(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights as far as is possible. Clauses 49 to 52 would disapply Section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. It is disappointing to see this Government wasting parliamentary time and public money to remove human rights from prisoners.
There is no evidence of the Human Rights Act 1998 limiting the Parole Board from making decisions about prisoners. These clauses appear to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, while the Government ignore the many critical problems across our criminal justice system. We in the Labour Party are proud that it was a Labour Government who brought about the Human Rights Act in 1998, and a future Labour Government will continue to be a bastion of justice and hope, unlike this current Government, who cannot bring themselves to focus on the real issues affecting the public.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lady Lister spoke about the lack of support from the Labour Party if he were to press this matter to a vote. He said—I wrote it down—that he thought this was “a sad portent for the future”. That is a harsh interpretation of our stance. I have just reiterated our commitment to the Human Rights Act. We would not have chosen to support him if he had pressed the matter, but the statement I have read out reaffirms the Labour Party’s commitment to the Human Rights Act. Having said that, I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has put his finger on the central question. If the Government see no diminution of the Human Rights Act, why are they disapplying Section 3 within this Bill? Do they believe that it would breach the Human Rights Act if they failed to disapply the Act in this case?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his amendments, which seek to remove Clauses 49 to 52. I am extremely sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and others, but the Government laid out their position in Committee and nothing the Government have heard since or this evening alters that position.
As I think I have said previously, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is a procedural, not a substantive, provision. Clauses 49 to 51 effectively disapply Section 3 in relation to prisoner release legislation. Let me start by reiterating that nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. If I was asked, as I think I was, to confirm that the full range of substantive rights under the ECHR remain: yes, of course they do. Nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. A breach of human rights may still be pleaded before any domestic court or in Strasbourg in the usual way, and we would not want to prevent such action by prisoners where it is warranted.
I respectfully respond to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, by saying that this provision does not represent either an invitation or still less an instruction to the courts to disapply the Human Rights Act; nor does it imply, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and perhaps by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the Government believe there is any breach of the European convention in relation to this legislation. That is not the case. The Government do not accept that there is any breach whatever in this legislation. It is the Government’s position that a matter as important as the public protection test should be for Parliament and that it should not be open to the so-called writing-in or reading-down provisions of Section 3, which is an interpretive position which means that the courts may be required to go further than usual in interpreting legislation that would otherwise be compatible with convention rights. Although this has happened less often in recent years, it can require courts to stray from Parliament’s original intention, and the Government do not think that that is appropriate in this context. The real issue is the balance between the courts and Parliament from a procedural point of view.
I am puzzled by this because it is an unusual thing in legislation to say that Section 3 is disapplied. Is it not the inevitable inference from the inclusion of that provision disapplying Section 3 in this legislation that the Government are seriously concerned, at the very least, that the substantive provisions would breach the substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act?
My Lords, that is not by any means the Government’s position; nor can that inference be drawn. The Government’s position on this clause is, as I understand it, in effect, that which the noble Lord himself is reported as expressing to the independent review on human rights because Section 3 requires the judge to perform a remedial function which legislation does not on its proper construction conform to convention rights. Such a role is inappropriate under our constitution and unnecessary because Section 4 provides an effective means by which Ministers and Parliament can amend the legislation. That is the Government’s position on this provision.
So, totally hypothetically, if anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied was found to be incompatible, it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. It would then be up to Parliament to decide how to rectify it, rather than the intermediate rewriting process of the courts. It does not remove or limit convention rights. It is simply saying that in this case that is the right balance between Parliament and the courts. That is the Government’s position on that.
This group of amendments also seeks to remove Clause 52, which sets out that, when considering a challenge, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. Of course, the courts already consider risk to the public. This clause does not mean that public protection will be the exclusive or only factor to be considered. The matter will be up to the judges, who are very capable of doing their independent part in construing the legislation. What the clause does is to ensure that due weight is given to the important consideration of public protection.
So, on behalf of the Government, I beg to move that Clauses 49 to 52 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 150.
My Lords, for convenience, I will start, if I may, with Amendments 154B to 154D, which relate to the role of the chair of the Parole Board. The Government have taken note of the debate in Committee regarding the original proposals affecting the Parole Board chair and the power of the Secretary of State to dismiss the Parole Board chair.
