Draft Broadcasting (Regional Programme-making and Original Productions) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 Draft Broadcasting (Independent Productions) Regulations 2025

Louie French Excerpts

Wednesday 29th October 2025 General Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Edward. As the Minister rightly said, these regulations are made under powers introduced by the Media Act 2024, which is a significant piece of legislation designed to modernise our broadcasting framework for the digital age, passed under the previous Conservative Government.

The draft Broadcasting (Regional Programme-making and Original Productions) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 update the Broadcasting (Original Productions) Order 2004 to ensure that key definitions and obligations remain consistent with the new statutory regime established by the Act. In particular, these regulations bring the treatment of repeats within the original and regional productions quotas up to date, reflecting the way in which programmes are now produced, distributed and consumed.

As members of the Committee will know, the Media Act gave the Secretary of State the power to determine whether repeats of public service content could count towards broadcasters’ quotas. These regulations delegate the responsibility to Ofcom, the industry regulator, which already sets the levels of the original productions and regional programme-making quotas for public service broadcasters, other than the BBC. Allowing Ofcom to decide how repeats are treated ensures a coherent and practical approach—one that links the measurement of quotas to the operational realities of programming, commissioning and scheduling.

By modernising the definitions and entrusting Ofcom with the appropriate discretion, these regulations help to maintain the integrity of the United Kingdom’s public service broadcasting system, while ensuring that it remains fit for purpose in a fast-changing media landscape. They are a further example of how the previous Conservative Government’s Media Act continues to provide the foundations for a flexible, forward-looking and well-regulated broadcasting sector.

Moving on to the draft Broadcasting (Independent Productions) Regulations 2025, as members of the Committee will know, the previous regime for independent production quotas was based on linear television, requiring each public service broadcaster to commission at least 25% of their qualifying hours from independent producers. However, as audiences have increasingly turned to on-demand platforms, such as ITVX and BBC iPlayer, the old system no longer reflected how viewers were accessing public service content. The Media Act addressed this by extending the scope of the quotas so that they could be delivered across a broadcaster’s wide range of services, and by converting percentage-based quotas into minimum hours targets.

This statutory instrument gives effect to those provisions, setting the new quotas for each of the main public service broadcasters—the BBC, S4C and Channels 3, 4 and 5—based on a five-year average of qualifying hours. I understand that the updated framework has been agreed with both Ofcom and the broadcasters themselves to ensure that it remains balanced, proportionate and achievable. It also updates the definitions of “independent production” and “independent producer” to bring them into line with modern industry practice without making substantive policy changes.

An important part of the reform relates to Channel 4. Following the removal of the publisher-broadcaster model under the Media Act, Channel 4 has been permitted to undertake limited in-house production for the first time. To maintain its strong relationship with the independent sector, the quota for Channel 4 has been increased from 25% to 35% of its programming hours. We believe this represents a fair and reasonable adjustment that safeguards opportunities for small and medium-sized independent producers, while giving Channel 4 the scope to adapt and innovate.

Overall, this instrument reflects a pragmatic and forward-looking approach to media regulation. It ensures that public service broadcasters continue to meet their obligations to commission high-quality, independent content while providing flexibility to operate effectively in a rapidly changing digital landscape. It builds on the legislative foundations set out by the Media Act and maintains the UK’s reputation for having a diverse, independent and world-leading broadcasting sector. On that note, we will not be seeking to divide the Committee.

Draft Football Governance Act 2025 (Specified Competitions) Regulations 2025

Louie French Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2025 General Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. Today’s statutory instrument prescribes the top five flights of the men’s English football pyramid as “specified competitions” for the purposes of the Football Governance Act, and brings them into the scope of the Government’s new regulator. Although I think we all understand and support the desire for stronger governance and transparency across football and sport more broadly, I and many others have concerns about the impact that the statutory instrument will have on smaller clubs. Last week, I spoke to the National League and some of its clubs about their 3UP campaign and their broader concerns about the state of the game. Many were concerned about their ability to comply with the new regulatory demands and paperwork that will soon be coming their way.

The Premier League and its clubs, and, to a certain extent, the Championship and its clubs, can meet the new burdens of red tape the Government’s new regulator will bring, but the smallest clubs—those closer to the foothills of the football pyramid—will struggle. The truth is simple: many of these teams just do not have the capacity, the officials or the financial resources to cope with the new layers of bureaucracy and the increase in costs that the Government’s regulator will bring. That is something I warned the Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the hon. Member for Barnsley South (Stephanie Peacock), of during Committee stage of the Football Governance Act.

In that Committee and in the Chamber, I have said that football is one of England’s greatest success stories. From grassroots pitches to packed stadiums, it embodies our values of teamwork, fair play and community pride, but it is also a fragile ecosystem. If the Government keep layering on costs and compliance demands at the bottom of the pyramid, the Government risk hollowing out the very base that sustains the sport. Every £1 spent on regulatory compliance is £1 not spent on improving an ageing stand, an overgrown pitch or introducing a new generation of local youngsters to the game. It is an evening of paperwork instead of an evening coaching the under-12s, potentially depriving us of the next Harry Kane or Jordan Pickford.

[Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)]

I agree with my hon. Friend strongly that the regulation will impact clubs both large and small, such as Bromley FC in my constituency. The financial impact will be quite onerous, with very little benefit. Would my hon. Friend agree that we should have a review of the impact of the regulator on smaller clubs such as Bromley?

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend is right that we should have a review of the impact on smaller clubs. He will know from his club, Bromley FC, just how difficult it is to get out of the National League and into the English Football League. Bringing these clubs into scope will make it even more difficult for teams seeking promotion—especially to the National League, and then on to the English Football League—as they go from a successful but unregulated club to a heavily regulated club at the bottom of a higher division in fewer than 60 working days. Clubs already struggling to balance the books could find themselves in breach of regulations simply because they do not have the manpower to meet sudden new obligations placed upon them.

I would also like to talk about the timing of the statutory instrument. First, it has come months into the current season, and will come into force in less than a month’s time—not the Christmas present that many lower league clubs were looking for. Secondly, and most importantly, the Government have laid the statutory instrument before us in the full knowledge that there is an ongoing investigation into the Secretary of State’s decision to appoint a Labour crony to the chairmanship of the regulator. Will the Minister tell us why the Government think it is appropriate to appoint their Labour crony to the chairmanship of the regulator while there is an ongoing investigation into the process? Will the Minister also please tell us why he thinks it is appropriate to lay the statutory instrument while that investigation is ongoing?

The Football Governance Act was thought up as a way of protecting football clubs as community assets, not just businesses. We all know that these clubs are organisations that do so much more. They give young people a sense of belonging and purpose, provide an economic boost to local businesses and, most importantly, bring entire communities together. If the Government, however, make it too difficult for smaller clubs—such as Bromley FC, in my hon. Friend’s constituency—to operate, we risk losing them forever. As we know from recent memory, when a club disappears, it does not just take the team with it; it takes away an often major piece of local identity, history and pride.

It is because of the Government’s gung-ho attitude to the burdens it is placing on the smallest clubs—I warned it would—that we will vote against the statutory instrument today. As we have set out previously, we welcome stronger tests for owners, and I am grateful to the Sports Minister’s letter to me yesterday outlining some of the steps being taken on this. We support giving fans more of a say over their clubs, but we do not support state interference in our sports or burdening them with more red tape.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I am astounded by the shadow Minister, or perhaps I am not—I have heard it all before from him. Let me make this clear; I chaired a meeting two weeks ago with the National League on its 3UP campaign. One thing that it wanted to talk about was the football pyramid, and how the “State of the Game” report would then determine the strength of the pyramid in future with the proper distribution of resources, which is a key role that the regulator will have. The National League actually welcomed a possible meeting with the regulator that the football group will have, and the National League will be there to influence the regulator as far as possible to ensure that the bottom of the pyramid, where it sits, is sustained going forward. I think the Act has the potential to strengthen those clubs, rather than weaken them.

Of course, there are two fundamental parts to the Act. The first part is the distribution of resources, the “State of the Game” report and the powers that the regulator will have. The second part is the fit and proper person test for owners. I will just say this to the shadow Minister: bad owners do not wait until the end of the season to destroy their clubs—they can do it at any time. He suggested that we should have postponed all this for a few months and hoped that everything would be alright in the meantime. I would just tell him to look at the mill we have been ground through with Sheffield Wednesday over the last few months.

The EFL has been good; it has been constructive in speaking to MPs and supporters, and it has had meetings with the Supporters Trust to keep it updated. In the end, however, it admitted that it could not deal with an owner who failed to pay the taxman five times, who did not pay players or staff at the club on five occasions, and when part of the ground was closed down because it was not safe. This is a man who waited in his office in Bangkok to sign cheques for a leaking roof in the training ground, or to give the manager the money to buy straps to put on the players’ socks. How can he run a football club like that? This is not a fit and proper person, but the league had no power at all to intervene.

[Mr French]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s passion as a fan of the club, and we all sympathise with the situation of Sheffield Wednesday. However, his point also highlights the fact that we must reflect on the original test of this individual and whether such tests were strong enough at the time. That is why the Opposition have said that we support strengthening ownership tests, but we need some honesty from the Government in saying that they cannot stop a bad owner from turning up any time in the future for any club.

[Mr Betts]

The problem with strengthening ownership tests is that, in the end, it is a members’ club that currently imposes them—it is the league. Owners do not want to come out strongly against other owners, as they worry that they will be the next ones to be caught. That is why we need an independent regulator to do tests of not just new owners but existing owners, which is a key part of what the Bill does. Yes, owners can pass the initial test, and they can even lie about their circumstances. They can claim they have money, or they might even have had money when they began. The owner of Sheffield Wednesday, Chansiri, did have money, but he ran out of money to the point that the club almost collapsed.

