Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment in the name of my noble friend. I am an employer, and I have declared my interest in the register. I founded and was the executive director of a think tank for over the best part of a quarter of a century, and now I am research director there. We continue to employ students on a flexible basis. As your Lordships know, many universities have changed their timetables. Some are taking much shorter summer breaks, some have started working more flexibly and many work remotely for certain classes. Postgraduate and undergraduate students welcome the opportunity to train, get a foothold in the world of work and understand what happens there. They learn disciplines. They learn the discipline of work, timetabling and deadlines. But we have to be flexible. Terms can be busy. There can be things such as essay crises, or a postgraduate student may have an extra schedule to fit in, and of course we will accommodate that.

We have devised a good work programme. I am speaking only to give the Committee an example of the damage this will do, particularly to the students. We devise a work programme so they can work remotely and do research when they have free time. They want to earn money, and both parties are flexible. I, particularly as a former academic, recognise that their work in the university, their teaching and their essays come first. This suits all parties. We have had full-time staff who have come to us with good degrees, stayed three or four years and then gone on to do a professional training course, perhaps in law or accountancy. They, too, want to come back and continue with the work that they have brought to a high level, and they will be paid accordingly. There is no exploitation in this market; rather it is mutual gain.

It is a great pleasure for me to see young people. I have had students from inner London universities whose family had no habit of third-level or even second-level education, who came from families from abroad, who used to ask for time off during their time to take their granny to the hospital in order to interpret for her. We gave them opportunities, and it is a great pleasure to see that they have done very well as a result. Some of the work placements are organised directly with the university, and for others students write in themselves. I beg the Government to listen to this amendment and take heed, because the Bill will do untold damage to the life chances of students and their capacity to earn and keep afloat when they are paying for their studies.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, this debate takes me back to my own student days and the work that I did as a student. It was not very glamorous, I have to say. I did the overnight shift shelf-stacking at Gateway, which set me up, obviously, to be a Peer in your Lordships’ House. I also did a stint at McDonald’s. That was valuable experience in terms of socialising, learning life skills and the important opportunity to meet different sorts of people.

I believe that this Government are fair-minded and decent in the way they wish to protect the interests of working families who want the certainty of being able to put food on the table and earn a decent wage. I think we all believe that that is very important as an imperative. However, the mark of a good piece of legislation is the ability to answer the question, “What problem is this solving?” Another mark of good legislation is the ability to be flexible in carving out some parts of a Bill where the effect of the Bill will be disadvantageous to a group. I think that this is one such example and that the very important points made by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral should be taken on board by the Government.

Remember that this is a student generation that has lived through the trauma of Covid. Many students and graduates have had to start their working career not being able to socialise in an office or a factory or out on site but at their kitchen table with their laptop. My problem is that employers who, broadly speaking, are not wicked and rapacious but want good people to join their business, make money for them and grow themselves as people and individuals and workers, will not take a risk with this legislation. This goes through the whole of this legislation. Employers are going to be significantly more risk-averse if they are going to be compelled to offer guaranteed hours to certain groups, including students. I think Ministers should give that consideration.

The reason that this is a good amendment is that it recognises that we have a very complex, fast-moving labour market and that young people are making decisions and value judgments about their work, employment, training, skills, knowledge and experience that I did not take 30 years ago and my parents certainly did not take, as you were generally in the same job for the whole of your working life, but—I would not use the word “promiscuous” necessarily, but I cannot think of a better word—younger people now are a bit more promiscuous in the decisions they take, and therefore they value that ability to enter into a flexible contract. In my time, I would not have expected a guaranteed hours contract. I would for someone aged, say, 35 or 40 who had a family and had to provide for them, but I think my noble friends have made a good point that this amendment would allow the Government to carve out this particular group. I do not think there is anything in the Explanatory Notes or the impact assessment that definitively makes the case for keeping students in this group, and for that reason I would like the Minister to give active consideration to this amendment. It is a sensible amendment. It is not a wrecking amendment. It is designed to improve the Bill. It recognises the real-life consequences and issues that may arise from the Bill: in other words, fewer young people having the opportunity to work and fewer long-term employment opportunities. For that reason, I am pleased to support my noble friend’s very good amendment.

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[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Penn. I declare an interest that I work for Marsh, a very large insurance broker in this country and around the world. I run a team of between 30 and 40 people. Within that team, I have all sorts, sizes and cultures—you name it. Of that team, all the married women—I should say, the women with children—have some sort of flexible way that they work with us. I can tell noble Lords from my own experience that unhappy staff do not do good work; it is 101. Happy staff are very likely to do very good work. One of my main jobs is to keep my team happy, and I am given immense flexibility to do it. Without this amendment, it is less easy. I rest my case.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, which was so ably enunciated by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. I think that the amendment is neither fish nor fowl really. It is perfectly possible, as I understand it, for the Government to have already addressed this issue and, by statutory instrument, to set differential rates for compensation at employment tribunal. It seems rather a waste of time, and not necessarily a good use of ministerial time, to put in primary legislation another review.

My substantial issue is also that this, again, tips the balance are much more towards the worker, unreasonably, and away from the employer. I think that is to be deprecated, because that is what we have seen in so many aspects of this Bill. This leads me to conclude something else as well. On a risk-based assessment of whether you would wish to employ a person, an employer may very well conclude—it may, unfortunately, be an encumbrance of being a female employee or potential employee—that “We do not wish to employ that person because she may apply for flexible working, and it is better to employ someone else”. This is particularly because of the risk that, in going to an employment tribunal, after already having believed they had behaved in a reasonable way, they would be subject to a potential substantial monetary fine, which will impact on their bottom line. That is not good for those workers. It is not for the women who wish to work and have flexibility.

I broadly agree with the idea of reasonableness in applying for flexible working. That is how our jobs market and employment regime works now. Many women do want flexible working, and it is absolutely right that employers reasonably consider that. But I think this amendment is a step too far, because it will have the unintended consequence of making it more likely that women will not be employed because they may ask for flexible working. I think it is otiose: it is unnecessary, and it will not add to the efficacy of the Bill.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, just when I was getting worried that everybody was going to agree, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, popped up to rescue us. In his objection, it seems that the noble Lord has second-guessed the findings of the impact assessment that we have not had yet, which will add to the level of fines if his point that it will help workers more than employers is correct. On that basis, he was admitting that the fine is already too low, so I am not sure where he was going on that. He then drifted into a critique of the principle of flexible working.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I will not give way. I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn. Had I been a little more organised, I would have signed her amendment.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Will the noble Lord stop interrupting me?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Will the noble Lord give way very briefly at this juncture?

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

Order. It is clear that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is not going to give way, and that is his prerogative.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

If I get to a point where I feel like it, I will. At the moment, I would like to develop my point.

The issue in Amendment 64 was dealt with very well by the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and then picked up subsequently by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. This is commonly thought of as a soft policy—a one-sided policy about giving people things—but both speakers touched on the harder edge to this, and I would like to emphasise it too. This is good for the economy. It is an economic hard edge. We have millions of people who are not working and not able to work. Some of them will never work, but many, with more flexibility and the right amount of help, will be able to work. It is, quite rightly, the Government’s objective to bring as many of those people into the workforce as possible, and flexible working is one of the important tools that will enable us to do that.

I am broadly sympathetic to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Watson; there is no problem in assessing the impact of tribunals. But during the debate on the last group I promised to bring in a wider point on tribunals: unless we clear up the tribunal system, it will not matter what the level of sanction is, because it is going to be years before that sanction is brought. It becomes a meaningless activity, particularly for the employee but also for the employer. As I have said before, every time we go into a tribunal, both sides lose. We have to find ways of moving the system faster and eliminating issues within the system that are clogging it. That is why I asked the Minister for a proper meeting to go through the whole issue of what the Government are planning to do with tribunals—not on just what the Bill does but on how they are going to flush the system through and get it working properly.

If the Government do not do that, a huge lump of the Bill will fail, because it will be years and years before any of the sanctions are brought and before—as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Leong—case law becomes an important element of how we define what “reasonable” means. If we have to wait two or three years before we get that ruling, how many more unreasonable things are going to happen in the meantime? This is a vital point, and I very much hope that the Minister responds to it. I will now give way to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. Not for the first time, he has mischaracterised what I said. It is very clear, and I was quite emphatic, that I support reasonable requests for flexible working. So I would be obliged if the noble Lord did not wilfully misrepresent what I said barely five minutes ago, although I know that, being a Liberal Democrat, he is not always acquainted with the actuality.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I was about to, but I clearly will not now, so the noble Lord can fly for that one.

Flexible working is an important tool for getting people back in the workplace and keeping them there. We should be grateful for the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, tabled, and I hope the Government are sensible enough to adopt their version of it at the next stage of the Bill.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Fourthly, more broadly, does the Minister believe that this Bill is in alignment with the conclusions reached during the passage of the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023, or are the Government now reversing course? Finally, and crucially, will the Government please commit to carrying out a comprehensive and transparent impact assessment? I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment ably and comprehensively moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which would, as he explained, insert a new clause. It is an eminently sensible amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, described the arguments put by this side in the previous debate as straw man arguments. He was like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, because his claim that they were straw man arguments was comprehensively eviscerated by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. They were substantive arguments and substantive concerns, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s comments and those of noble Lords on the Government’s side.

Clause 20 could be described as a hologram or a chimaera because it does not provide very much in the way of detail about the practical ramifications and impacts of this clause on businesses, particularly smaller businesses. The amendment is very sensible. In section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis in the Employment Rights Bill: Economic Analysis that the Government published last October, one is hard pressed to see any detailed empirical evidence from reputable economists or other academics which would sustain the likely costings that the Government have prayed in aid in favour of this part of the Bill. We are told that the universal cost of the Bill to business will be a very speculative £5 billion, but the source of that figure is not very clear; in fact, it is quite opaque. I do not believe that figure. For a number of reasons, the data is suspect, which is why we need the proper impact assessment so persuasively argued for by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We have not had a proper analysis of the detail in a risk assessment of section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis.

We also have not had a proper consultation process on the Bill. We have not had the opportunity to look at the likely impacts that flow from this clause. I say at the outset that, like my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, I am a proud member of the Free Speech Union, which has made a similar case about consultation.

We also do not know anything about the opportunity cost. Not everyone is an economist, but opportunity cost is what may have happened if this Bill had not come along. I suspect that employers, including smaller employers, would have taken on more staff, had there not been the encumbrances in this clause. In other words, they will be risk averse: they will not wish to run the risk of taking people on, given the litigation and vexatious claims which may well arise from this clause.

The figure the Government have put forward for the number of employment tribunals does not stand up to scrutiny, given the pressure that this will put on the tribunals themselves, as well as the other courts that will be responsible for adjudicating on this litigation. Indeed, as my noble friend said, this will exacerbate the already very significant problem of backlogs in the employment tribunals.

I turn to the kernel of this amendment. If I take the Minister and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who supported her from the government Benches, at their word, I do not know why they would not wish to support the free speech caveat in this amendment. Although they have not properly identified what harassment is—they have not defined it—they are going after people who are committing acts of harassment. They are not seeking to stifle or curtail free speech.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I would suggest that the so-called “free speech caveat” is Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, which requires all public authorities, including courts and tribunals, to interpret all other legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights, including—for the purposes of the present debate, as I understand the noble Lord’s concerns—Article 10 of the convention on human rights.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I defer to the noble Baroness’s expertise on human rights legislation, but we are considering this specific, bespoke legislation. There will not necessarily be a read-across between that and—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

There will.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, the noble Baroness will not be present at every employment tribunal and hear and adjudicate every case. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton has said, there is a significant threat of inadvertent issues arising from this legislation, which, as my noble friend Lady Cash has said, is very poorly drafted. As subsection 2(a) of the proposed new clause sets out, it is important to look through the prism of free speech at Clauses 19 to 22.

It is also important to look at the likely costs to employers. This is the central point of my remarks: we do not know what those costs will be. It is certainly appropriate that Ministers be required to tell Parliament what the ramifications are in terms of cost. This is a Government who are committed to growth and to supporting businesses in all their endeavours. Therefore, it would be sensible to consider a review of how these issues impact on businesses.

On proposals for mitigations, there have been no ideas, no protocols, no concordats, and no policies put in place to give any guidance to smaller businesses—I am not necessarily referring to the smallest micro-businesses—to cope with the problems deliberately arising because this Labour Government have chosen to put these encumbrances and burdens on businesses. They are not giving any support to businesses to help cope with this. The costs will fall on the shareholders, on the businesses, and ultimately on the workforce—and it will cost jobs. For that reason, I support the amendment. It does not detract from the important commitment to protect ordinary working people, who deserve to be able to go to work without being bullied, harassed or treated unfairly or egregiously. We all agree with that, on which there is a consensus. It would not detract from that to make an amendment that would provide extra protections against people who are vexatious or malicious, or who cause difficulties in the long run, for no apparent reason. It is a sensible amendment that would protect business and would also protect the workforce.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

Can the noble Lord indicate what he thinks the value of an impact assessment is that does not weigh the benefits that ensue from the legislation but only the costs?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I think that is a slightly odd question coming from the supporter of a Government who are not coming forward with either intangible or tangible benefits in monetisable ways. Were that in the impact assessment or the economic analysis of the Bill, I would defer to the noble Lord’s argument, but neither of them are there. Frankly, it is difficult for us to make a value judgment on the balance of obligations and responsibilities between the workforce and the employer when the data is not provided. I think the noble Lord has probably made my case. With that, I support the amendment from my noble friend on the Front Bench.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in proposing this impact assessment and thank my noble friend Lord Hunt for making the case so persuasively from the Front Bench. I shall simply pick up on a few points that were made in the amendment and his speech. The amendment asks for an impact assessment on free speech. Proposed new subsection (1) asks for an assessment of Sections 19 to 22 of this Act on employers. Proposed new subsection (2) says:

“The assessment must report on … the impact of sections 19 to 22 on free speech”


and include

“an assessment of the likely costs to employers”

of these sections, which must include types of occupations at risk and proposals for mitigations.

