Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

16: Clause 3, page 4, line 40, leave out “or citizen”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can be relatively brief in introducing a small group of technical amendments to the Bill and perhaps, if I may say so, allow the House to take a short break from the understandably strong feelings generated by the discussion.

The amendments essentially address three issues. The first is to define the term “national” as including a citizen of the relevant country. Thus Amendment 19 inserts a Bill-wide definition of the term “national”. The effect is that any reference to a country of which a person is a national includes a country of which a person is a citizen. In not all countries are citizenship and nationality exactly the same. Similarly, a reference to a person not being a national of a country is to be read as also referring to a person not being a citizen of that country. Amendment 19 ensures that the Bill is consistent in this regard. Amendments 16, 24, 28, 99 and 141 are simply consequential amendments. Amendment 128 makes a similar change to Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The second group of technical amendments ensures that the word “court”, where it appears in the Bill, includes a tribunal. That is in relation specifically to Amendment 25A, which refers to the definition of an application for judicial review. The definition of the application for a judicial review in Clause 4(6) is extended so that it covers an application to a tribunal. That will specifically be the judicial review jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

The substantive issues about the scope of judicial reviews—whether they are non-suspensive or not, and the related provisions of Clause 52 and 55—will, I am sure, be debated in due course. The effect of Amendment 25A, and the associated Amendments 115C, 116A, 117A, 123A and 123B, is to make it clear that the relevant provisions in each case apply to tribunal proceedings, especially proceedings in the Upper Tribunal, as they do to proceedings in the High Court or the Court of Session.

Finally, the third group of amendments includes Amendments 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 38, which relate to the country to which certain persons who satisfy the conditions in Clause 2 may be removed to. Effectively, they treat persons who hold a passport or an identity document from the country in question as if they were nationals or citizens of that country. If, for example, an Indian national had a French identity document, they could be returned to France, assuming that there were no exceptional circumstances preventing their removal there. In other words, it is simply to treat persons who have obtained an identity document in the same way as they would be treated were they a national or citizen of that country.

I am happy of course to deal with any points that arise, but I do hope that these relatively technical amendments find favour with the Committee, and I beg to move Amendment 16.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will just ask the Minister for clarification with regard to countries that we do not recognise or areas where there are territorial disputes. Two of the main areas people are coming to the UK from, which the Government wish to stop, are conflict-afflicted areas because of territorial disputes, where the UN has a particular mechanism of providing humanitarian identification.

Is it the government position that all those people will have to come from a state that we recognise? By definition, many of the asylum seekers are seeking asylum because they are being persecuted because they are on one side of a territorial dispute—some of these geographical areas I have visited. The Government in this Bill now seem to be indicating that they will come to a side with regard to which identification documents, either national or citizenship, they will recognise. Why is this the case?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the proposed amendments are to cover the technical situation where somebody who is not necessarily a citizen or a national happens to hold an identity document of that country, and therefore—almost by definition, but certainly by strong presumption—is clearly someone who has a close relationship with that country. Assuming it is a safe country and that there are no other circumstances that might create an exception, that is a place to which they should normally be returned. If, as I think the question is posing, there are real risks in sending that person back to a particular country, the procedures in the Bill kick in. That would be a question of fact in each case.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his explanation of the government amendments. I have two questions. First, what would be the status of people who have no passport: stateless people? Of course, there are stateless people in refugee camps. There are, perhaps preponderantly in refugee camps but also elsewhere, people who have no recognised state.

Secondly, it so happens that I was in the West Bank in Palestine last week. Palestinians who live in the West Bank are entitled to a Jordanian passport. They are not entitled to an Israeli passport, but they have an identity document as Palestinians in the West Bank. That is a different category from the category of people who are completely stateless. I am wondering whether the Minister could explain how these two particular examples might be accommodated within these government amendments.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I will, if I may, look into the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and give a more precise answer. I think, just as an initial answer, we are essentially dealing with nationals of a country listed in proposed new Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which is to be added by this Bill. They are EU and EEA countries, together with Albania and Switzerland. It is to those countries that this applies. The provisions I referred to relate to EU countries, EEA countries, Albania and Switzerland, and I do not think that they touch at all on the situation of stateless persons in particular, or those who hold a Jordanian but not an Israeli passport, et cetera.

Amendment 16 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

19: Clause 3, page 5, line 38, at end insert—
““national” includes citizen;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a Bill-wide definition of “national”. The effect is that references to a country of which a person is a national include a country of which the person is a citizen and references to a person who is (or is not) a national of a country include a person who is (or is not) a citizen of that country. This is for consistency across the Bill.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is another important group of amendments and we support all of them. I remind noble Lords of the importance of this. Since the Bill assumes that everybody arriving irregularly will be detained and automatically removed, where they are going to be removed to becomes important to us all, and for us to have some consideration about the criteria which the Government will use is of particular importance. Can the Minister confirm that deterrence does not trump human rights with respect to removals? That was the implication of what his noble friend Lord Murray said earlier—that deterrence is everything and something that has to be achieved irrespective of any other consequence.

Since the Government always say that they are on the side of the British people, let me be controversial for a moment. With regard to the issues that we have been discussing in this group of amendments, I do not believe that the British people believe that deterrence should trump human rights. Let us make this real. I have looked at this, as other Members have done, in relation to various LGBTQ rights in countries that the Government say will be safe to send failed asylum seekers to through the Bill. Let us take the case of Nigeria; as my noble friend Lord Cashman has said, you can be flogged for being gay there. In Malawi, it is up to 14 years’ imprisonment with or without corporal punishment. In Liberia, it is a maximum of three years in prison.

Can the Minister tell us, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, whether a failed asylum seeker who is gay would be removed to those countries? In the end, that goes to the essence of what we are talking about. I want to know, and the British public and this Chamber want to know: will such an individual—or anyone in circumstances detailed in the helpful amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—be deported, or not? I do not think they should be deported in those circumstances. I do not see how those countries can be included in Schedule 1; I do not understand that at all. I do not believe that the Minister would want anyone —a female asylum seeker, for example, who has failed according to the terms of the Bill—to be returned to a country where they would be persecuted. Would such a country be included in Schedule 1? Rather than these general terms, let us see the specifics of what would happen.

Some noble Lords who have been Members of the other place will know that people will often say in general terms, “It’s an outrage”, or that “It’s about time those people were sent back” or “dealt with”. Then, the individual case—the individual family, the individual asylum seeker, the individual gay person—comes up and that very same community launches a campaign to stop them being deported. You can see it happening up and down the country because people are genuinely decent. When the human consequences of a piece of legislation are made clear, that general enthusiasm and support dissipates because they understand its consequences.

When the Minister answers the various questions of noble Lords, I want him to answer the specifics about an individual gay person who has failed as an asylum seeker under the terms of the Bill. Will they be returned to the sorts of countries and the sorts of persecution that other noble Lords and I have outlined?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have put forward amendments in this group and contributed to this debate. The Government completely understand the sincerity and thought that has gone into these amendments and we are grateful for those observations but, for the reasons that I hope I will be able to explain, the Government do not feel that we should accept the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wish to probe a little more what the Minister said. I understand his points about certain parts of countries. As I understand it, the Government accept that, in certain parts of countries, the risk to the individual will be such that that person should not be returned or sent to them if they are part of what could otherwise be a safe country. What is our Government’s mechanism to secure a guarantee from that country’s Government that that person would not then be sent to that region?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I suppose that the direct answer is that one would have to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the country concerned. I agree that that may not be enough, and the situation may well be such that it is not appropriate to designate a part of the country. All I am saying is that one should have this power; I am not necessarily saying the circumstances in which one should exercise it. It would still be open to an individual, in a suspensive claim, to say, “I’m still at risk because I might be transferred to the part of the country where it would be too dangerous for me to be sent”. That would be part of the analysis that the tribunal seized of the case would have to make.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I appreciate that the Minister said that, therefore, a negotiation may have to be done on not sending someone to part of a country. How would the British Government and the Home Office then monitor that to ensure that the host country kept to the agreement and that people were not moved to the part of the country that was deemed unsafe?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

The Government would have to monitor it as best one could, and, if it turns out that an arrangement is not satisfactory, it probably may not be a good idea to designate that part of the country as safe in the first place. All I am saying is let us not deprive ourselves of the opportunity to have this flexibility. We can work it out as we go forward.