Strong leadership of the Parole Board is essential. It appears that a mechanism already exists, in the unlikely event that it is needed, for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about their ability to do the job effectively. On balance, the Government have decided that this existing mechanism is sufficient, so we will not be proceeding with the original proposals in the original Bill.
We have also listened to feedback that the judicial functions of the chair, including deciding whether a hearing can be held in public, would most appropriately continue to be held by the chair. It has become clear that, to lead the board effectively, the chair should retain these functions, including their ability to take part in individual cases. For these reasons, I have tabled these amendments to remove all provisions relating to the chair of the board from the Bill.
I turn next to my Amendments 153A and 154A, which seek to amend Section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. These amendments enable the Secretary of State to create procedural rules via secondary legislation which the Parole Board must follow when carrying out its statutory duties.
These amendments will allow the Secretary of State to create new rules that will allow the Parole Board chair to delegate certain functions, including some judicial functions, from board members to staff in its secretariat. The Government intend for this provision to be commenced immediately on Royal Assent. This is the subject of Amendments 162A and 162B, to which I shall refer briefly in a moment.
Other courts and tribunals typically have provisions in primary legislation to allow for rules permitting the delegation of certain functions but, to date, we have not had comparable provisions for the Parole Board.
The Parole Board has approximately 320 members and 200 staff in its secretariat. Its members are public appointees, including judicial members, specialist members and independent members, the specialist members typically being psychologists or psychiatrists.
The purpose of the amendment is to give the Parole Board greater flexibility in how it manages its workload. I have to say that delays in the Parole Board process are currently serious and must be tackled. Each review that the Parole Board carries out will include a range of case management decisions, such as varying or revoking certain directions, agreeing deadlines or timelines, adding or removing witnesses, or adjourning or deferring cases that are not ready to be heard. At present, these decisions are taken by Parole Board members, but that is not always necessary. There are efficiency savings to be made if some case management decisions could be delegated to appropriate staff, and the Parole Board supports this amendment, which is dedicated to improving the overall efficiency of the board and reducing delays in the system. That is particularly important in relation to IPP prisoners, whom we discussed earlier, since we can anticipate an increasing flow of IPP decisions to the Parole Board and an increasing workload accordingly.
My Lords, that is my understanding. I am in a slight panic at the moment—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, having raised this matter—and I hope I have not proceeded in the wrong order. I think this is group 6, according to my instructions.
I am simply referring to today’s list, which is what I am working from. If the Minister looks at today’s list, he will see that this group includes, for example, government Amendment 156ZB, which is an amendment to Clause 55, and government Amendments 156ZC, 156ZD, 156ZE and 156ZF. I do not mind at all whether my amendments are in another group, but I do not want to be told later that I have missed my opportunity.
I have to say that I decided to ignore those and will discuss them in the next group, because they were in the wrong place.
It is also the Government’s wish and position that we discuss that in the next group.
Would it be possible to say something about what I think is common ground in this group—namely, the amendments dealing with the composition and functions of the Parole Board? This is dealt with in government Amendment 153A and Amendments 154, 155 and 156, in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett.
I thank the Government for what they have done. I entirely associate myself with that, and thank the Minister and the Lord Chancellor, and anyone else from the Government who accepted all of this. I am very grateful.
However, I now want to be slightly churlish about the new chair of the Parole Board—a very important position. A new chair is to be appointed, and looking at the website I see that the deadline for the applications was 24 February, sifting was 31 March, and interviews are expected to end on 31 May. I assume that the competition is largely done but current. Maybe the Minister cannot answer this now, but the provisions in relation to the Parole Board have been significantly changed as a result of this amendment.
There are two things. I imagine there are a number of people who would never contemplate taking on a quasi-judicial position; they would not touch it with a bargepole on the basis that you could make a decision that the Secretary of State thought affected public confidence in the board. No one would become a judge if you could be removed on the whim of a government Minister; it seems equally clear that no self-respecting person could agree to be chairman of the Parole Board if they could be removed on the whim of a Minister, as was in the Bill when this competition was run.
More seriously, the role of the Parole Board chair was crafted to remove the chair from the core work of the board—that is to say, deciding cases. Everyone knows that if you sit as a judge it is critical that you are not an administrator—you cannot lead and you are not respected. It seems to me very clear that the position of the chairman of the Parole Board has to be looked at in the light of the amendments that we are about to make.
