Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendments in this group, Amendments 150 to 153, objecting to Clauses 49 to 52 standing part of the Bill, fall into two slightly different categories. The first three amendments, in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, who I am grateful to for her support, would remove the proposals in the Bill that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act be disapplied in relation to three pieces of legislation.
First, by Clause 49, the disapplication would apply to Part 2, Chapter 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which concerns life sentences and sentences of detention at His Majesty’s pleasure, release on licence for prisoners serving such sentences, and their release on licence, recall and removal from the UK, and will include all those amendments to be introduced by Clause 41 of this Bill. Secondly, Clause 50 would disapply Section 3 to Part 12, Chapter 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which concerns the release on licence, supervision and recall of certain fixed-term prisoners, and will include all those amendments to that Act to be introduced by Clause 42 of this Bill. Thirdly, Clause 51 would disapply Section 3 to Section 128 of the LASPO Act, or any order made under that section. That is the section which, as we have heard in debate at some length in Committee and earlier today, permits the Secretary of State to change the release test for certain prisoners, importantly including IPP prisoners, to shift the balance so that if conditions are met, an IPP prisoner must be released.
As will be familiar to the House, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires that:
“So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.
The ECHR is fundamental to the protection of human rights in this country. That is and has long been an article of faith for my party and the Labour Party, which was responsible for enacting the convention as part of domestic law by the means of the Human Rights Act. Indeed, it is important for many but not all in the Conservative Party; we have all seen the fault-lines on this issue over the tenure of this Government. However, the present Secretary of State for Justice is a keen advocate for the convention.
The architecture of the Human Rights Act has been widely and, I suggest, rightly praised for striking the balance between the sovereignty of Parliament and the convention. That architecture has at its heart the combination of Section 3—the section I just read—which requires convention-compatible interpretation and application of legislation where possible, and Section 4, which provides for a court to make a “declaration of incompatibility” where a legislative provision is found to be irrevocably incompatible with the convention right. The making of such a declaration leaves it to Parliament to legislate so as to comply with the convention and remove the incompatibility.
It follows that the proposed disapplication of Section 3 represents an invitation, almost an instruction, to courts to disregard convention rights when interpreting or applying the legislation. This is not a purely academic point; in relation to IPPs, for example, the European Court of Human Rights found in the case of James, Wells and Lee v UK in 2012 that the applicants’ IPP sentences were a violation of their Article 5 rights to liberty and security because the unavailability of rehabilitative courses meant that their detention after the expiry of their tariff terms was “arbitrary”.
As the Prison Reform Trust put it, in its helpful briefing for this debate:
“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human. Moreover, it is precisely in custodial institutions like prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state”.
These carve-outs represent an insidious threat to the effectiveness of the convention in this country and, I suggest, a stalking horse for future legislation, undermining the balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the convention that I spoke of. They should be resisted.
I am bound to say that I find it very disappointing that the Labour Party is not whipping Labour Peers to support these amendments. The Human Rights Act was one of the Labour Party’s finest achievements. For Labour Peers to be instructed to condone by abstention the disapplication of Section 3 to these provisions is a sad portent for the future.
Before closing, I turn to Amendment 153, which seeks to remove Clause 52 from the Bill. Clause 52 does not seek to disapply any part of the convention, but it seeks to skew the court’s decision-making process on the application of convention rights in a way that is underhand and unacceptable. It would provide that, in making a decision as to whether a person’s convention rights have been breached in relation to a release decision:
“The court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing the risk to the public from offenders who have”
been given prison sentences. In other words, risk reduction is to outweigh all other factors. But what does the instruction to give “the greatest possible weight” say to a judge? The answer is effectively that no other factor is to count. There is to be no careful judicial balancing exercise, because if the risk reduction factor can be outweighed in the balance, a judge cannot, by definition, give that factor “the greatest possible weight”. Judicial discretion is to be removed; judges are to be compelled to reach decisions that they would not otherwise make, because they may not judge for themselves what weight to give to competing factors. That is not acceptable.
