Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 15th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I think was rather underplaying her expertise in her comments. There is a certain level of déjà vu about this Bill, as has been mentioned. Many of us spent a lot of time debating its predecessor, under the previous Government, and it is nice to see at least some of the band getting back together.

I acknowledge that this reincarnation has been significantly improved from the last version, and the changes go a long way towards dealing with many of the issues that Members from across the House raised last time round. I hope that my desire to clamp down on fraud is well known, and I completely understand the need to try to reduce the roughly £10 billion in annual losses to fraud and error that arise in the social security system. So I broadly support the strengthening of the powers set out in Part 1, although I share some of the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.

I cannot help but suspect that concentrating on the capabilities and competence of the agencies that should be investigating and recovering fraud losses would be likely to achieve more. The utter uselessness of the National Investigation Service in recovering Covid fraud losses is a good example. It seems to have cost more to run than it has recovered, and I note from today’s Times that it is about to be closed down.

Most of my comments will concentrate on Part 2, which relates to the social security aspects. First, there is the question of the proportionality of the measures. I have been struggling to understand the impact assessment; like most of these things, it is an awful lot of pages and not a lot of information—it really is time the Government got their act together on impact assessments. As I understand it, the measures will initially raise less than £180 million a year, rising to £500 million after 2030. I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm the actual number, if I have got that wrong. Set against that are the direct costs to the department of around £42 million per year, and the costs that the measures will impose on the banks that will have to provide the information, which the impact assessment makes no attempt to quantify. Can the Minister provide any update on what those costs are expected to be and whether the banks will be reimbursed for them?

That net recovery is a very small proportion of the estimated losses: 2% to 5% recovery is a very small return when set against the imposition of what is a very intrusive power that will force banks to scan all their accounts for benefit payments and eligibility indicators. It is worth pointing out that this scanning requirement is not a one-off; it is potentially effectively continuous for periods of up to 12 months, which can be extended as and when. Let us be clear that, while the banks will provide information to the DWP only on those accounts and connected accounts which meet the criteria set out, in order to achieve that the banks will have to scan all accounts to find the information. The Government already have significant powers. What assessment have they undertaken of what could be achieved if those existing powers were used more effectively?

It would be much better to prevent fraud and error in the first place, rather than after the event. Is the Minister satisfied that the DWP is doing everything reasonable to that effect? Levels of fraud and error seem extremely high. Surely there is more we could do up front, which might remove the need for some of these changes. A redesign of benefits and claim processes, such as removing cliff edges—the carer’s allowance is a good example of that—or making the process clearer and easier could go a long way to reducing claimant error. For example, we know that the pension credit forms are so long that they put people off even applying.

Then there is the philosophical question of carrying out blanket surveillance without suspicion. This raises the danger of making benefit claimants feel like second-class citizens and spied on, and that we inherently distrust them. Disability groups have already raised this concern, and today’s report from the Work and Pensions Select Committee reinforces it. According to its chair:

“We heard evidence that the process … of engaging with the DWP … too often led to mental distress … Deep-rooted cultural change of the DWP is desperately needed to rebuild trust”.


It is quite hard to see how the measures in this Bill will contribute to rebuilding that trust. Another philosophical question is whether it is right to treat fraud and error in the same way, particularly when the error is by the DWP and not by the claimant.

The Minister rightly referred to some of the new safeguards that have been introduced into this incarnation of the Bill, and I will probe a few of them. A number of codes of practice must be issued under the Bill before actions can be taken. I was going to ask, “When can we see those?”, but I am very grateful that the Minister has confirmed that we will see them before Committee. Instead, I just ask: can they be sent directly to those of us taking part in this debate, and as soon as possible before Committee, so that we have time to digest them?

The Minister has explained that only very restricted information can be requested from the banks, and I agree that that is a significant step forward from what we had before. However, that could be undermined by the enhanced investigatory power clauses, which will allow much more intrusive information to be to be obtained if DWP has reasonable grounds for suspicion that a person has committed an offence. Does the existence of an eligibility indicator under the verification processes constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion? If that is the case, it would drive a coach and horses through the safeguard of restricting the information in the first place.

Related to that, what are the consequences of an eligibility indicator being raised? What further investigations need to be carried out before, for example, a benefit is put on hold? I have heard a number of times—it was repeated earlier—that a human must be involved in any such decisions, but I can find nothing that says that in the Bill. Can the Minister point me to where that is? I have also heard nothing about what level of human interaction that will constitute and what level of seniority and qualification is required.

I also welcome the introduction of the independent reviews of the exercise of these new functions. However, the provisions for these independent reviews are somewhat lacking: they do not set out the timings, they are very limited in scope and there is no definition of what would constitute an “independent person”. In particular, the independent reviewer will not be required to opine on the proportionality of the powers and their use, which is a very serious omission. I am sure that we will revert to those matters later in the process.

The eligibility verification rights are limited to three specific benefits—universal credit, employment and support allowance, and pension credit—which, again, is another improvement on the previous version. I was quite surprised by the inclusion of the last one, as the main issue with pension credit is that it is woefully under claimed, rather than there being too much money being paid out. I am interested to understand why that was included. Those three can be added to by regulation, so are there any plans for them to be added to?

There is also an obvious loophole in the eligibility verification process, because it applies only to linked accounts within each single bank. A fraudulent claimant can easily avoid that by having accounts in different banks. Does that mean that deliberate fraud is unlikely, in practice, to be identified under this Bill? That would somewhat reduce its point. Has that loophole been taken into account when calculating the expected savings?

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned, the banking industry has also raised some concerns about the Bill, including—among other things—potential conflicts with its existing financial crime duties; possible tensions between the Bill and firms’ existing consumer duty and vulnerability guidance; the diversion of resources from wider economic crime capacity; and issues around safeguards for bulk data access. I would be interested to understand what meetings the Minister has had with organisations such as UK Finance to ensure that such concerns have been, and will be, addressed.

There are lots of other matters that I could raise, but given the time, I will raise just one more: the driving licence disqualification clauses. That seems extremely arbitrary, so I would like to understand more about the logic that was applied to that and what other measures might have been considered.

I acknowledge that the Bill has been greatly improved from its previous incarnation, but quite a lot of issues remain. The Minister has been generous with her time and, as always, constructive in her approach, so I very much look forward to further discussions and debates as we go through the next stages, as well as to the maiden speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too rise very briefly. A number of us have raised this scandal throughout Committee and the Minister has rightly said, “Well, there’s an independent review, I really can’t comment until we get the findings”. I say, “If we can’t comment until we get the findings of the independent review, the Government shouldn’t be taking money from the carers. That would seem obvious to me. Let’s wait until we’ve got the findings of the independent review”.

However, this speaks to the moral dilemma that was very well articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. It is something that has been troubling many of us throughout Committee: the Bill fails to distinguish between the ways people are treated for error and for fraud. Through no fault of their own, they end up in some instances being criminalised and certainly subject to some quite severe powers. That has always felt morally unjustifiable.

Another point this raises is that, although we constantly say that the moral case for this is that the money must be reclaimed, many instances of error seem to be due to errors made by the DWP, yet there is never any clarity about how, morally, it might be asked to pay. I am not suggesting that it pays financially, but if we are saying that those who make an error must pay, I do not understand why the DWP has not, as part of the Bill, made it clear which errors made by the department or state bodies the public will be able to hold them to account for when they are made. The scandal of the carers has cut through with the public: people know about it and are discussing it, and they in no way think that these people are welfare scroungers, frauds or doing anything wrong. So I urge the Government in this instance to be very clear that they will not act, as this amendment rightly argues, at least until the inquiry has brought its conclusions into the public arena.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope to be even more brief. I have sympathy for this amendment, but it is backward-looking, as it relates to situations that have already happened. We also need to stop them happening in the future. These problems have arisen because of a very badly designed benefit. It has a cliff-edge threshold. Cliff-edge thresholds will always be the ones that cause problems, so I really hope that we learn the lessons from this situation and stop applying cliff-edge thresholds to benefits. It does not work and is almost guaranteed to create problems of this nature.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments are well intentioned—an expression I believe I used in the last group, but I mean it. I want to acknowledge from the outset that they speak to a principle that I believe we can all support: the importance of integrating independent expert advice into the policy and operational decisions that we take, especially in areas where there have been clear signs that something has gone wrong.

The ongoing concerns around carer’s allowance overpayments are a case in point. The issue has rightly attracted attention, both inside and outside the House, in particular last year, and I believe that the decision to commission an independent review is right. Where there are systemic weaknesses, whether in communication, process or oversight, they must be identified and addressed, and we should absolutely be willing to listen to expert recommendations to improve how the DWP operates in the future.

I want to recognise the principle behind these amendments: it would be wrong to ignore serious and credible concerns raised by carers, campaigners and the public. They deserve answers and a process that ensures that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. That is why the review matters, and I hope we will all welcome it when it reports. I add to the questions raised earlier about the timing and when it will come.

However, that brings me to the core of my hesitation with these amendments. Although they stem from an entirely legitimate concern, I fear that they may go too far in how they propose to respond to it. Amendment 124, as laid out eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, would delay all recovery of carer’s allowance overpayments until the independent review had concluded and, crucially, all its recommendations had been implemented. Amendment 127 goes even further, effectively delaying the entire Act until those recommendations have been acted on.

I am not sure that this is a workable or proportionate course of action. We must remember that the review currently under way is, as I understand it, largely focused—this is an important point—on prevention. It asks how overpayments were allowed to happen in the first place, what lessons can be drawn and how the department can ensure that this does not recur. That is vital, but it is a forward-looking exercise: it is about improving systems going forward, not about deciding whether an overpayment that has already been identified should be recovered. The Minister might want to comment on my assessment of the review.

To put it plainly, if an overpayment has been made and the department has established this through due process, that money is owed to the public purse. The review likely will not and should not change that fundamental fact. We should not conflate the need to prevent future errors with the obligation to recover public funds that have already been incorrectly distributed. We are talking about money that could and should be supporting others in genuine need—to further a theme I made in the last group. While it is essential that recovery processes are fair and humane, it is also important that the recovery duty is not unduly delayed.

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If the DWP makes any decisions based on automated processing of personal data without meaningful human involvement which have legal or similarly significant effects on individuals, it must do so with specific safeguards in place, as per the UK’s data protection framework. When collecting personal data, the DWP must tell data subjects whether it uses any automated decision-making, with meaningful information about the logic involved and the significance and envisaged consequence for the data subject. Further safeguards, which apply after a relevant decision is taken, are set out—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Am I not right in thinking that that is about to change under the new Data (Use and Access) Act?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I was just about to get to that point, if the noble Lord will bear with me. Further safeguards, which apply after a relevant decision is taken, are set out in data protection law, to be amended by Section 80 of the Data (Use and Access) Act. These include providing individuals with information about significant decisions made about them and the opportunity to make representations and obtain human intervention on the decision.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised international comparisons and Australia. To be clear, the use of machine learning has led to legal action internationally, primarily because there were concerns about automated decision-making. That is not the case here, so I hope that reassures her.

This is not for this Bill and not for now, but the Committee has raised the fact that as, over time, AI will clearly be used a lot across government and the private sector, it is important that the Government make sure that all the right safeguards are in place. The DWP is leading the way on this, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is leading several programmes of work to utilise the opportunities of AI and ensure that it is used safely. For example, the algorithmic transparency recording standard is a standardised way for public sector organisations to publish information about how and why they are using algorithmic tools. It is mandatory across central government for algorithmic tools that have a significant influence on a decision-making process with public effect or directly interact with the general public. The Government Digital Service is currently implementing the mandatory rollout of the ATRS in government departments and arm’s-length bodies.

Work is going on in this broad space, but I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that the current law and the provisions in this Bill give the noble Baroness reason to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

We have had this discussion a few times, but does the Minister accept that most if not all of the safeguards she has talked about exist not in law but in the codes, guidance and internal rules of the DWP? They could be changed at will by a future Government less robust in looking after people’s safeguards. Would it not be sensible to put something into the Bill to future-proof these safeguards? My concern is not what is happening now but what could happen in future.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope I have made the case, in speaking to the amendment that we have been discussing, that the law already provides those protections—or it will do so when the provisions of the data Act are implemented, if those changes have not already been made. For my money, we could not have been clearer that the Bill creates no new automated decision-making powers. DWP and fraud and error decisions are always made by humans. There is a debate to be had, broadly for the future, which is where the work being done by DSIT is really important. That is where protections across government to future-proof things need to be brought in—not in this Bill, which does not introduce any new automated decision-making powers.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 126 would require a thorough assessment of the impact of the Bill on people facing financial exclusion. While the Bill’s intent to safeguard public money and tackle fraud is clear and necessary, we must not overlook the reality that those who are financially excluded are often among the most vulnerable in our society.

Financial exclusion can mean lacking access to basic banking services, credit or affordable financial products, which in turn imposes additional costs and barriers on those least able to bear them. Without a clear understanding of how the Bill’s provisions, such as new powers to access bank account information or recover debts, affect this group, we risk compounding their disadvantage and inadvertently causing hardship to those the social security system is meant to support. An independent assessment as proposed in this amendment would ensure that the implementation of the Bill does not create unintended consequences, and they would indeed be unintended for individuals already struggling to access financial services. It will provide Parliament with vital evidence of whether the Bill’s measures are proportionate and fair and whether additional safeguards or support are required for those at risk of exclusion.

This is about not weakening our response to fraud but ensuring that our actions are just and do not undermine the financial resilience of those who are most at risk of falling through the cracks. I know that the Minister and others mean well, but I urge the Committee to support this amendment, which guarantees that our efforts to protect public funds do not come at the expense of the most financially vulnerable in our communities. It is a balance. We need to be very careful that in stopping fraud we do not push people in vulnerable communities further down into debt and disappointment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I add my support at least to the intentions behind this amendment. We have had a number of discussions in Committee on the potential impact of layering costs and bureaucracy on financial services providers that relate to a particular class of people. In doing that, we risk incentivising those providers to stop providing services to that class of people—in this case, benefit recipients—and thereby potentially increasing financial exclusion.