If we had a regulator in place, we could have ended this farce at Hillsborough quite a long time before. In the end, we came very close to the club completely collapsing. Ultimately, it got so bad because of the strength of the fans’ boycott. I know that my right hon. Friend the Minister will also have had a history of this, given his own connections with Hearts. The fans standing together in a boycott drove the source of income down such that the owner had to go through administration. That was a long, horrible process, and it has not ended yet.

The prospect of the regulator being in the background was always there as a safety net for the fans. Ultimately, they knew that something could be done, even if it could not be done immediately. I think it is an incredibly good step forward not just for football generally but for fans who see their clubs in distress. We have seen fans at Morecambe, Derby and Reading go through the mill on these issues in the past, where a regulator could have stepped in much earlier and helped fans through that process.

I ask the shadow Minister: do I tell my fans at Sheffield Wednesday that a Tory Government would have let Wednesday go under? I am sorry, but that is entirely a possibility. I know there are not many Conservatives in Sheffield who have to worry about their seats in that regard, but nevertheless, that is entirely a possibility that could have happened. The regulator could have stepped in earlier, and been the backstop.

The powers are very clearly set out in the Act—you will be pleased to know I am not going to go through all of them today, Ms Lewell. Part 4 clearly sets out the new tests for owners and officers of football clubs, which are reasonable and proportionate. I draw hon. Members’ attention to an important one, which probably has not had a lot of attention. Section 51 talks about insolvency proceedings, which Sheffield Wednesday is now going through, and states that the administrator and regulator

“must take reasonable steps to keep…fans informed about the progress of the proceedings.”

That is sensible. Currently, they do not have to; an administrator does not have to liaise with fans at all— I am told by colleagues that that happened at Derby. The administrator and the regulator will have to keep fans informed during insolvency proceedings.

The administrators at Hillsborough are doing a good job. They are talking to the Supporters Trust and liaising with it. They do not have to, but the Act means that in future they will have to. I give credit to the Supporters Trust, which has done a brilliant job. On Wednesday night last week, we had an almost complete boycott of a game. By Friday, when the club went into administration, there was a queue along the road to the club shop, and £500,000 was spent by supporters who wanted to keep the club, without Chansiri involved, afloat and alive. That shows the strength of supporters.

I also give great credit to the players. Barry Bannan, the club captain, turned down £20,000 a week—probably not enormous sums of money for some—and is playing for Wednesday for £7,000 a week, for his love of the club. We give awards to players for being good footballers; how about giving awards to people who are just good people and who have that loyalty and commitment to a club? Barry Bannan is there, along with Liam Palmer—great credit to them. Also, the office staff have worked without pay for some weeks—great credit to them as well.

The spirit of this statutory instrument and the Act is about fan involvement. The Act came from the fan-led review—that was its essence. We must make sure that the administrator, the English Football League—which is currently the regulator—and the regulator that will take over, probably in December, bake into any agreement with a new owner the right of fans to be involved in their football club. That is the essence of what we are debating today. This instrument will put the basis of that in place. I just ask that the administrator, the EFL and the regulator ensure that fan involvement and engagement are baked into the administration and running of Sheffield Wednesday football club and any other clubs that they may have involvement with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Murray]

I will take your guidance, Ms Lewell. In response to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, I will say that when the Opposition lose the argument, they do not take the ball, they take the man. I think that that is what we are seeing.

[Mr French]

A strange dynamic is going on here: we seem to be pretending that the Secretary of State and the chairman of the new Football Regulator are not under investigation. That is what is happening. That is not my investigation; that is an investigation that is taking place. That brings the whole regulator into question, and its independence. That is the point.

[The Chair]

Order. The hon. Member is aware that that is not in the scope of the draft statutory instrument before us.

Oral Answers to Questions

Louie French Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

This has been an incredible year for women’s sport, with both the Lionesses and the Red Roses inspiring a generation with their fantastic performances and historic successes on the pitch. The previous Conservative Government worked in partnership alongside the national lottery, Sport England and various national bodies to help to support these incredible athletes with investment in grassroots facilities, including the £30 million Lionesses fund, which directly increased opportunities for women’s and girls’ sports. Beyond the sentiments that the Secretary of State has already expressed today, will she confirm whether her Government will support a new Lionesses and Red Roses fund specifically for women’s sports? Will she also confirm that fairness and safety will remain the key pillars of guidance for female sports?

[Lisa Nandy]

It was a real pleasure, with the Prime Minister, to meet the Lionesses before they went off and then on to victory in the Euros. We have been working closely with rugby football and other areas of women’s sport to advance this issue. The £400 million investment that I referenced in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for St Austell and Newquay (Noah Law) will double the number of places across the board, which will mean a significant increase in the number of women and girls able to access sports. My hon. Friend the Minister for Sport was pleased to launch the women’s sport taskforce, which will really grip this issue. I am happy to work cross-party on that; it is something that the whole House should be able to get behind and support.

[Mr French]

I thank the Secretary of State for her answer; hopefully she can pick up the point about fairness and safety in women’s sport in her next answer, because that was also part of the first question.

The Secretary of State will be aware that, alongside investment from Government and national sports bodies, voluntary donations and corporate sponsorship play a key role in funding our grassroots and professional sports clubs and leagues. For example, Flutter’s Cash4Clubs programme has invested £7 million in grassroots clubs since 2008. Does the Minister therefore share my concern that the Chancellor’s proposed racing tax will not only see thousands of British jobs lost across the country, but damage key sponsorship of a number of UK sports, especially British horseracing? Will she confirm that her Department has made it clear to the Treasury that it opposes this tax raid on our British sport?

[Lisa Nandy]

I absolutely recognise the point about fairness and safety, and I have had representations and conversations with many women athletes and competitors since taking office. Of course we want to be as inclusive as possible in the approach that we take, but we recognise that fairness and safety really matter, and we have been supporting the sporting bodies in dealing with that. It is a matter for them, but we stand ready to support.

In relation to the issues that the hon. Member raised about gambling, we believe that the gambling industry is an important part of the UK economy. We know that it brings joy to millions of people. Of course, future proposals on taxation are matters for the Treasury, but I can reassure him that we regularly engage with the Treasury to ensure not just that the voice of stakeholders is heard, but that we avoid any unintended consequences of tax reform.

London Fashion Week: Cultural Contribution

Louie French Excerpts

Tuesday 16th September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I congratulate the hon. Member for Kettering (Rosie Wrighting) on securing this important debate and all hon. Members for their contributions. I welcome the Minister to his new role and I wish him well in government.

London Fashion Week has been a regular part of Britain’s cultural calendar since it was first held in 1984. In four decades, it has grown to become one of the world’s leading fashion events, standing alongside Paris, Milan and New York as one of the big four fashion weeks. It is now firmly established as an international institution, but one that is rooted in Britain’s traditions of creativity, design and craftsmanship.

We can look at London Fashion Week’s contribution through several different lenses. There is the economic impact that we have heard about already today, which is unsurprisingly substantial. There is its international reach and the way it helps to shape Britain’s reputation abroad. As we heard from the Lib Dem spokesman, the hon. Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones), there is its role in supporting education, training and careers for young designers. There is its influence on sustainability, innovation and regional economies. Perhaps most importantly, there is the less tangible but equally vital contribution it makes to Britain’s cultural life and identity.

It is important to begin with the economic dimension. The fashion industry, as a whole, directly contributes close to £30 billion annually to the UK’s economy and supports nearly 900,000 jobs across the country. London Fashion Week plays a central role in that wider success. Each season, it brings together hundreds of designers, buyers, journalists and photographers from around the world. The event is not only about catwalk shows; it is also about deals and contracts that sustain designers and businesses throughout the year. Many small and medium-sized companies rely on the exposure that London Fashion Week provides. It gives them the opportunity to secure international orders, attract investors and build long-term relationships with global retailers.

The economic impact also extends into the hospitality and tourism sectors. International visitors attending London Fashion Week stay in our hotels, eat in our restaurants, use our transport system—when it is working—and support our local shops. The event generates millions of pounds of spending, providing a much-needed boost of inward investment for the wider London economy.

Importantly, as the title of this debate makes clear, London Fashion Week is not simply an economic generator; its cultural importance is equally significant. Fashion, at its heart, is a form of cultural expression. It reflects the values, identities and moods of a society. What people wear and how designers present clothing speaks to wider cultural trends, although I must admit that I am not that up on fashion. My sister got all the fashion genes in our house, so she tries to steer me in the right direction when I am looking particularly scruffy.

British fashion has long been known for its creativity and originality. From the craftsmanship of Savile Row tailoring to the rebellious punk energy of the 1970s and the dramatic visions of designers such as Alexander McQueen, British fashion has always had a distinctive voice. London Fashion Week provides the stage on which that voice is heard. At each event, designers bring together traditional materials and skills with new ideas. Tweed, tartan and wool, for example, are reinterpreted for new generations. Alongside them, we see collections that make use of digital technologies, sustainable fabrics and innovative production methods.

London Fashion Week is therefore both a guardian of tradition and a hub for creative experimentation. I have had the pleasure of seeing that when I am out and about in Old Bexley and Sidcup—I will not name all the boutiques that operate in my constituency, as I am bound to forget one and get myself in a lot of trouble. We also have arts students at the likes of Bird college and Rose Bruford college, a big part of whose work involves costume design that feeds the west end and a lot of the talent we enjoy in London.

One of the most striking aspects of London Fashion Week is its global reach. It is reported in newspapers, magazines and online platforms across the world, as we have already heard. Images from the catwalks are shared instantly on social media, reaching audiences far beyond those who have the privilege of attending in person. That means that London Fashion Week plays an important role in shaping how Britain is seen internationally. It presents Britain as creative, innovative and outward-looking. It demonstrates that our country still has something distinctive to contribute to global culture, and it acts as one of the best forms of cultural diplomacy. Just as our music, theatre and sport project Britain’s identity abroad, so too does London Fashion Week.

