Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Speaking as a lawyer—[Interruption.] Yes, there are still one or two of us left. I must say that I felt quite queasy reading the Bill. It is not the kind of thing that I would expect this Parliament to be considering. I detected the same queasiness among some of the lawyers who have spoken from the Government Benches, including the former Justice Secretary and the current Chair of the Justice Committee. Apparently, they too found reading the Bill a queasy experience.

I agreed with the former Tory Law Officer, Lord Garnier, who used to be in this House, when he called this Bill political and legal nonsense. It designates Rwanda as a safe country, but by doing so it seeks to reverse a conclusion of the Supreme Court on the facts. It is perfectly reasonable to legislate if the Supreme Court strikes down a policy, but one normally legislates to change a policy, not to purport to change the facts, or to say that the facts, which have not changed, are other than what the Court found them to be. That is the first thing that made me feel queasy.

The Bill goes on to try to prohibit any legal challenges that may argue that Rwanda, having been deemed safe in this way, is in fact unsafe. It says that every decision maker

“must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”,

notwithstanding any evidence that may come forward to the contrary. Given that the evidence that has already come forward, which the Supreme Court dealt with in its judgment, led the Court to say unanimously that it was not a safe country, it is worrying that we seem to think we can simply legislate to change the facts.

The Bill allows a very narrow range of claims, and this comes to the heart of the argument between those on the Government Benches who wish to beef it up even further to exclude any kind of legal challenge, and those, perhaps on the one-nation side of the Conservative party, who are trying to put a line in the sand to say that they will not accept any further amendments. The narrow range of claims allowed are those based on

“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”,

and even those sorts of claims are excluded in some circumstances relating to refoulement.

Excluding courts, by Act of Parliament, from considering relevant evidence; excluding them from taking account of judgments and laws, including domestic legislation; fettering their judgment as the Bill seeks to do; and giving Ministers power to ignore injunctions—taken together, that is tantamount to undermining the rule of law. It is certainly not respecting the rule of law, as I would expect parliamentarians in this place to do—and certainly as I would expect the Government of the day to seek to do, if they wished to uphold our international reputation.

It beggars belief that the Government’s response to the loss of their policy in the Supreme Court is to ask this House to legislate just to declare, “It’s all fine anyway; let’s carry on.” As others have pointed out, even if we were to start sending asylum seekers to Rwanda as a result of this Bill’s passing into law, the policy is designed for a few hundred people at the most, or less than 1% of people arriving in the UK. The permanent secretary at the Home Office was very clear when he said there was no evidence that it would work as a deterrent, whereas most of what we hear from Conservative Members is that that is the very purpose of the legislation—it is supposed to be a deterrent.

So there we have it: the policy is a Tory shibboleth, which has become an article of faith for some elements of the Tory party—the “five families”, as I think they have called themselves, somewhat menacingly. We see the Tory psychodrama unfolding yet again to decide the fate of the latest unelected Tory Prime Minister to be threatened with defenestration by some of the more right-wing elements of those five families. The country deserves better.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) set out in her excellent speech, time and again the Government go for gimmicks and infighting over basic competence and good administration. It is four years since the Tories promised to end boat crossings in six months. Almost a year after the current Prime Minister promised again to stop the boats, 30,000 more people have arrived. Hotel usage is going up, and not down as the Home Secretary claimed; it is at 56,000 at the moment, 10,000 more than when the Prime Minister promised to end hotel use. Criminal gangs are not being deterred. Convictions for people smugglers have dropped by 36% since 2010 and the criminal gangs are making more money than ever. The backlog of undetermined cases remains at 165,000, despite the PM’s promise to abolish the backlog of initial asylum claims by the end of this year.

It is folly to continue with this farcical failed joke of a policy when what is really needed is competent, good administration. Why not put the money being wasted on this policy into dealing with the actual problem? If the Tory party and the Government tried to do that rather more successfully than they have managed in 13 years, they might get some credit from the Opposition and from the nation, but there is precious little evidence that there is going to be any of that.

National Security Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I must once again highlight the importance of the Bill’s achieving Royal Assent in a timely manner. Our police and intelligence services need the tools and powers that it contains; the longer they go without, the greater the risk to national security.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Why doesn’t the Minister just accept the Lords amendments, then, so that we can move straight to getting the Bill on the statute book?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.

As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

Does my hon. Friend agree that intelligence and security activities are now undertaken by a wider assortment of policy Departments, including those that generally do not carry out national security-related activities? Those teams are not listed in the ISC’s memorandum of understanding, and therefore there is a scrutiny gap that cannot be fixed unless the memorandum of understanding is changed.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for making that important point. The annual report lists a number of policy Departments. Although the Select Committees do incredibly important work, they are not able to see the same information because their members do not have the same clearance as members of the ISC. It is quite right that such information and such scrutiny fall to the ISC, which alone can do that important work.

We have previously discussed that one of the starkest revelations from that annual report is that the ISC has not been able to secure a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014, nearly nine years ago. I welcomed the Chair of the ISC’s intervention when we debated the merit of the previous amendment, saying that the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss) had pledged to meet the ISC. However, given her exceptionally short tenure in office, we will never know if that meeting would have taken place—her name is No. 4 on the list of five Prime Ministers who have been in office since 2014.