I want to comment on this amendment in the context of universities. I spoke earlier in Committee about the mitigations a university might take in its rules and in the checklist that it hands out to potential candidates for a place who want to come to that university to study and who are asked to abide by certain arrangements or rules. These rules will, if the employer and the university follow what they are required as trustees of a charity to follow, protect the costs: whatever endowment of funds the university has, it will have to follow caution. I have no doubt that undergraduates or graduate students coming in for postgraduate work will be asked to promise not to complain, or be overheard doing so, or speak ill of lecturer A, whose lectures they may not approve of, may think are no good or whatever, as happens in normal intercourse in a university.

One of the standard things you will hear as undergraduates leave the room is, “What a rotten lecture that was” or “Isn’t it interesting that such a subject didn’t touch on the kernel of the matter?” or whatever they think is important. This is the sort of education we want to impart. We want students to question and challenge. We want them to make the case against what they have heard and to think about it. To make an employer liable for a student doing what a university education should encourage—we encourage it at school too—seems to me silly. We should have an impact assessment of what will happen and what sort of steps a university will take to curtail that freedom to argue or to criticise an employee of the university. We should ask for an impact assessment. It would not be very difficult to consult universities and find out exactly how they would get around this potential liability as employers.

The same goes for mitigation and the costs which will be incurred. For example, take the costs to an institution such as a university of fighting a claim in an employment tribunal. The member of staff concerned, against whom the criticism has been made, will be on tenterhooks all the time. They may be distracted, may have to continue to give evidence to the employer, and so on, with a lot of back and forth. As for the employers, think of the staff costs, counsel charges, legal charges, administrative costs and committee costs they will incur, and the time that will be spent on that rather than on running their universities to do what they ought to do—to educate undergraduates and do research. This is the most moderate request for an impact assessment that I have heard. Noble Lords would be well advised to agree that we need an impact assessment, both on free speech and the likely costs—particularly the costs of going to a tribunal and waiting for all that period.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for reminding me of this; we covered it last week. The RPC did not question the policy of the Bill. It just questioned the evidence—and I will go further on this Bill.

These assessments are based on the best available evidence of the potential impact on businesses, workers and the wider economy. We plan to further define this analysis in the future, working with a range of stakeholders including businesses, trade unions, academics, think tanks and the Regulatory Policy Committee to do so.

The Government are steadfast in their commitment to tackle all forms of harassment in the workplace. We know that harassment at work can have a huge impact on affected individuals, as well as broader economic impacts. The burden of holding perpetrators to account and of driving change is too great to be shouldered by employees alone. These measures send a clear signal to all employers that they must take steps to protect their employees from harassment, including from third parties, to encourage a cultural change.

We know that the vast majority of employers agree that harassment is unacceptable and are working to ensure that their employees are treated with respect. We will work in partnership with them towards this shared goal and will support them with these changes. We will publish an enactment impact assessment once the Bill receives Royal Assent, in line with the Better Regulation Framework. This will account for amendments made to primary legislation during the Bill’s passage through Parliament that would significantly change the impact of the policy on business. This impact assessment will be published alongside the enacted legislation. Additionally, we will publish further analysis, alongside carrying out further consultation with stake-holders, ahead of any secondary legislation, to meet our Better Regulation requirements.

According to our best estimates, across all our harassment measures the monetary cost to businesses will not be significant. Other than the initial one-off familiarisation cost, repeatable costs to businesses are very low. All three measures will also bring benefits to businesses in avoiding the harassment of staff.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I hear what the Minister says, but even the economic analysis says there will be a 15% increase in individual enforcement cases in employment tribunals arising from litigation because of the Bill. The analysis says:

“The exact impact on the enforcement system is difficult to predict because the number of cases that enter the system each year fluctuates”,


and that

“final policy decisions taken at secondary legislation will alter the number of workers in scope of protections and likelihood of a worker making a claim. These decisions are still subject to consultation and further policy development and therefore cannot be assessed with confidence”.

Later it says that the

“initial analysis on the impact of the Bill on enforcement is subject to change as policy development continues”.

The Minister is asking us to wave this clause through on the basis of information that has not been presented to this House.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

No, I was not saying that. What I said is that we are carrying out consultation and we will conduct further impact assessments. We are not saying that we are finished with it and that this is it. We have already assessed the impact of provisions about third-party harassment on SMEs in our impact assessment on third-party harassment. In all our impact assessments we assess the impact on SMEs, and the Bill is not expected to have a disproportionate impact on SMEs.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

I therefore hope that we can use this legislation as a vehicle for tackling that. I think the Government will understand and, because of the Labour movement’s proud history of tackling discrimination against workers’ political views over the years, they will be sympathetic to these amendments.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the excellent amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. It is hard to adequately follow the tour de force and the passion and energy of—I will call her my noble friend— Lady Fox of Buckley. I would make the point, and it bears repetition, that free speech is worth defending on all occasions and, in many respects, transcends party- political affiliations.

As my noble friend Lady Fox alluded to, there was a time many years ago—until quite recently, historically—when people who represented labour versus capital were discriminated against for organising in the workplace. If people who worked in factories and mines, and on farms, tried to organise a trade union—which was perfectly reasonable—to improve their conditions and pay, they were politically discriminated against, suspended or fired, and their very livelihoods were put in question. That is a fact. We know that was the case.

We have made good progress. Those people who were, for instance, organising the Workers’ Educational Association classes for manual workers, in order to improve their education and their life chances, were discriminated against. That was wrong. We have gone full circle now, and those people who may support a right-of-centre position—pro-capitalism, pro-tax cuts, pro-lower regulations—are discriminated against.

The importance of this amendment is that it distinguishes what is respectable, moderate, mainstream opinion, which noble Lords may or may not agree with, from the extremes. The caveat in this amendment is very nuanced, in that it defends free speech for respectable political debate and discussion. That is very important.

The other reason why I support this amendment is that we have a very unfortunate phenomenon these days with the advent of social media: doxing. If you are a pernicious, unpleasant, vexatious, litigious person and someone on social media appears to have a view with which you disagree, you are no longer going just to take issue with them on social media and let the matter drop; you are going to identify where they live, where their children go to school and, more importantly for our purposes today, where they earn their living.

A good example—and a proud member of the Free Speech Union—is Mr Ben Woods, who was employed by Waitrose at Henley as a wine specialist. He had unfashionable views, certainly unfashionable in the Liberal Democrat citadel of Henley-on-Thames, being against immigration. But actually, he represented the majority of people in that he was gender critical and believed that women are biological women and men are biological men, and he put that on his social media. Maybe he was a bit exuberant in his opinions, but someone decided to contact John Lewis Partnership and Waitrose to dox him. He was suspended, investigated and lost his job, and that is now going to an employment tribunal.

That is a good example of a very regrettable modern phenomenon. This amendment would seek to protect people like this, who have perfectly respectable views and are entitled to earn a living and to try to get on with their fellow workers in their place of work—who may disagree with them—but not lose their job unfairly. On that basis, this is an excellent amendment. I certainly urge the Minister to give it some consideration, because it would not detract from the Bill. Above all, it is a fair amendment, and I believe she should support it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I would join with anyone who wants to speed up employment tribunals and cut the costs of going to them. I hope that is an agenda the Government will take on rapidly. We heard an unfortunate case of someone who is waiting until 2027; some people are waiting four years. I hope the Government will address that issue, but I cannot see that it is central to this Bill.

I am not a legal expert, and many of the cases quoted are not ones that I know—I do not know any of them intimately. In my experience, at least with employment tribunal judgments, it is very unsatisfactory to sum them up in a single sentence. They usually have within them a great deal of complexity and a fair amount of nuance. Without going through those, I am in no position to assess the evidence that has been put before us today.

I remain somewhat sceptical. I hope that we can get reassurance that people are genuinely protected because of their political views. I do not think anyone in this Committee would think it was right for someone to lose their job because they belong to one particular affiliation or another. I will look for the Minister to make that case and to explain the legal situation in far more depth than I can. I do not feel qualified to be more than somewhat sceptical.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

I hope the Government will consider this amendment in the constructive and pragmatic spirit in which it proposed. I say this as someone in this debate who has not been a member of a trade union. The Institute of Chartered Accountants is probably a trade union, but it does not recognise itself as such. It is so often daunting for the worker, who is already morally undermined, to go to a tribunal without some form of assistance. Assistance comes from a number of sources, which I have outlined and which the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, outlined as well. I believe these amendments should go forward in some form in the future.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise with the soothing balm of cross-party collaboration to support the excellent amendments put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill. I declare at the outset an interest as a member for more than 20 years of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, an estimable professional body. More importantly, I have been made redundant twice. My experience of redundancy is that it is often a difficult and traumatic experience if you are working for a small company or if you are relatively new to the company. I certainly had a great deal of sustenance and support from my trade union representative in securing and expediting a reasonably successful outcome in what could have been a very difficult period financially for me in that situation—this is many years ago.

I think the benefit of these amendments is that they look from the perspective of the small employer in the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, and from the employee’s perspective in the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I think that, for people who have, for various reasons, chosen not to join a trade union, it is important that not just anyone, not their mate from the pub, but a professional accredited person can accompany and support them in this.

Normally, I would not want to amend a Bill unnecessarily, but I genuinely think it would not be administratively and financially onerous for these amendments to be added to the Bill, and in fact they would improve it. I would not say they are cost free, but they would be important in saving potentially significant amounts of money if, as the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, has said, they would alleviate or ameliorate the possibility of an escalation to expensive litigation and an employment tribunal. Having an expert in the room with you can sometimes dissipate the anger, the frustration and the sense of a battle between two sides, and in that respect it is sensible.

For those reasons, with the proviso that I have experienced these issues myself, I think the amendments are sensible and I look to the Minister to give them due consideration. They would not add to the burden of businesses, and in the long term they would save significant amounts of money.

[Lord Barber of Ainsdale (Lab)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendments 132 and 137. Both of them seek to expand the list of organisations recognised in law to represent workers. Amendment 132 relates to representation in reaching settlement agreements, while Amendment 137 refers to representation in hearings at workplace disciplinary and grievance hearings.

At present, the law specifies that individuals can be supported by trade unions, fellow workers or, in respect of settlement agreements, lawyers or other qualified people from, for example, the respected network of citizens advice bureaux. Both amendments propose that the right to representation be extended to professional bodies specified by the Secretary of State, and Amendment 132 refers in particular to CIPD members. I have to say I am genuinely puzzled about which other professional bodies would wish to take on this new role.

In short, the law should rest where it stands. Workers should be represented, where they are present, by workers’ organisations—trade unions—that, where appropriate, can provide legal representation. The CIPD is widely respected as an organisation of HR professionals, but it essentially represents employers’ interests and would surely be conflicted if it were to take on this very different role.

I know my noble friend Lord Pitkeathley is motivated by a wish to ensure that people working in small and medium-sized businesses without trade union representation should have relevant expertise available to help resolve difficult workplace issues. I support that aspiration, but ACAS—which I chaired for six years, to declare an interest—has the responsibility and the independent, impartial expertise to conciliate in such matters, and a considerable track record of success in doing so. Far better to ensure that it has increased resources to provide this vital service in the interests of both parties in any such dispute, rather than muddying the water on the issue of who is competent and appropriate to represent workers. I hope that both these amendments will not be pressed.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I am against Clause 31 standing part of the Bill. The 2010 Act protects against gender and other types of discrimination. It replaces earlier Acts, as your Lordships will know, including the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

The principles of equality are commonly supported. The aims are those on which people agree and under which employers are bound. Section 78 of the Equality Act stipulates that:

“Regulations may require employers to publish information relating to the pay of employees for the purpose of showing whether, by reference to factors of such description as is prescribed, there are differences in the pay of male and female employees”.


We have an Act that is commonly agreed on and obeyed, and known by those to whom it is addressed.

Clause 31 proposes to add a new Section 78A after Section 78, which stipulates:

“Regulations may require employers to … develop and publish … an ‘equality action plan’”


in respect of gender and equality,

“showing the steps that the employers are taking in relation to their employees with regard to prescribed matters related to gender equality, and … publish prescribed information relating to the plan”.

This will oblige more compliance, more bureaucracy and higher costs on employers—and it is unnecessary because we have the law.

We have just been listening to the discussion of the strategic defence review. We are going to have to spend a lot of money on defence. There are going to be lots of demands on the public purse. To oblige more compliance and bureaucracy on employers at a time when things are tight will not be a great help to the other demands on the public purse. It is not only about compliance and bureaucracy; much worse than that it leads to something beyond the principles of the Equality Act. It prompts institutions in practice to devise and interpret action plans that result in a 50:50 balance between men and women, and steps will be taken to achieve that level playing field and to discriminate positively.