I fully intended to divide the House on these amendments, but given the Labour Party’s decision not to support them but to abstain and the fact that it is now late, I have decided not to. Nevertheless these amendments raise an important point of principle for all those who believe in the convention.
My Lords, I was very disappointed by the Minister’s response in Committee, so I felt that I ought to have another go in support of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, aided by the British Institute of Human Rights and Amnesty International, which were also very disappointed.
First, the Minister said that this clause is not about disapplying the Human Rights Act. Well, of course it is not about disapplying the whole Act—but not just Amnesty, the BIHR and the Howard League, but also the EHRC, the chair of the JCHR and the Law Society take the view that it is disapplying Section 3. It feels like one of those occasions when the Government is the only marcher in step.
The BIHR challenges a number of the Minister’s arguments—first, his reassurance that it is still possible to plead any breach of human rights in the usual way and to seek a declaration of incompatibility. It points out that the point of the Human Rights Act was to bring rights home and provide an accessible, practical and immediate remedy. The excision of Section 3 makes access to human rights harder. He said it was a “difficult section to apply”. The BIHR argues the opposite, pointing out that it is used by lay front-line workers who see it as having given them a clear legal framework for arguing for the protection of people’s rights.
My Lords, that is not by any means the Government’s position; nor can that inference be drawn. The Government’s position on this clause is, as I understand it, in effect, that which the noble Lord himself is reported as expressing to the independent review on human rights because Section 3 requires the judge to perform a remedial function which legislation does not on its proper construction conform to convention rights. Such a role is inappropriate under our constitution and unnecessary because Section 4 provides an effective means by which Ministers and Parliament can amend the legislation. That is the Government’s position on this provision.
So, totally hypothetically, if anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied was found to be incompatible, it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. It would then be up to Parliament to decide how to rectify it, rather than the intermediate rewriting process of the courts. It does not remove or limit convention rights. It is simply saying that in this case that is the right balance between Parliament and the courts. That is the Government’s position on that.
This group of amendments also seeks to remove Clause 52, which sets out that, when considering a challenge, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. Of course, the courts already consider risk to the public. This clause does not mean that public protection will be the exclusive or only factor to be considered. The matter will be up to the judges, who are very capable of doing their independent part in construing the legislation. What the clause does is to ensure that due weight is given to the important consideration of public protection.
So, on behalf of the Government, I beg to move that Clauses 49 to 52 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I need some guidance. Today’s list indicates that in this group are contained the government amendments to Clauses 55 and 56, which are the amendments relating to marriage and civil partnership. Today’s list also indicates, in the next group, that we have already debated my opposition and that of other noble Lords to Clauses 55 and 56. I am very happy to delay my comments on Clauses 55 and 56 until the Minister deals with them, but I thought I should just mention where we are.
If I may help advance this, our understanding is that the Clauses 55 and 56 stand-part debates are the subject of group 6. I do not know whether that is the Minister’s understanding.
My Lords, I associate myself with those remarks. I stayed late, expecting to debate the question of the marriage of long-term prisoners, and was a bit concerned to see that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appeared to be described as “already debated”, which I do not think it can possibly have been.
My Lords, I will try to help once again, because I have in front of me a copy of the groupings that were sent out. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Meston, are absolutely right that some of the consequential government amendments have been put into group 5, but group 6 certainly includes—as we were told by the Government Whips’ Office—Amendment 165ZDA and Amendment 156ZI, which is the prisoner marriage substantive stand-part amendment. If we could proceed, that would be most convenient.
I am very happy to proceed on the basis that group 6 will deal with these matters.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining his amendments, which accept a number of points made in Committee. On the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about the position of the chair of the Parole Board—he raised this with me a little earlier, so I have not considered it in great detail— I am bound to say that I take the view that he is exactly right: you cannot possibly proceed with a selection procedure and take it to a conclusion when you have completely changed the job description. I hope the Government will take that point away.
