(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberI am sorry if I am taking a little time; I hear the Deputy Chief Whip. But it is important that we should look to the future and realise that this Bill is unfinished business.
My Lords, I simply associate myself, on behalf of these Benches and as the previous sponsor of this Bill in the previous Government, with the thanks that have been given to the entire team, not only to the special committee and its chair but to the civil servants who have supported the work. I thank the Government and the Minister himself, who worked very hard in the special committee, collaborated very closely with the previous Government and myself and has, as has been said, managed to bring the Bill forward again with remarkable speed. As the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said, of course there is always unfinished business and we must look to the future, but we now have an extremely good base on which to do so.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I continue to be glad that this Bill has the support of so many noble, and noble and learned, Lords. As I said in my opening remarks, the Bill has now enjoyed robust review and precise revision and I hope it will have swift passage through the House of Commons.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for noting that we are the only two noble Lords without direct experience who took part in both this Bill and the previous Bill; he was right in saying that. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and I was remiss in not thanking Joey Topping for clerking the previous Committee stage. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for his best wishes for the Bill.
I will address the substance of what my noble friend Lord Hacking said on arbitral corruption. Of course, we take this very seriously. We believe that it would not be appropriate to use the Bill to address these matters. However, the arbitral sector is reviewing how corruption can be better identified and dealt with. The Government will continue to support this work and push for the adoption of best practices as they are developed. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in relation to the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, your Lordships will recall that on 27 March this year, when I was then the Minister in charge of the Bill, I said that I had written to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the ICC, the LCIA, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, GAFTA, the Law Society and the Bar Council to ask them
“what measures they have in place to mitigate the risk of corruption in arbitration, whether more should be done in the sector to mitigate corruption in arbitration”,
and any suggestions they had as to
“the best way to proceed and how the Ministry … could support the sector’s efforts”.—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. 12.]
Before I had a chance to review or indeed see any of those replies, Parliament was dissolved, so I still do not know what the replies were. I understand from the Minister in a call this morning that there is some glitch in relation to the convention about what documents an incoming Government could see if those documents arose under the previous Government. I would have thought that this was an area where continuity between the Governments, transparency and a common approach were essential and necessary. I very much hope that in the meantime, any technical glitch about the change of Government should not interfere with the tackling of this problem.
As has been pointed out, the Minister in his letter of 15 August summarised the responses in some detail, but the question remains, as has been raised by two noble Lords—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith—as to whether those responses should be made public, with the co-operation, of course, of the institutions concerned, from the point of view of establishing and reinforcing the reputation of the City of London and, in particular, reassuring those who wish to arbitrate in this country that the question of corruption is being addressed.
It is true that the ICC is conducting an international review of the approach to arbitration in this sector, but that review is not due to report until the end of 2025. It seems to me that there is an argument for the present Government—the Minister—to go back to the persons to whom I wrote and ask them whether they would be prepared to make public their responses, with a view to reassuring and continuing to protect the reputation of the City of London.
That said, although I think we are all with the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, in spirit, amendment to the Bill is probably not the best way to proceed at this stage. As I indicated when I was myself the Minister, I would not support an amendment to the Bill to deal with this particular matter, but I invite the Minister to give us an assurance that the Government will continue to monitor the issue, to keep in touch with the relevant arbitral institutions in London, and take such steps as the Government think fit to ensure that the arbitration scene in London is as free from corruption as can conceivably be achieved. Nothing less will do. At the same time, I also invite him to perhaps revisit the question of publishing the responses, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, have just invited him to do.
My Lords, I associate myself with the wonderful words of the three noble and learned Lords and I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, but when I was reading theology, my then—wonderful—professor of theology said that the only way you know whether you have resolved a theological conundrum is to try to find some practical solution to your particular difficulty.
My greatest concern with the amendment is this. It talks about safeguarding the arbitration proceedings against fraud and corruption. Probably Queen Elizabeth I would have said to such a suggestion what she said to the troops at Tilbury:
“I have no desire to make windows into men’s souls”.
How do you safeguard proceedings against corruption? Corruption is in the hearts and minds of people. How do you do it? I cannot find a real, practical solution. Therefore, on those grounds, although the amendment is well intentioned, I think the burden it would put on the proceedings of arbitration is far too great, so please may we not have a desire to make windows in people’s hearts.
