Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill covers a lot of ground, and I agree that in some respects it has benefited from the extra time allowed, having been carried over from the previous parliamentary Session. I also agree that there is more to be done.

The valuable definition of victims at the start of the Bill is clearly the product of careful thought and is welcome. That definition helps to dispel the notion of victimless crime. It focuses on the impact of harm, including the effects of domestic abuse on children. When dealing with such cases in the family court, it is still surprising to realise how people do not recognise or grasp the misery and insecurity caused to children in environments where abuse occurs and where children have to accept it as the norm. That is not just distressing in the short term but damaging in the long term. Domestic violence begets violence and, it is now well understood, creates intergenerational problems when witnessed by children. I support the suggestion that has been made in this debate that there is scope for including reference in Clause 1 to exploited children. I also ask whether there is scope for referring to developmental harm caused to unborn children by domestic violence inflicted during pregnancy.

The intention of Clause 15 is welcome, providing for guidance to independent domestic and sexual violence advisers. In the family court, there is already specific provision for such people to accompany parents into court, and the judiciary and practitioners have become aware of, and value, the practical and emotional support provided, particularly by IDVAs, in cases in which abuse is a feature. If nothing else, such advisers can manage expectations. However, I suspect that the availability of such advisers is patchy and I assume that the hope is that guidance will provide some consistency. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify the expected nature and benefits of such guidance. It is also, as other noble Lords have suggested, a real opportunity to consider whether there should be a role for such specialist independent advisers specifically focusing on children affected by abuse.

I also wish to welcome the introduction of Clause 16, otherwise known as Jade’s law, which will require the Crown Court to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility by a parent who has been convicted of the murder or manslaughter of the other parent. There are few more difficult and sensitive cases for the family court to deal with than when one parent has killed the other. A range of immediate practical, legal and emotional problems arises for the surviving family, and for the children most affected. In such circumstances, it is inconceivable that a perpetrator without parental responsibility would then be granted it. Accordingly, if that perpetrator does already hold parental responsibility, typically by being named on the birth certificate, it is surely right that his status should be curtailed. In effect, the bereaved child has suddenly lost both parents, and will be traumatised, confused and in need of immediate expert support.

If the child is fortunate, there are capable grandparents or step-parents who come in, or the local authority will have taken responsibility under established guidance in case law. However, if the child is less fortunate, the surviving relatives may lack insight into how best to meet the needs of that child, and they may compete for control. Such disputes are utterly wretched. Clause 16 should at least ensure that arrangements and decisions that have to be made for the child, or children, cannot be impeded or complicated by the perpetrator. In principle, the surviving relatives should not have to deal with the perpetrator when making such arrangements and decisions, whether important or less so. Clause 16 should relieve them of that possibility.

My initial thoughts about the scope of this new power, and how it would work in practice, related to whether it could be extended, perhaps in discretionary form, to other situations which I and others have come across—for example, when one parent has caused the death of the other by dangerous driving in a car in which both were travelling, or where there was a conviction for a very serious assault which did not result in death. However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders in these less extreme cases. The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.

That said, there was a worrying report on the Radio 4 “Today” programme on 20 November about the very costly struggle a mother had in respect of the so-called parental rights of her former partner, who was in prison as a convicted paedophile. I would ask if the Government have taken note of that case and have considered whether in future any steps can be taken, by way of legal aid or otherwise, to assist a mother who might find herself in that position.

Having heard earlier contributions, I can see there is a potential argument for extending this to the removal of parental responsibility from fathers whose child is a product of a rape. However, of course, he is unlikely to have parental responsibility because he is unlikely to be named on the birth certificate—but it may arise in cases of marital rape after a conviction. Subject to that, the balance is well struck and the new Clause 16 is limited to extreme cases.

Finally, the impetus for the provision to prohibit serving whole-life prisoners from forming a marriage is well understood and may be justified in some cases. It is subject to the possibility of permission from the Secretary of State in exceptional circumstances. That is no doubt to reduce human rights problems and may manage to do so. Following what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, can the Minister indicate the type of situations in which permission might be granted? There may be a case for allowing marriage in cases of terminal illness, but I am afraid I cannot think of many others and I look forward to hearing a response on that point.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Lords Chamber

The Victims and Prisoners Bill offers a key opportunity to ensure protection and support for child victims, but we cannot pick and choose which victims are able to access that support. It is essential that a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation is put into the Bill so that all those children are supported. We owe that to them. I hope the Minister will accept these amendments and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, which seek to ensure better focus on the position and needs of children and thereby provide a better framework of support for children who are victims or potential victims.

I assume that the word “person” in Clause 1 includes a child but nevertheless I think that should be emphasised in the Bill, as so many noble Lords have said. The priority to be given to children should rest on at least three obvious points. First, children are much more vulnerable than adults. Secondly, children are less able to speak for themselves; exploited and abused children notoriously lose self-esteem. Thirdly, clearly children have much longer than adults to put up with the consequences of abuse and of inadequate decisions made when the abuse comes to light.

The Government may say that it is not necessary to highlight particular types of criminal conduct, as attempted in Amendments 5 to 7, and that they are already covered by Clause 1. I am not entirely convinced of that, and if there is any doubt about it, I hope the Government will look again to ensure that the particular categories of abuse highlighted in those amendments are indeed covered.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to which I have added my name digitally. We start on the thorny subject, to which I think we will return, of children. I declare my interest as a secondary school teacher in Hackney.

I am delighted to have my noble friend Lord Meston with me, because he can say it far better than I can when we are trying to persuade the Government that children should be defined separately as victims. I will speak more about that in the sixth group of amendments.

I join the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, in saying that we need a definition of victim, which is not contained in Keeping Children Safe in Education—there seem to be variations on that—and we need to deal with the children of victims of modern slavery. I support all the amendments in this group.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, particularly on the collection of evidence in criminal cases. She is arguing for precision, accuracy and consistency. At the moment, the system suffers in respect of all those three criteria.

The establishing of truth relies on the establishing of accurate evidence. It usually looks for accuracy, precision and consistency, but if we have any doubt about interpretation of another language, all those three things suffer. There is a concern that where the standard of interpreters is not established to a high and consistent level, there is a risk that the obtaining of evidence is damaged. This matters particularly for the police in the initial obtaining of evidence—which is usually an oral account. Eventually, the oral accounts have to be reduced to writing and the written evidence then fed back to the witness or victim to establish whether it relates to what they have told the police officer. If there is a difference in how those are interpreted, the person may not have a proper, accurate account of how they described their experience.

A secondary issue is that if there is not a consistent standard, different interpreters may help the police and the victim during different parts of the process. They may help the victim with the initial account; then there may be a written statement. After an interview with the suspect, the evidence may be checked. It is important that the interpreter is the same person or, if not, that there is a common standard of interpretation. Otherwise, there is a risk that the truth is not established.