The intention behind this amendment is right and I support adding it to the scope of the independent reviewer. However, I was not totally clear whether this applies to the whole Bill or just to Part 1, because it refers to the independent reviewer under Clause 64(1), which relates only to Part 1. This should relate to the whole Bill on a cumulative basis, because the cumulative impact of all the elements of this Bill may lead to greater changes in the behaviour of financial services companies than the sum of the individual changes themselves. We need to find a way of making sure that this covers the whole Bill and the cumulative impact.

Secondly, the amendment would require only a one-off report after 12 months. I am not sure that that would be sufficient. If there are impacts, as I fear there could be, they are likely to accumulate over time as banks decide that this is more difficult and therefore stop providing services. As we have talked about before, this is a question not of active debanking but more likely of stopping providing services over time. If we are to review this, we need to look at the impact more periodically—not necessarily annually, but over a longer period. I support the intention, but the amendment may need tweaking as it stands.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 126, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, which would require an independent assessment of the impact of this Bill on those at risk of financial exclusion and, crucially, ensure that the findings of that assessment are made public and laid before Parliament.

The principle behind this amendment is very important. We have heard throughout the Committee’s deliberations from me, my noble friend Lady Finn and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about the real and pressing risk that some of the measures in this Bill could unintentionally deepen financial exclusion. As we have said several times, there is a risk that banks are made to feel concerned about their customers if they are subject to an EVN, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has powerfully expressed previously and now, that banks could be deterred from taking on customers who are in receipt of benefits in the first place as a pre-emptive measure against the additional workload that this could demand.

As we do not yet have clarity from the Government about when and how often notices and demands will be made of banks, everyone is currently in the dark about how much of an additional workload this will mean for financial institutions. It is therefore entirely feasible that these institutions, which are, as we always need to remember, designed and operated to make money, could simply choose not to take the risks, impacting people who have not necessarily done anything wrong in the process. If we empower government to work more closely with banks to verify eligibility, recover funds and issue deductions, we must be equally mindful of the unintended consequences for those who sit at the margins of our financial system.

We appreciate that this amendment does not seek to obstruct or weaken the Bill. Quite the opposite—it offers the Government a constructive, concrete mechanism for assessing whether our enforcement framework is functioning in a way that is fair, proportionate and inclusive. This is an important measure, and I am sure that noble Lords across the Committee who have raised concerns about this issue will be somewhat reassured if the Government commit to undertaking a review as set out in this amendment.

We have heard Ministers reassure us that these powers will be used carefully and that the risk of harm is low. This amendment provides an opportunity to put those assurances to the test—not through speculation, but through evidence. Twelve months after this Bill is enacted, the independent reviewer would be tasked with producing a report examining the extent to which the measures we have passed are having an adverse impact on those already struggling to access or maintain financial stability.

In conclusion, this is not a burdensome ask; it is a safeguard. It would ensure that, as we work to strengthen our systems against fraud, we do not inadvertently erect new barriers for those who are financially vulnerable already. It would give the House and the other place the opportunity to revisit and respond to those findings, if and when action is needed. I therefore urge the Minister to consider this proposal seriously and to work with colleagues to ensure that the fight against fraud does not come at the cost of fairness or financial exclusion.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I reassure your Lordships’ Committee, particularly the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, that the PSFA and HMRC or the DWP can and will do dual investigations and work closely together. They have their own powers. I think the case of HMRC is probably more relevant than the DWP, but they will work collaboratively and do joint operations while having their own separate remits. It is not that they will not work together; however, we anticipate that especially where there is evidence—as I said earlier, it is about breadth of government—we would expect the majority of the PSFA’s work to be outside of those government agencies or public authorities.

Amendment 7 is unnecessary because it straight- forwardly duplicates matters already dealt with elsewhere in the Bill. Clause 1(1)(a) states that the Minister is given the function of investigating “suspected fraud” against public authorities. Clause 70, the interpretation clause, defines “suspected fraud” as

“conduct which the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect may constitute fraud”.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is content that the issues she raises in this amendment are appropriately dealt with.

Finally, Amendment 8 would restrict the fees that the PSFA could charge a public authority for investigation, enforcement or recovery action to no more than the amount that is recovered. Cash recovery is the hardest part of enforcement. Many initiated investigations will close without reaching the recovery stage—for example, because no fraud is found, an alternative approach is taken or because recovery is not possible even if the investigation is successful. The amendment would mean that no fee could be charged in those cases, despite the PSFA having necessarily invested resources into the investigation with the agreement of the public authority to have taken the case and undertaken the actions in the first place. That does not represent good value for money and runs contrary to the guidance in Managing Public Money on cost recovery.

In the most serious cases, cash recovery may not be the main or even a major factor; it will be the disruption of criminal gangs and prosecution of serious offenders. Such cases may be long, complex and multi-agency, and costs will probably exceed any potential recovery quite quickly. In cases of organised crime, assets may be irretrievable, laundered beyond reach or overseas. The public interest in investigation is to punish the criminals. The adoption of this clause would also fail to acknowledge or promote the deterrent effect of the investigations. The PSFA cannot be restricted in the cases that it selects by how much of its costs it can recover; that is counterproductive and counterintuitive.

I have two other points to raise.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon but, if the PSFA can charge more than it recovers, is that not a massive disincentive for the public authority to ask it to come in to begin with, given that it has to ask ?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

There is a balance here, because of the positives that go alongside this. There is a genuine issue that, if a criminal gang is actively targeting a public authority, the investigation and prosecution of those people in itself is something that the public authority would wish to see. There will always be costs involved in criminal activities, even if they cannot all be recovered. The police actively investigate criminal gangs, with the pragmatic understanding that not all costs can be recovered. There is also a deterrent effect in prosecuting people to ensure that everyone is aware that, if you defraud the state, you will be prosecuted. We will not always be able to get the money back, but we must be realistic about what is in front of us and what we can achieve.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the powers granted in this part of the Bill are necessary in principle, although the core principle of proportionality, which guides our approach on these Benches, means that we have some suggestions for improvement. We need to make sure that this system has adequate safeguards, protections and balance. I want to reiterate the view that in pursuit of a legitimate objective, we do not succumb to a temptation for overreach or powers which are too sweeping.

Our Amendment 9 introduces a reasonableness threshold, which has to be met before an information notice can be submitted. This amendment is designed to ensure that the information notice, which imposes a duty on the relevant person to provide information to the Minister, is imposed on that person only if there is a reasonable belief that the information notice would be proportionate.

We need to bear in mind throughout these discussions that the Bill establishes a substantial array of duties and responsibilities, and we need to make sure that when powers are exercised, they are done so with those burdens in mind. Our proposal that these powers can be exercised only when seen as reasonably proportionate incorporates this balance and will ensure that additional operational burdens are not imposed unless thought necessary.

Further, Amendment 10 seeks to protect the person to whom the information notice relates from unfair treatment ahead of any final conclusion about their liability. Banks and financial institutions, particularly when the Bill first comes into effect, will naturally be concerned that they are being asked to provide information about one of their customers in relation to fraud. It is feasible that the said bank may want to withdraw some banking services from the person in question, and it is therefore a reasonable demand that the Government make clear that the person in question is not necessarily guilty of the suspected fraud. We need to make sure that the verdict is not inadvertently passed on the person before a conclusion is reached, and this amendment would ensure that an investigation does not end up constituting a sentence.

Our Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 14 all address the technicalities of the review mechanism and seek to probe the Government on why they have set up the review mechanism in the way that they have in the Bill, Amendment 11 questions the Government on why they have defined 10 working days as the lower limit for the period in which the person to whom the information notice is given has to comply with the demands in the notice. Can the Minister assure the Committee that this period has been set based on a discussion with relevant persons to whom this duty will apply? Again, we need to recognise that this is a duty being imposed on third parties, and we need to balance it with the other activities undertaken by those persons.

Amendment 12 seeks to clarify how a review process could be initiated by the person to whom an information notice is given, which, alongside Amendment 13, seeks to make it easier for the person to review this decision with a longer timeframe. Amendment 14 would oblige the reasons for any decision reached following a review to be set out in writing, placing an additional duty of responsibility and accountability to the Minister for the steps they decide to take.

Alongside the reasonableness test outlined in our Amendment 9, these provisions work to make sure that the powers under the Bill are exercised proportionately and that they are balanced alongside adequate provisions for review, which will promote the sensible application of these notices.

Finally, Amendments 15 and 16 seek to protect the information of a person which has been shared with the Minister by limiting the people with whom that information can be shared. Defining in law that only specific people can have sight of personal, sensitive information is a proportionate check on the power of the Minister and will have the twofold benefit of protecting people who, we must remember, are not actually necessarily guilty of fraud, with the need to check their information to ascertain this fact.

The principle of obtaining information about a person is necessary for the provisions in the Bill to work and the objectives we all share to be met. Our amendments seek to nuance and improve the exercise of these powers by adding a reasonableness test, a clarification of the review process and additional controls on data sharing to protect those to whom the information notice relates. We hope that the Government and noble Lords across the Committee will recognise these improvements to the provisions currently set out in the Bill on information notices and the relevant review processes, and that these will be supported as measured and balanced proposals. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will very quickly make a couple of comments on Amendments 9 and 10. First, on Amendment 9, I have an amendment later in Committee that inserts a reasonableness point in a similar way, so I support this. However, I wonder whether this amendment is actually in the wrong place; I suggest that it ought to be in the initial line—“the Minister should reasonably consider”—as opposed to “reasonably proportionate”, but that is a small issue. I support the concept of Amendment 9.

Amendment 10 is quite important. This issue has been raised by the banking industry, and there is a very real concern that the receipt of a notice might provide reasonable grounds for the financial services firm to know or suspect that the customer has defrauded the public sector. In that situation, the failure to take action, for example to close or restrict the account, might conflict with wider anti-money laundering obligations and, possibly—I am not sure this is right—the corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent fraud. That might include having to exit customer relationships and so on.

So there is a very real concern from the financial services industry here. I am sure that that is not the intention of the Government in this situation but it is something that we need to think about, as the receipt of a notice cannot be seen as reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, because that would set all sorts of hares running against people who might be entirely innocent.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will just pick up the issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. We are dealing tomorrow with a statutory instrument that attempts to provide safeguards against banks and other organisations deciding to close people’s bank accounts or to deprive them of other financial services. It is often the people who are under the most financial pressure who find it difficult to get banked in the first place. They can get a basic bank account if they are lucky, but to get a bank account with any of the features that make financial life reasonable is exceedingly difficult. I therefore share the noble Lord’s concern that we do not start a hare running.

Banks are eager to offload people who do not have a lot of exciting and interesting activity. If this notice gives them an excuse to do that, I can see that an awful lot of banks will seize that opportunity, so I raise this as an issue to be wary of. In fact, we have an SI going in the opposite direction tomorrow, so this is really for the Government to make sure that one hand knows what the other hand is doing.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise in advance, because I think we are about to have a vote—or not, if the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, does not press her Motion.

Some significant points have been touched on in this very short debate. I will respond to each amendment in turn. Amendment 9 looks to introduce a test of reasonableness to determine whether an authorised officer has appropriately considered that information sought is both necessary and proportionate. Clause 3(1)(a) and (b) already set out the test for issuing an information notice: an authorised officer will have the power to compel information only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and only when the information being requested relates to a person whom an authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

What the Minister says is not quite true. It is where “the Minister considers” that it is necessary and proportionate to do so, not simply where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. That is an important difference—hence the reasonableness requirement.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord is going to inspire me to go into more detail. There must be reasonable grounds to suspect that fraud has taken place, which follows the basic rule that there must be an objective basis for that belief. It must be genuinely suspected that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and the belief must be based on facts and/or information that are relevant to the likelihood of needing to obtain information for the purpose of investigating suspected fraud against public authorities. It must be objectively reasonable for them to suspect this, given the information available to them. The reasonable grounds test is a standard and widely accepted test used by various organisations, including the DWP, the Serious Fraud Office and the police. We are seeking to replicate that.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, it is me again. Our proposal in this group is that Clause 7 and the corresponding Schedule 1 do not stand part of the Bill. The powers granted to civil servants under the provisions in this clause are sweeping, and we believe that they are better exercised by those with adequate training and experience—namely, police officers.

I will cover in a little more depth what this clause is proposing. Clause 7 would allow junior civil servants in the Cabinet Office—relatively junior, at HEO level—to apply to a Justice of the Peace for a warrant to enter and search premises for material relevant to an indictable offence. These civil servants can enter the property whether the relevant person is present or not, and they will have the power to seize anything if they have reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence or is evidence in relation to an offence. Section 20 would grant these civil servants the power to seize computerised information, and Section 22 would allow PSFA investigators to retain seized property for as long as necessary in all circumstances.

These are police powers, yet under this clause they are to be exercised not by police officers but by civil servants who, however well intentioned, are under no legal obligation to have the legal training or operational experience that should be required to exercise such powers responsibly. We believe that if an intervention required as part of an investigation is serious enough to justify a search warrant and serious enough to justify entering a person’s private premises and removing their belongings, it is serious enough to require the presence of a police officer, who is recognised as the proper legitimate authority who should bear the responsibility for exercising these powers.

There is a practical point here too. If the Government believe that fraud against the state requires this level of intervention, they should work with law enforcement to build capacity, not bypass it. It is the job of the police to investigate crime, including fraud; that is the basis for their training. That is the established legal framework in which they operate and that is what the public expect. We should not seek to empower civil servants to do the job of police simply on the basis of current operational capacity. Once again, we return to our maxim of proportionality: we need to make sure that the necessary powers in the Bill are exercised responsibly and in a way that is both balanced and effective.