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, again I take this opportunity to welcome and congratulate the Minister on his appointment, since this is the first time that we have faced each other across the Chamber at the Dispatch Box, and our roles are now reversed. I thank him particularly for his courtesy and common sense in the previous Parliament and I am sure that that those qualities will serve the ministry and this country in very good stead in the years ahead. It is a marvellous appointment and I congratulate him.
His Majesty’s loyal Opposition support the Bill and I thank the Government for bringing it forward so quickly and expeditiously when it was so unfortunately lost as a result of the Dissolution of the last Parliament. I also take this opportunity to thank everyone who has contributed to the result we have achieved, particularly the Law Commission team and all those who gave evidence to our Special Public Bill Committee. It has been a notable example of co-operation in achieving the result that we now have.
As the Minister has indicated, although this is formally the Second Reading, it is in effect the Third Reading or perhaps even the fourth reading, since many of these issues have been much gone over and the Bill is in effect in exactly the same form that I would have had the honour to present to this House at Third Reading had the election not intervened, in particular in relation to the insertion of new Section 6A(3), which affects investor protection-type arbitrations. I would have moved that wording at Third Reading as a government amendment—it was consulted on and I approved the wording—so I am delighted to be able to support not only that clause but the Bill as a whole. Indeed, I could do no other, since the previous Government worked very hard—in close collaboration with the then Opposition and with all stakeholders—to arrive at the result that we have now arrived at.
On the Bill itself, I will ask the Minister one question about the background that I have just mentioned. I think our procedures looked somewhat absurd in the eyes of the world when we lost the Bill when we did. Can the Minister say whether the Government in due course would be prepared to co-operate with all parties across both Houses to consider the procedures and rules for carryover between Parliaments, so that we avoid similar situations arising in the future, at least in relation to Bills that are uncontentious and apolitical? I am sure the Minister would be prepared to take that under advisement, but I look forward to his reply on that issue.
On the Bill itself, this is a very technical area, and there will always be certain what ifs, or questions that the Bill does not address. The Minister has indeed mentioned one such area in relation to the situation that may arise if there is in fact no choice of seat in the relevant arbitration agreement. The position of His Majesty’s Opposition is that one cannot cover everything in a Bill of this kind, and we should have absolute confidence in our excellent judges, who are well equipped to deal with any remaining lacunae there may be. As at present advised, we support the Government’s view that has just been expressed on that particular issue—there may be others—that we would welcome possibly a further comment in the Explanatory Notes but are entirely content to rely on the Commercial Court to sort out any questions that may remain. That is indeed what judges are for.
In our view, the Bill has, for one reason or another, been delayed long enough, and should now reach the statute book as early as possible. However, there is one point that has been drawn to my attention. It was drawn to my attention only today and relates to Clause 13, which relates to the situation where one needs the “leave of the court” to appeal on a certain issue. It apparently relates or could relate to a case called Inco Europe v First Choice. As I understand it, the issue is related to the question of whether the “leave of the court” means the court of first instance and/or includes or should refer to leave from the Court of Appeal. The normal situation is that you apply for leave from the court trying the case; if you do not get it there, you ask the Court of Appeal for leave. The question is whether the Inco Europe decision—a decision of this House sitting in its judicial capacity some years ago—is fully reflected in Clause 13. I simply leave that question with the Minister; I have no idea myself what the answer is, but that is a point that has been raised with me.
In relation to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, on corruption, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his contribution today, his continuing interest in the issue of corruption and indeed his contribution to our Special Public Bill Committee. It was a great pleasure to have the opportunity to work with him, and he is by far the most experienced Member of this House on a number of these issues. At this stage, to take the point raised by the noble Lord himself, the position of the Opposition would be that it is now important that the Bill reaches the statute book. We would therefore hesitate to support further delay or dealing with the issues of corruption in this particular Bill. There are a number of important, albeit fairly technical, improvements made by the Bill, and it is quite important that those reach the statute book as soon as may be.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has already said, the issue of corruption was raised before. I believe the ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR has commissioned a task force to explore the issues of corruption, and in my previous capacity, I also wrote to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the ICC, the LCIA, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association and GAFTA, asking for their views on the issue of corruption and the Government should take this forward. I ask the Minister what replies he has had to those letters I authorised and personally wrote, and if and when the Government are able to come to a view on how we should take forward this important issue of corruption. As the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has rightly emphasised, we cannot leave things where they are.
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the Rules laid before the House on 1 May be approved.
Relevant document: 26th Report from Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
My Lords, these are the procedural rules to enable the Upper Tribunal to handle the new appeals regime under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. These rules are already in force: this is by nature of a made-affirmative statutory instrument, which has been in force but needs to be renewed unless it sunsets after 40 days.