I find it somewhat disappointing that this competition has been rushed ahead with without the position of the chairman being clear. I very much hope that the Minister can give some reassurance that more time will be taken to consider this in the light of the changes to the Bill, and that the competition will not go ahead without a further opportunity for people to apply and a proper assessment made of whether the persons who are in line are competent to deal with sitting on cases.
I do not know how this has happened. I am sure it has absolutely nothing to do with the Minister, but it is very disturbing that an appointment should be made on the basis of something in the Bill which has now been radically changed. I feel very churlish to be raising this point in the light of the Government’s acceptance of these amendments, but it seems to me that, as the chairmanship of the Parole Board is so critical, as the Minister and all of us accept, we must get the right person to do it. I am not certain that it is possible to have the right person without taking into account the new qualifications. I apologise for being churlish and for asking this question, but it is rather important. Otherwise, I warmly welcome this and thank the Government for what they have done.
My Lords, I am very glad that we have managed to sort out which are the right amendments in the right place through a collective effort across your Lordships’ House.
Noble Lords will recall a discussion on this matter in Committee, which is presumably what has led to these government amendments. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I welcome them, but his questions about the appointments process are absolutely legitimate and feed into what we said in Committee—that the Government need to recognise the independence of the Parole Board and understand the risks of politicisation. The original Bill seemed to be government proposals in search of an actual problem to solve. The decision on the composition of the board should be a decision for the board.
The 2019 Ministry of Justice review of the Parole Board Rules stated:
“Restrictions on which panel members can hear particular types of case have gradually been lifted over time … to allow greater flexibility and timeliness in listing the right cases for the right panel members and we do not wish to undo the improvements this has achieved”.
That was echoed by Martin Jones, the chief executive of the Parole Board, when he gave evidence to the Commons committee.
So we are in a better place than we were at the beginning of this Bill, but the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are very legitimate and require the Government’s attention and an answer. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, raised some very interesting points about how the board operates and its accessibility. That is a difficult issue, because it sometimes deals with sensitive and controversial matters. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that, because its decisions by their nature are sensitive and controversial and the Government should keep the new additional power in sub-paragraph (2C) inserted by Clause 54 under review. Removing the chair because a decision in an individual case is unpopular, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, would influence the panel’s decisions and I think is not the way the committee and the House wish to see this go.
My Lords, I begin with the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. It was not in the least bit churlish to raise this point about the process for the appointment of the new chair of the Parole Board. I have no reason to believe that this is not a fully effective appointments process, but I am not informed of the detail at this moment, and I will write to all noble Lords to set out what the position is.
I take it that the amendments proposed by the Government remove the need for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to move his Amendments 155 and 156. I was not entirely clear on whether the noble and learned Lord is still moving Amendment 154, which relates to the law enforcement members of the Parole Board. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, I simply emphasise that nothing in the government amendments decides which individual members sit on which panel in individual cases. That remains the responsibility of the board, and that is right and proper. So I will not say anything further about that group of amendments.
I then come to Amendment 156ZA, proposed by my noble friend Lord Jackson. I thank him for the amendment because, as has been pointed out, it does raise some interesting and important issues. Once again, it is effectively a question of balance between all the various interests: victims, prisoners, confidentiality, details of health, et cetera. To recap, the provision for public parole hearings was introduced in 2022, allowing any hearing to be conducted in public if the chair of the Parole Board decides that it is in the interests of justice to do so. That changed the previous position, where all hearings were held in private. The amendment proposed by my noble friend would change that position so that all hearings would be in public by default, and a private hearing would take place only in exceptional circumstances.
The Government’s position on this amendment has not changed since it was explained in Committee and, if I may put it colloquially, the Government feel that we are still in the relatively early stage of developing and gaining experience from how the Parole Board manages public hearings. We are not yet ready to go as far as my noble friend would like us to go at this point. That is the essential answer to his point—but I do not close off the question at all. As has also been pointed out, it is part of a consideration of the continuous process of updating and reviewing the workings of the Parole Board as circumstances evolve.