Such a meeting is just one of the considerations for an updated MOU, but knowing how often this issue has come up, both in this House and in the other place, I wonder whether the current Prime Minister now has a date in the diary to meet the ISC. If we are to take Government amendment (a) at its word, arranging that meeting is the very least the Government could do to be able to point to some progress. Alas, it appears that they cannot point to that progress.

I am also interested to know whether the Government have spoken to the ISC about Government amendment (a). Given that the amendment seeks to assure us that the Government intend to do due diligence on engaging with the ISC, have they engaged the ISC about the amendment? Hopefully the Minister might be able to shed some light.

Knowsley Incident

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We passed that Act, which was opposed by the Labour party, and we are implementing every measure in it as swiftly as possible. Many of those measures are already making a difference, as seen in the number of arrests now being made of those people with their hand on the tiller of small boats when apprehended by Border Force and our partners in the English channel. That is important, but we will follow that up in due course with further, even more robust legislation, which I am sure my hon. Friend will support and hope the Labour party will too.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

What specific liaison occurred between the Home Office and Knowsley Council prior to the block booking of the hotel for the accommodation of asylum seekers? Did the Minister’s Department anticipate problems such as the ones that occurred? What steps will he take to prevent a recurrence of such problems at other similar sites?

[Robert Jenrick]

Shortly after taking up this role, I changed the Home Office’s engagement procedures to ensure that when accommodation is stood up, unless it is a grave emergency or we are ordered to stand it up by a court, we will provide at least 24 hours’ notice to a local authority, and that there will be extensive consultation with such a local authority. I am pleased to say that today that level of consultation happens around three to four weeks in advance of standing up a site. There are usually multi-agency meetings prior to doing so and opportunities for Members of Parliament to meet either me or senior officials, but of course if any right hon. or hon. Member feels we are falling short of those standards, I encourage them to bring that to my attention.

Hillsborough Families Report: National Police Response

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Wednesday 1st February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp]

Yes, I can do that. I thank my hon. Friend for his question, particularly in the light of how he has been personally affected by the tragedy. I can give him that assurance. Some steps have already been taken, partly through the changes made in 2020 to the statutory professional standards for policing. That will be further reinforced by the updated code of ethics, which will be published by the College of Policing, following its announcement yesterday, with the exact purpose that my hon. Friend has just set out in mind.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

It is unconscionable that 18 months after the collapse of the criminal trials, there has still been no Government response to the bishop’s report. The fact that we will have to wait until spring, whenever that is, shows that the work is not finished, more than five years after that report was written and published. It is outrageous that the Government have done nothing to sort this out in that time.

The Minister keeps referring to the consultation on the independent public advocate. That happened in 2018. The Government have not yet responded to their own consultation on the independent public advocate. But I can get the Minister off the hook. My Public Advocate (No. 2) Bill will be considered again in the Chamber this Friday. If the Minister were to stop his Whip objecting to it for the 12th time in this Session, we could get it into Committee and start this legislation rolling. It is a key part of the Hillsborough law, along with the duty of candour and the equality of arms at inquests. With the support of Labour Front Benchers, the Minister could do himself and his Government a favour by getting that legislation through.

[Chris Philp]

As I have said, we are working quickly on the comprehensive response. The hon. Lady says that nothing has happened since 2018, but with great respect I do not think that is entirely accurate. I have referenced the professional standards for policing introduced in 2020, which introduced a duty to co-operate. I have mentioned the pathology review that has happened. I have mentioned the consultation on the independent public advocate, and I can tell her that that is being very actively worked on by the Ministry of Justice as we speak. We have had changes made to the exceptional case funding at inquest, so the means testing has been removed. A lot has been done. But I do accept that a comprehensive Government response is required. Since arriving at the Home Office, I have asked for that to be done as quickly as possible, and it will be.

National Security Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. The challenge that we have, as he knows very well, is how we balance the responsibility to inform and how wide we go. I have spoken about this issue with my right hon. Friend in the past, and his judgment on this is something I have always valued, so it has always been very important to me that we share a view on it. However, I think we all agree that where a foreign power is seeking to influence our political life in the broadest sense, we should know about it, whoever is exercising that influence.

I take my right hon. Friend’s point about enhanced registration. Sadly, there is inherently a delay between the way that life changes and the response of Government —that is the reality of existence—but it is important for us to recognise that some countries and entities do require enhanced awareness. That is why it is important for us to have an extra tier.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Tom Tugendhat]

This will be the last time I give way for now.

[Maria Eagle]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has talked about the challenges and the enhanced part of the scheme. Will it not be a challenge to use the scheme in practice, because he has to put the country concerned into secondary legislation? Is that not going to be diplomatically very difficult to do? Is the reality not that the complex way in which the Government have set out the scheme, with little scrutiny possible from either this Chamber or Committees, means that in practice it is not going to be used at all?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think the hon. Lady knows me well enough to know that, having been sanctioned by three countries now, it is unlikely that I will be reticent in identifying those that I think are threats to the United Kingdom.

National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I have a minor point to raise with the Minister in respect of part of the supplementary provision in new schedule 2, which the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has referred to, about disclosure orders—

[The Chair]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but we are discussing new schedule 1 rather than new schedule 2.

[Maria Eagle]

Sorry; it is in new schedule 1. That was my mistake, Mr Gray, and I apologise. I am not seeking to confuse proceedings any more; it is confusing enough to have to scrutinise the provision without an explanatory memorandum. That makes this kind of provision very difficult to scrutinise with any real sense. The point I wanted to make is about paragraph 3(4) of schedule 1, which says,

“A disclosure order has effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.”

