Financial Provision on Divorce

Lord Meston Excerpts

Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I join in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for raising this question for further debate. The Law Commission’s thorough and balanced scoping report asks if it is agreed that the law needs reform and which of the four suggested models for reform should be preferred by the Government. Importantly, it asks the Government to consider what underpinning principles should appear in reforming legislation.

The Law Commission made it clear that future work in this area will require a number of significant policy decisions. Having worked since the early 1970s as a barrister, then until recently as a judge, dealing with matrimonial and other family cases, I hope that I understand the strengths and weaknesses of existing law and practice. When I started, the law, introduced in 1970 and reproduced in 1973, moved the focus of cases away from largely sterile disputes over legal ownership of property towards the realities of the needs of the parties and their children. The Act of 1984 added the aim of achieving financial independence and an immediate or deferred clean break. Case law has emphasised the objective of a fair outcome. Present company, I hope, will forgive me for saying that case law has not been assisted with its concept of matrimonialisation, which has perhaps moved the clock back, and arguments about it should be confined to a luxury in bigger money cases.

Whatever reform option is selected, the need will be for law that gives clarity, predictability and some flexibility and can address any significant financial disadvantage and disparity. While trying to avoid uncritical attachment to what is familiar to me, I suggest that problems with the operation of the existing law have in some respects been overstated. Much of the current law has evolved through authoritative decisions in big-money cases involving ultra-high-net-worth individuals, which have little similarity to the average case, with far less cloth to be cut, trying to create two households out of one mortgaged family home and stretched incomes and borrowing capacity. Whatever option is selected—I prefer the so-called codification plus model, with principles clearly stated on the face of the statute, maintaining the ability of judges to exercise discretion—I think the time has come for a decision to be made.

I wish to make the following final points. First, leaving some level of informed discretion to the court should not be seen as a bad or undesirable thing. Achieving greater certainty should not require restrictive rigidity. If anything, family law practitioners know that one size does not fit all. Secondly, any new law should highlight the importance of pensions and reform should address the question of accessible and affordable valuation of pensions. Thirdly, the temptation to allow for greater emphasis on domestic abuse as relevant conduct should be resisted, except in extreme cases. If disputed, allegations of domestic abuse have to be tried, and the cost to the parties and the court time taken will be greatly increased. Even when established, such abuse is hard to quantify in monetary terms, unless serious enough to have had a long-term financial consequence. Fourthly, if there is to be further delay, as has been said, the Government can at least now legislate for prenuptial agreements.

Finally, I suggest that the views of experienced specialist practitioners at the coalface should not be disregarded. They have to operate any changed legislative cogs, perhaps consoled by the advice of the late Joseph Jackson, doyen of matrimonial law, that there is always at least 10 years’ work in any new Act of Parliament.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Hailsham, I begin my remarks by apologising for not having been able to attend the earlier stages of the Bill. However, I am happy to say that, like my noble friend, I have read the report and I am reasonably up to date with the way in which the debates have gone.

I am very much attracted by what my noble friend said in support of his Amendment 1, and I speak from a position of some—but not a great deal—of experience as a sentencer. I was a recorder of the Crown Court for 15 years, from 1998 until about 2015, with time off when serving in the Government. One of the things I found most useful in dealing with what I thought was the most difficult task as a judge was the advice and help of the sentencing report.

If you are a High Court judge, you tend, if you are dealing with criminal cases, to deal only with life sentence cases. The job that you have to do when sentencing is to consider the tariff within the life sentence. This is difficult but not, perhaps, as complicated as having to deal with the multiplicity of sentences involved in road traffic cases, drug cases, dishonest acquisition cases, and so on, and obviously cases to do with assault and other forms of violence.

As a recorder, as a Crown Court judge and as a magistrate—I see the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is in his place—one is dealing with, in a sense, a much more complicated sentencing picture. The assistance of sentencing reports is huge and valuable. Anything that the Bill can do to make the life of the sentencer easier and to enable him or her to produce a juster sentence is to be welcomed, and the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Hailsham through his Amendment 1 provides the sort of assistance that I would very much have wished to have had as a low-level sentencer. It is perhaps more neatly encompassed in the suggestion through Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.