Take the example of academic shortlisting, where, in order to achieve a 50:50 balance, things can be so ordained at the shortlisting stage in order to appoint women, and as they are so ordained, discrimination takes place against men and appointments are made not on merit but on gender. This results in action plans under which men are discriminated against. It is also unfair for women because, once positive discrimination comes into play, women too suffer. The women who are appointed are perceived to have been appointed not because they come first on merit, or in a fair competition, but on account of their gender.

I shall comment briefly on new Section 78A(4), which sets down that

“matters related to gender equality include (a) addressing the gender pay gap, (b) supporting employees going through the menopause”.

New Section 78A(4)(a) is too broad. Take the case of a male and female employee appointed at entry level to similar positions. They start with the same salary, but one may do far better than the other, be given far more responsibility and be promoted eventually to a higher role. How is the gender pay gap to be addressed, given that the talent, resourcefulness and ability of one employee naturally results in more responsibility and higher payment?

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has already mentioned new Section 78A(4)(b), which has no place in the workplace. It is discriminatory in its assumption that women need special help at certain times of their life. It also violates the professionalism of a good workplace in treating the personal as public, and it puts the employer into a discriminatory role in requiring special support for a select group of employees, rather than acting as a dispassionate employer who treats all employees well and fairly.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I also support the proposition that Clause 31, on equality action plans, should not stand part of the Bill. We meet tonight with the knowledge that the OECD has downgraded the UK’s likely GDP for this year and next year. Less than an hour ago, the Minister said, I think I am right in saying, that it was not the intention of the Government to impose any onerous obligations on businesses as a result of the Bill. This is an example of exactly that.

I am very concerned about this clause, because it is very widely drawn and relies disproportionately on regulations that will be tabled, or laid before the House, once the Bill becomes an Act. I pay tribute to the very powerful intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the thoughtful comments of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. Is it really the duty and responsibility of a Minister in the sixth-biggest economy in the world, a mature economy of 68 million people, to impose by ministerial fiat, in primary legislation, the minutiae, the weeds, of

“the content of a plan”

for every business that has more than 250 employees,

“the form and manner in which a plan or information is to be published; when and how”

that plan is published, and, in new subsection (5)(d)—maybe I am being obtuse, but I do not even understand the meaning of this—

“requirements for senior approval before a plan or information is published”?

What does that even mean? Does it mean the chief people officer, the chief executive, the managing director or what?

It would be much better were the Government to use their energy, and the good will that is behind significant parts of the Bill, to work with people such as the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, ACAS and others to develop professional, timely briefings for employers. But they are not doing that. They are instead insisting, in the Bill, that they will direct these equality action plans, irrespective of what type of business is being transacted and whether it has a workforce of 251, 25,000 or 250,000.

In fact, the clause does not even define “employee”, “employer” or “descriptions of information”. It fails to define them and says that those details will be reserved for regulations to be laid after the Bill gets Royal Assent. New subsection (7) is also very opaque when it states:

“The regulations may make provision for a failure to comply with the regulations to be enforced, otherwise than as an offence, by such means as are prescribed”.


Again, that is very loosely drawn. We do not know what it means or what sanctions will be in place and available for Ministers to lay down in regulations. New subsection (6) states:

“The regulations may not require an employer, after the first publication of information, to publish information more frequently”.


It does not say “must not”, so Ministers can still use regulations to enforce periodic publications of and changes to these regulations.

For all those reasons, this is an unnecessary clause. It will add costs and administrative burdens. It will certainly take a significant amount of time, for instance, to get in specialists in human resources as consultants to draw up these plans on perhaps a 12-monthly basis. It will take a lot of administrative time and take away from employing people, for the bottom line and profit, which will impact employability. For that reason, I support the proposition that this clause should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to express a view that I did not think I would be expressing in your Lordships’ House. I am utterly appalled by this proposition and the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who, lest there were any doubt, has given the clearest possible indication of her political journey from the extreme left to the extreme right, which is there for all to see.

It is an absolute disgrace to suggest that to seek to help women in the workplace gain equality is somehow to treat them as victims. I did my university dissertation in 1974 on the Equal Pay Act, when the gap between men and women was 25%. Half a century later, it is down to something like 7% or 8%. Yes, that is a huge improvement, but the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and others who have spoken have said, “Well, that’s okay. We can leave it there. We don’t want to push it any further, because it’s going to burden industry with costs”. What about the women who are burdened with wages lower than they are entitled to get for the job they do on a day-to-day basis?

It is well known that inclusivity in the workforce increases levels of production, is good for problem solving and enhances job retention. I am talking not just about gender issues but wider diversity. The speech that the noble Baroness made and others have echoed will be cheered to the rafters by Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, because it is exactly the sort of thing they have been saying, and I think it is a very dangerous line for Members of this House to push. It is a perfectly legitimate expectation in a Bill such as this that an equality action plan is something that employers should be expected to have. Many already do—they do not need to be told. Good employers have one in place and are benefiting from the standard of output they are getting from employees who are more satisfied because they are clearly better valued. To suggest that we just leave it there is absolute nonsense.

I will not talk about the menopause, but I just could not believe what I heard—that, somehow, women are being painted as victims. As a man, it is difficult for me to comment, but there is a broad spread of opinion that the issue has to be dealt with by employers. To be perfectly fair, some employers do, but others do not, and there should at least be the opportunity for women who want to take advantage of this to be able to do so. To try to slam that door in their faces is an absolute disgrace.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I came into this debate by chance, but it seems to me that this is part of a very undesirable development: an attack on the principle of equality, diversity and inclusion policies. These principles are at the heart of my politics. I have fought for racial equality ever since I was a student, when I went on marches against Enoch Powell and what he stood for. I thought that the response of the Labour Government in the 1960s—to make racial discrimination illegal—was very important. In more modern times, when I was chair of Lancaster University and looking at the question of student admissions, I always thought that we should make allowance for the fact that some working-class people had not had the best chance in life and take this into account in admissions procedures Therefore, I rather regret what the Opposition Front Bench is trying to do, which is to undermine the political acceptability of these policies.

There is a danger here. I have seen it from some people in my own party who say that, in response to the alleged great Reform upsurge, we should start abandoning EDI. That would be catastrophic for a social democrat like me, who has always believed in these things. I hope that the Members opposite will withdraw their amendment.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I would gently advise the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, to have read the amendment before he pontificates down memory lane on his great campaigns of the past for equality.

This amendment is about fairness. It ill behoves his party to lecture us on equality when it needed the Supreme Court to tell its own Prime Minister what a woman was. We will take lessons on equality from many people but not from a party that was found to be institutionally racist by the Equality and Human Rights Commission not that long ago.

Let us move on from there because, if noble Lords read this amendment, they will see that it is an amendment that speaks of fairness. All it says, very simply, is that anyone who construes a situation where they have felt themselves personally discriminated against should have a proper, legal and transparent opportunity to question the decision of a person who is taking a big decision in their life: whether to appoint them to a post or not. It is not draconian and does not include fines; it is merely an occasion for that person to challenge a decision taken by authority in a fair, open and transparent way.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

205: Clause 55, page 73, line 11, leave out “A worker’s” and insert “If a worker’s employer has more than 50 employees, the”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the statement of trade union rights applies only to larger employers.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to have the opportunity to move this amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who is unable to be in her place today. I have to say that these parts of the Bill, Parts 4 and 5, will be the most contentious, but I think this is the meat and drink of what the Bill is intended to do, which is essentially to repeal most of the labour relations legislation put in place by successive Conservative Governments since 1992.

I am tempted by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, and her hagiography of labour relations and trade union activity before 1979, as if it was a land of milk and honey, the closed shop did not exist and the trade unions had not brought the country to its knees, to the extent that a third of trade unionists in the 1979 general election voted Conservative. In fact, Conservative trade unionists were one of the most powerful and influential groups in the Conservative Party at the time.

That was the reality of the situation then: the closed shop bringing the motor industry and various other industries to their knees. Many working-class people were sick to death of the trade unions, which is why they voted Conservative. The idea that it was a dark, draconian period of the evil capitalist bosses forcing the horny-handed sons of toil into penury was nonsense. I am more than happy for the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, to disabuse me of my prejudices, but I do not think that she will. Historically, we won general elections as a party because trade unionists supported us as they knew that reform was vital. We will no doubt debate that at length as we go on.

While I am being slightly contentious, I note the Cross Benches are empty, bar the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, whom it is always a pleasure to see. In many of the Bills over the last two years, the Cross Benches deprecated the use of excessive reliance on delegated powers. They would pop up during every piece of primary legislation, every Bill, to complain about the ministerial misuse of delegated powers, which is happening in this Bill in spades. Yet where are they? They are not present to remonstrate with the Government, take issue with the Government or hold the Government to account on that. Anyway, we must proceed.

In moving Amendment 205, I will speak also to Amendments 206 to 208, and the Clause 55 stand part notice tabled by my noble friends Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The practical and economic consequences of Clause 55 without amendment are likely to be damaging to the very workers whom the Bill claims to protect. This is against an economic background where we have growth becalmed, flat growth of GDP and a very tough labour market out there. Yet the Bill will load further incumbencies on small businesses in particular.

Amendment 207 seeks to exempt micro-employers—those with fewer than 10 employees—from the obligation in respect of access. These amendments reflect a recognition that a one-size-fits-all mandate across employers of vastly different scale is neither fair nor sustainable. Micro-businesses and SMEs are already struggling under the weight of administrative obligations. Writing in an open letter, signed by FTSE 250 firm Mitie, industry leader OCS and other employers from the £60 billion facilities sector warned that the Bill’s radical package would “discourage growth”, damaging their businesses and harming their clients and, crucially, their staff. Tina McKenzie, policy chair at the Federation of Small Businesses, put it succinctly:

“The Government also needs to think again and rework the parts of the Employment Rights Bill that will wreak havoc on hiring”.


This is a Government ostensibly focused on growth who have created—although we have never seen it written down in a comprehensive way—the so-called growth test that the Chancellor has referenced. Tina McKenzie’s concerns are far from abstract. We are facing a sustained fall in payroll employment. Small businesses, the engine of British job creation, are being hit hardest. The rise in national insurance contributions and a growing web of compliance burdens are already pushing small firms to the edge. This clause in its current form risks tipping many over.

Amendment 205 seeks to ensure that the obligation to issue this statement applies only to employers with more than 50 workers. This is a reasonable and proportionate step. Larger firms are more likely to have a human resources infrastructure to absorb such obligations. For smaller enterprises, every new administrative requirement pulls resources from service delivery and job creation. It has an impact on the bottom line, which inevitably will feed through to decisions to not employ people or to make people redundant, which we would all deprecate.

Let us not be naive: the cumulative effect of obligations like this can and will lead to reduced hiring, increased redundancies and the potential acceleration of automation. Faced with mounting costs, employers may choose software over staff. The Government must be mindful that even well-intended regulation carries a cost. In the words of the very employees this Government say they want to support:

“We are deeply concerned that some of the Bill’s provisions will have serious unintended consequences that could harm both good employers and the very employees that the Bill seeks to protect”.


My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom referenced the British Retail Consortium survey published on 29 April. It bears repetition, because it is a pretty damning indictment of the very significant concerns that employers at the sharp end—this is a survey of HR directors—have about the Bill as it stands. Some 70% believe that the Bill

“would have a very negative or negative impact on their business”,

52% said it would result in fewer staff members in their businesses and 61% said it

“would reduce flexibility in job offerings”.

They have urged the Government to engage, and today I echo that call.

Finally, Amendment 208 seeks to probe why the requirement to issue this statement must extend beyond the point of employment commencement. Is there any compelling justification for placing employers on a continual alert to reissue the statement at “prescribed times”? What does that even mean? Why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to intervene in the minutiae of a business—in the very weeds of how a business runs to make money, make profit, provide jobs, pay taxes and deliver public services for people? Why is it important for Ministers to involve themselves in the prescribed times a statement can be given? Surely, if the goal is awareness, combining this with the statement of employment particulars under Section 1 of the 1996 Act would suffice. We should not mandate bureaucracy for its own sake.

Let us step back and consider the broader context. If the Minister did not want to listen to the British Retail Consortium, she will no doubt be aware of other surveys published recently, such as that by the Federation of Small Businesses earlier in the year, which revealed that

“92 per cent of small employers are worried about the Employment Rights Bill, with 67 per cent saying they plan to recruit fewer staff, and 32 per cent set to reduce headcount”.

The Minister will know that her ministerial colleague, the MP for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough, has been challenged in the other place on a number of occasions to name just one small business that supported the Bill, and has hitherto been unable to come up with a name. The Government have come forward with Richer Sounds—which is not a small business by any stretch of the imagination—and Centrica, which is a massive business. I know that, under the Bill, big businesses will probably soon end up as small businesses, but that is a different matter. They also mentioned the Co-op. There is a surprise: the Co-op supporting the Labour Party; “The Pope likes balconies” will be the next one. Yes, the Co-op supports the Bill.

