National Security Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, whether that is the view of the Law Commission or others, reform of the Official Secrets Act is complicated and not straightforward. I can tell colleagues that no one would be happier than I to present a reform agenda in that space, but it is not straightforward—[Interruption.] I appreciate colleagues’ gesturing on the Back Benches, but it is important that on this complex reform we continue to engage with a wide range of interests and give all due consideration to a number of concerns, because there are many, many concerns being raised.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I, too, am a little mystified at why the Home Secretary is not seeking to reform all the Official Secrets Acts—the entire regime—with this once-in-a-generation piece of legislation. If she is not doing it in this Bill, can she tell the House when it will be done? Is there a timeline for reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989?

[Priti Patel]

Without pre-empting the work that is taking place in Government right now, I want to give that assurance. That is also based on the Law Commission’s recently published review. However, as I have already said, a wide range of work is required in terms of engaging stakeholders and looking at all aspects of the law itself. These issues take time, but the Government are working on them right now, and I can assure the House that as soon as we can, when we find the right moment, we will come back to this.

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[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. These changes and measures are not straightforward. I can say to colleagues from the Floor of the House that, having had many discussions directly with our counterparts in Australia over the past 18 months, some aspects of the scheme work, but some do not. It is in our interests to make sure that we get this right. Colleagues need to come together on this. We need to work collectively—not just on the technicalities, but on the legal points. It is the legal application that will matter in terms of making a material difference.

[Maria Eagle]

I think I heard the right hon. Lady give us a commitment that the provisions will be introduced in time for Committee stage in the Commons, which is very welcome. We can then try to make sure that we get this right. I hope that she will confirm that I did hear her correctly and that the provisions will be introduced at the earliest stage in the Commons.

[Priti Patel]

That is exactly what I said.

While these considerations are important, we should also reflect on the fact that the Bill is informed by extensive public consultation. It is informed not just by the work of our counterparts in the Five Eyes and other countries, and by legislation that has been introduced by others, but by our evolving work with our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Those agencies are at the heart of the application of this work. They will be the ones who will be leading the enforcement, putting the laws into practice and dealing with the practicalities of this work. The Bill also builds on the difficult and necessary work undertaken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), who corralled the unprecedented international response to the barbaric Salisbury attacks. This Bill is a culmination of much of the work that she set in train, and we have also been in discussion with her about this Bill as well.

We should not forget that, in response to the Salisbury outrage, the UK expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. Twenty-eight other countries and NATO supported us, resulting in one of the largest collective expulsions ever—of more than 150 Russian intelligence officers. That led to the degrading of Russian intelligence capability for years to come, and we have more cause than ever to be grateful for that today.

The National Security Bill completely overhauls and updates our espionage laws, which date back to the second world war—in some cases, to the first world war. It also creates a whole suite of measures to enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to deter, detect and disrupt the full range of modern-day state threats. The Bill includes a range of new and modernised offences, alongside updated investigative powers and capabilities. Those on the frontline of our defence will be able to do even more to counter state threats. Additionally, the Bill will prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid and civil damage systems by convicted terrorists by stopping public funds being given to those who could use them to support terror.

I now turn to specific measures in the National Security Bill. The foreign power condition provides a clear approach to determining whether offences or aggravated offences are being carried out for a foreign power, or on their behalf, or with the intention of benefiting a foreign power. Many of the offences introduced in the Bill apply only when the foreign power condition is met and it prepares us to face tomorrow’s threats as well as those that we face today.

We are comprehensively updating the laws that deter and disrupt espionage, as well as enhancing the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence services to investigate and prosecute those who spy on behalf of foreign states. We have already had cause to strengthen visa screening of Chinese academics and researchers in sensitive areas of research, and to step up engagement with our higher education and research sectors to alert them to the threats and risks of Chinese espionage. Three reformed offences in the Bill will combat the modern threat from state-linked espionage and related harmful conduct.

One of the UK’s greatest strengths is that we have absolutely world-leading research and innovation, but as we have seen too often it is the target and subject of hostile activity by foreign states. A new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets will help us to respond to that threat more effectively. It will specifically target the illicit acquisition or disclosure of sensitive trade, commercial or economic information by foreign states, as the value of these is directly linked to secrecy. The offence will apply only where the foreign power condition is met and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison.

The Bill will also make it a criminal offence to aid the UK-related activities of a foreign intelligence service. This, too, will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That means that, for the first time, it will be an offence to be an undeclared foreign spy working in the UK. We know that foreign intelligence services can have malign intentions: for example, as the US and UK set out in April 2021, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has been behind a series of cyber-intrusions, including the extremely serious December 2020 hack of SolarWinds, the American software company.

The Bill will reform the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information. Where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and…the foreign power condition is met”,

they could now face a life sentence.

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[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I am pleased to be speaking in this debate as one of the newer members of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. It is good to hear from my colleagues on the Committee, and I will try not to repeat too much of what they have said, because the Committee has of course taken a view on some of the issues covered by the Bill.

Let me begin by saying to the Home Secretary that it is unequivocally a good thing that the Government have finally brought forward a Bill to update and reform the Official Secrets Act regime, as has been made clear across the House. As many have said, the legislation relating to the Official Secrets Act regime goes back many—very many—years and is no longer fit for purpose. It is not just the Government who do not think it is fit for purpose. The Committee has said that it is not fit for purpose and the Law Commission has said that it is not fit for purpose. I have not heard anybody suggest that it is fit for purpose, so I think there is consensus across the Chamber that it needs to be replaced.

The idea of replacing the Official Secrets Act regime is to ensure that the intelligence community has the legislative powers and the tools it needs to combat the varied, complex and constantly evolving threat to the UK’s national security posed by hostile state actors. It is therefore good that the Bill as currently drafted, with its aims to modernise the offence of espionage and create a suite of more modern tools and powers for police, security and intelligence agencies to defend the UK against hostile state actors, is now before us. Although the Home Secretary has set out her intentions in legislation, she has not made it clear that she intends a comprehensive reform of the Official Secrets Act regime in total. She is reforming espionage offences, but she is not doing much at the moment about the Official Secrets Act 1989, which relates to the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information. That is an important part of the Official Secrets Act regime, without reform of which she cannot claim that she has modernised the existing suite of powers. I agree with her—I doubt there would be much disagreement—that it is quite a difficult thing to do, but she and her predecessors have been at it for some time, helped by other parts of Parliament and by the Law Commission which have looked at the matter. Perhaps now is the time—with this Bill before us, which is meant to be a comprehensive piece of legislation—actually to make it comprehensive and come up with proper reforms.

The Law Commission has suggested a regime, and the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers) has set out that she certainly believes, as the Committee does more generally, that this reform ought to be part of this legislation. From what I gathered from the Home Secretary’s replies to interventions earlier—and I am glad if she is listening to what is being said—she is not proposing to bring forward reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989 in this legislation, nor has she set out a timetable within which she intends to bring it forward in another piece of legislation, which is a disappointment.

This Parliament will end in 2024, if it does not end sooner—of course, provisions about when Parliaments end have now changed, and it could end sooner than that—so the Home Secretary might be saying to the House that she does not have any plans to make the reform comprehensive in this Parliament. She has certainly not committed that she will. I think that that is a shame—it is an omission. However, in respect of the other missing element—the foreign influence registration scheme—I very much welcome the fact that the Home Secretary has been very precise and said that it will be introduced in Committee. I hope that that is at the beginning of the Committee stage, because the points that have been made by Members across the House about the importance of scrutinising such a provision are important. She will only get into trouble in the other place if she does not enable proper scrutiny in the Commons. We all want to get the foreign influence registration scheme right, and scrutiny can only help with that.

I hope that the Home Secretary introduces that swiftly, giving plenty time for proper scrutiny. The proposals that have been made for a Committee of the whole House might be a way of doing it, if she can persuade the business managers. I hear that she is very persuasive, so perhaps she can persuade them that that should be done. I do not think that she would find anyone who said that that was a bad idea. The Government have previously made a commitment that reform of the OSA 1989 would represent a key part of the Bill, so it is a bit of a mystery, difficult as it is, that it is missing. One might even say that it is a glaring omission. The Home Secretary could put it right by introducing that sooner.

Comments have been made about clause 23 and the amending of schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007, to disapply the offence of encouraging or assisting offences overseas when the activity in question is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of any function of the intelligence services or armed forces. The explanatory notes say—and I think that I heard the Home Secretary say something similar—that the provision will

“provide better protection to those discharging national security functions on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, to enable more effective joint working and to improve operational agility”.

I think that that is what the Home Secretary said, but this appears to be a wholesale carve-out of the intelligence services and the armed forces from any liability for assisting or encouraging crime overseas in any activities undertaken abroad. It is in effect an extensive granting of impunity against liability for criminal wrongdoing abroad for those discharging national security functions. It is extraordinarily broad in scope, particularly given the defence in legislation for those discharging national security functions abroad, which protects from liability in certain circumstances.

Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 protects those who act “reasonably”, and the agencies and armed forces can use those provisions to protect their staff in appropriate circumstances where their actions are reasonable. There is a further option in some cases to protect staff from liability by obtaining a ministerial authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

The question—and it has not really been answered—is why has this wholesale carve-out been included? Why is it needed? What is inadequate about the current defences that has led the Government to do this? If an action does not meet a reasonableness test, I do not think it could possibly be described as necessary for the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service or of the armed forces. Clause 23 at the moment appears to confer impunity without the need to consider whether an action is reasonable. When the Committee considered this matter, it did not think that it was justified, and the case has not been made to justify the inclusion of a blanket carve-out from liability—nor does that carve-out explain what has gone wrong with the existing reasonableness defence and the ministerial authorisation system, and why that is thought to be inadequate. We look forward to a much clearer explanation in Committee of why the Government think the provision is necessary, because in a worst-case scenario it could lead to less accountability for the agencies. At best, it seems unnecessary, given the existing safeguards.

On the legal aid provisions in part 3, I heard what was said by the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who is not in his place at the moment. He cautioned that the Government need to be careful about the terms in which they set out such provisions. My remarks are in view of my membership of that Committee and certainly not a reflection of my membership of the ISC, because such matters are not in its remit.

Civil legal aid has always been made available based on two main criteria: the type of case, including its likelihood of success; and the financial means of the applicant. It has never been dependent on the nature of any previous conviction of the applicant in a blanket ban, and certainly not whether they had been convicted of a particular type of offence in the past. I understand why policymakers and the Government might be concerned about those who have committed terrorist offences getting civil legal aid to sue, but I hope the Government will consider whether introducing this novel way of determining eligibility for civil legal aid is the right way forward.

I notice that provisions in clause 61 and schedule 10 will enable the court to make a freezing order on all or part of any damages that such a person recovers, ensuring that they are paid into the court, and enable an extension of the period for which awarded damages can be frozen. There is also provision in schedule 10 for a forfeiture of any such damages if it looks like they may be used to further some terrorist cause. I have no problem with that, but the novel restriction proposed on eligibility is difficult because it changes the whole way in which administration of civil legal aid is carried forward for a particular class of person. We must be careful about that. One can always think of other types of offenders who perhaps do not “deserve” to get civil legal aid. My concern is that introducing such a way of looking at eligibility may have a much broader implication that is not entirely good. That is despite there being hard cases, and I understand why policymakers are concerned.

When we get to Committee, I hope that those of use fortunate enough to consider the Bill further will be able to go into all its aspects in a lot more detail. I finish as I began by welcoming the Bill’s introduction; it just needs to be more comprehensive.

National Security Bill (First sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Just before we get the answer, I will just flag up that this may be outside of the scope of this Bill, but we will allow the discussion to proceed, because we have not made a precise ruling on it as the co-Chairs of this Committee. So please proceed, but there the potential for it not to be within the scope.

Sir Alex Younger: My answer is a less eloquent version of that, which is that I have talked about the Government about this. Essentially, they say that they think it is too complicated to work this issue through in the timescale that this Bill is operating in. I am not a lawyer; I apologise. I do not have a detailed answer to your question.

Professor Sir David Omand: I believe that the powers in the Bill are not only necessary, but urgent. In addition to everything that Alex was saying, we are living through a digital revolution. The digital harms are there. I would hate to see the powers in this Bill held up, and possibly even miss their legislative slot, while quite difficult work is done on the 1989 Act.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Q I have never heard anybody apologise for not being a lawyer before.

Sir Alex Younger: It is sincere.

[Maria Eagle]

It is novel for me—I speak as a lawyer.

I would like to come back to clause 23 and the changes proposed to the Serious Crime Act 2007. I could tell you are very strongly in favour of the changes, but I wonder whether this kind of complete carve-out from liability for the agencies is something you have come across before anywhere else. Is this totally novel, or have you seen it operate somewhere else, and you think it would work well in these instances? There are already defences in that legislation to protect the people you were expressing concern about. What is so wrong with the defences that are already there?

Sir Alex Younger: There are other examples. Australia is the clearest, but it goes much broader than this, actually. In our case, you are right, and it is really important to recognise that a large part of what is already there works. The SCA is, by the way, an Act that I absolutely support—I hate to see fat cats here helping people launder money overseas; it is really irritating. We need this stuff, but I am fairly sure that this aspect, the potential criminalisation of intelligence exchange, was unintentional. The reality is that the way the SCA is drawn, with its extraterritorial nature and its very broad conditions, captures things that would not be adequately addressed through the safeguards that were in place before.