The words “by an enactment” seem to make it pretty clear that unless it excludes material, the provision is designed to enable the investigating authority to look at anything. Can the Minister give an example of what that aims to remedy? What lacuna is it aimed at preventing? We are talking about waving through a provision that allows a disclosure order to ignore another enactment, and that seems to me to be a large power.

The provision goes on to say, “or otherwise”, which is an absolute catch-all phrase. Can the Minister can explain why the provision is drafted so widely, as well as what kind of “otherwise” arrangement it seeks to get around and why? It seems to me to be extraordinarily wide. We might have seen the rationale for that in an explanatory memorandum, had there been one, but we do not have one to hand. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether we will have an explanatory memorandum before the completion of the Commons stages of the Bill. I think that waving through extraordinarily wide arrangements is cause for concern if we are trying to scrutinise what the Government seek to do and why.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for their comments so far. I will first touch on the point that has been raised about the explanatory notes. I am told that it is normal procedure for that to be published before the Bill is introduced to the Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

People have to register under tier 1 anyway. That will be a public scheme that already identifies many areas. Tier 2 will make sure that there is an enhanced aspect that allows us to be clear what exactly is going on, rather than relying on a general identification. That is an important distinction.

[Maria Eagle]

Is my understanding correct that tier 1 is about capturing arrangements and activity undertaken for the purpose of influencing a political event or decision, but that the second tier will capture all other behaviour beyond political influencing, such as acting as a foreign intelligence officer? Is it correct that the scheme as set out at present is aimed at making everyone apply at the lowest level—the political influencing level—but that only more serious incidents will be dealt with by designating individual countries or companies? We are going to immediately run into the difficulty of upsetting diplomatically any person, company or country that is designated for more serious activity.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady is not noted for her shyness. I am surprised that she feels that the diplomatic repercussions of designating a company or country should dissuade the UK Government from defending themselves. I know she does not think that, and I know the right hon. Member for North Durham does not think that.

The different schedules identify the different natures of influence being used. As the hon. Lady rightly identifies, schedule 1 is about political influence. As I think we all appreciate in this House, that should be public. Those who seek to influence anyone in this House or anyone else by political means, whether through lobbying or in different ways, should identify on whose behalf they are doing so. I do not think that is a very contentious provision.

[Maria Eagle]

indicated assent.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am glad to see the hon. Lady nodding. The second point is the enhanced scheme. That is where influence may come in different ways, where co-operation and interaction with different businesses that pose a particular and distinct threat may be required. That is why—we will come to this later—the political register will be public and the second register will be private, but the identification of those who are required to be registered will of course have to be public and there will be a political and a diplomatic decision that will go with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I would be prepared to move that, if the Committee were supportive.

[Maria Eagle]

Would it be possible to extend the sitting by 15 minutes, so that no time is lost? If we were to do that, I would have no objection.

[The Chair]

If the Minister so moves, it would be a question of starting 15 minutes later and ending 15 minutes later this evening.

Ordered, That the Committee shall meet at 2.15 pm until no later than 5.15 pm.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Why not include the UK company? I do not understand why there are different levels in the two schemes.

I support the measure—when we did the Russia report, the right hon. Member for Dundee East and I were very clear that there was a gap, where international partners had provisions and we did not, so this is welcome. I just think that the Government are making it unnecessarily complicated.

I press a final point about secondary legislation. More information about how the measures are going to work in practice before the Bill gains Royal Assent would help the process.

[Maria Eagle]

I endorse what my right hon. Friend has just said about the complexity of the proposed scheme, which concerns me as well. I very much favour our having a scheme, and I think we should have had one sooner. It is a shame that we were not able to see on Second Reading what was being proposed, because we could have had some of these debates at an earlier stage, when there was still a chance to make changes.

I have a concern about the two tiers being different. It is confusing and complex—much more confusing and complex than it needs be. It might have been more effective to have one tier applying to all countries, and a broader range of covert activity specified as having to be registrable. That might have then meant we would have needed more exclusions, but it would have had the benefit of being simple, straightforward, transparent, all on a level and more obvious, both to those to whom it applies and to those who wish to see the benefit of being able to consult the publicly available information, from a transparency point of view.

It is hard to understand the need for this level of complexity, particularly when it comes to the second tier. Why is the registration of harmful activity outside political influencing, some of which is worse than political influencing, only registrable when a foreign power is set out in the secondary legislation? What we are doing is putting an additional burden on the Government. The Security Minister might always be up for registering the right companies and organisations and countries, but he has got to persuade the whole Government. Other Departments have their own interests and their own work to pursue, which could be made much more difficult by designating in this manner. We seem to be setting ourselves a barrier that might be quite hard to overcome. The eventual outcome of the discussions within Government might not be in accordance with the best security interests. I am not talking about this particular Minister or this particular Government, but there are always competing issues and concerns.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Miss Sarah Dines.)

National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Ms Ali. I bring good news to the Committee: yesterday, I met the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is alive and well. We asked why he did not attend the Committee, but we have not yet had an explanation from the Government. From what he told me, I understand that the reason why he was told to stay away was that he would not move part 3 of the Bill.