A vital part of London Fashion Week’s contribution lies in its links to education and training. Britain has some of the world’s most highly regarded fashion schools, including Central Saint Martins, London College of Fashion and the Royal College of Art. These institutions attract students from across the globe, and many of the designers who now show collections at London Fashion Week began their career in their classrooms and studios.

The pipeline from education to the catwalk is clear. Students are trained in technical skills, encouraged in creativity and given the chance to develop their own design identity. London Fashion Week then provides a platform where they can present their work to international audiences. The pathway is vital to sustaining Britain’s long-term success in fashion and those vital careers that we all want to see flourish.

Linked to that is the emphasis that London Fashion Week places on supporting emerging talent. As we have already heard, the British Fashion Council’s excellent NEWGEN programme provides opportunities for new designers to show their work, gain visibility and build their careers. Many of today’s established names first appeared through such initiatives. That commitment to new talent ensures that London Fashion Week remains dynamic and forward-looking. It prevents the event from becoming static or predictable and keeps Britain at the forefront of global design patterns.

Young designers tend to be even more eco-conscious than their predecessors, and London Fashion Week has made an important contribution to sustainability. Globally, the fashion industry has faced growing questions about its environmental footprint, from the use of resources in production to the disposal of clothing. Many British designers and retailers lead the way in exploring sustainable practices, including the use of recycled fabrics, investment in traceable and transparent supply chains, and the development of circular economy models in which garments are reused and repurposed. London Fashion Week has become a stage on which such ideas are shared around the world.

On that point, I wish to give a shout-out—which I do not always do—to my local council, which works with an organisation called Traid to recycle textiles in the London borough of Bexley. I would like to see other boroughs roll out that important initiative for recycling fashion, alongside the work of charity shops and others.

By promoting sustainable practices, London Fashion Week not only addresses environmental concerns but shapes the cultural conversation about fashion. It shows that creativity and responsibility can go hand in hand. As that makes clear, fashion does not exist in isolation. It intersects with many other areas of the creative economy. Film, television and music all rely on fashion for costumes, styling and identity. Sports stars and musicians frequently collaborate with fashion designers, and their influence shapes trends in turn. As much as I would like footballers to be more focused on football, a lot of them are budding fashionistas on their social media profiles. London Fashion Week strengthens such connections, contributing to a wider ecosystem of cultural activity.

London Fashion Week has been held for almost 40 years, and its longevity is a sign of its importance. Over time, it has adapted to new technologies, consumer habits and cultural movements, yet it has retained its identity as a showcase for British creativity. The balance of continuity and change is a great part of its success.

London Fashion Week makes a significant contribution to the United Kingdom. Economically, it generates income, supports jobs and boosts tourism. Culturally, it showcases creativity, reflects our traditions and helps define our new identities. Internationally, it strengthens Britain’s reputation and influence. It supports education, encourages new talent, promotes sustainability and even sustains regional industries. It is not simply a series of shows; it is a major cultural event that brings together tradition, innovation, creativity, commerce, national identity and international reach. In conclusion, I again thank the hon. Member for Kettering for securing this important debate, and thank hon. Members for their contributions.

Free-to-air Broadcasting: Cricket Participation

Louie French Excerpts

Tuesday 9th September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship as always, Ms McVey—fantastic umpiring, and hopefully no need for DRS. I start with a declaration of interest: over the summer I, alongside a number of colleagues, attended a cricket match with Sky. It was below the registrable threshold, but I am making sure that it is transparently disclosed.

I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson) for securing this important debate. After another great summer for English cricket and sport, and ahead of the Ashes series and the women’s one-day international world cup, it is timely that we are having this debate, and I thank all hon. Members for their fantastic contributions so far.

As many of us will remember, between 1999 and 2005, test matches were shown on Channel 4. That culminated in the historic 2005 home Ashes series, shown on Channel 4. There was an average of between 2 million and 3 million viewers per day for an average test match, before that soared to upwards of 7 million viewers for the 2005 tests and peaked at 8.5 million on the deciding and dramatic final day of the series. The impact of that fantastic series was clear, with the ECB reporting a massive increase in junior club memberships after the 2005 series, and waiting lists at many clubs across the country. Sport England data showed that junior participation rose in 2006 by roughly 7%, bucking wider trends across the sector.

However, there has been a decline, which has been referenced, in participation rates following the switch from free-to-air cricket to subscription-based broadcasting, and there is of course a discussion to be had, as always, about coincidence versus causation, which is why we are here today. For example, Sport England’s Active People survey showed a fall from 428,000 adults playing cricket weekly in 2007-08 to 278,000 in 2014-15. That represents a drop of about 35%, and over the same period participation halved among 16 to 24-year-olds.

More recently, we have begun to see a welcome revival in participation rates as more matches are shown on free-to-air television and England’s Bazball style has attracted new admirers. Most famously, that includes the 2019 cricket world cup final, sub-licensed by Sky and shown on Channel 4 as live international cricket returned to free-to-air television for the first time in 14 years. That thrilling final, which I also had the joy of watching, saw a peak of 4.8 million viewers for Channel 4 and 3.5 million for Sky—a total of 8.3 million. It was a huge audience for a huge moment for British sport. Data from the ECB has shown that more than 1 million under-16s watched that final, and I am sure each and every one of them took inspiration from what they saw.

Of course, all sporting bodies face a tension between ensuring that their sports are accessible to the widest possible audience and the need for financial stability and support as provided by subscription-based broadcasters. The broadcast contracts with Sky have been the financial engine of English cricket for some time now, and the most recent deal is worth more than £200 million per year. Those revenues have funded professional central contracts for men and women. That includes increasing the number of professional women cricketers from 17 to more than 100. It has also helped to sustain the England team at the top of the world game and finance grassroots programmes that have reached millions of children across the country. Without that support, the professional and grassroots structures of cricket would simply not be sustainable. As a fan of cricket, I applaud Sky’s innovative coverage—I had the privilege of seeing behind the scenes first hand over the summer.

Recent years suggest that a balance can be struck—and has been struck. The 2019 world cup final was shared by Sky and Channel 4, and reached millions of people. The Hundred has brought live cricket back to the BBC, with sizeable audiences for both the men’s and women’s games, and a clear impact on youth and girls’ participation, alongside vital grassroots community work.

I am pleased that women and girls’ cricket is growing fast across the country, including in my Old Bexley and Sidcup constituency. It is fantastic that local clubs, such as Bexley cricket club, Bexleyheath cricket club—they are separate clubs—and Sidcup are growing the girls’ game in my local community. Last year saw a 21% growth in girls’ teams, a 25% growth in women’s teams, and 1,000 new women’s and/or girls’ teams across the country. Moreover, initiatives such at Metro Bank’s girls in cricket fund have added to that momentum, delivering over 1,000 hours of dedicated coaching support and helping to grow the number of girls’ teams by more than a fifth in the past year alone. That contributed towards a record 192,000 recreational games being played across the country in 2024, more than 12,500 higher than the previous record.

Those moments and the data that follows show that when cricket is visible, it can capture the imagination of the public, regardless of background. That is why the previous Conservative Government were proud to invest £34.7 million to maximise the opportunity of the women’s T20 world cup in 2026, cricket’s inclusion in the Olympics in 2028, and a men’s T20 cricket world cup in 2030 to build a network of state school cricket programmes and facilities.

While the recent announcement regarding cricket dome funding from the Government over the summer is very welcome, this Government have so far only allocated £1.5 million to fund those two new cricket domes. The money was there, but the Government have instead taken the political choice to reallocate what remains of the capital fund. Will the Minister say whether clubs across the country, which will be listening to this debate, should expect more funding to come their way in terms of grassroots support in the years ahead?

The challenge remains trying to find a balance between reach and growth in participation via the exposure that free-to-air broadcasting brings, and with the financial resources provided from subscription funding. We can all agree across the House that too much of one without the other undermines the long-term health of the sport. That is an outcome that none of us wants. I thank all hon. Members again for this important debate, as well as the hon. Member for Cheltenham for supporting it.

Football Governance Bill [Lords]

Louie French Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling—

“A regulated club or English football competition must not promote or engage in advertising or sponsorship related to gambling.”

This new clause prevents regulated clubs and competitions from promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship.

New clause 3—Free to air coverage—

“(1) The Independent Football Regulator must require that every season—

(a) at least ten Premier League football matches,

(b) the League Cup Final, and

(c) the Championship, League One and League Two playoff finals

are made available for live broadcast on free-to-air television channels in the United Kingdom.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) the matches must include a representative selection across different clubs and times in the season, subject to reasonable considerations of scheduling and broadcasting logistics.

(3) In this section ‘free-to-air television’ means a service that satisfies the qualifying conditions of such a service defined by Section 2 of the 1996 Communications Act.”

This new clause would mandate a minimum of ten Premier League matches, the League Cup Final and the Championship, League One and League Two playoff finals on free-to-air television channels.

New clause 4—Fan representation: mandatory golden share—

“(1) A licensed club must, as a condition of holding a licence under section 15, issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan organisation.

(2) The golden share must confer on its holder the right to veto any proposal by the club to—

(a) relocate the club’s home ground outside its current local authority area,

(b) change the club’s name,

(c) materially alter the club’s primary colours or badge, or

(d) enter into or withdraw from any competition not sanctioned by the Football Association, the Premier League, or the English Football League.

(3) A licensed club must—

(a) consult the holder of the golden share on any material changes to the club’s ownership, governance, or strategic direction,

(b) provide the holder with access to relevant financial and governance information reasonably required to fulfil its function, and

(c) facilitate structured and regular engagement between the club and the holder of the golden share.

(4) The Regulator must monitor compliance with this section and may—

(a) issue guidance to clubs and Supporters’ Trusts on the operation of the golden share,

(b) impose licence conditions or financial penalties for non-compliance, and

(c) take enforcement action where a club fails to uphold the rights associated with the golden share.