It is important to step back and think about the Bill. In an already fragile market where businesses are battling inflation, rising taxes and regulatory fatigue, we must not view administrative obligations as cost-free, because they are not. They weigh heavily, particularly on the smallest firms. I speak from experience. A number of years ago, I was an Investors in People manager, when I used to help small and medium-sized businesses with their quality standards. They often did not want to engage, because they did not have the time and the energy as they were focused on chasing invoices, chasing new businesses and giving presentations to potential new clients. These are the burdens that small businesses face every day. They become big businesses, and they pay taxes, so I ask the Minister to give some consideration to that.

--- Later in debate ---

I appreciate that Justin Madders, who I am sure is a decent Minister, hoped this would be uncontroversial. I hope this reflects an opinion—I accept that they might not share it and think I am creating some kind of drama—that it is about the tone. It is the tone of the Government deciding the direct relationship that employers have on something that is entirely optional. It should be irrelevant to whether somebody has a job and we will get into other debates on that in other parts of the Bill. For that reason, I will encourage my Front Bench—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that our very serious concerns about this clause would be assuaged were the Government to have properly followed Cabinet Office protocols and updated expeditiously the impact assessments, which are normally present in Bills of this size and magnitude?

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend. I have tried to get deposited in the Library, or sent through some other form of communication to all Peers, a response I have received from the Secretary of State on this matter. By the way, I have still not received a reply from the Cabinet Secretary, who is supposed to uphold Cabinet Office guidelines. In essence, the answer came back: “We’ll do a full impact assessment once the Bill is completed”. We know that industry is looking for that. We have no idea when these regulations will be introduced; I assume that they could already have started the consultation. It is important that the Secretary of State—I am trying to remember; I do not have a photographic memory—basically said, “We haven’t really changed that much”. That is where we are. I will continue to make the point. My noble friend is right and reminds me to chase the Cabinet Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am fully aware that it would help to see the implementation plan and, as I said, we are working at pace to get it to your Lordships as soon as we can.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this very interesting debate. I think you always know when your arguments are hitting home when you are admonished by the Front Bench about tone. It usually means that you are hitting the target. I particularly thank my noble friends for the typically erudite and forensic analysis of Clause 55 by my noble friend Lady Coffey, the excellent real-world experience articulated by my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lord Leigh, and, of course the passion, from real-world experience, of my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lord Moynihan of Chelsea.

I do not want to get into a historical discussion, because the hour is late, but Margaret Thatcher was mentioned. Margaret Thatcher never won an election with the puny mandate that this Government had, because what we are seeing is a counterrevolution in favour of the trade unions based on 20% of the electorate, a turnout of 66% and a 34% poll. That is no kind of mandate. In fact, it is a post-dated cheque to the trade unions paid for by the British taxpayer and working people of this country.

There is news from Birmingham, incidentally, as Birmingham was mentioned earlier. Four hundred Unite members have just voted today to carry on striking all the way to Christmas. This is an interesting quote from Sharon Graham, the Unite general secretary, known to our collective trade union alumni. I do not know what the collective term is: union barons, perhaps. She said:

“It beggars belief that a Labour government and Labour council is treating these workers so disgracefully … Unite calls on the decision makers to let common sense prevail in upcoming negotiations”.


The reason I quote that is that I have to say very gently to the Government Benches: be careful what you wish for. The 1974 Labour Government was destroyed by the trade unions’ actions in the winter of discontent of 1978-79. If the Government proceed with this Bill unamended, they run the risk that that unintended consequence might also be the end of their Government. I would not wish that to be the case, of course, because I think that they sincerely believe they are doing the right thing. Nevertheless, it is a risk.

Let us step back from the historical discussions that we have had in what has been an interesting debate. We are being asked to vote for a clause in primary legislation with huge delegated powers in the hands of Ministers. That brings me to a very interesting quote, that

“excessive reliance on delegated powers, Henry VIII clauses, or skeleton legislation, upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the Executive. This not only strikes at the rule of law values I have already outlined but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty”.

That was beautifully put, by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General in his Bingham lecture, proving that he is not always wrong about everything.

We have tabled these amendments because this clause does not give us the detail, it will have unintended consequences, and it will have a real-world impact on small businesses in particular. It is not about bashing the trade unions. I would concede, as someone who was a trade union member, that the trade unions have done a brilliant job in terms of member welfare, insurance schemes, et cetera, over the years. They are a force for good generally, but the measures in the Bill far too easily tip the balance against businesses trying to earn a living, in favour of unions, by repealing all the legislation from 1979 and 1992.

The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Leong, are doing a difficult job and defending a sticky wicket, but I do not think that the Minister really engaged with the arguments. I hope that on Report there is an opportunity to alter this clause, to make it a little less onerous and burdensome to businesses while keeping the spirit of the legislation for workers. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 205 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, that brings me to the second consideration: whether the purpose of the access could reasonably be achieved without physical entry. In many ways, the amendment does not prefer one side over another; it just provides a structured way for the central arbitration committee to make balanced, informed and context-sensitive decisions that reflect the diversity of modern workplaces and the need to accommodate both access and operational stability. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to my Amendments 212 and 213. Naturally, I wholeheartedly agree with the excellent points made from our Front Bench by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, particularly on Amendments 210 and 213B.

My two amendments are probing amendments, essentially, and I think they are very sensible and reasonable. The perhaps slightly more contentious one would restrict these powers to businesses with over 250 employees. I cannot and will not rehearse the arguments my noble friend made about disruption, interference and taking resources and time away from the main job of work in the business. Interestingly, it could be “one or more” trade union officials, so it could be one but it could be 25 going into a small business. We do not know because the clause is drawn very widely and is very permissive. That is Amendment 213.

Amendment 212 is basic good manners and common sense. If you want to facilitate a good relationship between the trade union representatives—properly elected and appointed by the workforce—and the employers, you want an agenda and an objective place that you wish to reach. That might be to avoid industrial action, to look again at a pay offer, to discuss a suspension of a worker or something like that. But what is wrong with giving 24 hours’ notice? It takes the heat out of the potentially disputatious nature of the relationship that you might have between the employer and the trade union representative. I think it is just basic good manners and would make things work better. It does not diminish the role of the trade unionists and it does not undermine their integrity or their bona fides; it just says, “Let’s give 24 hours’ notice to enable a more fruitful and productive relationship to be expedited between the two sides”. For those reasons, I would like the Minister to at least consider the amendments, perhaps with a view to looking at them again on Report.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 214 is designed to provide an effective remedy against an employer which defies an order of the CAC to provide trade union access. This is a situation where the trade union has applied to the employer for an agreement for access and been refused. The trade union has then gone to the CAC and succeeded in obtaining an order for access, which the employer has defied. The employer has had the opportunity to appeal to the EAT and has either declined to appeal or has had its appeal refused. In that situation, the Bill merely provides that a union can apply for a fine to be paid, not to it but to the CAC. That is no real deterrent and no incentive either for the union to enforce the CAC award, knowing that it will not result in compulsion for the employer to obey the order of the CAC. My amendment provides enforcement by way of a High Court injunction. That is an established procedure often used against trade unions for breach of their obligations in relation to industrial action. Some equivalence is surely justified here.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Burns. I want to emphasise that, in a period of mass disillusion with mainstream parties, opt-in was actually a very important way of putting those parties on their guard that they had to inspire people to want to opt in. Relying on inertia, or not being in a situation where you feel you need to go out and win the support of people to opt in politically, is very dangerous, because it will create the kind of complacency that we have seen mainstream parties of all sides show over recent years.

I note that it would be dangerous—and I am sure that nobody is implying this—for the party of government, the Labour Party, to assume that it is any longer the party that represents the working class. Long gone are the days when that claim could be made, and I think that it would be better for that party to consider how it can inspire ordinary working people to support it, both at the ballot box but also in relation to something such as political funds. I had every sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Prentis of Leeds, talking about the difficulties of campaigning when you do not have enough money. Tell me about it: I have been doing it for years. I have not had a political fund to help, mind.

It all sounded very admirable, but it really did sound as though the noble Lord was discussing not so much UNISON but an activist campaign group, a particular group around particular issues. That is fine. I have no objection to that: I am involved in some of those campaigns, although not all of them. I have to go out and raise the funds in order to be able to carry on campaigning for things I believe in. I do not think it is right that trade unions use their political funds to pursue what are political issues beyond the issues of trade unionism. Trade unionism is a particular thing. It can inspire great political revolutions over the years, I agree, but it is not a hobby-horse for trade union bureaucrats to pursue the particular political issues that they enjoy or agree with.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I shall primarily speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Cash in respect of political funds, but I will say in passing that I found the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and the excellent speeches of my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Finn not just erudite but very compelling.

There is a challenge to try to understand what has significantly changed that has led the Government to make these epochal amendments to what has been accepted by Governments of all persuasions—including, as has been said, the Blair and Brown Governments—which will radically alter industrial relations.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

224: Clause 61, page 89, line 33, after “take” insert “reasonable”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled a number of probing amendments to Clause 61. As I alluded to earlier, I take the view that the amendments are not unhelpful but should be seen through the prism of fairness, balance, proportionality and reasonableness. There is the possibility that, as drafted, it could plausibly be argued that the Bill’s balance is very much in favour of not just employees and union members but unions themselves as corporate bodies and organisations, rather than employers.

We are on our eighth day in Committee, and we have discussed on a number of occasions the less than benign economic circumstances faced by many businesses, including small businesses. The situation is deteriorating. Pretty much every week, there is worse economic data than one would hope for, particularly for the jobs market and the levels of employment and potential unemployment.

Therefore, anything that the Government do—and certainly this Bill represents a very far-reaching change to the employment relations regime—to make things more difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises, and businesses generally, to employ people should be a cause for concern for Members of your Lordships’ House.

I will briefly go through the amendments. Amendment 224 would qualify the right to time off for union officials with a reasonableness test. I can see that most relationships between employers and union representatives are positive, based on mutual respect and it was ever thus. Therefore, this will not be a problem for the vast bulk of employers. However, when I was a local councillor, I had to rely on the Employment Rights Act 1996 to enforce my right to attend a number of meetings held during the day—in my case, at Ealing Borough Council, although I was an alternate member of the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority, which met across the road at County Hall. As a young working man, it was sometimes very difficult to get time off, and I understand that we went in the right direction in guaranteeing the right to time off. Equally, reasonableness is key, and this amendment speaks to that.

Amendment 225 would qualify the right to the provision of facilities for union officials with an appropriateness test. Again, this reflects a real-world experience of the discrete circumstances affecting a business at the time that the request is made. It might not be appropriate for a business to provide a room, audio-visual facilities or materials. This would be easier for a big company, which has a bespoke budget for HR training et cetera, than for a much smaller commercial entity, which might struggle to provide a similar level of facilities for trade union officials.

Amendments 226, 227 and 228 would reverse the burden of proof in disputes over the reasonableness of requested time off for union activities, and therefore there would be more of a balance for making the case for facilities being provided. I do not want to delay the Committee at this relatively late juncture; the amendments stand on their own merits.

Amendment 229 would qualify the right to time off for union learning representatives, again with a reasonableness test. In past debates, I mentioned my admiration for the Workers’ Educational Association and the great work it did in empowering working people to improve their life and their life chances, which is very important. However, a reasonableness test makes sure that it can be accommodated in a way which will not undermine the commercial viability of a business, while at the same time assisting individual workers and their representatives to deliver education and training outcomes.

Amendment 230 would qualify the right to the provision of facilities for union learning representatives, again with an appropriateness test.

Amendments 231, 232 and 233 would reverse the burden of proof in disputes over the reasonableness of requested time off for union learning representatives. It would be for the union representatives to explain why their request for facilities and learning resources was reasonable rather than the other way round.

These are probing amendments. I know I have said it before, but it bears repetition that these are not wrecking amendments. They do not alter substantially the kernel of the Bill, which is—and I take Ministers on their word—to improve the working lives of people, as in the report, Make Work Pay. I accept that premise and that Ministers sincerely want to do that, but these amendments are an attempt to rebalance between the workforce, their representatives and employers in a fair and equitable way. On that basis, I beg to move Amendment 224.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I oppose the question that Clause 62 should stand part of the Bill, with the intention of removing provisions which compel employers to allow time off for trade union equality reps. To note, I am not opposed to trade union facilities time per se, and I am actually not objecting to Clause 61 in relation to learning reps.

My concern is specifically on the nature of equality as has been interpreted by the trade unions in recent years, the divisive nature of their adherence to identity politics, for example, and the ideologically contentious implementation of prescriptive policies, often setting one group of workers against another. Trade union priorities under the auspices of fighting for equality have been skewed, to say the least.

The wording in this unfeasibly long clause states at subsection (12)(b)(i) that:

“‘equality’, in relation to a workplace, means … the elimination of discrimination, harassment and victimisation … in accordance with the Equality Act 2010”.


You would think I would have nothing to disagree with there, yet, time after time in the last few years, what we have actually seen is the discrimination and victimisation of women workers that has been at best ignored and too often actively abetted by trade unions’ own version of inclusive equality. They have in fact ignored the Equality Act.