What I should come to now are Amendments 35, 36, 41 to 52 and 54 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, so ably developed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and spoken to by others. In essence, they seek to amend either Clause 5 or the references to various countries listed in the schedule on the basis that certain individuals would have a well-founded fear of persecution and that we should therefore now declare in statute which these countries are and on what basis people should not be sent back to them. In general terms, the Government’s view is that it is not desirable to enshrine in statute descriptions of which countries are safe or not, or of particular groups of individuals or those with protected characteristics. The route—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I will finish my train of thought and then give way. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, rightly asked about the route for the protection of the individual. If there is a removal notice to a country in question, and if they have a well-founded fear of persecution and would be at real risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed to that country, they have a right to make a suspensive claim—a claim of suspensive harm—and that claim is then appealed to the Upper Tribunal. That is their individual protection in which their individual circumstances are closely considered, including in a judicial process. That is the essential protection.

I also clarify that, if you read the Bill with care, you will see that people cannot be sent back to a country unless we are satisfied that the country is prepared to accept them. In practical terms, that will include Rwanda at the moment and other countries in the future, with which we might be able to form immigration partnerships. However, that is a precondition that does not necessarily apply to many of the countries listed in the schedule.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

First, following on from what the Minister said at the beginning of the answer he has just given, when he said that the Government do not feel that it is appropriate to list characteristics of individuals in the Bill, I ask him: why in Schedule 1 are there, on eight occasions, a description of an individual in the list of countries for men only? They are deemed not safe for women; therefore, the Government have described certain groups of individuals by a characteristic.

Secondly, and very importantly, the point I raised—which the Minister may be coming to, based on his last answer—was that most people who claim asylum on LGBT, sexual orientation or gender identity grounds tend not to start with that. Therefore, it would be completely missed if there were not people supporting them to be able to go through a normal process. In some cases, it takes five or six attempts before that person will claim asylum on their own characteristic, because they do not trust authority, and so that trust has to be built.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the first part of the question asked by the noble Lord, it is true that there are certain countries designated for men only, and so forth, in the existing schedule. The Government do not consider that that is an appropriate precedent to extend at this stage. Circumstances change and countries change, so it is much better to deal with this on an individual basis. It is probably the case, one would have thought as a matter of common sense, that, if it arises, the Government’s travel advice to particular countries, to raise one particular point, is likely to be a highly material fact, when they come to consider the risk of serious and irreversible harm.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for the answer he gave to a point I raised earlier. I ask him whether, before Report, he will talk to some of those organisations which have been the secondary referrals for people who have tried to make claims that they would be in danger in unspecified other countries. They face the extreme inconsistency of quality legal advice in different parts of the country, and they often obtain quality legal advice only when some well-meaning social worker or other person refers them to the Children’s Society or some other organisation, which has a proper team of lawyers, who are able to give informed advice. Around the country, where the people we are talking about tend to be dispersed, the knowledge of this part of the law is thin.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are always prepared to talk to anybody who would like to put forward various ideas. We will come to the question of legal advice and legal protections and procedures in a later group, where I will be very happy to elaborate on the Government’s plans in that respect.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The judge in an Upper Tribunal would no doubt be trying to determine the will of Parliament in deciding the issues before us. In what circumstances do the Minister or the Government believe a judge would send a gay individual going to the Upper Tribunal as the result of a suspensive claim back to Nigeria or a similar country?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am not sure I completely understood the question. It may well be that in practice there will be various countries to which people with certain characteristics will never be sent because it is well known either at the level of the case worker and the Home Office or at the level of the judiciary that such a claim would give rise to a risk of “serious and irreversible harm”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Let me try again for the Minister. It is often said in court that judges were uncertain as to the intention of Parliament and it was not clear in the legislation what Parliament actually meant and therefore there was ambiguity. For the sake of avoiding any ambiguity, let us say that a suspensive claim goes to the Upper Tribunal, where the judge will determine whether that claim is right and whether an individual should be sent back to a particular country. So that the judge in the Upper Tribunal is not in danger of misreading the will of Parliament, I do not think that Parliament would want a gay individual who had failed because of the terms of the Illegal Migration Bill to be sent back to a country such as Nigeria which flogs gay men. I am asking the Minister of the Crown to say what the Government’s attitude is towards gay men in those circumstances, so that a judge in an Upper Tribunal will know what the intention of Parliament was. I hope that was clear enough for the Minister.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s position is that no one should be sent back if to do so would lead them to face

“a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”.

If that is the position in relation to gay men in Nigeria, there should be no difficulty in them satisfying those conditions.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am sorry to trouble the Minister again, but I have been listening to this with great interest and have two questions. First, is the Minister able to say any country outside Europe where it would be safe to send a gay man or indeed woman back? Secondly, if there are any countries, would it be possible for the Government to put those on their website?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It will remain a question of fact in each case and the examples of relevant harm are set out in Clause 38(4), which refers to

“death … persecution … torture … inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”

and where onward removal would raise a risk of

“real, imminent and foreseeable risk of … harm”.

If that in practice amounts to a situation in which you could not send a gay person back to that country, that would be a decision for the tribunal.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so grateful to the Minister for responding with his characteristic courtesy and patience. I think I can help him, because I think the problem here arises from the Government own cake-eating, if I can put it like that. The general proposition in the Bill is that we will now decide on a blanket basis that people are to be removed, regardless of their circumstances, because of the means of their arrival, not because of the circumstances of their past and their persecution. Fair enough; that is the thinking behind the Bill. Then the Government say, “Here is the schedule of safe countries”, again on a blanket basis. Then the Government say, “But only for men”—so they have already adopted the approach that there are some countries that are safe for men but not for women. But then when my noble friends and other noble Lords in the Committee say, “But gay people are a vulnerable group in many parts of the world, just as women are”, the Minister is, I think, forced into the Government’s position of saying, “But women are not a precedent”.

That logic is not standing up to scrutiny, in this Committee at least, so I hope that, after Committee and before Report, the Minister might just consider that issue of gay people, or LGBT+ people, in particular. We all know, in this Committee, that just as there are some countries that may be safe for men but not women, there are many countries that are not safe for queer people either. Rather than playing on this sticky wicket, which he, with his characteristic grace, handles with great aplomb, perhaps before Report, the Government could think again.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government will of course consider that, as we try to consider everything that is said in this House, before Report. I simply reiterate that under Clause 5(3)(d), it still has to be

“a country or territory to which there is reason to believe P will be admitted”—

and that is probably not very likely to be satisfied in the particular countries we are talking about, such as Ghana, for example. Having responded to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Government will of course consider the position.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

On that very point, what is the point of having Ghana in that schedule? There is no agreement with Ghana at all, so how do the Government know that Ghana would be unlikely to accept someone who is not admissible under the UK scheme? The UK will presumably not necessarily divulge that that person is gay.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I sought to explain earlier that Schedule 1 is an amalgam of all the existing schedules that exist. Ghana was already on a list of countries to which people could be sent, and the present practice is not to send people back to places where they are at serious risk. That practice will continue under this Act when you make a suspensive harm application. It is a historical situation, but it has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. As I said to the noble Baroness a moment ago, the Government will reflect on what has been said in this debate.

That brings me to deal specifically with the question of Rwanda and the fact that there are currently proceedings pending in relation to Rwanda, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out. So far, the High Court has upheld the position on Rwanda: we will see what the Court of Appeal judgment says. If the case goes further, it will be a matter for judicial decision and we will see how that works out, but we will not take Rwanda out at this stage, while the matter is still pending. I think that is also the answer, if I may say so, in relation to Amendments 43A and 49A on Hungary and Poland. These are ongoing proceedings: let us see what the outcome is and then it can be properly determined whether Poland and Hungary are countries that should remain on the list. That is not clear yet and it depends on the outcome of those pending proceedings.

I think that I am nearly through, except for the very important points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others, as to whether we should beef up Clause 6(4)(b), which at the moment places certain requirements on the Secretary of State, in deciding on possible new countries and territories. The thrust of the amendment suggested by the noble Lord and supported by others is that effectively there should be a more detailed list of conventions and other international instruments to which the Government should have regard, with a specific obligation of consultation. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others wanted in particular to enshrine the obligation to follow the decisions of domestic courts and the Human Rights Act.

