the same set of issues in a slightly modified form. While we are at it, we will hit this again in clause 7, in another way. The same package that the Solicitor General has suggested will handle all the problems arising from clauses 5 and 7, and point the way to handling the problems with clause 6, once we have got rid of the clause 6(4)(a) error.

We have a pattern here that can make the Bill work in its own terms. It can provide the flexibility that the Government need in order to correct deficiencies, to transpose or adjust things when references are technical or incorrect, to bring to the House important matters that need adjustment but are not fundamental, and to give this Parliament the power it needs to change the law fundamentally and to make that something that Parliament does, rather than the Supreme Court. If we can get to that point, we will have a Bill that is perfectly good in its own terms and that will serve the purposes that the Government intend for it, and I shall rest happy in the knowledge that I have in a small way been able to contribute to a series of debates that will have provided legislation of which we can be proud.

[Mr McFadden]

I want to make a few points about new clause 22, which my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) spoke to a little while ago. Language can obscure things as well as shed light on them, and that is true of much of our Brexit debate. For example, we were told that this was all about taking back control but, as we have seen many times since the referendum, the Government have stoutly resisted giving control to Parliament, resisted publishing a White Paper, and resisted allowing us a meaningful vote. They have finally caved in on having legislation, but they are still resisting allowing us a meaningful say on a real choice, rather than a choice between whatever is negotiated and no deal and WTO rules. We were told that Brexit would save huge amounts of money, yet one of the critical issues in the talks is how to settle a multi-billion pound divorce bill that was mentioned by no one during the referendum campaign. So language can obscure as well as shed light.

Perhaps this is nowhere more true than in all this talk about “the negotiations”. Unsurprisingly, the public place great faith in anything called “negotiations”. If I were buying a house from someone—I hesitate to tread here after yesterday’s exchanges—who was asking a certain selling price and I offered a certain purchase price, the negotiation would involve us meeting somewhere in the middle. There might be parts of the Brexit talks that involve negotiation in that sense of the word.

I serve on the Brexit Select Committee, but I should add that I do not seek to speak on its behalf here today: this is my interpretation of the situation. Last week, the Committee spent a couple of days in Brussels and Paris talking to some of the people involved in the so-called negotiations. There may be negotiation about parts of this process, particularly in phase 1, but the point that I want to make—which refers to new clause 22 and the European Economic Area—is that our future relationship is less about negotiation than about a fundamental choice. What is the relationship that we want to have with the European Union? Where do we want to be in relation to its system, which is a market with rules? The people that we talked to about this round of talks made it pretty clear that this is a choice. It is a decision.

Basically, there are two ways of doing this. The first is the way outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East—that, having voted to leave the European Union, we remain part of its single market system and adhere to the rights and obligations that that gives us, and in so doing, we put the economic prosperity of our people first. That is one way, and I wholeheartedly back my hon. Friend’s assertion that the referendum did not decide this question. The referendum decided our membership of the institutions. The referendum did not decide on the manner of leaving the European Union. There are countries outside the European Union that take part in this system, and we know which they are. I do not think that this is a perfect solution by any means. There is, of course, the issue of having a say in the rules, and whatever our say is outside, it will not be like the say that we have now. My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East covered that as well.

The other option involves a free trade agreement, something akin to what has been negotiated with other countries. This matters to our economy. We have talked a lot in these debates—and I have been guilty of it myself—about the importance of manufactured goods. We have talked a lot about cars, we have talked a lot about aerospace, and we have talked a lot about agricultural products. All those are all hugely important to our economy, but 80% of it consists of services. We are hugely successful at them, and we are hugely successful at exporting them. Tens and hundreds of thousands of jobs are sustained by financial services, insurance, legal services, business services and so on. I must say to those who advocate the FTA option that the blunt truth is that no existing FTA would give us anything like the access to the services market that we currently enjoy as members of the single market.