(5) In this section—

(a) ‘Supporters’ Trust’ means a formally constituted, democratic, not-for-profit organisation that is recognised by the Regulator as representing the interests of a club’s supporters;

(b) ‘golden share’ means a special share or equivalent legal instrument issued to a Supporters’ Trust, entitling its holder to the rights and protections described in this section.”

This new clause would give fans a veto on club proposals, exercised through a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan body.

New clause 5—Protection of assets of regulated clubs—

“(1) Where any of the following assets belong to a regulated club, the asset must not be removed from the club’s ownership or used as collateral for a secured loan—

(a) any stadium,

(b) any training facility,

(c) any trophies,

(d) any car park,

(e) any hotel.

(2) But subsection 1 does not apply to a car park or a hotel where—

(a) the regulated club can demonstrate to the IFR’s satisfaction that the asset is causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial sustainability, and

(b) the IFR has provided prior written approval for the disposal of the asset or the use of the asset as collateral.

(3) Where the current owner of a regulated club owns any asset listed in subsection (1)(a) to (c), the owner may not sell the club unless the owner has inserted the asset into the club’s ownership structure.”

This new clause would ensure that the club assets listed above are recognised as the inalienable property of the club rather than the club’s owners.

New clause 6—Financial abuse, mismanagement or fraud: protection etc—

“(1) The IFR must, in any strategy it publishes, set out measures aimed at achieving the financial abuse, mismanagement and fraud objective.

(2) Measures to be set out under subsection (1) must include oversight of—

(a) robust education for relevant players on matters relating to financial abuse, mismanagement and fraud,

(b) industry wide standards aimed at relevant players in relation to those matters, and

(c) an equitable system of support and redress for relevant players where they have been affected by those matters.

(3) In this section, a ‘relevant player’ means a current or former player in English football who—

(a) has been a victim of financial abuse, mismanagement, or fraud, or

(b) is at risk of becoming a victim of financial abuse, mismanagement, or fraud.”

New clause 7—Human rights and modern slavery considerations—

“(1) When considering whether a person (‘A’) satisfies the requirement in section 26(7)(c), the Regulator shall have regard to (among other things)—

(a) whether A has been complicit in any egregious or consistent violation of international human rights law, whether of any international human rights treaty, customary law, or other instrument,

(b) whether A has been convicted, cautioned or reprimanded or complicit in any egregious or consistent violation of domestic human rights legislation, including breaching provisions in the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 or equivalent national legislation,

(c) whether A has been subject to a Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Order,

(d) whether A has been found liable in a civil claim relating to a human rights violation,

(e) whether A has been convicted of an offence, cautioned or reprimanded for failing to comply with their human rights and modern slavery reporting and due diligence obligations under applicable domestic legislation,

(f) any representations made by A or the club in accordance with the notice.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) where A is a body corporate or other non-corporeal entity (including a government or nation state), the Regulator shall consider the actions of anyone who controls that body corporate or entity (and ‘control’ shall have the meaning given in section 255 of the Companies Act 2006), and

(b) the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).

(3) In respect of subsection (1)(c) and (d), a risk of disrepute shall not be valid grounds for disqualification of any person if such disrepute would, in the reasonable opinion of the Regulator, be unfounded.

(4) In accordance with Schedule 2, Part 2, paragraph 15, the Regulator may establish a committee or committees to discharge its functions under this Clause.”

New clause 8—Duty to address ticketing market practices—

“Regulated clubs and competition organisers must take reasonable steps to—

(a) monitor practices in the secondary ticketing market that may lead to excessive price mark-ups or unauthorised resale;

(b) provide transparent information about ticket pricing and resale policies, including the face value of tickets; and

(c) provide official ticket exchange channels where reasonably practicable.”

New clause 9—Prioritisation of competitions within English football—

“(1) This section applies where a regulated club is participating in a competition outside of English Football.

(2) Where the IFR considers that the regulated club’s participation in the competition is damaging to the heritage of English football, the IFR must take what measures it considers necessary to prevent that damage.

(3) Measures that the IFR might take include a direction to the club that it—

(a) prioritise any fixtures taking place in a competition within English football over those in the competition outside of English football;

(b) cease participation in the competition outside of English football.”

New clause 10—Player welfare—

“Within one year of the passing of this Act the Secretary of State must review how to improve the welfare of football players. This review should include consideration of—

(a) neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs;

(b) the number of games that footballers are required to play each season; and

(c) the impact on the welfare of current and former professional footballers as a result.”

New clause 11—Correspondence about the IFR—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish any correspondence received by the Secretary of State from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) about the IFR’s exercise of its functions.

(2) The IFR must publish any correspondence it receives from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) about the exercise of its functions.”

This new clause would require correspondence between FIFA and UEFA and either the Secretary of State, or the IFR, with regards to the IFR’s regulatory functions, to be published.

New clause 12—Impact on Regulator of changes in Government administration—

“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”

This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.

New clause 13—Neurodegenerative care scheme—

“(1) The IFR must establish and supervise a scheme aimed at providing a high standard of care and support to any person who has developed a neurodegenerative condition linked to their career in English football.

(2) The Secretary of State must make regulations setting out—

(a) minimum requirements for the scheme,

(b) a timescale for the scheme’s establishment, and

(c) arrangements and a timescale for a periodic review of the scheme.

(3) The IFR must ensure that, as a condition of organising any competition specified pursuant to section 2(3), all specified competition organisers jointly operate, manage and fund the scheme in accordance with subsections (4) to (8).

(4) For the purpose of operating, managing and funding the scheme, all of the specified competition organisers must form a Joint Coordinating Committee (‘JCC’).

(5) Any current or former player who has at any time been registered as a professional footballer is eligible for the scheme.

(6) The scheme must provide care and financial support to any eligible person who suffers from a neurodegenerative condition which is deemed, pursuant to subsection (7)(a), to have been caused or contributed to by playing or training activities within English football.

(7) The JCC must, under the supervision of the IFR, appoint a panel of independent experts—

(a) to determine whether, on the balance of probabilities, a neurodegenerative condition of an eligible person has been caused or contributed to by playing or training activities within English football, and

(b) to determine the appropriate provision of care and financial support required in the case of each eligible person.

(8) The IFR must ensure that the JCC acts upon the panel’s determinations.

(9) Where—

(a) specified competition owners, through the JCC, cannot agree about the operation, management or funding of the scheme, or

(b) at any time, the scheme does not meet either—

(i) the aim under subsection (1), or

(ii) any requirements set out in regulations under subsection (2),

the Secretary of State may, having taken advice from the IFR, make a direction about the operation, management or funding of the scheme.”

New clause 14—Duty to vet financial investment in football clubs—

“(1) The IFR must review and approve all proposed financial investments in regulated clubs from funds which are located outside of the United Kingdom.

(2) A review under subsection (1) must include—

(a) assessing if any sources of revenue for such a fund is the result of money laundering;

(b) assessing if the owner of such a fund is charged with any breaches of UK or international law.

(3) If upon completing a review under subsection (1) the IFR has determined a source of revenue for a fund is the result of money laundering or the owner of a fund is in breach of UK or international law the IFR must direct the club to reject the investment.”

Amendment 14, in clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) For the purposes of this Act a ‘specified competition’ includes—

(a) the Premier League,

(b) the English Football League, and

(c) the National League.

(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament amend the competitions specified in section (3).”

This amendment would specify the leagues that are to be classed as “specified competitions” under Act.

Amendment 3, in clause 6, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(d) to ensure that the care and support of people who have developed neurodegenerative conditions linked to their career in English football forms part of any strategy published by the IFR, and to oversee an equitable and fair industry financial scheme to provide care for those people.”

Amendment 12, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(d) to take responsibility for the protection, financial welfare, and safeguarding of current and former players involved in English football who—

(i) have been victims of financial abuse, mismanagement, or fraud, or

(ii) are at risk of becoming victims of financial abuse, mismanagement, or fraud, (referred to in this Act as ‘the financial abuse, mismanagement and fraud objective’).”

Amendment 29, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(d) to ensure that the care and support of those who have developed neurodegenerative conditions linked to their career in English football is a central part of its approach to football governance, and to establish and supervise the scheme provided for under section [Neurodegenerative care scheme].”

This amendment places an objective on the IFR to establish and supervise a scheme to provide care and support to those who have developed neurodegenerative conditions linked to their career in English football (see NC13).

Amendment 25, in clause 7, page 5, line 27, at end insert—

“(d) conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies, including FIFA and UEFA.”

This amendment requires the IFR to exercise its functions so as to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies.

Amendment 1, in clause 10, page 7, line 6, at end insert—

“(d) an assessment of the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets.”

This amendment would require the IFR to include in its state of the game report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.

Amendment 21, in clause 11, page 7, line 41, at end insert—

“(7) No football governance statement may have effect unless approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the football governance statement to be approved by Parliament before it could have effect.

Amendment 2, in clause 14, page 9, line 3, at end insert—

“(aa) the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets, and”.

This amendment would require the IFR to include in its annual report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.

Amendment 28, page 9, line 3, at end insert—

“(aa) the cumulative impact of the costs imposed on clubs through compliance with the IFR’s regulatory regime, and”.

This amendment would require the IFR to include in the annual report an account of the financial costs imposed on clubs through its regulatory requirements on them.

Amendment 26, in clause 17, page 11, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—

“(9) The IFR must make the decision whether to grant a regulated club a provisional operating licence within the period of one month.

(10) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (9) by no more than two weeks if it requires more time to consider the application due to—

(a) unusual staffing pressures, or

(b) discrepancies or abnormalities with the application.

(11) If the IFR extends the period as per subsection (10), it must give a notice to the relevant club stating—

(a) that the period has been extended,

(b) the length of the extension, and

(c) the reasons for the extension.”

This amendment places a time limit of one month for the IFR to decide whether to grant a provisional operating license.