The Government’s position on this—and of course, as with other things, we will reflect on it—is that these are effectively de facto covered in the existing Clause 6(4)(a) and (b). They provide that the Secretary of State must—it is a positive duty—

“have regard to all the circumstances of the country”

and

“must have regard to information from any appropriate source (including member States and international organisations)”.

That, in the Government’s view, necessarily requires the Secretary of State to have regard to case law, whether it is domestic or European; to have regard to international conventions and obligations; and to have regard to what international organisations say—and they are not exactly bashful when coming forward in this kind of area. The Secretary of State would be seriously at risk of being found to have acted irrationally or found not to have taken into account relevant considerations, if there was a major international organisation, a major convention or a major decision that had somehow been overlooked. So the combination of the normal duties of rationality and duty to take into account all relevant considerations, plus the actual wording of Clause 6(4), in the Government’s present view, covers the situation adequately.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. The hour is late, and I promise not to intervene again on his remarks. Before we get to group 19, which is also linked to this amendment, or indeed before we get to Report, could the Minister arrange for his officials or perhaps for himself or his noble friend to meet the Salvation Army and the other providers and stakeholders to which I referred in my remarks? It was they who raised these concerns—and, given that they have a contract with the Home Office, they are in a pretty good position to know the territory.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My noble friend Lord Murray tells me that that is already in train—or, certainly, there is no objection from the Government’s point of view.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for his patience and graciousness. Given the amendments that I raised, which I co-signed with others, particularly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and given the notion that deterrent trumps all, I am still not reassured that a person would not be returned to somewhere like Uganda, where you face 14 years’ imprisonment or the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality”. I am not reassured that a person will not be sent to those countries if they are at serious risk. Historically—and I shall close on this intervention—in the Home Office, people have been told that they will be returned to countries where they should not make their sexual orientation or gender identity known. I do not want us to return to those days.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

In taking full account of what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, has just said, which was obviously a powerful comment, I simply reiterate, as I have said to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the Government will consider the content of this debate. However, I reiterate first of all that this is a judicial and not a Home Office decision, and that those concerned will need to explain to the tribunal why they do not want to be sent back to these countries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The equality impact assessment that the Government have done on this talks particularly about sexual orientation. The very point that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others have made is that people will be returned. The Government more or less say that that will be the case unless something happens:

“Where individuals are from a country where their sexual orientation is criminalised, and their exploitation is linked to their sexual orientation, they may require additional support in order to trust and engage with law enforcement”.


That is the Government’s own equality impact assessment. Where in the Bill is that extra support in place? I cannot see it anywhere in the Bill to ensure that discrimination does not take place against people from the LGBT community. Therefore, subsequently, if this support is not put in place, people from the LGBT community will be sent to places where they are unsafe due to local LGBT laws.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, at this stage I do not think I can elaborate beyond the answers I have already given. This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the care with which he has responded to these amendments. I do not know whether I am right, and I do not want to embarrass him, but I sensed a slight feeling of discomfort with the issues we are having to address. I applaud him for that.

It seems to me that noble Lords have been both practical and principled in this debate. I agree with the analysis about half an hour ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of the position, but the practicality has been by testing the reality of different circumstances. It was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who said that, when faced with the situation of somebody one knows well being in this precarious position, it all looks very different. I agree; it is rather similar to feelings about people who come from other cultures. We are suspicious of them—“But not So-and-so—no, she is fine”.

On Amendment 30, I will read the report of what the Minister has said. I was not challenging most of subsection (4). It was simply the discretion, and I take what has been said about the Secretary of State having to act reasonably and so on. Subsection (5), however, says that “exceptional circumstances include”. That, to me, raises questions about what might not be included on the face of the Bill.

The Minister is quite right that I was trying to read “prevent” as someone being put at risk, and I think the Bill should say so because a person is prevented from being removed only if, in his individual case, he falls within the exceptions. That is not the natural understanding of the term. I have to say that I remain very concerned about the issue of a part of a country. A conflict in one part of a country can spread very fast, and can the risk to an individual—if he is persona non grata in one part of the country, that can become known in another part of the country very easily—and we are talking about individuals.

I am still a bit confused about “in general”. I understand that the lists we have are an amalgam of previous lists. The Minister defends the position—I think I am right in saying—by referring to procedures that can be used to challenge a decision. We are going to get to some more of this later in the Bill, but noble Lords have already shown their concern about the very narrow circumstances in which challenges—if I can use the term broadly—can be made.

A couple of things have come up in the Minister’s response that have made me think again about these. I would have mentioned some in any event, but I sure that noble Lords will understand that I am, at this moment, speaking a little bit slowly for reasons of time. If there is to be a negotiation about a home country and whether to have a negotiation with that country, does that actually raise the risk of drawing the individual to the attention of the authorities in that country and putting that person in greater jeopardy than he may have been?

The notion of acceptance by the receiving country has also been raised. I do not know whether the Minister can answer this tonight; if he can take a couple of minutes to do so, it would be helpful. If the UK and other countries are going to say, “Will you accept this individual?”, does that not, again, put that individual in jeopardy, because the reason for his having sought asylum in the UK will become known? We are in Committee, so the Minister is free to reply if he can help at this point.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I expect that I am being asked to play a sort of night watchman role in continuing the batting until stumps are drawn. As far as I know, it is not the case that the Government intend to engage in negotiations in relation to particular individuals. The Government’s general policy is to engage in discussions with particular countries about reciprocal arrangements and migration partnerships. There are various reports of other countries that are currently engaged in discussions.

Subject to correction—I am sure my noble friend Lord Murray will put me right—I think it is very likely to be the case that a lot of what we have discussed tonight in relation to Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda is simply not going to arise. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others are sceptical about that and it may be that the Government need to provide some further reassurance to satisfy noble Lords. Perhaps the noble Baroness will forgive me for noticing the time.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. That has raised further issues in my mind about what information may be given—not necessarily about an individual—to a receiving country, whether the questions may be asked and how the UK responds.

I think stumps probably can be drawn, though it is not in my gift to say so. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 30.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

At the heart of this, because there is no case-by-case assessment, under Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 we very much run the risk—if the situation is not inevitable —of individuals who have a quite legitimate case for the granting of asylum being returned to dangerous situations. As such, there are very real concerns across the Committee about that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, with permission, I will first respond to the first point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and confirm that the Government’s Front Bench was as surprised by the report in the Daily Telegraph as everybody else.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can I just confirm that the Minister means the Lords Front Bench?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Yes, the Lords Front Bench—this Front Bench. I cannot speak for other colleagues, but I can assure the Committee that no one is attempting to intimidate this House. As I understand it, the Prime Minister is misreported in the Daily Telegraph—it is not the first time the press has misreported a politician—and the Government fully recognise the role that this House has to play in scrutinising the legislation. The Government’s duty, if I may say so, is to listen, reflect on what is said and respond as they think fit, depending on the strength of the points made and the Government’s general policy. I emphasise that there is no question but that this legislative process should be followed duly and properly throughout.

That said, and in relation to following established due process, as it were, we debated Clauses 5 and 6 in detail in Committee on Monday. With your Lordships’ permission, I will not repeat what I have already said in that respect and refer your Lordships to the record in Hansard. To the extent that some points have been repeated, I refer to what was said in the last debate.

If I may also respectfully say so, on various other points that have been raised—for example, in relation to Clause 2, to trafficking, to unaccompanied children and to agreements with third countries and so on— I will not go over the ground that has already been covered or is to be covered in debates on other clauses. These are matters that we are debating on another occasion—the legal rights and remedies, for example—so for today’s purposes I will concentrate on Clauses 5 and 6.

I should perhaps once again go over the ground of what Clauses 5 and 6 actually say. If I am right and your Lordships accept the analysis, I venture to suggest that at least a considerable part of your Lordships’ concerns may be reduced or laid to rest.

In simple terms, Clause 5 deals with two different groups. The first group are nationals, including persons holding an identity document, of the European countries listed in new Section 80AA of the 2002 Act, which are the EU member states plus Switzerland and Albania. If a national of one of those countries makes an asylum or human rights claim, they may none the less be removed unless there are exceptional circumstances. The exceptional circumstances, which again were referred to today by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, are defined in Clause 5(5). This part of the Bill is essentially the same as the structure that has stood for many years, including when we were part of the EU, with the addition of Switzerland and Albania. These are safe countries and, in the Government’s view, no reasonable objection can be made in relation to this group.