Of course, as you allude to, there are defences in place, but to go back to the conversation we have just had, I do not think I as a counter-terrorist operator, which I was, would be particularly happy—even though I have faith in the justice system and the wisdom of juries—to know that what I did could be tested in a court of law with all the uncertainty that entails, when I am obeying a lawfully authorised instruction with all of the oversight that exists. I want to be really clear: when a UK intelligence community individual acts not in good faith or outside those instructions, they should absolutely be subject to all the considerations, including of secondary liability, that exist, but I think any ambiguity in the circumstances I just described is wrong and will have a chilling effect on our intelligence exchange.

[Maria Eagle]

Q Does not the ability to obtain a ministerial authorisation under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 deal with those concerns?

Sir Alex Younger: Again, I am not a lawyer, but I do not believe that it does, no, not entirely. In fact, that is the predicate for what I am saying.

[Maria Eagle]

Q Do you agree, Sir David?

Professor Sir David Omand: Yes, I would agree with that.

[Damian Hinds]

Q Sir David, you have a long sweep of history to look back at, with GCHQ and your role as the first security and intelligence co-ordinator, and now in academia. Sir Alex was speaking earlier about some of the long-term trends and the blurring of boundaries. I think you used the phrase “the digital revolution”. I wondered if you might say a word about what you think are the biggest growing or evolving threats right now.

Professor Sir David Omand: From my experience, I would point to the consequences of the digitisation of every conceivable kind of information. That is proceeding apace. We have digital cities. Our infrastructure is now wholly dependent on IT.

In my recent book, I coined an acronym, CESSPIT—crime, espionage, sabotage and subversion perverting internet technology—and that perversion is going on as we speak. I will add one thought: I put “crime” in my acronym deliberately. If you take the activities of something like the North Korean Lazarus group, which was responsible for the WannaCry ransomware attack on our national health service, it is operating in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for the North Korean nuclear programme and North Korean intelligence activity. In March, the group took more than $0.5 billion-worth of Ethereum currency from an exchange. This is large-scale larceny on behalf of a state.

My hope is that the powers in the Bill will help the police and agencies to deal with state-based criminal activity. I know that there are aggravated offences powers as well, which will help the police.

National Security Bill (Second sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Damian Hinds]

Q Mr Armstrong, with your China speciality, can you say anything about how that country’s approach to information ops has changed or is changing?

Sam Armstrong: Yes. China initially began—there is some really interesting stuff that has only happened in the UK in this space. We had a university that for a very long time rather openly advertised itself as providing services and specialist media training to officers of the Chinese propaganda Ministry, among others—various branches of the Chinese state—right here in London, metres away from the BBC. You also have the Confucius centre picture, which is important.

Where China has actually done very poorly is in its direct Government-to-Government disinformation. Some of the stuff that you saw around “Wolf Warrior” or that the Global Times—its state international newspaper—puts out is very ineffective. What China is incredibly effective at is not really that disinformation or misinformation public communications picture, but identifying individuals of influence within academia, business or wherever, and building up close relations with them. They are invariably people of influence, who in turn use their own networks to say, “Well, look, I’d be careful of all this talk about China. They are the biggest-growing economy on Earth, we really need to trade with them and we shouldn’t do anything to upset them at any point.” In so far as I have seen, that is where the Chinese influence picture has been focused.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Q I have a couple of questions. My first is for both of you. You have said slightly different things about the Bill, but is there anything that is not in the Bill that you think ought to be there and that would make a difference in the field in which you are doing research?

Sam Armstrong: Yes, there are two things. The first is the foreign influence transparency register system. I note that there has been a promise that it is to come, but the devil will be in the detail on that because there is a series of policy judgments that have to be made—whether it is expansive, where the teeth bite and so on. It is incredibly important that it is seen quickly.

Secondly, there should be an ability for the Secretary of State, either of the Home Office or the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to intervene in known problematic institutional relations. There are excellent powers here, such as the individual prevention and investigation measures, but there is very little capacity when that is done more corporately—to go in and say not just to universities but to companies, which would be an expansion of the Australian power, “This arrangement is not in the UK’s interest, and we are ordering you to terminate it.” To say that is a glaring omission is perhaps overstating it, but those are the two powers I would really like to see.

[Maria Eagle]

Mr Miller?

Carl Miller: There is nothing I dislike in the Bill. It makes a lot of sense to criminalise conscious influence activities linked to foreign states, but we should not think that it will have an appreciable impact on the kind of illicit influence operations that we know are happening.

[Maria Eagle]

Q My second question is about the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government promised they would introduce during the passage of the Bill through the Commons. However, we do not quite have a Minister at the moment, apart from Mr Mann, who probably has not been deeply involved in the policy decision making thus far. I may be doing him wrong, but as a former Minister I know that it takes a bit of time to get up to scratch in a new brief.

Mr Armstrong, you obviously think the foreign influence registration scheme would help a very great deal. Mr Miller, would it make any difference to some of the issues that you have been discussing if it were clearer that some of the actors that work in social media that you have been talking about had to register?

Carl Miller: No, it will not. Identity is being hijacked and used at a very great scale, so we do not know who these actors are. To be honest with you, the way to start to reduce this activity is to try to create some cost and penalties for the people who do it. They are not doing it from the UK. The nature of the internet is that crime on the internet, like anything, passes unbelievably easily across borders, almost without being noticed. The way forward will be for us to create ways of reaching beyond our own borders and increase the costs. This might sound strange for a think-tanker to say, but we need to increase cyber-offensive activity against the criminal architectures that allow this kind of work to happen.

[Maria Eagle]

Q Are there powers that you would like to see in the Bill that are not in it and might help with some of this?

Carl Miller: It is difficult, because the web of powers that the intelligence agencies have to use cyber-offensive activity—various kinds of online action, such as device interference—is spread out across a number of different pieces of legislation.

One of the difficulties is that online influence operations are so widespread and common that most of them would probably not pass the thresholds for the intelligence agencies to become interested and engaged in them. That is one of the difficulties that we have with cyber-crime in general. A tremendous amount of it happens, but so much of the capability to do something about it is concentrated within GCHQ, and not in the police services that have to handle most of it. Sorry, that was a slightly amorphous and broad answer.

[Maria Eagle]

Q That is fine. Finally, Mr Armstrong, is there a foreign influence registration scheme out there that you think would be particularly helpful to import into this legislation? What is the best example?

Sam Armstrong: The Australian scheme is by far and away the best example—in my view, the US FARA system is not a good comparator—and it is a shame that we have not taken the opportunity to bring it in sooner. The Australian high commissioner in London was George Brandis, who was the Attorney General who wrote that very Bill, and I know he was keen wherever possible to impress on the Government that he was there and ready to help. I am sure that offer has not dissipated.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Q I have two questions, if there is time. First, Mr Miller, you mentioned people who are employed online and you said that you do not think those people have any idea who is employing them. Clauses 13 and 24 state that

“a person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct”

and

“the foreign power condition is met…if… the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that”

it is a foreign power. Do you think that should be widened to include an element of recklessness or recklessness?

Carl Miller: I think doing anything that might compel any of the services involved to do any kind of due diligence on the people who are employing them can only be a good thing, although the general point I am making is that I don’t think criminalising activity within domestic legislation has been a particularly effective way of changing what people do on the internet, especially when those people are largely concentrated in jurisdictions that do not have any co-operative relationship with British law enforcement.

I remember I spent time with a number of cyber-crime teams across the UK and, in the words of one cyber-crime police officer, “If you are in Russia, the cost or penalty of doing cyber-crimes against British citizens is basically nil.” This is not going to be an effective way of reaching beyond our borders and addressing where we believe a large number of actors doing this kind of thing are; they are not doing this from the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

Q Exactly, as long as they are part of our regulatory framework.

Louise Edwards: Yes.

[Maria Eagle]

Q We seem to have fairly decent regulation for participants in elections. We all know what imprints are, let us put it that way—anybody who has been elected knows what an imprint is. Some of the effort to perpetrate disinformation—to use a blanket term—whether that is successful or not, does not come from people who want to abide by the rules or who are keen to get their imprint on their material; that is precisely what they are not doing. Do you have any views about how we make it clear what is going on? In that respect, do you think that the foreign influence registration scheme that we are promised will be brought in during the Commons stages of the legislation will have a positive impact on identifying people who are trying to do this, or not?

Louise Edwards: You have hit upon one of the hardest issues here. Broadly speaking, people who are within the regime already—the established actors we have been talking about—comply with the law. Many of them, in fact, already put digital imprints on their online material, even though it is not yet a legal requirement to do so. The challenge is those who are perhaps based overseas or who do not want to play by the rules, basically. There are real enforcement challenges there, particularly when you are thinking about organisations or individuals based overseas.

If I go back to the recent Elections Act, one of the provisions that the Government brought in at that point was to lower the spending threshold in elections for people who are based overseas to £700: if you are an overseas entity, you can spend up to £700 campaigning in our elections, then that is it—that is your spending threshold. The problem is that, from our point of view, that can only really be symbolic, because it is virtually impossible to enforce spending at that low level. Even if we were to identify an overseas organisation spending in UK elections, they are overseas, so we have no enforcement powers that we can use to try to stop them.

I am painting a fairly awful picture, but there are some ways to tackle it from a slightly different perspective. For example, we have recently started launching a campaign before elections that is helping voters to look at online material with perhaps a more critical eye, to try to assess whether they should let it affect their vote and to give them a place to find out how to express concerns about that material, with the hope then being that we can perhaps raise confidence in legitimate digital campaigning while at the same time giving people an outlet if they see something they think is illegitimate. There is also a fair amount of work that you could do around political literacy at a very young age with voters, to help them to have that kind of critical perspective.

You mentioned the registration schemes. As a civil political finance regulator, our remit does not extend to matters of lobbying and influence, but one thing I would say, if I may, is that when it comes to the integrity of our democracy and voter confidence in it, transparency is key. Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.

[The Chair]

Are there any other questions? Okay. I thank our witness for joining this Zoom call and for giving evidence. We will move on to the next panel.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

As I said earlier, we have three huge protections. One is that activity must be for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is making, but there are another two layers on top of that protection. The first is that the Attorney General’s consent must be obtained. Secondly, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that prosecution would be in the public interest. Those are three very strong layers of protection that would help protect an NGO if it were to do something inadvertently.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister to his place. Having such protections in place is all very well, but the real issue is the chilling effect this could have in the kinds of circumstances that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has set out. It is not right, is it, for us to criminalise activity that we do not really want to criminalise, but then say, “Well, the Attorney General will sort it out later in each individual case.”? That is not really a very good way of legislating.

[Stephen McPartland]

We are not talking about legislating in that way. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, we are saying that there are three layers of protection. The first layer is that people would be deemed to be obtaining or disclosing protected information for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. The next layers would involve the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. Lady, as a lawyer, will be very well aware that the CPS always determines whether it feels it is in the public interest to prosecute. People will not be caught up by accident, and I think we are getting into theoretics by going further and further down that line.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

Current events demonstrate that we never protect the Government from embarrassment!

Before I get into the detail of the offence itself, it is important to flag that, along with other offences in the Bill, it will apply only in circumstances where there is a clear link between the activity and a foreign power. That is provided for by the foreign power condition, which we will discuss in more detail later. It responds to recommendations in the Law Commission’s 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report about moving from outdated concepts such as “enemy”.

Clause 1 enhances our ability to tackle the threat of espionage by introducing a modern offence to capture those unlawfully obtaining, copying, recording, retaining, disclosing or providing access to protected information. Protected information is any information, document or other article that is or could reasonably be expected to be subject to a form of restriction of access in order to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—for example, if the information is stored within a secure Government building or has a form of restricted classification. Protected information can cover a wide range of Government material, including information such as raw data, documents such as committee reports and other articles such as memory sticks.

Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material. That is important, given that serious harm can be caused by obtaining or disclosing seemingly non-sensitive information that, if used in a certain way by sophisticated state actors, could be capable of damaging the United Kingdom’s national security. However, I want to be clear that the definition will not cover truly benign items such as the lunch menu of the Home Office canteen.

Like the existing espionage provisions, and as recommended by the Law Commission, clause 1 will require that a

“person’s conduct is for a purpose…prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

The term

“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

has been interpreted in case law as meaning the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers, which includes national security. That enables the United Kingdom to respond to threats targeted against its wide range of interests.

Amendment 46 would require that a person’s conduct be instead for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is damaging to the safety or critical interests of the UK. That would create a higher evidential threshold to secure prosecution in an area that is often difficult to evidence due to the sensitive nature of the information that may have been obtained or disclosed. Put simply, we would have to explain why it caused damage, which may require evidence that compounds the damage. That would provide challenges to our law enforcement agencies and courts, and is likely to result in fewer prosecutions being pursued, offering further opportunities to those looking to harm our country through acts of espionage. The use of “prejudicial” mitigates some of that risk.

[Maria Eagle]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the difference between those two words, but can he give us an example? The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East gave a theoretical example to illustrate why he tabled the amendments. Can the Minister give us an example of something that is prejudicial and not damaging?

[Stephen McPartland]

I will come on to that in a bit. I will provide an example shortly.

[Maria Eagle]

Thank you.

[Stephen McPartland]

You are very welcome. I would not want to get it wrong.