Related to that, however, we also raised the issue of losing a day last Tuesday because the Government insisted on adjourning the Committee. Has any thought been given to an extra day next week—if we need it—to complete the Bill’s proper scrutiny?

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. On both occasions that the Committee met on Tuesday, although only for a short time and without being able to make any progress on the Bill, I asked the Minister in charge, the Government Whip, for an explanation of why the former Minister had not turned up to the Committee. Had he engaged in dereliction of his duty—he said he would stay in post until the new appointment and then did not turn up—or had he been asked to stay away? My right hon. Friend put forward—we would call this hearsay in the courts—an explanation that he heard from the hon. Gentleman in question, but I had asked the Whip to tell us. I think the Committee deserves to hear why that happened. Will one of the Ministers tell us what the Government’s explanation is? It has been requested since Tuesday.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. The right hon. Member for North Durham made the request for additional time. Given how much is yet to be done, in particular the most contentious new clauses—contentious in the minds of some perhaps—especially relating to the public interest defence, which may take substantial time to deal with fully, will proper consideration be given to replacing at least the day lost earlier this week?

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

This is the first time that I have spoken on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It is an enormous privilege to be here. I realise that I enter this process—this lion’s den—at a moment when other lions have been through the Bill a few times before—there are an awful lot of Christians in this Committee and only one lion.

Before I say anything further, I pay enormous tribute to the Bill team, who have been phenomenal. The very fact that this has continued at all in such a professional way—

[Maria Eagle]

It hasn’t!

[Tom Tugendhat]

It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.

On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—

[Tom Tugendhat]

My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—

[Maria Eagle]

Right first time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will endeavour to find out what the reason is. You will understand, Ms Ali, that I was not appraised of this situation. I have spent rather a long time reading the Bill in the past 36 hours and not so much time asking about the movements of former Ministers.

On the point made by the right hon. Members for North Durham and for Dundee East about time, I will endeavour to do what I can to ensure that we have time available. Let us see how we go today. If time is needed, I will talk to the Whips team about it.

Public Advocate (No. 2) Bill

Maria Eagle Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 15th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

It is now more than 33 years since the Hillsborough disaster, when 97 wholly innocent children, women and men, who were supporters of Liverpool football club, were unlawfully killed by the gross negligence of South Yorkshire police at the semi-final of the FA cup in Sheffield. Many thousands of survivors of that catastrophic event were traumatised by their experiences, and many of them suffer its terrible impact on their lives to this day. The families of those killed have also had to face unimaginable heartache, made worse by the behaviour of those responsible for the disaster in, even now, seeking to blame the victims and survivors for what happened. This 33-year long attempt by those responsible for the killings to evade their responsibility, and the lies and smears that they have repeatedly perpetrated and are still peddling, form the backdrop to this Bill. They still have an impact today: we need only refer to what was said at the Champions League final by those seeking to cover up the disaster of the organisation of that match.

The South Yorkshire police cover-up and smear campaign, begun on the day of the disaster, succeeded for many years in convincing public opinion that the Hillsborough disaster was caused by hooliganism, and that somehow those who died and the supporters who survived were responsible for what had happened, when they were all wholly innocent. Were it not for the fortitude, togetherness and determination of the families and survivors of Hillsborough, who fought a three-decades-long campaign for truth and justice, the truth would never have been set out or accepted, and the rightful inquest verdicts would never have been returned. The apology that families received from the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, in 2012, on the publication of the Hillsborough Independent Panel report, for what had happened to them and for the cover-up would never have been forthcoming, and some of those responsible would never have been put on trial.

It was not until just over a year ago, in May 2021, that all the remaining criminal trials of those responsible who had been charged collapsed without anyone being held to account. Our criminal justice system can be said to have failed catastrophically when it takes more than three decades to fail to convict those responsible for 97 unlawful killings. After all, the events were filmed, with much shown live on television, yet those responsible for the catastrophe and the cover-up that followed have got away without being held to account.

It took 27 years for the families of those who died to have correct inquest verdicts of unlawful killing handed down, after the accidental death verdicts were quashed in 2012. It took 23 years, and the publication of the work of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, for the full truth to be told and accepted fully by the legal and political establishment: the fans were not to blame; the police in charge on that day were.

We must learn the lessons, and ensure that never again will families bereaved by public disasters have to endure their lost loved ones being smeared and traduced; and never again will families have to spend more than three decades campaigning to get truth and justice for their wholly innocent loved ones. There will be more public disasters. There already have been in the intervening time. Hillsborough is an exceptionally bad case, but we can see in other public disasters some of the same problems arising for bereaved families who, through no fault of their own, are caught up in these tragedies—the Grenfell fire and the Manchester arena bombing to name but two. We have already started to see some of the same problems.

So more is needed. The law must be changed. Public authorities must be made to tell the truth. They must be prevented from using all the public money at their disposal to prevent the truth from coming out. Families must be at the heart of subsequent investigations. They must have a collective voice. They must have agency and the capacity to act to get to the truth much sooner than the Hillsborough families were able to.

Hillsborough shows that attempted cover-ups must be torpedoed at an early stage to prevent what happened to the Hillsborough families from happening to others caught up in public disasters. It was not a legal process. It was the Hillsborough Independent Panel, and the publication of documents using freedom of information principles, that finally succeeded in establishing the truth about Hillsborough for all to see, when many legal proceeding for years previously had failed. But it took 23 years.