Either way, both amendments appear to me to be trying to undo the political mess that has caused the arrival of the Bill. I understand the politics of all this; I am sure we all do. It is a thoroughly unnecessary Bill, one that the Government allowed themselves to be backed into a corner about. It may well be that they regret it. However, given that we have got the Bill, I invite the Government to pay close attention to the speech of my noble friend and to listen very carefully to my chambers colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he comes to speak to Amendment 2.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I have not spoken before on the Bill, and frankly, like others, I was rather astonished that this was a topic requiring legislation at all. Like the noble and learned Lord, I have been what you would probably call a low-level sentencer for a number of years.

I will make two points. First, in recent years, in my experience, the quality of pre-sentence reports has greatly improved: from what were sometimes formulaic and feeble reports to nowadays, in my more recent experience, really providing an insight into the defendant’s background, life and attitudes, and conveying realistic recommendations. To that extent, they must always be regarded as helpful, greatly improving on, as the noble Viscount described, representations made by the legal representatives after a few moments in the cells or in the court corridor before coming into court.

Secondly, this experience has led me to adopt the attitude that, whenever in doubt, a report should be directed. I, for one, never regretted directing a report. For that reason, I certainly support Amendments 5 and 6. In other words, pre-sentence reports should, wherever possible and sensible, be the norm.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, I have not previously spoken on the substance of the Bill before, either, but I am very attracted by the noble Viscount’s amendment, for the reasons that he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have set out.

I think the Government have accepted that their Bill is not intended to prevent sentencers inviting pre-sentence reports in the case of personal characteristics. They are getting at the guidelines that should not take account of personal characteristics. However, there is a danger that, as the Bill stands, sentencers might be deterred slightly from seeking pre-sentence reports in the case of personal characteristics, even though, were the Bill not on the statute book, they would otherwise have done so.

The amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, sorts that out. It makes it absolutely clear that there is nothing to stop the sentencer seeking a pre-sentence report in the case of personal characteristics, if that is desirable for the purposes of the particular case. That is exactly what the legal position should be.

So, I strongly urge the Government to give close attention to Amendment 1 and indeed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which, as has been said, seeks to achieve the same thing. This is consistent with what the Government think their Bill allows for, but there is a danger that it might not have the effect they seek, whereas the noble Viscount’s amendment would clarify the position in what everyone must agree is the right way.

Criminal Cases Review Commission

Lord Meston Excerpts

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I will have to write to my noble friend; I do not have those figures in my pack. As I said, the CCRC has a target of completing case reviews in about 85% of cases within 12 months, which it is meeting in 10 months out of 12. I cannot answer my noble friend’s question with an exact figure, but I will write to her.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, do the Government agree that the provisional proposals for reform of the tests and processes of the CCRC, indicated recently by the Law Commission, have a lot to commend them? No doubt the Government will say that we should wait for the Law Commission’s final report next year, but meanwhile has any assessment been made of the implications of likely reforms for applications that have previously been rejected by the review commission, which may well require reconsideration? Has any assessment been made of the implications for the workload of the Court of Appeal?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a number of very important questions, which will, of course, be answered by the interim chair when that name is announced. The workload of the Court of Appeal is an important factor in this, and the tests for how those cases are referred up to the Court of Appeal are important as well. As I said earlier, the answer to the question lies in both the Law Commission report and the work of the new interim chair.

Crown Court Criminal Case Backlog

Lord Meston Excerpts

Thursday 20th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, the essential causes of the backlog we are debating are clear enough. They are to be found in prevalent austerity measures, underfunding of legal aid, sales of the court estate and underinvestment in the remainder—and what has been described as the unmitigated disaster of the privatisation of the Probation Service. A bad situation was made worse for the courts and their users by the pandemic, some of which I spent in a subterranean Nightingale court. The response of all court staff to the pandemic was impressive and should be acknowledged.