I want to be clear that what we are proposing will not prevent the PSFA undertaking its investigations. Once the threshold for the exercise of these powers has been met, the investigation itself will have had to progress considerably if a warrant is to be issued. Given the way these powers are set out in Clause 7, the Government are obviously certain that investigations will be able to proceed substantially without the need for these powers. Our proposal that they be removed from the remit of civil servants and held instead by the police, which is the established, recognised authority that largely wields these powers at present, will therefore not infringe on the capacity of the PSFA to investigate fraud, as recognised by the Government.

This is therefore another exercise in balance. We believe that our suggestion that Clause 7 and the corresponding Schedule 1 do not stand part of the Bill balances the need to counteract fraud with the imperative that we do not grant sweeping powers to civil servants who are not sufficiently trained, experienced or recognised to exercise them in the proportionate, measured and sensible way we need to be able to guarantee in the Bill. For those reasons we do not believe that Clause 7 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. We urge the Government to reconsider this approach and to ensure that powers of this magnitude are exercised only by those with the proper training, the proper accountability and the proper role: our police services.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, has said it all, so I will be very brief. I have to say that I am extremely uncomfortable with giving these sorts of police powers to civil servants and others. We have an example in the recent past of powers being used inappropriately by a non-police agency in the Post Office Horizon situation. I am very uncomfortable about it. I am interested to hear why we should not allow the police to deal with these things and why we should give them to civil servants, but I will take some convincing.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it is now my turn to say, “I’m back”. This is a very important part of the Bill, and it is right that we discuss it in some detail. It was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in the previous group.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for flagging her concerns regarding the PSFA seeking powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. For ease, I will now refer to it as PACE. Clause 7 designates authorised investigators with the necessary authority to use limited provisions from PACE within the remit of public sector fraud investigations. Specifically, they are the power to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter and search premises and seize evidence and special provisions to apply to the courts to gain access to certain types of material which are regarded as excluded material or special procedure material. These powers will only be used in criminal investigations to enable all reasonable lines of inquiry to be followed and all relevant evidence to be collected.

To reassure noble Lords, when executing a search warrant, authorised investigators will be accompanied by an officer who has the powers of a constable. This could be either a police officer or an officer from another government department, such as HMRC or the NCA, with the powers of a constable. They will ensure the safety of the authorised investigators and will be able to use their own powers of arrest or reasonable force if necessary. We are not seeking for the Cabinet Office to have powers of arrest. They will always be accompanied by appropriate officials who have powers under PACE.

Authorised investigators will adhere to the relevant PACE codes of practice, which provide robust safeguards around the use of these investigative tools. Every application for a search warrant or a court order under PACE must be scrutinised and authorised by the court. Authorised investigators will also be subject to robust internal and external scrutiny. This will come from the PSFA’s independent person, as appointed under Clause 64, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and, as required, the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, we are very aware of the Horizon scandal and the impact that that had on normal people’s lives. We want to put in every safeguard to make sure, and we hope we have, that these powers could not be used to replicate such a scandal. The PACE powers sought in Clause 7 are the minimum necessary to allow the PSFA to effectively undertake criminal investigations. We are not seeking the full use of PACE powers under this clause for the PSFA.

Turning to Schedule 1, this modifies the provisions of PACE adopted in Clause 7 so that they apply appropriately to authorised investigators within the PSFA. Schedule 1 provides a route for authorised investigators to apply to the court for access to excluded material. Access to special procedure material is provided under Clause 7 and Schedule 1 to PACE. It also establishes a legal framework that allows the PSFA to transfer evidence seized under PACE to other organisations, securing the chain of command—I mean the chain of evidence. It has been a long week; I was getting married a week ago.

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This is about ensuring that money that has been fraudulently paid out is pursued and reclaimed wherever possible and that those responsible are held accountable for their actions. For these reasons, I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, not to press her opposition to Clause 7 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned a number of safeguards, including the authorised officer being accompanied by a police constable. I cannot find any of that. Where can I find those safeguards?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very interesting point. It is in the guidance, but I will write to him so that he has a written record.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th June 2025 Grand Committee

I trust I have reassured the Committee that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards for an individual to avoid this power entirely, and that they have the right to challenge the terms of the order to the PSFA and then to a tribunal should it not agree.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Baroness mentioned a moment ago that a direct deduction order can be made only when a person has already agreed that an amount is recoverable. Could she point out where that is in the Bill? I cannot find it anywhere.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I am assured that it is in the Bill. I ask noble Lords to bear with; as soon as that has been passed to me, I will highlight exactly where in the Bill it is.

It is in Clause 12. That was like magic.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to reassure him that, yes, it can and it will.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

On Amendment 55, I understand that 24 months may not be the right number, but it cannot be right that an order can stay open indefinitely so that, 10 or 15 years later, the PSFA can suddenly start taking money from the account again. There must be some sort of drop-dead point; I wonder where that should sit.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I beg the leave of the Committee to consider that; I will reflect on it and come back in due course.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I apologise to your Lordships. The Committee will be fed up with hearing from me before the afternoon is out. No? Excellent.

We all agree that fraud against the public purse is wrong and must be tackled, but we must also be honest about who is being asked to do the work and at what cost. Banks are expected under the provisions in the Bill to dedicate staff, systems and time to support public sector fraud investigations or enforcement efforts. This may be in the form of complying with information notices, processing and applying deduction orders, or liaising with government departments. These activities are not core business functions for a commercial bank. They are not revenue generating. They do not serve the bank’s shareholders or contribute directly to its customers’ financial well-being. They are, in essence, a form of public service being performed by a private entity.

Here is the crux of the matter: every hour a member of the bank staff spends assisting with a public fraud case is an hour that they are not spending on risk management, product development, client service or revenue generation. That is a real and measurable opportunity cost: the bank is being asked to sacrifice its own commercial objectives to achieve a government policy goal. Regardless of the fact that this is a goal with which we all agree, we need to recognise that this is a burden on banks, even if it is in pursuit of a good objective.

Of course, banks have legal and moral obligations to help prevent criminal activity—and they do. However, we must be cautious about crossing the line between reasonable regulatory compliance and the outsourcing of state enforcement functions to private firms, without proper consideration of the attendant costs and effects that this could have.

It is also worth considering the cumulative effect. Banks are not only being asked to support fraud detection but simultaneously are dealing with sanctions enforcement and a growing raft of compliance burdens. The more we demand of banks in public service roles, the more we divert their resources away from their essential commercial purpose: financing the economy. So, while the fight against public sector fraud is essential, we must be alive to the costs that we are placing on others to carry it out.

Our Amendments 32, 38 and 54 would demand that the Minister has due regard to the costs that they are imposing on banks as a result of the exercise of their powers. We return to our core theme of proportionality: building into the Bill a regard to the cost burden on banks is a way that the imperative of tackling fraud is sensibly and responsibly balanced with the attendant costs that it imposes on private entities.

Further to this, our Amendment 33 would require the Minister to undertake a review of the costs being imposed on banks within 12 months of Clause 19 coming into effect. This amendment works alongside our Amendments 32, 38 and 54 in establishing the principle that the Minister must have due regard to the costs imposed on banks, and furthers this by demanding that the Minister undertakes a review of these costs a year after the provisions in the Bill come into force. In creating a duty to have due regard and combining it with the requirement for a review after a year, we have proposed sensible amendments which impose on the Minister an important obligation to the banks on which the Bill so heavily relies. We must make sure that, in our efforts to tackle fraud, we work alongside partners in the banking and financial sectors, not against them. These amendments will ensure that the Bill does that.

Finally, our Amendment 40 would ensure that the relevant bank is involved in determining the amount of money that it could recover to cover the costs incurred by complying with the demands under the Bill. At present, the Minister is able to unilaterally determine what a bank’s reasonable costs are. As I have outlined in my remarks, in complying with the Bill banks will incur not just an operational cost but an opportunity cost. Banks understand the complexity of their own systems; they know what it takes to divert staff from commercial roles to public service tasks. They are best placed to quantify the impact of compliance on customer service, internal risk management and technical infrastructure. To exclude them from this process of determining costs, to impose obligations without consultation or a mechanism for cost recovery, would be to create an asymmetric relationship in which the state demands and the private sector simply absorbs.

We are not asking for a blank cheque or for banks to name any figure they please, but there must be a structured and collaborative process, grounded in evidence, in which banks have a say in what their involvement truly costs and in how those costs are acknowledged and, where appropriate, reimbursed. This is therefore a sensible amendment which seeks to create that relationship between the Cabinet Office and the banks on which it relies. I hope the Government will consider it as a reasoned improvement to the Bill.

In conclusion, it is important that we do not overlook the practical realities of who is being asked to shoulder the burden of implementation. The provisions in this Bill place real and ongoing demands on the banking sector—not only in staffing and systems but in opportunity costs that affect banks’ ability to serve customers and grow the wider economy.

Our amendments do not seek to weaken the fight against fraud but to ground it in a framework of fairness, partnership and proportionality. By requiring that Ministers have due regard for the costs imposed, that those costs are reviewed and that banks have a say in assessing what they are owed, we introduce essential balance and accountability into this regime. These are moderate, practical and constructive proposals. If we are to maintain the willing co-operation of the banking sector in delivering the public good, we must also treat banks as genuine partners, not simply as instruments of policy. I hope the Government will take these amendments seriously, and I urge noble Lords to support them. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have amendments in later groups on the EVM section of the Bill with a similar effect to these, looking at the costs to the banks. This is not just about the impact on the banks, however. As many of us know from the experience of being politically exposed persons, when you put onerous responsibilities and costs on the banks that relate to a particular class of customers, you can create a disincentive for the banks to provide services to them. Most of us have probably had the experience of being PEP-ed, and it is not terribly pleasant. Here, if we are putting a load of costs on the banks that relate to benefit recipients, we make it less likely that those vulnerable people will be able to access banking services. The Government need to think about this quite carefully.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I was going to make a very similar point. We have to consider the serious consequences of the Government, in effect, turning banks into de facto government inspectors, as well as the unintended consequences such as those for politically exposed persons. Goodness knows that that has not gone well. It has created all sorts of chaos. I am very anxious about private institutions, in effect, being asked to do the Government’s dirty work in many instances.

I want to query, though, banks being able to charge for the hard work they do via new paragraph 8 in Schedule 5, in which there is a provision for the bank to be able to deduct a fee from the debtor’s account to meet its reasonable costs in complying with the order, which is a ridiculous situation. It amounts to state-backed approval of funds being taken directly from the bank accounts of private customers to deal with administrative retrieval of overpayments. By the way, the maximum amount that banks could charge would be set by the Secretary of State via regulations, which is also not reassuring. Although I do not want the banks to be used, I also do not want them to be able to charge their own clients to do the job that the Government have demanded they do. I feel very queasy about all this.

On the discrimination point, if these measures identify a range of types of bank clients who are causing more trouble than they are worth, the obvious decision will be to debank. It makes perfect sense that they would think, just like every other private sector organisation, “Do I really want people on benefits living in my house?” We have seen this discrimination time and again. There is a serious danger of unintended consequences here that the Government have to take seriously.

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[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I, too, have a few comments to make on these amendments. I very much support the intention behind them. I would like to understand a bit more about Clause 34 and how it will operate. Paragraph 219 of the Explanatory Notes says:

“This clause introduces a process for review of deduction orders by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker upon application by relevant parties”.


As far as I can see, there is no mention in the legislative text of the authorised officer who conducts the review being of a higher grade. Perhaps I have missed it, and it is somewhere else; if so, I would be grateful to know where. If it is not somewhere else, it may be that the Explanatory Notes made that point on the basis of general principles of administrative law. Either way, it would be useful to know where that comes from.

My second point concerns the grounds for review, which are very narrow. Clause 34(4) says:

“An application for a review under this section may not be made on, or include, any ground relating to the existence or amount of a payable amount (unless the amount is said to be incorrectly stated in the order)”.


The grounds for appeal in the following clause are equally narrow. Is my understanding correct that the reason these grounds are so narrowly drawn is that there has already been a final determination of the payable amount by a court or tribunal—which was the reference to Clause 12 that we were given earlier on? Can the Minister give us some examples of grounds for review, given how narrowly drawn that provision is in Clause 34(4)?

Finally, I note that there is no time limit imposed on the Minister for carrying out the review. The applicant would have to put in an application within 28 days, but they might just sit and wait for the outcome of that review for an indefinite period. Would it not be a good idea to include a clear time limit on the reviewer—ideally the independent reviewer—or the authorised officer for that review to be concluded?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will say very briefly that I support the concept, at least, behind these amendments. It cannot be right that the Minister marks his own homework. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, talked about what it says in the guidance notes. I do not know whether this is the right mechanism but, at the very least, if a review is to be carried out by the department, it must be by somebody who was not at all involved in the original decision and is not answerable to anybody directly involved in the decision-making process. That needs to be set in stone somewhere, not just in guidance notes or whatever that can be changed at a whim by any future Government. This is one of the weaknesses throughout this. We have lots of safeguards, but they are all in codes of conduct, future statutory instruments or whatever; they are not set in stone in the law and therefore are not strong safeguards. That is a general thought.

I have a feeling that I know what the answer will be: if they do not like the outcome of the review, they can go to the First-tier Tribunal. But that is a big leap from going back and saying, “Can we have an independent review?”. A First-tier Tribunal is, effectively, a full legal process. We need something that works and in which people can have confidence at the first level, before needing to take it to the much more legalistic, costly and complicated process of the First-tier Tribunal. I think the Minister will say that that is the answer, but I am not sure that I agree.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This is a popular set of amendments. I agree entirely that there should be an independent review. That is something that somehow has to be in the Bill. What worries me about the noble Baroness’s amendments is that they talk about an “independent person”. Those are the words in the amendment. An independent person is somewhat different from an independent review. I can see a wonderful job opportunity in having panels of independent persons who could be available to be appointed.