Precision matters in obtaining the victim’s or witness’s account. It also matters in interviews to establish the suspect’s account. It matters generally in evidence collection because the person who holds the evidence may not be the person who is going to give it. You need to establish whether the CCTV and all the other digital evidence that is available now is what you want, and to make sure that it is accurate.

Finally, precision matters for juries. They will not only want to hear what is said in court; they will want to compare it with the first account as well. If there is inconsistency, they will want to understand it. If we are not careful, they may judge the victim or the witnesses harshly. In turn, that may impact on the suspect. It is vital that consistency and precision are there. As the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, said, it matters also for the care of victims and witnesses. If we do not understand how people are living, the challenges they face and the nature of their lives, it is very hard to do what this Bill is trying to establish, which is consistency in care for victims in a way which supports them beyond the event and beyond any criminal prosecution.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, brought out well that this is not only about the interpretation of language—that is, what happened, who said what or who did what—it is also about the legal process. An interpreter may be well qualified to interpret language but may not always understand the legal process. Of course, the victim relies on them to understand both. They need good advice to understand how the process will affect them and its impact; for example, in a court case. The evidence may be challenged in a court case to establish its accuracy, but the victim may take this as an attack. In particular, somebody who has a second language may have an experience of another criminal justice system which may not be like ours. It may be more adversarial—sorry, it could not be any more adversarial than ours, could it? It may search for the truth in a different way. They certainly need to understand how our system works if they happen not to have experienced it before.

For all those reasons to do with evidence collection, precision and accuracy, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. She has been pushing this point for a while. It has not been established; it is time it should be, and this is a great opportunity to do it.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 18, which would require the code to provide for interpreting and translation services and, more importantly, for the standards to be expected of the professionals supplying those services.

Good and reliable interpreting and translation is an increasingly necessary part of the justice system in all areas. It is also an expensive part of the system, for which value for money should be important. Most interpreters are good and efficient, but others, regrettably, are less so. A long time ago when in practice, I recall a particularly impatient interpreter helping me and my client who pulled me aside and urged me to get my client to plead guilty, which I politely declined to do. That completely undermined the confidence that either of us could have in that particular interpreter.

At present, as I understand it, court interpreting services are obtained through agencies used by the Courts & Tribunals Service. If this amendment or something like it is enacted, I would assume that the same agencies would be used. In any event, I would hope that care is taken to stipulate, ensure and review the efficiency of the agencies used and the quality of the work they do.

Finally, I would also hope and expect that this amendment, if approved, would be understood to be wide enough to help those requiring sign language and lip-reading assistance. If not, will those requirements be expressly covered by the code?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I also apologise for being unable to be present for Second Reading. I will speak very briefly in view of the comprehensive opening speech on this group of amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the speeches from all other noble Lords. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for a sustained campaign on the need for professional interpreting and translation services. We have travelled this road before in other contexts, but I hope that the Government will pay the closest attention to her arguments and her justification for these amendments.

The first point is an obvious and a human one. Just as for witnesses, complainants and defendants in formal criminal justice proceedings, so for victims in understanding the code and in securing, receiving and understanding services, the experience of being a victim is extremely traumatic, emotional, often unique in the victims’ experience, and it is very difficult for the victim to comprehend what is happening to them—in short, it is difficult to understand in a human way. These problems are all the more acute for victims whose first language is not English.

However, the main point that the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, made, and the point of these amendments and the conclusion, while in the context of that initial human point, is thoroughly supported by her arguments. Complete understanding of the language is vital. What is needed, therefore, is a service that as closely as possible diminishes and removes language barriers, so what is written and stated in English is understandable to the victim, and what is written and stated in the victim’s native language is understandable in English. That can be reliably achieved only if the translation is full, accurate and direct.

The stress the noble Baroness places on the distinction between “interpreting” and “interpretation” is of the greatest importance. It is crucial that, just as in courts, when evidence, submissions or judgments are delivered, in the context of victims’ needs the translator’s or interpreter’s view must not be interpolated between the service provider and the victim or between the code and the victim. Translation and interpretation should convey exactly and straightforwardly what is said or written to and by the victim.

There is a risk, which is well known in courts and other contexts, that when non-professional, unqualified or inexperienced translating or interpreting services are involved, the directness and accuracy are compromised, not just because mistakes of meaning may be made but because the translator’s or interpreter’s own ideas and understanding colour, embroider or develop the meaning of what is written or of what is being said. This process may, and often does, reflect the best of intentions on the part of the interpreter—the intentions of those who are genuinely trying to help.

We should not underestimate the temptation for people, including professional service providers, looking for understanding or expression in order to seek or accept help when that is well-meaning but unprofessional, and the risk that those good intentions may involve. That risk, whether well-intentioned, or, as in the example of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, of the interpreter in the police station who was effectively on the other side, always needs to be minimised, and these amendments offer a good chance of achieving that minimisation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I am listening to all of this. My brief, from my team, is to correspond with Ministers, but I will speak, I hope in a succinct way—because I do waffle at times and get so distracted because I am that passionate—and as eloquently as other speakers in the Chamber.

I have dealt with transcripts—I am showing my age here—since 1980. This is how I know we should not have to have this discussion. As a committal court assistant, I used to take evidence down and do these transcripts the old-fashioned way with headphones and typing. That got abolished because of cutbacks. I then became a legal PA where I did barristers’ briefs. Again, everything was all there for the client, the defendant and everyone else, indexed.

Then came Garry’s murder. I listened to everything at a 10-week court trial. I listened to my daughters giving evidence. They wanted to come back and sit in the court, but as a mum I advised them it was too brutal for them. I am very glad I did, because five QCs goaded by defenders is not something I want my children to see after seeing their dad kicked to death. So, I know that element of it. I did get a summary of the judge’s direction, but I do not remember that document to be perfectly honest because it is so traumatising. I found a lot more out from the media, believe it or not, because they could see the dock and they give out everything 24/7—even to this day, I check on things because my mind is a blur.

Parole hearings are where statements are made. People do not know what date the parole hearing will be, they are just asked to do it and it goes off—not into the iCloud, but into something they cannot control. In all of this, the defendants and the barristers for the offender have a copy. The offender has a right to see these copies. In parole hearings, the offender has a right to see what I say about the impact of the crime. Surely, we should be able not to pilot this scheme, but to have the decency to just give a copy. We can go to the Post Office and pay 15p for a photocopy of a document. We have a digital system now even for passport photographs; we can go in a photo booth and give a code number and it appears on GOV.UK. Surely, we can have a copy of the transcript—the direction, the sentencing, how it was all resolved—for whenever a victim decides to pick it up. It is at their discretion, but surely we should not be looking at the monetary value of their damage, of the direction of the sentence and the direction for the judge, because it is so important to victims.