That, fundamentally, is the choice that we must make. The Solicitor General resisted the existing comparisons, as the Government have throughout: they have said, “We will have a bespoke arrangement that is somehow different from this.” Let me tell the Solicitor General candidly that not a single person on the other side of the table last week thought that that was possible.

This is a decision, a choice. What kind of Brexit will we have? Fundamentally, at some point, the Government will have to face up to the truth, be candid with their Back Benchers and the House as a whole, and be candid with the public. The choice, in the end, is not just a choice between systems, but a choice between economics and nationalism. It is a choice about whether we put the prosperity of our constituents first or the nationalist ideology that is driving this agenda, and I know which I prefer.

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[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The role of the ECJ in applying fines has concentrated the minds of policy makers in the UK. It was only the threat of significant fines that led to the air being cleaned up in places such as London. One of the many things that worry me about the Brexit process is that, even in what the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said about closing the so-called governance gap, I have not heard any proposal from him for real sanctions to concentrate the minds of policy makers on bringing their laws into conformity.

In EU law, the environmental principles are forward looking and play a formative role in guiding not just day-to-day decisions, but future policy development. That role could be lost under the Bill as drafted. In the months and years ahead, the principles of environmental law should be applied to UK decision making in a number of high-risk areas, such as trade policy, chemicals, and infrastructure planning, but unless the Bill is amended, the legal force of the environmental principles to guide future policy and decision making will be lost.

I want to end with a few words about national policy statements. The Government have suggested several times that instead of enshrining the principles in UK law, they might instead consider using the NPS route. I have real concerns about that because an NPS is not a fixed, long-term commitment, and does not provide the long-term certainty of primary legislation. Such an approach would represent a serious step backwards from the current position.

The statutory framework for establishing an NPS limits its scope to planning matters, so we would need a new statutory instrument to have a much broader scope. Also, an NPS lacks the binding character of legislation. Courts could give little or no weight at all to policy statements so, essentially, the basic problem with an NPS is that a Secretary of State has a great deal of control over it, unlike with primary legislation. In a case in which a non-governmental organisation or an individual wanted to use an NPS to hold the Government and public bodies to account, there could be a serious temptation for the Government to amend the NPS precisely to make it less effective at holding them to account.

I want briefly to express my support for amendments 93 to 95, which the hon. Member for Bristol East will no doubt speak to. Those amendments speak to the primary intention of the Bill as expressed by Ministers. Without them, it could not be said that the same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before, as the Prime Minister has pledged. They are needed to ensure that our laws and our rights, and indeed the intent and purpose behind them, remain the same immediately after withdrawal from the EU. Any changes to those laws and rights, other than to ensure the faithful conversion of EU law into domestic law, should be made following our exit from the EU only through primary legislation, not by any other means. Those amendments therefore ask, in a sense, little of Ministers, and so, as with new clauses 30 and 60, I hope that the Minister will respond positively to them.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I have a large degree of agreement and sympathy with what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has just said. So far as animal sentience is concerned, I suspect we may find that there is more on that already in UK law than she is allowing, but I wait to hear from the Government about that. However, I do agree that, one way or another, we need it to be present in UK law at the end of this, and I think the Secretary of State is probably pretty convinced of the same thing.

I want mainly to talk about the question of new clauses 60 and 67, or more precisely what they are aiming at and how best to achieve it, because the point at which I disagree with the hon. Lady is not one of ends but one of means. It is a rare thing to happen in the House of Commons, but I hope I might at least half-persuade her by the end of my remarks that it would be better for her to adopt a different view of the mechanics than she is suggesting.

Let me begin with this: I agree with the hon. Lady wholeheartedly that, in the light of schedule 1, we cannot possibly rely on clause 6—even as I hope it will subsequently be adjusted—and still less on clauses 2 and 3 to do the heavy lifting that she rightly wants to get the precautionary principle and other critical principles into UK law. She is absolutely right about that.