During the debate on this Bill, one has somehow to put flesh on the concept of an independent review, how it is set up and how people can make their complaints. One of the real problems of modern life is that, if you want to make a complaint, you have to be able to do it on a computer and use IT. Is there going to be a process whereby you do this in a letter form in some way or another? These amendments, in seeking to put right the lack of an independent review, latch on too closely to the concept of an independent person, which in my view is completely different.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Finn, particularly on Amendment 60A, because as we go through this process it feels as though the Government are trying to be judge and jury on whether the existence of an order should apply at all. I am conscious that it is important that the Government be allowed to get on and have this more straightforward way of collecting money that they are due, but it strikes me as pretty draconian that the question of whether a debt exists cannot be challenged—it cannot go for review. I appreciate we are debating the amendment, but I say by the way, in reference to the Explanatory Notes for Clause 34 on the process for review, that the legislation does not point to the fact that it is supposed to go to a higher-grade person; I am sure that it will be set out in guidance, which I hope will have statutory standing. It strikes me as odd that, having not been able to even challenge whether the order should exist, you cannot go to a tribunal about it, either. Ministers will know that I wish that parts of the Bill would go further in trying to get money back from people in a variety of ways, but in this area I do not agree with the approach of the Government and certainly agree with that of my noble friend.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this group, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, proved the other day, Amendment 60A is not necessary because Clause 12 sets out clearly that these orders can be used only where there has been a final determination of the amount owing by the court or where it has been agreed.

However, I support Amendment 61A. Frankly, it is becoming a bit of a weakness in an awful lot of areas that the impact assessments that come with legislation are regularly quite poor. It is incredibly important that, when we make regulations that will have impacts on people, we understand what those impacts are.

I have one other question that I probably should have dealt with by means of an amendment, but I have only just spotted something. Why are regulations made under Clauses 37(2)(c) to (f) subject to the negative procedure and not the affirmative procedure?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, raise important considerations about procedural fairness and transparency in the implementation of the Bill. Amendment 60A, which would allow applicants to request a review into the existence or value of the payable amount, would provide a valuable safeguard, ensuring that individuals have an accessible means to challenge decisions where there might be uncertainty or dispute. This aligns well with the principle of natural justice and could help prevent errors going uncorrected.

Amendments 61A and 61B focus on the mechanisms surrounding direct deduction orders, emphasising the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight. Requiring an impact assessment to accompany any changes to the processing of these orders, as proposed in Amendment 61A, would encourage transparency about the potential costs and effects on banks’ operational capacity. Similarly, Amendment 61B’s provision that consultation outcomes must be laid before Parliament prior to implementation would ensure democratic scrutiny. Together, these amendments would contribute to a more open and considered approach, balancing the efficient recovery of public funds with the need for oversight and due process, and I support them.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, all these amendments pertain to deduction from earnings orders—or DEOs, as I shall refer to them from here. DEOs are a mechanism by which the PSFA can instruct an employer to make deductions from the liable person’s salary in order to recover the money owed as a result of fraud or error. This power can be exercised only after the amount owed has been agreed by the liable person, a court or tribunal, or if the penalty appeal period has lapsed or an appeal has been finally determined. People can avoid their employers being contacted if they simply engage with us and pay what they owe.

DEOs are an established mechanism used by the courts, the DWP, the Child Maintenance Service and some local authorities. We have sought to emulate best practice and established processes to make it straightforward for the employers that have to implement them. There are safeguards for the liable person, such as a protected earnings amount of 60% and the requirement for deductions to be affordable and fair, as set out in Clause 41.

Before an order is made, the liable person will have the opportunity to make representation on the proposed terms. Amendment 61C would create an obligation for the PSFA to provide the reasoning behind its decision to proceed with a DEO following these representations. Amendment 61D would create a similar obligation for the PSFA to demonstrate that it has taken the liable person’s wider circumstances into account when determining the level of affordable and fair deductions. Both these amendments are duplicative as the PSFA would be doing this anyway, as a matter of good public law. As I outlined previously, guidance will also be published detailing what information will be supplied to the liable person as part of the wider decision-making processes.

Amendment 61E would limit the regulation-making powers in Clause 41(7) to establishing affordability considerations. We have striven to put as much detail into the Bill as possible, but there are elements where it is valuable to have a degree of flexibility so that further conditions or restrictions can be added to the measures to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes. This amendment would severely limit the Government’s ability to adapt to these changes and impact the efficacy of this recovery method, thus potentially reducing the money lost to fraud that could be recovered in the future.

Amendment 61F would require that the PSFA consults with employers on the level of admin costs that they can charge the liable person for implementing a DEO. There are standard charges of £1 per deduction period allowed by the courts and other organisations that use DEOs. It is not for the PSFA to set up a different regime single-handedly, as it will be following established processes already used across government. If it is felt that changes to this charge should be made, they would need to be done in conjunction with the other bodies.

Amendments 62A and 62B would prevent a suspended DEO from being restarted after 24 months. We discussed the same matter on Monday, in relation to direct deduction orders. I confirm that I am still reflecting on the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which also apply to DEOs, and I am having meetings with officials on them. It is important that the PSFA has discretion in how it can react to individual circumstances counterbalanced against its duty to recover money lost to fraud and error in the most appropriate way. There is a balance to be struck and I shall report back on my reflections in due course.

Finally, Amendment 62C would require that, when the PSFA revokes a DEO, it provides the reasoning to both the liable person and their employer. In practice, this would be shared with the liable person as a matter of good public law to safeguard the public law duty of fairness in decision-making for the individuals subject to the orders. However, there are serious privacy considerations that could be undermined by providing such information to the employer. Upon the establishment of a DEO, the employer is not told anything about the DEO other than what is to be deducted from the liable person’s salary. This is the only information of relevance to the employer. Any other information would be a breach of privacy.

Regarding some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I think it would be helpful to your Lordships if I assist them with some more information on safeguards. Regarding the safeguards in place for the use of DEOs, including preventing hardship, the Public Sector Fraud Authority has committed to the following safeguards: vulnerability assessments, maximum deduction amounts, opportunities for representation, reviews and appeals, and the ability to notify a change of circumstances. The PSFA will continue to utilise best practice from across government.

On the question of who determines the amount of debt owed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s investigation will calculate the debt owed to the Government as a result of fraud or error following an investigation into suspected fraud. The liable person will be notified of the recoverable amount. If they do not agree, a firm and final determination will be sought by a court or tribunal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked what is meant by “among other things” in Clause 41. Clause 41(6) gives the Minister powers to

“make further provision about the calculation of amounts to be deducted”

in respect of DEOs. To be clear, to make further provision would not allow the Minister to qualify or change the provision, only to add specific conditions or restrictions that can be taken into account when calculating the amount to be deducted. As given as an example in Clause 41(7), the key consideration will be hardship and defining what constitutes hardship. It is important that the definition of hardship is not fixed, as what constitutes hardship today may look very different in, say, 10 years’ time.

The term “among other things” could also include other items that can be taken into account when calculating DEOs that are not so immediately obvious. For example, the regulations could be used in allowing for a different deduction rate around the Christmas period, when the liable person might have other outgoings that would not be reasonably foreseeable when the order was first given.

I hope that goes some way to assuring noble Lords about our safeguards and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I listened to the Minister, and I listened to her the other day on the same subjects regarding DDOs. A question occurs. In many cases, the amount owed is set by the court. Why, then, does the court not decide how that amount should be repaid? Why do we have to go through all these processes and decisions by the departments rather than the court?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a very interesting point, on which I will have to reflect and come back to him, if that is okay.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

75A: Clause 70, page 37, line 32, at end insert—
““reasonable grounds” do not include generalisations or stereotypes of certain categories of people, for example that members of a particular social group are more likely to be involved in fraudulent activity than others, irrespective of whether they are made through entirely automated, partially automated, or non-automated processes;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Lord Vaux of Harrowden, clarifies that people cannot be investigated for fraud based on stereotypes and generalisations, be this through the use of algorithms, human assessment, or a combination.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have been debating Part 1, which gives substantial powers to the Cabinet Office when the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, and we are about to kick off on Part 2, which gives substantial powers to the DWP. Those include police-style powers to enter private premises, search them and seize property, as well as powers to demand information. Those are potentially very intrusive powers, so it is essential that they can be exercised only when it is genuinely appropriate to do so.

The two amendments in this group cover both Parts 1 and 2, and they provide essential clarification as to how the DWP and PSFA should interpret the legal threshold for most of the investigative powers in the Bill, which is the requirement to have “reasonable grounds” of suspicion of fraud.

The amendments are intended to ensure that, when the DWP and PSFA are exercising their investigative powers under this Bill, reasonable grounds do not include generalisations or stereotypes of certain categories of people—for example, that members of a particular social group are more likely to be involved in fraudulent activity than others. Investment in data analytics and other emerging technologies, such as AI, for fraud risk detection is inevitably, and probably rightly, increasing. The Government have signalled their intention to turbocharge AI and to mainline AI into the veins of the nation, including the public sector.

The Government are, as we speak, trying to pass the Data (Use and Access) Bill, which would repeal the current ban on automated decision-making and profiling of individuals. The DWP has invested heavily in artificial intelligence, widening its scope last year to include use of a machine-learning tool to identify fraud in universal credit advances applications, and it intends to develop further models. This is despite a warning from the Auditor-General in 2023 of

“an inherent risk that the algorithms are biased towards selecting claims for review from certain vulnerable people or groups with protected characteristics”.

The DWP admitted that its,

“ability to test for unfair impacts across protected characteristics is currently limited”.

There are real concerns about the inaccuracy of algorithms, particularly when such inaccuracy is discriminatory, when mistakes disproportionately impact a certain group of people. It is well evidenced that machine-learning algorithms can learn to discriminate in a way that no democratic society would wish to incorporate into any reasonable decision-making process about individuals. An internal DWP fairness analysis of the universal credit payments algorithm, which was published only due to a freedom of information request, has revealed a “statistical significant outcome disparity” according to people’s age, disability, marital status and nationality.

This is not just a theoretical concern. Recent real-life experiences in both the Netherlands and Sweden should provide a real warning for us, and are clear evidence that we must have robust safeguards in place. Machine-learning algorithms used in the Netherlands’ child tax credit scandal learned to profile those with dual nationality and low income as being suspects for fraud. From 2015 to 2019, the authorities penalised families over suspicion of fraud based on the system’s risk indicators. Tens of thousands of families, often with lower incomes or belonging to ethnic minorities, were pushed into poverty. Some victims committed suicide. More than a thousand children were taken into foster care. The scandal ultimately led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister, Mark Rutte.

In Sweden in 2024, an investigation found that the machine-learning system used by the country’s social insurance agency is disproportionately flagging certain groups for further investigation over social benefits fraud, including women, individuals with foreign backgrounds, low-income earners and people without university degrees. Once cases are flagged, fraud investigators have the power to trawl through a person’s social media accounts, obtain data from institutions and even interview an individual’s neighbours as part of their investigations.

The two amendments that I have tabled are based on paragraph 2.2 of Code A to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, in relation to police stop and search powers, which states that:

“Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more likely to be involved in criminal activity”.


These amendments would not reduce the ability of departments to go after fraud. Indeed, I argue that by ensuring that the reasonable suspicion is genuine, rather than based on stereotypes, they should improve the targeting of investigations and therefore make the investigations more effective, not less so.

The Bill extends substantial intrusive powers to the Cabinet Office, the PFSA and the DWP, and those powers must be subject to robust safeguards in the Bill. The use of “generalisations or stereotypes”, whether through automated systems or otherwise, should never be seen as grounds for reasonable suspicion. I hope the Minister will see the need for these safeguards in that context, just as they are needed and exist in relation to stop and search powers. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and to speak in favour of Amendments 75A and 79A, to which I have attached my name and which noble Lords will see have rather broad support in political terms—perhaps not the broadest I have ever seen but it is certainly up there. I must also pay tribute to Justice, a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation that is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists, which has been most determined in ensuring that these issues are raised in this Bill, in this context.

I have already addressed these issues in the Chamber in a number of amendments to the Employment Rights Bill that I tabled and spoke to. I am not going to repeat all that I said there, but I cross-reference those amendments. If noble Lords want to find out more about this issue, there is an excellent book by the researcher Shannon Vallor, The AI Mirror, which is a useful metaphor for understanding the risks whereby we live in a biased society in which those biases risk being reflected back to us and magnified by the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms. That is very much what these two amendments seek to address.

The noble Lord has already given us two international examples of where using AI, algorithms, stereotypes and generalisations in investigations has gone horribly wrong. I have to add a third example, which is the infamous case in Australia of “Robodebt”. That was an automated debt recovery and assessment programme, from the rough equivalent of the DWP, that was exercised in Australia. There was controversy before and through its implementation, and it was an unmitigated disaster. I point the Minister and others to the fact that there was a Royal Commission in Australia which said the programme had been

“a costly failure of public administration in both human and economic terms”.

I note that the House of Representatives in Australia passed a public apology to the huge number of people who were affected.

In a way, I argue that these amendments are a protection for the Government, that this will be written into law: there is a stop that says, “No, we cannot allow things to run out of control in the way we have seen in so many international examples”. I think these are truly important amendments. I hope we might hear positive things from the Minister but, if not, we are going to have to keep pursuing these issues, right across the spectrum. I was very taken: Hansard will not record the tone of voice in which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the Government wish “to mainline AI”, but it is important to note that a concerning approach is being taken by the Government to the whole issue of artificial so-called intelligence.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

The noble Baroness will be very aware that we now have several days of Committee before us on stage 2 of the Bill, and I look forward to discussing this and many issues with her as the Committee stage progresses.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but informative debate. I seem to be getting a bit of a track record. I thought my previous record was managing to get an amendment signed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I might even have surpassed that with this one. I am not sure quite what that says.

I am partially reassured by what the Minister has said, and obviously I am sure that she and her team will follow the safeguards that she has talked about. But those safeguards are not in statutes. For example, she talked about decisions being taken only by humans in relation to putting out information requests. That is not the case. The code of conduct refers only to decisions that will affect benefits, not the information request side of things, and it is only in the code of conduct, which can be changed at will. I am uncomfortable here.