As your Lordships will probably recall, the suspensive claims, already approved by Parliament in Sections 44 to 49 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, are those cases where it is argued by the appellant that there would be serious and irreversible harm if they were to be removed or that the removal conditions were not met—for example, if they were actually lawfully in this jurisdiction.
Exceptionally, these rules are made by the Lord Chancellor instead of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, but there is very close liaison with the committee. Going forward, that committee will be able to amend or replace these rules as it deems appropriate under its usual procedures. That is all I need to say by way of explanation of this instrument. I commend the rules to the House.
My Lords, we recognise the controversial background to this SI and the legislation that has really formed a backdrop to many months of deliberations in this Chamber. Nevertheless, this SI, as the noble and learned Lord explained, is already in place, and this is, essentially, a renewal of it. Of course, there needs to be a robust and in-place appeals procedure. On that basis, we are happy to support the SI.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his support.
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do not insist on its Amendment 32 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 32A in lieu—
My Lords, with the leave of the House, in moving Motion A I will speak also to Motions B to H.
It is a privilege to bring the Victims and Prisoners Bill back to this House from the other place, whence it has returned in relatively good shape. I am grateful to Members of both Houses for the constructive way in which they have engaged with the Bill, especially on this last stage of its passage. I again thank all the officials at the Ministry of Justice for their hard work on the Bill. The other place has made some amendments, which I will consider in turn. I hope they will not be controversial. I will take them in what seems to me to be a logical order, which is not necessarily the alphabetical order in which they now stand in the Motions.
Lords Amendment 33, which is the subject of Motion B, seeks to require training to be provided to those with obligations under the victims’ code. Of course, agencies should, and do, have training in place to deliver the legislative duty to act in accordance with the code, but that training must be tailored to the specific function that each person is discharging, and agencies are best placed to do that. As it would place an additional burden on the Secretary of State to implement a strategy of training, we consider this amendment would be costly and inefficient. It would not be proper for an amendment from the Lords to place financial burdens on public authorities.
We also consider that the more effective approach, as has been committed by the Government in the other place, is to include a requirement for agencies to report on the adequacy of their code training as part of evidencing delivery of code entitlements. This gives us a route to identify and address ineffective training if it has led to non-compliance with the code. For those reasons, the Government do not support the original Lords Amendment 33.
Lords Amendment 47, which is the subject of Motion E, seeks to establish a firewall and prevent the police sharing data relating to immigration status with Immigration Enforcement. We disagree with this amendment because it would be inappropriate to impose a blanket restriction on the use of personal data in the circumstances to which the amendment relates. It would not prevent the perpetrator informing Immigration Enforcement about the victim’s immigration status, and it would impact on the ability to investigate crimes and support victims.
Leaving those two amendments aside, the Government have today brought forward a number of other amendments in lieu. I turn to Amendment 32, which is the subject of Motion A and concerns the duty to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. We have accepted the principle of the amendment put forward, which would place a duty on relevant authorities to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner when requested. Again, I am pleased to see my noble friend Lady Newlove in her place today. We hear the strength of feeling that a response to the Victims’ Commissioner as they do their important work should not be seen as a favour and that there should be clear, open co-operation as an integral part of enabling the independent scrutiny that victims deserve.
The Government’s Amendment 32A makes a few minor changes to Amendment 32. First, it extends co-operation further than simply assisting the commissioner in monitoring compliance with the victims’ code. Instead, it requires co-operation in relation to any of the Victims’ Commissioner’s functions, including promoting the interests of victims and witnesses. Secondly, it adds important safeguards to make it clear that any co-operation must be not only practical but appropriate. This protects against, for example, potential interference with activities that are rightly independent, such as when exercising prosecutorial discretion. Thirdly, it future-proofs the clause by putting this duty on the agencies that deliver services under the victims’ code, rather than including a specific list of bodies that may become out of date over time.
I turn now to Lords Amendment 35, which is the subject of Motion C. This amendment disapplies Clause 18 in relation to devolved matters in Wales. Only yesterday, I think, I explained the devolution position as regards Wales. We are seeking to amend the measures that relate to the issuing of guidance about victim support roles, which now form Clause 18. Victim support roles operate across different settings, some of which are devolved. The Senedd did not grant legislative consent for this measure as previously drafted. I am therefore putting forward an amendment so that the duty to issue guidance applies to England and reserved matters in Wales only, and have consequently removed the requirement to consult with Welsh Ministers on “any” guidance issued. I am grateful for the constructive discussions that have taken place in relation to the important principles that sit behind this clause, which aims to improve the consistency of support services provided to victims, and am confident that we can continue to work together so that victims have this consistency across England and Wales wherever possible.