The question that the hon. Lady and I are both asking is, how best can we get over that problem and get to the position where the UK courts and the UK Administration as a whole—the Government and their agencies—carry on applying those principles in a sensible and serious way to our environmental protection over succeeding decades? This is obviously a matter not just of a minute or a day or a year, but of a long period over which we want a settled, continued policy being carried on by succeeding UK Governments of different persuasions.

If that is the question, clearly one route would be some variant of new clause 60, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), or new clause 67 or some other variant. I completely admit that that is a route, but I want first to explain why I do not think it is an optimal route and then to explain why what has been talked about by the Secretary of State is a better route.

--- Later in debate ---

[Geraint Davies]

Is not one of the central problems of the Bill that the legislation is so broadly drafted that there is no effective means for the courts to exercise judicial review, and that the reason we need these principles in it is to enable the court to get a grasp, which would be much better than if there is nothing there at all? Otherwise, we would have to live with a hotch-potch of precedents, which the Secretary of State referred to in the Select Committee.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman asked that question, because more or less the whole of the rest of what I want to say answers that very point. I think there is a better structure available to us, which will enable Parliament to be much more certain that the courts will be enforcing a set of much more detailed principles in a much more concrete and much more certain manner. I think that would answer the hon. Gentleman’s point and reassure him, and I believe it would do better at achieving what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion wants to achieve than her own suggestions.

[Geraint Davies]

rose—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

May I explain what I have in mind? I am more than willing to give way to the hon. Gentleman again if he does not agree as I go along.

The first point about a better structure is that it does indeed need to have a statutory base, but that need not be in this Bill. In fact, I think it is much better that it should be an environment Bill, because an environment Bill gives the scope and opportunity to determine these things in much more detail and much more carefully, and gives the House, rather than what we have now—two and a half hours, not all of which will be spent on this topic—days and weeks of consideration in both Houses. That is the right way to do long-term environmental legislation.

[Kerry McCarthy]

The Environmental Audit Committee recommended, after its inquiry into the future of the natural environment post Brexit, that the Government bring forward an environmental protection Bill in order to do just what the right hon. Gentleman says, but there is no sign that the Government are prepared to do so. In the absence of such legislation, does he not think that the second-best option would be to protect the environment by supporting new clauses 60, 67 and 28, which are on the table today?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Well, we must leave it to Ministers to speak for themselves, but I have to say that the discussions that I and others had with the Secretary of State, who, as people have remarked in this debate, is of a very different cast of mind from some previous Secretaries of State, suggest to me that actually there will be an environmental protection Bill coming forward. I think that is—[Interruption.] Ah! Maestro! With perfect timing my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State comes into the Chamber, at just the right moment for him to signify with a nod, if nothing more, that the possibility of proper environmental legislation in the form of a new statute is on his mind.

[The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Michael Gove)]

indicated assent.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

And his mind is one that is capable of grasping these matters, if ever the mind of a Member of the House of Commons was. The first point, then, is that a proper statutory basis is superior to a specific amendment to the Bill.

[Caroline Lucas]

Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that the two are mutually exclusive? Why could we not have the security of knowing that we have a provision in the Bill? We are delighted with the new Secretary of State, but how long will he stay? Who knows? Who might come next? We want the certainty of the Bill now, as well as the nice hope of the environment Act that so many of us have been requesting for such a long time.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

First, I am confident that this Secretary of State will be here for rather longer than some other Secretaries of State have been recently. I welcome that, because I think he is a very, very fine Environment Secretary. Secondly, I am not saying that it is inconceivable that there could be two pieces of legislation, but I think it rather inelegant to legislate in a slightly awkward way, and then to repeal that legislation in a Bill that would probably start its passage before the passage of this Bill has been completed. I would prefer it to be done properly, although opinions may differ.