We are talking, particularly with the eligibility verification process, about very large amounts of data, potentially on 9.9 million people. Who knows how many will flag up eligibility indicators? But without a shadow of doubt, the department will be using some form of algorithmic or AI tool to decide which of those are the ones the department wants to concentrate on. If that is the case, that is where the bias can creep in. If bias creeps into the algorithm or the machine learning tool and comes up to a person, it is easy to say “computer said yes” or “computer said no” and not to question the data coming to you.

I am not totally comfortable that there really are the safeguards at the moment. We are going to come to the human interaction at a later stage of the debate, so I will not go further into that. To be honest, I suspect that the Netherlands, Sweden and Australia probably had similar safeguards. They did not work. I cannot say for certain, but most departments believe that they are doing the right thing and that the safeguards are working. But they did not in those cases, and real problems were caused to vulnerable people.

I will withdraw the amendment but this is something that we will definitely come back to. Just in passing, I also welcome the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, to the right side of the fence with us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 75A withdrawn.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 77 is, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has just said, slightly different from the others. I thought about degrouping it, but I decided that life was too short.

Amendment 77 would introduce a reasonableness test—a discussion we have had before—so that an authorised officer must “reasonably” consider that it is

“necessary and proportionate to require the specified information”,

rather than just “consider” that it is necessary and proportionate. We have had a number of debates about a reasonableness test as we have gone through the various days in Grand Committee. Ensuring that an authorised officer should “reasonably” consider, rather than just arbitrarily “consider”, is an important safeguard against misuse of these powers.

Last Monday, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, argued against a similar change in Amendment 29, saying:

“In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All ‘public law powers’ must be exercised with


‘reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion’.


Making a Minister’s belief a ‘reasonable’ belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it”.—[Official Report, 9/6/25; col. GC 159.]

The Judge Over Your Shoulder—known by the rather inappropriate acronym JOYS—was a new one on me, so I looked it up. The Government describe this exciting publication as:

“Guidance to help you navigate the legal frameworks within which public bodies, particularly Government, make decisions … Currently in its 6th edition, it is used to communicate with clients on what to expect when working with government lawyers, allowing for effective collaboration and lowering the risk of legal challenge. The guidance is highly regarded across the legal profession”.


Most importantly, it goes on to say:

“The guidance remains a lay person’s guide to Administrative Law”.


So I am afraid that the noble Baroness’s argument does not hold up to scrutiny. The document is not even official guidance for civil servants; it is merely a lay person’s guide, has no legal status whatever and cannot be used as evidence that public law powers must be exercised with reasonableness or rationality. Unless the Minister can come up with something that actually has some legal force on civil servants and Ministers, the need for these reasonableness tests, which we have been debating throughout this Bill, remains.

As I have said before and will keep repeating, the noble Baroness will not always be in her position. While I completely believe that she would ensure that these powers are exercised reasonably, that may not always be the case for future Ministers or future Governments. We need to legislate for the future, not just for the present situation, so safeguards should be on the face of the Bill to be effective. In my view, a requirement to act reasonably is a very important safeguard.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. It was because it said “reasonable grounds” in the first half that the fact that it was missing in the second half—paragraph (b)—stuck out: you have to have reasonable grounds, but then you just have to consider. But my point is more than that. Let us imagine the worst-case scenario, where a future Government decide to go for an all-out DOGE approach to whatever. I have no doubt, as I said, that the noble Baroness and the department at the moment will follow the guidance, et cetera, that she laid out, but that is just guidance and it can be torn up on a whim. If a new Government decide to go all out, there is no reasonableness safeguard; they can just say, “We consider it necessary”, and there does not need to be any reasonableness attached to that. That is the concern. It is not about now; it is about where we might be in a year or five years’ time that worries me.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I see where the noble Lord is going with this and I am happy to pick up the conversation outside. I do not think that the distinction is big enough for it to be a problem, because the reality is that a reasonable suspicion is not just a hunch: it has to be based on an objective test, it requires up-to-date and accurate information and it must be something that an ordinary reasonable person would consider a legitimate cause for suspicion given the same information. So, for information gathering to be legal and justified, the intrusion into a person’s privacy must be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the legislation. We think that that is belt and braces, but I am happy to pick that up with the noble Lord because I think that we want the same thing. The only question is: do we need any more ways of saying it?

Finally, Amendment 79, in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, would require DWP to copy the information notice to all parties, including the subject of the information request. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, has explained the obvious reason why this is the case: since these powers apply only to named individuals about whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, telling somebody at the outset could clearly prejudice the investigation and potentially enable them to conceal or destroy evidence.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I give my wholehearted support to the stand part notices in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer who, as noble Lords might gather, is in the Chamber for the Employment Rights Bill—I should perhaps also be there, but that is why noble Lords have me and not my noble friend Lady Kramer.

The opposition to Clause 74 and Schedule 3 standing part of the Bill is both principled and pragmatic, and would ensure that the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill strikes the right balance between combating fraud and protecting the rights and dignity of individuals. The removal of the requirement for banks to examine claimants’ bank accounts, proposed in both Clause 74 and Schedule 3, would restore a vital safeguard for personal privacy and prevent an unnecessary intrusion into the lives of those who rely on public support. This approach would uphold commitments to civil liberties, ensuring that anti-fraud measures do not come at the expense of fundamental rights, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, on the previous group. I commend my noble friend Lady Kramer’s leadership in recognising that the fight against fraud must never become a pretext for overreach and unwarranted surveillance.

Equally, Amendments 79B and 80, supported by my noble friend Lady Kramer and others, would wisely align eligibility verification safeguards with those already established for suspected fraud and, crucially, would limit the use of such powers to cases where there is genuine suspicion of wrongdoing. These changes will prevent fishing expeditions—I am sure that there will be fishing expeditions—and protect innocent welfare recipients from undue scrutiny.

My own Amendment 89 to Schedule 3 would ensure that the Bill applies only to the benefits explicitly listed and would further clarify and limit the scope of these powers, which could be pretty heavy, providing certainty and reassurance to the public. Together, these amendments would strengthen the Bill, making it more proportionate, transparent and just. I urge your Lordships to support this package, which embodies the best traditions of parliamentary scrutiny and my party’s belief in both fairness and effective government.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I speak to my Amendment 79B and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support for it. It is a very simple amendment that would make the giving of an eligibility verification notice subject to the same safeguard that already applies to all the other information-gathering powers within the Bill—namely, that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that issuing an EVN is necessary and proportionate for the purpose for which it is issued.

The Minister will no doubt have noticed that I have taken the liberty of inserting “reasonably” into the amendment, as we have just been discussing. Otherwise, the wording is aligned with the safeguard in Clause 3(1)(a), in relation to the Cabinet Office Minister requiring information, and to the wording in Clause 72, in relation to the Secretary of State for the DWP requiring information about suspected fraud under new Section 109BZB(1)(b). This safeguard applies everywhere in the Bill whenever the required information relates to suspected fraud. Rather strangely, however, it does not appear in Schedule 3, where there is no suspicion. That seems the wrong way round. Surely it is even more important that the giving of an information notice should be necessary and proportionate in cases where there is no suspicion.

I am assuming that this omission is in fact an oversight and that, given that it appears everywhere else in the Bill, the Minister will simply accept it. If not, she will need to explain why the exercise of these important and intrusive suspicionless information-gathering powers should not have to be, at the very least, necessary and proportionate in the same way as the exercise of the other information-gathering powers have to be. I will take a little bit of convincing, I am afraid.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 80. There is a certain amount of overlap with other amendments not just in this group, obviously, but in other groups. The mysteries of the grouping of amendments are beyond my pay grade, but we are in a situation where we are bound to discuss the same subject again and again—and, I suspect, again. I will read with interest what my noble friend the Minister said in replying to the previous debate. At the conclusion of all these overlapping debates it would be useful to the Committee if she could write a letter explaining how this whole thing fits together.

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It is reasonable for us, as a Committee, to keep pressing—and we no doubt will—as to whether it is appropriate for a Government to use private banks in this particular fashion. No doubt some money will be gained this way, but at what cost?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will jump in quickly before the Minister continues. She has been very helpful in explaining how this is going to work. I should say, as I have before, that I think this is infinitely better than it was when we saw it a year or so ago—I just put that on the record again. However, there are two questions about how it works on which I would like clarification.

First, I think the Minister indicated that the banks would not have to trawl all bank accounts, but I do not think that that is right. The logic must be that the DWP provides the criteria that it wants to look at, which is whether someone is in receipt of benefits and, secondly, whether there is a flag. In order to identify whether they are on benefits, the banks will have to trawl through all the accounts to find that out. That seems a necessary step—they have to spot the indicators in the accounts.

More importantly, though, this is not a one-off exercise under the Bill. They do not just send it once and then go away. The Bill allows for these things to be periodic within 12 months, and they can then be extended. I am interested to understand what the Government intend by “periodic”. Under the way that it is currently written, they could be saying, “I want you send us this data every day—or indeed every hour or minute—for the next 12 months”, and they could then extend it. What is the plan in terms of the periodicity of this?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Let me deal with the noble Lord first, because that will be quick and I am conscious of the time—I have already gone over the 20 minutes. The DWP will tell the banks, “We have a reference number and these are the accounts at your bank into which we pay benefits; please look only at those accounts, not those of anyone else”. I have been saying this all the way along the line, but I have clearly failed to get this across. The noble Lord may recall the previous discussions when we were asked why you could not look at every bank account, and the reason is—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am still not convinced that that is correct. I think that what happens is that there is an indicator that goes with the payment of the benefit, and we are then asking the banks, first, to identify all accounts where that indicator exists—so they have to look at all accounts to identify which those are—and, secondly, for those accounts, whether there are any with an eligibility indicator that is flagged. My reading is that it is in fact quite clear, and it is also clear in the code of conduct and the other stuff.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

In as much as we will say to the banks that we would like them to look at the accounts into which we pay benefits and will give them the reference numbers. Clearly, it is up to the banks how they identify those. I think it unlikely that they will take each bank account, look at it individually and make a decision, but it is up to them. We simply want them to look at those bank accounts and to tell us whether, within those bank accounts, they believe that the particular eligibility indicator that we have given them is correct.

Regarding frequency, we will negotiate that with the banks. The previous Government looked at an earlier iteration of this and ran two proofs of concept to establish that it would work and be effective. We now have to take the powers in order to be able to start doing this. So, we have agreed that we will work with a small number of banks and work out bit-by-bit how this works, bring over information as we can manage it, make sure that the system works, and build up as we go. We will determine from that how often we will need to do that and how it works. That has to be determined; we could not determine that in advance because we need the powers in the Bill to be able to start the process.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is a question of proportionality. Clearly, we already ask the Revenue to tell us how much people earn in order to determine whether or not they meet the earnings criteria for, for example, universal credit. We could simply allow people to tell us, but when we did that, some of them got it wrong; many of them made mistakes; sometimes it changed, and sometimes they deliberately did not tell us. So now, we simply get information directly from the Revenue.

We think that the power is proportionate. Whenever someone compares it to something that feels disproportionate, such as spying or putting bugs in everyone’s houses, I think that we can either claim that this is a mass surveillance power like China would use and then wonder why people are getting paranoid about it, or, while I do my best to be specific about what we are trying to do, we can all try to have a measured conversation about whether or not it is reasonable, while fully accepting that for some people the line will be in a different place than for others for reasons of both philosophy and proportionality. I fully accept that.

I have done the best I can in 25 minutes. On that basis, I urge noble Lords to agree that the clause stand part.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

81: Schedule 3, page 78, line 19, at end insert—
“(9) Before giving a person an eligibility verification notice, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the costs that will be incurred by the person in responding to the eligibility verification notice will be proportionate and reasonable for that person to incur, or the Secretary of State must agree in advance to repay all or some of the costs to the person.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe how the Secretary of State will ensure that they do not impose undue costs on the banks and to what extent the banks will be able to recoup these costs.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that my Amendments 81, 89C and 91 are fairly self-explanatory and that we are getting into more detailed points, which might be easier, rather than points of philosophy.

Amendment 81 relates to the costs that the eligibility verification process will impose on the banks and other financial institutions that must respond to the notices. It is intended to probe how those costs will be treated. We have already had various debates on third-party costs at earlier stages in Grand Committee, but in relation to the DWP clauses around eligibility verification, there is an important difference, which is that, so far, the Government have not made any real attempts to quantify the impact that the EVM process will have on the banks or other financial institutions.

The impact assessment says about the EVM:

“The cost to Data holders has not been estimated at this stage; estimates will be included in a subsequent IA”.


It goes on to give a bit more detail of the impact on third parties, banks and institutions, saying:

“There will be transition costs and on-going costs for businesses. The impact assessment outlines some indicative costs to business, however at this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation. This is because the operational solution for the measure is currently being developed, alongside further engagement with banks. We have committed to work in partnership with banks to develop the most appropriate implementation route. Estimates will be included in a subsequent IA”.


Later, the IA refers to set-up costs to banks of around £41.25 million, although that is not based on any substantive evidence.

The Bill itself is entirely silent on the costs of the eligibility verification regime to banks and other financial institutions, and how they might be treated. As we have discussed, this is not about the impact on the banks alone; it is also about the possibility of the unintended consequence of making banks less willing to provide services to benefit claimants. We had a long debate on that previously, and I shall not repeat the arguments.

Amendment 81 would require the Secretary of State to satisfy themselves that the costs to the banks will be proportionate and reasonable or, where that is not the case, to agree to repay some or all of the costs to the banks. This is not a situation where the costs can be recovered from the fraudster, because there may be no fraudster. The banks will, effectively, be working for the Government in this case, so it is appropriate that the Government should cover any unreasonable costs.

Amendment 91 also looks at the costs of the EVN regime. It would add to the scope of the annual independent review—as an aside I very much welcome that independent review; it is a big step forward in the safeguards around this—so that it would now also report on whether the use of EVNs has been proportionate to the costs incurred both by the department and by third parties such as banks. As I have said, there has been no meaningful attempt yet to evaluate the costs to third parties, particularly because the work is ongoing to work out what those will be, so there must be some mechanism to ensure that the costs are proportionate, and the independent review would be the logical and sensible place to do that.