I now come to Motion F, which concerns the amendment on the duty of candour. Lords Amendment 54 seeks to place a statutory duty of candour on all public authorities, public servants and officials after a major incident has been declared in writing by the Secretary of State. The Government entirely share the desire to see an end to unacceptable institutional defensiveness, dissembling or what can perhaps be described as an economical approach to the truth. However, we are unable to accept the amendment in its current form as it would not sit neatly on top of the existing frameworks; it is ill suited to replace what already exists, both in the context of major incidents and beyond; it fails to take into account the nuances of different professions in the spheres of the public sector; and it would entail significant legal uncertainty. The area is complex, and we believe that it would be unwise to rush forward with this amendment for these reasons.
Therefore, we have tabled Amendment 54A to require a statutory review to determine whether additional duties of transparency and candour should be imposed on public authorities and public servants in relation to major incidents. This review will need to be completed by the end of the calendar year, and, following the completion of this review, a report will need to be laid before Parliament.
I come to Motion G, which concerns the MAPPA amendments. In effect, government Amendment 99A replies to Lords Amendments 98 and 99, which relate to MAPPA. Amendment 99A would ensure that those convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour who are sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment will be automatically subject to management under the MAPPA arrangements, thereby ensuring that we are effectively managing and targeting the most dangerous domestic abuse offenders.
The previous amendment to the Bill was tabled in the other place to add domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators to those who qualify for automatic MAPPA management. While there is a legal definition of domestic abuse, a domestic abuse crime does not exist with the exception of controlling or coercive behaviour. Therefore, although well intentioned, this amendment would still have required criminal justice agencies to decide on a case-by-case basis whether an offender is eligible for MAPPA management and consequently would not quite have achieved the intention to reduce or eliminate any scope for local discretion.
There are already provisions in place that require offenders on licence to live only at an address approved by probation. All offenders released on licence are further subject to standard conditions, and there are numerous additional licence conditions that can be imposed to address specific risk factors. Those conditions also allow for information to be collected and used to manage the risk. The previous amendment would have added little to public safety but could result in a significant pressure on resources.
Offenders who perpetrate other forms of domestic abuse, such as threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, attempted strangulation, putting people in fear, and stalking, including fear of violence, serious alarm or distress, are already automatically managed under the automatic MAPPA of sentence to 12 months custody or more. Adding the additional offence of controlling and coercive behaviour will ensure that the most harmful domestic abuse offenders will be automatically covered by these arrangements. These changes mean that these offenders will be automatically managed under MAPPA in the same way as those convicted of sexual, violent or terrorist offences. This is crucial, as controlling or coercive behaviour is a known risk factor for domestic homicide. Treating these offenders in the same way as the most violent offenders is critical to improving the safety of domestic abuse victims.
I come, therefore, to Motion H, which I think is the last Motion before the House, which is the home detention curfew amendment. For someone in my position, this is procedurally somewhat difficult to follow, because it involves the Government disagreeing with their own amendment, Amendment 106, in order to reintroduce it with an addition. Amendment 106A is exactly the same as Amendment 106, but Amendment 106B, which is the important amendment, extends the eligibility of the home detention curfew scheme to offenders serving four years or more.
The original aim of the home detention curfew scheme was to help suitable lower-risk offenders who had been in custody to reintegrate into society in a controlled manner. As sentences become longer, it is important that we revisit whether eligibility for HDC continues to allow all those who may be suitable and would benefit from the scheme to be considered, as originally intended. That means looking again at whether offenders who are excluded solely because of sentence length or old curfew breaches, rather than any assessment of risk, should be able to be considered for HDC. Since HDC was introduced, sentences have grown longer and should no longer be the sole determination of whether someone is eligible to be considered for HDC. A four-year sentence length for old curfew breach is not a useful measure of whether an offender is lower-risk and suitable for HDC.
While this amendment increases the number of offenders eligible for HDC, it does not extend the range of offences that make an offender eligible for HDC. All sexual offenders and serious violent offenders are excluded from the scheme, as are those subject to Parole Board release. Those convicted of offences often associated with domestic abuse, such as stalking or harassment, are also excluded. So are many other people, including category A prisoners. There is also a robust risk assessment to ensure that offenders are released only if there is a plan to manage them safely in the community. In every case, that includes a curfew backed up with electronic monitoring.