[Mary Creagh]

We have had three Environment Secretaries in two years, and we have all been waiting for the famed environment plan for two and a half years. A 25-year environment plan will be a 22-year environment plan by the time it is actually published. What gives the right hon. Gentleman the confidence to assume that an environment Act, which would have to be underpinned by the environment plan, will be in place by the time we leave the EU, especially if we end up leaving without a transitional deal and crashing out in March 2019?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

What gives me the confidence is that I think it is perfectly doable, and I think the Secretary of State intends to do it. I am in a slightly odd position—the Secretary of State has to nod each time I say these things, because I cannot speak for him—but I assure the hon. Lady that I really am very confident about that. Let us proceed for a moment, however, on the assumption that that is indeed going to happen. That gives us a place in which to do things, although of course it does not solve all the problems.

My second point is that, unlike the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, I think that a national policy statement is an ideal vehicle for the translation of these principles into something much more solid and much more determinate. A national policy statement is not just something that a Minister dreams up and issues like a piece of confetti. It comes before the House of Commons and is subject to resolution by the House of Commons, and it is therefore debated. It is exposed in draft, and it is discussed by the green groups.

There will of course be considerable debate about the exact terms of a national policy statement that seeks to turn those principles into something much more concrete, but I think there is ample scope for turning it into something of which we could be really proud. It would also have a huge advantage over mere principles when the courts came to judge the actions of the state and measure them against it—for that is exactly what would happen. A national policy statement is a policy statement by Ministers. If Ministers do not follow that policy, they are, by hypothesis, acting irrationally and in a Wednesbury unreasonable way, and can therefore be judicially reviewed. When they are judicially reviewed, the courts will look at the policy statement and compare it with their actions. If the policy statement is properly debated, properly exposed and properly expressed, those actions can be measured against it in a very determinate and careful way, and we can end up with a much more solid environmental protection than we would ever have got out of the principles.

[Caroline Lucas]

The idea that judicial review will be an adequate recourse is misguided. Judicial review is about only the process, not the outcome. Moreover, it is becoming harder and harder for people to obtain the necessary funds: plenty of people would not know how to begin to do it. I also do not share the right hon. Gentleman’s confidence about the way in which a court will necessarily regard a national policy statement. An NPS does not have the same quality of judiciability as primary legislation.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Perhaps we will not reach agreement about this. I disagree with every part of what the hon. Lady has just said. First, judicial review has been a highly successful mechanism for environmental campaigners. It is, in fact, from judicial review that the clean air measures have arisen. Secondly, the reason why it is particularly effective in the case of a national policy statement is that a policy statement is a policy statement by Ministers and therefore creates a presumption of Wednesbury unreasonableness if it is departed from, so it is very easy to use as a tool for judicial review. Thirdly, judicial review is the mechanism that the principles in the new clause of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, or the Opposition new clause or the new clause of the hon. Member for Wakefield, would have to operate on. It is not the case that the courts in our country would simply take a set of principles and apply them to some set of cases. They would not know what to do with them. The Government would have to be judicially reviewed for failing to apply those principles in their policy.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will give way in a moment.

It is much better to be in a position where we can take the Government to judicial review for failing to apply a much more detailed set of policies, which are the Government’s policies, as approved in the House of Commons by resolution, and which have been fully debated and where we then know whether the court is likely to find that the action is or is not in accordance.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mary Creagh]

rose—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will give way to both hon. Ladies shortly, but first I want to come to a further point that is an important part of the architecture.

I do not personally believe that even the combination of an environmental protection Bill and an NPS emerging from it and under it would be sufficient. This exactly answers the last point of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion. I accept that it is difficult for campaigners and others to use the vehicle of judicial review, which is why I and some of my hon. Friends have advocated what we have proposed, and why we have agreed with the Secretary of State.