Amendment 15, in clause 37, page 28, line 28, at end insert—

“(fa) whether the individual is a member of a proscribed organisation as per section (3) and schedule (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000.”

This amendment requires that IFR, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Amendment 8, in clause 46, page 39, line 5, at end insert—

“(c) in the case of a disposal under subsection (1)(a), it has taken reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales approve of the disposal.”

Amendment 9, page 39, line 5, at end insert—

“(6A) Before the IFR grants an approval under subsection (6) it must—

(a) consult the supporters of the body in question, the relevant competition organisers and persons representing the local community with which the body is associated, and

(b) have regard to the views expressed by those consulted.”

Amendment 24, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert—

“(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.”

This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.

Government amendments 4 to 7.

Amendment 18, in schedule 2, page 87, line 12, at end insert—

“(3A) Any political interests of, and political donations made by, the prospective chair of the Board, must all be declared as part of the appointments process, and published before the chair’s pre-appointment hearing with the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee.”

Amendment 19, page 87, line 37, at end insert—

“(5) No member may be appointed to the Board if they currently have any broadcast or media interests or any role in a television or media broadcast that relates to football.”

This amendment prohibits any person who currently has any interests or roles in a television or media broadcast that relates to football from being appointed to the Board.

Amendment 23, page 88, line 37, at end insert—

“(1A) But the number of persons in the employment of IFR (including any persons seconded to the IFR) must at no time exceed 50.”

Amendment 22, page 89, line 9, leave out subparagraph (3) and insert—

“(3) The IFR may pay a person appointed as the Chief Executive no more than £172,153 per annum.

(3A) Notwithstanding the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer as per paragraph (3), the IFR must pay its employees such remuneration as may be determined by the non-executive members.”

This amendment limits the pay of the Chief Executive.

Amendment 20, page 93, line 5, at end insert—

“(4A) No member may be appointed to the Expert Panel if they currently have any broadcast or media interests or any role in a television or media broadcast that relates to football.”

This amendment prohibits any person who currently has any interests or roles in a television or media broadcast that relates to football from being appointed to the Expert Panel.

Amendment 16, in schedule 4, page 99, line 37, at end insert—

“(f) the club’s political statements and positions.”

This amendment ensures that clubs have to engage their fans on the political statements a club might adopt.

Amendment 10, in schedule 5, page 100, line 26, at end insert—

“(e) an Asset of Community Value condition.”

This amendment adds the requirement to attach an Asset of Community Value condition to each club operating licence.

Amendment 27, page 102, line 7, at end insert

“including the club’s official charity.”

This amendment would make clear that the activities of a football club’s official charity can be counted towards it meeting the corporate governance code.

Amendment 17, page 102, line 13, leave out sub-paragraph (e).

This amendment removes the requirement for the corporate governance statement to cover what action the club is taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion.

Amendment 13, page 102, line 33, at end insert—

“(1A) The IFR must ensure that the persons referred to in subsections 1(a) and 1(b) are representative of the majority of the club’s fanbase and represent the club’s key supporters’ groups.

(1B) If it is unclear which are a club’s key supporters’ groups the IFR must consult with the Football Supporter’s Association to determine which groups apply for the purposes of this paragraph.”

Amendment 11, page 103, line 20, at end insert—

“Asset of Community Value

11A The Asset of Community Value condition is a condition requiring a club to either—

(a) obtain and maintain Asset of Community Value status for its home ground; or

(b) incorporate into its Articles of Association a restriction which substantially mirrors the restrictions placed on Assets of Community Value under the Localism Act 2011,

and the Secretary of State may create regulations detailing further the implementation of the Asset of Community Value condition.”

The amendment defines the Asset of Community Value condition that clubs are required to obtain for their home ground and is consequential on Amendment 10.

[Mr French]

I also put on record my thanks to Lord Tebbit for his life of service to both our country and our party. He will be dearly missed by us all. In opening today’s proceedings, I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It is a privilege to speak on Report for the countless fans who fill the stands week in and week out, wear their club’s shirt with pride and keep our clubs alive, come rain or shine. I put on the record my thanks to all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions in Committee, and to everyone who has engaged with the process outside of Westminster. For all the high talk of regulators, quangos and corporate structures, let us never forget that football in this country is not an industry dreamed up by officials on neat PowerPoint slides or Excel spreadsheets, but a living tradition that is part of who we are and part of the fabric of our nation.

That is precisely why we must be so careful now: because this Bill, well-intentioned though it may be, risks replacing one danger—a minority of reckless owners—with another, namely reckless political interference that risks the independence of sport. This Bill, which wants to tackle cowboy owners, comes from an incoherent Government under investigation for appointing a Labour crony to be the new sheriff of football, and from a Department that has seen the Whip resign since the last meeting of the Bill Committee. We really are in “The Thick of It”.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

Would the shadow Minister like to join me in thanking the shadow Secretary of State, his right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), for first introducing legislation to this House that promoted an independent football regulator? [Interruption.]

[Mr French]

As the shadow Secretary of State says from a sedentary position, “You’ve messed it all up”, and I am sure that does not apply just to football.

Before I move on to our amendments, it is worth reminding ourselves how we got here. English football was not invented by corporate lawyers or politicians. Its origins are in the history and soul of communities across our country. It is the same spirit that today sees parents across the country drive through wind and rain on a Sunday morning so that their child can run out in their local club colours. It is a spirit that does not appear on balance sheets, but without sustainable finances there is no football at all. Sadly, we have all seen those cases where financial mismanagement and reckless spending have seen clubs and fans damaged. That is why the Conservatives put fans first by launching the independent fan-led review of football governance, which focused on the long-term sustainability of the game.

We support better fan engagement, respecting the heritage of our clubs and strengthening ownership tests to help prevent the issues we have seen at the likes of Bury, Charlton and Reading. The fan-led review stated that this area of regulation should in time be returned to the Football Association and leagues. Having spoken to many football fans across the country and also in my constituency, I can say with confidence that they would agree with that even more now that Labour is trying to directly interfere in English football by appointing a Labour crony.

During the passage of the Bill, we have heard from the FA and the Premier League that they are concerned by regulatory scope creep, and we have sought in our amendments to push back on the tentacles of this socialist state seeking to strangle with red tape our beautiful game—this great British success story, which attracts millions of fans around the world and contributes £8 billion to our economy each season. Our amendments would prevent the Secretary of State from expanding the leagues in scope of the regulator under clause 2 without the approval of Parliament. We must give clubs certainty and prevent Whitehall empire building.

We must also have transparency about how much these new regulatory burdens are costing clubs and ticket prices, both today and in the future. That is why we have tabled amendments 1, 2 and 28. Every pound spent on new compliance staff is a pound not spent on grassroots players, stadium maintenance or affordable ticket prices. Every new bureaucrat is another tenner on a family’s matchday cost. In the end, the fans pick up the tab, just like always. The Government’s impact assessment suggests that these costs will be more than £125 million, with smaller clubs expecting a bill of up to £47 million. We know that many smaller clubs will have no choice but to pass that cost on to fans, and the Government and their regulator must be honest about that.

Members can help limit those additional costs by supporting our amendments 22 and 23, which would limit the size of the Government’s new regulator and cap the pay of the chief executive at the same level as the Prime Minister. The Government state that they want their regulator to be light-touch, but they vote against limits being placed upon it. That leads to the question: why are they saying one thing while doing the opposite in Westminster? Is it because of inexperience, or is the truth that this is yet another example of jobs for the boys, to the cost of fans? That is why we have tabled amendments that would limit political interference in the independence of sport.

We believe that fans should be consulted on any political statements made by clubs. Football clubs must not be mouthpieces for whichever fashionable cause of the time, and we believe that politics should be kept out of sport wherever possible. When a club speaks, it speaks for its fans and the local community. If it wants to do that on matters far beyond football, it should ask those fans first.

[Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

Would the shadow Minister mind telling the House what these fashionable causes that football clubs should not speak about are?

[Mr French]

I am happy to do so. Throughout Committee stage we have been quite clear—as the hon. Gentleman’s colleague, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), will say—that we do not believe that that includes the likes of remembrance, which we is differ from political causes. However, as we have said, we do not believe that clubs should be getting involved in politics, and that is a hill that we are willing to die on.

My amendment 17 to schedule 5 would remove the requirement for additional reporting on equality, diversity and inclusion. We all know that football must be welcoming to everyone. Racism and bigotry have no place on the terraces, just as they have no place in wider society. Football has made huge progress by itself, with a range of initiatives already in the game including Kick It Out, Show Racism the Red Card, the Premier League Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Standard framework, the English Football League’s equality code of practice, anti-racism education and mentoring schemes. The game has done that not because a Government regulator told it to, but because it is right, it works and fans support it. However, fans do not pay their hard-earned money at the turnstiles to fund diversity paperwork. Our amendment leaves inclusion where it belongs: on the pitch, in the stands and in the community.

Let me now turn to clause 7, and to new clause 11 in my name. The new clause seeks to ensure that the IFR exercises its functions to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies. FIFA and UEFA rules are clear: national associations must be free from undue political interference. Countries that break that rules have been banned before: just ask the Greek football committee.

The Government are sleepwalking towards a giant own goal, and this time there is no VAR to save us. We already know that UEFA has written to the Secretary of State setting out its concerns about the Bill, and that the letter arrived after the Government had introduced its expanded version. UEFA writes:

“One particular area of concern stems from one of UEFA’s fundamental requirements, which is that there should be no Government interference in the running of football.”

Unfortunately, the Minister could not give us enough reassurance about Government interference with English football, which is why I have re-tabled my amendment. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, and that the Government’s regulator may expand its mandate beyond its loosely defined current competencies. Such an expansion, intentional or otherwise, into broader aspects of football governance could undermine the established structures and processes of the sport, and amount to Government interference.