If we facilitate the capacity for families to get such a process going much sooner, that can help to stop things going so wrong for so long. That is what the Bill intends to achieve. It would establish an independent, adequately resourced public advocate for those bereaved in public disasters, and injured survivors. It would locate the public advocate’s office in a Government Department, able to call on its resources but—crucially—totally independent of Government control and direction. It would require the public advocate to act if 50% plus one or more of the representatives of the deceased and injured survivors ask the advocate to act.

Lord Michael Wills and I have been introducing a Public Advocate Bill into the Commons and the Lords since 2016. That is why this is one is called the Public Advocate (No.2) Bill. It has already been introduced into the Lords this Session by my noble Friend. It would give families agency by putting them at the heart of the response to public disasters through the establishment of the independent public advocate, who, if the bereaved families wish it, and only then, will act as a representative of their interests, advocate and guide. As a data controller, the advocate would be able to establish a panel to review all documentation and produce a report at a much earlier stage than the 23 years it took for Hillsborough. So it would be cheaper and the process would be shorter. That enforced transparency would quickly put a stop to any venal attempts to deflect blame, such as that conducted by South Yorkshire police. Who could successfully conduct such a campaign in the forced glare of transparency, openness and the production of documentation directed by the public advocate at the behest of the families? Cover-ups and the spreading of lies and propaganda could be stopped at an early stage.

[Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is bringing an important matter to the House. On the issues around Hillsborough and other major incidents that have gone on for so long, obviously, there are issues about the cover-up, but also about ignoring whistleblowers. Does she agree that we need to look at listening to people who raise these issues in these important matters?

[Maria Eagle]

That is an important point, but not important in this context, I think.

The role of the independent advocate would not replace any of the usual legal advocates and would be an addition to prevent things from going wrong over such an extended time. The advocate would get involved only if the families wanted them to be involved. Too often, bereaved families and survivors feel like outsiders, mere adjuncts to proceedings to which others—often those who were at fault—are parties. Those most affected have least agency. These measures could make a real difference and stop what happened to the Hillsborough families ever happening again to other families.

The measures, along with the recommendations of Bishop James Jones’s 2017 report into the lessons to be learned from Hillsborough, are urgently needed. Together they form the Hillsborough Law Now campaign, of which I am a part. In addition to the independent public advocate put forward in the legislation, the recommendations consist of a statutory duty of candour for all public authorities, equality of arms at inquests and a charter for families bereaved through public tragedy.

The report was produced and the recommendations made in 2017. The Conservative party had a manifesto commitment in 2017 to establish an independent public advocate and conducted a consultation, though to date there has been no publication of its outcome and no Government response—there really should be.

The survivors and families of Hillsborough have already had to wait for 33 years. To make them wait five years for a response to a Government-commissioned report into the lessons to be learned is too long. It is more than a year now since the last of the criminal trials collapsed. Getting this Bill into Committee to start making the legal changes we need will enable us to show the families and the survivors that we are starting to take the relevant steps. I hope the Minister can allow us today to give this Bill a Second Reading and get it into Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

What I can tell my hon. Friend—the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood knows this, because we have had meetings and conversations about it—is that this is something that Ministers in the Ministry of Justice are actively considering. I hope that we will be able to say more about that in due course. I recognise that the House and the Hillsborough families feel very strongly about this proposal. We want to make sure that the detail of any proposal linked to this is got right and worked through.

[Maria Eagle]

Can the Minister tell me when the response to the consultation, and the Government’s plans, might come forward? We were told during the Backbench Business debate last September that it would be by last Christmas, but that did not happen.

[Tom Pursglove]

Unfortunately, I cannot give the hon. Lady a firm commitment on timescales, but I repeat that this is something that we as Ministers are actively considering. We want to get it right, and we will of course then be in a position to say more about it as soon as possible.

National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

This is supposed to be scrutiny.

[Stephen McPartland]

The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to make his own speech, and I will listen.

Let me also be clear that clause 23 will not enable activity by individuals who, acting outside the proper functions of their organisations, contribute to criminal activity by others or commit criminal offences themselves. We will retain the ability to prosecute anyone for other offences should their behaviour in support of international partners amount to a criminal offence. Further, it will not remove the ability to challenge the UK intelligence community or armed forces on their activities through judicial review, civil damages claims, or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers.

To conclude, clause 23 is really about supporting UKIC and armed forces officers, who we ask to undertake vital work on our behalf, by ensuring that when they work with our partners in good faith, according to wider domestic and international law, and in support of vital national security aims to keep this country safe, they do not risk personal criminal liability for any actions of that partner state. Responsibility for any action that we cannot support should surely sit at an institutional level, which is what will be the case under clause 23.

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[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will explore in more detail in a second. I go back to the point that the security services have conveyed to us that their caution is having an operational impact, which requires a resolution. We are sympathetic to that. We recognise that a junior member of staff facing that burden of potential liability when carrying out their proper functions under instruction does not feel right. However, I look to the Minister to find a way through the matter that does not involve what can feel somewhat like a gold-plating of exemptions for the security services, which stands to entirely erode appropriate safeguards and due diligence when considering the risks and consequences of sharing information with partners. As the Minister knows, there is an existing reasonableness defence in section 50 of the Serious Crime Act, which recognises that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

[Maria Eagle]

My hon. Friend is right to refer to the defences that already exist because to agree with the clause, we would need to see that the existing offences and defences are not working. There does not seem to be much evidence of that. Section 53 of the Serious Crime Act sets out the factors to be considered in determining whether it is reasonable for a person to act as he did. That includes any purpose or authority he claims to have been acting under. An individual working for our intelligence service has clearly got extensive protection under that existing provision. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As a lawyer, she has a great deal of experience navigating some of this legislation, and she makes a powerful point about the reasonableness defence. In addition, a prosecution would have to be deemed to be in the public interest.