The effects of the backlog are also clear, particularly for victims. The courts have to prioritise some types of case, inevitably to the disadvantage of others. Delays impair the court process: evidence gets mislaid, witnesses disappear or disengage, and juries require specific necessary directions on the effect of passing time on memories of events and on the availability and reliability of witnesses. Of particular concern to family judges are cases in which there are parallel proceedings in a criminal and family court. It used to be possible to defer hearing a family case likely to be determined by the outcome of a criminal case. Delays now mean that that simply cannot be done. The situation is now reversed, with charging decisions often awaiting the decision of a fact-finding hearing in the family court. That produces yet further delay in the criminal case and prolonged uncertainty for the family, and the children in particular.

In the short term, clearly courts and the court estate should be worked to full capacity without artificial and frustrating restrictions on permitted sitting days. That would allow for the use of trial and sentencing blitzes, and more use of part-time judges, including those authorised to sit in retirement. However, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, that it is really time to end the fiction that listing is a judicial function.

Longer term, consideration should be given to the Bar Council proposal requiring Crown Court trials to start within six months of the first hearing. In time, this will prove no more unrealistic than the 26 weeks for disposal of public law children’s cases in the family court, to which legal and other professionals have responded resolutely. That should be underpinned by rigorous case management by procedural judges, relieving the full-time judiciary—particularly in smaller court centres—from work which cuts into and holds up listed and ongoing trials.

Time does not permit the consideration of the longer-term suggested solutions eroding jury trials, but we should recall the Lammy review and research that concluded that the one stage in the criminal justice system at which minority groups do not face disproportionality is when a jury reaches a verdict.

Prenuptial Agreements

Lord Meston Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I have practised in family law as a barrister for many years and latterly have worked as a family judge. I do not find it altogether easy to recognise the picture of how the law now works, as portrayed by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, but never mind; that is a debate for another day.

Given that the median duration of marriages ending in divorce is now just under 13 years, it is a good time to assess the effect on law and practice of the important decision of the Supreme Court in Radmacher 15 years ago. Typically, the parties to prenuptial agreements may legitimately wish to ring-fence inherited or previously acquired assets or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, said, wish to ensure provision for children of previous relationships. Not surprisingly, agreements are now said to be popular with the farming community, with their particularly illiquid assets. All who enter into such agreements will naturally wish to avoid the costs and hazards of litigation.

The perception and use of prenuptial agreements have developed remarkably. They were felt by some to devalue a view of marriage for life, distastefully requiring the involvement of lawyers in what was supposed to be the happy period leading up to the marriage ceremony. They used to be seen as required only by wealthy older men after several unsuccessful trips around the matrimonial course, who wanted to protect themselves in case the latest candidate for matrimony turned out to be a gold-digger—at least, from the man’s point of view. They were also seen as disadvantaging women, who were asked to waive some or all of what they might expect to receive if the marriage later ended in divorce, and as allowing parties to contract out of the responsibility to meet each other’s needs.

In a classic American case, the very wealthy husband, 25 years older than the wife, presented her with an agreement only a few hours before the marriage ceremony, and threatened to cancel the marriage if she did not sign. She had sparse knowledge of his finances and did not have any independent advice, only a session with a lawyer selected by the husband. That lawyer, to his credit, advised her not to sign. However, in spite of that advice, she signed the agreement and the marriage went ahead. Thirteen years and two children later, there was a divorce and costly litigation across two state jurisdictions.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Radmacher has reduced the prospect of such a scenario in the United Kingdom. Rushed agreements with limited legal advice and limited disclosure, particularly if they appear unfair and very different from what the court might otherwise order, cannot expect to be upheld, and in reality can be worse than having no agreement at all.

The Law Commission’s later well-researched and reasoned recommendations in 2014 included the crucial requirements for there to be independent legal advice for each party and sufficient financial disclosure, and for the agreement to be completed at least 28 days before the wedding. Although those recommendations are not yet in statute, they undoubtedly already reflect current good practice and have helped to make agreements more popular and effective.