Amendments 47 and 48 would introduce and define the term “critical interests”. In the amendments, “critical interests” is defined to include security, intelligence, defence, international relations and law and order. Although I recognise that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East tabled the amendments to attempt to specify exactly what should fall under UK interests in order to add clarity, I must stress that it limits the scope and utility of the clause 1 offence and risks creating loopholes that could be exploited by those looking to harm the UK. There is also the risk that the offence would become quickly outdated as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve. Notably, the list does not include economic interests or interests relating to public health, to name just two areas that would be overlooked by such a definition. Those are areas that are targeted by hostile actors and should rightly be protected.

The safety or interests of the UK test is used not only in clause 1, but in several other offences throughout part 1 of the Bill, such as sabotage or entering a prohibited place with a purpose prejudicial to the UK. There is a risk that creating a notably different test under the clause 1 offence would confuse the legal interpretation of the tests under those other offences and may have a significant impact on their operational utility.

Finally, I reiterate that the test of a person conducting activity

“prejudicial to the safety or interests”

of the UK already exists and is understood in the courts. Just last week at an oral evidence session, the law commissioner invested considerable time and effort in reviewing this area of law, outlining their support of the Government’s decision to retain that term. They commented that the

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act…and it avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 52, Q97.]

Moving away from the amendments, it should be noted that instead of using “enemy”, as in the espionage provisions, the offence in clause 1 includes a foreign power condition. That moves the offence away from labelling countries as enemies, which is less relevant in the 21st century.

The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood asked about the difference between prejudicial and damaging. The damage requirement would require the court to demonstrate harm and explain why it is damaging, whereas prejudice is broader and could include reducing future opportunities. That will also mitigate some of the risks associated, as I have said. It provides a wider test so that we can intervene at an earlier stage of a plot or something else that would affect our national security.

I turn to the extent of the provisions under the 1911 Act. An activity that takes place wholly outside the UK would be an offence only if it is committed overseas by a UK national or officer, such as a Crown servant. Technological developments in a more global world mean that it is now more likely that information that warrants protection to safeguard the safety or interests of the UK may be vulnerable to activity that takes place outside the UK by a wider range of actors—for example, a locally engaged security guard working in a UK embassy stealing papers, or the theft of information held there digitally via cyber means.

To keep pace with the modern threat, the extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offence has been expanded so that the offence can be committed anywhere in the world and by anyone, regardless of their nationality. The extraterritorial jurisdiction is a critical reform within the offence as a better defence for the United Kingdom against a modern espionage threat, whose global nature is not reflected in the current provisions in the espionage offence of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Another key difference from the existing offence is the increase in the maximum penalty available to life imprisonment. The emergence of modern vectors such as cyber means that espionage has the potential to cause a greater level of harm than was possible in 1911 when the United Kingdom’s espionage offences and penalties were first drafted. In the most serious cases, an act of obtaining or disclosing protected information can result in the loss of life or can gravely undermine the United Kingdom’s ability to defend itself from a range of threats. This demonstrates the United Kingdom’s resolve to make it more difficult and detrimental for hostile actors to undermine our country’s interests and safety by committing acts of espionage.

Although we will come to this in more detail later in Committee, I want to flag a key safeguard that applies to prosecutions to this and other serious offences in part 1. Given that state threat activity and the United Kingdom’s response can have a significant impact on the safety and interests of our country and wider international relations, the Attorney General’s consent, as I said earlier, must be obtained in the case of England and Wales before a prosecution is taken forward. In Northern Ireland, the consent of the Advocate General must be sought.

I stress the importance and need for reform of the espionage laws in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939. Recent and ongoing events make it clear that the threat from state threat activity, particularly acts of espionage, is of continuing concern and we must have robust protections in place. The introduction of the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information as a core part of the Bill provides measures to tackle the harmful espionage activity that the United Kingdom faces. That is why clause 1 is so vital. I encourage my fellow Committee members to support it and I ask that the hon. Member withdraw his amendment to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

My understanding is that the action would have to be done on behalf of or for the purposes of a foreign power. If it was done unknowingly, it would be for the lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide how to proceed.

[Maria Eagle]

In the example that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham gave of a person obtaining information and trade secrets and selling them to a competitor business, if that business had a complex ownership structure that led back to, say, China, would that be enough for the person to fall foul of the legislation?

[Stephen McPartland]

I appreciate the question and understand the spirit in which it was asked. However, one thing that we must be careful of is laying out exactly what someone must do to fall foul of the legislation. If we did, in that example, the Chinese would create that structure and be in a position to use it ensure that anybody acting on their behalf would not fall under that power. We must provide the intelligence agencies with the tools that they need to interdict and decide whether such people can be pursued and taken to court. As we have seen, it is difficult to get anybody on espionage. However, as we have said throughout proceedings, we do need the foreign power condition, or to reasonably know, and reasonableness is a huge test within English law, so a person would have to reasonably know that what they are doing would benefit a foreign power.

The offence under the clause is first and foremost a national security offence. We have created a definition of “trade secret”, found in subsection (2), which is intended for use in the state threats context. The introduction of the definition in the offence will help to address the increasingly diverse set of tactics employed by state actors to undermine the UK’s national and economic security and target a wide range of information.

There is no specific criminal offence in UK law that directly criminalises the threat to trade secrets by or for the benefit of foreign states. We have trade secrets regulations that transpose European law, but they serve a different purpose. We have therefore modified the definition of “trade secret” to ensure that it is suitable for our specific purposes. For example, as well as requiring that protections are in place that would limit the utility and potentially impose obligations on businesses, the definition in the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 does not account for information with a potential value. We are seeking to capture early-stage ideas such as research as well as established ideas that are more likely to be subject to protective measures.

Subsections (1)(b) and (3) set out in the instances in which a person’s conduct is unauthorised and what that means. The clause uses the term “unauthorised” because it focuses on the consent of the person with the power to give that consent. We want to make it absolutely clear that legitimate conduct is not captured by this offence. For the purposes of this offence, a person’s conduct is unauthorised if they are not entitled to determine whether they are able to carry out the conduct in question—for example, if they disclose a trade secret to a foreign power and they do not have the permission of the person who does have the power to make that decision. An example of where someone is not captured by the offence could be a team of researchers who are working with a foreign power, but although the information they control amounts to a trade secret, their research partnership authorises them to share that information with the foreign power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

The SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham have outlined their thoughts on amendment 50. I will speak to clauses 4 and 5 more broadly.

Clause 4 establishes a new offence of entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK. We welcome the measure, and the protection it will offer to sites and places that are vital to our national security. It has been a long time coming, and we have been falling back on somewhat antiquated legislation in the absence of such provisions. Giving evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee in January 2019, the director general of MI5 said,

“The purpose of [a potential new Espionage Act] is to be able to tighten up on the powers that have become, you know, dusty and largely ineffective since the days of the Official Secrets Act, half of which was drafted for First World War days and was about sketches of naval dockyards, etc.”

In his evidence on behalf of the Law Commission last week, Dr Nicholas Hoggard said

“One of our concerns about the existing offences in the 1911 Act was that the existing prohibited places—though extensive; it is an extensive and complicated piece of drafting—have a strong military focus, and they do not necessarily reflect the way that critical national infrastructure, for example, or sensitive information is held by the Government.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 51, Q96.]

Clause 4(2) sets out that,

“a reference to inspecting a prohibited place includes—

(a) taking, or procuring the taking of, photographs, videos or other recordings of the prohibited place;

(b) inspecting photographs, videos or other recordings of the prohibited place.”

We heard some more innovative examples, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham likes to think outside the box, and as those acting on behalf of hostile states will continue to evolve and adapt to the legislation that we progress through this place.

Clause 4(3) explicitly states that the offence applies if the person inspects a prohibited place

“by electronic or remote means”,

and clause 4(4) states that the offence applies

“whether the person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”

The use of drones has been an asset in many ways, but inevitably a headache in others. I have raised concerns previously on behalf of constituents that it is at the extremes of distaste and disrespect for drone footage of serious or even fatal accidents to be taken by members of the public and shared on social media, or published by news outlets. It is with urgency that we need to update the laws that ensure national security is not compromised in the absence of up-to-date legislation, but for the reasons I have highlighted I hope this might also be the start of a conversation about drones, beyond their national security implications.

Clause 5 establishes that

“A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person—

(i) accesses, enters, inspects or passes over or under a prohibited place, or

(ii) causes an unmanned vehicle or device to access, enter, inspect 15 or pass over or under a prohibited place,

(b) that conduct is unauthorised, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised.”

The Opposition welcome this provision, and see it as a necessary step to protect sites that are vital to our national security. I would like to probe the Minister on the stipulation that a person who commits an offence “ought reasonably to know” that their conduct is unauthorised. There is a concern that an individual may unknowingly stumble on a prohibited place, and then be prosecuted in the same way as someone actively seeking to undermine UK national security. Further detail on the sentencing guidelines might allow us to work through that uncertainty, but we have to work with what we have in primary legislation. The chances of that occurring are made more likely by the fact that this stand-alone offence does not need the foreign power condition to be met.

Let me provide some rare light relief in today’s proceedings. In 2016, civilians began to wander on to the grounds of several restricted air force and military bases in Canada while playing Pokémon GO, which is an augmented reality game where characters spawn randomly in the proximity of a user’s location—it was all the rage at the time. Documents released on request to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation revealed the military’s confusion about what was happening at the time. One email from a major read,

“Please advise the Commissionaires, that apparently Fort Frontenac is both a PokéGym and a PokéStop”.

He went on to say,

“I will be completely honest in that I have no idea what that is.”

Just three days after the app’s release, two men drove a van on to an air force base near Toronto just before midnight. A corporal confronted the occupants and found them playing with their smartphones. In another incident, one woman was found at the Borden base playing the game, while her three children climbed over tanks. In their attempts to get on top of what was going on, the documents revealed that one colonel wrote,

“There’s a game out there taking off like gangbusters, and it requires people to move to digitally cached locations to get points”.

I do not know what “gangbusters” means. Another security expert recommended they hire a 12-year-old to help them out with the problem.

As part of the military response, at least three officers at different bases were assigned the task of playing Pokémon GO on site, and logging the appearance of every gym, PokéStop, and wild monster. In what I thought was a particularly enterprising spirit, in my constituency of Halifax’s namesake, they instead recommended that the PokéStop be relocated nearer to the museum, in the hope that it would increase footfall in a helpful rather than unhelpful way. I intended to share those examples by way of demonstrating that innocent players of Pokémon GO should be protected from the harshest of sentences, but on reflection, having read out the details, I am not so sure.

Back to the serious—I could not find specific examples here in the UK, but I can only imagine that there were some. We cannot afford to create carve-outs for Pokémon GO players that could be exploited by those acting on behalf of hostile states. The example outlines the need for appropriate consideration of such mitigations in the sentencing guidelines for such offences.

I note that the Law Commission proposed that in any reform of the Official Secrets Acts, a safeguard similar to that contained in section 131 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 should be introduced, requiring the Secretary of State to take such steps as he or she considers appropriate to inform the public of the effect of any designation order, including, in particular, by displaying notices on or near the site to which the order relates. That would ensure that an individual is given fair warning that he or she is approaching a location that is given enhanced protection by the criminal law. If I am not mistaken, that point was made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East on Second Reading. I hope that the Government will recognise the merit of doing so.

[Maria Eagle]

I have a short point of clarification for the Minister, if he would be so kind. It is about what is covered by the offence.

I am looking at clause 5(1)(a)(i), which states:

“A person commits an offence if…the person…accesses, enters, inspects or passes over or under a prohibited place”.

Clause 5(3) clarifies further:

“In subsection (1)(a) a reference to inspecting a prohibited place includes taking, or procuring the taking of, photographs, videos or other recordings of the prohibited place.”

Does that include someone who is off the premises with binoculars or some device to enable them to look closely at the prohibited place, without being under or over it? Does that include the old-fashioned spy looking through binoculars and taking notes, rather than taking photographs, or is that not covered by the clause? It does not seem that it is, but I might have missed something. I will be grateful for clarification.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I agree.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the Minister give way on this point?

[Stephen McPartland]

A final time.

[Maria Eagle]

I regret having to ask more than once, but I am just not quite clear from the Minister’s answers. Perhaps he could write to the Committee if it is not totally clear; that would not be a problem. In subsection (1)(a)(i), does inspecting include looking from a distance—not over or under—say through binoculars that magnify, if someone is doing that with a malign intent, so they are caught by subsection (1)(b), which are the other requirements of the offence?

Would just looking through binoculars from a distance—not taking videos or photographs—and just doing notes or a sketch still be covered, or are we creating a lacuna? That is the only question I seek an answer to. I am afraid the Minister has not been totally clear on how looking through binoculars is covered. We are not inspecting the sketch—we are inspecting the site through the binoculars. Is that not right? In which case, is it still okay for this person to do a sketch? It is not clear.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful for the intervention and shall try to clarify. It is clear that the provision is not exhaustive, but the reality is someone has to inspect the site, whether that is through binoculars or making a sketch, and the purpose of that activity—that inspection—is to be prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom.

[Maria Eagle]

That is clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member. As I said, that is certainly something that we will look at and come back to.

[Maria Eagle]

rose—

National Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

Clause 13 is quite substantial, and creates a new and general offence of foreign interference. Under the clause, someone who behaves recklessly but for whom an intention to aid a foreign intelligence service cannot be proven would not be committing an offence, unlike under clause 12.