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[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Our intelligence and security services are this country’s frontline of defence, and we need to ensure that they remain the best and most professional in the world. To do that, they need to know that if an individual makes a decision in good faith and in accordance with all relevant procedures, to keep us safe, that individual should not be at risk of criminal liability. That responsibility must lie with the organisation.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

In a moment.

Last week, Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, said the issue was a point of principle. Contrary to some alarmist news reports and those opposed to clause 23, Ministers and spies will not be given immunity from committing crimes overseas. Clause 23 does not have any effect on any other criminal offences that might apply to an individual’s actions.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I have finished, thank you.

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[Mr Jones]

It is about both. I will come to liability, because I do not think that individual officers are liable due to existing legislation. As for what I mean by oversight, I am clear that the structures we have for the authorisation of things that are not pleasant should include oversight—whether from the ISC, the tribunal or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We do not live in a society—thank God—where Ministers and the Executive can just say to the security services, “Do x, y and z.” That would be wrong. That is why it is important to have oversight and checks and balances in the system, which were not always there. This morning, I referred to a very sad time in our history—I was a Minister at the time. It was not a good time for our security services, and we should have been ashamed of some of the things that were done.

I want to see an example of what Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand were talking about last week. If there is a specific problem, I would be sympathetic and say, “Right, we need to get that sorted.” It may be a broad notion. We are talking about principles and morals, and it is very difficult to legislate on morals—certainly the Conservative party gets into difficulty when we talk about morals—but I would like to know specific examples that would lead to a liability.

Let me turn to the existing protections. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 includes the offence of encouraging, assisting or commissioning an offence abroad. Clause 23 amends schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act to disapply that offence when the activity is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence agency or the armed forces. The Government are basically asking for a carve-out, which I find extremely rare.

[Maria Eagle]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that putting in legislation a carve-out from an entire class of offences—in this case, the inchoate offences of crimes committed abroad—engenders more suspicion among those who worry about the intelligence services than would be the case if the law applied properly to them with appropriate defences?

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[Mr Jones]

That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.

The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?

[Maria Eagle]

I will not go through all the points that have already been made, although I do feel quite strongly about some of this. I generally endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham—my fellow member of the ISC. Like him, I do not think it is true to say that anybody on this Committee or any of our parliamentary colleagues are intent on trying to stop the intelligence and security services doing their job. They do a very important job and they do it very well. It is dangerous work and we want to support them as much as we can.

But we are a democracy. One of the things that concerns me about clause 23 is its wholesale disapplication of an area of the law that applies to all the rest of us. If we are going to do that for the intelligence services, it is important that we are very clear that it is necessary. It applies only for a certain type of offence in a certain place—overseas—but it is a wholesale carve-out. The clause says that an entire schedule to the Serious Crime Act 2007, which sets out inchoate offences abroad, does not apply if “any relevant behaviour” was necessary for

“the proper exercise of any function”

of the relevant services. That is a wholesale carve-out. I cannot think of too many other examples of that. I do not know if the Minister has a list of examples of other wholesale carve-outs from liability from the criminal law for particular officers of state organisations, but I think it is quite rare.

In those circumstances, I could tell from the evidence we were given that the Government have been asked for this by the relevant services. It did not seem to me that it was coming from the Government—that the Government were saying, “You must have these extra powers.” I accept that they are responding to requests, but because this is a wholesale carve-out from liability for criminal acts, it is important that it is properly justified. We all know about the difficulties of properly justifying it, because a lot cannot be brought into the public domain, but what we have had in the public domain has not been very convincing.

I expect that many people in their day-to-day life would like to have impunity from criminal liability for something that they might do, but it is not something we should be granting easily. The arguments for it need to be very strong. There are already defences that make it harder for people working in the intelligence community to be found guilty of some offences. They have defences that others do not. By the way, it is probably philosophically right that the law should apply to those people but that they should have extra defences. In legislative terms and for the good of society as a whole, it is probably better to do it that way round than to disapply the law to a particular type of person.

I would expect to hear why the current arrangements do not work, but I have not heard that. I did not hear it in the evidence we took from Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand. If I can characterise the issue in this way, they both said, “We would rather have this. We feel very strongly that we would rather have this,” but they were unable to give us any examples of why the current arrangements did not work. In fact, I asked Sir Alex whether some of the current arrangements worked. I asked him about the ministerial authorisation, and he just told me that he was not a lawyer, which is not a convincing answer when someone is asking for a whole area of the criminal law to be disapplied. Sir Alex obviously felt strongly about the matter—I could see that. That is perfectly legitimate, but as a scrutiny Committee and as parliamentarians, we need to hear a little bit more.