Amendment 89C is more technical; it is designed to deal with a concern raised with me and others by UK Finance. This concern is that the existence of an eligibility indicator might constitute grounds to suspect fraud and therefore impose obligations on the bank to take actions such as closing or freezing the account or issuing a suspicious activity report under the various obligations that the banks already have. It is worth hearing what the impact assessment has to say in this respect. It says:

“In discussion with the banking sector, the Department has been clear that any data received under this measure should not be seen as indicative of any financial crime. Many claimants will have a legitimate, authorised reason to hold savings in excess of capital benefit rules (disregards for injury compensation, for example) and in many cases, overpayments could have been caused by genuine claimant error. Given this, the Department has been clear that there should be no action to risk claimant bank accounts because of the measure”.


So that sounds good. Part 2 of Schedule 3 already goes some way towards this, but UK Finance has made it clear that it does not see the existing wording in Part 2 of Schedule 3 as adequate, as it covers only the suspicious activity report element. UK Finance agrees that there has been extensive engagement with DWP on this but makes the point that, despite this engagement, there is currently no agreed deconfliction on banks’ financial crime obligations. The amendment simply says that information that results from a EVN should not be treated in that way, and should not of itself be treated by the bank as grounds to suspect fraud. The “of itself” is important there. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, given the industry’s remaining concerns. Why does she disagree with UK Finance on this?

An alternative way of dealing with this concern would be to ensure clear guidance from the FCA, which does not seem to be happening. Why are the Government not simply pressing the FCA for such guidance? Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, does something similar, with reference to conflicts between the Bill and the duty of care that banks owe to their customers, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say in that respect. I beg to move.

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I hope that that has answered noble Lords’ questions, and that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and for their support for my amendments. We tabled these cost amendments primarily because we do not know what the costs are but we know that things will evolve in the future, and therefore it seems sensible that the independent reviewer should at the very least have a look at that. The Minister used the word “could”, but I would still like that to be “should”. We may well come back to that point at a later date.

The Minister mentioned that, when we are sending an EVN in, we are not requiring the banks to look into the data that is being provided to the DWP. That is naive. I do not think that any bank will ever just trawl through, pull a load of data out and send it up without checking it, because there are liabilities here to the banks. If they send a load of stuff up that is incorrect and people suffer as a result, guess who will end up getting it in the neck? It will be the bank that provided the incorrect data. It comes back to the debate we had earlier on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, about who is liable. That is slightly naive; there are genuine, real costs here. The banks will be required to review, check and make sure that what they are providing does not cause them problems with their customers, hence the questions on breach of duty of care.

With respect to Amendment 89C—the UK Finance amendment, if we want to call it that—the Minister said that she would try to persuade me. I need to look at what she said more closely to see whether I have been persuaded. However, to be brutally honest, it is not me she needs to persuade—it is UK Finance. I urge her to have further discussions with UK Finance as soon as possible on this matter, because it seems that it is still exercising financial institutions and the industry. There is a lot in the impact assessment to say that they should not have a problem with this, and the Minister has given an explanation as to why she does not think they should, but they are still worried about it, so the department and the Minister still have work to do to make sure that UK Finance is comfortable. If it is uncomfortable, that is not a good way to start this relationship.

The Minister said that the job of the FCA was not to endorse government guidance, and I agree, but that is not what I was asking. The FCA should provide guidance to the industry that says, “If you provide this information, it does or does not have this effect”. It is for the FCA to give guidance in that respect, rather than endorsing what government guidance says. It ought to be proactive. To be honest, it should be involved in this process to make sure that it is happy that this does not cause a problem to the industry, and give guidance to the industry accordingly. Again, I hope that that discussion is going on.

I touch, finally, on the debanking issue, because it has been raised. It is a bit of a misnomer. The bigger concern to me is not that people’s bank accounts will be withdrawn—that is unlikely. More likely is that banks will become less willing to provide future bank accounts. It is not active debanking, but a slow erosion of willingness to provide services to particular groups of people. We have seen for ourselves as PEPs that banks do not like to provide us services as a result of the PEP rules. It will not be any different here. If we make it more difficult and expensive to provide accounts, it will slowly erode over time. It is not debanking in the sense of the closing down of Nigel Farage’s bank account approach, but more the erosion that I worry about.

Having said all that, I think that we will come back to one or two of these issues at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 81 withdrawn.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 89ZA in this group—I still do not understand the numbering system that the Public Bill Office uses.

Before I move on to that, I want to make a couple of comments on the two amendments that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, just raised. I have to say that I am a bit cautious about Amendment 82, because if you tell everybody what the eligibility indications are, it becomes very easy to avoid them. There is also a massive, gaping loophole in the Bill, which is that it covers only one bank at a time. I do not know—I would be quite interested to understand from the noble Baroness—whether, having received data from individual banks, the DWP will be amalgamating and therefore will be able to track the sort of concept that, if you have £8,000 in this bank account and £8,000 in that bank account, that puts you up to the £16,000 that would trigger the eligibility indicator. But there is a gaping hole there and, if you publish everything you are looking for, it makes it so much easier to get around it. So I am a little cautious about that one.

I am much more sympathetic to at least the spirit behind Amendment 88. We had a long debate the other day around the issues of machine learning, bias, stereotyping and generalisation creeping into decision-making processes, and there is more to do in this Bill around the safeguards around the use of automated decision-making. I know that the noble Baroness will talk about the code of practice, but that is very specific. It requires a human element only where the decision could impact on benefit eligibility. So it does not include stepping into the next phase of an intrusive investigation using the powers in Clause 72, for example. So, whether or not Amendment 88 is the right way to go, there is definitely more that we need to think about in terms of safeguards around the use of algorithmic or machine learning—or AI or whatever—trawling through this, and a number of amendments later cover the same ground a bit.

Amendment 89ZA is very simple. It simply says that applicants for benefits should be informed at the time of their application that information relating to their bank accounts may be provided to the Secretary of State, and that people who are already in receipt of benefits are informed within three months of the commencement of the Bill.

The information-gathering powers that this Bill creates are a significant step, and are carried out without any suspicion of fraud, so it must be appropriate and fair that people are informed that their bank account information may be provided to the department. I cannot actually see any reason for not accepting this one; it would improve transparency and also make those who are considering fraud think twice if they are being told that their bank account details could be accessed. In fact, I mean “provided”, because technically they are not accessed but provided.

As a general principle, as set out in our data protection laws, people have the right to know where their data is going and how it is being used, and I really cannot see any reason why this situation should be any different.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak broadly in support of Amendment 82 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. This amendment goes to the heart of something that we should all be able to agree on: that the public have a right to know the rules by which they may be judged and that those tasked with making assessments, such as banks, should not be left to act on unclear or unpublished guidance.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the eligibility indicators that banks are expected to use when checking their customers’ accounts under the new regime. In plain terms, it asks the Government to set out clearly, before these provisions are enforced, what criteria are being used to determine eligibility. This chimes with the opening remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is difficult to see how a system of such potential consequence to individuals and to financial institutions alike can be implemented fairly, if the basis on which it operates is not published and understood in advance.

We have heard throughout the debates on this Bill about the need to balance effective fraud prevention with the protection of individual rights, proper due process, and clarity for institutions involved. Amendment 82 speaks directly to that balance. If banks are to play a front-line role in identifying accounts or individuals under suspicion, they must be given unambiguous and publicly available guidance to avoid the risk of overreach, error or unjustified intrusion. We cannot have a system where accounts are flagged or actions taken on the basis of indicators that are withheld from public view. That would be both untransparent and unjust.

We should not legislate for a regime that affects people’s access to their financial resources or that places duties on banks to act in quasi-investigative ways, without knowing exactly how those judgments are to be made. This is not a wrecking amendment—it does not oppose the broader framework of the Bill. It merely insists that, before new powers are exercised, the public and partners involved in delivery know the criteria. That is not too much to ask. In fact, it is the very least we should expect in a system rooted in fairness and good governance. Again, this echoes the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

To pick up on remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is a balance to be struck between not giving too much away in the interest of transparency so that fraudsters are given fuel to manipulate the system. Can the Minister say where that balance should be struck, as balance there must be?

Similarly, I speak in support of Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I believe it represents a sensible and timely addition to the schedule. As we have discussed throughout the passage of this Bill, the use of data and automated decision-making, particularly through algorithms, is becoming an increasingly central feature of fraud detection and eligibility verification. That in itself is not a problem; it is a reflection of the complexity and scale of modern fraud threats. But it also means that we need clear and consistent standards for how these tools are developed, deployed and scrutinised. The cautionary tale from the Netherlands, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is very much noted. I am sure that the Committee has noted it.

This amendment goes to the heart of the need for standards. By requiring the code of practice to include mechanisms for the scrutiny of algorithms used by those in receipt of eligibility verification notices, typically banks, it creates a shared framework for oversight. This is particularly important when algorithms are applied across several discrete institutions, each of which may have slightly different internal systems, standards or even risk profiles. Without a common baseline, we risk inconsistency, a lack of accountability and potential harm to individuals through opaque or poorly calibrated processes.

Moreover, new sub-paragraph (g) proposed in this amendment rightly extends that principle of scrutiny to the powers themselves, and we must also be willing to assess whether they are effective and 100% secure in their specified and sole objective. We must also be willing to assess whether they are proportionate to the outcomes that they set out to deliver. In short, this is a practical amendment rooted in the principles of clarity, consistency and continuous improvement—perhaps part of the test and learn. It does not obstruct the Government’s goals; it helps to make them more credible and accountable, we believe.

I express my support for Amendment 89ZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, which I believe strikes a careful and important balance between transparency, accountability and the effective operation of the powers contained in this schedule. At its core, this amendment does something quite simple but significant: it ensures that individuals applying for or receiving relevant benefits are clearly informed—that is, in writing—that information relating to their bank accounts may, under certain circumstances, be shared with the Secretary of State. This is a matter of basic transparency and fairness. I note that this is being proposed at the time the benefit is applied for, and I might describe it—perhaps putting words into the mouth of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—as part of an induction process when one applies for any benefit in scope. In other words, fair warning is given that a benefit that comes from the taxpayers’ pocket has responsibilities attached to it. Perhaps this should also be placed in the code of practice, and I ask that question of the Minister.

If we are to entrust public authorities with powers of this magnitude—which allow for sensitive financial data to be accessed without the individual’s active consent—surely it is right that we also commit to informing individuals of the possibility that those powers might be used. This is not about compromising investigations or alerting fraudsters in advance; it is about ensuring that people understand the system that they are entering and can act responsibly and lawfully within it. Providing this information up front reinforces personal responsibility. As I said earlier, it says clearly to the individual, “If you are claiming public money, there is a legitimate expectation that your eligibility may be subject to verification”. It allows claimants to know the rules of engagement in advance, and it ensures that they cannot claim later to have been caught unawares.

At the same time, I recognise, and I think the noble Lord does as well—I hope he does—that this amendment must not inadvertently encourage more sophisticated methods of deception. It is a fine line to walk, and this chimes with my earlier question to the Minister. We must not turn transparency into a user manual for fraud, but I believe that this amendment is framed carefully enough to avoid that risk. It does not disclose when, how or under what criteria information will be requested—only that it may be. That is, I believe, a proportionate step. Ultimately, this amendment supports the legitimacy of the wider regime, and I therefore support it and hope that the Government will see it as a constructive addition to the schedule.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 88, I asked about the cross-comparison with datasets from different banks; this goes to the point that the Minister has just been making about it being easy to commit fraud. To what extent will data from bank A be amalgamated with data from bank B to discover whether, when combined, there is an eligibility indicator flag?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

An EVN can be used only in relation to the bank account into which the benefit is paid. Therefore, that would be a specific bank account in a specific bank. Of course, the DWP’s authorised investigators have and use a range of sources where they have a suspicion of fraud, and there is a range of mechanisms out there to look at what other information can be gathered in order to make that judgment. I can see that I have not hit on what the noble Lord was asking for.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In the situation where there would be a suspicion of fraud, you have bank A—actually, I suppose it would not have provided the information, would it?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Exactly.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have just answered my own question.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I apologise for jumping up and down. This is the confusion I have in relation to this area: if you are a fraudster and you are watching this Committee very carefully, as the Minister indicated they are doing—I am sympathetic to the idea that I am perhaps being naive in publishing, “Here you are, fraudsters, this is what you should do”—it seems to me that what you would do is set up multiple bank accounts. In fact, I think it was the Minister for Transformation, Andrew Western MP, who conceded

“that we will not have full sight of somebody’s accounts if they bank with more than one institution”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Committee, 6/3/25; col. 237.]

So it seems to me that the fraudsters are over there playing the system.

This is a Bill that gives enormous powers, about which I worry. It seems that the eligibility criteria should be known in order for them to be accountable. I do not want to be naive, but the people who actually need the eligibility criteria are those people who might, by error, breach the eligibility criteria, but also, democracy requires it because we need to know how to hold this legislation to account. The fraudsters—the people who are deliberately going out of their way to rip off the welfare system—already know how to play this, if that makes any sense. Even as I was tabling the amendment, I was aware of the fact that I am not saying, “Let’s give the game away completely”; however, we cannot just say, “We can’t tell you anything in case the fraudsters find out”, when there are real loopholes here that the fraudsters are going to exploit anyway.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Just to be clear, this measure is attacking both fraud and error. It looks at overpayments, whatever the source. It is simply one tool among many that is available to the DWP and which will help produce a source of information, which will help to identify incorrect overpayments. Having got that information, the DWP will use the full range of powers and the information available to it. If any fraudsters are sitting down on a quiet Monday afternoon and watching this Committee, they should be warned: the DWP has lots of sources of information; it will investigate them; and it successfully prosecutes many people for fraud. The DWP will use this and other powers to pursue what is there. However, this measure alone has been scored by the OBR to save up to £940 million over the next five years. No single measure will be foolproof alone; it will play its part alongside a range of measures and processes to help root out fraud.