I will speak to my Amendment 156ZAA, which remains on the Marshalled List and remains unresolved. It is intended to reduce the trauma caused to bereaved families and victims by repeated unmeritorious applications to the Parole Board for parole by the perpetrators of crimes who are serving life sentences. The restriction of such applications would be implemented without in any way diminishing access to the Parole Board for applicants who have a genuine reason for making, after an earlier refusal, further applications that may, in the right circumstances, be made as little as a year after a refusal. I am grateful to the London Victims’ Commissioner for her help with this amendment.
The present provision in Section 28(7)(b) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence may not require the Secretary of State to refer the case to the Parole Board until after they have completed their minimum tariff and after the lapse of two years after any previous reference was completed. However, in practice, the Parole Board can, and frequently does, consider parole more often than every two years. Indeed, in the case of Chris Cave, stabbed to death at the age of 17 in 2003, there have been nine parole hearings after the earliest release date. His mother describes the repeated trauma of facing those parole hearings for her son’s murderer as torturing and as sometimes allowing only six months’ respite before the family has to prepare psychologically for the next parole hearing and prepare further victim impact statements.
This amendment would enable the Parole Board to direct a waiting time of between 12 months and four years before a further reference could be made—so the Parole Board could make the direction. However, if there were a direction for a waiting period of more than two years, the Parole Board would have to have a reasonable belief that the prisoner’s release prospects were unlikely to change over the period, and that decision would be reviewable.
The parole process is lengthy and is a potential time of stress for bereaved families and for victims and their families. Although such victims and bereaved families appreciate the opportunity to make impact statements and have them considered by the Parole Board, the strain of making them often is considerable and can often be retraumatising. This amendment is primarily aimed at preventing victims being subjected to that frequent stress when it is clear that nothing has changed.
We have considered concerns, which the Minister raised in Committee, that the rights of prisoners to reviews of their detention under Article 5(4) of the convention might be infringed. But we are satisfied that the flexible provisions in this amendment, including the review provision, are compliant with the convention and strike a fair balance between the rights of prisoners and those of their victims and their families.
At the same time as making this relatively modest change, we invite the Minister to say a bit more about what extra support can be offered through a perpetrator’s parole process to make that process more manageable and less frightening for the victims and bereaved families. With more public parole hearings and the trialling of victims’ attendance at closed hearings expected, the need for that support—and for sufficient resources to be allocated to providing it—is increasingly important.
The provision of further information to families is also very important and we would be grateful if the Minister would say something about the future provision of information to victims and bereaved families, either through the victim contact scheme or otherwise. Better information about the parole process is important, but such information is also needed about moves of prisoners to open conditions and their progress towards rehabilitation. That information would make the perpetrators’ process towards release much less painful for the families of their victims. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about that.
My Lords, I am very glad that we have managed to sort out which are the right amendments in the right place through a collective effort across your Lordships’ House.
Noble Lords will recall a discussion on this matter in Committee, which is presumably what has led to these government amendments. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I welcome them, but his questions about the appointments process are absolutely legitimate and feed into what we said in Committee—that the Government need to recognise the independence of the Parole Board and understand the risks of politicisation. The original Bill seemed to be government proposals in search of an actual problem to solve. The decision on the composition of the board should be a decision for the board.
The 2019 Ministry of Justice review of the Parole Board Rules stated:
“Restrictions on which panel members can hear particular types of case have gradually been lifted over time … to allow greater flexibility and timeliness in listing the right cases for the right panel members and we do not wish to undo the improvements this has achieved”.
That was echoed by Martin Jones, the chief executive of the Parole Board, when he gave evidence to the Commons committee.
So we are in a better place than we were at the beginning of this Bill, but the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are very legitimate and require the Government’s attention and an answer. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, raised some very interesting points about how the board operates and its accessibility. That is a difficult issue, because it sometimes deals with sensitive and controversial matters. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that, because its decisions by their nature are sensitive and controversial and the Government should keep the new additional power in sub-paragraph (2C) inserted by Clause 54 under review. Removing the chair because a decision in an individual case is unpopular, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, would influence the panel’s decisions and I think is not the way the committee and the House wish to see this go.