[Michael Gove]

indicated assent.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The Secretary of State is again nodding. That is why we have agreed that it is necessary under that same statute to create a body which is a prosecutorial authority, wholly independent of Government, along the lines of the Victims’ Commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner, the Office for Budget Responsibility, or the Equality and Human Rights Commission—we can choose which model—and which is an entity that is small and lean but, like the Committee on Climate Change, very serious. It would be established under statute, and charged with a duty under statute to ensure that the NPS is observed. I advocated the CCC when I was first working with Tony Juniper to get what became the Climate Change Act accepted in this House, and at an early stage I came to believe that the combination of clarity of objective and a body wholly independent and staffed by serious experts was a powerful mechanism, and so I think it has proved to be.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am interested in what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Is he proposing that the body he is describing would have the same power of sanction that currently—as we have been talking about—the ECJ has, in the ability to fine Governments, which is what finally made them conform to the air quality laws, for example? Will this body have the capacity to do something as strong as fining Government to make sure they put their house in order?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

In a word, yes, because this body will be able to take the Government to court, and the courts have the power to injunct, and if the Government fail to observe an injunction, results follow. The body must have that capacity.

I am not envisaging—and I know the Secretary of State is not envisaging—anything remotely like the Environment Agency or Natural England, which are part of the DEFRA family, if I can put it that way. This agency will not be an agency of the state, carrying out the Government’s operational objectives; rather, it will be independent of the Government and will continuously be judging the Government’s actions, taking on board the complaints of others, and using the expertise.

Finally, before I give way again, let me say that I hope the hon. Lady will take some comfort from the fact that ever since I began to propose this with some of my hon. Friends, and started discussing it with the Secretary of State, those who most disagree with her and me about these things have been sticking pins in voodoo images of people like me, because they are afraid that this body might be very effective. I take some comfort from that, and hope the hon. Lady will, too.

[Mary Creagh]

I am interested to hear the right hon. Gentleman develop the ideas around this new body to fill the commission-shaped hole, which was what the Secretary of State described to our Committee, but I want to press the right hon. Gentleman on the point of remedy, because there is no such body. The CCC sets out goals, but does not have any remedy against Government if we fail to meet our targets; it only has the power of its authority in saying that we are missing the fourth carbon budget, or the fifth carbon budget, and so forth.

Secondly, on judicial review, the Ministry of Justice proposed to increase the fees charged to individuals and environmental groups in clear breach of the Aarhus convention, which guarantees access to environmental justice through European law for everybody and caps the costs. The only reason why that proposal was overturned was a judicial review brought by big charities such as the RSPB, not because the Government were aware of the principles.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The hon. Lady is actually making my point. If one looks at new clause 60 or new clause 67, they clearly do not create a right of action against an individual. They create the possibility of judicial review of Government, and I accept the good intention of doing so. Instead, we have the possibility of judicial review of Government not in the hands of some private charity, group, NGO or whatever, but through a taxpayer-funded, statutory body that can take the Government to court, where the Government will be measured against a precise policy statement that is authorised by this House. That is a much more powerful vehicle. In fact, it is the most powerful vehicle available to us for the control of Government. We know nothing higher than the Supreme Court as a means of holding Government to account in relation to their own policies, as approved by the House of Commons. It is an ironclad method of proceeding. I accept that we would of course have prolonged discussion of what was in the policy statement and further prolonged discussion of exactly how the body was structured. There is a basis for debate, but the fundamental structure is much more powerful than what is proposed in either of the new clauses.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on some nice blue-sky thinking about what could come in the future, but I do not see how that is mutually exclusive to the new clauses that we are debating. They relate to values that the UK has signed up to through, among other things, the Rio principles and the Aarhus convention that are currently underpinned in EU law to ensure that they are binding in British law. Leaving the EU would mean that there is no underpinning for our courts to rely on them. The new clauses would allow the courts to use them and rely on them in other judgments. If the right hon. Gentleman’s blue-sky thinking comes forward, it could happen then as well.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. I know that we are in Committee, but interventions must be brief.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

That was the subject of a previous intervention, and what I said in response then I will say again. The application of the principles in this Bill is a possible way to go and is not necessarily incompatible with later legislation, but it seems rather awkward to legislate inadequately and then to produce a good piece of legislation that repeals the inadequate legislation—we certainly would not want them to conflict—when it is extremely likely that the Bill in question will actually be marching through the Houses in parallel with the Bill that we are now discussing.