I will have to write to my noble friend Lord Sikka on the Cayman Islands. I do not have them at the back of my mind at the moment, I am afraid, but I will let him know if there is an issue over there.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I fully accept that there is a line between giving all details in public and tackling fraud. We have given out a lot of information and a lot of protections here, and we have found ways of making sure that there is oversight. One reason for having oversight is that there are things that we will never be able to put out in public; it is important that somebody has scrutiny and can report to Parliament, independent of the department, on how these powers are being used. We would hope that that picks up the remaining areas of concern.

I turn to Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I will address in turn the two points that it raises. The first is the requirement for the code of practice to include information about the ways in which scrutiny can be applied to the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts, for the purposes of the eligibility verification measure. This is not a matter for a code of practice. The criteria that financial institutions must use to identify relevant accounts are described in paragraph 1(2)(b) of new Schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Accounts must simply meet two tests in order for information to be shared by the financial institution with the DWP: first, the account must receive a relevant benefit payment or be linked to that account; and, secondly, the account in question must meet the criteria that the DWP sets out in the eligibility verification notice. Financial institutions operate in many ways. It must be for each individual financial institution to determine how it identifies relevant accounts.

The key point here is that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where those two tests have been met. It is a data-requiring power; we are not asking banks to do anything more than that. Again, I remind the Committee that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. No decisions will be taken using EVM data alone; decisions about entitlement will be made only once the DWP has made further inquiries.

On that point, the Bill does not introduce any new use of automated decision-making. The DWP will examine data received from banks under the new power, alongside other data received, to determine whether there has been an incorrect overpayment. As is set out in our personal information charter, which is publicly available, the DWP uses automated processing in some decision-making to help us deliver efficient services. The DWP will not make any decision that has significant effect based solely on automated processing unless the law allows this, and claimants will be informed if we make any such decision.

I turn to the second issue in this amendment. It would require the code of practice to contain information about measures that would enable scrutiny of the effectiveness of the EVM. This is, again, an important issue but not one for the code of practice. However, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that we must assess how effective the EVM is; that is why, under Clause 75, the independent overseer of the measure must consider the extent to which the exercise of the power has been effective in helping to identify incorrect payments of relevant benefits.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 89ZA, which raises the issue of informing claimants that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of information about their relevant accounts with the DWP. Let me take a moment to update the Committee on the ways in which the DWP will inform claimants and relevant account holders about the measure; I hope that this will reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The DWP has a personal information charter that sets out how it uses and stores personal information. It is publicly available, and claimants are explicitly directed to it at all times when the DWP requests their personal data. We will update the DWP personal information charter to make it clear that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of their personal information; that commitment is made clear in the draft code of practice, which noble Lords have seen.

This amendment suggests that we should inform claimants either at the start of their claim or within three months of the EVM becoming operational. Our approach of updating the personal information charter means that customers are much more regularly informed about the EVM; this is because claimants are regularly directed to the document throughout their claim. For the benefit of the Committee, I can confirm that claimants are explicitly directed to it in all DWP claim forms; in change of circumstance and uprating letters; in recorded telephone messages; in DWP agents’ telephony scripts; on digital online services; and in other products where the DWP collects personal data. As noble Lords will know, the draft code of practice, which will be publicly consulted on, makes clear that all those who hold a personal account into which a relevant benefit is paid should be aware that information about them and their relevant accounts may be shared by a financial institution with the DWP if the eligibility indicators specified in an EVN are met.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There is a big difference between pointing someone towards a data protection statement—let us be brutally honest: how many of us have ever read one?—and telling people that their bank account details can be provided to the DWP as a result of having this particular benefit. Nobody has ever read a data protection statement, and I do not suppose that they ever will.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

84: Schedule 3, page 80, line 26, at end insert—
“Reasonable grounds for suspicion
5A The existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion for the purpose of section 109BZB (1)(a) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that an authorised person would need more evidence than the existence of an eligibility indicator alone before exercising more intrusive investigations.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 84 and 85 attempt to strengthen important safeguards around the use of information that is gained through an EVM. The Minister has quite rightly said that the scope of the information the banks can provide in response to an EVM is tightly limited. She is right, and that is a very significant improvement to the previous incarnation of the Bill. As currently framed, the only information that can be provided to the Secretary of State by the bank is specified details about the account, such as sort code and account number; specified details about the account holder, such as name and date of birth; and specified details about how the account meets the eligibility indicators. It is also clear in the Bill that transaction data or special category data may not be provided. So far, so good and, as I said, it is a great improvement.

But there is another important potential loophole here. Clause 72 gives the Secretary of State the power to require much more intrusive information if the Secretary of State

“has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed, is committing or intends to commit a DWP offence”.

So, if the existence of an eligibility indicator alone would meet the threshold of “reasonable grounds to suspect”, then the tightly drawn restrictions on the data that banks can provide under an EVM become somewhat meaningless. It will just move on to the next phase almost automatically. We have had a lot of discussion around automation, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that given the volumes of data that will be provided over time, it seems extremely likely that it will—in fact, it is extremely unlikely that it will not—be processed automatically by the DWP, which will choose which ones to investigate more deeply. We have heard about the human elements and will come on to those in the second amendment in this group. but the code of practice does not cover the transfer from EVM to Clause 72’s more intrusive data searching.

Nothing in the code of practice or the Bill would prevent this eligibility indicator being used as reasonable grounds to suspect and, therefore, the Clause 72 provision being triggered with no other safeguard. There may be many reasons why the existence of an eligibility indicator might be entirely innocent. The impact assessment and the noble Baroness have given the example of authorised disregards and genuine error—and genuine error on the part of both the individual and the department. So it seems that, before exercising the robust and intrusive powers under Clause 72, much more should be required, or at least more should be required, than just the existence of an eligibility indicator alone, and I stress “alone”. That is what Amendment 84 tries to achieve, and I think this is probably in line with what the noble Baroness intends, so I hope that this or something like it will be acceptable.

The second amendment, Amendment 85, deals with another critically important safeguard. In response to various concerns raised about the use of algorithms, algorithmic processing, the use of AI and so on, the noble Baroness has stated very clearly that information must be reviewed by a human person before action is taken, and a previous group discussed how bias and stereotyping can creep into automated systems—I will not repeat that. But again, the human element—the human review—does not appear anywhere in the Bill. There is a reference to human decision-making in paragraph 4.31 of the draft code of practice:

“No data source is perfect or infallible. That is why in fraud and error, a human will make any final decisions that affect benefit entitlement, and any indications of potential fraud or error will be looked at comprehensively”.


But this does not set out any level of seniority or qualification, and it covers only final decisions that affect benefit entitlements and not, for example, decisions to affect the intrusive investigative powers that Amendment 84 is looking at. More importantly, the code of conduct can be changed at will by the department; there is no parliamentary oversight or what have you.

As I have said before, I do not doubt the noble Baroness’s intentions in this respect, but the Bill will outlast her tenure and indeed her party’s tenure. Future Governments or Ministers may not have vulnerable people’s interests at heart in the same way that she does. Imagine a future Government applying a DOGE-style approach to this.

The requirement for any decision to be taken by a suitably qualified and senior human is such an important safeguard that I believe it must be in the Bill and not left to the whim of any future Government who might wish to simply automate the whole process—and they could do that: they just change the code of conduct. The issue is not about decisions that affect benefit entitlement alone; as I say, appropriate human review should cover also the use of the more intrusive powers under Clause 72, and the code of conduct does not cover that at all.

I am very happy to discuss the wording, but the principle of suitably qualified and senior human review before decisions are taken is, for me, one of the key safeguards. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to look sympathetically at this amendment, especially as all it does, I think, is to codify what she has consistently said will be the case. I beg to move.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I very strongly support everything that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has said on these two amendments. They are some of the most important amendments that have been debated today because they go to a very fundamental principle. The power in Clause 72, with the new Section 109BZB, is quite significant, and we need to have limits to the exercise of this power in the Bill, both as regards the reasonable grounds—that is Amendment 84—and as regards the human decision-maker. I will not repeat the noble Lord’s reasons because I thought he put his case so compellingly, but I am very much in favour.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate for their support on this. I welcome the clear statement from the noble Baroness that she agrees—which is a very good start—that the eligibility indicator in itself would not be reasonable grounds. I need to go back and carefully read what she said to understand exactly what is guidance, what is code, what is Bill, et cetera. But I am reassured by a lot of what she says.

I suppose my caution still comes back to this point: my worry is not with the noble Baroness but with a Government in five or 10 years’ time of a rather different hue and with slightly less squeamishness, shall we say, about some of this stuff. Are these safeguards robust? We are giving substantial new powers to the department, therefore these safeguards need to be robust and not changeable at will by a future Government. That is what I want to dig into and understand a bit better when I go back into this. So we may come back to this, and I hope we will discuss it further between now and Report. But, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 84 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, there are three amendments in this group. Amendments 91A and 91B are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. All three seek to strengthen the review into the impact of eligibility verification on vulnerable persons. I will just speak to my Amendment 90.

Amendment 90 seeks to clarify whether the Government will take account of the views of recipients of the benefits in question in any independent review and suggests that this would be best achieved by ensuring that at least 50% of the review body is elected by benefit claimants. The proposed review under the Bill is welcome, even though it creates another quango. One difficulty is that regulators and reviewers are all too often appointed to advance political aims and objectives rather than serve the people. One needs to look no further than regulators of water and energy—the Independent Water Commission is currently reviewing the water industry, but its terms of reference exclude consideration of public ownership of water, even though that is favoured by many, including those who are experiencing high customer bills and sewage floating in rivers at the bottom of their gardens. I am seeking the representation of the people directly affected.

All too often, Governments claim that regulatory and review functions are best carried out by individuals with some experience of the field. None has more experience of the field than benefit claimants—after all, they are directly impacted. They will know the frustrations of answering 243 questions to apply for pension credit; they will also be subjected to financial surveillance and may be concerned about that. They are also affected by the DWP’s errors, including erroneous prosecutions, as we heard earlier. They have direct experience of that, and are therefore eminently qualified to directly participate in the review process.

This Bill refers to an independent review by a reviewer, but that reviewer will essentially be a political appointee. The review team is unlikely to include benefit claimants or someone experiencing hardship due to benefit cuts, confusing DWP forms or inconsistent application of DWP rules. Such a person and his or her team are unlikely to be able to bring the daily experiences of benefit claimants into the review. It is vital that the experience of the people on the receiving end of this legislation is brought directly into the review—their words and their worldview, not filtered through what was heard by somebody on some regulatory body or review commission. Quite often, there are cosmetic consultations or token discussions with the affected people. That is not really appropriate here.

Amendment 90 would empower benefit claimants and enable them to elect individuals to carry their worldviews into any review. The person so elected would be accountable to the claimants, whereas the proposed reviewer would not be accountable to any benefit claimant. There is absolutely nothing that they can do about it—they cannot force that person to consider their worldviews deeply. I fully appreciate that extending democracy may well be a contentious issue, even in Parliament, and that empowering people may well be contrary to some government department’s policies. Nevertheless, I would like to see greater representation of benefit claimants in any review that is carried out under the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 91A and 91B in my name in the group, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support in this.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, just said, these two amendments are designed to expand the scope of the independent review and the powers of the independent reviewer. I was very pleased to see the introduction of an independent review around the EVN powers; it adds an important safeguard. But as drafted, the scope of the review is quite limited, covering only whether the exercise of the powers has complied with Schedule 3B and with the code of practice, and whether it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. It does not cover any of the other impacts that the exercise of the powers might have beyond that; we talked in the previous group about the costs, for example.

We have previously discussed and raised concerns about the effects that the Bill could have on vulnerable people, so I will not repeat those again—we have had quite a lot of debates around it. However, the possibility of those impacts on vulnerable people is both real and important, so it should be considered once those powers are in force, and, frankly, the obvious place for that is the independent review. So Amendment 91A would simply add an assessment of the impact on vulnerable persons to the scope of the independent review.

Amendment 91B is about the powers of the independent reviewer to obtain information. As it stands at the moment, they have no information-gathering powers. All the Bill says is that the Secretary of State “may” disclose information to the independent reviewer, and that is not good enough. For the independent review to be meaningful, the reviewer must have the legal ability to obtain all the information that he or she considers necessary to carry out the review. That is what Amendment 91 attempts to achieve: to allow the independent reviewer to request whatever they feel necessary to carry out the review, and to put a requirement for the Secretary of State to disclose what is requested. I rather hope that neither of those is particularly controversial as amendments go.

Just generally, I should say that these are the last amendments that I have tabled, which may relieve the Minister, so I just wanted to say that I hope that she accepts the spirit in which all of them have been put forward. I accept that the Bill is much less concerning than its predecessor was, and I hope that she sees the amendments as generally constructive, aimed primarily at ensuring that the safeguards against misuse of these powers are both robust and, importantly, permanent. I will be very happy to meet with her between now and Report to see whether we can find common ground on some of them.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, it is another sort of spirit that I want at the moment.

I am pleased to welcome these thoughtful amendments, which significantly enhance the transparency, accountability and fairness of the Bill. Amendment 90 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to ensure that the voices and experiences of benefit recipients are taken into account in any independent review of eligibility verification measures. This is a vital step in building trust and legitimacy for these new powers, ensuring that those most affected have a say in how the system is reviewed and improved. Listening to recipients will provide invaluable insights, helping to identify unintended consequences and ensuring that the system remains responsive and humane.