I ask my noble and learned friend: could we have further discussions and make sure that every victim of crime, not just those of rape and sexual abuse, has the opportunity to have that document whether in their hand or digitally? For too long it has been the offender’s right to see everything and surely now, while we are discussing victims legislation, we could have that in this Bill, to say they have a right free of charge, and let them have that document for sound peace of mind.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, what this debate has shown is the need for some clarity about what can and cannot properly be provided to the victim after criminal proceedings. While I understood and supported the provision of a transcript, the conventional view always was, at least until I heard the arguments today, that the provision of a transcript of the whole trial would be very expensive and probably, in many cases, unnecessary and of little benefit. However, if modern technology enables it to be done much less expensively, then so be it. Indeed, the transcript or a recording could and should be provided. Subject to that, clearly a free transcript of the sentencing remarks of the judge or bench, or a transcript of the summing up in cases in which there has been a contested trial and an acquittal, could be of considerable value in helping victims and their families understand what was decided and why.

In particular, the sentencing remarks may help victims and their families to understand what account was taken of the impact on the victim and the court’s assessment of harm. In some cases, a transcript could also be provided to those offering counselling, therapeutic services and treatment to victims, or otherwise offering them professional advice. However, I would like to hear what can now be usefully provided without enormous expense, in the light of modern technological advances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it will be abundantly clear what our view is from these Benches, but I am speaking formally from them to support this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, referred to Sarah Olney as being meticulous—she always is.

The recent public discussion about dissatisfaction with sentences has made me think about this issue. Without wanting in any way to disparage, and I do not, the comments of relatives and the victims of crimes themselves who make public statements on the steps of the court, one wonders how much they have been able to take in. That is no criticism of them, but they are responding to a very emotional experience and will have been emotional while hearing, or possibly not very thoroughly hearing, what has been said. I had a very minor example of that experience myself last week. I went to a medical appointment and a friend came with me. When we discussed afterwards in the car what the consultant had said, our recollections were completely different.

I want to ask the Minister some questions about the pilot which has been announced. I wonder whether he can give some details. Is it in all courts for the category of crimes that has been announced? What monitoring will there be of how the pilot is going and how will it be evaluated? Like other speakers, though, I would like to go straight to a new procedure.

I am not sure whether the technology actually comes within the category of artificial intelligence; it may be a much earlier generation than that. There are other noble Lords in the Chamber who probably could have answered this question, had I thought to ask them before we started the debate, but are the judge’s remarks not normally written down before the judge makes them? That might differ among members of the judiciary —I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Meston.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

Only sometimes.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I suppose it is like our written notes: sometimes we have them, sometimes we do not and sometimes we do not follow them.

We have heard that Minister Freer is looking at how audio recordings can be used. I wonder whether there is any more news on this than has been in the semi-public domain so far. The suggestion of listening to a recording or reading a transcript while supervised reminds me of the arrangements made for a very few senior politicians to read the assessments of the Chilcot inquiry. To me, like to others, that is not a sensible arrangement.

In any event, as I understand it, in magistrates’ courts recordings are not made. For a victim to have to sit in court and listen it is very likely that she or he will be close to the family and friends of the defendant. As my noble friend Lady Brinton said, it is a matter of open justice. This debate confirms that the adversarial system treats the victim as little more than a witness.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, reference was made briefly to Amendment 80, and

“services for victims … with no recourse to public funds”.

I want to offer brief but firm support for that amendment. Quite simply, victims of domestic abuse with no recourse to public funds are some of the most disadvantaged people that one sees in the family justice system. It is unthinkable, in my view, that they could be excluded in any way from the benefit of services under the victims’ code.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group—sometimes the way the groupings lie is a bit difficult. This group covers violence against women and girls, and my amendment relates to how we assess data on that violence. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for their support—and we shall hear from one of them shortly.

Amendment 105 seeks to probe problems with the data that we use to develop policies and ensure that there is guidance to establish that sex registered at birth is used for any analysis of patterns of offending and recording victim and perpetrator profiles. Ideally, this would apply throughout the whole criminal justice system but, for now, this amendment focuses on violence against women and girls. I hope that, on this topic at least, there will be unanimity in acknowledging that sex difference between men and women can impact on people’s experience of victimisation and offending and on patterns of offending and risk.

Official crime data is used to assess the most appropriate services that should be developed, and how resources should be targeted effectively—something that the Bill has focused on at length in relation to support for victims. But any claims for evidence-based policy must be based on material reality and cannot depend on, for example, subjective assertions or ideological beliefs, both of which could be misleading. I invite people to agree with me that data needs to be accurate, credible and consistent. The problem is that accuracy, credibility and consistency are being undermined at present, because the criminal justice system has either conflated or replaced data based on immutable sex with data based on more fluid concepts, such as gender identity or self-declared sex.

I am aware that even discussing the collection of data based on a person’s sex, whether male or female, has become controversial these days. One has only to look at last week’s media reports of internal rows taking place in the Office for National Statistics about the methodology used in the census. But that is all the more reason why my amendment emphasises the need to raise the consistent measure of sex registered at birth. At present, there is an inconsistent model of options. The variable category of “gender” is used carelessly in criminal justice circles as interchangeable with sex. Sex can mean, if used imprecisely, sex as self-declared gender. It can mean a legally recognised but none the less acquired gender, sometimes evidenced by a gender recognition certificate—GRC. It can also mean changed government records, such as passports, driving licences, or NHS numbers, even though a person’s biological sex does not change, even if the documentation does. But the introduction of this vast array of recording practices creates a lack clarity about what is being measured and what exactly some types of official criminal justice data represent.

To illustrate that confusion, let us consider that a few years ago the British Transport Police stated that, because the BTP treats all people—victims, offenders and witnesses—with dignity, it

“records their gender according to the gender they present as, and/or how they self-identify their gender”.

That seems to suggest that the British Transport Police is undoubtedly well meaning but none the less prioritises validating people’s identity rather than understanding that data collection is a critical variable in crime statistics. It is important we ensure that official statistics are not treated as personal records of preference; they must be objectively accurate if they are to be useful. What is more, different police forces use different criteria for data collection, and this is very important for our understanding of violence against women and girls.