My second point is that the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle)—this is part of the reason why we have a slight difference of view about the means—has far more faith in the current TFEU principles than is justified. They are principles of procedure that govern proceedings and hence have a big effect on the formulation of EU directives. Had they been part of EU law in a strict sense, they would of course have been incorporated into the Bill that we are discussing, and the problems that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion and I agree exist about this Bill not carrying them into UK law would not exist.

At the moment, we have weak procedural principles, and new clauses 60 and 67 seek to take those weak procedural principles and turn them into a weak procedural principle of UK law. I am recommending, and I think the Secretary of State is happy to take forward, a solid statutory basis for a powerful body operating against a statutorily based national policy statement approved in this House in order to create a binding mechanism that is far more ironclad than what is currently on offer.

[Neil Gray (Airdrie and Shotts) (SNP)]

On adopting EU law into domestic law, I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will accept that there is more than one legal jurisdiction in these isles. On that basis, does he believe the UK Government should be discussing and seeking agreement with the Scottish Government on how it should happen in Scotland?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I leave that to the Government, but it is noticeable that new clauses 60 and 67 would have UK application. I take it that we will be able, by one means or another, to ensure that such legislation as comes forward is so discussed with the devolved authorities that it, too, has some kind of UK application. The precise means of doing that I am neither competent nor desirous to discuss in the context of these amendments.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

After Brexit, we all want to have the best environmental standards possible. Before my right hon. Friend sits down, will he return to new clause 30? If he reads new clause 30, he will see that it drives a coach and horses through the entire principle of the Bill, because in matters concerning animal welfare it would make, for all time, our courts and Supreme Court ultimately subject to the treaty of Lisbon. In that sense, new clause 30 is therefore a wrecking amendment.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I did not intend to return to new clause 30, which I did not table, but my hon. Friend may well be right. I am sure the Government will have something to say about sentience in UK domestic law.

I am under pressure from the Whips to end, and I certainly will end. [Interruption.] I am very sorry. I just express the hope that we can at least continue to discuss this. My hon. Friends and I, as well as the Secretary of State, have tried to discuss this in some detail with the environmental groups, and we should continue that discussion because there is a golden opportunity to do something very good for our country and for our environment.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Kerry McCarthy]

My hon. Friend is quite right. It is about the removal of the cap on costs as well, and the fact that local people bringing these cases might find themselves liable to a huge financial burden if they are not successful.

Amendment 93 removes clause 4(1)(b), which restricts rights in clause 4 to those which are

“enforced, allowed and followed accordingly”.

Amendment 94 removes clause 4(2)(b), which excludes rights arising under EU directives that have not been adjudicated by the courts before exit day. There is no explanation as to why only rights that have been litigated on or enforced are carried over. The Minister may dispute this, but my interpretation is that the result will be that contentious aspects of law will be retained, but those that have never been litigated, perhaps because they are really obvious and incontrovertible and no one has seen the need to challenge them—the ones that everyone accepts—will be the ones at risk, which seems a little bizarre.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I have a great deal of sympathy with the hon. Lady’s amendment 93. I hope she would agree that it would be helpful if the Minister responded to her amendment and the points that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) made by explaining what would be lost if paragraph (b), which is as clear as mud to many of us, were left out and paragraph (a), which is blissfully clear, were in place.

[Kerry McCarthy]

I can only invite the Minister to intervene on me at some point before I finish this speech and give a bit more clarity. I am glad that another superior intellect is as baffled as I was by that provision.

Amendment 95 adds wording that attempts to deal with the poor transposition of EU law, so that if retained law is found to have been incorrectly or incompletely transposed, there would be a statutory obligation on Ministers to make the necessary modifications to correct that. It says that until that piece of EU law is fully and correctly transposed, the EU directive itself can still be relied on. There are some clear examples of where we have not correctly transposed EU directives. For example, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds points to article 10 of the birds directive in relation to the marine environment, which requires Governments to carry out research and other works to inform our efforts to protect wild birds. That goes back to what I was saying earlier—that it is not possible to enforce environmental protections properly without monitoring to ascertain the scale of the problem. The requirement to carry out research has not been transposed into domestic legislation, which means that, for instance, a new seabird census is long overdue. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds was able to take that as a complaint to the European Commission, but there will clearly be a different scenario after Brexit.