Let me use as an example an incident that happened in May 2024 at Epsom and St Helier University Hospital. A black female nurse, Jennifer Melle, indirectly called a six-foot transgender patient “Mister” while on the phone to a consultant. The patient, whom I will call Mr X, was having treatment on the ward, having been transferred from a male prison. He was chained to two guards. Mr X is serving a sentence for luring young boys into sex acts on the internet while pretending to be a woman. For Ms Melle’s alleged misgendering, Mr X, the convict, violently lunged at her, screaming, “Do not call me Mister, I’m an effing woman”, and then called her the N-word, screaming it at her. He of course used the full words in those instances, and he screamed that word at her three times.

After her shift, Jennifer went home shaken but resilient about the reality of unpleasant abuse at work. She was then contacted by her hospital trust. You might think it was a welfare check—but no. There was no mention of support after the racist attack. Instead, she was issued with a written warning, and the trust reported her to the Nursing and Midwifery Council to investigate her fitness to practise, because she posed a risk to the public, it was said, and the reputation of the NHS for not using the patient’s preferred gender identity. Only when Jennifer went public and the story hit the media did the trust say it would investigate the racist abuse. But by then, it had suspended Jennifer for telling her story. Then, they moved her to another hospital, demoted her to a lower grade, and she lost pay et cetera.

Now, I would have assumed that this shocking story would be a huge equality-at-work story for the trade union movement to take up: an ethnic minority female, a front-line health worker, a victim of explicit racist harassment and male violence, all over the papers, and then gross discriminatory employer behaviour. But no, not a dicky bird: a deafening silence in the nursing unions and the TUC. Maybe Nurse Jennifer was, as an open evangelical Christian, rather than a trade unionist, the wrong kind of victim.

Recently, we heard that another nurse, Sandie Peggie, a Royal College of Nursing member for 30 years, has been forced to sue her union for its failure to support her or provide legal assistance when she was suspended by NHS Fife. Her crime was that she challenged the presence of Dr Beth Upton, a biological man, in the women-only changing rooms at Victoria Hospital, Kirkcaldy. That Nurse Peggie’s legal action is necessary should shame the trade union movement. As Mrs Peggie’s solicitor, Margaret Gribbon, explained, her client expected the union to

“exercise its industrial muscle to challenge the decision which was adversely impacting her and other female union members”.

She alleged that she

“spoke to the union about the issue of single-sex spaces in February last year”.

In relation to this amendment, how can we mandate employers to provide generous facility time for trade union equalities work with such a risible attitude to the real-life attacks on equality at work, as evidenced? When Nurse Peggie is forced to take legal action to get justice from her own union, I am not sure I want any more union equality officers. Susan Smith, of the For Women Scotland organisation that brought the successful Supreme Court action, notes:

“We imagine this is likely to be first of many such cases. Sadly, it seems that only financial penalties will persuade the unions to step up, do their job, and represent women in the workplace”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am very happy with that and I apologise if I have misunderstood the point that the noble Baroness was trying to make. This has been a fascinating debate but, in the interests of time, I want us to make progress and finish.

Amendment 237 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The Government resist this amendment, which unnecessarily asks the Government to conduct a sectoral cost assessment of trade union facility time. We strongly dispute the notion that facility time represents a significant cost to employers. We have already conducted an impact assessment that covers the measures in the Bill. This assessment noted that the cost of facility time is not likely to be significant for particular employers. Instead, it could benefit business performance in the form of increased worker training and support greater worker retention through a reduction in dismissals and voluntary exits.

It is worth noting that the estimated percentage of public sector pay bills spent on facility time in the first year of reporting regulations that were enforced in 2017-18 was 0.07%, and that, for the 2023-24 reporting year, the figure was 0.06%. That suggests a minimal impact of facility time in the public sector. Before I turn to Amendment 333, it is worth saying that we expect further savings from the Exchequer resulting from more positive industrial relations, which come about through greater facility time. For instance, we expect enhanced facility time to result in a reduction in the number of disputes going to an employment tribunal. This again makes the point that more harmonious workforces are more productive workforces.

Amendment 333 was also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. Again, the Government strongly dispute the notion that facility time represents a significant cost to employers and we have already conducted an impact assessment covering the measures in the Bill. The amendment is therefore not necessary and would simply delay the implementation of this clause and the benefits that equality representatives would bring.

I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, to withdraw Amendment 224 and I hope that noble Lords agree that Clause 62 has a rightful place in the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 224 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, for bringing this into our debate but, candidly, his Amendment 240 is truly extraordinary. The only success Flying Pickets had was a number one in 1983 with the single “Only You”—and, by the way, that was a copy from the great band Yazoo. The idea that we would go back to flying pickets is just extraordinary.

Some 45 years on, no sensible Labour Peer has put this forward until tonight. I genuinely find it astonishing that we are here still debating the idea that it is democracy for a strike to be called somewhere else all of a sudden and for you to go off somewhere else for a dispute you are not part of.

While I appreciate the erudite speech we have heard tonight, going back to the real substance and principle of this, this is an important Bill. I do not agree with a lot of it, but I find it extraordinary that we are going back in time when this country actually needs to move forward in modern industrial relations. I regret the amendments that have been tabled today.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak against this amendment very briefly. I agree wholly with my noble friend Lady Coffey. I also agree that the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was very persuasive, compelling, detailed and comprehensive, but completely wrong. It would be a disaster for our country if we were to go back to the era of Saltley coke works, Grunwick, the disaster inflicted on the automotive industry, flying pickets and the closed shop.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

The uncollected rubbish of Birmingham must be a ghastly historical aberration. However, this legislation, if it is unamended, threatens to turn the bins of Birmingham into an augury of the future and create a new norm. The nation deserves better. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment so eloquently moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. There is not much more to add, but I will try. I also put my name to the amendment.

I thought we had gone past the stage where we look back at history and do not learn its lessons on protecting the franchise and the ballot in sensitive elections. There are no more sensitive elections than workplace elections, on which people’s very livelihood, careers, family and income depend.

I take your Lordships’ Committee back to February 1834. Colleagues on the other side of the Chamber will be aware that in 1833 agricultural workers in the village of Tolpuddle in Dorset quite rightly formed a union to fight wage cuts. The following year they were arrested, arraigned, found guilty and transported not because they had administered oaths, which was the official reason for their incarceration, but because they assembled as a group. The point is that they did not have a secret ballot. They had an open meeting to form the union and a strategy for fighting those wage cuts, and they were betrayed by two union members. If you talk to Unite the Union and GMB, there is nothing new under the sun.

That said, the point was they did not have a secret ballot. One reason that the unions have evolved in a positive way over many years—hitherto, until we reached this Bill—is that we have had that workplace democracy, unlike in the bad old days of the 1970s and before, where people were pressured to join a union in the closed shop and sometimes pressured to support industrial action which was uncalled for and damaging both to their own jobs and to the business generally, as we saw, for instance, in 1984 with the miners’ strike. Amendments 247 and 248 tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral are very sensible. I would say: be careful what you wish for, because there is another historical example, although noble Lords on the other side may resile from it. The Jim Crow laws in the southern part of the United States existed for many years post-reconstruction in 1865. That they marginalised, traduced and undermined the right of black people, of African Americans, to vote was, in effect, because they did not have a secret ballot and had to register, and there were many legal impediments to them voting.

We respect the integrity of the secret ballot. We would not dream of asking local councillors, parish councillors, borough councillors, county councillors and certainly not Members of Parliament to seek election on the basis that their electorate would be corralled into voting a certain way and there would not be a secret ballot. That is as it should be and as it has been for modern times, and it is correct. Why are we now going back to a potential era of bullying, harassment and attacking people who may not support the union line? Give people a chance to think, reflect and choose the right way for not just themselves and their families but their union by means of a secret ballot. For those reasons I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment, and I hope the Minister will give it due regard.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I oppose this group of amendments. I have to say that it is with deep regret, because my assessment of them is that they are trying to stir up a spectre of trade union intimidation, which reminds me strongly of the initiative going back in history—not quite as far as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson—to 2014, when the Government commissioned Bruce Carr QC, as he was then, to conduct an investigation of intimidation in workplaces. As it transpired, Mr Carr declined all opportunities to make any recommendations whatever on the basis of the evidence that he received. For the TUC’s part—and I was at the helm at the time—we described it as a party-political stunt and said that, frankly, the then Conservative Party in government should have repaid the taxpayer for the significant cost of conducting that investigation that led to zero—I repeat, zero—recommendations for changes in the law. In fact, Mr Carr went on just a year or two later to oppose the then Conservative Government’s Trade Union Bill as “a threat” to industrial relations and to civil liberties.

That brings me to safe and secure e-balloting. It seems to me that anybody who was a true democrat would be looking to increase opportunities for participation in safe, secure, secret and electronic balloting. Any boost to democracy should be welcome. I have to say that it is disappointing that those who oppose the right for trade unionists to cast their vote safely, securely and secretly by electronic ballot apparently believe that there is no threat of intimidation in respect of political parties. Therefore, it is fine for political parties to use modern methods of balloting; it is not fine for trade unionists. I would ask what view that gives us of the perception of trade unions from the Benches opposite, when, on the contrary, we should be proud of trade unions. We should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms of industrial action. We should be proud of constructive industrial relations in this country, which are vital for productivity and growth.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I support the lead amendment in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom to exempt a new Government, for up to three years, from the labour market enforcement strategy of their predecessor for the reasons set out so ably by my noble friend Lord Hunt. I also support Amendments 274 and 278 for a new clause after Clause 140 to review the effectiveness of enforcement and compliance with relevant labour market requirements as in Part 1 of Schedule 7 before the new agency is set up and for the costing of such a new body before it is set up.

The new fair work agency proposed by the Bill to bring together existing functions of enforcement is unknown territory. Today, to enforce a limited number of employment rights, official powers are used by four different agencies: the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, HMRC and the Health and Safety Executive. The proposed new fair work agency bundles these—and new responsibilities under the Bill—into a single, untried and untested body. In general employers are quite familiar with HMRC and HSE, which provide advice as well as having enforcement functions. At the moment, we have the benefit of experienced bodies with whom employers are familiar and an ability by each body to be precise and knowledgeable about the subject on which it is an enforcement officer. We also have the advantage of different horses for different courses. Now, the plan is to move to an unknown, inexperienced entity with all the start-up costs that entails and without the precision focus which the present bodies have, because what is proposed is a one-size-fits-all model.

The enforcement of the laws will be differently framed with different aims by the current bodies. GLAA will have a different focus to that of HMRC, although some of the functions may overlap. I therefore suggest, in the interest of the taxpayer, that there is a need for a costing of the new body before it is set up and for a review of the effectiveness of the outcomes of present arrangements for enforcement and compliance to see how they stack up. This should be done before any steps are taken to put in place a new body. For these reasons, I heartily support Amendments 274 and 278.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak on the issue of the labour market enforcement strategy in support of Amendment 274 to which I have appended my name and to build on the excellent remarks of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and the specific points raised by my noble friend Lady Lawlor. For transparency, I declare that I have been a member of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development for more than 20 years. The CIPD estimates that the People Skills HR support service which it has mooted, working with ACAS, would cost about £13 million under the new regime when this Bill becomes an Act. We already know, following on from my noble friend’s comments, that the cumulative cost of the existing bodies doing similar work, with analogous workstreams, is about £40 million.

Amendment 274 is important because in this country we have a strange anomaly. Unusually for an advanced country, we generally do not put the architecture of scrutiny and oversight in primary legislation. I want to know how this agency is going to be accountable in terms of the costs, who it employs, its policies et cetera. No doubt the Minister will say, “Well, once it becomes an Act, there will be what was the Business Select Committee, or there might be the National Audit Office, or there might be the Public Accounts Committee”. But we are being asked to sign a blank cheque for this without knowing how precisely this agency is going to operate and, most fundamentally, at what cost. We have not seen a detailed impact assessment focusing on the work of this body. On that basis, I ask the Minister specifically how he sees the process of accountability working and whether there will be any work by his department, and Ministers more generally, to work out what the costs are likely to be.

I accept at face value that this Government are committed to reducing the regulatory burden, particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Leong, will bend the Minister’s ear on that, having come from the background that he came from as a champion of small businesses from the Labour side. It is therefore not unreasonable for us to ask what the cost will be and how we will be able to hold this agency to account once it is established.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 277 and 328, which I expect the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, to speak to shortly, are an interesting element. Amendment 277 talks about the review of the fair work agency. Considering that a number of questions have come up about this, that is a fair assessment, given that there is still a considerable amount of consultation to be done. Amendment 328 would basically strip out the commencement of any part of the Act until that review has been done and

“a Minister of the Crown has tabled a motion in both Houses of Parliament for debate … and the review has been approved by a resolution”—

not just regulations.

The reason I say this is that I continue to assert that some of the powers here are going to be novel. Even if the Equality Act 2006 may give powers to the EHRC, it has never used them to institute legal proceedings, only as an intervener or for judicial review, rather than taking on individual cases; I am conscious that there is a consultation there. The amendment from the Liberal Democrats is an interesting way to think about how we are looking at the details of what the new agency is going to do.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 95 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I will speak to the significant number of amendments in this group in my name. This is quite an interesting cornucopia of amendments, a number of which are, in essence, probing amendments. The very nature of the work we are undertaking is to look at the minutiae of the Bill and to see it through the prism of how it impacts on small businesses. It is very important, when we consider the fair work agency’s powers, that we look at the Bill’s real-world ramifications and consequences.