[Mr Betts]

I do not whether the shadow Minister can get some help from his right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry, who is sitting next to him on the Front Bench. I wonder whether, when the right hon. Gentleman was in the Government, he received any correspondence from UEFA and FIFA. Given the openness that the shadow Minister is calling for, will he now publish any correspondence received by the last Government?

[Mr French]

That is quite a rehearsed line that the hon. Gentleman is seeing to play out. As we heard in Committee, the Minister has sought to reassure the House that UEFA has no problems with the Bill. If that is the case, why is the letter not being laid in the House so that all Members can vote with full confidence in what is being said? What is being briefed to the press differs significantly from what the Minister is telling Members today.

So far, the Minister has refused to allow Parliament to see that letter so that we can scrutinise the Bill properly in the fullest possible way and in the proper context. Let me will ask her again now: what is she so afraid of? Is she scared that, given the Secretary of State is already under investigation for appointing one of her donors as chair, the publication of the letter will prove to be yet another nail in the coffin of her regulator?

Let me now turn to schedule 2. Any regulator must be credible, and that means independent beyond any doubt. But what have we seen? A preferred chair with a hidden political donation, a Secretary of State forced to recuse herself only when exposed, and a revolving door—

[The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Lisa Nandy)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr French]

I will give way happily.

[Lisa Nandy]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, given that he has named me. May I ask him why the previous Government—including his colleague the shadow Secretary of State, who is sitting next to him and who was the Minister responsible at the time—actively headhunted the individual in question and added him to the shortlist? [Interruption.] They can shake their heads all they like, but that is true.

[Mr French]

The Secretary of State has, either deliberately or not deliberately, just misled the House. The gentleman in question—[Interruption.] Let me explain. The gentleman in question has already said—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. I understand that the shadow Minister may not have meant to say that the Secretary of State has deliberately misled the House; he may want to clarify that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I will reflect on that comment, Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] And I withdraw it. [Interruption.] I have said that I withdraw it; I do not know what the problem is. Members can scream and shout all they want, but the reality is that in the Select Committee, the chair in question said very clearly that he had been approached by civil servants, not by the then Minister in question. The Minister in question, my right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), has already said on the Floor of the House that he did not approach the said gentleman. Perhaps the Secretary of State would also like to reflect on her comments. There is a revolving door of vested interests ready to leap in. We would not let the chairman of a rival club—[Interruption.] You are already under investigation; I am not sure you want to make it worse. We would not let the chairman of a rival club referee a cup final, so why let—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. I am sure the shadow Minister did not mean to infer that I was under investigation.

[Mr French]

Of course, Madam Deputy Speaker. I apologise. You are not under investigation, but the Secretary of State and the Government are. That is a matter of public record. We would not let the chairman of a rival club referee a cup final, so why would we let people with political or commercial conflicts of interest sit at the very top of this new football referee? My amendments to schedule 2 are basic due diligence: they would mean no party hacks in the chair and full declarations of conflicts of interest, to avoid the mess that this Government have got themselves into. Amendment 18 would put a stop to the cronyism once and for all, and give the public proper transparency. It is not radical; it is responsible. If we do not accept it, the regulator will fail before the first whistle blows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

We welcome this Bill, as did Members across the House until a few short months ago. [Laughter.] Indeed, some of those Members even came up with the idea. Like many in the Chamber today, we are disappointed that the consensus remains broken, after an apparent direction from the Leader of the Opposition, and that the Conservatives have chosen to turn their backs on the sustainability of football quite so dramatically—perhaps it is time to sack the manager. While their time in government left much to be desired, the Conservatives had the chance to claim a statement win today. After all, as I said, this Bill was their idea: Dame Tracey Crouch initiated the fan-led review, and the previous Government started this process.

Now, however, the Conservatives have spectacularly missed an open goal, much like Ronnie Rosenthal at Villa Park in 1992. If I was generous, I would say their performance on this Bill has been like Man United in 1998—throwing away a massive points lead only to finish with nothing. Instead, I fear for the shadow Minister that they are more like Spurs in 2016, somehow managing to finish third in a two-horse race—although, I suppose coming third is the sort of result the Conservatives need to get used to.

Throughout this process, we have been clear on our position: we are in favour of the principles of protecting the heritage of our national game, of greater financial sustainability, and of greater fan involvement in the game. We applaud the Government’s approach in delivering that, and we will support the Bill on Third Reading later today, because we remain consistent in our view.

None the less, we think that the Bill could go further. Let me begin with the issue of free-to-air coverage. In new clause 3, we are calling for key fixtures from the domestic football calendar to be made available on free-to-air television. This includes a selection of 10 premier league matches each season, the league cup final and the play-off finals in the championship, league one and league two. As a Charlton Athletic fan, the shadow Minister might have an interest in this one, because his team might make the play-offs one day. These would complement the existing free-to-air marquee events such as the FA cup, the World cup and the Euros. This proposal is neither about undermining private broadcasters, whose viewing figures sadly are already declining, nor about devaluing the broadcasting rights on which clubs rely, which are showing signs of plateauing, despite the addition of so many more live games to broadcast packages. Rather, this is an opportunity for broadcasters and the football leagues to innovate and to consider a more direct route to accessing fans without a paywall.

By introducing more free-to-air games, broadcasters could explore wider sponsorship opportunities tied to larger audiences, generate new appointment-to-view moments, and engage fans who are currently priced out of football not just in the stadium, but on television, too. This approach is already proving successful in other countries. For example, La Liga broadcasts one Spanish top-flight match per week free to air, helping to maintain widespread public engagement with the sport. With the rising cost of living and the growing number of subscription services required to watch live football—now totalling around £700 a year—making more matches available without a paywall would ensure the game remains accessible.

[Mr French]

First, Charlton did reach the play-offs and we were promoted to the championship, so I am happy to correct the record for the hon. Member. But on the broadcasting issue, what cost analysis have the Liberal Democrats done on this issue, given that we know that the premier league and the EFL have already signed broadcast deals with the likes of Sky and others? What is the economic impact for those clubs and leagues?

[Max Wilkinson]

A huge amount of money is already going around in football, and we know that when we get to contract negotiations with the broadcasters and the leagues, these things are chunked up into packages. And when the next contracts are up, this would be one of those packages. I do not see that there would need to be any massive economic impact.

[Max Wilkinson]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. The point here is that Gen Z and people younger than those in the Chamber today consume sport and media in a very different way. [Interruption.] My pronunciation of Gen Z has been corrected. It turns out that I am out of touch. Those of us in the Chamber today grew up watching football as a 90-minute game on television, many of us on free to air. Today, youngsters will be watching social media clips on TikTok. They will be watching clips of people playing games on computers as well. If we are to get the next generation of fans involved, the easiest way to make sure that they are entertained and that they are engaging is by making football free to air.

[Mr French]

I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make. He suggests that there would not be a cost impact on the broadcasting rights, but the Liberal Democrat amendment states that a number of key matches would be required to shown on free-to-air TV channels every season. And as I highlighted in my previous intervention, those broadcasting deals are already in place. Does he not agree, therefore, that if Members were to vote for the Liberal Democrat amendment today, that would impact the broadcast deals already in play for the EFL and the premier league.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yuan Yang]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I am very surprised to see Conservative Front Benchers whipping their colleagues to oppose a Bill that they had previously introduced in part and supported. We had built a cross-society consensus because of the work of Dame Tracey and many others like her, and we should respect that work and the importance of regulating football so that it is financially sustainable.

[Mr French]

Anyone who has read the fan-led review will know that it ultimately suggests that football should be given back to the FA and the leagues themselves. Our position is to accelerate that now, rather than appoint a Labour regulator.

[Yuan Yang]

The approach of the Conservative party here and in the Lords has been to delay this Bill and any progress made on regulation for far too many months, during which my club has struggled to go on without any independent regulation. I would like to see some reflection from Conservative Front Benchers about what that means not just for Reading, but for many clubs that are waiting for the regulator to come in.

Let Reading be one of the last clubs that have to fight this hard to survive, and let this Bill be the turning point. Let us do what the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), has said: let us crack on with this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lisa Nandy]

We believe that it does. As I said, the Minister will write to him on that point and place a copy of the letter in the Library so that the whole House can understand the Government’s position.

Let me turn to the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr French). I do not really know where to start with this, to be honest, but I am determined to give it a try. When it comes to the Government’s preferred candidate, I gently point out to the hon. Member that this is a candidate that has been strongly endorsed by the cross-party Culture, Media and Sport Committee. He was appointed by the last Conservative Government to the board of Channel 4 and, as I made clear a moment ago, he was on the list that I inherited from the Conservative Government and the right hon. Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), who now serves as the shadow Secretary of State, along with a Conservative donor as well.

It is astonishing that the shadow Minister has come to this House, belatedly, with allegations of cronyism, and that the best and only defence that he has been able to offer for this breathtaking hypocrisy is that his right hon. Friend, the shadow Secretary of State, did not have a clue what was going on in his own Department. Can he not see how absurd that is?

[Mr French]

Will she give way?

[Lisa Nandy]

Of course I will. I would love to know the answer.

[Mr French]

Let me explain, for the benefit of Members who were not in the room at the start of the debate, that the discussion was about the fact that the gentleman in question said in the Select Committee that he was not approached by the then Minister, but by civil servants. The Secretary of State is trying to say now that her Department is not under investigation. Is that correct? Are you under investigation for this appointment?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

Order. First, I am not. Secondly, the Secretary of State came very close to unparliamentary language in accusing another hon. Member of hypocrisy; I am sure she did not intend that.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. Having lowered the temperature, I trust that I can now rely on the shadow Minister to maintain the lowered temperature. If not, I might have to intervene.

[Mr French]

With leave of the House, it is my pleasure to sum up this Report stage. We have heard today that there is common ground on many of the issues facing football, but as I highlighted in my opening speech, we disagree on the solutions. This is a Government who are currently under investigation for appointing a Labour crony to chair an independent football regulator. They may not like it, but that is the reality. Our amendment 18 seeks to end the politicisation of such roles and to ensure transparency on future appointments. We believe strongly that no Member would vote this measure down, given that it seeks to end cronyism over clubs and favours over fans.