Similarly, Amendments 91A and 91B are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friend Lady Kramer, who is busy in the Chamber on the Employment Rights Bill, where I should have been. These are crucial safeguards. Amendment 91A requires that the independent review specifically considers the impact of eligibility verification on vulnerable persons, ensuring that our most at-risk citizens are not overlooked or disproportionately affected. Amendment 91B strengthens the review process by obliging the Secretary of State to disclose all information reasonably requested by the independent reviewer rather than leaving disclosure to ministerial discretion. These changes will create a more vigorous and effective oversight regime, fostering public confidence that the powers are being exercised justly and transparently. I support these amendments.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

92: Clause 76, page 45, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The functions are exercisable only when accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to restrict investigators’ powers of entry, search and seizure to situations when they are accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. When we discussed a previous group on Part 1 that was similar to this, I believe the Minister stated that those using search or other powers would always be accompanied by a police constable, so I suppose I am looking for confirmation that that is the same in this case. If it is, I am curious to know why we really need the powers and why it cannot be left to the police to exercise them.

I have one other, more important question. On the powers in Clause 76, under the DWP powers, new subsection (4)(i) refers to

“section 117 (reasonable use of force)”.

Slightly oddly, I have just discovered that that was not included in the powers for the PFSA, so can the Minister explain why the DWP thinks it needs to be able to use reasonable force when the PFSA did not? I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments and questions. I will speak first to Amendment 92. The amendment would undermine the policy intent of this part of the Bill, so we cannot accept it. The DWP leads investigations into social security matters and, as a result, our staff are better positioned to search for items relevant to these investigations—the things that they deal with, such as benefit claim packs or documents related to fraudulent identities. Requiring the police to be present for all DWP search and seizure activity, including investigative tasks related to securing criminal evidence, would erode the anticipated obvious benefits of the measure to both the DWP and the police. Crucially, it would divert the police away from focusing on the crime within our communities that only they can deal with and dealing with the human victims of those crimes.

These powers allow the DWP to apply to a court for warrants to enter a premises, conduct search and seizure and apply for and exercise production orders, with or without the police present. That clarifies the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. They provide the DWP with greater control over its own operations and ensure that police time is not spent undertaking administrative tasks on the DWP’s behalf.

However, I reassure the Committee that safeguards are in place to govern the use of these powers. First and foremost, court approval must be granted for all warrants. The requirements for a DWP warrant application will be as strict as those for a police warrant application. Furthermore, the DWP intends to exercise these powers exclusively in cases involving serious and organised crime. This is not novel. Similar powers are already being used by HMRC, the Food Standards Agency and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which can undertake search and seizure activity without needing to be accompanied by the police.

Amendment 93 would impose unique obligations on the courts that they do not face in respect of other government departments with similar powers. PACE powers do not require the individual exercising them to be appointed by the court and there is no clear reason for the DWP to be any different. DWP-authorised investigators, like others who exercise PACE powers, will be subject to the PACE code of practice relating to search and seizure activity and will be required to follow the same procedures and processes as the police when submitting a warrant application to the court. These are not standards set by the DWP; they are set out in PACE, which all bodies exercising these kinds of law enforcement powers must adhere to. Specialist training must be successfully completed before authorisation is given and only then can an authorised investigator exercise these powers on behalf of the Secretary of State. That approach ensures that the correct responsibilities are attributed to the Secretary of State and the courts.

On the question relating to the PSFA, I am advised that it is not that a constable necessarily has to be present, but somebody with those powers, who may not be a police officer but could be from the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, et cetera. As I said, the police do not always have to be there, if it is not necessary. There will be occasions when it will be necessary. For example, the previous Government published a fraud plan in which they recommended that powers of not only search and seizure but arrest be taken. We have decided not to take those powers, so if there needed to be an arrest, we would need to have police officers with us. If there were a risk of serious violence, again, the police would need to be present, but not otherwise.

On the question of force, the provisions set out in Clause 76 provide powers under PACE to enable DWP serious and organised crime investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items, with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The clause also enables authorised investigators to apply to a judge for an order requiring an individual suspected of social security fraud to provide certain types of sensitive information when relevant to the criminal investigation. It also provides for the use of reasonable force to conduct a search, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to search for materials. The clause provides that these powers can be used by an authorised investigator who is authorised by the Secretary of State.

To be clear, a warrant provides for the powers that can be deployed when that warrant is exercised. Our authorised investigators in DWP will not use reasonable force against people, although they may use it against property, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to retrieve a laptop or other evidence. However, the reason it has to be here is that, when the DWP applies for a warrant, that warrant must cover any activities that may need to be undertaken by either the DWP or the police, so although our investigators will not use reasonable force against people, it may be necessary for the police to do so when they are accompanying the DWP. That is why the legislation is drafted that way. If it were not, police out there on our warrant would not be able to use reasonable force and there may be occasions on which they need to do so. I hope that that clarifies matters for the noble Lord.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Can the Minister explain why the DWP needs that power but the PSFA does not? The two clauses in the Bill are otherwise identical and differ only in respect of the reasonable force element. If the PSFA does not need it, I do not understand why the DWP does.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

As I said, the police might need to be present if we felt there was a risk of any serious violence. If it was felt there might be a need for arrests or, as the noble Viscount has suggested, there was a possible risk of violence, the police would be asked to accompany DWP officers. I have given those assurances, so I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but, I hope, illuminating debate. I have concerns about these police powers being given to civil servants and I do not think I am alone in that respect. I am comforted, to some extent, by the fact that these will be used only in the cases of serious and organised crime. I wonder whether the solution, therefore, is to put that in the Bill and put that safeguard in place, because I think that would comfort most people who have the concerns that we have. Perhaps that is something that the Minister might be willing to discuss between now and Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 92 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 99A to 99C have been tabled, as ever, in the spirit of constructive scrutiny and with the aim of strengthening one of the more significant accountability provisions in the Bill: the independent review process set out in Clause 88.

These amendments are modest, reasonable and necessary. They are not designed to undermine the intention of Clause 88 but quite the opposite: to give that clause the clarity, independence and rigour that an effective review mechanism surely must demand. Fundamentally, they seek to correct the text in the Bill as drafted, as this would not provide for a proper independent review process of the exercise of powers under this part of the Bill. As we have been clear throughout these days in Committee, having a proper, full and independent review mechanism is an essential requirement to balance the powers granted.

Let me begin with Amendment 99A. As currently drafted, new Section 109J, to be inserted by Clause 88, allows the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes, saying in subsection (1):

“The Secretary of State may give the independent person appointed … directions as to the period to be covered by each review under section 109I”.


This, in our view, strikes at the heart of the independence that the clause is meant to enshrine.

If the Secretary of State can determine the scope of the review in such a narrow and discretionary fashion, deciding what is in and what is out, we risk reducing the entire review process to something partial and predetermined. An independent reviewer must have the freedom to examine the full timeline of events, decisions and outcomes as they see fit, not just the periods that a Minister deems relevant. This amendment would remove the power for the Secretary of State to constrain that scope. It would ensure that the independent person can review what needs reviewing, not merely what it is convenient to review.

Further to this, Amendment 99B addresses another area in which we believe the clause falls short of its intended purpose. As present, new Section 109J(3) states:

“The Secretary of State may disclose information to the independent person”.


We do not think this is adequate. For a review to be meaningful, the reviewer must be empowered to access all relevant material. It cannot be left to the Minister to determine what relevant information may or may not be disclosed to the independent person for review. By replacing “may” with “must”, this amendment would impose a basic but essential duty for the Government to co-operate with their own independent review mechanism. This should not be controversial. If the review is to be credible both in substance and perception, the provision of relevant documents, data and records must be a legal obligation, not a voluntary gesture. Our amendment would ensure that the independent reviewer could operate with true independence and without the bias that the discretionary drafting currently in the Bill implies.

We must appreciate that if the Secretary of State can direct the scope and scale of these independent reviews, they cannot truly be called independent. As noble Lords across the Committee will know, the outcome of such a process is only as good as the information that is put into it. I am sure that this Minister would not allow biased information or timeframes or seek to direct the independent reviewer. But, as noble Lords have previously made clear in Committee, we must legislate for the future and future Ministers. This cannot be done on the basis of guarantees alone. I trust the Minister implicitly, but I do not know—indeed, none of us in this Committee knows—that we could always say the same about her successors. It is important that we ensure that this independent review process is independent from day one and there is no risk of it becoming a rubber-stamping body used to sign off favourable reviews on the back of limited information and narrow timeframes.

Finally, Amendment 99C would compel the appointment of independent persons to carry out reviews in England, Wales and Scotland. The Bill in its current form allows the Secretary of State to do so but does not require it. We think that is a mistake. Public sector fraud is not a phenomenon confined to one part of the United Kingdom. If we are serious about building a coherent and credible national response, it follows that there must be consistent independent scrutiny across all three nations. Leaving this to ministerial discretion opens the door to uneven practice and potential political selectivity. By making the appointment of independent reviewers mandatory across the nations, we would create a consistent framework for accountability —one that reflects the devolved landscape while still holding the centre to account.

Taken together, these three amendments seek to reinforce what I believe the Government want to achieve: an independent, well-informed and effective review mechanism. They would ensure that reviews are not unduly limited, that reviewers are not kept in the dark and that all parts of the UK are covered by the same standards of transparency. In short, these amendments would close the gaps that could otherwise turn an accountability provision into an optional exercise. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on their intent and consider how they might help deliver a stronger, fairer and more credible oversight process. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to add my support to the first two amendments in this group. While I agree with removing the discretion of the Secretary of State, Amendment 99A does not say what the period of the review should be. I suggest that it should be the same as the period of the review for the eligibility verification notices, which is annual, and that that is what should be in the Bill. It would be useful to hear from the Minister what the Government are proposing in that respect.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments so powerfully, and with considerable detail, explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I want to cross-reference a couple of things. I was unable to be here for the whole discussion on the last group in this Committee but I came in and heard the Minister reassuring us that there are layers of support in the DWP for identifying the vulnerable and that there is regular vulnerability training.

I have to contrast that with one of my last contributions in this Committee and this Room, talking about the horrendous case of Nicola Green. I try to share as much as I can of what I am doing in the Chamber so that it is available to the world. I have to say that the little parliamentary video of that exchange, with its less-than-ideal lighting—no offence to anyone who is doing their best they can with the television—has, you could reasonably say, gone viral, because there is a flood of comments of people saying what the DWP has done to them. I cannot attest, of course, to the truth of every one of those comments, but there is a profound problem of trust with the DWP.

I fully acknowledge that the Minister, when she was on the Opposition benches, and I have often spoken out strongly on this matter. The Government actually called an inquiry into the DWP’s treatment of disabled people after the EHRC expressed concern that equality had been breached. That is the context in which we are looking at these amendments.

The noble Baroness is calling for people to have a day in court—to be able to have a genuinely independent voice in our greatly respected courts and put the case. If they indeed have committed fraud and can afford the repayments, or it is not a complete error by the DWP, or the DWP is at fault or is not being realistic about how much people need to eat and live, the court will make a ruling. That, surely, is regarded as a basic principle and right in our law.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 102 and 122, which would require the Secretary of State to apply to the court for a direct deduction order—a DDO. I confess that I am struggling a bit to understand the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would be able to make a direct deduction order, as the Bill is drafted. I hope the Minister will be able to help me.

When we discussed the DDOs in relation to Part 1 of the Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, correctly pointed out that a direct deduction order could be made only in circumstances where either there had been a final determination of the amount of the liability by a court or the person concerned had agreed that the amount was payable. I agreed then that that was an important safeguard, as it is a significant restriction on when the DDO process could be used under Part 1. I asked why, if the court was making the determination of liability, we did not just leave the court to determine the way in which it should be repaid, rather than requiring new powers for the Minister to make that decision. The noble Baroness was kind enough to offer to write to me on that, and I very much look forward to receiving her letter.

However, I think the same issue may arise here, except that I am struggling to find the definition of the amount recoverable described in paragraph 1(1) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill. Can the Minister please explain how the amount recoverable is determined, and by whom? Does this part have the same safeguard as Part 1, which is either final court determination or agreement by the person concerned, or is it at the discretion of the Secretary of State? I can see, in Clause 89, that the person must have been convicted of an offence or agreed to pay a penalty. That raises the question: does this DDO regime apply in cases or error, or not? Presumably, in cases of error there will not be a conviction or a penalty, so it does not apply in the case of error, but I am confused.

I cannot find anywhere the amount being determined by a court; that is where I am struggling a bit. If the recoverable amount has not been decided by the court, then the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is likely to be necessary. That is particularly important because, just as it does in Part 1, for understandable reasons, the appeal process to the First-tier Tribunal against a DDO prevents a person appealing with respect to the amount that is recoverable. If that is the case, and the amount recoverable has not been determined by a court, I think there is an issue here.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am proud to support Amendments 102 and 122, which I tabled alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Amendment 102 proposes that the power to make direct deduction orders should rest with the courts following an application from the Secretary of State, rather than allowing the Secretary of State to impose such orders directly. This change would introduce an important layer of judicial oversight, ensuring that deductions from individuals’ bank accounts are made only after careful, independent consideration of the evidence and the circumstances.

Although the Bill includes safeguards such as affordability and vulnerability checks, as enumerated by the Minister, and rights to representation and appeal, placing the final decision in the hands of the court would further strengthen public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of the debt recovery process. Amendment 122 is consequential on this approach, ensuring consistency throughout the Bill. By requiring court approval for direct deduction orders, we uphold the principle that significant intrusions into personal finances should be subject to the highest standards of scrutiny and due process. This is particularly important given the potential for hardship and complexities that can arise in cases involving joint accounts or vulnerable individuals. I hope the Minister can address that when she replies.

These amendments do not seek to undermine the Government’s legitimate efforts to recover public funds lost to fraud or error but rather to ensure that such efforts are always balanced with robust protections for individual rights. I urge fellow noble Lords to support these amendments as a constructive step towards a more transparent and accountable system, and I am very pleased to have signed this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

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So the noble Baroness makes an important point, and I hear it, but the job of this Committee is therefore to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards when we do that to try to make sure that we are protecting those at the heart of this. I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, will be able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Baroness has not answered one question that I had. My understanding from Clause 89 is that these DDO rights—or however one describes them—can be used only where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act or any other enactment, or agrees to pay a penalty under Section 115A of the 1992 Act. Does that mean, therefore, that this does not apply to situations of error and that it is only fraud?