Although some of the amendments may seem somewhat obscure, I think they are nevertheless quite compelling and worthy of the Minister’s attention. In addition, the Clause 95 stand part notice is in my name; I will come to that shortly. I also have a more substantive amendment near the end of the group on a duty on the UK border agency and the new enforcement agency, the fair work agency, to collaborate or co-operate.

I begin by considering the clause stand part notice. I remind noble Lords that, ostensibly, Clause 95 circumscribes the powers available in respect of using a warrant to enter a dwelling. On the face of it, the clause looks pretty innocuous, but I do not think it should be in the Bill because its wording is quite loose and opaque. I have serious concerns about the use of permissive, wide-ranging powers, particularly in subsection (3)(b), which says

“that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the documents or equipment”.

Further, paragraph (d) says

“that the purpose of entry may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless an enforcement officer arriving at the dwelling can secure immediate entry to it”.

I would like to interrogate the Minister’s perception and interpretation of these powers. For the avoidance of doubt, I think that the question of whether this clause should stand part of the Bill is worthy of our consideration. Although, of course, it was not considered by the statutory instruments committee—the name of which escapes me—to be a particularly egregious example of permissive or Henry VIII powers, I nevertheless think that it could be misconstrued.

I will now consider the other amendments in my name. Amendment 273A would require the Secretary of State to have “an evidential basis” for believing that a labour market offence is being or has been committed in order to request an LME undertaking, as opposed to requiring merely that the Secretary of State “believes” this to be the case. This amendment is important because what I am attempting to define more clearly the limits of the powers being conferred—in other words, to make it explicit that there has to be a firm evidential basis for exercising those powers. We do not want a situation in which the Secretary of State may do as he wishes as long as he pleads that he believed an offence was being committed.

I am not a lawyer, but I make reference to powers being conferred on a Minister based on subjective jurisdictional criteria. Let us look at—I am sure that the Minister will be advised of this—Customs and Excise Commissioners v Cure & Deeley Ltd 1962, in which it was found that Parliament would never presume on courts adopting a particular approach to statutory construction, especially when it comes to the subtleties of administrative law. I think that this reasonable and rational amendment would tighten up the wording.

Moving on, Amendment 273B would mean that the Secretary of State could impose a prohibition, restriction or requirement as an LME undertaking only where they considered it “proportionate” as well as “just and reasonable”. The test of proportionality is, of course, at the heart of adjudication and the justice system; it is the bread and butter of administrative decision-making, especially in respect of our human rights regime. It is good practice to have statute clear in order to direct Ministers to undertake the kind of judgments which the legal framework will impose on them anyway, and which otherwise will have to be communicated by the production of additional guidance material. That is the basis for that amendment.

Amendment 273C would reduce the maximum period for which an LME measure can have effect from two years to one year. This is a practical amendment, because there is no obvious reason why any necessary measures cannot be imposed and changes expedited within 12 months. It is better, for one thing, that a business falling foul of standards should be made to get its house in order quickly and to be compliant with any LME measure within a reasonable space of time. We are talking not about a month but about 12 months; I think that is a reasonable reduction from two years. It is also better for the economy, public expenditure and Civil Service efficiency to have a shorter timescale.

Amendment 273 would require the Secretary of State to bring the end of the LME measures to the attention of “all” other persons likely to be interested in the matter, rather than “any” such persons, and the subject of the measures. This is clearly straightforward. If you are in a business, you will have multiple partners, directors or people with a significant interest in the business. Therefore, to avoid bureaucratic mistakes and errors, I think it is fair to involve as many people as practicable.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. I am trying to follow the noble Lord’s arguments, but I think Amendment 273 is in a different group.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving me the opportunity to clarify where I am: it is Amendment 273D. My apologies if I have not been clear enough.

This amendment would make a small clarifying adjustment: where the text currently says that the Secretary of State must take whatever steps she or he considers appropriate to bring the end of LME measures to the attention of

“any other persons likely to be interested in the matter”—

that is, other than the subject of the measures—it would use the words “all other persons”. It is important for business certainty, good faith and, indeed, fairness that all those who are affected or likely to be affected by a quite significant measure are kept properly informed about it. Otherwise, we may see messy episodes unfold where there is a misunderstanding or extra, hidden penalties imposed on businesses in the form of the costs of informing the other people affected by the LME measure that it has, for instance, come to an end.

Amendment 273E to Clause 119 would require notice of LMEs against a partnership to be given to “all partners”, rather than just “any partner”. This does not reflect what running a business with multiple partners is like, perhaps in multiple locations or running multiple business units as partners, whether it is an accountancy firm, solicitors or others—I know that there is a different regime for solicitors. It is not sensible to advise only one partner of a significant infraction or issue arising from an LME. If you want businesses to co-operate in ameliorating the issues identified in the LME, you would really need—I admit, at some modest cost—to advise all the partners. You need also to cultivate good faith in order to make the changes necessary arising from the LME.

Furthermore, it is possible that the courts will decide that notice has been given as a matter of law in circumstances where the one partner who was theoretically served it had not actually seen it and was not subjectively aware of it. Better, then, to require that all partners be given notice to ensure that businesses are genuinely aware of the ramifications and the LME decisions.

I am mindful of the time, so I will move with greater alacrity. Amendment 273F would increase the proposed burden of proof for court orders of LME measures from balance of probabilities to beyond reasonable doubt. There is reason to fear that a future Government will use the provision of Clause 117(3), which empowers the Secretary of State to create new kinds of LME measures by regulation, to create measures which go beyond regulation and become punitive, in which case the criminal proof standard will be appropriate. More generally, good faith between businesses and government, which aids compliance, will be better cultivated if they are required to comply with LME measures only in cases where there has been a clear violation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords I thank noble Lords who have spoken. I am responding to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe, Lord Hunt and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, who have tabled amendments on the powers of the fair work agency and oppose Clauses 95 and 134.

I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that some of his amendments are probing amendments. I will attempt to respond to each in turn. Forgive me if I repeat some points that my noble friend Lord Katz made in the previous debate, which covered similar ground. I think we covered some of this ground in debates on a previous day. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that I have no need to justify the unjustifiable in my response.

I will speak first to the fair work agency’s investigatory powers and address the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, to Clause 95. I listened to the noble Lord, but investigatory powers are common to all regulators. The fair work agency’s powers are based on those set out for existing enforcement bodies in the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Employment rights enforcement agencies have had power to enter premises used as dwellings since their inception. For example, HMRC’s minimum wage inspectors can and do regularly visit business premises used as dwellings to gather evidence. It is right that officers should be able to gather evidence from such premises. Businesses operating from premises used as dwellings is nothing new. Pubs, for example, often have flats above the public area where the business’s documentation is kept.

Today, more and more businesses operate from home. Current law makes no distinction for dwellings. This Government believe in stronger safeguards for such powers. That is why Clause 95 introduces a new requirement for a warrant to enter dwellings. Together with the additional safeguards in Clause 128 and Schedule 8, this clause strikes the right balance between protecting the privacy and rights of individuals and allowing the fair work agency to go about its job of enforcing labour market legislation. I hope that I have reassured noble Lords on this point, and that noble Lords can agree that Clause 95 should stand part of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, also addressed his amendments to Clause 128. I recognise the intent behind these amendments, but there are already extensive safeguards around the use of investigatory powers in Part 5, including the new requirement for a warrant when entering a dwelling. Clause 128 is a sensible provision that sets out that any enforcement officer has the right to execute a warrant and, as long as the enforcement officer is present, they can be accompanied by an authorised person or persons if they deem it relevant to the investigation—for example, an IT specialist.

Turning to Amendment 271ZC from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, enforcement of holiday pay is a key part of the fair work agency’s remit. Large numbers of workers are missing out on their statutory right to paid annual leave. The Trade Union Congress estimates that 2 million people lose around £3 billion per year by not receiving holiday pay to which they are entitled. We recognise that this disproportionately affects the lowest-paid workers. The fair work agency will not be able to meaningfully support workers to recover the holiday pay they are owed if it cannot issue notices of underpayment. This is a power that is already available in the national minimum wage enforcement regime, which has been successful in ensuring that workers receive the arrears that they are owed. Therefore, I must respectfully resist this amendment.

I turn now to the amendments to Clauses 116 to 121 inclusive, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Jackson, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, together with the amendments to Clauses 126 and 136. These pertain to the labour market enforcement undertakings and orders regime. Although these amendments touch on important aspects of the Bill, they either duplicate existing provisions and introduce unnecessary complexity, or risk undermining the careful balance that has already been struck in the drafting. The labour market enforcement regime was introduced by the 2015 to 2017 Conservative Government. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, at that time in the other place, voted in favour of this regime consistently during the passage of the Immigration Act 2016.

It is a regime that works and works well. It promotes a compliance-first approach, as employers are first encouraged to enter into voluntary undertakings to correct their behaviour. Only persistent or egregious offenders are issued with a compulsory order to stop. As of March 2024, there have been 140 labour market enforcement undertakings and just 14 labour market enforcement orders. These amendments seek to water down the regime and increase legal tests and administrative burdens for its use. By making the labour market enforcement regime more cumbersome and less effective, the fair work agency would have to resort more often to prosecution, which could be disproportionate and time-consuming for all concerned. The effects of these amendments would be to make enforcement more heavy-handed, less efficient and less focused on helping businesses to comply. This is not what businesses or workers want or need, and it is not what the fair work agency is about.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I hear what the Minister says, but surely she would agree that, if one looks at Amendment 273F, which moves from having “a balance of probabilities” to “beyond reasonable doubt”, if you are taking forward an LME infraction case beyond reasonable doubt, you are more likely to succeed, and the corollary of that is that you are not taking forward cases on which you have a paucity of evidence. So, with all due respect to the noble Baroness, I disagree. If you are bringing in proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, you are going to have sharper cases that tackle the most egregious examples of infractions of the legislation and do not waste a lot of time—and consequently save the taxpayer money.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The evidence shows that the current wording is proportionate. There has not been a huge number of cases. Maybe we could argue about whether there should be more cases, but the fact that there has not been a huge number of cases is a reflection of that. What we do not want to do is set the barrier so high that we cannot take the cases that are necessary to deliver the changes and the better worker protection that we seek to achieve.

I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273N. I agree that effective sharing of information and pooling of knowledge will be crucial to the success of the fair work agency. The list of bodies that the agency will be able to share information with is limited to those with a need for access, and safeguards are provided for. However, the power to update the list is necessary to ensure that the fair work agency can respond to future changes in the wider labour market and the regulatory landscape. It means that we can keep the list of bodies under review and remove bodies where the need to share information no longer applies. This is good data information governance.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked about the Low Pay Commission being listed. The fair work agency will be able to share information with the bodies in Schedule 9 if it is for the purposes of a function of the body. This does not need to be about the enforcement functions. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed no concern with this power in its report on the Bill.

On the opposition of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to Clause 134, HMRC data is critical for investigating and enforcing various employment rights, not just the national minimum wage. However, I say to the noble Baroness that much of HMRC’s data is confidential, and it is therefore prudent to require an extra level of approval before this information is shared further.

Clause 134 restricts the sharing of confidential HMRC data without authorisation from HMRC commissioners. This will ensure that the fair work agency operates in line with the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act. This is a standard safeguard which is necessary to ensure responsible data sharing between HMRC and the fair work agency.

In relation to Amendment 273PB from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, I reassure him that the Bill already gives the Secretary of State the power to share information with border authorities, such as the National Crime Agency and immigration officers. Rather than enhancing enforcement, the amendment risks introducing unnecessary complexity and diverting attention away from the fair work agency’s core task. The amendment’s intended effect can be achieved through the existing Bill drafting.

I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273R to Clause 140. The ability to recover enforcement costs in relation to the time spent is a matter of fairness. Restricting the use of hourly rates would in practice force the fair work agency to adopt fixed fees. A fixed approach to cost recovery could mean that a small business ended up paying the same as a much larger organisation, regardless of the scale or complexity of the case, and that is not fair. This clause is an enabling power. Regulations made under it will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Parliament will be able to scrutinise and debate whether to adopt a fixed-fee or variable-fee regime at the point where the regime is proposed, and it is right that we afford that flexibility in design at this stage.

In conclusion, while I appreciate the intention behind the amendments, they either replicate what is already achieved by the Bill’s existing provisions or risk unsettling a framework that has already been carefully constructed. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, not to press Amendment 271ZC.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive canter through my amendments. I defer to the poetic licence of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and accept that it is not a cornucopia, but my cup overfloweth nevertheless.

I appreciate the spirit in which the amendments were received. I was attempting to improve the Bill. Not for the first time, my noble friend Lord Hunt put it much more succinctly than I did in that, certainly with regard to proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, notwithstanding the excellent drafting by officials, the amendments would have improved the Bill.

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[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, I support the comments made, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. This is an extraordinary clause; I am not aware of anything else on the statute book like it.

My practical question to the Minister is: if the Secretary of State takes it upon himself or herself to go to court on a worker’s behalf, and the worker is strongly against that, what will that do to the relationship between the worker and the employer? It could absolutely devastate that relationship, because the employer will greatly resent the fact that the Secretary of State is taking proceedings on behalf of the worker, even if the worker has said that they do not want those proceedings brought. This is not good for industrial relations at all.