Keep Prisons Single Sex is involved in an invaluable project and public service which annually submits freedom of information requests to all police forces in the UK with the aim of determining how they record a suspect’s sex. The campaign’s findings for 2023 make for troubling reading. Just for a taster, of the 32 forces that answered the freedom of information request, no force records sex registered at birth in all circumstances; 20 forces use legally recognised acquired gender where the suspect has a GRC; and 13 forces stated that, where a suspect has a self-declared gender identity, they will record this as sex, rather than sex at birth. Some 22 forces answered the question on how a rape suspect’s sex is recorded, with 20 forces recording legally recognised acquired gender—in other words, GRCs—and only one force recording sex registered at birth. This means that suspected rape perpetrators and convicted rapists can be recorded in official statistics as female, if they no longer wish to identify with their male birth sex. To confuse matters further, 22 forces answered questions on how they record the sex of a suspect who identifies as non-binary, with 11 recording sex as “indeterminate” or “unspecified other”, and only nine using sex registered at birth.

Noble Lords might wonder whether any of this matters, and some say it does not. However, in 2019, when Fair Play For Women revealed results from its FOI requests to police forces, the National Police Chiefs’ Council responded that:

“There is no evidence to suggest that recording a person’s gender based on the information that they provide will have an impact on an investigation or on national crime statistics, because of the low numbers involved”.


That is wrong-headed and complacent. On the point about the low numbers involved, one might ask what will happen if many more people apply for a legal sex change. Organisations such as Stonewall claim that the UK trans population is up to 500,000, even though only a small minority have GRCs. That would make a significant error in the datasets. Small numbers of cases misclassified in this way can lead to substantial bias in crime stats, and, importantly, can distort and mislead public understanding of the nature of, in particular, violence against women and girls and offending patterns in relation to sexual offences.

If the police now record female crime based on gender identity, this means female crime statistics include both women who were born female and trans women who were born male. I do not know whether noble Lords recall that, in 2021, newspaper headlines screamed that the number of female paedophiles had doubled in four years. This shocking statistic was based on a Radio 4 “File on 4” documentary that used data from FOI requests. It claimed that, between 2015 and 2019, the number of reported cases of female-perpetrated child sex abuse prosecuted by police in England and Wales had risen from 1,249 to 2,297, an increase of 84%. A moral panic followed, as people assumed that that meant that more women were sexually abusing children, with endless talking heads on TV discussing why. The furore calmed down only when it dawned on commentators that no account had been taken of whether males who identify as women might be responsible for the apparent increase because of confusion about data protection. Of course, maybe it is the case that there are more women sexually abusing children—after all, offending patterns do change. However, it is impossible to know or make that claim from the collected data based on a mixture of gender identity and sex registered at birth.

This sort of unreliability surely erodes public understanding. Trust is eroded when sex-disaggregated data held by the police does not actually record what most people think it does. Unsurprisingly, this can lead to media reports of female rapists, women as sex abusers and so on, when in fact what is being reported is male perpetrators claiming female gender identity. We have to look only at the widespread public shock when it was revealed that a double rapist treated as a woman when remanded in a Scottish women’s prison was in fact not the female Isla Bryson but Adam Graham. Indeed, that scandal precipitated the downfall of the Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon.

To finish, routinely such confusions continue. Only last week, in media coverage of a trial at Southampton Crown Court, both broadcast and print media reported that a 56 year-old female charity shop worker was charged with exposing “her” penis. Lawyers in court were quoted as describing how Samantha Norris pulled down “her” trousers and manipulated “her” penis in front of two 11 year-old girls as they walked past the window of “her” home. But it is “his” home, “his” pants and “his” penis. Mr Norris may identify as a woman and be treated as such by criminal justice agencies, but he is male. How can the public or public authorities have any realistic picture or analysis of the threats posed by violence against women and girls if these confusions are reflected in official data?

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I will briefly respond to the noble Baroness. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her constructive engagement and for everything she has said. I will respond on that specific amendment. I understand where she is coming from.

Perhaps I did not put it very well, but what I was trying to articulate before is that I fully accept, as a fact of life, that marital breakdown will, sadly, sometimes —maybe even often—create a rancour that can be passed on to the children. The children can be caught in the middle, and they may feel that they are pulled in two directions, or perhaps in one direction more than the other; it does not matter. That is a fact of life. It is a matter of evidence and fact that is not, in my view, a matter for medical experts, but a matter for the judge to deal with and cope with—I think the noble Baroness is slightly sympathetic to that point.

In many cases, it will be about encouraging the parties, whatever their pain, to reflect on their actions in the interests of the child. However, it does not require the kinds of sums of money and the sorts of diagnoses that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, was talking about. It has to be said again that we are often talking about some very wealthy men; it need not be, but it is usually men. These are some very wealthy individuals who pay some very expensive, slightly dodgy—and if the noble Lord, Lord Russell, can use the “B” word, I can use “dodgy”—experts, whose expertise I would query, but whose greed I would not.

I can always reflect on drafting; that is what Committee is about. Here, when we talk about being

“considered … as a potential perpetrator of parental alienation”—

as opposed to simply saying bad things to their kids about the other party—we are talking about this syndrome. That is what I was trying to reflect. As for the fact that they should not be diagnosed or considered for diagnosis for 90 days for this syndrome, frankly, if they are a victim of abuse, it is almost inevitable that they are going to have some rancour or anger towards the other partner, unless they are a saint. Judges are well capable of considering that and working out what to do on the facts.

It is really about attempting to separate facts from expert evidence. These are hard facts that judges can deal with, with other court reports. This so-called “alienation expertise”, that some of us believe has become a bit of a racket, is being weaponised against victims. If there is something in the clarity of the drafting that can be improved, that is the great benefit of Committee, but I am trying to respond with the intention behind my amendment. I am very grateful for the opportunity to do that, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, having started to grow old in the family courts, I feel that I ought to address some of these amendments, some of which I would like to support and some of which I would like to qualify.

I begin by clearing up one particular point, which was possibly a slip by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. There is no question now of unrepresented litigants being allowed to cross-examine mothers, particularly in contested cases involving domestic abuse allegations. It simply is not tolerated. No judge would tolerate it and we all know how to deal with it when it arises.

Turning to the individual amendments, as quickly as I can, and dealing first with Amendment 82 relating to parental alienation, I am worried by the proposal to restrict the family court’s approach to cases involving allegations of so-called parental alienation by what would amount to a statutory exclusion of evidence. There are two main grounds for concern that I suggest. First, the amendment would restrict the scope of what the court might want or need to consider. Secondly, and ironically, it might tend to elevate the significance of the concept of parental alienation. Allegations of alienation, whether justified or not, have become part of the weaponry of high-conflict parental disputes. The concept of parental alienation is controversial, and, indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the idea that there is a syndrome is largely discredited. That in itself may be one reason why it should not find its way, in any way, into a statute.

I was not going to refer to what was recently said by the President of the Family Division, but in view of what I have heard, I will say that in an important recent decision, in 2023, the President of the Family Division said:

“Family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the court's focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied”.