I noted with some surprise the doubt expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, questioning the need for a cooling-off period of 28 days. However, there is a need to protect those who get married in a fever, to quote the old song.

The remaining area of controversy concerns whether and in what circumstances the court might go beyond an agreement, freely and properly entered into, that would otherwise be expected to be binding upon the parties. There is a clear distinction between agreements unfair from the outset and agreements that may later operate unfairly if access to legal remedies is severely restricted. It was recommended by the commission that the court’s jurisdiction to make provision for needs should not be ousted by qualifying agreements, so that no party would be left unjustifiably without resources following separation. To that extent, the mere fact of an agreement cannot make fair what may otherwise appear or become particularly unfair.

The Law Commission said there was little evidence of how agreements operate in practice and that it would be helpful to have more relevant information about how popular they are, how they are treated in litigation and how many cases settle on the basis of agreements. I suggest that it would also be helpful to have reliable overall evidence of the difference between the outcomes that prenups produce and the outcomes that the court would otherwise direct. I suspect that the majority of prenups are not seen by the courts because the couples involved manage to stay married and leave the agreement in a drawer, and that many other agreements are seen by the courts only because the parties simply wish to comply with it by submitting it in support of an agreed order, to reflect what has been agreed.

It is likely that those prenups that are challenged, at least by those with enough money to do so, come before the court only because of inadequate drafting or unforeseen changes in circumstances, or because of an irresistible dispute about jurisdiction if the agreement was made outside England and Wales. However, I seriously question the number of challenges that was suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, but statistics will prove one or other of us right or wrong.

Carefully prepared agreements, although unromantic and transactional, can provide couples with a sense of security and certainty, reducing some of the acrimony and expense in the event of later permanent separation, and reducing the temptation to divert or conceal assets ahead of a divorce. Specialist legal practitioners can now help parties to achieve fair, realistic and civilised agreements, capable of later revision, that the courts will uphold. Indeed, if in doubt, the parties can now ask the court for an early decision as to whether the agreement is determinative of their financial affairs.

Nevertheless, there remain parties who sign agreements and marry, having ignored, rejected or not understood good legal advice that they could or would be better off marrying without the agreement. The Law Commission described the argument for autonomy as strong but as raising concerns that some may still enter an agreement unwillingly or with unrealistic optimism. The chances of that are not likely to be much diminished by any legislation. As the right reverend Prelate suggested, contractual autonomy has to be seen in the peculiarly emotional context of these agreements.

It is clearly premature to anticipate a final report by the Law Commission on the much wider question of whether and how substantial reform of financial remedies legislation should be undertaken, and any decision by the Government on that. Paragraph 7.98 of the commission’s recent scoping report suggests that, if there is not to be major change, its recommendations relating to agreements could be implemented straightaway, but, if major changes are expected, the recommendations about agreements will need to be reconsidered. We should be grateful to the noble Baroness for making us think hard about that.

If there are major wholesale changes, many existing agreements could well need postnuptial revision and renegotiation. An important component of any good advice is what a court might do in the absence of a prenup to protect the economically weaker party. Until it is clear what the law is to be in the foreseeable future, it will be hard to give satisfactory advice to those who need it about what might happen at a much later date.

If reforms are undertaken piecemeal, with prenups legislated for in advance of substantive law reforms, there is a risk that some agreements based on the substantive law in force when the agreement was reached would become unfair, and so would either produce an unfair result or have to be renegotiated, if the parties were willing to do so, failing which they might have to go to court. However, I accept that, to some extent, that risk exists irrespective of whether the law relating to prenups is reformed as the noble Baroness has proposed, and irrespective of changes that may be further down the track

Accordingly, meanwhile, until clarity is reached and a decision is made about how we should proceed, I suggest that the approach that has developed following Radmacher now works well, and that the family courts can and should be trusted to continue to deal with individual cases as required.