New clause 28 concerns the enshrining of domestic principles in domestic law, which was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) and with which I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) will deal shortly.

When the Government say that the Bill will ensure that the whole body of existing environmental law continues to have effect, that should mean not just specific substantive obligations but the broad and comprehensive framework in which those obligations are embedded, including the principles that underpin and aid the interpretation of environmental laws—such as the “polluter pays” principle, which states that those responsible for damaging our environment must pay, and the precautionary principle, which states that if there is a suspected risk that a policy could cause severe harm to public health or the environment, we should not proceed with it. Those principles are currently part of the body of EU environmental law in the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, and are also contained in a wide range of legal agreements to which the UK is party. They guide decision making, and provide a basis for legal challenge in court. Richard Benwell of the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust has said:

“Take out principles like precaution and polluter pays and you rip the heart out of environmental law.”

NC28 would ensure that public authorities carrying out their duties must have regard to environmental principles that are currently enshrined in EU law. Schedule 1 states—the Minister touched on this—that

“There is no right of action in domestic law”

post-exit

“based on a failure to comply with”

EU “general principles”, other than those that have been litigated on by the European Court. That creates a problem. I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify another issue that was mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). “General principles” seem to specifically exclude environmental principles.

When the Environment Secretary gave evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee last week, he said that the principles could best be enshrined in UK law through guidance. Although we know that, in some cases, the precautionary principle has been enforced in the UK courts in relation to planning issues, that does not mean that it would apply more broadly than it does now. What we currently have is not simply guidance. For the principles to have equivalence on exit day, they must be placed in domestic legislation. Laws are binding, but guidance is only guidance. Public authorities must take it into account, but they need not follow it if it conflicts with other priorities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zac Goldsmith]

I will answer the intervention but, with respect, I do not think that that is directly relevant to the points that we are making. We will engage in talks on a free trade agreement with the United States, and there will be argy-bargy and give and take. My view and—I am so happy to say— that of the Secretary of State is that that will not involve lowering animal welfare standards or environmental standards. Another point to make is that we do not just sign up to European animal welfare standards; our standards are higher in many respects than those applied throughout the rest of the European Union. Our pig standards, for example, are higher than any other country in Europe, and that does come with problems.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Exporting cruelty.

[Zac Goldsmith]

My right hon. Friend is correct. While we apply higher standards on our own food producers, we are accepting lower quality imports from other countries, so we are exporting cruelty to those countries, which is a problem. However, there is no question about the commitment of this Government or, indeed, of any party in our politics today—our collective commitment—to maintaining high animal welfare standards. The first campaign that I engaged in, aged four, involved persuading neighbours to let their birds out of their cages, because I could not bear the idea of the cruelty. Few people here are more committed to animal welfare than I am, but I have no concerns in this area, partly because of the assurances from Government and partly because there is a consensus in this place on the issue.

I cannot remember who asked me to give way, but I will not take an intervention whoever it was, which makes—

Investigatory Powers Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 15th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Garnier]

It might if both new clauses became law, but it might not if the new clause to which the hon. and learned Lady has referred did not become law, and we were left with only the one with which I am dealing.

My second point is this. Why should a well-intentioned and successful defendant publisher have to risk the expense of successfully defending a claim and then having to pay the costs of the unsuccessful claimant? That strikes me as unjust. The House is famous for passing laws that are laden—replete—with unintended consequences. It seems to me, however, that when an amendment paper contains a proposal that will clearly lead to a problem—although I am not suggesting that it would be an insoluble problem—we would be foolish not to warn the Government against it. I am delighted to see that the Government seem to have mustered their forces and thinking processes in such a way that an unjust law will not be passed.