It is often said that the family court has to take a holistic view of the child’s welfare. It has to look not only at what happened in the past but at what might be possible in the future. Cases of this type have a particular complexity. The signs of parental alienation are, frankly, not difficult to identify. In my experience, Cafcass is well equipped to do that. The causes are more difficult to understand. Cases in which one parent tries to turn the child against the other parent, consciously or unconsciously seeking to punish the other parent, present differing degrees of alienation and varying motivations.

These cases are not easy to resolve. They require an understanding of the family dynamics, and an assessment of the impact of what has happened and of the harm to the child concerned. The evidential picture is not always clear-cut. Indeed, there are some cases in which there may quite well have been some level of domestic abuse by one parent, but the alleged parental alienation is wholly unrelated to it; or the persistent hostility revealed is quite out of proportion to the type of abuse that has been experienced. The Children Act and the practice direction governing cases in which abuse has been established fundamentally require the court’s assessment of harm, or risk of harm, from all sources. Those are the vital considerations.

Amendment 82 would insert the label “parental alienation” into primary legislation. It could artificially restrict—and, indeed, distort—the proper analysis of parental behaviour and attitudes in their context, and could restrict the careful handling that such cases sometimes require. I doubt that would be helpful. Indeed, it could well be unhelpful.

I turn now to Amendment 84 and others that wish to introduce the use of Section 91(14) orders. For the uninitiated, Section 91(14) orders restrict further applications to the court without leave of the court. It is a valuable power. Although Section 91(14) orders are not strictly speaking barring orders, as sometimes described, they provide a necessary protective filter to ensure that inappropriate applications will not be allowed to proceed.

In reality, a Section 91(14) order may or may not be necessary in any individual case of this type—that is to say, a case involving the application of Jade’s law. However, in these extreme cases, if there is any possibility of an inappropriate application by the convicted offender, such an order would be justified. Indeed, under current guidance there does not always have to be a risk of repeated applications, but rather the risk of any application without merit.

In the situation covered by the Bill, when, unfortunately, one parent has killed the other and the victim’s family or foster carers have stepped in to care for the child or children, they should be shielded from the prospect and distress of further court proceedings. However, in that context, and slightly tangentially, I will just qualify one observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when she referred to parental rights. One of the great improvements brought about by the Children Act 1989 was to remove the concept of parental rights. What is being restricted here is the exercise of parental responsibility.

My only reservation about the Section 91(14) amendments relates to the question of who should be responsible for making such orders and when they should be made. From experience, I emphasise that the orders require careful, case-specific drafting. It is therefore always necessary, when making such an order, to specify its duration, which is not dealt with by Section 91 itself. That may require consideration of the age and circumstances of the child and, in these situations, the position of the surviving adults. I rather assume that those proposing these amendments would wish the order usually to run until the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, but I suggest that should be made clear, either in the statute or in the order.

However, I add that these are not orders of which most Crown Courts will have had any experience. At the sentencing stage in the Crown Court, there might not be the material on which to craft an appropriate order. Accordingly, while I do not in any way wish to oppose the principle of the amendments relating to the use of Section 91(14), I suggest that under the existing scheme of the Bill it would be better to leave any mandatory imposition of a Section 91 order to the required review hearing in the family court, for which the Bill provides in new Section 10B.

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I hope it is of some reassurance to the noble Baroness that there are, nevertheless, good reasons for not making a Section 91(14) order alongside the prohibited steps order, but that there are well-used existing powers to put one in place when the circumstances are appropriate.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt, and I understand the drift of what the noble Earl is saying, but all I was suggesting was that, although I fully understand the desirability in many cases of having Section 91(14) orders—and suggest that in these extreme cases they should be the norm—it should not be done in the Crown Court but should be part of the mandatory requirements at the review hearing that will follow shortly afterwards in the family court. It should, at the very least, be something in the statute that the reviewing family court should be required to consider.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for those comments and will ensure that they are fed back to my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy, and the department as a whole.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 16th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I too have added my name to Amendment 1. The great thing about following my noble friend Lord Russell is that I need to say very little. The beauty of this is its simplicity. We have talked about this again and again, and I thank the Ministers for their hard work and the very collegiate attitude we have had. People have come to an agreement and the Government have given a lot. However, it is so beautifully simple to change “a person” to “any adult or child”. There is a lot of talk about how, if you start doing that, where do you stop? But “any adult or child” is perfect.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, we discussed this in Committee. Since then, a decision of the Court of Appeal comprehensively rejected the rather eccentric argument that a child is not a person. In fact, reading that judgment, it is quite clear that there was never any doubt that a child is a person. The Oxford English Dictionary definition, which was quoted, defines a person as:

“An individual human being; a man, woman, or child”.


The purist would say that this amendment is unnecessary, but I suggest thinking about it a little more deeply, and that the arguments we have heard in support of the amendment, which makes it clear that children are individually and separately covered by the Bill, should ultimately carry the day.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, as we begin Report, from these Liberal Democrat Benches I thank the Minister and his fellow Ministers for talking to noble Lords in the short time between Committee and the commencement of Report. We understand that this has been difficult during the Easter Recess, but it has been extremely helpful to hear the Government say where they are and are not prepared to make some progress on closing the gap between themselves and others across this House on this important Bill.

This group, as has already been outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and other noble Lords, relates to the importance of ensuring that child victims are recognised as having different needs and services available to them under the victims’ code and this Bill. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, echoes that made in Committee specifically changing the definition of victim to “any adult or child”.

Amendment 21 and others tabled by the Minister choose a different definition:

“victims who are under the age of 18 or who have protected characteristics”.

I am grateful to the Minister for that addition because, as somebody with a protected characteristic—in my case, a disability—it makes it clear that age alone does not cover some of the particular vulnerabilities faced by those with protected characteristics. In this case I am thinking of those over the age of 18 with an intellectual disability, who may need a heightened level of support under the code. However, there is a broader point that we welcome from these Benches. Under the terms of the Equality Act 2010, those with protected characteristics have enhanced rights in relation to crimes against them, because of their protected characteristics. We welcome that. Can the Minister explain why the government amendments are phrased the way they are and why the Government are therefore still resisting the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell?

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd April 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 60, 64 and 70, which echo amendments on support services for victims that I tabled in Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for his responses at that stage and for his kindness in meeting me and representatives of Refuge and Women’s Aid in the interim. In light of those conversations, it is not my intention to press any of these amendments to a Division today. However, I hope that, in this debate and in the Minister’s response to it, we can clarify a little further how His Majesty’s Government will seek to ensure that victims across the country have access to quality support services provided by organisations that hold their confidence and understand their specific circumstances. As we are now on Report, I will not repeat the detailed arguments of Committee, but I think their force still stands.