Now we have the second group, who are nationals of all other countries: those outside the European countries defined in new Section 80AA. What is the position in relation to those nationals? The first point to make is that if the migrant is a national of another country—with all respect to the Republic of Ghana, the Republic of Uganda or India, let us take Nigeria—and they make an asylum or human rights claim, for example because of a risk of persecution for their sexual orientation, they cannot be sent back to that country. That is clear from Clause 5(8), so a lot of the concerns expressed about persons being sent back to these countries will relate to nationals of those countries who do not want to be sent back to them. Unless others correct me, if they make a protection—that is to say, an asylum or human rights—claim, they cannot be sent back as nationals to those countries where they fear persecution. That is a very considerable safeguard.

Where can they be sent back to? They can be sent back only to another Schedule 1 country, but subject to very important conditions. The most important condition in this context is that set out in Clause 5(3)(d): only if there is reason to believe that they would be admitted to that country. In other words, it depends on whether we have an agreement with that country to take them back. That is not at present the case, except in relation to Rwanda, but it may in future be the case in relation to other countries.

To take a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, or possibly the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, as to whether such future agreements would be—forgive me, it was the noble Lord, Lord Hannay—subject to parliamentary scrutiny, that is a matter for the future. I cannot commit the Government on that here at the Dispatch Box. However, I think your Lordships can be reassured that the availability of all kinds of remedies and the force of public opinion in this country would necessarily require a very full debate to take place before we made an agreement with another country. There is the constitutional safeguard of the constitution of public debate in that regard.

There is no indication that the countries mentioned in this debate—very understandably, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and even India—are likely to be, in any foreseeable future, places to which the relevant migrants could be sent. If we were ever to reach an agreement with another country, the Secretary of State has powers in Clause 6, in particular Clause 6(3), to exclude from that agreement persons of particular sexual orientations or with particular protected characteristics set out in that clause. That is a further protection against the fears noble Lords have expressed.

If all of that were to fail, it remains the case that the individual affected could make his suspensive harm application on the basis that he would suffer irreversible serious harm in that context. I think I can legitimately offer noble Lords reassurance that a great deal of the fears understandably expressed in your Lordships’ Committee rest on a particular view of the Bill that is not entirely correct.

I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—it was implicit in most of the other comments—what Schedule 1 is for. I think the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, asked what the rationale of Schedule 1 is. The answer is that Schedule 1 is a reproduction, an amalgamation and a restatement of all the existing legislation from 2002 onwards, in which various countries over the years have been added as safe countries. For example, in 2005 the Labour Government added India on the basis that it was, in general, a safe country.

This also enables me to deal with the “in general” point, which has stood as a statutory point for the last 20 years at least. It might not be entirely within the active career of the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Kerr, but it has been on the statute book for 20 years. It has not so far given rise to any particular difficulties. That is the background to what we are considering.

In the future, it might be appropriate to keep Schedule 1 updated; it might be necessary to make changes from time to time. Let us cross those particular bridges when we get to them. At the moment, there is no practical possibility of Uganda, for example, accepting migrants who arrive in Dover into Uganda. It might be, to take a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the existence of Schedule 1 or the failure to amend it, might be challenged in judicial review. If I may respectfully say so, it would be a somewhat adventurous case to compel a Minister to legislate or to amend primary legislation, but let us again cross those bridges when we get to them.

I hope that I have not taken up undue time and have covered most of the questions that I was asked. I am sure that I shall be reminded if I have not done so; I will do my best to answer them, if anyone reminds me.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

The Minister kindly said that, if he had not answered anything, he would do so. Would he please write to me about which countries practise female genital mutilation, criminalise homo- sexuality and criminalise humanism?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her question, but I cannot answer it today at the Dispatch Box. My respectful reply is that this issue does not arise for the reasons I have given. The Bill does not envisage, at the moment, returning people to such countries. The general position is that we can continue discussing the provisions on legal requirements, trafficking, unaccompanied children and so forth, but this part of the Bill is an essential part of the Bill. I therefore beg to move—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am most grateful to the Minister and have great respect for his legal analysis. However, I will correct him on the point I made about judicial review. I was not saying that a judicial review could be taken in which the order would be for the Minister to amend the law. The Minister cannot amend the law; we in this Parliament amend the law. The application would be for a judicial review of the refusal of the Minister to take steps to amend the law. That is quite a different matter, and I do not apprehend any difficulty in making such an application for judicial review.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if I misunderstood his point. I respectfully continue to beg to differ as to both the likelihood of such judicial proceedings or the relevance of such judicial proceedings to today’s stand part debate. So, if your Lordships permit me, I beg to move—

[Lord Swire (Con)]

I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests. I ask, gently, whether my noble and learned friend the Minister would not agree that it is worth reminding ourselves that some of these countries—indeed, all those we talked about in the last hour—are Commonwealth countries, including Uganda, India and Ghana. It is worth remembering that Rwanda is not only a Commonwealth country but the current chair-in-office of the Commonwealth, so, surely, that must count for something.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I entirely accept the point my noble friend makes and thank him for it.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The noble and learned Lord is so reassuring, and his manner is so friendly, that one is tempted to believe that this might all be as good as he says. On the two-part process, he says that the list sets out possible destinations, but that the Secretary of State would make a judgment about the individual and whether the individual should not be sent to a particular country for reasons particular to the individual. If it were the noble and learned Lord making these decisions, I would be very reassured; unfortunately, it is the Home Secretary.

I am sorry to press the Minister but he has not really answered my question. He says that the list is based on history, but in the past we have not sent people compulsorily to go through an asylum process in another country—so there is something new here. Further, we have not been sending people to countries where there is no asylum process but we are insisting that they must seek asylum there. I do not think the noble and learned Lord has addressed that point.

I would also be grateful if the Minister would construe for us the language in the first paragraph of Clause 6, which addresses “in general” and “a part”. I have not heard his answer to my question as to why it is all right that a country should not in general contravene the human rights convention—implying that if in particular it does, we do not care—and, secondly, why it refers to part of a country or territory. I do not understand how we can get an international agreement with a counterpart. If I am a negotiator, how do I persuade him to accept that there are parts of his country that are unsafe and parts of his country that are safe? Surely the agreement has to be with the other country in respect of the full territory of the other country, not in respect of part of the territory.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the latter point, I repeat the point I made on Monday that this is precautionary. There is no reason to deprive oneself of the possibility of providing for “a part”. With an enormous country such as India, it may be that up in Nagaland or somewhere there are some disturbances, but that does not prevent us saying that India is a safe country. That is the Government’s answer to the first point.

Our answer to the second point is that the words “in general” have—I am open to correction and I will correct myself if I am wrong—stood for 20 years on the statute book without difficulty and do not preclude, in an individual case, an application being made to oppose removal on the grounds of irreparable harm. It is the combination of a general view that the country is safe with the possibility of individual protection. Those are essentially the answers I gave on Monday.

I entirely accept the noble Lord’s point that this is new, but, for the reasons I have tried to explain, it is a workable and, I submit, balanced approach to a very difficult problem which the Bill is trying to solve.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As always, the Committee is very grateful to the Minister. I want to be absolutely certain that I have understood his case, because this is so important. My understanding is that he is reassuring the Committee on the basis that, first, nobody is going to be sent to the country that they fear in the first place—they are not going to be sent back directly to the country that they have escaped from and which they say was originally persecuting them—and, secondly, they can be sent only if there is a deal with a country. So maybe this is all going to be rhetoric in the end: we are going to tell the British people that we are stopping the boats, and we are going to warehouse more and more people under this whole edifice because there will be a duty under Clause 2 to remove people to places where they are irremovable to because there is no deal. Thirdly, the Minister points to the little chinks in the scheme whereby somebody might make some kind of exceptional non-suspensive claim. That is what I understand to be the three parts of his case.