I really urge the Government to rethink this. What are its practical implications? How will it work in practice if the worker is against it? Will they be called as a witness by the Secretary of State, if necessary? Will they then be a hostile witness? It is all a complete and utter mess, I am afraid. I was not planning to speak on this, but this is an extraordinary clause and I urge Ministers to drop it completely.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I was happy to sign the clause stand part notice with my noble friend Lady Coffey. I am thinking of the words of Zhou Enlai, I think, who, considering the French Revolution, said, “What did they mean by that?” I look at this clause and think, “What do they mean by this?” Maybe the Minister will open the trinket box at the end of this process and let us into the secret of this bizarre, perverse clause, but I really cannot see the point of it.

I am mindful of the fact that we are surrounded by very accomplished lawyers, so I will not get too much into law, but lawyers and others will be aware that Magna Carta—1215; I know the noble Lord, Lord Katz, likes a history lesson occasionally in Committee—resiled from the arbitrary power of the state. It is an arbitrary power of the state for it to insert itself into civil litigation without any real methodological basis, any timeline or, as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth so rightly said, any tests being met. That is very odd.

Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us as to the rationale. The clause is novel. It is completely perverse and unheard of, to be quite honest, because it will engender a disputatious regime, more litigation and more disputes in the workplace. It will have a deleterious effect on business, commerce and profitability, and on how businesses are run. What tests will the Minister use? How likely is it that these powers will be used and at what likely cost? Is there any impact assessment or opportunity cost as to the use of these powers?

Why does subsection (2) leave agricultural workers out of the process? There may be a specific sectoral reason for that, but that is a reasonable question to ask. Why are they not swept up in these powers? Why are their rights not circumscribed to not get involved in civil litigation in respect of employment?

Finally, the most bonkers part of a truly epically bonkers clause is subsection (7). It is so crazy that it could have been written by the Liberal Democrats, but it would be unkind to make such an observation. My noble friend Lady Coffey has already made the point that you do not even have to be a worker to have the Secretary of State impose themselves into your potential litigation on a matter; you can be someone seeking employment as a worker. Presumably, anyone who is of working age can be affected by this clause. Subsection (7) also states that a worker is defined more widely as an individual who is a worker for the purposes of Part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

I really do not understand the rationale for or the logic behind this clause. The Minister is clearly aware of the great disquiet that it gives rise to, and I hope she answers the specific points made, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. It takes something for a noble Lord of his experience in the law to say that this is the most perverse and strangest clause he has seen in a piece of primary legislation. On that basis, I hope the Minister will respond to that and answer those specific points that noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, have raised.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in some of the amendments in this group, and my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough in their opposition to Clause 113, which I must describe—much as the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, did—as quite extraordinary. It is extraordinary because it grants the Secretary of State exceptional powers—namely, the ability to initiate proceedings before an employment tribunal on behalf of a worker without that worker’s consent or even their knowledge. How can this be right? If a worker has chosen not to pursue a claim, whatever their reasons, how can the state reasonably step in and proceed in their name? Unlike my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, I am no lawyer, but I think this demonstrates the need for Amendment 271D.

Consent is a fundamental principle in so many aspects of law and life, yet here it appears to be disregarded. Amendment 272ZZA at the very least seeks to restore some balance by ensuring that the worker in question is given the opportunity to consent or decline. If consent is not given, the matter should go no further: all bets should be off. I find it puzzling that those on the Benches opposite consider it appropriate to have the ability to disclose personal data, whether legally privileged or not, without the written consent of the individual concerned. It is not typically something permitted in other circumstances. It is not fair, and we are about fairness in this House.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

As the noble Lord has more legal expertise than me, I am happy to write to him on that point because it is an important point that we need to clarify. Of course, these are relatively new powers that we are taking on board, and we are taking them for very good reasons. I am sorry that noble Lords opposite do not see the case for this, because, certainly, an awful lot of workers are being exploited out there. At the moment, they do not have the power to speak for themselves in the way that many others who are better informed can do.

While I respect the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, behind some of his amendments, I must state they are unnecessary. Some of the provisions of the amendments are already provided for, either within the existing drafting of the specific clauses or in other clauses of the Bill. Regarding Amendments 271D, 272ZZA and 272ZZD, as I mentioned on Monday, normal practice would be for the Secretary of State to bring proceedings with a worker’s consent and involvement. However, in the worst cases of serious exploitation and intimidation, workers may fear the repercussions that they may face from their employer should they be de-anonymised. By allowing the Secretary of State to take a case forward without consent, it would be harder for employers to attribute blame to individual employees. Therefore, limiting this power in the way that these amendments seek to do could prevent the Secretary of State pursuing serious breaches in some of the most egregious cases.

Amendment 272ZZB is an unnecessary amendment. Legally privileged material and confidential information is already protected under the Data Protection Act, as well as under usual legal rules and principles that apply to proceedings.

On Amendment 272ZZC, normal public law principles already take account of all considerations referenced in this amendment, including the best interests of a worker. This is therefore another unnecessary amendment.

Amendment 272ZZE is yet another unnecessary amendment. Clause 113(6) does not provide a blanket exclusion from all liability, and it is self-evident that the Secretary of State would be held accountable if they undertook actions that were unlawful. This is a basic principle of the rule of law.

On Amendment 272ZC, it is clearly in the interests of enforcement authorities and all parties that the most effective and proportionate means of enforcement is chosen. The Bill already provides that civil proceedings cannot be initiated where a notice of underpayment has been given. It would be inappropriate to impose hurdles on the fair work agency’s use of its powers; it should be able to decide how best it will use this and its other powers to enforce labour market legislation in each case.

On Amendment 272AA, Clause 92 already provides for the fair work agency to prepare and publish an annual report, which we would expect to cover all of its activities. It is simply not necessary to require individual reports on individual powers.

We strongly resist Amendment 272AB. Ultimately, the business of the next Parliament should be for that Parliament to decide and not for us to dictate now.

Briefly on Amendment 272AC, only officers with appropriate knowledge and training will carry out these powers. Clause 87(6) already clearly provides that a person can exercise the powers of an enforcement officer only to the extent specified in their appointment by the Secretary of State. This amendment would duplicate that existing provision.

To summarise, Clause 113, together with Clauses 114 and 115, delivers a manifesto commitment. It provides a new power that will enable fair work agency enforcement officers to bring proceedings to an employment tribunal in place of a worker. It is designed to address situations where a worker has a legal right to bring a claim but, for various reasons, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers, they are unable to do so. This clause enhances the state’s ability to support the most vulnerable workers in accessing justice and will be particularly valuable in cases involving labour exploitation or breaches of minimum employment standards.

It will bring broader benefits. The fair work agency will be able to bring multiple complaints simultaneously. This will save time and costs for workers and employers alike. It has the potential to reduce the burden on the employment tribunal system over current practices, where most claims are brought individually.

Importantly, the clause is tightly drawn. The fair work agency’s tribunal proceedings will follow the same process as if they were brought by workers. This includes a requirement for ACAS consultation. Additionally, the power cannot be used in cases where a notice of underpayment has been issued under Section 100. This ensures that there is no duplication of enforcement mechanisms. Both the Secretary of State and the worker can appeal a decision, recognising that both parties have a legitimate interest in the outcome. The clause includes safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot be held liable to the worker for how they exercise this power, reflecting the discretionary and strategic nature of enforcement.

This clause forms a crucial part of the fair work agency’s toolkit, enhances the effectiveness of labour market enforcement and delivers a manifesto commitment upon which Members in the other place were elected. It should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister, and she did not address either of my specific points. Given that she is saying that this rather strange clause is to defend the interests of new migrants and black and minority-ethnic folk, many of whom work in agriculture, particularly in the east of England and other parts of the UK, why is there a carve-out for agricultural workers? The Minister did not answer my question on why that happened. Secondly, can I press her on my specific point on why de facto unemployed people fall under the purview of subsection (7) of this clause, allowing the Secretary of State to insert state apparatus into their litigation, when they are not even in gainful employment?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. My apologies; I should have answered both of those questions. On the issue of agricultural workers, I do not know the answer, so I will write to the noble Lord. On his question about why subsection (7) covers people who are not yet employed, the clause was worded in that way to capture whistleblowers and was amended to widen it to include zero-hours contract workers. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, in this group of amendments, I have the stand part notice for Clause 114. I support the several amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lady Coffey, many of which are probing amendments to try to find out more about this clause. I could find no clear rationale that the Government have given for Clause 114, in the sense of providing a rationale for the state—that is to say, taxpayers—funding the legal and other costs of civil proceedings in employment matters cases.

The scope of Clause 114 is huge. Not only does it cover the whole of employment, trade union and labour relations law, but the intended recipients seem to be unlimited. My noble friend Lady Coffey referred to the use of “person”. Subsection (1) refers to

“a person who is or may become party to civil proceedings”,

which covers a huge number of persons, and there does not seem to be any clear target for this clause. Of course, as we have heard, the funding can also extend to litigation involving non-employment matters, which seems extraordinary to me. All of this adds up to Clause 114 being very wide.

We already have in the UK a system for providing support for people in legal cases. It is called legal aid. It costs the taxpayer around £2 billion a year, nearly half of which is for civil litigation. That already has rules for employment tribunal support, where there is no funding for legal representation but there may be funding for advice on preparing cases. Successive Governments have had to make hard choices about what will be funded by legal aid in order to keep the cost of it within reasonable bounds for taxpayers as a whole but, now, with Clause 114, the business department is going to undermine that completely by taking powers to fund legal cases completely outside of the structures and limits that have been created for the legal aid system. The Government are again showing that they are, at heart, a two-tier Government, with unlimited legal aid by the backdoor for some favoured employment cases but tough eligibility criteria and financial limits for everybody else.

I now turn to the costings, which my noble friend Lady Coffey mentioned briefly. I could not find out what Clause 114 is going to cost. There is a limited amount of information in the paperwork that surrounds the Bill on the estimate of the overall costs for the fair work agency but, as far as I could find, there is no reference to how much the implementation of this proposal to fund legal costs will be within that totality. So my question to the Minister is really quite simple: what are the Government’s estimates of what Clause 114 will cost?

Going beyond that into the underlying assumptions, how many cases do the Government expect to bankroll every year? Will the Government support only cases with a better than average chance of success, or will they also fund no-hopers? What is the average cost of the cases that they think they will fund using the powers under Clause 114? What are their assumptions about cost recovery? I would have expected to find all these things analysed in detail somewhere in the papers, but I could not find anything. I hope the Minister will be able to answer these specific questions, and maybe also explain the lack of analysis in the documentation that the Government have prepared surrounding the Bill so far.

As I said earlier, I support my noble friend Lady Coffey’s amendments in this group, and I will listen carefully to what the Minister says in response to those amendments and, indeed, on Clause 114 standing part overall. My view is that, in the absence of good justification and a good understanding of the costs of Clause 114, it should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I commend my noble friends’ excellent speeches on this clause. I press the Minister on what the Explanatory Notes say about subsection (4), because we have talked about the concept of persons and what that actually means. My noble friend spoke earlier about ministerial powers and the lack of information on costs, which should have been in a proper and more detailed impact assessment but is not. It is not in any supporting material, including the Labour Party manifesto for the general election. Presumably, the Minister will say that such information about the form and function of the clause will be developed in secondary legislation.

The sentence in the Explanatory Notes about subsection (4) is extraordinary, because it touches on what is potentially ultra vires and will certainly, I think, be subject to litigation or judicial review. Given that this is an Employment Rights Bill about labour relations and employment, it says:

“Subsection (4) makes provision for situations where proceedings relate partly to employment or trade union law … and partly to other matters”.


I just do not understand what those other matters can be. This is an employment law Bill. It is about labour relations and the relationships between employers, trade unions and a workforce. What other matters are within the bailiwick of Clause 114? I think we need to press the Minister on that, because we are being invited to give a blank cheque with taxpayers’ money to something that is very opaque, we do not understand, is not costed and is not detailed. On that basis, the Minister should address those specific issues.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Coffey, Lady Noakes and Lord Jackson of Peterborough for some penetrating questions about the power to provide legal assistance as set out in Clause 114. First, I would like the Minister to share with us what discussions have been held with the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice. A number of the points made by my noble friends relate to the fact that legal aid is already available in certain circumstances, so what is this all about and, as my noble friend Lady Coffey asked, who is this going to benefit?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I must press the Minister. I have looked at the Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay document and it does not make reference to de facto legal aid. It says:

“We will also consider measures to provide accessible and authoritative information for people on their employment status and what rights they are owed, tackling instances where some employers can use complexity to avoid legal obligations”.


That is very different to what the Minister has outlined to your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to extend the debate too much or do too much quoting across the Dispatch Box but, to counter that, Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay talks about establishing a single enforcement body that

“will have the powers it needs to undertake targeted and proactive enforcement work and bring civil proceedings upholding employment rights”.

To a fair-minded person that is pretty clear.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

This kind of approach could be a very positive development. We could finally get a bit closer to achieving that dream made in Dagenham nearly 75 years ago, and closer to achieving equal pay for equal work. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this amendment. It is quite an ingenious and intelligent amendment that is quite superficially attractive. I know the Minister will give it proper and due consideration.