The hon. Member for Hastings and Rye has a particular interest in that element of the offences. She will remember that in last Thursday’s evidence session, she asked Professor Sir David Omand, the former director of GCHQ, about the question of recklessness in clause 13. He said that he

“looked to clause 24, ‘The foreign power condition’, and there is quite a lot of scope in it for a successful prosecution to demonstrate that the individual who has, as you say, acted recklessly, could reasonably have been expected to know that their act would benefit a foreign power, for example, so I was not so concerned about that particular question.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 17, Q34.]

However, in response to a very similar question, Carl Miller, the research director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos, made the interesting point that introducing recklessness in such a way may make businesses or service providers take their responsibilities on those types of risks more seriously when agreeing to take on commissioned work. I put that example to the Minister in our discussions on clause 3.

We will propose later in proceedings, through new clause 2, an independent reviewer to look annually at all the powers in the Bill—not just part 2—and not only check that we have the right balance when using the powers, and consider any unintended consequences, but make recommendations. I think clause 13 is viewed as fair by both sides of the Committee, but I hope that our debate about recklessness has shown that new clause 2 would make a great deal of sense.

Government amendment 9 is a welcome step—if somewhat presumptuous—that would make foreign interference a priority offence in the “Online Safety Act”, as on the amendment paper. It is slightly odd to amend the Online Safety Bill through this Bill, given that that Online Safety Bill is only just out of Committee—it is on Report in the Chamber as we speak—but the change is a very welcome development none the less. Reset.Tech’s Poppy Wood spoke in evidence of her hopes for that provision, and was pleased to see its addition.

Later in proceedings, we will come back to what more could be done in the disinformation space when we discuss new clause 3, which addresses the reporting of disinformation originating from foreign powers. Alongside clauses 13 and 14, we have discussed separately with the Minister that we are still awaiting further news about the planned foreign influence registration scheme, which has been called for since the aforementioned 2020 Russia report. It was a big focus on Second Reading, when the Minister’s predecessor was under a great deal of pressure from the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee and others for not having produced the detail in time for the whole House to be able to discuss and debate it. The practical outcome of the implications of clause 13 is that we would like to see the detail as soon as possible, and the Minister knows our views on that.

Before closing, I want to touch on the issue of foreign interference. On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) spoke extensively about the need to tackle shell companies. The new offences outlined in these clauses will mean little if they cannot be detected or if measures are rarely enforced. Again, we urge the Government to remove the loophole that allows shell companies to be used to make donations to political parties, and to hide foreign donations and donations linked to hostile states. I expect the Minister will say that further work on interference of that type is under consideration as part of a second economic crime Bill, but I am looking to him for further assurances on that type of foreign interference.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I rise to support some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax. Given the Minister’s recent arrival, I am sure that this is not his responsibility and would not have happened had he been in charge, but it is particularly bad for a Government amendment to seek to amend a Bill that is still going through its Commons stages and has not reached the other place. In fact, it is still on the Floor of the House. It is a particularly poor practice that I hope the Minister, in his new role, will deprecate among his officials and seek to prevent from happening in the future.

It is really bad for the Committee to seek to amend a Bill that is still on the Floor of the House and has not been passed yet, when it is quite clear—unless the Minister has a good reason why it is being done this way, which I would be interested to hear—that it is not sensible for us to amend a Bill that has not yet even passed its Commons stages. It seems to be a recipe for incoherence and confusion. I hope that the Minister will agree and seek to prevent us from seeing such amendments in the future, because it is just rank poor practice.

The clause introduces an important defence for the country and fills a gap that has needed to be filled for many years, so I very much support it. However, it is noticeable that, unlike clause 12, which we have just discussed and approved, the offence set out in clause 13 does not include recklessness in the same way as some of the other offences set out in the Bill. There must be a reason for that, but it is not immediately apparent what that is, and it would help the Committee a great deal if we could hear the rationale for recklessness being left out.

Obviously, the offence also does not include where an individual is unwittingly used to conduct the activity that the person who is engaging in the interference is seeking to conduct. I can understand that a bit more, because if someone is a dupe—perhaps without any intention or recklessness at all—one can understand why the offence might not extend to that person. However, given that some of the offences being introduced by the Bill do include recklessness, it would still constitute an offence if there was recklessness rather than intent. Why has recklessness not been made a part of the offence? I am sure there is an explanation, and I think it would help the Committee a lot to hear what it is. If there is no good explanation, perhaps the Minister might go back and produce an amendment that includes “recklessness” in clause 13.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

I have a couple of points to ask the Minister about. The clause is a generally necessary and helpful provision. It provides for the offence of preparatory conduct, and makes it an offence to do things that are not an offence at the moment. The point, however, is that it helps law enforcement to intervene at an earlier stage, before the preparatory conduct has turned into the capacity to commit whatever it is that is being prepared for. It must be difficult for those seeking to disrupt such activities to have to sit around and wait for an offence to be committed before putting a stop to the preparatory conduct.

The purpose of the clause is clear, and it will be a useful addition. However, will the Minister explain why the clause covers preparatory conduct for various offences, but not all the offences in the Bill? Why does it not cover preparatory conduct with the intention of committing a new foreign interference offence, for example, because it does not? What is the reasoning behind that offence being left out of the clause?

It would be helpful for us to hear from the Minister what the thinking is in that regard. If it is good to have an offence of preparatory conduct to prevent at an early stage offences that might otherwise be committed that would be quite serious, why not for the foreign interference offence?

[Stephen McPartland]

The clause provides a disruptive tool to tackle preparatory activities carried out by those who seek to cause us harm. Malign actions by states have the potential to cause significant damage to the UK and its interests, and it is therefore vital that the law can intervene at an early stage when preparatory activities are under way. That is already provided for under the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the Law Commission has recognised the importance of maintaining the provision.

The offence covers preparatory conduct in two scenarios. The first is preparation to commit acts that would constitute one of the following offences: obtaining or disclosing protected information, obtaining or disclosing trade secrets, entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, and sabotage. The second is preparation to commit state threats activity that involves serious violence, that endangers life or that creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public. The offence of preparatory conduct covers those who are preparing to carry out harmful acts themselves, and those who make preparations for another person to commit the acts.

Importantly, the preparatory conduct offence is committed only where there is an intention to commit a relevant act and that can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—I hope that provides some reassurance. The element of intention provides an important safeguard that will prevent the offence from capturing legitimate acts, or acts undertaken by individuals who did not engage intentionally in state threats activity. In addition, consent will be required by the Attorney General, or the Advocate General in Northern Ireland, before a prosecution can be brought under the offence.

When preparatory acts are caught at an early stage, it may be unclear exactly what the perpetrator intended as the ultimate outcome—for example, an act of sabotage or obtaining trade secrets. The offence may therefore be committed if there is a general intention that the preparatory conduct will result in harmful state threats activity of a general nature. That is in line with the approach taken by Parliament when it provided the offence of the preparation of terrorist acts under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. A requirement to demonstrate that the preparatory act was undertaken with the intention that specific harmful state threats activity result would, in many cases, constrain the offence in a way that would be wholly undesirable and potentially allow state actors to evade the law.

Those caught preparing to harm us could face a maximum sentence of up to life imprisonment. The Committee will be aware that the ultimate decision on the length of the penalty faced will be decided by the courts, taking into account the severity of the preparatory activity and the harms that were intended to result from it, which could include long-lasting damage to the UK or the loss of life. I totally understand what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said about life imprisonment being a heavy penalty, and the courts would not give such a sentence for some of the examples that he described. But the courts could impose life imprisonment if someone was preparing to commit murder and the courts would want to treat some activities in the same manner, because if someone had another person assassinated, the court would want the full ability to impose a life sentence in those circumstances.

We know all too well that state actors operate using sophisticated methods, and that they can cause unimaginable harm. I therefore stress the importance of clause 15 as a key tool in our fight against states who seek to harm us. Where we can disrupt state actors at a preparatory stage, we must do so, before they have the opportunity to manifest their intentions to cause harm to our nation. As we discussed earlier, the ability to deal with the offence already exists in the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the proposed offence in the Bill modernises its terms. With regard to why the offence is to be expanded to apply to some rather than others, we believe that we have carefully assessed the link between the two, and we do not think it is necessary or appropriate to extend the offences to apply to foreign interference or assisting a foreign intelligence service at present. That is something that we will continue to look at.

Effectively, we need to continue to get the powers on the statute book to help the intelligence services and provide them with the toolkit that they need to help keep us safe.

On amendment 52, which seeks to raise the threshold—

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

I was trying to work out the Minister’s answer to me. The foreign interference offence in clause 13, which we have debated, covers a wide range of harmful activity, including manipulating legal or political processes, interfering with fundamental rights. Why is the offence of preparatory conduct not applying to those activities? What is the reasoning, because it would be an important disruption tool for authorities to try to prevent foreign interference, would it not?

[Stephen McPartland]

I understand what the hon. Lady is saying—

National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 70, line 27, at end insert—

“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—

(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or

(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”

I will speak to amendment 45, tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I will also address the wider schedule 3 powers.

The amendment reflects the place of detention powers at the start of schedule 3, which gives the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. The Minister’s predecessor was asked repeatedly whether he could clarify what types of buildings could be designated places of detention beyond police stations on Second Reading. In response, he said:

“I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 636.]

I am still not convinced about the provisions based on that response.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

The provisions in paragraph 1(1) of schedule 3 give the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. However, sub-paragraph (2) states that in the entire schedule a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place that the Secretary of State has designated. That means that as long as the Secretary of State says, “I designate this place”, any building in the UK—it does not even say “building”—or any place can be a police station. Can that possibly be adequate and correct?

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. I was just about to say that operational need provided a reason for the appalling asylum accommodation provided by the Home Office during the pandemic, and we now know that the official guidance was ignored. That leads to a great deal of concern about the ability to designate any type of building as a place suitable to detain somebody.

To introduce some safeguards, we propose an amendment whereby any such place designated as a place of detention must be subject to an inspection regime. We have given the Government some discretion to determine who the most appropriate body to do that would be, given the absence of any steer at all, as my hon. Friend has just said, about what type of buildings might be used. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue might be the most obvious choice. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and adopt our sensible and measured proposal.

Schedule 3 is massive—32 pages of powers. To consider the implications of it all once enacted is an enormous undertaking. That is why I come back to this principle when making the case for new clause 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

The Minister has just given a great deal more information than is written in the Bill. Paragraph 1(1) states:

“The Secretary of State may designate places”,

and, at sub-paragraph (2), that

“a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place”

so designated. That could be a square in the middle of a field. Will the Minister consider inserting into the legislation some of the detail that he has just put on the record to make it clear that a specific power is being taken to designate more custody suites?

[Stephen McPartland]

As I have said, I am very interested in the amendment and am looking at possibly doing something along similar lines. I am trying to get the facts out. I heard what was said about the response on Second Reading so I am trying to be open and transparent and to put stuff on the record, in the official record of the sitting. I am doing the best that I can to be open, so that people are not concerned about rendition or people being taken overseas.

[Maria Eagle]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I am glad to hear about the amendment, but that is of course about inspecting such places. As he is doing more work, does he mind also taking away the suggestion that I have just made? He might like to make it clearer in the legislation that we are talking about custody suites and not about squares of ground in the middle of a field or any other such place.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.

My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

As we have discussed, clause 21 provides for a state threats power of arrest. If an individual is arrested under that power, the further provisions in schedule 3 will apply. As part of that, schedule 3 provides for a new regime whereby biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA profiles, that are collected on arrest for foreign power threat activity may be retained for an initial period of three years, with the option to extend the retention period for a further two years where considered necessary. A similar provision is made in schedule 9 for those subject to state threats prevention and investigation measures, or STPIMS. These are the same timeframes and procedures that operate for arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000—once again, we are trying to mirror the terrorism legislation.

The group covers a number of technical Government amendments to the biometric regimes in schedules 3 and 9. I turn first to amendments 13, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36, which relate to the indefinite retention of biometric data in certain circumstances. Again, the amendments put the new retention regime in line with what already operates for arrests made under PACE and the Terrorism Act. The law rightly sets strict limits on how long biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, can be retained where a person is investigated but ultimately not convicted of an offence. In certain circumstances, including under the Bill, biometric data taken in the course of an investigation can be retained for longer periods, and further retention of that data can be authorised, but the principle is that the data will be deleted unless further retention is specifically provided for. Where a person has been previously convicted of an offence, their biometric data can be retained indefinitely, subject to the requirement for ongoing review that is set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.

Both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 allow for the indefinite retention of biometric data taken during an investigation, if it is found that an individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence. This means that if an individual has previously been convicted of any offence that could carry a term of imprisonment, their biometric data taken during any new investigation can be held on the police national database indefinitely, irrespective of the outcome of that new investigation.

[Maria Eagle]

Generally, these are very sensible measures. There has obviously been some major redrafting of the schedule for the Government amendments to be necessary, and it would be interesting to hear why that is. I am looking at Government amendment 18, which says:

“For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if…the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity”.

Why is that instance included here? The person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. They have not admitted the offence, unlike in the situation described in proposed new paragraph 20A(1)(a)(i), whereby a person has received a caution and admitted the offence. By contrast, this person has been found not guilty.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am going to write to the hon. Lady.

