Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I will briefly respond to the noble Baroness. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her constructive engagement and for everything she has said. I will respond on that specific amendment. I understand where she is coming from.

Perhaps I did not put it very well, but what I was trying to articulate before is that I fully accept, as a fact of life, that marital breakdown will, sadly, sometimes —maybe even often—create a rancour that can be passed on to the children. The children can be caught in the middle, and they may feel that they are pulled in two directions, or perhaps in one direction more than the other; it does not matter. That is a fact of life. It is a matter of evidence and fact that is not, in my view, a matter for medical experts, but a matter for the judge to deal with and cope with—I think the noble Baroness is slightly sympathetic to that point.

In many cases, it will be about encouraging the parties, whatever their pain, to reflect on their actions in the interests of the child. However, it does not require the kinds of sums of money and the sorts of diagnoses that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, was talking about. It has to be said again that we are often talking about some very wealthy men; it need not be, but it is usually men. These are some very wealthy individuals who pay some very expensive, slightly dodgy—and if the noble Lord, Lord Russell, can use the “B” word, I can use “dodgy”—experts, whose expertise I would query, but whose greed I would not.

I can always reflect on drafting; that is what Committee is about. Here, when we talk about being

“considered … as a potential perpetrator of parental alienation”—

as opposed to simply saying bad things to their kids about the other party—we are talking about this syndrome. That is what I was trying to reflect. As for the fact that they should not be diagnosed or considered for diagnosis for 90 days for this syndrome, frankly, if they are a victim of abuse, it is almost inevitable that they are going to have some rancour or anger towards the other partner, unless they are a saint. Judges are well capable of considering that and working out what to do on the facts.

It is really about attempting to separate facts from expert evidence. These are hard facts that judges can deal with, with other court reports. This so-called “alienation expertise”, that some of us believe has become a bit of a racket, is being weaponised against victims. If there is something in the clarity of the drafting that can be improved, that is the great benefit of Committee, but I am trying to respond with the intention behind my amendment. I am very grateful for the opportunity to do that, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, having started to grow old in the family courts, I feel that I ought to address some of these amendments, some of which I would like to support and some of which I would like to qualify.

I begin by clearing up one particular point, which was possibly a slip by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. There is no question now of unrepresented litigants being allowed to cross-examine mothers, particularly in contested cases involving domestic abuse allegations. It simply is not tolerated. No judge would tolerate it and we all know how to deal with it when it arises.

Turning to the individual amendments, as quickly as I can, and dealing first with Amendment 82 relating to parental alienation, I am worried by the proposal to restrict the family court’s approach to cases involving allegations of so-called parental alienation by what would amount to a statutory exclusion of evidence. There are two main grounds for concern that I suggest. First, the amendment would restrict the scope of what the court might want or need to consider. Secondly, and ironically, it might tend to elevate the significance of the concept of parental alienation. Allegations of alienation, whether justified or not, have become part of the weaponry of high-conflict parental disputes. The concept of parental alienation is controversial, and, indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the idea that there is a syndrome is largely discredited. That in itself may be one reason why it should not find its way, in any way, into a statute.

I was not going to refer to what was recently said by the President of the Family Division, but in view of what I have heard, I will say that in an important recent decision, in 2023, the President of the Family Division said:

“Family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the court's focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied”.


It is often said that the family court has to take a holistic view of the child’s welfare. It has to look not only at what happened in the past but at what might be possible in the future. Cases of this type have a particular complexity. The signs of parental alienation are, frankly, not difficult to identify. In my experience, Cafcass is well equipped to do that. The causes are more difficult to understand. Cases in which one parent tries to turn the child against the other parent, consciously or unconsciously seeking to punish the other parent, present differing degrees of alienation and varying motivations.

These cases are not easy to resolve. They require an understanding of the family dynamics, and an assessment of the impact of what has happened and of the harm to the child concerned. The evidential picture is not always clear-cut. Indeed, there are some cases in which there may quite well have been some level of domestic abuse by one parent, but the alleged parental alienation is wholly unrelated to it; or the persistent hostility revealed is quite out of proportion to the type of abuse that has been experienced. The Children Act and the practice direction governing cases in which abuse has been established fundamentally require the court’s assessment of harm, or risk of harm, from all sources. Those are the vital considerations.

Amendment 82 would insert the label “parental alienation” into primary legislation. It could artificially restrict—and, indeed, distort—the proper analysis of parental behaviour and attitudes in their context, and could restrict the careful handling that such cases sometimes require. I doubt that would be helpful. Indeed, it could well be unhelpful.