On sending people to third countries that are unsafe because they are gay or because there is some other reason why that individual person would be at risk, it matters not that they would be unsafe in a third country or unsafe in a first country. In relation to the other little nudges and winks that he offers us—that this is perhaps fiction because in the end we do not have deals with a lot of these countries—that might be some comfort to people coming, and maybe even to those smuggling them, but it is certainly no comfort to the British people on the cost or on the toxicity of the debate we are having about stopping the boats, when actually the boats are not likely to be stopped.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is a question of judgment. The Government’s judgment is that this legislation will go a long way towards reducing the terrible risks that people and unaccompanied children are facing in crossing the channel in difficult circumstances, and will destabilise the business model of the people smugglers. Those are surely legitimate objects for any Government to pursue.

The noble Baroness’s analysis is essentially correct: if I am a national of a particular state and I make an asylum claim or human rights claim then I cannot be sent back to that country; I could be sent back to a country with which—she puts it somewhat colloquially, and I would not quite use these words—we have a deal. The country with which we have a migration partnership at the moment is Rwanda, so that is still a possibility, subject to the individual in that case being able to make an application for either a factual suspensive application or an application based on imminent and foreseeable and serious harm. That is how it works, and that is how the Government see it.

While I am on my feet, I will address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about whether the threat of deterrents supersedes individual human rights. For the reasons I have given, our answer is that there is no question of superseding individual human rights due to the protections I have just explained. Refoulement is covered by the existing agreement with Rwanda, and I am sure it will be covered in future agreements.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder if an answer could be given to the question from the Minister’s colleague on the Benches behind him, who asked about Commonwealth countries. Would the Minister agree that many of the Commonwealth countries have laws which criminalise homosexuality? Indeed, Uganda has just passed legislation which says that the death penalty can be used in relation to homosexuality, and in India there are currently a lot of issues and questions about the treatment of Muslims there. There might be very real issues even when it comes to Commonwealth countries.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness says, there might indeed be issues. Their legislation is a matter for them. The fact that they are members of the Commonwealth which upholds, or seeks to uphold, barest basic standards is a relevant background consideration, as the noble Lord pointed out.

For the reasons I have given, as best I can, the protections in the Bill are adequate to deal with the problems that have been raised. I respectfully say that Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his thorough response, and to those who have spoken.

I looked at the reference to the Commonwealth when the Bill and the schedule were published. It is worth noting that 76% of Commonwealth countries are not considered by this Government to be safe, because 76% of the Commonwealth is not in the schedule. That is not us questioning it; that is the Government making their own decision.

The Minister, in his typically emollient way, suggested that we do not really understand these clauses and that if we did we should not be concerned because, as he put it, the legislation will have no practical operability. We are in a situation where the Home Office is doing the reverse of virtue signalling, which is to try to create, as my noble friend Lord Paddick indicated, the most punitive and threatening environment, of which the justice department will have to pick up the pieces. The Minister has been at pains to point out that there are many elements which would mean that there is no practical operability, but we are being asked to legislate for this, and on the basis of a lack of agreements.

On Monday, the Minister said to me:

“I suppose that the direct answer is that one would have to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the country concerned”.—[Official Report, 5/7/23; col. 1229.]


As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others indicated, the Government have not done so, but they are still asking us to legislate. The Minister said that, when we are negotiating some of these agreements in the future, there would be a “force of public opinion” on the agreements and debate. But on the only one that we have, with Rwanda, there was no debate or consultation. We were surprised by it. It was not a treaty that was ratified by Parliament; it was an MoU. The International Agreements Committee forced a debate on the MoU in this House, in which noble Lords took part, and the committee raised the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about refoulement. Unfortunately, this is the pattern of the Government.

On Monday, the Minister was not even able to confirm to me—he said he would write to me and I am grateful for that—that there are child facilities in the Rwanda agreement, because it was not designed for that in the first place. That addresses the point that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, indicated with regards to those who are children. I referenced 73 children, up to 2022, who would be in the situation of being referred to protection and then on their 18th birthday would receive, under the Bill, a third-country notice, and they would have no idea what that country would be.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, it is always a rewarding experience to find oneself largely in agreement with some of the sentiments that have been expressed. On the issue of legal aid, Clause 54 ensures that individuals who receive a removal notice under the Bill have access to free legal advice before removal and, in so providing, it is one of the keystones of the Act. It is absolutely essential that free legal advice is available to persons before removal. That is important for the reasons that have just been given. It is important that people understand the process and that it is a fair and efficient process. No one would disagree with any of those sentiments expressed in the Chamber today.

It is important to emphasise that, unlike most civil legal aid, legal aid in the context of the Bill is being made available without a merits test, nor a means test—as a matter of statutory instrument, that will be provided in due course.

To answer the first question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, we are in close discussions with the authorities in Northern Ireland and Scotland, where I anticipate the position will be exactly the same as it is in England but, obviously, that has to be covered. As has been rightly said, legal aid is, in the context, essential for speedy but fair decision-making. Those basic points are essentially common ground.

I will now deal briefly with the amendments. Government Amendment 119A in this group simply corrects the references to the clauses in the Bill under which advocacy in the Upper Tribunal can take place, and adds a reference to the tribunal procedure rules, since the clause as tabled in the other place at a late stage needs to be corrected in those technical aspects. That is all that Amendment 119A is.

I turn now to Amendment 92A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, which seeks to make provision for legal aid for potential victims of modern slavery subject to removal for possible referral to the NRM. In the Government’s view, this amendment is not required, as Clause 54 already provides free legal advice for anyone issued with a removal notice under the Bill, and that legal aid is available irrespective of the merits or means.

The Committee has just accepted that Clause 21 stand part of the Bill, so I respectfully say that it does not seem correct for me to reopen or rediscuss the various arguments which have been debated at length this afternoon in relation to modern slavery. In practice, if Clause 21 stands part of the Bill, as the Committee has just agreed, the basis for this amendment, in the Government’s submission, largely falls away and it is not at all clear that there is any remaining practical purpose in pursuing the amendment. That is the Government’s position on Amendment 92A.

As far as Amendment 120 is concerned, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, which seeks to ensure the availability of civil legal aid services for various claims, challenges and legal proceedings covered by the Bill, the Government’s position is that Clause 54 already effectively provides for that. The Lord Chancellor already has a statutory duty to ensure that legal aid is made available to individuals where it is required under LASPO. By virtue of Clause 54, legal aid will therefore have to be made available to individuals in receipt of a removal notice, in relation to that removal notice, to take advice in making a suspensive claim either on factual grounds or on grounds of serious irreversible harm. This is, as I said a moment ago, an essential feature of the Bill to ensure fairness to those facing potential removal under the powers in the Bill. There are other existing provisions in LASPO that make legal aid available in relation to protection claims, human rights claims, modern slavery, detention and habeas corpus. But the key need here in this Bill is for legal advice before removal takes place and legal advice in relation to making a suspensive harm claim or a suspensive factual claim.

Finally, Amendment 120A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who I know follows these matters with great interest and great integrity and has over the years been very concerned indeed about the provision of legal aid, highlights the practical importance of making sure legal aid actually is available. The same point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and others. That is a very important aspect that the Government and the Ministry of Justice in particular are fully seized of at the moment. As noble Lords can imagine, it provides a considerable logistical challenge, because it depends on a number of factors: where the potential removees or detainees are; how they can be accessed; who is going to provide the advice; whether there are enough people to do it; whether they are trained up enough; whether it can all be done in the short time limits provided by the Bill. Those are all matters with which the ministry is currently seized. We are working extremely closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office to ensure that legal aid is really made available to those who need it. I venture to hope, most sincerely, that we are not in a position where any significant proportion of the persons concerned fail to get legal aid. It would not be acceptable, in the Government’s view, for very large numbers of people to be removed without the benefit of legal advice. It is a problem that the Government have to solve and are working to solve.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to take us back to the impact assessment issue, but it would certainly be helpful to know before Report where the Minister’s department is going in relation to the work he referred to. We should have a much clearer idea, by the start of Report, as to the extent to which his department is able to give guarantees that a proper legal aid system would be in place, effective and able to operate.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord says. It is an entirely reasonable question. I will take it back to the department and do my best to see how far we can satisfy that completely understandable request. The Government accept that legal advice should be available in practice and quickly, and they are working on that with intense attention at the moment but, in relation specifically to Amendment 120A, do not feel it is appropriate or feasible to provide for a statutory obligation to deliver within 48 hours, which is what the amendment calls for.