Amendment 60 places a duty on the Secretary of State to define in statutory guidance

“the full breadth of specialist community-based support domestic abuse services”.

This would ensure that victims receive quality support that meets their needs, and that they are made aware of the variety of community-based support available to them. Victims seek various forms of support, which might include advocacy, outreach, floating support, formal counselling or being part of a support group. All of these have a vital role to play. The guidance could cover the holistic support intersectional advocacy that is often provided by what we call “by and for” services —these are particularly helpful for black and minoritised women—as well as those providing specialist advocacy to deaf and disabled people and LGBT+ victims.

The implementation of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 demonstrates why a clear and precise definition is now critical. Under Part 4 of that Act, a statutory duty was placed on local authorities to fund domestic abuse support in safe accommodation. We found that organisations with a much wider remit than domestic abuse, and often services that had no expertise at all, because they are eligible for refuge funding under the duty, have now moved into that area, entering a sector previously run by specialists who really understood the service users.

What we find when local commissioning bodies rely too much on non-specialist organisations—which can be for financial reasons, or because they are easier to get hold of or to deal with—the result is that victims, particularly those from minority backgrounds or specialised contexts, receive much poorer support, yet these are, of course, often among the most vulnerable in our society. The amendment would simply ensure that commissioning bodies have to pay attention to their needs. Although I am not pushing it to a Division, my question to the Minister is: in the absence of placing a duty on the Secretary of State in the Bill, what assurances can he offer us today that the Government will place appropriate pressure on local commissioning bodies to procure the full range of specialist services from specialist organisations that such victims need?

Amendment 64 would require the Secretary of State to address the funding gaps identified by joint strategic needs assessments and support local authorities, integrated care boards and police and crime commissioners to deliver their duties under the duty to collaborate. The amendment has been framed so as to avoid requiring the Secretary of State to go outside the normal spending review processes, which I hope will give some assurances that this is not about trying to break the bank.

Without sufficient funding, it will not be possible for local commissioners to have regard to their joint assessments when producing strategies and providing services. The gaps in service provision that will likely be identified are already known, and there simply is not the funding available to plug them. Ultimately, the scale of the funding shortfall facing local commissioners —and in turn those specialist services—means that the Government do have a role to play.

Although the Ministry of Justice has committed to increasing funding for victim and witness support services to £147 million per year until 2024-25, this funding is not ring-fenced to domestic abuse services. Of course, existing commitments are simply insufficient to meet the demand around the country. Women’s Aid has found that a minimum of £427 million a year is really needed to fund specialist domestic abuse services in England: £238 million for community-based services and £189 million for refuges. Moreover, specialist services are now feeling the effects of this concerning rise in local authorities issuing Section 114 notices. This is a crisis that will only get worse.

However, I welcome the Minister’s statement in Committee that a ministerially led national oversight forum will be set up to scrutinise the local strategies. This could be the vehicle to identify systemic shortfalls in service provision, and hence to put pressure on commissioning bodies to plug the gaps. It could also provide the evidence to justify more adequate funding settlements, with specific requirements to include specialist community-based services. I would therefore be grateful if he could say a little more about how the ministerial-led forum he has promised will function.

Finally, Amendment 70 would require the Secretary of State to include advice on sustainable, multi-year contracts with statutory guidance. I know that the Government are already committed in principle to multi-year contracts in the victims funding strategy. The problem is that in practice, this is not happening. Refuge monitors all commissioning opportunities nationally, and half of commissioning opportunities are for less than three years. There is no enforceability mechanism for the victims’ funding strategy, and in the absence of that, short-term contracts are prevalent across the specialist domestic abuse sector. Such contracts make recruitment and retention of staff more difficult as services cannot offer fixed-term contracts. That leaves survivors forced to find alternative sources of ongoing support at critical points in their recovery and prevents services being able to take root properly in local communities. This is why I feel that a statutory requirement is necessary.

This amendment is a change from the one I proposed in Committee, where I sought to put the requirement into the Bill. I am glad that the Minister acknowledges the problem and would be grateful if, in responding, he could set out what further action the Government will take to ensure that longer-term contracts for specialist service providers become the norm and not the exception.

Finally, I support other amendments in this group, in particular Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, but will leave my right reverend friend the Bishop of Gloucester to speak to that.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly again in relation to the provision of transcripts covered by Amendment 19. I fully understand the point and the force of the amendment and wish to emphasise a point that perhaps the noble Baroness did not. She is not, in fact, talking about transcripts of the whole trial or transcripts of sections of evidence. I could not help suspecting that the costly examples she gave were of much lengthier transcripts than transcripts of the summing-up and sentencing remarks about which she seeks to make provision under this amendment.

To that extent, the noble Baroness may well have undermined her own case, because I suspect that transcripts of the sentencing remarks and summing up are much cheaper, but I cannot give expert evidence on that. Particularly important to some victims is the transcript of the sentencing remarks, because that gives the victim, and those who may advise or support them or provide them with therapy and counselling, an appreciation of what the judge assessed to have been the culpability of the offender and the impact on the victim.

As far as it concerns the provision of a transcript of the summing up and sentencing remarks, I support this amendment. This is subject to the caveat I mentioned at an earlier stage: in the case of sexual offences the distribution of transcripts needs to be subject to safeguards, because otherwise they can and do fall into the wrong hands. From time to time, I have been asked to authorise the distribution of a transcript, and a lot of thought has to go into who can and cannot see them and what happens to them once provided. If they get into the wrong hands, it will do the victim, among others, a great disservice.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 57. Why would I not, since it is a duty to collaborate and co-operate? We like a lot of “C”s in this Bill. I also support what has been said about transcripts. It is so important to have the sentencing remarks, so that further down the line you have the time to read them and digest them. I have some sympathy and understanding of what it feels like.

This amendment is so important to future Victims’ Commissioners. In Committee, I told noble Lords that it was time we gave the Victims’ Commissioner the tools to do the job that Parliament intended. I am not on the state pension yet, but this amendment would mark the coming of age of the role of Victims’ Commissioner. It would require criminal justice agencies listed under the victims’ code to co-operate with commissioners not as a favour or because they happen to get on with them but because they have a statutory duty to do so. This is how it should be.

When I met my noble and learned friend the Minister to discuss this amendment, he told me that commissioners had very different roles, and that the authority given to one commissioner should not automatically be given to others. I do not disagree but—I say this with the greatest respect to him—that is not why I back this amendment. All commissioners rely on the co-operation of government departments and agencies to deliver an outcome. They do not, as a rule, have executive powers invested in them. Whatever the differences in their remits, whether it be victims, domestic abuse, children or modern slavery, the underlying requirement to work collaboratively with key stakeholders remains the same. All commissioners are dependent on the co-operation of others if they are to effect change.

