Employment Rights Bill

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I was happy to sign the clause stand part notice with my noble friend Lady Coffey. I am thinking of the words of Zhou Enlai, I think, who, considering the French Revolution, said, “What did they mean by that?” I look at this clause and think, “What do they mean by this?” Maybe the Minister will open the trinket box at the end of this process and let us into the secret of this bizarre, perverse clause, but I really cannot see the point of it.

I am mindful of the fact that we are surrounded by very accomplished lawyers, so I will not get too much into law, but lawyers and others will be aware that Magna Carta—1215; I know the noble Lord, Lord Katz, likes a history lesson occasionally in Committee—resiled from the arbitrary power of the state. It is an arbitrary power of the state for it to insert itself into civil litigation without any real methodological basis, any timeline or, as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth so rightly said, any tests being met. That is very odd.

Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us as to the rationale. The clause is novel. It is completely perverse and unheard of, to be quite honest, because it will engender a disputatious regime, more litigation and more disputes in the workplace. It will have a deleterious effect on business, commerce and profitability, and on how businesses are run. What tests will the Minister use? How likely is it that these powers will be used and at what likely cost? Is there any impact assessment or opportunity cost as to the use of these powers?

Why does subsection (2) leave agricultural workers out of the process? There may be a specific sectoral reason for that, but that is a reasonable question to ask. Why are they not swept up in these powers? Why are their rights not circumscribed to not get involved in civil litigation in respect of employment?

Finally, the most bonkers part of a truly epically bonkers clause is subsection (7). It is so crazy that it could have been written by the Liberal Democrats, but it would be unkind to make such an observation. My noble friend Lady Coffey has already made the point that you do not even have to be a worker to have the Secretary of State impose themselves into your potential litigation on a matter; you can be someone seeking employment as a worker. Presumably, anyone who is of working age can be affected by this clause. Subsection (7) also states that a worker is defined more widely as an individual who is a worker for the purposes of Part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

I really do not understand the rationale for or the logic behind this clause. The Minister is clearly aware of the great disquiet that it gives rise to, and I hope she answers the specific points made, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. It takes something for a noble Lord of his experience in the law to say that this is the most perverse and strangest clause he has seen in a piece of primary legislation. On that basis, I hope the Minister will respond to that and answer those specific points that noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, have raised.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in some of the amendments in this group, and my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough in their opposition to Clause 113, which I must describe—much as the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, did—as quite extraordinary. It is extraordinary because it grants the Secretary of State exceptional powers—namely, the ability to initiate proceedings before an employment tribunal on behalf of a worker without that worker’s consent or even their knowledge. How can this be right? If a worker has chosen not to pursue a claim, whatever their reasons, how can the state reasonably step in and proceed in their name? Unlike my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, I am no lawyer, but I think this demonstrates the need for Amendment 271D.

Consent is a fundamental principle in so many aspects of law and life, yet here it appears to be disregarded. Amendment 272ZZA at the very least seeks to restore some balance by ensuring that the worker in question is given the opportunity to consent or decline. If consent is not given, the matter should go no further: all bets should be off. I find it puzzling that those on the Benches opposite consider it appropriate to have the ability to disclose personal data, whether legally privileged or not, without the written consent of the individual concerned. It is not typically something permitted in other circumstances. It is not fair, and we are about fairness in this House.