However, there should be a system that enables people effectively to take advice within the strict periods of time set out in the Bill, which are subject to extension—we do not yet know how that will work, but they can be extended by the Secretary of State and the Upper Tribunal. I hope your Lordships will accept that the general position on legal aid in Clause 54 is a positive provision in the Bill and that removing the means test and merits tests is correct in the circumstances. Properly administered and operated, this will be a very important safeguard for those affected by the provisions in the Bill. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw the relevant amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. I welcome Clause 54 being put into the Bill—it is better than it not being there—but several problems arise. First, Clause 54 says in terms of LASPO only that:

“Sub-paragraph (5) does not exclude services provided to an individual who is subject to removal”.


It does not do anything to make sure that that legal aid for advice and representation will appear, which is the reason for the importance of the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Hunt of Kings Hunt, about a duty to provide legal aid, as there is no guarantee. There is also no guarantee that Clause 54 will deliver any legal aid before this Bill comes into force as an Act. What will the Government do in practice to deliver that legal aid?

Secondly, Clause 54 benefits only people who are subject to removal and have, presumably, already had a removal notice. The concern that motivated Amendment 92A was that it should be available not only to individuals who are subject to removal under this Act but to those who might reasonably expect that they would be. They ought to be able to get advice so that they can give informed consent to a trafficking referral; they need to know what the implications and consequences could be. With respect, I do not think the Minister covered either of those points.

Finally, we do not appear to be getting the message across that the better informed and supported people are, the greater the benefit to the Government will be in being able to have faster processes. Clearly, those processes are not working at the moment—we would not have this incredible, appalling backlog if everything was going swimmingly with processing efficiency. I cannot speak for the noble Lord, Lord Bach, but I think we are inspired by the idea that you could streamline the system and try to avoid delays in highways and byways if people were properly legally informed of their rights. The Minister is a lawyer, so I am sure he gets that point, although unfortunately I have not heard him express it. All that said, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 92A.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for explaining this really quite complex area. The only thing I was going to ask the Minister was whether he could explain the timeframes within which the appeal must be lodged: seven days for the Upper Tribunal and then 23 days for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session. Are those timeframes standard in these types of cases? How have they arrived at them?

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expressed the case very fully and I thought the way the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summarised it was a fair comment about the accessibility of these processes to people taking part in them.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, Clauses 43 to 51 are an essential part of the scheme of the Bill, just like Clause 54 on legal aid, which we discussed earlier. I think by now your Lordships are very familiar with the scheme of the Bill but, just briefly, for the record, I will try to outline these clauses and answer the questions that have arisen as we go through.

The first thing the Bill does is to render certain claims —protection of human rights and modern slavery claims—non-suspensive so that making them does not delay the removal of an illegal migrant to a safe third country. However, the Bill then provides safeguards for removal in two cases: where there is a serious harm suspensive claim and where there is a factual suspensive claim—there has been a mistake as to whether the conditions are met.

Then the Bill goes on to provide that if the Secretary of State refuses those claims there is then an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In general, the Government’s position is that that provides proper safeguards. It does not dismiss safeguards—if I may use the phrase just used by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—it strikes a fair balance between expedition and fairness to the migrant. It does not in any way destroy justice because the ultimate decision in relation to the suspensive claims is in the hands of a very respected and senior judicial body and legal aid is available in order to bring those claims.

The basic timetable, to answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that there are seven working days from receipt of the notice of removal to bring the claim, subject to the possibility of an extension if that is necessary to secure justice in a particular case. The 23-day period—I think I am right although I will correct myself in writing if I am wrong—is for the Upper Tribunal to take its decision. Those time limits for appeals are specific to this Bill. This is an expedited procedure that provides strict time limits, but in the Government’s view they are fair time limits.

One should make it clear that we have two situations. The first is where the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded. In that circumstance, the person concerned has to apply for permission to appeal. That is the current approach, as I and the Government understand it, in the asylum and human rights system. It is effectively to weed out unmeritorious appeals as those designed to do no more than frustrate removal. Those cases are decided by the tribunal on the papers. Similarly, if you make a late suspensive claim—a claim out of time—it will be considered only if there are compelling reasons. That is at the level of the Secretary of State but if they consider that there are no compelling reasons, you can go to the tribunal and say, “There are compelling reasons why I was out of time”. Again, that is for the tribunal to decide on the papers.

These provisions are designed to ensure that claims are made at the earliest opportunity and prevent late claims being used to frustrate removal, undermining the overall effectiveness of the claims process. Once a claim has been made to the Secretary of State but not refused, and then to the Upper Tribunal as well, the whole process is suspended until the tribunal has taken a decision, so there is protection during that period.

Clause 47 also deals with another problem that constantly arises in this kind of case, where somebody tries to raise something new at a late stage. Again, there is a procedure for dealing with that: effectively, that the new matter can be considered by the Upper Tribunal only if there have been compelling reasons for it not to have been raised earlier. In relation to late claims, claims out of time and new matters, there are those checks to prevent the system being abused.

Clause 48 then requires the various timeframes to be respected. It places a requirement on the tribunal procedure rules to secure that those timeframes are respected. As I have just said, there are seven working days for the submission of a substantive appeal—I think that is in Clause 48(1)(a)—and a 23 working-day period for the tribunal to decide that substantive appeal. Those timeframes may, as I say, be extended. What we have here is a process that, in the Government’s view, is essentially a fast-track process but none the less a fair and balanced one.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

These very short timescales are no doubt part of the deterrent effect which the Government are seeking to put in place through the Bill. What estimate have the Government made about the workload on the tribunal process? Is it really sustainable to have such short timescales?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have been working closely with the senior judiciary to ensure that we have the relevant judicial manpower and resources to deal with the workload. I am not, as of this moment, in a position to give specific details but one of the reasons for allowing the judges of the First-tier Tribunal to sit in the Upper Tribunal, which gives us a pretty wide pool to draw upon, is that it enables us to draw upon recorders, retired judges and others. The Government are at the moment satisfied from the discussions they have had that there will be sufficient judicial capacity to meet any reasonably foreseeable workload, but that is a perfectly good question and I thank the noble Lord for raising it.

I will come in a moment to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about judges in general, but I will first deal with government Amendment 115A, which provides for the first set of tribunal rules effectively to be made by the Lord Chancellor rather than, as would normally be the case, by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. That committee normally takes quite a long time to make new rules—maybe 12 months or more—so, since we are working to implement the Bill as soon as practicable, government Amendment 115A provides for the first set of tribunal procedure rules, including these time limits, to be made by the Lord Chancellor so that we have the relevant tribunal procedure rules in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his responses. I am not really persuaded by his answer on Clause 49: that these are just some little minor issues that cannot be JRed from the Upper Tribunal. Subsection (3) states that

“the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision”.

So the fact that it has made an error is apparently not subject to judicial review, which seems to me not particularly minor. An application for judicial review can be made if the tribunal

“has acted … in bad faith or … in such a procedurally defective way as amounts to a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice”.

I do not suppose those crop up very often, and I would imagine that bad faith would be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish, so I do not think there is much wiggle room in Clause 49—but those who know more about how these things work might have other thoughts, and if they do I would be grateful if they would share them with me in due course.

I do not think the Minister covered the point about First-tier Tribunal judges being appointed to act as Upper Tribunal judges. If he did not—I will check what he said—perhaps he could write to me with any answers.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I will happily write to the noble Baroness. I thought I had covered it when I said that it was creating a pool. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, nods. It is creating a pool of judges so we have enough judges of relevant standing and experience to decide what are essentially factual questions. These are relatively limited factual questions.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise. I was clearly inattentive as I was trying to look at the other groups that are coming up. Even so, I think concerns remain about promoting, and possibly overpromoting, people before they are ready. What the Government are proposing to do seems a little odd.