New clause 1 would deal with alcohol at football grounds, as we have heard in the debate, and we have support from the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst (Clive Efford) and from the Liberal Democrats. We believe this ban is outdated. Football fans should not be treated with a two-tier approach when it comes to being able to drink in the stands. We will be pressing this new clause to a Division because we on the Opposition Benches are on the side of football fans. We do not want this nanny state approach to continue; we want to make sure that football fans are treated with the respect that they deserve, and we will see tonight whose side this Government are really on.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Here we are: the final opportunity for the Government and this House to trigger a VAR review before English football fans and the beautiful game are left in tears. We cannot support this expanded Bill as drafted, and we believe that passing it tonight risks harming the very game that it claims to protect.

We all largely agree on the problems in football: we have a minority of greedy owners, with loyal fans left powerless when a proud club is torn apart for profit or by reckless management. No one in this House wants to see another Bury or Macclesfield, but let us be clear and honest with fans: this Bill will not stop a bad owner damaging a club, market failure will not be removed, and clubs will not be bailed out by this Government. The risk of a breakaway league will now grow, not shrink.

This Bill risks replacing financial mismanagement with political interference, poor governance with endless red tape, and the soul of our game with a new quango that grows year by year, unchallenged by real scrutiny or accountability to Parliament or fans.

If we vote this Bill through tonight, we will not remove unaccountable owners; we will only create more unaccountable bureaucrats. This amateur Government will strangle the growth of a great British success story, rather than enable it, while Reform still struggles to manage its five-a-side team after yet another scandal—sorry, four-a-side now. English football does not belong to politicians; it belongs to the fans in the stands, the volunteers in the clubhouse and the kids pulling on the shirt for the first time on a Sunday morning.

Yet this Bill opens the door for mission creep on an extraordinary scale, with provisions that would let any future Minister expand the regulator’s powers and the leagues covered at will. As drafted, this Bill risks breaching FIFA and UEFA’s clear rules against Government overreach, putting our clubs and national sides in danger of sanctions that would shame the country on the world stage. It sets up a powerful new regulator with vast discretion, but precious little real democratic control, and it piles on costs that smaller clubs and fans simply cannot bear. If the Minister thinks that big clubs will pay for this quango alone, she needs to read her own impact report. Ultimately, the fans always pay—through higher ticket prices and higher merchandise prices—all to stand on the same terraces on which generations have previously stood.

The test of a good law is whether it solves a problem proportionately and properly, not whether it lets Ministers feel that they have done something. This Bill fails that test, and fails it spectacularly. It treats our national game not as a living tradition rooted in local pride, but as an industry to be micromanaged by the state. This is not how English football was built, and it is not how it will be sustained.

On behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition, I say clearly tonight that football is at its best when the players entertain the crowd and the referee goes unnoticed, but this Bill risks creating more referees than players—referees who answer not to clubs or supporters, but to Labour Ministers and mandarins. If this Bill passes, and we expect it will tonight, I can confirm to the House and to fans at home that a future Conservative Government will trigger a review of Labour’s regulator as soon as possible, and if it is overreaching and strangling clubs—[Interruption.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. We do not need any more of that disruption.

[Mr French]

If the regulator is overreaching and strangling clubs with unnecessary red tape, as we believe it will under this Government, we will act decisively on behalf of fans to promote the English game again. The real threat to football’s future is not a lack of regulators; it is the erosion of competition and trust between owners, communities and supporters. We would fix that with stronger transparency rules—such as the rules that Labour Members have just voted against—as well as the better enforcement of existing laws and real fan power, not a vast new quango led by a Labour crony working three days a week on a salary of £130,000.

This shameful Labour Government are already under investigation having once again put their party first, with cronies over clubs, favours over fans and greed over the beautiful game. Tonight, the Conservatives will be voting against this Bill in good conscience, because our national game deserves better than a Government whose only knowledge of football is free tickets and corporate prawn sandwiches. It is worth noting that Labour Members have tonight voted against fans having a drink on the terraces, while their Ministers drink alcohol in their corporate hospitality boxes for free.

We will continue to stand up for the fans, not the bureaucrats creating an even larger nanny state. We will continue to stand up for healthy competition and local pride, not a one-size-fits-all state interference that will relegate English football among global competition. We will be ready to revisit this when, as is likely, it fails to deliver the promises being made, and to review it, to rein it in, to scrap it altogether and to give powers back to our sporting bodies. That was the ultimate goal of the fan-led review, as Labour Members would know if they had read it. Football belongs to the fans, and no badly drafted Acts of Parliament should ever make us forget that. [Interruption.]

[Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

They think it’s all over!

Oral Answers to Questions

Louie French Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister—a former rugby league player.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

The Government are on the ropes after a grand slam of unforced errors. Since we last met, we have seen the Secretary of State placed under investigation after appointing a Labour crony to head the football regulator, the Chancellor slash the DCMS budget and the DCMS Government Whip resign in protest. Own goal, knock on, double fault—whatever our choice of sporting analogy, it is clear that they have royally ballsed it up.

With Labour’s latest U-turn creating a fiscal black hole set to be £20 billion, what assurances can the Secretary of State give today that her Government will not go ahead with their planned tax raid on bingo halls, racecourses and sports betting, which will immensely damage sponsorship of major sporting events, fuel the black market and cost thousands of jobs across the country?

[Lisa Nandy]

I apologise; I could not make head nor tail of that, but this Government are absolutely determined to support bingo. It is something that I immensely enjoy—it is very popular in my home town—and will continue to do so.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)

Louie French Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.

Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.

Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.

Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.

Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.

I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.

Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.

Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.

I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.

How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.

[Mr French]

I am happy to receive a response in writing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10

Reviews

Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert

“to trigger, or not to trigger,”.

This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10.

Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22.

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30.

This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 85 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.

Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.

The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.

However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.

In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.

The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 86

Disclosure of information by the IFR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91

Regulations

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 91, page 74, line 24, leave out subsection (3)(iii).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

[Mr French]

Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.

The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.

Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.

Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.

Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.

Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.

That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?

My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.

This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.

Such interference has one clear sanction:

“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”

As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.

Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.

By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.

As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.

However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been

“a material change of circumstances”.

Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.

This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Opposition still have major concerns about the powers afforded to the Secretary of State and what we believe to be appropriate parliamentary oversight. We will press the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.

As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.

We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that

“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.

I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.

[Mr French]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister’s definition of a conflict of interest. Does she believe that it should be applied to the new chair of the regulator, who has donated to the Labour party?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.

Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Payments into the Consolidated Fund

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.

[Mr French]

I have heard what the Minister just said. Can I clarify that the amendments would make the regulator FOI-able?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 99

Extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.

[Mr French]

I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will make that commitment.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Commencement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17 

Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration

“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”—(Mr French.)

This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.

I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.

Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.

The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It has been 40 years since alcohol was first banned in view of the pitch. Given the support that lifting the measure has among a number of clubs, the Football Supporters’ Association, and even some Labour MPs, we urge the Government to consider the new clause.

[Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Does the shadow Minister consider the new clause to be scope creep?

[Mr French]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point—I was probably due one of those after five days in Committee—but if we are talking about the interests of fans, we believe that this measure should be considered. Some clubs might want the option; some might want it only in certain areas—for example, excluding family areas of stadiums. We believe that fans, especially those who act responsibly, should be treated as adults. A bit more common sense around how the ban works in the modern age might stop some of the binge drinking that happens before games because fans cannot drink in the stands.

We urge the Government to give careful consideration to this option to consult. We are not instructing them to take a definite position, but just to consult.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Member suggests that we have not sided in any Divisions with the official Opposition; the record will show that we have.

[Mr French]

The last one.

[Max Wilkinson]

No, several.

I have been to many football matches at more than 50 Football League grounds, and every time I have attended with groups of people who have been in the pub until the last possible moment, forcing down an extra pint—or an extra lucky gin and orange, which was a tradition that a group of my friends used to have—before a game. They did that because they knew that once they got into the ground, they were subject to ridiculous rules that meant they were not treated as adults. These people were very much adults. They were drinking real ale and talking about cricket, sport and things they had done at work that week. They were not football hooligans. We know that the majority of people who watch football matches are not football hooligans.

These rules date from a bygone era when people were concerned that everyone who went to the football was a hooligan. The atmosphere in grounds these days is entirely different from what it was back in the 1980s and 1990s, when things happened that nobody would want to see now. We are drifting in the right direction, back towards standing in stadiums—that is positive—and we need to start drifting back towards a situation in which we treat football fans as adults and recognise that the current ridiculous ban means that people are more likely to be more drunk at football.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.

This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.

I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.

The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that the provisions of new clause 20 are missing from the Bill as drafted. We have debated issues involving clubs, fans and leagues, but there has been little on player welfare. In different debates, we have discussed scheduling and the impact on player welfare of the excessive number of games in different competitions. The perfect example is the club world cup taking place in America. There are also other competing demands on player welfare and the welfare of retired players, as we have discussed.

This new clause on player welfare would, within one year of the passing of this Bill, require the Secretary of State to review how to improve the welfare of football players, considering neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs, the number of games footballers have to play each season—in line with my earlier comments—and the impact on current and former professional footballers’ welfare. It is a straightforward amendment, very much in the spirit of the new duties being asked of the regulator and the leagues going forward. We would therefore be interested in the Minister’s response.

[Mr Betts]

Briefly, will the Minister look at something else directly related to the new clause, which is the safety of the grounds that players play at? Three years ago, the PFA approached me about a horrible incident at Bath City, where a young player went headlong into a concrete wall and suffered severe brain damage. I was surprised to find that the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 does not cover players, but only spectators. That is a shocking omission, although we can probably understand how it got there.