I think I have covered Motions A to H, and I beg to move.
My Lords, we welcome the discussions that have taken place in the usual channels to ensure that the calling of the election does not unduly disadvantage victims who have waited for many years for this legislation to be brought forward. We on our side have strived to be collaborative throughout the Bill’s progress and, while we have not been able to achieve everything we would have liked, we acknowledge that the department has been willing to negotiate on some matters and make a number of amendments in lieu.
It is a shame that my noble friend Lady Royall’s amendments on stalking were not successful as part of the negotiating process. On stalking and the eligibility for home detention curfew, I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made a very interesting point about the CPS charging stalkers with alternative offences as well. As I have said in other debates, I have dealt as a magistrate with stalking matters relatively recently. If lesser charges of harassment can be pressed in the alternative, the court would have better choices to make when determining guilt or otherwise. I thought that that was an interesting point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, did not mention unduly lenient sentencing. While that was not part of the wash-up agreement, the Government nevertheless committed from the Dispatch Box to keep unduly lenient sentencing under review. As far as I can or cannot commit any future Government, I think it is something that any Government would want to keep under review, as the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is important.
We also welcome the amendment in lieu, Amendment 32A, on the duty for agencies to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. I congratulate her on all her sterling work on this Bill. This does not go quite as far as we asked, but it is an improvement, nevertheless.
The Labour Party remains committed to introducing a statutory duty of candour. It is a shame that the Government have not felt able to go further, but at least there is a review in the Bill.
We are pleased that the infected blood provisions will make it on to the statute book and be commenced at Royal Assent, and we welcome the recent government Statements and hope that compensation will get to people as early as possible.
On IPP, we have tried to work collaboratively across party lines and there is further work to be done. We want to ensure that solutions proposed are robust and assessed with public safety in mind, and we will work at pace, consulting widely on potential ways forward.
We of course welcome the concession on controlling or coercive behaviour and the MAPPA process, in Amendment 99A. It is an important marker, but only part of a bigger picture where violence against women and girls needs to be addressed. There is more work to do, but passing this Bill is an important step towards a new era of transparency and advocacy for victims of crime.
In conclusion, I thank my honourable friend Kevin Brennan for steering Labour’s response to the Bill through the other place and my noble friend Lady Thornton for her support for me during the passage of the Bill. I also thank our advisers, Catherine Johnson and Clare Scally.
Finally, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. I also thank his civil servants, who have been extremely helpful to me and, I know, to many other noble Lords who have taken an interest in this Bill. Turning back to the noble and learned Lord, I know he will say that he works as part of a team, but the team needs a leader and he has been the leader for this Bill in this House—and that has been to the benefit of all noble Lords who have taken an interest in the Bill.
The Bill is an accomplishment. It is only a step in the road, and I hope we can work on the progress that has been made in any future Governments who may be formed.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I will deal briefly with the points made. The point the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made about the firewall is a difficult one. No doubt it will continue to be discussed in the years ahead. The Government do not feel able to go further at the moment.
On Motion E, which is on the importance of training, I hope we have now put in place something effective, though indirect, to ensure that training will happen properly. That will no doubt be kept under review and be publicly reported in the annual report, so that this House and the other place can monitor how that is going.
On Motion G, which is on MAPPA, I respectfully suggest that the Government’s amendment completes the picture. It includes coercion and controlling behaviour. The point the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made about the importance of the CPS considering exactly what it charges is important, but I stress my own understanding that a risk assessment will take place in every case so that, even if there is not actually a stalking charge, the fact that it is stalking-like behaviour should be properly taken into account in assessing the risk before HDC is used.
On the commitment in relation to unduly lenient sentences, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned, at the time we envisaged that we would include something in the Criminal Justice Bill. Unfortunately, that has not taken place. The Government’s commitment remains as long as the Government are the Government—no doubt a future Government will wish to take that matter forward as well.
Those are my brief comments on the substantive points that have been made, but I will make some very brief concluding remarks as we reach the concluding stages of the Victims and Prisoners Bill. I once again thank all those who have engaged and collaborated throughout the passage of the Bill. I particularly thank my noble friends Lord Howe and Lord Roborough, who, if your Lordships remember, took over the passage of the entire Bill at a certain stage in Committee and have taken on certain sections of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Roborough has done very important work, particularly on MAPPA and related points, but my noble friend Lord Howe, as your Lordships know, has taken on a major role in relation to the infected blood issues. I am very grateful to them.