Humanist Weddings

Lord Meston Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I cannot remember making that commitment, so I will need to write to my noble friend about that matter.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, the House should recognise that the Minister’s answer of “in the coming months” is rather better than we have had before. Humanists and others simply want a marriage ceremony that reflects their beliefs, whether religious or not, and that will be legally recognised without unnecessary obstacles. Can the Minister confirm that the Government are now actively looking at comprehensive reform, in line with the Law Commission’s 2023 recommendations, to help not just humanists but other similarly disadvantaged groups, even if that may take more time than we would want?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. The Government are indeed looking at comprehensive reform. There are many anomalies within our current marriage law and a number of disadvantaged groups. We believe that we need to take our time on this matter to get the answer right, so I thank the noble Lord for his question.

Humanist Marriages

Lord Meston Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

The statistic that the noble Baroness cited is accurate from my experience. Yes, such a change would have a disproportionate benefit for same-sex couples, and that factor should be taken into account in the review.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that, rather than an equality impact assessment, what are required are certainty, clarity and essential fairness in the law governing all marriages, religious and non-religious, in line with the recommendations of the Law Commission back in 2022? People now use a variety of ceremonies—religious and non-religious—and should, frankly, be confident of their status at the end of each ceremony. Surely, the Government can direct reforms to meet those requirements.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Lord. The objective of the Government is to have clarity and fairness in relation to weddings within England and Wales. There were 57 recommendations in a 500-page report from the Law Commission, and the Government need to take their time to consider them all carefully.

Property (Digital Assets etc) Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Second reading committee
Wednesday 6th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, we should indeed be grateful to the Minister for his introduction to this Bill. It concerns a topic for which there are mixed messages, as we have already gathered.

Digital assets are now said to be a fundamental part of modern society and economies, yet it is clear that many people continue to regard them with suspicion. They see them as a currency for criminals; as a sophisticated way to launder money or otherwise put funds out of reach in order to evade tax or creditors; or, in the legal area with which I am most familiar, as a way to frustrate claims by estranged spouses and partners. Others regard any investment in digital assets as a peculiarly risky way for fools to be parted from their money, lacking even the colourful excitement of a horse race or tulip fever.

However, it is also clear from the enthusiasm we have heard today that the market in crypto assets is here to stay and grow. Nevertheless, these are programmable assets that remain volatile, illiquid and an intangible species of wealth. They are transferred, stored or traded electronically on what are described as permissionless and public global systems with unregulated intermediaries, which are, as I recently read, detached from traditional geographical boundaries.

It seems that the criminal law is ahead of the civil law in this regard, as was shown by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act of last year. The law and many non-criminal lawyers have had to get to grips with unfamiliar technological terminology and legal complexities. Bitcoins, altcoins and Bored Apes are beyond the experience and ambitions of many of us; I admit that, before starting work on this Bill, I had never heard of, let alone thought about, reification or rivalrousness. Doubtless others present for this debate talk of little else.

The remarkable feature of the debate is that we are now considering a Bill, as has been said, with just two clauses on less than one page; indeed, the use of the abbreviation “etc” in the short title is hardly justified. It follows, of course, a report by the Law Commission of more than 300 pages and a supplementary report of a further 80 pages. The Law Commission reports on this topic show a breadth and depth of research and analysis based on wide consultation, making its conclusions authoritative and compelling. Of particular help is the way in which those reports expressly consider, balance and address differing and contrary arguments and viewpoints.

The fundamental proposition underlying the Bill is the conclusion of the commission that, in the common law world and elsewhere, there is now a persuasive, clear and well-reasoned body of case law that holds that certain digital assets are capable of being objects of personal property rights; and the further conclusion that the law should focus on the attributes or characteristics of the thing with which it is concerned in a particular case, without rigid application to so-called “third-category things”—legal principles formulated by reference to other things that are capable of being objects of personal property rights.

The Bill itself, admirably drafted with unambiguous brevity, is designed to knock out potential arguments about the essential nature of the property rights relating to digital assets. It is now to be hoped that, as a result, there will be no further doubt that such property rights fall within Article 1 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights; and that, nearer to home, digital assets can be property capable of transfer in matrimonial and family cases before the courts.