To respond to the specific 8,000 hearings point raised by my noble friend, the Parole Board holds more than 8,000 hearings a year. This amendment would require the Secretary of State and the Parole Board to consider the merits of having a public hearing in every case. Victims would need to be contacted in every case, which would potentially add to their trauma. It is more complex and takes longer to have public hearings, and that may well delay proceedings further. To date, the Parole Board has published decisions for just 32 public hearing applications since 2022, eight of which have been granted. That suggests to the Government that the demand for public hearings is not, in fact, especially high, but I again emphasise that the situation is still evolving and that we need to continue to learn from the practice of the day. I very much understand the desire to create more openness, transparency and trust in the parole system, but I would not wish to create new administrative burdens on the system, potentially slowing it down. On the other hand, I do not feel that this amendment can be pursued at this point in time. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Amendment 156ZAA, tabled again by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, concerns the interval between hearings and seeks to allow the Parole Board to direct the period of time. It aims to deal with the problem, as he would put it, of repeated applications. The Government are not able to change their position from that set out in Committee. The current system already provides for flexibility in the time set for the prisoner’s next parole review, and it is HMPPS—not the board—that currently sets that interval. HMPPS considers a range of factors in deciding when to refer the prisoner to the Parole Board on behalf of the Secretary of State. Reasons must be given for the length of the interval between reviews, including the Parole Board’s reasons for declining to direct the prisoner’s release at the conclusion of the last review and the interventions required to allow them to progress. The closer the interval length is to the two-year limit, the greater the justification required for the time between reviews.
For the convenience of the House, as we have just agreed to de-group the amendments, it would be helpful if the Minister could introduce this group.
We are now on what was group 6. In any event, the Government are bringing forward Amendments 156ZB to 156ZD and 156ZE to 156ZH. These are technical amendments and do not change the policy, which remains as set out on previous stages of the Bill. The amendments make minor revisions to the drafting of Clauses 55 and 56. Importantly, they ensure that registrars have all the information they need at the point they consider an application to marry or to enter into a civil partnership. The information needed is whether an applicant or their intended spouse or civil partner is a whole-life prisoner and, if so, whether they have been granted an exemption from the Secretary of State. They also make some minor changes to clarify the procedure and to update related legislation in line with the reforms. For the reasons that I have just given, I ask that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill and invite noble Lords to support these government amendments.
My Lords, I have tabled my opposition to Clauses 55 and 56, which noble Lords know will prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or a civil partnership with another person without the written permission of the Secretary of State, with that permission to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. I am very pleased to be joined in my opposition to these clauses by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord German—the latter of whom unfortunately cannot be in his place tonight—both of whom spoke very powerfully on this topic in Committee.
I am also very pleased to be joined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whom I first met when he was a legal adviser at the Home Office from 1989 to 2006. We used to travel together to Strasbourg to defend the United Kingdom against allegations that it had breached the European Convention on Human Rights. Our record in court was mediocre at best, but the lunches were excellent, and I have great admiration for his expertise and judgment. I very much look forward to what he has to say on this subject.
Why have we brought this matter back on Report? It is not because I have any expectation of changing the Government’s mind, and it is not because I intend to divide the House, particularly at this late hour. My motive is simply to ensure that we record why this is an objectionable measure which has no conceivable justification. There are three reasons why I express such a critical view of these clauses. First, the Government’s reason for conferring this power on the Secretary of State and imposing this disability is so weak. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, suggested that these measures will
“drive up public confidence in the justice system”.—[Official Report, 25/3/24; col. 491.]
I can think of many reasons why confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined: the unacceptable delays in hearing trials in which defendants are accused of serious offences; the fact that so many courtrooms cannot be used because of their poor state of repair; the low rates of pay for prosecutors; and the low rates of legal aid renumeration for criminal barristers and solicitors, which has substantially reduced the number of lawyers available in criminal cases. What I have never heard anyone say is, “My confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined because whole life prisoners are able to marry”. It is preposterous.
My second reason for objecting to these provisions is that they are wrong in principle. We all know, and the Minister emphasised in Committee, that whole life orders are reserved for those who have committed the most serious crimes—awful crimes of serial or child murders involving premeditation or sexual or sadistic violence. However, this does not mean that we deny such prisoners basic rights. However repellent their crimes, whole life prisoners are allowed to eat more than a crust of bread; they are allowed to exercise; they are allowed to read books, to watch television and to send and receive letters. The right to marry another consenting adult is also a basic right. National law may limit the exercise of that right—you cannot marry your brother, a 12 year-old or your dog—but what the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test repeatedly stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Minister in Committee suggested that the Government consider that Article 12 of the European convention allows for a restriction on the right to marry to be in the public interest. However, that does not assist the Government because there is a judgment of the Strasbourg court in a case concerned with prisoners. It is Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court recognised at paragraph 91:
“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and… some civil rights and privileges. This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
The court added, at paragraph 93, that the state cannot prevent a prisoner exercising the right to marry because of the view of the authorities as to what
“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.