When I spoke in the House following the publication of the Leveson report, I was sufficiently pompous and self-confident to rebuke Members who thought that the inquiry, and the report that followed it, meant that there would be state regulation of the press. There will be no such thing as a consequence of the Leveson inquiry. However, I feel that I am entitled to warn Members who, like me, thoroughly disapprove of illegal phone hacking not to assume that once the words “phone hacking” have been uttered, that permits the House, the Government and the courts to rain down on successful, innocent and well-intentioned defendant publishers the burden of the costs of successfully defending a claim.

It should be borne in mind that defendants do not choose to be defendants. Of course they choose to publish the material that they have got hold of, but it is the claimant who feels obliged, or makes the choice, to sue the defendant. To be sued as a defendant is tedious enough, but to be sued as a defendant, to win, and then to be required to pay the costs of the unmeritorious claim must surely constitute even more of a punishment.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Is there not another choice that the media can make? Can they not choose to subscribe to a compliant regulator and thereby avoid the need for all the regulation and legislation that we do not want to see in the Bill?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

Of course I understand what my right hon. Friend has said. He is one of the most sophisticated proponents of the “nudge” or incentive system of lawmaking, and I salute him for that. I sometimes wonder, however, whether it is a good idea to use the force of what are essentially the punitive elements of the legal system to encourage innocent defendants to pay the costs of unmeritorious claims. Yes, in a perfect world we would all settle our disputes, and people would not even provoke disputes in the first place; but to be compelled, on penalty of having to pay out large sums in legal costs, to join an organisation of which one either does not approve for one reason or another, or does not wish to join for one reason or another, strikes me as unjust.

I have been a victim of, shall we say, stupid conduct by the press. It is very annoying. I have seen others, not only my friends and colleagues but people for whom I have acted, having to deal with the misconduct of the media. But I would rather have a system which recognised justice—

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

First, I echo what Members have said across the House about the importance of a free press and a press both acting freely and speaking with confidence to the powerful. We have seen the role of British investigative journalism in taking on corruption in international sport, where it could without fear or favour pursue its investigations and therefore brought down powerful and mighty people. We do not want that to be jeopardised in any way. At the same time we should be conscious that if we just implement the section 40 provisions as they currently stand, some of the biggest victims would be small newspapers and magazines that have never been part of these bigger things. We should also at this time reflect on the nature and purpose of section 40. That is why I believe the Secretary of State is right to have a further consultation.

The idea was not necessarily that the section would be required; the hope was that the press would seek recognition through a recognised authority and have a proper, robust system of self-regulation recognised by the press recognition panel. The press have decided not to do go down that path. Many of them have set up the Independent Press Standards Organisation as their own regulator. They do not wish to see recognition, which in itself would solve the problem; if IPSO had sought recognition we would not be having this debate about costs and extra damages, but it has not sought that. So this should be a time to see whether IPSO can become recognised, with public confidence, as being Leveson-compliant, meeting the standards and providing, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Herefordshire (Bill Wiggin) said, the right level of proper low-cost arbitration. Section 40 is really about saying there must be a robust system of self-regulation and low-cost arbitration. If that cannot be put in place, the alternative is someone going to court and the industry having to pick up the costs in the courts, rather than paying for the arbitration system.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the demands that the nation puts on the media would be satisfied if IPSO were to establish the low-cost arbitration, even if it did not formally seek recognition? Does he agree that most Members would be satisfied with that as an answer?

[Damian Collins]

My right hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. If such an accessible arbitration system were to be established—which would involve going further than the pilot scheme—it would be churlish of the House to ignore that progress and to insist on the point of principle involving going before the recognition panel. This matter should be pursued, and that is why it is right to use the consultation process to explore what more can be done to ensure that IPSO is compliant, that it offers the access to low-cost arbitration that the public want, and that it can win public respect as an effective means of self-regulation for the press.