My office was asked to provide examples of where agencies have not co-operated in the past. We duly provided this information. I do not intend to share our examples today, but I believe they made the case for the change that we are calling for. To allay any concerns, we recognise that sometimes data might simply not be available or that there may be very good reasons for not sharing it with us. However, the reasons for withholding information are not always explained to us, and we do not always get the impression that agencies have considered whether they hold other sources of data that might be helpful as a substitute.

In conclusion, when asking my team members for other examples, I was concerned to be told that they generally do not ask for information as they know that it will not be shared with them. That cannot be right. If further Victims’ Commissioners are to be part of the solution in driving change and improvement, they need the support and co-operation of criminal justice colleagues. I await to hear what the Minister will say, but I am tempted to support the amendment if it is put to a vote.

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[Baroness Helic (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. They are underpinned by a simple principle: the best interests of the child. They seek to prevent the subversion of the family court, so that it cannot be used by abusers to extend their influence and control over victims; and to ensure that, as far as possible, children are protected from abuse and trauma.

Whether directly or indirectly, children are victims of domestic abuse in a household. Tragically, they are sometimes victims of abuse at the hands of their own parents. In such circumstances, the normal assumption that their best interests are served through contact with their parent must be reconsidered. This is why we seek to extend Jade’s law so that not just offenders who are convicted of murdering a partner but those convicted of sexually abusing a child in the family will automatically have their parental responsibility suspended on sentencing, rather than placing the burden on the family to go through family court proceedings after the criminal conviction.

It is why we seek to prohibit unsupervised contact for a parent who has perpetrated domestic abuse, sexual violence or child abuse. Too often, “best interests” has been determined as almost synonymous with increased parental contact. In most cases, that may be true, but we need to make sure that the law works when it is not. Sadly, contact does not correlate to care. Unsupervised contact with someone accused of abuse is a serious risk to the well-being and safety of a child.

Other amendments in this group seek to limit the ability of domestic abusers to carry on their abuse by subverting our justice system and using court procedures to harass and control their victims. The proceedings of our courts must be fair, and we must not let them be used as a tool of abuse. To that end, we must also make sure that any expert advice is properly regulated. This was discussed in some detail during the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act. The sorry truth is that we continue to see allegations of so-called parental alienation used routinely by abusers and the so-called experts they produce in the courts to try and discredit children’s testimony and avoid the charges they face. Victims are even encouraged not to disclose domestic abuse as it will only see them cast as unco-operative. This is a deeply alarming situation which poses a real risk for victims and children.

The UN Human Rights Council report Custody, Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children recommends that states legislate to prohibit the use of parental alienation or related pseudo-concepts in family law cases, and the use of so-called experts in parental alienation and related pseudo-concepts. In an early 2023 case involving a regulated psychologist, the President of the Family Division held that it was at Parliament’s discretion whether a tighter regime should be imposed. We should exercise that discretion.

My sense from Committee was that the principles behind the various amendments in this group are widely supported across the House and the differences are largely down to practicalities. It is precisely because of the practicalities that these amendments are needed. Without them the psychological, practical and financial burdens placed on families trying to recover from abuse is very heavy. I shall give just one example. A mother in Cardiff had to spend £30,000 on court costs to remove parental rights from her ex-husband, who was a convicted child sex abuser, to protect her daughter. This is sadly not untypical. In another case I have been told about, a father was found to have used abusive behaviour towards his children and rape their mother. The mother’s court costs were £50,000. Eventually, the father was ordered to pay, but the very prospect of such high sums risks putting children’s safety at an unjust price.

Victims of domestic abuse must be able to have faith that any abuse endured will not be manipulated against them in court. These amendments are firmly in line with the Government’s ambitions for the Bill. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will accept them.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 80 and 84. These amendments would extend the provision of Jade’s law in the Bill, which relates to murder and manslaughter cases, and would deprive a convicted offender of parental responsibility. The amendments would extend the provisions to sexual offences against children in the family. A powerful case has been made for this extension. It was recently approved, as has been said, in another Bill before the Commons. The examples provided in the briefing material fully justify this amendment.

If I may be pedantic for a moment, I will point out that in the explanatory statement attached to Amendment 80 there is an incorrect reference to removal of “the presumption of custody”. There is no such presumption, and the concept of custody has not existed since the Children Act 1989, although it persists in soap operas, to the irritation of family lawyers.

This amendment would prohibit the exercise of parental responsibility by convicted offenders in cases of child sexual abuse. Allowing sexual offenders to continue to exercise parental responsibility would be wholly inappropriate. Amendments 80 and 84 are well suited to the structure of the Bill, which provides for an order to be made by the Crown Court and then automatically reviewed by the family court when there is perhaps a fuller picture of the family circumstances and a fuller picture of wider implications.

In many ways, cases of sexual offending are more difficult because, sadly, in cases of murder and manslaughter, both parents are not alive. When both parents are still alive, and when there is the possibility that the offender is not in custody—or not for very long —serious thought needs to be given, after the automatic order in the Crown Court, by the family court. That is why I suggest that these amendments are well suited to the structure of the Bill.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, we have before us various amendments that deal essentially with family justice. I will deal first with Amendment 91, which proposes that only experts regulated by the Health and Care Professions Council undertake certain psychological assessments. The Government entirely appreciate the aim of this amendment—something needs to be done. This problem probably extends to healthcare generally. In the Ministry of Justice, we have been in discussion with the Department of Health about the term “psychologist”, what it means, whether one should regulate it and so forth. The Government’s position is that only psychologists who are regulated should be undertaking psychological assessments in the family court.

The short point is that this is going to be better dealt with under the Family Procedure Rules than in primary legislation. In particular, in this Bill, for reasons of scope, you can deal with it only in relation to victims of criminal conduct. We need an across-the-board solution, worked out through the Family Procedure Rule Committee, to implement changes that would ensure that, where a psychologist undertakes any psychological assessment in private law children proceedings, they are suitably regulated and that that broader work encapsulates any other problems that arise in relation to unregulated experts. The position of the Lord Chancellor is that this matter should be undertaken now by the Family Procedure Rule Committee—which operates in very close collaboration with practitioners, judges and all those involved in the family law scene—to implement changes, rather than it being done through this primary legislation.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

I fully understand the point that the Minister is making. Can he indicate whether this problem has now been referred to the relevant Family Procedure Rule Committee? If it has, I would hope that it would get urgent and speedy consideration. If it has not, when will it be?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

There have been preliminary discussions with the committee but it has not formally started work. I cannot give the noble Lord a precise date, but I can say that there is a reserve power under Section 78A of the Courts Act 2003 which entitles the Lord Chancellor to require the Family Procedure Rule Committee to consider the point. In the Government’s submission, that is the way that this should be dealt with, rather than in this necessarily narrow Bill.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. Government Amendment 90 would require the police to notify schools as soon as possible when they have reasonable grounds to believe that a child in their police force area may be a victim of domestic abuse. That means that all children who may be a victim of domestic abuse will receive the necessary support and relevant safeguarding interventions.