On the tribunal rules, I note the Minister’s citation of a precedent, but at one point he said that the problem is that the committee works too slowly. I would have thought that if processes do not work very well or do not work in a reasonable timeframe, the way to resolve that is to work with the relevant bodies to speed them up rather than to grab power from them. However, I find that this Government seem to have an appetite for grabbing powers from everybody else, whether it is the courts, other agencies or indeed Parliament. I worry that the Government are getting rather too big for their boots. Perhaps one day they will even come a cropper. That said, I think I have probably taken these issues as far as they can go.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

154: Clause 55, page 58, line 19, at end insert—
“(6) The Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/435 (N.I. 10)) is amended in accordance with subsections (7) and (8).(7) In Article 14 (decisions about provision of funded services), after paragraph (2A) insert—“(2AA) But paragraph (2A) does not apply to a grant of representation for the purposes of—(a) proceedings before the Upper Tribunal mentioned in paragraph 2(ic) of Schedule 2 (proceedings under or for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023),(b) proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under or by virtue of section 2AA of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (jurisdiction: appeals in relation to the Illegal Migration Act 2023), or under rules under section 5 of that Act made for the purposes of that section, or(c) an appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court in respect of proceedings mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”(8) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 (civil legal services: exceptions to excluded services), after paragraph (ib) insert—“(ic) proceedings before the Upper Tribunal under any of sections 43 to 48 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, or under Tribunal Procedure Rules made for the purposes of any of those sections,(id) proceedings before the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review within the meaning of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (see section 4(6) of that Act), where the application relates to that Act,”(9) The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015 (S.R. (N.I.) 2015 No. 195) are amended in accordance with subsections (10) to (14).(10) In regulation 2 (interpretation), in the definition of “representation (higher courts)”, in paragraph (f), after “2(ib)” insert “, (ic) or (id)”.(11) In regulation 31 (applications for advice and assistance)—(a) in paragraph (1), after “Subject to” insert “paragraph (1A) and”,(b) after paragraph (1), insert—“(1A) An application for advice and assistance may be made to a supplier by an applicant by telephone where the applicant is being detained under paragraph 16(2C) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention under authority of immigration officer for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023) or section 62(2A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention under authority of Secretary of State for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023).”, and(c) in paragraph (3), after “except where” insert “paragraph (1A),” (12) In regulation 32 (extensions)—(a) in paragraph (1), for “paragraph (2)” substitute “paragraphs (2) and (2A)”, and(b) after paragraph (2) insert—“(2A) No extension shall be required under paragraph (1) if the advice and assistance is advice and assistance mentioned in regulation 4(1)(n) of the Financial Regulations (advice and assistance relating to removal notices under the Illegal Migration Act 2023).”(13) In regulation 41 (applications for certificates)—(a) in paragraph (2), after “Subject to” insert “paragraph (2A) and”,(b) after paragraph (2), insert—“(2A) An application for a certificate under this Part may be made to a supplier by an applicant by telephone where the applicant is being detained under paragraph 16(2C) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention under authority of immigration officer for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023) or section 62(2A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention under authority of Secretary of State for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023).”,(c) in paragraph (3), after “The applicant shall” insert “, except where paragraph (2A) applies,”, and(d) in paragraph (3)(b), after “met” insert “(where they apply)”.(14) In regulation 43 (determination of applications for certificates)—(a) in paragraph (1), for “paragraph (2)” substitute “paragraphs (2) and (3)”, and(b) after paragraph (2) insert—“(3) But paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to an application for a certificate in respect of—(a) proceedings before the Upper Tribunal mentioned in paragraph 2(ic) of Schedule 2 to the Order (proceedings under or for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023),(b) proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under or by virtue of section 2AA of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (jurisdiction: appeals in relation to the Illegal Migration Act 2023), or under rules under section 5 of that Act made for the purposes of that section, or(c) an appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court in respect of proceedings mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”(15) In regulation 4 of the Civil Legal Services (Financial) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015 (S.R. (N.I.) 2015 No. 196) (exceptions from requirement to make a determination in respect of an individual's financial resources)—(a) in paragraph (1), after sub-paragraph (m) insert—“(n) advice and assistance provided to an individual who has received a removal notice, in relation to the removal notice, and such advice and assistance—(i) includes advice and assistance in relation to a suspensive claim relating to the removal notice, and an application under section 45(4) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 as regards such a claim, but(ii) does not include advice and assistance in relation to an application for judicial review within the meaning of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (see section 4(6) of that Act) relating to the removal notice;(o) representation in respect of—(i) proceedings before the Upper Tribunal mentioned in paragraph 2(ic) of Schedule 2 to the Order (proceedings under or for the purposes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023), (ii) proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under or by virtue of section 2AA of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (jurisdiction: appeals in relation to the Illegal Migration Act 2023), or under rules under section 5 of that Act made for the purposes of that section, or(iii) an appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court in respect of proceedings mentioned in paragraph (i) or (ii).”(b) in paragraph (3), at the appropriate places insert—““removal notice” has the meaning given by section 37 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023;”““suspensive claim” has the meaning given by section 37 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision about legal aid in Northern Ireland for the purposes of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 55 will ensure that individuals who receive a removal notice under the Bill have access to free legal advice. The clause at present applies only to England and Wales. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, properly asked what the position is regarding Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Scottish Government advise that legislative provision is not required to ensure persons issued with a removal notice can access free legal advice in Scotland. Legislative changes are required, however, in Northern Ireland. Amendment 154 ensures analogous provision in Northern Ireland to that already applicable to those seeking legal advice in England and Wales. It is simply an extension to Northern Ireland of the provisions of the Bill. That is the content of government Amendment 154. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, has an amendment in this group and I defer to him at this point. I beg to move.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 155, which is in the same terms as it was in Committee. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Prashar, and of course to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for putting their names to this amendment and adding some lustre to it. I am also grateful for a superb briefing note from Bail for Immigration Detainees, ILPA and the Public Law Project.

In my view, ensuring that those who are detained have legal advice at an early stage is of fundamental importance. Obviously and above all, it is important to the detainees themselves, but it is also important to the reputation of our much-vaunted legal system. I ask the House to think about it for a moment: the proposition that, in our country, any person, whether adult, child, pregnant woman or victim of trafficking, can be deprived of their liberty and, at the same time, of proper legal advice is horrific, unconscionable and unconstitutional.

Clause 55 provides for insufficient access to civil legal services. It is concerned with free legal advice and representation only in relation to removal notices. It makes access contingent upon receipt of a removal notice and does not ensure that the necessary services will be made available shortly after a person has been detained. I remind the House that there is no set timeframe in the Bill for the Home Secretary to serve a removal notice under Clause 7. It is therefore not unrealistic to suggest that an individual could be left to linger in detention for days and even weeks before a removal notice is served by the Home Secretary and thus before they are able to access legal aid under Clause 55. Accordingly, the Bill does not provide for people trapped in its provisions assurance of access to free civil legal services before a removal notice has been served on them.

Clause 55 also does nothing to address the reality that it is practically impossible for many people to access legal aid under existing entitlements. There are, as I think the House knows, vast numbers of unrepresented individuals seeking asylum and in detention due to the current unsustainability of and lack of capacity within the immigration and asylum legal aid sector.

Our Amendment 155 introduces a new clause—a duty to make legal aid available to detained persons, which would address this issue in England and Wales by supplementing what the Government intend to achieve in their Clause 55. It would place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to make civil legal aid available to detained persons in relation to already in-scope judicial review and immigration matters, and suspensive claims, within 48 hours of their detention. This is crucial, given that the Bill gives the Home Secretary wide powers to detain families indefinitely, to detain children who are alone and to detain vulnerable people such as pregnant women, while also placing a duty on the Home Secretary to remove them, with short timeframes to make suspensive claims with compelling evidence to prevent such removal.

I hardly need to remind this House of Parliament that the provision of legal aid is a key component of ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice—itself inherent in the rule of law. The courts have repeatedly upheld the principle that a failure to provide legal aid can amount to a breach of fundamental rights. Legal aid is essential to ensure that people without means can secure effective access to justice and redress.

So why is this amendment needed? As I think the House knows, legal aid was, in effect, decimated in this area of law by the legal aid cuts of 2013. Most non-asylum immigration matters are excluded, which has damaged the entire immigration and legal aid sector and the ability of everyone, including individuals seeking asylum and those in detention, to access reliable, quality legal aid immigration advice. Immigration law is highly complex and extremely difficult, if not impossible, to navigate without a lawyer.