That is precisely the basis on which this Government purport to justify Clauses 55 and 56 of the Bill—public opinion, public confidence. I ask the Minister, how can the Government maintain the statement, made by the Secretary of State for Justice on the front of the Bill, that Clauses 55 and 56, like the rest of the Bill, are compatible with Convention rights?
My Lords, from these Benches I express irritation that we have these in the Bill at all. We have spent the last two or three months working across the House, improving and building a new framework for victims. It is, let us just say, very puzzling that these are in the Bill.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling his amendments, and of course I thank the noble Lords, Lord Carter, Lord Meston, Lord Bach and others for their eloquence. I can well understand the feelings expressed. I of course recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, together with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spent many hours in Strasbourg defending the United Kingdom, and in that context, although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was modest enough—probably inaccurately—to say that his results had been mediocre, in fact the United Kingdom has, if not the best, at least one of the best records in Strasbourg of respecting human rights.
The question of the compatibility of this particular provision with Article 12 of the ECHR has been very carefully considered—otherwise the Secretary of State would never have given the certificate in the first place.
The Government’s arguments were set out in Committee and I am not sure it is particularly useful at this late hour—especially as it is 10.01 pm—to repeat them. In the Government’s view, the measures are proportionate and apply to a very small cohort of the most serious offenders who have committed the most serious crimes. As of last December, there were 67 whole-life prisoners in England. Because they will never be released, their ability to enjoy anything resembling normal married life is already lawfully and legitimately restricted in a very significant way.
In the Government’s view, the measures are justified on the basis of public interest, as already set out in Committee. The public’s confidence in, and respect for, the justice system is a matter for which any elected Government must have regard—and that of course includes the feelings of victims. The one cause célèbre that has been mentioned did have an important impact in that regard.
I would add only that the measures do not prevent whole-life prisoners benefiting from supportive relationships while in custody, in the same way as other prisoners. We are simply talking about being married or in a civil partnership, and not being able to do that does not have any practical impact on an individual’s ability to maintain a relationship with a prisoner, and does not provide any additional rights or detriments in terms of visits or communications.
I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Carter, in particular. I do not have any authority to simply drop these clauses, nor am I able to indicate in any way what my personal views may or may not be. I hope I have provided at least some reassurance and I respectfully suggest that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.
I thank the Minister. I also ask him to give a very modest undertaking this evening that, before Third Reading, he will ask the Secretary of State to consider the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, as a way of solving the perceived problem, without including in the Bill a clause that so many of us regard as objectionable. I ask him to kindly give that undertaking—with of course no commitment whatever.
I can and will and do give that undertaking.
Amendment 156ZB agreed.
Amendments 156ZC and 156ZD
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 156BA and to the three further government amendments in this group. Yesterday’s publication of the infected blood inquiry’s final report has laid bare the devastating tragedy and suffering that far too many people have endured as a result of the infected blood scandal. I trust and hope that the House is assured of the Government’s commitment to compensate victims of this dreadful scandal, and to do so as quickly as possible. Noble Lords will have seen that I have withdrawn government Amendments 162 and 165, which would make early commencement provisions for the establishment of the infected blood compensation authority and interim payments to the estates of deceased infected people. Having done so, I am now proposing to replace those amendments with government Amendment 162AA, the effect of which is to ensure that all provisions under Part 3 will be available to government on Royal Assent. This will ensure what I know is the wish of all noble Lords: that there will be no unnecessary delay to implementation of the infected blood compensation scheme.
This group also contains further consequential amendments—government Amendments 157CB and 157CC—which allow for consequential amendments of other legislation to be made to ensure that the legislation operates as intended. I beg to move.
My Lords, from these Benches, we are very grateful that the Government have agreed to move forward with these amendments. It is extremely important that things move at pace. Obviously, there is always a bit of concern about a regulation that can revoke primary legislation, but given the circumstances, it is completely understandable. Given the lateness of the hour, I will stop there.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. We welcome these amendments.