[Maria Eagle]

It is a small but important point.

[Stephen McPartland]

I know, and I will write to the hon. Lady, because I do not know the answer.

As we have already discussed in Committee, state threats activity poses a serious and enduring risk to UK security, and the Bill must provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to combat hostile activity. Indefinite retention of biometric data enables the police and the security services to use the data to support investigations into state threats offences and other criminal activity. That mirrors the approach taken in PACE and the Terrorism Acts.

Given that threat, it is right that where an individual with a previous conviction for a recordable offence is arrested under the state threats arrest power in clause 21, or is subject to a STPIMs notice, biometric data taken under those regimes should be retained indefinitely. Accordingly, the amendments provide for indefinite retention of biometric data in these circumstances in schedules 3 and 9 respectively.

Out of an abundance of caution, the provisions were not included when the Bill was introduced while we considered the questions raised by the Gaughran judgment. Based on the UK response to that judgment, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that these provisions are indeed compatible with the European convention on human rights and, therefore, should be included in the Bill.

As highlighted, state threats investigations can be complex and resource-intensive. By bringing forward the amendments, we are strengthening the ability of the police to use biometric data to support criminal investigations. Not agreeing to the amendments would create a position where the police’s ability to retain biometric data of a person with a previous recordable conviction would be more restricted than in other cases.

Aligning our approach with that of TACT and PACE ensures consistency in respect of biometric regimes. The requirement for ongoing review of retention, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, ensures that interference with the right to respect the private and family life of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I will now speak briefly to the remaining amendments in the group, which are comparatively minor and technical.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful for the intervention. What we are trying to do is to mirror what is in TACT and PACE to keep the regimes identical so there are not different ones for different areas. Obviously, if someone has accepted a caution, they have in essence accepted that they were guilty of an offence—they have just not proceeded to court.

[Maria Eagle]

Would not an additional safeguard in those circumstances be to ensure that before a youth caution is offered and accepted in any given case, it is made clear to the individual concerned that if they were to accept it, it would mean the retention of their data for their entire life? In those circumstances, the individual concerned could consider whether they really wanted to accept the caution or go for a trial.

[Stephen McPartland]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. I would add that it is “may” be held indefinitely not “will”. There is still an element of choice and discretion.

[Maria Eagle]

The Minister is correct about that, but perhaps the individual who may be considering accepting a youth caution and their adviser ought to be advised, before they do so, that there “may” be a consequence of biometric data and so on being kept for that person’s entire life, so they can make a proper decision about whether they want to accept the caution in full knowledge of the potential consequences.

[Stephen McPartland]

My understanding is that that what happens under TACT and PACE, and that would be the intention for what would happen under this legislation, so the regimes mirror each other.

Amendments 16 and 17 to schedule 3 separate the reference to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales in the list of chief officers who can extend the period of biometric retention. They make no practical change to the provisions.

Amendments 14, 25 and 27 address some unnecessary duplication in the list of databases against which biometric data obtained under the powers in schedules 3 and 9 can be searched. Amendment 26 provides that data obtained under the powers in schedule 9 can be searched against data taken under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.

National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

This is supposed to be scrutiny.

[Stephen McPartland]

The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to make his own speech, and I will listen.

Let me also be clear that clause 23 will not enable activity by individuals who, acting outside the proper functions of their organisations, contribute to criminal activity by others or commit criminal offences themselves. We will retain the ability to prosecute anyone for other offences should their behaviour in support of international partners amount to a criminal offence. Further, it will not remove the ability to challenge the UK intelligence community or armed forces on their activities through judicial review, civil damages claims, or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers.

To conclude, clause 23 is really about supporting UKIC and armed forces officers, who we ask to undertake vital work on our behalf, by ensuring that when they work with our partners in good faith, according to wider domestic and international law, and in support of vital national security aims to keep this country safe, they do not risk personal criminal liability for any actions of that partner state. Responsibility for any action that we cannot support should surely sit at an institutional level, which is what will be the case under clause 23.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will explore in more detail in a second. I go back to the point that the security services have conveyed to us that their caution is having an operational impact, which requires a resolution. We are sympathetic to that. We recognise that a junior member of staff facing that burden of potential liability when carrying out their proper functions under instruction does not feel right. However, I look to the Minister to find a way through the matter that does not involve what can feel somewhat like a gold-plating of exemptions for the security services, which stands to entirely erode appropriate safeguards and due diligence when considering the risks and consequences of sharing information with partners. As the Minister knows, there is an existing reasonableness defence in section 50 of the Serious Crime Act, which recognises that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

[Maria Eagle]

My hon. Friend is right to refer to the defences that already exist because to agree with the clause, we would need to see that the existing offences and defences are not working. There does not seem to be much evidence of that. Section 53 of the Serious Crime Act sets out the factors to be considered in determining whether it is reasonable for a person to act as he did. That includes any purpose or authority he claims to have been acting under. An individual working for our intelligence service has clearly got extensive protection under that existing provision. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As a lawyer, she has a great deal of experience navigating some of this legislation, and she makes a powerful point about the reasonableness defence. In addition, a prosecution would have to be deemed to be in the public interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Our intelligence and security services are this country’s frontline of defence, and we need to ensure that they remain the best and most professional in the world. To do that, they need to know that if an individual makes a decision in good faith and in accordance with all relevant procedures, to keep us safe, that individual should not be at risk of criminal liability. That responsibility must lie with the organisation.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

In a moment.

Last week, Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, said the issue was a point of principle. Contrary to some alarmist news reports and those opposed to clause 23, Ministers and spies will not be given immunity from committing crimes overseas. Clause 23 does not have any effect on any other criminal offences that might apply to an individual’s actions.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I have finished, thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It is about both. I will come to liability, because I do not think that individual officers are liable due to existing legislation. As for what I mean by oversight, I am clear that the structures we have for the authorisation of things that are not pleasant should include oversight—whether from the ISC, the tribunal or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We do not live in a society—thank God—where Ministers and the Executive can just say to the security services, “Do x, y and z.” That would be wrong. That is why it is important to have oversight and checks and balances in the system, which were not always there. This morning, I referred to a very sad time in our history—I was a Minister at the time. It was not a good time for our security services, and we should have been ashamed of some of the things that were done.

I want to see an example of what Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand were talking about last week. If there is a specific problem, I would be sympathetic and say, “Right, we need to get that sorted.” It may be a broad notion. We are talking about principles and morals, and it is very difficult to legislate on morals—certainly the Conservative party gets into difficulty when we talk about morals—but I would like to know specific examples that would lead to a liability.

Let me turn to the existing protections. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 includes the offence of encouraging, assisting or commissioning an offence abroad. Clause 23 amends schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act to disapply that offence when the activity is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence agency or the armed forces. The Government are basically asking for a carve-out, which I find extremely rare.

[Maria Eagle]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that putting in legislation a carve-out from an entire class of offences—in this case, the inchoate offences of crimes committed abroad—engenders more suspicion among those who worry about the intelligence services than would be the case if the law applied properly to them with appropriate defences?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.

The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?

[Maria Eagle]

I will not go through all the points that have already been made, although I do feel quite strongly about some of this. I generally endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham—my fellow member of the ISC. Like him, I do not think it is true to say that anybody on this Committee or any of our parliamentary colleagues are intent on trying to stop the intelligence and security services doing their job. They do a very important job and they do it very well. It is dangerous work and we want to support them as much as we can.

But we are a democracy. One of the things that concerns me about clause 23 is its wholesale disapplication of an area of the law that applies to all the rest of us. If we are going to do that for the intelligence services, it is important that we are very clear that it is necessary. It applies only for a certain type of offence in a certain place—overseas—but it is a wholesale carve-out. The clause says that an entire schedule to the Serious Crime Act 2007, which sets out inchoate offences abroad, does not apply if “any relevant behaviour” was necessary for

“the proper exercise of any function”

of the relevant services. That is a wholesale carve-out. I cannot think of too many other examples of that. I do not know if the Minister has a list of examples of other wholesale carve-outs from liability from the criminal law for particular officers of state organisations, but I think it is quite rare.

In those circumstances, I could tell from the evidence we were given that the Government have been asked for this by the relevant services. It did not seem to me that it was coming from the Government—that the Government were saying, “You must have these extra powers.” I accept that they are responding to requests, but because this is a wholesale carve-out from liability for criminal acts, it is important that it is properly justified. We all know about the difficulties of properly justifying it, because a lot cannot be brought into the public domain, but what we have had in the public domain has not been very convincing.

I expect that many people in their day-to-day life would like to have impunity from criminal liability for something that they might do, but it is not something we should be granting easily. The arguments for it need to be very strong. There are already defences that make it harder for people working in the intelligence community to be found guilty of some offences. They have defences that others do not. By the way, it is probably philosophically right that the law should apply to those people but that they should have extra defences. In legislative terms and for the good of society as a whole, it is probably better to do it that way round than to disapply the law to a particular type of person.

I would expect to hear why the current arrangements do not work, but I have not heard that. I did not hear it in the evidence we took from Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand. If I can characterise the issue in this way, they both said, “We would rather have this. We feel very strongly that we would rather have this,” but they were unable to give us any examples of why the current arrangements did not work. In fact, I asked Sir Alex whether some of the current arrangements worked. I asked him about the ministerial authorisation, and he just told me that he was not a lawyer, which is not a convincing answer when someone is asking for a whole area of the criminal law to be disapplied. Sir Alex obviously felt strongly about the matter—I could see that. That is perfectly legitimate, but as a scrutiny Committee and as parliamentarians, we need to hear a little bit more.

I hope the Minister will understand—I do not particularly like the fact that he refused to take interventions, but that is his choice—that everybody on this Committee is seeking to do the right thing. We do not want to make a change to the law that opens up our intelligence and security services and our armed forces to accusations that they can act with impunity abroad. Based on some of the evidence that has been sent to the Committee from those who campaign on these issues, some people think that the clause does precisely that. I do not agree with some of what is in the submission from Reprieve that we received recently, but that submission contains quite a representative sample of what people in our society would probably think if they were to take a look at this clause.

A wholesale carve-out from liability under an area of the criminal law is a very serious step to take. I am not saying it is not the right thing to do, because we should take requests from the agencies and armed forces seriously—as the Minister is clearly doing—but I remain unconvinced. Such a carve-out could have unintended consequences, such as making it much less likely that thoughts will be focused on making sure that activity is lawful. We need to make sure these proposals are the right way forward, and that their advantages outweigh their disadvantages. We have been told that reasonableness is a vague concept, but it is vague only in the sense that it is very flexible and can, and does, apply in many areas of the law; its meaning is relatively well known. To my mind, if the agencies and armed forces are concerned that their conduct might not be considered reasonable, it is difficult to see how it could be necessary for the proper exercise of their functions.

[Mr Jones]

The other safeguard in this area is surely that if there were to be any prosecution of an agency staff member or a member of the armed forces, the Attorney General would also have to agree to that prosecution. That would be a pretty high bar to get over.

[Maria Eagle]

It would be a very high bar to get over. If we are being told—there was an element of this in the evidence we heard—that there is a chilling effect on individuals trying to do their jobs, those individuals may need to be a bit better trained in what the law says, what it means and what they are able to do. In any event, whatever the law ends up being—whether it is this Bill, or what we already have—it is not a bad thing for those who operate at its margins to know precisely what they can and cannot do. I worry slightly that having a complete carve-out from liability might swing activities a bit too far in the other direction.

There are pros and cons to any way of doing this. I do not want the Minister to think I am being hostile; I am certainly not. I just want us, as the House of Commons, to be sure, when we consider this further, that this way is right and will work better than what we already have. I, for one, cannot see how this will be better than what we already have; I think that in many ways it will be worse.

[Stephen McPartland]

It has been a great pleasure to listen to the debate and Members’ speeches. I can feel the frustration in the room. I share that frustration, because I have been told by the intelligence services that we need clause 23 because the schedule it amends is having a damaging impact on critical operational activity aimed at keeping the UK safe. That is the reason why we need clause 23. I wish that we could tell the Committee everything, and that we could just all agree to it, but that is what I am told by the intelligence services, so I have frustration too.

I will try to answer some of the questions, and then sum up. We have been asked about section 7 authorisations. Some of the Committee have been in their roles a little longer than I have been in mine, so they will be aware that section 7 authorisations can be sought only by SIS and GCHQ—not by the MOD or MI5—so this is about trying to create reassurance across all the UK intelligence community.

On section 50 and the reasonableness defence, the defence has never been tested in the context of activity of the intelligence services and the armed forces, so we feel it is more appropriate for them to demonstrate that their actions were carried out as necessary in the proper exercise of their functions.

[Maria Eagle]

If what the Minister says is accurate—that the defence has never been tested—how can he say that it does not work?

[Stephen McPartland]

What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—

National Security Bill (Tenth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

Quill pens, yes. Now it is about resigning by tweet. The Minister was clear in his tweet that he was resigning—[Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood has helpfully passed me her smartphone—again, using new technology, which is not the usual way I operate. The Minister made things quite clear in the last paragraph, when he said:

“I will continue to serve until a new Security Minister is appointed and look forward to supporting our new Prime Minister.”

The Minister is therefore still in post, so we need an explanation as to why he is not here to continue discussion of the Bill.