It is unrealistic to believe that individuals seeking asylum, who have just arrived in the UK and who may be traumatised or vulnerable and who may speak little or no English, can understand our complex laws and make effective representations without professional legal assistance. As stated by Lord Justice Underhill in last week’s decision on the Rwanda scheme, cases where decisions are fair and where there has been no access to legal assistance are “likely to be exceptional”. I pray that in aid of this amendment. Amendment 155 would help to secure timely access to legal assistance, which is crucial to the fairness of decision-making.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, clearly, the Government entirely accept that legal advice is fundamentally important in the present context. That is why we introduced Clause 55. The Government are well aware that, if the procedures for obtaining legal advice under the Bill are not appropriate, legal challenge will follow. That is constraint enough to ensure that those procedures are sufficient to ensure the system works as fairly as possible. That is the approach of the ministry and, as I will say in a moment, that is how we are developing procedures to ensure that appropriate legal advice is available, and why the Government, while entirely understanding the points that have been made, respectfully feel that Amendment 155 is not the correct way to achieve the desired result, which is certainly one that is shared by everyone: that there should be appropriate legal advice.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his comments on the importance of legal advice, and to my noble friend Lady Lawlor for the reservations that she expressed. In the longer run, the whole area of legal advice, not just on immigration, is for review, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, just said. The Government regard this as being at the heart of a fair justice system.

However, on this particular amendment, we already have established procedures, both at Manston and immigration removal centres, for individuals to access legal advice. I understand that, at Manston, there is scope for unlimited free phone calls to be made. There are notices and other bits of information about how you contact a lawyer: the names are given and the rotas change. Those procedures are there. Similarly, at immigration removal centres there is already a procedure similar to the police station procedure. It is not exactly the same, but there is the detained duty advice scheme, under which solicitors provides immigration advice on a rota system. That will be expanded as necessary. I was sorry to hear the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, say that people have sometimes been misadvised; I hope that will not happen in the future, because the Ministry of Justice is determined that the system to be introduced will be coherent, joined up and, above all, fair. That is what the House and the country would expect.

We are engaging closely with legal aid providers, and we believe that our proposed capacity-boosting measures will enable us to attract sufficient providers. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, observed, we are out to consultation on increasing fees for this kind of immigration work. An ongoing Legal Aid Agency tender has been out since March, I think, which I understand has had an encouraging response so far. We are seeing an uptick in providers coming forward. Those procedures remain to be completed and it remains to be seen exactly how that works out, but that is at least encouraging. Other key areas of focus include the provision of remote advice—that might well go some way towards addressing the problems in Lincolnshire, Norwich or wherever it happens to be, but I am given to understand that there will be on-site advice at immigration removal centres—paying for travel times for providers, and various options for signposting and connecting up individuals to ensure that they actually receive appropriate legal advice.

The Ministry of Justice is working very closely with the Home Office on the detail of this. It is a ministerial responsibility to follow closely and ensure that these measures cut the mustard, if I may use that expression, and come up to proof—to mix my metaphors somewhat dramatically. In that regard, and for those reasons, I invite the House to accept that Amendment 155 is not necessary because we are thoroughly on the case and our objective, which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, rightly drew attention to, is shared.

Amendment 154 agreed.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 103, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 103A.

103A: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as section 1 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 already provides for the National Crime Agency to have functions in relation to combating organised crime; this function encompasses organised immigration crime.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Motion X, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motion Y.

Motion X relates to the function of the National Crime Agency. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, indicated that he had brought forward his amendment to generate a debate about the role of the NCA in tackling organised immigration crime. That debate has been most useful, but on the substance of the amendment I hope that your Lordships will accept that it is not in fact needed, as the Commons has decided.

As regards proposed new Section 6A of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which is now proposed in Amendment 103B, I respectfully suggest that the NCA’s annual report and annual plan already set out the range of activities in which it is already engaged to tackle the cross-channel people-smuggling gangs. Again, this is an unnecessary addition to the 2013 Act.

Finally on this aspect, I gently say that this here is, after all, the legislature. We are not the Executive, and I would respectfully suggest that the legislature should be slow to overmanage the independent executive agencies, when there is no compelling reason to do so in this case. That is the Government’s position on Motion X.

As regards Motion Y, the Government are of course grateful to have the further opportunity to discuss Lords Amendment 104 with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Government can wholeheartedly concur with the sentiments behind this amendment. While our immediate focus is on enacting this Bill, we also need to take a longer-term view if we are to tackle refugee crises and human trafficking. That is what the Government are doing. The Government entirely accept that these challenges cannot be solved by the UK alone and that we need to work collaboratively with our international partners if we are to achieve our shared goals.

The interconnected nature of migration and the need to work collectively is why the Government are already working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international partners. Noble Lords will be aware that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has secured agreements quite recently with France, Italy, Albania and the EU to work together to address illegal migration, through a combination of operational, diplomatic and development-led interventions. The UK has every incentive to continue to develop that work at international level to address the international problems of migration.

Against that background, the Government’s position, while accepting fully the very good, worthy and wise intentions behind the amendment proposed by the most reverend Primate, is that this amendment is unnecessary. If I may, I again respectfully and humbly question whether it is a proper use of legislation to provide in law how a Government—it would be any Governments over the next 10 years—should set out their policy on working with international partners over a 10-year period. Government policies change, adapt and respond to circumstances. What those policies should be is a matter of public debate and political debate.

In the Government’s view, it would be a somewhat unusual use of legislation to set this out alone for migration. Why not do it for defence, health or education? This is particularly where the Government are expected to set out their strategy for working diplomatically with international partners in such a circumstances, unless it is really required. But in the Government’s submission, with all respect to those who support and have proposed this amendment, it is not necessary because the Government are well aware of the need to develop a strategy and co-operate with international partners, as I have just said.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, if I may I will first deal briefly with Motion X1 and the National Crime Agency. It is important to remind the House that the Government have a dedicated multi-agency task force on organised immigration crime, which includes the NCA. The task force is committed to dismantling organised immigration crime groups internationally, including the criminal networks which facilitate people smuggling. In partial response, at least, to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, the task force is active in 17 countries worldwide, working with partners to build intelligence and prosecution capability.

The Government’s position, and indeed the position of the House of Commons, is that there is no need for further legislative measures to support the effectiveness of the National Crime Agency. That is the reason why the Government cannot support Motion X1. As regards Motion Y1, no one could have listened to the speeches tonight without recognising the power and sincerity with which they were made. The Government are all for reconciliation and accountability; that is a matter, in the Government’s view, for the normal political process. The House of Commons’ view, as expressed very recently and by a substantial majority, is that Amendment Y1 is unnecessary, although I am sure the sentiment behind it is shared by all of us.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in this brief debate. I thank my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his support and one or two of the ideas he brought forward, which highlight the point I am trying to make. That I have tabled an amendment has caused my noble friend Lord Blunkett to put before your Lordships the idea of licensing the boats. That may be a good idea, there may be better ideas or there may be additional ideas, but at least that was an idea that came forward.

The Minister himself has given the House a couple of facts about 17 countries working together; that has never come up in our discussions on the Bill. We need to continue to ask questions of the Government and to keep making demands of them; through that, public policy will be improved. The very least we can do is for at least one part of the Bill to concentrate on the criminal gangs who are causing such misery, rather than on the people who suffer misery at the hands of those gangs. That is the purpose of my amendment, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his support.

I finish with reference to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. How refreshing it is to have a contribution which talks about how to deal with a common problem facing humanity, whatever our views or wherever we come from—actually looking at what we might do to come together to solve that common problem rather than seeking to divide us, as sometimes happens.

I finish with this: we either try to solve this problem as one country—where one country believes that it can solve the problem by tightening up its borders and pulling up the drawbridge—or we recognise that across the continent and the globe countless millions of people are moving and the number who are going move in the future is probably going to increase. Some of the poorest countries in the world take in more refugees than many of the richer countries. All that needs to be discussed, debated and looked at—not just in a debate in Parliament but over a period of time in which people can contribute. That should include not just people in the legislature but members of the public, organisations and people from different parts of the globe.

I thought that the most reverend Primate’s contribution was refreshing and is to be welcomed. I hope that as well as supporting my own Motion your Lordships see fit to support the Motion in his name. It deserves support. It allows us to look forward, up and out, rather than inward. For that, we are in his debt. I look forward to all of us supporting his Motion. I wish to test the opinion of the House on Motion X1.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 104 and 107, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 107A.

107A: Because the Amendments are unnecessary as the Government already works in collaboration with the UN High Commission for Refugees and others in response to refugee crises and in tackling human trafficking.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoke to Motion Y. I beg to move.

Motion Y1 (as an amendment to Motion Y)

Moved by