I turn now to Amendment 84 and others that wish to introduce the use of Section 91(14) orders. For the uninitiated, Section 91(14) orders restrict further applications to the court without leave of the court. It is a valuable power. Although Section 91(14) orders are not strictly speaking barring orders, as sometimes described, they provide a necessary protective filter to ensure that inappropriate applications will not be allowed to proceed.

In reality, a Section 91(14) order may or may not be necessary in any individual case of this type—that is to say, a case involving the application of Jade’s law. However, in these extreme cases, if there is any possibility of an inappropriate application by the convicted offender, such an order would be justified. Indeed, under current guidance there does not always have to be a risk of repeated applications, but rather the risk of any application without merit.

In the situation covered by the Bill, when, unfortunately, one parent has killed the other and the victim’s family or foster carers have stepped in to care for the child or children, they should be shielded from the prospect and distress of further court proceedings. However, in that context, and slightly tangentially, I will just qualify one observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when she referred to parental rights. One of the great improvements brought about by the Children Act 1989 was to remove the concept of parental rights. What is being restricted here is the exercise of parental responsibility.

My only reservation about the Section 91(14) amendments relates to the question of who should be responsible for making such orders and when they should be made. From experience, I emphasise that the orders require careful, case-specific drafting. It is therefore always necessary, when making such an order, to specify its duration, which is not dealt with by Section 91 itself. That may require consideration of the age and circumstances of the child and, in these situations, the position of the surviving adults. I rather assume that those proposing these amendments would wish the order usually to run until the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, but I suggest that should be made clear, either in the statute or in the order.

However, I add that these are not orders of which most Crown Courts will have had any experience. At the sentencing stage in the Crown Court, there might not be the material on which to craft an appropriate order. Accordingly, while I do not in any way wish to oppose the principle of the amendments relating to the use of Section 91(14), I suggest that under the existing scheme of the Bill it would be better to leave any mandatory imposition of a Section 91 order to the required review hearing in the family court, for which the Bill provides in new Section 10B.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope it is of some reassurance to the noble Baroness that there are, nevertheless, good reasons for not making a Section 91(14) order alongside the prohibited steps order, but that there are well-used existing powers to put one in place when the circumstances are appropriate.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt, and I understand the drift of what the noble Earl is saying, but all I was suggesting was that, although I fully understand the desirability in many cases of having Section 91(14) orders—and suggest that in these extreme cases they should be the norm—it should not be done in the Crown Court but should be part of the mandatory requirements at the review hearing that will follow shortly afterwards in the family court. It should, at the very least, be something in the statute that the reviewing family court should be required to consider.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for those comments and will ensure that they are fed back to my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy, and the department as a whole.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, reference was made briefly to Amendment 80, and

“services for victims … with no recourse to public funds”.

I want to offer brief but firm support for that amendment. Quite simply, victims of domestic abuse with no recourse to public funds are some of the most disadvantaged people that one sees in the family justice system. It is unthinkable, in my view, that they could be excluded in any way from the benefit of services under the victims’ code.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group—sometimes the way the groupings lie is a bit difficult. This group covers violence against women and girls, and my amendment relates to how we assess data on that violence. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for their support—and we shall hear from one of them shortly.

Amendment 105 seeks to probe problems with the data that we use to develop policies and ensure that there is guidance to establish that sex registered at birth is used for any analysis of patterns of offending and recording victim and perpetrator profiles. Ideally, this would apply throughout the whole criminal justice system but, for now, this amendment focuses on violence against women and girls. I hope that, on this topic at least, there will be unanimity in acknowledging that sex difference between men and women can impact on people’s experience of victimisation and offending and on patterns of offending and risk.

Official crime data is used to assess the most appropriate services that should be developed, and how resources should be targeted effectively—something that the Bill has focused on at length in relation to support for victims. But any claims for evidence-based policy must be based on material reality and cannot depend on, for example, subjective assertions or ideological beliefs, both of which could be misleading. I invite people to agree with me that data needs to be accurate, credible and consistent. The problem is that accuracy, credibility and consistency are being undermined at present, because the criminal justice system has either conflated or replaced data based on immutable sex with data based on more fluid concepts, such as gender identity or self-declared sex.

I am aware that even discussing the collection of data based on a person’s sex, whether male or female, has become controversial these days. One has only to look at last week’s media reports of internal rows taking place in the Office for National Statistics about the methodology used in the census. But that is all the more reason why my amendment emphasises the need to raise the consistent measure of sex registered at birth. At present, there is an inconsistent model of options. The variable category of “gender” is used carelessly in criminal justice circles as interchangeable with sex. Sex can mean, if used imprecisely, sex as self-declared gender. It can mean a legally recognised but none the less acquired gender, sometimes evidenced by a gender recognition certificate—GRC. It can also mean changed government records, such as passports, driving licences, or NHS numbers, even though a person’s biological sex does not change, even if the documentation does. But the introduction of this vast array of recording practices creates a lack clarity about what is being measured and what exactly some types of official criminal justice data represent.