I suggest that the points to take away from the Law Commission’s work are these. First, statutory confirmation through the Bill will provide greater and valuable legal certainty for many cases, and will allow the law to develop from a clear foundation and from a considered parliamentary decision that has recognised existing modern realities.

Secondly, the Law Commission has recognised the limits of what it wishes to propose in this area, expressing its confidence in the flexibility and capabilities of the common law and our courts to provide for any necessary further development and definition of boundaries. The commission has not attempted to provide a Bill with greater detail or exhaustive definitions, so avoiding what was once called the vain search for greater certainty; indeed, rather than trying to make the legislation judge-proof, it is expected and intended that the courts will deal with developments as they arise. As the commission stated:

“We also consider that the market will, in general, gravitate towards legal structuring of arrangements where existing legal certainty is high”.


It was therefore suggested that much remaining uncertainty will be transient and will diminish through the operation of markets. There was a welcome conclusion that much of the current law can be applied to provide causes of action and remedies.

Thirdly, the Law Commission supplemented its view of what could be achieved through the courts with the recommendation of the creation of a panel of experts, practitioners, academics and judges to discuss difficult factual and legal issues, particularly relating to control, and to provide guidance, albeit non-binding. It is welcome that this recommendation has been accepted and, as I understand it, is being implemented.

Fourthly, these mechanisms should provide the foundation for the courts to consider both the duties of developers and intermediaries towards users and consumers and potentially complex international jurisdictional questions.

Fifthly, the commission tells us that the large number of crypto-related frauds and scams is likely to serve as a catalyst for further development of the law relating to following and tracing.

Finally, it was hoped that the statutory confirmation of the position would reduce the time spent by the courts on questions of categorisation, allowing them to focus on substantive issues. Certainly, the law reports in this area show how much time and effort have had to be devoted to discussion of the legal status of the assets concerned. This Bill, if enacted, should help to reduce this tendency, although I suspect that the legal profession can still take comfort from the adage that there is always at least 10 years’ work in a new Act of Parliament. Given the position taken by the Law Commission, it is now for Parliament to respect that position and the reasoning behind it.

It is to be hoped that the separate and different action required in Scotland will be encouraged, so far as possible, to align the law in each jurisdiction. More practically, this is not just esoteric law for lawyers; at a practical level, the greatest challenges to the public and their advisers relate to insolvency practice and to those dealing with succession and probate, who have to try to locate, realise and value these assets and any liabilities. Even if the owners of such assets manage to avoid tax and debt, they cannot avoid death. The now well-known case of the Canadian gentleman, Mr Cotten, who died while the sole password holder of an account containing £105 million worth of cryptocurrency, demonstrates the fragility of digital assets on death.

As the Law Society and consumer bodies remind us, not enough people make or update their wills and even fewer prepare a digital inventory or legacy plan or give directions to help their loved ones or personal representatives to identify or access digital accounts. There is a lot of good and necessary advice for those of us who have failed to do so, and I for one am going home to prepare just such an inventory.