I asked that question this morning, and the Government Whip, the hon. Member for North Cornwall, did the usual by just ignoring it. I thought I would try again because persistence pays off and I quite like the hon. Gentleman, as he knows. We—not just the Opposition, but the House—deserve an explanation as to why today’s sittings are being adjourned when a Security Minister is in place.

In her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, Madam Deputy Speaker said that this is the normal process until a new Minister has been appointed. I then raised a supplementary point of order to point out that we still have a Minister; it is just that he seems to have disappeared or is being kept away from the Committee. We need an explanation for this unique event, whereby the Minister has been kidnapped or is being kept away from the Committee, and the Government want to fold the Committee today.

I have one last point about the timings of these things. As I said this morning, there is quite a lot of consensus on the Bill. We—me and my hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench—want to get the Bill into statute and provide our security services with the best weapons and ammunition for the difficult job that they do on our behalf. That has not been helped by the rather messy and squalid way in which the Committee has been dealt with today. Will the Whip consider giving the Committee an extra day to pursue the Bill through Committee, to make up for the day that we have lost—not through our lack of willingness—and to give the Bill the proper scrutiny that it clearly deserves?

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I will speak briefly, as I do not wish to labour the point. I would not be making this point at all if it had not been for the terms of the Minister’s resignation letter, which we have all seen and which has been quoted to the Committee:

“I will continue to serve until a new Security Minister is appointed”.

The new Prime Minister, who is now in post, will no doubt appoint a new Security Minister in the next few days—possibly this evening or tomorrow. That is good; it means that we ought to be able to get back to consideration as planned on Thursday. However, there is no reason that would have stopped the resigning Minister, who is continuing in post until he is replaced, from coming to this Committee today and doing the work on the Bill that he has prepared for, because he has had the whole of August to do it.

The new Minister, no matter how excellent he or she ends up being as a Minister—no matter how knowledgeable in matters defence and national security—is not going to be as familiar with the Bill as the hon. Member for Stevenage. I just cannot see why the hon. Gentleman could not have come here, which is why I asked that question of the Whip, the hon. Member for North Cornwall, this morning. I understand that he has been put in an awkward position, but I did ask him whether he could seek some advice from his Whip colleagues about why the Minister did not come this morning when he had specifically said he was going to continue until he was replaced. Did he decide himself not to come, or was he asked to stay away? The Committee and the House deserve an answer to that question. I live in hope that the hon. Member for North Cornwall has that answer; if he does, it would be excellent if he put it on the record when he replies.

[Mr Jones]

Would it not also be interesting to know whether the hon. Member for Stevenage—unless, let us say, he has been kidnapped and put in a box or sent on a foreign trip somewhere—is still Security Minister? Not only does he have to appear before us today in that post, but there are obviously ongoing issues in that department that he will have to deal with. Some clarity would be helpful.

[Maria Eagle]

That is an important point. I was looking at this merely in terms of courtesy to the Committee, proper scrutiny and the way in which Bill Committees ought to and do work, but of course the Security Minister has other duties outside this House. One would not want a discontinuity between one Security Minister and the next, which I expect is why, when the Minister sent his letter to the previous Prime Minister, he said in his last sentence that he would continue until his successor was appointed. However, we now seem to be in a position where he has not continued until his successor is appointed.

When I was a Minister, Mr Gray—no doubt you will recall your own experience of these things—duties in the House took precedence over all other duties that one might have as a Minister, as stated in the ministerial code. As such, if the hon. Member for Stevenage is still the Security Minister, it is extraordinary that he is not here. There are two explanations: either he has decided to stay away himself, in which case it is a dereliction of duty, or he has been asked to stay away by the business managers, in which case this Committee and the House deserve an explanation.

I do not wish to put too much pressure on the hon. Member for North Cornwall, because I realise that he is doing his job and may or may not have had an answer in the time between this morning’s adjournment and the resumption at 2 pm, but we do require an answer. I hope he will be able to give it now, but if he cannot I hope he will undertake to ensure that all members of the Committee get that answer.

[The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Scott Mann)]

I have heard the points made by Opposition Members loud and clear, and I heard their points of order in the Chamber this afternoon. The Chief Whip and the officials are aware of the requests that hon. Members have made around additional timing. The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood made a point about the Minister for Security. I have not had a chance to get an answer to that question yet, but I will seek reassurances on that point.

National Security Bill (Ninth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

May I put on the record my great sense of regret and disappointment that the Committee is not progressing today? There is a great deal of support for the Bill, because we all recognise that our security services need the new measures to keep our country safe. At every opportunity, we the Opposition have sought to be constructive and to undertake our due diligence in providing the level of scrutiny that should come with the powers in a Bill such as this.

We have sought to work with the Government, but it is disappointing that we will now have a fourth person acting as Minister in a Bill Committee on the matter of national security. We very much look forward to meeting again on Thursday so that we have the appropriate opportunity to scrutinise and debate every last bit of the Bill and the new clauses, ensuring that the security services have what they need from us. Despite a real sense of disappointment, we look forward to ensuring that we meet again on Thursday to progress without any delay.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I am surprised by the difficulties caused for the Committee by what has happened. I have before me the letter by the Minister for Security, the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), which he has kindly placed on Twitter. After all the niceties, and saying that he will not carry on, he signs off his letter by saying quite clearly:

“I will continue to serve until a new Security Minister is appointed and look forward to supporting our new Prime Minister.”

So where is the Minister? A new Security Minister—if one is to be appointed—has not been appointed. The hon. Member for Stevenage is still the Minister, and in his letter indicating his wish to resign in due course, he has undertaken to continue to serve until a new Security Minister is appointed. We have business this morning on one of the most important Bills before the House in the current Session—one that has been delayed for years because the Government had not got on with producing it.

Not only that, but we started Committee stage in chaos, when a former Minister suddenly resigned. The poor old Whip, to whom I extend my greatest sympathies —it is not his fault; he is just doing his job—has now been placed in an utterly invidious position on two occasions in one Bill Committee. We started out with a Minister resigning, and now this Minister has indicated his intention to resign but has made it quite clear in that letter that he intends to continue in post until a new appointment is made by the new Prime Minister. Let me remind the Committee that that appointment has not yet been made, although we expect that to happen later today.

So where is the Minister? Has he been asked not to turn up by the Government, or has he chosen not to turn up? If the latter is true, he is not doing as he undertook to do—continue in post until a replacement is appointed. It is an important part of any Minister’s job to take a Bill through the House and answer the questions of the Opposition and their own Back Benchers. This Minister has been working on that; I have no doubt he will have spent the whole of August reading through the Bill and getting his head around it in a way that he had perhaps not quite managed in July, when he was quite honest about being new to it. He will be an absolute expert on it by now. He could have been here this morning, and this afternoon, for us to make progress on it.

I would like the Whip, because he is a Minister, to explain to us in replying, which I hope he will, whether the Minister for Security was asked not to turn up today or whether he chose not to. If the latter, it is a dereliction of duty; if the former, Opposition Members would like to know why. I for one deplore the way in which the Committee has been treated by the Government. We are trying to consider a very important Bill, which is about the future security of this country, and we have been treated shabbily. Government Back Benchers have been treated shabbily, the Committee has been treated shabbily, and the House has been treated appallingly. The Government should resign en masse and let us have a new Government. Then we might be able to make some progress on the Bill.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

This is not just an ordinary Bill. Although every Bill should be important, the idea that we are again delaying a Bill on our national security troubles me, as does the way in which the Bill has been dealt with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said, we are now on to four Ministers, including the Whip, who have been involved in the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax said, there is a degree of consensus on the Bill, in the sense that we want to support national security—certainly I do, as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee—and ensure that we give our security services all the tools that they need to combat those people who would do ourselves and our nation harm.

Certainly when I was in Government, this would have been one of those situations where we would work very closely with the Opposition to see what we could agree on, what we disagreed on, and whether there were things that needed to be tweaked, as there are with all Bills. The present Government have continually presented Bills as though they are the finished item. Well, they are not. The drafting of Bills since I have been here has frankly got worse, in terms of not only mistakes but points being missing completely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It is important that we have time to do that. We lose two sittings today and are supposed to finish next Tuesday. That also depends on when a new Minister is appointed. I assume the Cabinet will be done tomorrow, and I understand that there is a debate about whether the post of Security Minister will be a Cabinet appointment, so it might be made today or tomorrow. However, if it is not done by late tomorrow, that basically means Thursday for the Minister—whoever he or she is—to read themselves into the Bill. As I say, it is not just a small Bill, so it will be quite a task. I suspect, therefore, that we will get to Thursday and Thursday will be lost, which leaves us with one day next week.

There are some major issues about ensuring not only proper scrutiny of the Bill, but time for certain of the amendments tabled by me and others to be heard. One day next week will not be sufficient. I am looking to the Whip for an indication of whether the Government, if we lose today and potentially Thursday, will add an extra day next week. That would at least ensure that we have the number of sittings we were promised, although if we lose Thursday as well, we would need two extra days.

Again, I do not understand why the Minister is not present. As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halesowen said—

[Maria Eagle]

Halewood!

[Mr Jones]

Halewood, sorry; I am getting mixed up. I do not know who I have insulted most—Members for the west midlands or Members for Merseyside.

The Minister is still in post, so why is he not here this morning? To be fair to him, the hon. Member for Stevenage picked the Bill up at a difficult time and worked hard to master the detail. His civil servants must have been pulling their hair out about some of the questions. I have known him for many years: he will not take everything as fed in front of him, but will ask questions. The civil servants might be relieved to get rid of him. But that is not the point. If he is still in post, as we are led to believe, why is he not in Committee this morning?

It is important for us to consider this Bill. I just hope that we will get back on track, because the other thing that is needed quickly—whoever the new Minister is—is early engagement on this type of Bill with the Opposition, to see what we can get through uncontroversially and what areas need changing. Lo and behold, some parts of the Bill might then need changing yet again. The Government will have to do something that I do not ever agree with, which happened when we were in government and increasingly with this Government: leave major changes to the Lords.

The Lords has somehow become the great oracle that listens to everything and changes things that we cannot spot; the only reason why things are not changed here is that successive Governments have got into the habit of railroading things through here and making concessions there. That diminishes the House of Commons and does not lead to proper and good scrutiny. It is not a failure of a Government to admit in a House of Commons Committee that there are problems in a Bill and to change them. Unfortunately, it is seen as such, so it is left to their lordships’ House to change things. With that, I shall resume my seat.

National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Ms Ali. I bring good news to the Committee: yesterday, I met the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is alive and well. We asked why he did not attend the Committee, but we have not yet had an explanation from the Government. From what he told me, I understand that the reason why he was told to stay away was that he would not move part 3 of the Bill.

Related to that, however, we also raised the issue of losing a day last Tuesday because the Government insisted on adjourning the Committee. Has any thought been given to an extra day next week—if we need it—to complete the Bill’s proper scrutiny?

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. On both occasions that the Committee met on Tuesday, although only for a short time and without being able to make any progress on the Bill, I asked the Minister in charge, the Government Whip, for an explanation of why the former Minister had not turned up to the Committee. Had he engaged in dereliction of his duty—he said he would stay in post until the new appointment and then did not turn up—or had he been asked to stay away? My right hon. Friend put forward—we would call this hearsay in the courts—an explanation that he heard from the hon. Gentleman in question, but I had asked the Whip to tell us. I think the Committee deserves to hear why that happened. Will one of the Ministers tell us what the Government’s explanation is? It has been requested since Tuesday.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. The right hon. Member for North Durham made the request for additional time. Given how much is yet to be done, in particular the most contentious new clauses—contentious in the minds of some perhaps—especially relating to the public interest defence, which may take substantial time to deal with fully, will proper consideration be given to replacing at least the day lost earlier this week?

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

This is the first time that I have spoken on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It is an enormous privilege to be here. I realise that I enter this process—this lion’s den—at a moment when other lions have been through the Bill a few times before—there are an awful lot of Christians in this Committee and only one lion.

Before I say anything further, I pay enormous tribute to the Bill team, who have been phenomenal. The very fact that this has continued at all in such a professional way—

[Maria Eagle]

It hasn’t!

[Tom Tugendhat]

It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.

On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—

[Tom Tugendhat]

My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—

[Maria Eagle]

Right first time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will endeavour to find out what the reason is. You will understand, Ms Ali, that I was not appraised of this situation. I have spent rather a long time reading the Bill in the past 36 hours and not so much time asking about the movements of former Ministers.

On the point made by the right hon. Members for North Durham and for Dundee East about time, I will endeavour to do what I can to ensure that we have time available. Let us see how we go today. If time is needed, I will talk to the Whips team about it.

National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an important point. Does she agree that the reasoning appears to be that this is such an intrusive and important provision, affecting people’s rights in such a potentially serious manner, that legal aid, subject to merit and means, ought to be available? Would that not also be an argument for getting rid of the whole of part 3 of the Bill?

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend makes a really powerful point: there are very different principles evident in this element of part 2 compared to those in part 3. We will get into the details of part 3 shortly, but my hon. Friend is exactly right. Part 3 prevents civil legal aid from being available even to British children with any spent terror convictions, yet we are providing legal aid to those who we suspect of engaging in espionage on behalf of hostile foreign states. There is absolutely a powerful case for that, but my hon. Friend is right that that powerful case extends beyond the provisions in part 2 and should also be considered in relation to part 3.