At the time, I went to see the then Sports Minister with the PFA. He was supportive, and he agreed that he would write, with the PFA and others, to get the leagues and the other football authorities to look seriously at this issue. I think that guidance was given about how they should approach ground safety for players and the dangers they could face, such as running headlong into a concrete wall with no protection between the wall and the pitch.

The Minister probably will not be able to answer me now, but will she investigate how far that guidance changed behaviour and whether it had any impact on making grounds safer for players? It is an issue. One incident caused severe damage to the wellbeing of one young player. It could happen anywhere. That was at Bath City, which is not a regulated club. It is an issue not just of regulation but of player safety, and we ought to be concerned about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.

While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Louie French Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

For the avoidance of doubt, I should explain that I am not Esther McVey. For that, I apologise. None the less, we are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind all Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

Clause 57

Applications for resolution process to be triggered

Amendment made: 29, in clause 57, page 47, line 12, leave out “the application relates” and insert—

“the question or questions for resolution mentioned in subsection (1) relate”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment provides that a specified competition organiser may only apply under clause 57 if the conditions in clause 57 are met in relation to the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions mentioned in subsection (1) of clause 57 relate.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 57, page 47, line 35, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) Condition 4 is met in relation to a qualifying football season if—

(a) a distribution agreement is in force between the two specified competition organisers in relation to the season,

(b) the distribution agreement has been in force for at least the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8)), and

(c) no distribution order has effect in respect of the specified competition organisers in relation to the season.

(7) Where—

(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and

(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,

the applicable period is that period.

(8) In any other case, the applicable period is 5 years.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 128, in clause 57, page 47, line 38, leave out “five years” and insert—

“the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”.

Amendment 129, in clause 57, page 47, line 41, at end insert—

“(7) Where—

(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and

(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,

the applicable period is that period.

(8) In any other case, the applicable period is five years.”

[Mr French]

It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.

The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.

The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.

We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.

In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.

I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.

These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.

The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.

Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.

As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.

Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.

Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.

The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.

We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.

Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.

That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.

There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Once the regulator has made its decision, it must notify the relevant leagues and, as we discussed, give them the information they need to understand the decision and the scope of the process going forward. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

The mediation stage

Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out

“the question or questions for resolution”

and insert

“that question or those questions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.

Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.

A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.

The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.

We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 61

Final proposal stage

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.

We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.

In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.

New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.

League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.

That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.

The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Distribution orders

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(c).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, in clause 62, page 52, line 5, at end insert—

“(d) must address to the satisfaction of the Regulator any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.”.

This amendment would add the principle that the final proposal in the resolution process should address any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.

Amendment 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3).

Amendment 141, in clause 62, page 52, line 11, leave out from “means” to “in” in line 13 and insert

“the first full football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be applicable”.

Amendment 5, in clause 62,, page 52, line 43, at end insert—

“(8A) Where subsection (1)(c), (4)(b), or (5) applies, the committee must make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with a proposal of its own that is consistent with the principles in subsection (2) on or before the last day of the period of 28 days beginning with the final proposal deadline.”.

This amendment would require the IFR, under the circumstances specified in the amendment, to make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with its own proposal.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 54, 70 and 73.

Government new clause 4—Distribution orders.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules.

Let me start with subsection (1 )(c). In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?

[Mr French]

I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do.

I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.

[James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)]

On parachute payments, what is the shadow Minister’s view on the balance between sustainability and giving clubs a competitive advantage? Does he not think that the regulator could have a role to play in determining the extent to which parachute payments, which have grown considerably, are getting to the point at which their size distorts their purpose?

[The Chair]

Before the shadow Minister responds, I remind the hon. Member for Rushcliffe that the dress code requirements for Committee are the same as for the Chamber, which means a tie must be worn. I cannot see the hon. Gentleman wearing one. If he would like to put one on before he next seeks to intervene, that might make things easier.

[Mr French]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question.

We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.

[Mr Betts]

On the issue of parachute payments, as the Minister will recall we had this debate in the equivalent Committee in the last Parliament. It is absolutely fundamental. Let us go back to the objectives of the regulator, which include:

“to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs…and…of English football.”

How can it be sound that over 90% of the funds in English football go to the top 25 clubs, and that, of the money that the Premier League gives out, 80% goes to those clubs on parachute payments? There is a problem, is there not?

[Mr French]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but we do not believe that it necessarily applies to what the amendment seeks to do: to allow the leagues to resolve such issues themselves, rather than the regulator. That is what we are talking about here.

[Mr Betts]

This is the point that we got to before. If the leagues cannot resolve it—and they have not been able to over many years—is the hon. Gentleman just content to let the status quo remain?

[Mr French]

As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on.

Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear.

The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA.

UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen.

Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.

[Mr Betts]

I want to speak to amendment 141, which has been tabled in my name. To some extent, amendments 4 and 5 have been superseded, and I accept what the Minister said earlier about the arrangements in Government new clause 4 being a significant improvement on where we were before with the pendulum arrangements in the backstop. Also, they are a distinct improvement on where the last Government were, because they allow the regulator to look at parachute payments in a particular way. That is really helpful, because we cannot address the massive disparity of funding within football, and the cliff edge that exists between the Premier League and the Championship, without addressing the issue of parachute payments.

I want specifically to look at amendment 141, because it is about timing. I want to go through what I think is the time period that we will now move towards. If the Minister thinks that I am wrong, it would be helpful if she would explain that to me. Hopefully, if we get the Bill through before the parliamentary recess, and it comes into effect fairly quickly, the regulator can begin work next season. I hope that is the intention. In the first season, 2026-27, it is probable that the regulator will be bedding in—having discussions, getting arrangements with clubs, and trying to work towards the beginnings of the licensing system. I am speculating because we do not absolutely know, but it seems to me that is the sort of way we will go.

The regulator will also be starting to work on the state of the game report; hopefully, therefore, the regulator might have it by the end of 2026. Perhaps we could do it a bit quicker—we have encouraged the Minister to make it 12 months rather than 18. But assuming that the report takes 18 months, it will appear towards the end of 2026. When is the regulator likely to be in a position to implement a backstop, if that is deemed necessary? The regulator will be having discussions in the meantime, hopefully trying to encourage the leagues to reach an agreement. Best of luck with that! If the regulator does that in a year when previously it has failed over many years, it will have done a fantastic job and I am sure we will congratulate it. But if there is not an agreement, we will get to the backstop probably at the beginning of the 2027 season at the earliest.

The problem is that because of how “relevant period” is described in new clause 49, there will then be basically two years before the backstop kicks in. On that basis, this Parliament will not see any significant distribution of funding in English football. That will not come in until the 2029-30 season, after the end of this Parliament, because of the two-year gap between the regulator reaching a decision and then the backstop being implemented. Why, if we have gone all through this process?

We know what the problems are in the English football game. We know about the massive disparities of income and about the concentration of money not merely in the Premier League but in the parachuted clubs as well. The regulator has a responsibility to address the soundness and stability of English football and of clubs within English football. We know that the Championship clubs are massively overburdened with debt, as they all try desperately to compete to get into the Premier League. If all that is the problem, and the regulator is bound to address it, does address it, and decides the leagues have not resolved it so comes to implement a backstop, why then do we sit back and wait for two years for the backstop to be implemented? That is the issue. Having failed to stop the regulator and the inclusion of backstops within their remit, it almost seems as if the Premier League has decided, “Well, at least we can stop any of this happening in this Parliament in the hope that after the election another Government will come in and save us.” It is almost as though that is what it is trying to do.

I say to the Minister, kindly and carefully: have a think about this. There is an awful lot of concern—not just in the English Football League, but among colleagues. Clubs throughout the EFL have been speaking to their local MPs and saying, “We know what the problems are. We are electing you to Parliament to resolve those problems, and you committed to do that in your manifesto. Yet with this timescale, the likelihood is that by the time you get to the end of this Parliament you won’t have solved the problem. You won’t even have put anything in place to do so.”

At the end of this Parliament, I would like the Minister to be saying, “I am the Sports Minister who has substantially helped resolve the appalling distribution of finances in English football, which cripples our game and means that clubs are exposed to enormous cliff edges that put them unnecessarily into debt, and which leads to bad practice among owners.” There are many things to stop bad practice, but we could help by resolving the issue now and agreeing on something: not how the regulator should do its job, but that once the regulator has done the job it is at least allowed to implement within a timely period.

I hope the Minister will seriously consider amendment 141 and listen to other colleagues who may want to discuss these issues as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.

[Mr French]

Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.

It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.

[Mr French]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)—(Mr French.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.

Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr French]

I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc

Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Power to require information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.

Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.

The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.

As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Reports on clubs by expert reporters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.

The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.

The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.

We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Meaning of “relevant infringement”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.

Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?

Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?

Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?

Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?

Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?

Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.

Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.

Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?

Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.

On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Investigatory powers

Amendment made: 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75

Sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.

As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?

Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?

Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?

I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.

The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?

The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.

On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.

We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Urgent directions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.

We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.

Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?

We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?

[Stephanie Peacock]

An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.

A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025

Louie French Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2025 General Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. For full transparency, I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

The Conservative party has long championed positive reforms to the Gambling Act that will deliver further investment in jobs and leisure activities across the UK. We therefore welcome that the Government have finally listened to our calls to unlock this investment in casinos, whether in Blackpool, Birmingham or—closer to home for me—the Hippodrome in London. The statutory instrument had cross-party agreement before the election, and we will not oppose it for the sake of it today.

However, we continue to have major concerns about the rise of the gambling black market. I urge the Minister to do all she can to ensure that the Treasury does not move forward with its tax hike, which will hurt bingo halls and sports across the UK. Will she please confirm that she and colleagues at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport are making those representations to the Treasury, ahead of the end of the consultation? She will be aware of the widespread concerns across the industry. Secondly, can she please clarify why the Government are taking a different approach to machine reforms of adult gaming centres? I hope that she is also aware of the widespread concern in that sector. Some of the points in her speech may also apply to that sector.