My only problem is that it draws an analogy that does not really stand up to close scrutiny. I defer to the noble Baroness’ greater legal expertise, but when you are employed, there is a personal contract between the employee and the employer that you have freely entered into. It may be that, in the course of that contract, your pay falls behind and there are societal and economic reasons why you are paid different amounts of money. We could be here all week discussing that.

However, it is not the same as the relationship you have with a nuclear power station, where you have the expectation that you will be kept safe from accidents and drastic events; with your local water authority and the expectation that you will not be flooded; or when you go on an aeroplane that, God forbid, that aeroplane will not crash. You do not have that direct contractual relationship with those bodies. In other words, you essentially defer that responsibility legally to other bodies to intercede on your behalf. Therefore, this amendment, in a circuitous way, undermines the very concept of a one-on-one contractual relationship, so I do not think it is analogous.

Having said that, I would not particularly oppose this amendment. It is ingenious and interesting but, with all due respect, I do not think the noble Baroness draws an accurate analogy between the two.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking the argument so seriously. Of course, I disagree with him. When you go to eat in a restaurant, go to school or buy a can of baked beans, you may well have a private, contractual relationship with the supplier of that good or service. None the less, the state has decided that it needs to intervene because these power relationships are not all equal and there is a public good in the baked beans being safe to eat, the school delivering a good service, et cetera.

So, from the moment the UK Government and the UK people took the democratic decision that there should be laws to protect school standards, food safety, health and safety and non-discrimination in pay—supported by people from all parties, including in your Lordships’ House—it is not just a matter of private contract between two parties anymore; it is actually a matter of public policy and a wider rule of law point. The non-discrimination point has been non-partisan in this country for some years.

Most equality legislation has, perhaps, been promoted by Labour Governments, but the disability rights Act is the obvious exception. There has been a bipartisan consensus that we should not discriminate against people because of their sex, including in pay. We just have not been delivering on pay as well as we have been delivering in other areas of women’s lives. Therefore, the analogy with school standards, health and safety standards and food standards works. If we want to achieve equal pay, we have to take it seriously in enforcement.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Just to come back to the noble Baroness, would she therefore extend the provisions of her amendment to all protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Yes, I would.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 149 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I feel like the support act, really, because the substance, the meat, of this issue and this clause has been debated, although I am delighted that this is the final schedule and the final part, so we are on the final stages of the Bill. I just say very briefly, with respect, to the Minister, that we often ask the Minister to write to elucidate the remarks that she and her colleagues have made in the course of the Committee’s proceedings. We are watching that and making sure that we do get replies and, if we do not get proper replies, we will raise those issues on Report. I do hope, very gently, that the Minister is aware of that. Of course, we understand that information is not always at her disposal or her colleagues’ disposal, but we will need that information in order to make an informed decision on Report if the House divides at that juncture.

The second issue that I think it is appropriate to raise, raised several Committee days ago by my noble friend Lady Coffey, is impact assessments. The Cabinet Office guidelines say that impact assessments should be updated as the Bill goes through. To the best of my knowledge, that has not happened, and I am not sure that the Minister has satisfactorily answered the question that my noble friend asked earlier. With that in mind, I think that the rationale that the Minister used for the extension from three to six months was not even tepid and not even weak; it was just non-existent. To say that the Law Commission has done a consultation I do not think cuts the mustard. We on this side believe firmly that extending that period will bring more uncertainty to business, will be more costly, will encourage more litigation and workplace strife and will be a false economy.

I look over at the Government Benches and I see the pawprints of the trade unions in this. I do not know why they would want to do this, but, as on so much of the Bill, they are seemingly pulling the strings and I think that, in the end, it will not be in the best interests of workers for this to happen, not least because, as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said, the system is creaking. It is no good saying, “Oh, well, it was creaking under you”; this Government have been in power 12 months now, it is incumbent on them to fix the system with their legislation and I think that this is a retrograde step. It will not work, it will backfire, and on that basis, I think that neither Clause 149 nor Schedule 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, most of what I needed to say was said in the last group, so I will not labour the points, except to add a bit of colour, because my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and I consult quite widely. We consulted this morning with a distinguished employment lawyer, who told us that, if you apply now to an employment tribunal, you will have no chance at all of getting even a preliminary hearing for 10 months. That is next April. In order to get a resolution, a case resolved, you would be looking probably at December 2027. That is nearly two and a half years away. It will take a lot more than the number of judges the noble Baroness mentioned that they have recruited so far in order to fix that particular problem. I wish her good luck and I hope she succeeds, but I really do not think that we should be doing this.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in some ways, we are continuing a theme with Amendment 313 in my name. The Government have talked about supporting those on the fringes of the labour market; this is a goal that I hope we all share. We know that different individuals face different work challenges, whether due to educational background, employment history, health circumstances or socioeconomic factors. The question before us is whether this legislation achieves that laudable objective or whether it inadvertently makes it harder for precisely those individuals whom the Government claim they want to help.

I start with the day-one right concerning unfair dismissal, and I pose a fundamental question: why would any employer take on what might be considered a high-risk hire? Why would they take a chance on a young person seeking their first opportunity? Why would they hire a student who did not attend a top-tier university? Why would they consider a person from a lower socioeconomic background, who may lack conventional credentials but definitely possesses untapped potential? When employers face immediate legal liability for dismissal decisions, they naturally become more risk averse in their hiring practices. They gravitate towards candidates with proven track records, established credentials and minimal perceived risk. This is not callousness; it is rational economic behaviour in response to the regulatory environment.

The Government’s refusal to include a meaningful probationary period at this stage compounds the problem significantly. I have little doubt that, fairly soon, the Government will be arguing that they intend to consult and to continue with a light-touch probationary regime, which, it is suggested, could last for up to nine months. That is all well and good, but what does it mean in practice? What does the phrase “light-touch” mean and how will it be defined? Who are they going to be consulting, and on what? What are the Government thinking about this? It needs to be in primary legislation. Make no mistake: this uncertainty is affecting business decision-making now.

It looks as if the Government fundamentally fail to understand that employment relationships involve mutual discovery. In the short term, virtually all jobs represent a cost to business. Employers hire workers not because they are immediately profitable but because they are confident that, over time, these workers will develop skills, reach their peak performance and productivity, and ultimately become a net benefit to the company or employing organisation. This process of development and mutual learning requires flexibility. It requires the ability for both parties to recognise when a match is not working and to part ways without excessive legal complexity. By removing this flexibility from day one, the legislation creates a powerful incentive to hire only the safest and the most predictable candidates—precisely the opposite of supporting those on the fringe of the labour market.

The same perverse logic applies to the day-one right to sick pay. Consider the position of someone who has been absent from the workforce for an extended period. There are businesses that will make a point of hiring such individuals, recognising their potential and being willing to provide them with opportunities. But now the cost calculation has fundamentally changed. An employer considering such a hire must now factor in the immediate liability for sick pay from day one, combined with an inability to part ways if the employment relationship proves unsuccessful. The rational response is fairly obvious: avoid the risk entirely.

This is not theoretical speculation; it is how labour markets function when faced with regulatory constraints. No amount of academic opinion can state otherwise. I urge the Government to review the impact on social mobility, so that they can adapt the legislation to avoid the unintended consequences I have highlighted. Like my noble friend Lord Deben on the last group, I would like to be proved wrong on this. If I am, I invite the Government to gloat to their hearts’ content about that, but I think we need the evidence. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s excellent amendment, as we reach the end of Committee. Before I get into the substance of that, I will offer some praise. Noble Lords know that, last week, I took issue with the Government Front Bench about the potential lack of response to letters from individual noble Lords who had raised specific points during Committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, who is no longer in her place, took some issue with that, resiled from my analysis and said that it was not the case. However, over the last few days, I have received a plethora of epistles from the Government in my email. As Private Eye may have said in the past, are those two occasions by any chance related? That was my praise; I thank the Government for coming forward with those letters and we will hold them to account when we reach Report. I am grateful for small mercies, nevertheless.

I commend to the Government the excellent report of the Social Mobility Commission, State of the Nation Report 2024: Local to National, Mapping Opportunities for All. I probably say this at every juncture, but my noble friend’s amendment is helpful, because there is a cross-party consensus that we should all be working to help young people in particular into work, innovative employment, and skills and training. As we all know, and as has been found by apolitical third parties such as the charity the Sutton Trust, which focuses on improving social mobility, there are disparities across the country. There are sectoral and geographic disparities, and disparities in people’s backgrounds, race, ethnicity, age et cetera. As far as is practicable, we should be designing legislation that tackles issues around improving life chances, training and skills, and innovation.

More fundamentally, we need to be designing legislation that tackles endemic, entrenched inequalities, and that is what this amendment is about. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom is absolutely right that this is about opportunity cost. Many employers, given the chance, will try to help young people by giving them a chance to improve their life chances and skills, and by paying for their exams and training, et cetera—via apprenticeships, for instance. But the legislative regime will be such that they are encouraged not to employ that person, because they may have a disability, may be late to the employment market or may not be socialised—they may not understand the protocols of going to work each day, of being on time and of being dressed smartly, which are very basic things that we take for granted. That risk aversity, employers not wanting to employ those people, will have a negative effect as the corollary of this Bill.

Ministers have a chance at least to engage with this amendment and, when we come to Report, I hope to accept it; it would make a real difference to the lives of people who find it tough to enter and stay in the employment market. I encourage Ministers to look at the report to which I referred, and at the work that has been done to support the Bill and its laudable objectives. My noble friend offers this amendment in good faith in order genuinely to improve the Bill. On that basis, I hope that the Minister will look on it favourably and incorporate its ideas into the finished Bill.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I could not support this amendment more; I heartily support it. A social mobility impact assessment is vital.

I want to illustrate this with a few brief words on the retail sector. My noble friends have referred to the many reasons why people are excluded from employment in the retail sector, such as a lack of social mobility. When this Bill was coming forward last year, the British Retail Consortium expressed great concern and doubt about its ability to offer jobs. The BRC indicated that 61% of those consulted said that the Bill would reduce flexibility in job offers, 10% were unsure and 23% said that it would have no effect.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 14th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 24 and 25 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. As we highlighted in Committee, the Government appear to hold an implicit bias in favour of the trade unions, as though they are the only legitimate bodies capable of making rational decisions on behalf of workers. That is clearly not the case. One needs only to look at the chaos of the Birmingham bin strikes to see that unions are not always acting in the best interests of employees, and nor are they always representative of them.

In Committee, during the debate on Clause 5, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, remarked that

“the whole point of a trade union is that it is a democratic organisation of working people”.—[Official Report, 8/5/25; col. 1744.]

If that is so, surely workers should be free to choose whether to be represented by a union or by another independent body—choice is the essence of workplace democracy. If the noble Baroness and the Government are so committed to democratic representation, I wonder whether she also supports the Government’s proposal to remove the 50% ballot threshold for strike action—a move that clearly undermines democratic standards rather than upholding them.

On Amendment 25, the law must have no gaps, no shadows and no hiding places where the old habits of industrial bullying can take root and flourish. Every loophole we leave open becomes a wound in the body politic of free employment. Every ambiguity we permit becomes a tool for those who would turn the noble art of collective bargaining into a weapon of exclusion. That is why I speak in support of this amendment and why I urge the Government not to dismiss it on the tired ground that closed shops are already unlawful.

Yes, closed shops are illegal on paper, but we are not here to legislate for the perfect world of statutory textbooks; we are here to legislate for the real world and, in the real world, pressure to join a union can exist. This amendment simply states what most of us would regard as common sense: that no worker should be treated differently under a collective agreement based solely on their union membership status. It would prohibit making membership a condition for the agreement’s terms to apply. It would ban imposing any disadvantage on non-members and prevent contract terms being automatically imported purely because someone happens to hold a union card. In other words, it restores balance. It would ensure that collective agreements function as they ought to—as negotiated protections for the workforce—not as a gatekeeping tool for union organisers. It does not therefore weaken unions; it strengthens fairness. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 25 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom. I reiterate his key point that the imperative is to make it clear that the closed shop is not coming back and that the Government are committed to free but fair bargaining.

Let us remember that the closed shop has never actually been that popular. In the United States, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 outlawed the closed shop, and in the UK—even before I was born—in 1964 Rookes v Barnard involving the British Overseas Airways Corporation began the fightback against the closed shop when that organisation sacked a worker who refused to join a trade union. As noble Lords will know, in effect the closed shop was made illegal by the Employment Act 1990 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

The fact that we accept that the closed shop is damaging and an anachronism is, as much as anything, a reflection of the different working regimes in which the 40-odd million working people, or potentially working people, in this country exist. The closed shop was very much of a time when heavy manufacturing, manual labour and a heavily unionised workforce were prevalent, and that is now different. The working environment of young people particularly is a much more modern, diverse, dynamic and disaggregated labour market where the closed shop is a throwback and an anachronism.

There are good reasons why it is important to put in primary legislation that even this Government—who are legislating in a very negative way, which will cost jobs and opportunities and force people not to hire workers—will not go back to the bad old days of the 1970s and institute a closed shop. Labour market flexibility is reduced by the closed shop because the capacity of employers to employ the best-qualified candidates—regardless of union membership—is reduced. That inevitably leads to a misallocation of labour resources, higher business costs, higher prices and, ipso facto, a lower number of jobs.