Humanist Weddings

Lord Meston Excerpts

Wednesday 16th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I agree with the noble and learned Lord. That is an important factor within the wider consideration of this issue. It is also a factor concerning which groups would be included. His point about focusing on the celebrant rather than the building is fundamental.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, although this Question refers only to humanist weddings, it really does concern the unsatisfactory state of the law on the formation and validity of marriages. The inconsistencies and potential for unfairness have been comprehensively shown by the Law Commission in its report, which I remind the House was produced over two years ago. As to humanist weddings, which are part of the wider problem, there remains the anomalous difference between the law applied in England and Wales and the law in Scotland and other places where humanist marriages are recognised without the need for a separate civil ceremony. Can the Government indicate what work is under way to align and modernise the British law overall? At the very least, surely the Government do not want to become responsible for an exodus of lovelorn humanists to Gretna Green.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for his question, and I agree with his premise that the current state of laws regarding weddings is unsatisfactory. Although the current weddings law is contained within the Marriage Act 1949, the fundamental structure of weddings law dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries. There are profound difficulties, and I acknowledge that point. I am giving a commitment that the Government will look at this in the whole and undertake to come back in due course with rounded recommendations to address these issues.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am simply referring to today’s list, which is what I am working from. If the Minister looks at today’s list, he will see that this group includes, for example, government Amendment 156ZB, which is an amendment to Clause 55, and government Amendments 156ZC, 156ZD, 156ZE and 156ZF. I do not mind at all whether my amendments are in another group, but I do not want to be told later that I have missed my opportunity.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I associate myself with those remarks. I stayed late, expecting to debate the question of the marriage of long-term prisoners, and was a bit concerned to see that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appeared to be described as “already debated”, which I do not think it can possibly have been.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to help once again, because I have in front of me a copy of the groupings that were sent out. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Meston, are absolutely right that some of the consequential government amendments have been put into group 5, but group 6 certainly includes—as we were told by the Government Whips’ Office—Amendment 165ZDA and Amendment 156ZI, which is the prisoner marriage substantive stand-part amendment. If we could proceed, that would be most convenient.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not intend to say much, for the very good reason that I do not have to. The arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, and particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are overwhelming. I do not want to put the Minister, for whom I have huge respect, on the spot, but I have a suspicion that he has more than a bit of sympathy for the arguments that have been put.

The only point I want to make is this: commentators have said that, when the Minister and the Secretary of State came to their positions, there was likely to be a different attitude towards issues of this kind than there was under some predecessors. The evidence is that that is true, and we have seen examples tonight and this afternoon of the Minister no doubt using his influence in persuading the Secretary of State to have sensible views and change the Bill where it needed to be changed.

This is exactly a case of a clause that is both against the European legislation we have adopted and against all common sense; it should be removed. It would be a real shame if this Bill, which contains some really excellent stuff on both prisoners and victims, has at the tail end of it, as the noble Lord said, this rather ridiculous and very anti-British way of dealing with this issue—so I do ask the Minister to please think again.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I raised questions about Clause 55 and how it might operate in practice at Second Reading that were really not answered. I make no criticism; the Minister had a lot to deal with. I regret not being able to participate in Committee. But I have devoted quite a lot of my professional life to the formation and validity of marriage, and therefore in the context of this Bill I would like to point out that the question of whether and to what extent certain marriages should be restricted or governed by statute faces two underlying problems.

First, it is generally not necessary for anybody otherwise qualified to marry to have any good or creditable reason to do so. I mention that in the context of my noble friend Lord Carter’s suggestion that possibly in these circumstances prison governors should question the motives and have the ability to do so, and that that may be the way through this problem. I have to say that research suggests that the decision to marry is rarely reached on rational grounds—and indeed the same research revealed that 3% of those surveyed did not know why they were getting married at all.

Secondly, and altogether more seriously, there is the fundamental right to marry, stated in Article 12 of the ECHR. That is a right that long predated that convention in this country. However, it was Article 12 that underpinned the Marriage Act 1983, which allowed for marriages of those detained in prison, for essentially pragmatic reasons. It was legislation that did not attract criticism—indeed, only newspaper headlines such as “Get Me to the Jail on Time”. Article 12 also led to the extension of the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, which I had a part in, believe it or not, and which set mankind free to marry their mothers-in-law.

The restrictions proposed in this Bill on specific marriages were understandably prompted by the attention-seeking attempts by particular convicted prisoners to marry—something that many people, no doubt including their victims and their victims’ families, will have found grossly offensive. Nevertheless, the underlying points emphasised by all noble Lords who have spoken so far simply cannot be ignored.

If Article 12 rights are to be curtailed and qualified simply by reference to the nature of the sentence being served or by vague concepts of public interest, the Government really should spell out more clearly the justification for the proposed restrictions and should clearly indicate the circumstances likely to satisfy the Secretary of State that they are “exceptional circumstances”. At Second Reading, I suggested that they might include terminal illness, but I can see that it ought probably to go wider than that. Otherwise, we are simply going to be storing up problems and litigation for the future.