There is a distinct lack of rationale and consistency in the proposals. When we continue into the debate on part 3, I would be grateful if the Minister could provide us with a greater understanding of why those differences occur in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

I endorse what my hon. Friend has just said from the Front Bench regarding the breadth of some of these provisions, but before the Minister replies I want to put another point to him. There is going to be a question about the necessity of the provisions, and whether or not they give a court any real, additional power beyond what it already inherently has.

There is a general requirement that judges would apply in any case to those coming before the court and seeking redress, which is that they have to come with clean hands. If any court has a case before it where some ne’er do well is trying to take advantage of court proceedings to get damages for something that they then intend to use for nefarious purposes, it is perfectly normal for that court, under its inherent jurisdiction and the rules of equity, to take into account, when deciding damages, whether or not the applicant has come to the court with clean hands.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that what tends to get the headlines in newspapers is when people bring claims in these kinds of cases? Some of the cases seem quite horrific and brazen, but what never gets reported is that they are usually thrown out, because, as my hon. Friend has outlined, the courts already have powers to do so. The fact that someone has the ability to bring a case does not necessarily mean that it is going to be successful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

Indeed. Certainly, my experience of the courts is that judges are not daft: if they have somebody arguing a case before them and seeking damages who has been a very badly behaved individual, that person is less likely to get damages in the first place, and to the extent that they get any damages, they are likely to be exceedingly small—probably not enough to cover the costs they have incurred in bringing the case. Where those cases have been legally aided, zero damages would certainly be an option in most of them.

As such, I wonder whether any of these provisions are actually necessary. They are setting out requirements for judges, telling them what they must do in all cases and creating extra procedures, but they do not go an awful lot further than the inherent jurisdiction of the court under the general rules of equity. As I say, judges are not daft: they know what their powers are, and they tend to apply them.

My other concern regarding these provisions is that, if they stay in the Bill and ossify into court procedures that have to be undertaken in each case, there will be a slippery slope. This legislation addresses instances where especially badly behaved people are coming before a court, seeking damages that they intend to use for nefarious purposes. In this particular case, it is terrorism-related offences, but what about gangsters? What about murderers? We can all think of other dodgy characters who could go to court without clean hands, seeking damages to further their nefarious behaviours.

Once all these procedures are set in aspic, in statute, it is very easy for draftsmen—well, I am not having a go at parliamentary draftsmen, who work very hard. It is easy for the next outraged junior Minister, clearly not from the Home Office but from some other Department, to say at some point in the next couple of years, “We will use those provisions that were in the National Security Bill.” We may see a slippery slope, where these provisions are extended to other nefarious characters who might decide to go before the courts seeking damages. All the while, judges have an inherent jurisdiction and can make their own decisions. I am really not sure that the measures are at all necessary, and while the Minister is looking at some of these things, I invite him to think about removing them entirely. In any event, even if he decides that these unnecessary measures will remain in the Bill, they are certainly too broad.

[Mr Jones]

There is lots in the Bill on which there is cross-party agreement. We want to achieve a situation whereby law enforcement, our agencies and others have maximum powers to stop the real threat out there from those who wish to do us harm. Clause 57, and the ones on legal aid, which we will come to next, seem to have been plonked into the Bill as headline-grabbing measures—“We will do this because it will look as though we’re tough on terrorists.” I do not think they add anything to the ability of our security services to do their work; nor do they ensure that our courts deal with such cases effectively, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood has outlined.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned a case. I will not refer to it in detail—my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood and I are members of the ISC, which has looked at it in detail—but it comes back to the checks and balances point that I made this morning, and not just in terms of security. When the state does something that leads to a wrong being committed against a citizen, there needs to be a redress mechanism, and I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood that the provision will be extended to other areas. The measures will get a nice headline for the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton, who clearly wants to be seen as tough on terrorism, but I am not sure that, in practice, they represent anything of the sort.

Increasingly—and this is a slippery slope of which politicians need to be wary— we in this country react to newspaper headlines about what the courts do, such as “They have got X, Y or Z wrong.” Is the justice system or the jury system perfect? No, they are not, but they are robust. As my hon. Friend has just said, judges know in most cases when someone is pursuing a claim that is not grounded—they are experienced. I believe that we should leave that to courts and judges to decide.

When a newspaper rings up to say, “This judge has just done X, Y and Z. Isn’t this terrible?”, I always urge colleagues to dig into it because in most cases, the headline is completely different from the facts of the case. Without hearing the facts of the case in detail, making an instant judgment is difficult. I do not accept that our judges and judiciary are somehow woolly liberals who are prepared to turn a blind eye to justice; they are robust individuals who want not only to uphold the law, but to ensure that they get the right balance between the rights of the state and the rights of the citizen, as I mentioned earlier.

I accept that the Minister cannot accept the amendments today and that he perhaps does not want to carve out this piece of the Bill now, but discussion needs to be had on this—we will come to the next bit in a minute. If it does not get carved out here, when it goes to the other place, which is full of legal experts and people with a lifetime and huge experience in this area, it will get sliced to pieces. It is not just bad drafting; it is Ministers trying to put provisions in Bills for political purposes, rather than because they make common sense. As I said the other day, what irritates me is that, if we are going to take the provision out, we should do so in this House rather than allow it to go to the House of Lords. It will not survive that process, and we need to be honest about that. It is far better that we do it, and actually do our job, which is scrutinising legislation.

I said the other day, when the Minister was not here, that there is something that has built up over the last 21 years that I have been in the House: Ministers take it as a slight if a provision gets dropped when a Bill goes through the Commons, as though that is a weakness of the system. No, it is not: it is proper scrutiny. With a certain amount of co-operation, much of the Bill could go straight through, but measures such as this cannot, unfortunately.

--- Later in debate ---

While real risk is the same threshold for both freezing and forfeiture, we are clear that its application will be different. With respect to a freezing order, the court will be considering the risk of the duration of that order—two years—and that is what the evidence will have to address. The decision for a forfeiture order will be different. The court will be considering risk on a balance of probabilities, in the context of loss, of the award for all time. The evidential basis it considers will therefore necessarily be different. It should also be borne in mind that the forfeiture order application will not be considered in a vacuum. It will have followed two court proceedings over a four-year period, where evidence would have been assessed and properly tested by the claimant. The court will also have that evidence at its disposal to inform its conclusions. The evidential basis of a forfeiture order will therefore be much stronger.

[Maria Eagle]

Can the Minister tell us whether these provisions have been based on some existing case, or cases, where the Government think this has happened and needs to be stopped, or are they just being made in anticipation of the unlikely circumstances in which damages are used in the way these provision seek to prevent? Are there existing cases the Government are concerned about?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady asks a fair question. This is a plan for the future or rather a concern over the future, rather than provisions based on existing cases. It is the Government, I hope, doing a responsible thing and looking forward, which is, I hope, what we would expect them to do.

Let me give an example. When making their application, the security services will provide evidence of the claimant’s involvement in terrorist activity and relevant associations, together with their risk assessment of the likelihood of the claimant’s using the money to fund terror activities.

National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I have a minor point to raise with the Minister in respect of part of the supplementary provision in new schedule 2, which the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has referred to, about disclosure orders—

[The Chair]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but we are discussing new schedule 1 rather than new schedule 2.

[Maria Eagle]

Sorry; it is in new schedule 1. That was my mistake, Mr Gray, and I apologise. I am not seeking to confuse proceedings any more; it is confusing enough to have to scrutinise the provision without an explanatory memorandum. That makes this kind of provision very difficult to scrutinise with any real sense. The point I wanted to make is about paragraph 3(4) of schedule 1, which says,

“A disclosure order has effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.”

The words “by an enactment” seem to make it pretty clear that unless it excludes material, the provision is designed to enable the investigating authority to look at anything. Can the Minister give an example of what that aims to remedy? What lacuna is it aimed at preventing? We are talking about waving through a provision that allows a disclosure order to ignore another enactment, and that seems to me to be a large power.

The provision goes on to say, “or otherwise”, which is an absolute catch-all phrase. Can the Minister can explain why the provision is drafted so widely, as well as what kind of “otherwise” arrangement it seeks to get around and why? It seems to me to be extraordinarily wide. We might have seen the rationale for that in an explanatory memorandum, had there been one, but we do not have one to hand. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether we will have an explanatory memorandum before the completion of the Commons stages of the Bill. I think that waving through extraordinarily wide arrangements is cause for concern if we are trying to scrutinise what the Government seek to do and why.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for their comments so far. I will first touch on the point that has been raised about the explanatory notes. I am told that it is normal procedure for that to be published before the Bill is introduced to the Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

People have to register under tier 1 anyway. That will be a public scheme that already identifies many areas. Tier 2 will make sure that there is an enhanced aspect that allows us to be clear what exactly is going on, rather than relying on a general identification. That is an important distinction.

[Maria Eagle]

Is my understanding correct that tier 1 is about capturing arrangements and activity undertaken for the purpose of influencing a political event or decision, but that the second tier will capture all other behaviour beyond political influencing, such as acting as a foreign intelligence officer? Is it correct that the scheme as set out at present is aimed at making everyone apply at the lowest level—the political influencing level—but that only more serious incidents will be dealt with by designating individual countries or companies? We are going to immediately run into the difficulty of upsetting diplomatically any person, company or country that is designated for more serious activity.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady is not noted for her shyness. I am surprised that she feels that the diplomatic repercussions of designating a company or country should dissuade the UK Government from defending themselves. I know she does not think that, and I know the right hon. Member for North Durham does not think that.

The different schedules identify the different natures of influence being used. As the hon. Lady rightly identifies, schedule 1 is about political influence. As I think we all appreciate in this House, that should be public. Those who seek to influence anyone in this House or anyone else by political means, whether through lobbying or in different ways, should identify on whose behalf they are doing so. I do not think that is a very contentious provision.

[Maria Eagle]

indicated assent.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am glad to see the hon. Lady nodding. The second point is the enhanced scheme. That is where influence may come in different ways, where co-operation and interaction with different businesses that pose a particular and distinct threat may be required. That is why—we will come to this later—the political register will be public and the second register will be private, but the identification of those who are required to be registered will of course have to be public and there will be a political and a diplomatic decision that will go with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I would be prepared to move that, if the Committee were supportive.

[Maria Eagle]

Would it be possible to extend the sitting by 15 minutes, so that no time is lost? If we were to do that, I would have no objection.

[The Chair]

If the Minister so moves, it would be a question of starting 15 minutes later and ending 15 minutes later this evening.

Ordered, That the Committee shall meet at 2.15 pm until no later than 5.15 pm.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Why not include the UK company? I do not understand why there are different levels in the two schemes.

I support the measure—when we did the Russia report, the right hon. Member for Dundee East and I were very clear that there was a gap, where international partners had provisions and we did not, so this is welcome. I just think that the Government are making it unnecessarily complicated.

I press a final point about secondary legislation. More information about how the measures are going to work in practice before the Bill gains Royal Assent would help the process.

[Maria Eagle]

I endorse what my right hon. Friend has just said about the complexity of the proposed scheme, which concerns me as well. I very much favour our having a scheme, and I think we should have had one sooner. It is a shame that we were not able to see on Second Reading what was being proposed, because we could have had some of these debates at an earlier stage, when there was still a chance to make changes.

I have a concern about the two tiers being different. It is confusing and complex—much more confusing and complex than it needs be. It might have been more effective to have one tier applying to all countries, and a broader range of covert activity specified as having to be registrable. That might have then meant we would have needed more exclusions, but it would have had the benefit of being simple, straightforward, transparent, all on a level and more obvious, both to those to whom it applies and to those who wish to see the benefit of being able to consult the publicly available information, from a transparency point of view.

It is hard to understand the need for this level of complexity, particularly when it comes to the second tier. Why is the registration of harmful activity outside political influencing, some of which is worse than political influencing, only registrable when a foreign power is set out in the secondary legislation? What we are doing is putting an additional burden on the Government. The Security Minister might always be up for registering the right companies and organisations and countries, but he has got to persuade the whole Government. Other Departments have their own interests and their own work to pursue, which could be made much more difficult by designating in this manner. We seem to be setting ourselves a barrier that might be quite hard to overcome. The eventual outcome of the discussions within Government might not be in accordance with the best security interests. I am not talking about this particular Minister or this particular Government, but there are always competing issues and concerns.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Miss Sarah Dines.)

National Security Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government new clause 12—Offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement.

Government new clause 13—Requirement to register activities of specified persons.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

As we adjourned this morning, I was expressing concern about the complexity of the two-tier scheme embodied in the new clauses. I was suggesting that it might be more effective to have one tier that applied to all countries and a broad range of covert activity, rather than this two-tier arrangement, which is more difficult to understand and which presents more barriers to the Government of the day, and to the Minister in particular, in designating those who ought to be covered by the secondary tier, which the Minister referred to as the enhanced tier. It might be more sensible to have a simpler but more extensive scheme that does not require lots of extra Government activity and inter-departmental negotiations between the Security Minister and other Ministers who are looking at relations with foreign countries and companies through a different lens. That was my basic point.

It is difficult to understand why, unlike comparable schemes in Australia and the US scheme, there are two tiers, and why the registration of harmful activity outside of political influencing—some of which is more serious—applies only where the foreign power has been designated by the Government. If it is not designated, or while the Minister is desperately trying to persuade other bits of Whitehall that it ought to be, such activity could go on unimpeded by these arrangements and the necessity for registration. That will have a consequent, knock-on effect on the transparency that should be gained, which is supposed to be one of the purposes of the scheme. If we cannot get something registered because there is no agreement in Government, we will not get the additional transparency that is supposed to be one of the major benefits of the foreign influence registration scheme.