Domestic abuse is an abhorrent and sometimes fatal crime, yet it is far too common. It is high volume, high harm and high cost. We fully recognise the devasting impact that it can have on children and young people, which is why we are determined to protect and support better the victims of abuse, including children, and bring perpetrators to justice. The landmark Domestic Abuse Act 2021 acknowledged, for the first time, the appalling damage that domestic abuse can inflict on children and young people and recognised the damage caused to children who see, hear or experience the effects of domestic abuse.

Recognising children as victims of domestic abuse in their own right is a very important step. It helps to ensure that children themselves remain visible in the multi-agency response to domestic abuse. This government amendment will help us take this work one step further. It will legislate that each chief officer of police across England and Wales must ensure that arrangements are in place to notify schools when they have reasonable grounds to believe that a child may be a victim of domestic abuse.

This amendment places the notification scheme, widely known as Operation Encompass, on a statutory footing. It is already in operation across all 43 police forces in England and Wales on a voluntary basis. By enshrining the scheme in law, we can ensure that it is consistently applied across all forces. This will help improve early intervention and enable the most vulnerable children to be safeguarded from the harms of domestic abuse.

This Government are committed to supporting child victims and protecting them from domestic abuse. The amendment will be key in our efforts to do so. I therefore hope that the House will welcome it, and I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 90, which provides for the relaying of information to schools. Schools need accurate and prompt information about what is going on. They need to know, and understand, what is happening, or what is suspected. Therefore, I welcome the amendment. It is almost as important as the information going the other way—that is to say, schools relay information to local authorities and, where appropriate, to the police.

I am afraid to say that there are a few cases I have come across where schools, or individual members of school staff, have been reluctant to get involved in child abuse cases, or where there is suspected child abuse. Albeit this amendment provides for the information to pass the other way—from the authorities to the school—if it serves to do anything it may well encourage the passing of information in both directions.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, we also welcome Amendment 90. I want to add one other issue though. It is very much a one-way system, as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has announced, and I ask whether the noble Earl will write to me, the noble Lord, and any noble Lords who speak in this group, to report on the Government’s progress on the recommendations that they have accepted following the independent inquiry into child sex abuse. Recommendation 13 is about the need for mandatory reporting, and the Government said, over a year ago, that there would be a full public consultation beginning with a publication of a call for evidence. I have seen neither, but, more importantly, I want to know when we can—perhaps through this Bill—have something going the other way, as the noble Lord so rightly pointed out.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am simply referring to today’s list, which is what I am working from. If the Minister looks at today’s list, he will see that this group includes, for example, government Amendment 156ZB, which is an amendment to Clause 55, and government Amendments 156ZC, 156ZD, 156ZE and 156ZF. I do not mind at all whether my amendments are in another group, but I do not want to be told later that I have missed my opportunity.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I associate myself with those remarks. I stayed late, expecting to debate the question of the marriage of long-term prisoners, and was a bit concerned to see that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appeared to be described as “already debated”, which I do not think it can possibly have been.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to help once again, because I have in front of me a copy of the groupings that were sent out. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Meston, are absolutely right that some of the consequential government amendments have been put into group 5, but group 6 certainly includes—as we were told by the Government Whips’ Office—Amendment 165ZDA and Amendment 156ZI, which is the prisoner marriage substantive stand-part amendment. If we could proceed, that would be most convenient.

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[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not intend to say much, for the very good reason that I do not have to. The arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, and particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are overwhelming. I do not want to put the Minister, for whom I have huge respect, on the spot, but I have a suspicion that he has more than a bit of sympathy for the arguments that have been put.

The only point I want to make is this: commentators have said that, when the Minister and the Secretary of State came to their positions, there was likely to be a different attitude towards issues of this kind than there was under some predecessors. The evidence is that that is true, and we have seen examples tonight and this afternoon of the Minister no doubt using his influence in persuading the Secretary of State to have sensible views and change the Bill where it needed to be changed.

This is exactly a case of a clause that is both against the European legislation we have adopted and against all common sense; it should be removed. It would be a real shame if this Bill, which contains some really excellent stuff on both prisoners and victims, has at the tail end of it, as the noble Lord said, this rather ridiculous and very anti-British way of dealing with this issue—so I do ask the Minister to please think again.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I raised questions about Clause 55 and how it might operate in practice at Second Reading that were really not answered. I make no criticism; the Minister had a lot to deal with. I regret not being able to participate in Committee. But I have devoted quite a lot of my professional life to the formation and validity of marriage, and therefore in the context of this Bill I would like to point out that the question of whether and to what extent certain marriages should be restricted or governed by statute faces two underlying problems.

First, it is generally not necessary for anybody otherwise qualified to marry to have any good or creditable reason to do so. I mention that in the context of my noble friend Lord Carter’s suggestion that possibly in these circumstances prison governors should question the motives and have the ability to do so, and that that may be the way through this problem. I have to say that research suggests that the decision to marry is rarely reached on rational grounds—and indeed the same research revealed that 3% of those surveyed did not know why they were getting married at all.

Secondly, and altogether more seriously, there is the fundamental right to marry, stated in Article 12 of the ECHR. That is a right that long predated that convention in this country. However, it was Article 12 that underpinned the Marriage Act 1983, which allowed for marriages of those detained in prison, for essentially pragmatic reasons. It was legislation that did not attract criticism—indeed, only newspaper headlines such as “Get Me to the Jail on Time”. Article 12 also led to the extension of the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, which I had a part in, believe it or not, and which set mankind free to marry their mothers-in-law.

The restrictions proposed in this Bill on specific marriages were understandably prompted by the attention-seeking attempts by particular convicted prisoners to marry—something that many people, no doubt including their victims and their victims’ families, will have found grossly offensive. Nevertheless, the underlying points emphasised by all noble Lords who have spoken so far simply cannot be ignored.

If Article 12 rights are to be curtailed and qualified simply by reference to the nature of the sentence being served or by vague concepts of public interest, the Government really should spell out more clearly the justification for the proposed restrictions and should clearly indicate the circumstances likely to satisfy the Secretary of State that they are “exceptional circumstances”. At Second Reading, I suggested that they might include terminal illness, but I can see that it ought probably to go wider than that. Otherwise, we are simply going to be storing up problems and litigation for the future.