To illustrate that confusion, let us consider that a few years ago the British Transport Police stated that, because the BTP treats all people—victims, offenders and witnesses—with dignity, it

“records their gender according to the gender they present as, and/or how they self-identify their gender”.

That seems to suggest that the British Transport Police is undoubtedly well meaning but none the less prioritises validating people’s identity rather than understanding that data collection is a critical variable in crime statistics. It is important we ensure that official statistics are not treated as personal records of preference; they must be objectively accurate if they are to be useful. What is more, different police forces use different criteria for data collection, and this is very important for our understanding of violence against women and girls.

Keep Prisons Single Sex is involved in an invaluable project and public service which annually submits freedom of information requests to all police forces in the UK with the aim of determining how they record a suspect’s sex. The campaign’s findings for 2023 make for troubling reading. Just for a taster, of the 32 forces that answered the freedom of information request, no force records sex registered at birth in all circumstances; 20 forces use legally recognised acquired gender where the suspect has a GRC; and 13 forces stated that, where a suspect has a self-declared gender identity, they will record this as sex, rather than sex at birth. Some 22 forces answered the question on how a rape suspect’s sex is recorded, with 20 forces recording legally recognised acquired gender—in other words, GRCs—and only one force recording sex registered at birth. This means that suspected rape perpetrators and convicted rapists can be recorded in official statistics as female, if they no longer wish to identify with their male birth sex. To confuse matters further, 22 forces answered questions on how they record the sex of a suspect who identifies as non-binary, with 11 recording sex as “indeterminate” or “unspecified other”, and only nine using sex registered at birth.

Noble Lords might wonder whether any of this matters, and some say it does not. However, in 2019, when Fair Play For Women revealed results from its FOI requests to police forces, the National Police Chiefs’ Council responded that:

“There is no evidence to suggest that recording a person’s gender based on the information that they provide will have an impact on an investigation or on national crime statistics, because of the low numbers involved”.


That is wrong-headed and complacent. On the point about the low numbers involved, one might ask what will happen if many more people apply for a legal sex change. Organisations such as Stonewall claim that the UK trans population is up to 500,000, even though only a small minority have GRCs. That would make a significant error in the datasets. Small numbers of cases misclassified in this way can lead to substantial bias in crime stats, and, importantly, can distort and mislead public understanding of the nature of, in particular, violence against women and girls and offending patterns in relation to sexual offences.

If the police now record female crime based on gender identity, this means female crime statistics include both women who were born female and trans women who were born male. I do not know whether noble Lords recall that, in 2021, newspaper headlines screamed that the number of female paedophiles had doubled in four years. This shocking statistic was based on a Radio 4 “File on 4” documentary that used data from FOI requests. It claimed that, between 2015 and 2019, the number of reported cases of female-perpetrated child sex abuse prosecuted by police in England and Wales had risen from 1,249 to 2,297, an increase of 84%. A moral panic followed, as people assumed that that meant that more women were sexually abusing children, with endless talking heads on TV discussing why. The furore calmed down only when it dawned on commentators that no account had been taken of whether males who identify as women might be responsible for the apparent increase because of confusion about data protection. Of course, maybe it is the case that there are more women sexually abusing children—after all, offending patterns do change. However, it is impossible to know or make that claim from the collected data based on a mixture of gender identity and sex registered at birth.

This sort of unreliability surely erodes public understanding. Trust is eroded when sex-disaggregated data held by the police does not actually record what most people think it does. Unsurprisingly, this can lead to media reports of female rapists, women as sex abusers and so on, when in fact what is being reported is male perpetrators claiming female gender identity. We have to look only at the widespread public shock when it was revealed that a double rapist treated as a woman when remanded in a Scottish women’s prison was in fact not the female Isla Bryson but Adam Graham. Indeed, that scandal precipitated the downfall of the Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon.

To finish, routinely such confusions continue. Only last week, in media coverage of a trial at Southampton Crown Court, both broadcast and print media reported that a 56 year-old female charity shop worker was charged with exposing “her” penis. Lawyers in court were quoted as describing how Samantha Norris pulled down “her” trousers and manipulated “her” penis in front of two 11 year-old girls as they walked past the window of “her” home. But it is “his” home, “his” pants and “his” penis. Mr Norris may identify as a woman and be treated as such by criminal justice agencies, but he is male. How can the public or public authorities have any realistic picture or analysis of the threats posed by violence against women and girls if these confusions are reflected in official data?