I am questioning the entire underpinning of the way in which the scheme has been designed. I am certainly not convinced that it is better than a simpler but broader arrangement. That was the essential point that I wanted to make. I do not wish to repeat every point that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham or the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, have made. However, I believe that the scheme, as set out in the new clauses, is too complicated and could be simpler, and that, were it simpler, it would be more effective.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and the right hon. Member for North Durham for the tone with which they have approached the debate. I appreciate their comments and those of the shadow Minister, who has made similar points. They have made them in the spirit of openness, proper debate and trying to improve what they see, correctly, as a Bill that will keep our country safe. I am grateful to them for that.

I will go through some of the points that have been made. First, the right hon. Member for North Durham asked about the purpose. Part of the objective of registering under the scheme is to highlight and to be clear. This is not a sanction. The very fact that a scheme exists for foreign companies that trade with British companies does not in any way mean that it is a sanction. The intention is to bring transparency to relationships that might otherwise lie hidden. It is intended not as a punishment, but merely to promote openness.

The requirement to register an arrangement within 10 days is made so that the person acting on behalf of the Government, or the individual, makes that clear at that point or within a reasonable period of time. I am happy to hear arguments for a slightly longer or less long period, but I think 10 days is a reasonable period for a registration to be made. Again, that is not supposed to be a sanction or an obstacle, but it is merely supposed to be a way of achieving transparency. It is not really supposed to be stopping the entire process, but merely supposed to be enabling people to know what is going on. If there was a requirement, and if it was a sanction, that would be different and the process would have to stop immediately. That is not what this is about.

--- Later in debate ---

It is important to reiterate that it is not the Government’s intention to obstruct or interfere with a legitimate activity where persons and sectors are trying to comply with the transparency requirements. We see the offences as providing options where there is an intention to engage in covert arrangements and evade these registration requirements.

[Maria Eagle]

New clause 14(9) includes definitions that refer to “the Online Safety Act 2022”, but that is a Bill, not an Act, and it is not on the statute book, is it?

[Tom Tugendhat]

It will be very soon.

[Maria Eagle]

Will it?

[Tom Tugendhat]

That is the plan.

[Maria Eagle]

Is it correct for this Bill to make reference to another Bill as being an Act of Parliament when it is not?

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is not entirely unheard of to make reference to other legislation that is going through at the moment. Should there be issues, then there may be obstacles, but—

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for giving us a comprehensive understanding of this group of new clauses. Before I talk about them, it is crucial that we have clarity on the outstanding issue of when an arrangement has been registered, because new clause 12 creates an offence of undertaking such activity before it has been registered. I put on record that the Minister was not able to respond to that point and said that he would follow up in writing.

It feels as though there has been a surge in hostile states seeking to infiltrate our political discourse. They are prepared to allow years for their efforts to bear fruit, in an attempt either to align our values with theirs or to sow division and polarisation across our country. That has become more salient following Russia’s abhorrent invasion of Ukraine.

Only days ago, a report from a German newspaper stated that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is looking into the case of two civil servants who

“are involved with energy supply in key positions”

and are suspected of having Kremlin links, and I think a further and even more serious report from Germany has just broken. The allegation is that these individuals were advocates of Russian gas and highly supportive of Nord Stream 2. If confirmed, this case would represent exactly the type of security breach we have to protect ourselves against. Without wanting to repeating myself, there is just a single line in new clause 15 on the meaning of “political influence activity” by way of explanatory note. It is a crucial but operationally complex area.

I want to pull out subsection (6) of new clause 14, which explicitly states that the requirement to register a foreign influence arrangement does not apply to “a recognised news publisher” or

“a person who makes a foreign influence arrangement with a recognised news publisher where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the arrangement is the publication of news-related material.”

Many civil liberties organisations and the National Union of Journalists have expressed concern over the need to ensure press freedom in relation to this Bill. That is absolutely right, and the Minister quite rightly put his strength of feeling about that on the record. But how do we protect ourselves and ensure transparency when blatant mouthpieces for hostile states present as news outlets, or when someone on the payroll of a hostile state seeks to place their pro-regime opinion pieces or articles in mainstream media? We have had assurances from officials that there are circumstances in which people in such situations may still have to register, and I would be grateful for clarity from the Minister on that.

Further to a point that my hon. and right hon. Friends have made, we gave one of the Minister’s predecessors some grief in discussion on Government amendment 9, which meant that this Bill would amend the “Online Safety Act 2022” by making online interference a priority offence. That was certainly a very welcome measure, but we said at the time that it was presumptuous to amend an Act when it was still a Bill in the Commons. Members might remember that the Online Safety Bill was on the Floor of the House while we debated it in this Bill Committee, so not to have made the change directly in the Online Safety Bill was somewhat cack-handed.

In subsection (9)(c) of new clause 14, we are referred once again to the “Online Safety Act 2022” for definitions. As things stand—I heard the Minister’s comments—what has happened to the Online Safety Bill is a bit of a mystery, and it seems to have been paused indefinitely. The last time it saw the light of day was that day in the Chamber, when we were in this Bill Committee. Can the Minister confirm that we will see that Bill again, and that the definitions in these new clauses will remain unchanged? Can he confirm that he is committed to ensuring that there is a future for making disinformation a priority offence, whether in that Bill or this? He will be aware that there are national security considerations in the Online Safety Bill that are of interest to him and to me, so we have an interest in ensuring that that Bill emerges once again.

[Maria Eagle]

Does my hon. Friend agree that for this clause to be accurate in referring to the “Online Safety Act 2022”, that Bill, which seems to have disappeared for now, has to have Royal Assent by the end of the year?

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We thought that that was quite an aspiration at the time, but now it is looking even more unlikely. I just make the point to the Minister that that needs consideration to make sure we do not lose the definitions, or something more substantial under Government amendment 9.

Government new clause 15 defines “political influence activity” for the purposes of the new registration scheme. Members will be aware of the Security Service interference alert sent from MI5 to MPs and peers back in January regarding Christine Lee. The alert stated that Lee knowingly engaged in political interference activities on behalf of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party. The warning read that the UFWD was seeking to covertly interfere in UK politics by establishing links with established and aspiring parliamentarians across the political spectrum and cultivating relationships with influential figures. Can the Minister confirm that such conduct would need to be registered under these new clauses?

Proposed new subsection 3(a) states that

“the conduct of an election or referendum in the United Kingdom”

falls under the criteria of political influence activity. This is a welcome inclusion and reflects the evidence provided to the Committee by several of the expert witnesses we heard from at the start, which feels like a lifetime ago—it was certainly four Chancellors ago! One of the expert witnesses was former deputy national security adviser Paddy McGuinness. He stated,

“Vladimir Putin’s intent, which is to have us off balance—is that if the Russians do hack into a political party’s servers and mess about within them, and maybe mess with the data or interfere, or if they play games with a technology platform that people rely on for information and put out information, and we decide as a result that we cannot trust a referendum or an election, they succeed. That is success for them, so I think what really matters in this space is the ability to measure the impact that state activity has on the democratic process we are looking at, and…that there is bright transparency so we know who is doing what.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 24, Q48.]

We welcome the fact that the registration scheme will go some way toward addressing these concerns, but I want to again make the case for new clause 3, because the Minister was not here for that debate. His predecessor gave us a commitment to look further at it. Alongside this new clause, new clause 3 would provide for an annual review on disinformation, with particular consideration of interference in elections. That would help with the transparency and awareness piece that needs to sit alongside the provisions. In a similar spirit, we want to tighten Government new clause 15 with our new clause 29 on the registration of former members of intelligence services, and with new clause 5 on ministerial conduct when meeting with representatives of foreign intelligence services. We will come to those.

I would be grateful for clarity on when we can expect the new clauses to come into effect, as we are hearing that it might be some time. Will we seek to backdate them to capture political influence activity already in motion? I think I heard the Minister say that he could not yet say when the measures would come into effect, and essentially the Government would not be rushed on that matter. I asked the relevant agencies the same question, and the working assumption seems to be that we will not backdate the requirements. I ask the Minister to consider looking at that again. Surely we stand to miss much political influence activity that is already under way—not even necessarily activity that has started and come to an end, but conduct that may have started some time ago. We would create a loophole whereby people could claim, as a cover for failing to register, that the activity predated the introduction of the scheme, whether or not it actually did, and could thus commit an offence under new clause 16.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes, there is no question but that it should be according to when the first part of the scheme comes into effect, not when the whole scheme is done.

[Maria Eagle]

Briefly, I welcome the provisions for an annual report to give information to Parliament. I wonder whether the Minister might consider extending the requirements, when it comes to those who are charged and convicted, to include a need to make it clear which countries they come from, to give an overall view on the extent to which there are difficulties with particular places?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I take that point in the spirit in which it was made. I think that makes sense, but it should be possible to refer back through the registrations. If registrations have not been made, I take her point entirely.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 27 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

Interpretation

‘(1) In this Part—

“foreign activity arrangement” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

“foreign influence arrangement” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“foreign power” has the same meaning as in Part 1 (see section 25), subject to subsection (2);

“foreign principal” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“political influence activity” has the meaning given by section (Meaning of “political influence activity”);

“recognised news publisher” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“registered activity” means an activity registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons) or (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals);

“registered arrangement” means an arrangement registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) or (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“specified person” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements).

(2) For the purposes of this Part references in section 25 to a foreign State, or a foreign country or territory, do not include the Republic of Ireland.

(3) Any provision of this Part which does not apply in relation to a person (“P”) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity);

(b) a person whom the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising functions on behalf of P as if they are a person who holds office in or under, or as if they are an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity).’ —(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause contains definitions relevant to the registration scheme.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Proceedings relating to safety or interests of the United Kingdom

“(1) This section applies where a court is considering proceedings under Part 1 of this Act, where the proceedings involve the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) In proceedings to which this section applies, the court must take account of how the interests of the Secretary of State or of the Government of the United Kingdom may differ from the interests of the United Kingdom, in order to satisfy itself that the interests of the United Kingdom have been appropriately identified and considered.”—(Holly Lynch.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

National Security Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. The challenge that we have, as he knows very well, is how we balance the responsibility to inform and how wide we go. I have spoken about this issue with my right hon. Friend in the past, and his judgment on this is something I have always valued, so it has always been very important to me that we share a view on it. However, I think we all agree that where a foreign power is seeking to influence our political life in the broadest sense, we should know about it, whoever is exercising that influence.

I take my right hon. Friend’s point about enhanced registration. Sadly, there is inherently a delay between the way that life changes and the response of Government —that is the reality of existence—but it is important for us to recognise that some countries and entities do require enhanced awareness. That is why it is important for us to have an extra tier.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Tom Tugendhat]

This will be the last time I give way for now.

[Maria Eagle]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has talked about the challenges and the enhanced part of the scheme. Will it not be a challenge to use the scheme in practice, because he has to put the country concerned into secondary legislation? Is that not going to be diplomatically very difficult to do? Is the reality not that the complex way in which the Government have set out the scheme, with little scrutiny possible from either this Chamber or Committees, means that in practice it is not going to be used at all?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think the hon. Lady knows me well enough to know that, having been sanctioned by three countries now, it is unlikely that I will be reticent in identifying those that I think are threats to the United Kingdom.

National Security Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I must once again highlight the importance of the Bill’s achieving Royal Assent in a timely manner. Our police and intelligence services need the tools and powers that it contains; the longer they go without, the greater the risk to national security.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Why doesn’t the Minister just accept the Lords amendments, then, so that we can move straight to getting the Bill on the statute book?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.

As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

Does my hon. Friend agree that intelligence and security activities are now undertaken by a wider assortment of policy Departments, including those that generally do not carry out national security-related activities? Those teams are not listed in the ISC’s memorandum of understanding, and therefore there is a scrutiny gap that cannot be fixed unless the memorandum of understanding is changed.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for making that important point. The annual report lists a number of policy Departments. Although the Select Committees do incredibly important work, they are not able to see the same information because their members do not have the same clearance as members of the ISC. It is quite right that such information and such scrutiny fall to the ISC, which alone can do that important work.

We have previously discussed that one of the starkest revelations from that annual report is that the ISC has not been able to secure a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014, nearly nine years ago. I welcomed the Chair of the ISC’s intervention when we debated the merit of the previous amendment, saying that the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss) had pledged to meet the ISC. However, given her exceptionally short tenure in office, we will never know if that meeting would have taken place—her name is No. 4 on the list of five Prime Ministers who have been in office since 2014.

Such a meeting is just one of the considerations for an updated MOU, but knowing how often this issue has come up, both in this House and in the other place, I wonder whether the current Prime Minister now has a date in the diary to meet the ISC. If we are to take Government amendment (a) at its word, arranging that meeting is the very least the Government could do to be able to point to some progress. Alas, it appears that they cannot point to that progress.

I am also interested to know whether the Government have spoken to the ISC about Government amendment (a). Given that the amendment seeks to assure us that the Government intend to do due diligence on engaging with the ISC, have they engaged the ISC about the amendment? Hopefully the Minister might be able to shed some light.