I hope the Minister will understand—I do not particularly like the fact that he refused to take interventions, but that is his choice—that everybody on this Committee is seeking to do the right thing. We do not want to make a change to the law that opens up our intelligence and security services and our armed forces to accusations that they can act with impunity abroad. Based on some of the evidence that has been sent to the Committee from those who campaign on these issues, some people think that the clause does precisely that. I do not agree with some of what is in the submission from Reprieve that we received recently, but that submission contains quite a representative sample of what people in our society would probably think if they were to take a look at this clause.

A wholesale carve-out from liability under an area of the criminal law is a very serious step to take. I am not saying it is not the right thing to do, because we should take requests from the agencies and armed forces seriously—as the Minister is clearly doing—but I remain unconvinced. Such a carve-out could have unintended consequences, such as making it much less likely that thoughts will be focused on making sure that activity is lawful. We need to make sure these proposals are the right way forward, and that their advantages outweigh their disadvantages. We have been told that reasonableness is a vague concept, but it is vague only in the sense that it is very flexible and can, and does, apply in many areas of the law; its meaning is relatively well known. To my mind, if the agencies and armed forces are concerned that their conduct might not be considered reasonable, it is difficult to see how it could be necessary for the proper exercise of their functions.

[Mr Jones]

The other safeguard in this area is surely that if there were to be any prosecution of an agency staff member or a member of the armed forces, the Attorney General would also have to agree to that prosecution. That would be a pretty high bar to get over.

[Maria Eagle]

It would be a very high bar to get over. If we are being told—there was an element of this in the evidence we heard—that there is a chilling effect on individuals trying to do their jobs, those individuals may need to be a bit better trained in what the law says, what it means and what they are able to do. In any event, whatever the law ends up being—whether it is this Bill, or what we already have—it is not a bad thing for those who operate at its margins to know precisely what they can and cannot do. I worry slightly that having a complete carve-out from liability might swing activities a bit too far in the other direction.

There are pros and cons to any way of doing this. I do not want the Minister to think I am being hostile; I am certainly not. I just want us, as the House of Commons, to be sure, when we consider this further, that this way is right and will work better than what we already have. I, for one, cannot see how this will be better than what we already have; I think that in many ways it will be worse.

[Stephen McPartland]

It has been a great pleasure to listen to the debate and Members’ speeches. I can feel the frustration in the room. I share that frustration, because I have been told by the intelligence services that we need clause 23 because the schedule it amends is having a damaging impact on critical operational activity aimed at keeping the UK safe. That is the reason why we need clause 23. I wish that we could tell the Committee everything, and that we could just all agree to it, but that is what I am told by the intelligence services, so I have frustration too.

I will try to answer some of the questions, and then sum up. We have been asked about section 7 authorisations. Some of the Committee have been in their roles a little longer than I have been in mine, so they will be aware that section 7 authorisations can be sought only by SIS and GCHQ—not by the MOD or MI5—so this is about trying to create reassurance across all the UK intelligence community.

On section 50 and the reasonableness defence, the defence has never been tested in the context of activity of the intelligence services and the armed forces, so we feel it is more appropriate for them to demonstrate that their actions were carried out as necessary in the proper exercise of their functions.

[Maria Eagle]

If what the Minister says is accurate—that the defence has never been tested—how can he say that it does not work?

[Stephen McPartland]

What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—

National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 70, line 27, at end insert—

“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—

(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or

(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”

I will speak to amendment 45, tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I will also address the wider schedule 3 powers.

The amendment reflects the place of detention powers at the start of schedule 3, which gives the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. The Minister’s predecessor was asked repeatedly whether he could clarify what types of buildings could be designated places of detention beyond police stations on Second Reading. In response, he said:

“I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 636.]

I am still not convinced about the provisions based on that response.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

The provisions in paragraph 1(1) of schedule 3 give the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. However, sub-paragraph (2) states that in the entire schedule a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place that the Secretary of State has designated. That means that as long as the Secretary of State says, “I designate this place”, any building in the UK—it does not even say “building”—or any place can be a police station. Can that possibly be adequate and correct?

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. I was just about to say that operational need provided a reason for the appalling asylum accommodation provided by the Home Office during the pandemic, and we now know that the official guidance was ignored. That leads to a great deal of concern about the ability to designate any type of building as a place suitable to detain somebody.

To introduce some safeguards, we propose an amendment whereby any such place designated as a place of detention must be subject to an inspection regime. We have given the Government some discretion to determine who the most appropriate body to do that would be, given the absence of any steer at all, as my hon. Friend has just said, about what type of buildings might be used. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue might be the most obvious choice. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and adopt our sensible and measured proposal.

Schedule 3 is massive—32 pages of powers. To consider the implications of it all once enacted is an enormous undertaking. That is why I come back to this principle when making the case for new clause 2.

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[Maria Eagle]

The Minister has just given a great deal more information than is written in the Bill. Paragraph 1(1) states:

“The Secretary of State may designate places”,

and, at sub-paragraph (2), that

“a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place”

so designated. That could be a square in the middle of a field. Will the Minister consider inserting into the legislation some of the detail that he has just put on the record to make it clear that a specific power is being taken to designate more custody suites?

[Stephen McPartland]

As I have said, I am very interested in the amendment and am looking at possibly doing something along similar lines. I am trying to get the facts out. I heard what was said about the response on Second Reading so I am trying to be open and transparent and to put stuff on the record, in the official record of the sitting. I am doing the best that I can to be open, so that people are not concerned about rendition or people being taken overseas.

[Maria Eagle]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I am glad to hear about the amendment, but that is of course about inspecting such places. As he is doing more work, does he mind also taking away the suggestion that I have just made? He might like to make it clearer in the legislation that we are talking about custody suites and not about squares of ground in the middle of a field or any other such place.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.

My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—

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[Stephen McPartland]

As we have discussed, clause 21 provides for a state threats power of arrest. If an individual is arrested under that power, the further provisions in schedule 3 will apply. As part of that, schedule 3 provides for a new regime whereby biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA profiles, that are collected on arrest for foreign power threat activity may be retained for an initial period of three years, with the option to extend the retention period for a further two years where considered necessary. A similar provision is made in schedule 9 for those subject to state threats prevention and investigation measures, or STPIMS. These are the same timeframes and procedures that operate for arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000—once again, we are trying to mirror the terrorism legislation.

The group covers a number of technical Government amendments to the biometric regimes in schedules 3 and 9. I turn first to amendments 13, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36, which relate to the indefinite retention of biometric data in certain circumstances. Again, the amendments put the new retention regime in line with what already operates for arrests made under PACE and the Terrorism Act. The law rightly sets strict limits on how long biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, can be retained where a person is investigated but ultimately not convicted of an offence. In certain circumstances, including under the Bill, biometric data taken in the course of an investigation can be retained for longer periods, and further retention of that data can be authorised, but the principle is that the data will be deleted unless further retention is specifically provided for. Where a person has been previously convicted of an offence, their biometric data can be retained indefinitely, subject to the requirement for ongoing review that is set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.

Both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 allow for the indefinite retention of biometric data taken during an investigation, if it is found that an individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence. This means that if an individual has previously been convicted of any offence that could carry a term of imprisonment, their biometric data taken during any new investigation can be held on the police national database indefinitely, irrespective of the outcome of that new investigation.

[Maria Eagle]

Generally, these are very sensible measures. There has obviously been some major redrafting of the schedule for the Government amendments to be necessary, and it would be interesting to hear why that is. I am looking at Government amendment 18, which says:

“For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if…the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity”.

Why is that instance included here? The person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. They have not admitted the offence, unlike in the situation described in proposed new paragraph 20A(1)(a)(i), whereby a person has received a caution and admitted the offence. By contrast, this person has been found not guilty.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am going to write to the hon. Lady.

[Maria Eagle]

It is a small but important point.

[Stephen McPartland]

I know, and I will write to the hon. Lady, because I do not know the answer.

As we have already discussed in Committee, state threats activity poses a serious and enduring risk to UK security, and the Bill must provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to combat hostile activity. Indefinite retention of biometric data enables the police and the security services to use the data to support investigations into state threats offences and other criminal activity. That mirrors the approach taken in PACE and the Terrorism Acts.

Given that threat, it is right that where an individual with a previous conviction for a recordable offence is arrested under the state threats arrest power in clause 21, or is subject to a STPIMs notice, biometric data taken under those regimes should be retained indefinitely. Accordingly, the amendments provide for indefinite retention of biometric data in these circumstances in schedules 3 and 9 respectively.

Out of an abundance of caution, the provisions were not included when the Bill was introduced while we considered the questions raised by the Gaughran judgment. Based on the UK response to that judgment, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that these provisions are indeed compatible with the European convention on human rights and, therefore, should be included in the Bill.

As highlighted, state threats investigations can be complex and resource-intensive. By bringing forward the amendments, we are strengthening the ability of the police to use biometric data to support criminal investigations. Not agreeing to the amendments would create a position where the police’s ability to retain biometric data of a person with a previous recordable conviction would be more restricted than in other cases.

Aligning our approach with that of TACT and PACE ensures consistency in respect of biometric regimes. The requirement for ongoing review of retention, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, ensures that interference with the right to respect the private and family life of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I will now speak briefly to the remaining amendments in the group, which are comparatively minor and technical.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful for the intervention. What we are trying to do is to mirror what is in TACT and PACE to keep the regimes identical so there are not different ones for different areas. Obviously, if someone has accepted a caution, they have in essence accepted that they were guilty of an offence—they have just not proceeded to court.

[Maria Eagle]

Would not an additional safeguard in those circumstances be to ensure that before a youth caution is offered and accepted in any given case, it is made clear to the individual concerned that if they were to accept it, it would mean the retention of their data for their entire life? In those circumstances, the individual concerned could consider whether they really wanted to accept the caution or go for a trial.

[Stephen McPartland]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. I would add that it is “may” be held indefinitely not “will”. There is still an element of choice and discretion.

[Maria Eagle]

The Minister is correct about that, but perhaps the individual who may be considering accepting a youth caution and their adviser ought to be advised, before they do so, that there “may” be a consequence of biometric data and so on being kept for that person’s entire life, so they can make a proper decision about whether they want to accept the caution in full knowledge of the potential consequences.

[Stephen McPartland]

My understanding is that that what happens under TACT and PACE, and that would be the intention for what would happen under this legislation, so the regimes mirror each other.

Amendments 16 and 17 to schedule 3 separate the reference to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales in the list of chief officers who can extend the period of biometric retention. They make no practical change to the provisions.

Amendments 14, 25 and 27 address some unnecessary duplication in the list of databases against which biometric data obtained under the powers in schedules 3 and 9 can be searched. Amendment 26 provides that data obtained under the powers in schedule 9 can be searched against data taken under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.