I am very pleased that the Bill has made it through this process. We have not lost it and I put on record my own thanks to all the officials who contributed to the Bill. They have already been warmly thanked in the other place, but I need particularly to mention Nikki Jones, Katie Morris and Lizzie Bates, who were among the team leaders. I also personally thank the infected blood team at the Cabinet Office.
Since I may not have another opportunity, I will say, personally, what a privilege it has been to deal at this Dispatch Box with the affairs of the Ministry of Justice over the last two years, and how much one appreciates the courtesy, perspicacity and hard work of this House. Members actually listen to the debates and take on board the points made. I think most people understand that we are trying to find solutions to very difficult problems and there are very often several points of view. My overall impression is that, on the whole, the House works very closely and collaboratively. As a newcomer to your Lordships’ House, I may say personally that that is a most impressive situation—possibly unique among legislatures in the western world.
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 33 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 33A.
Moved by
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 35A to 35C.
Moved by
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 46A.
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 47 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 47A.
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 54 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 54A in lieu—
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 98 and 99 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 99A in lieu—
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 106 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 106A and 106B in lieu—
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the draft Regulations laid before the House on 2 May be approved.
Relevant document: 25th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.
My Lords, this instrument is an important part of the Government’s ongoing support for coroners’ services in their continuing recovery from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It extends for a further two years the disapplication of the statutory requirement for any inquest into a death involving Covid-19 to be held with a jury.
As noble Lords will recall, the Coronavirus Act 2020 removed the requirement for juries in coroner cases in many—indeed, at the time almost all—circumstances, following which the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 provided that juries should not automatically have to be empanelled in cases involving a Covid-19 death. That provision was extendable, and the present regulations seek to extend that exception for a further two years.
I have three points to make. First, it is entirely open to any coroner to empanel a jury if he thinks fit; it does not prevent there being a jury but simply gives the coroner discretion, rather than automatically having to have a jury. Secondly, there is, as I have just said, a sunset provision as the extension is limited to two years. Thirdly, this measure helps reduce the delays that I am sorry to say are still besetting coroner services and the system of coronial inquests. I understand, on the basis of a comment from the senior coroner in the north-west of England, that for each day of a listing for an inquest without a jury, it takes a week’s listing with a jury. So, to empanel a jury automatically in all these cases, irrespective of whether you need a jury, is, in the Government’s view, somewhat excessive provided that the coroner also always has the power to empanel a jury if he wishes to.
The Government are concerned about the impact of inquest backlogs, particularly on bereaved families, and feel that this measure, if the House agrees it, will support coroners in their continuing efforts to reduce those backlogs and promote the Government’s objective of putting the bereaved at the heart of the coronial process. Of course, in high-profile cases it always remains possible and open to the coroner to empanel a jury. For those reasons, I commend the regulations to the House.
My Lords, I would like to ask the Minister one question in relation to something he just said about the families and the fact that coroners will have discretion. If, for whatever reason, a family wishes a coroner’s procedure to proceed with a jury, what weight would a coroner place upon that in deciding in his or her discretion whether to empanel one?
My Lords, I cannot answer for individual coroners, but I would venture to suppose that such a circumstance would have great weight with most coroners.
My Lords, I welcome these regulations. It is very important that backlogs are reduced. It is very damaging to the families and, very often, to the witnesses who may have been involved in a very serious matter that has caused them grief even if they are not a direct victim. The sooner these things are resolved, the better. It is important also that, where a jury is properly required, it is not passed to one side simply for administrative convenience.
I also take this opportunity to remind the House that, as of this date, coroners are still the responsibility of local authorities. That does not lead to efficiency or proper funding and resources. I hope that it will not be too long, as senior coroners in the past have urged, before the coronial system is put on a proper national basis within the courts service.
My Lords, we support this SI. We thank the noble and learned Lord for everything he has said and recognise the point he made that the coroner will still have discretion, rather than there being a requirement to empanel a jury for hearings.
I want to make a slightly different point to the other noble Lords. Everyone has quite rightly said how backlogs affect families of those involved; that, of course, is true. But there is another, positive reason for continuing with the current arrangements, albeit on a temporary basis, and that is the quality of the decision-making itself. For any witnesses who are having to wait longer, there will inevitably be a degradation in their memory. For that reason—not just the very laudable reason of trying to reduce difficulties for families—the outcomes will be better through reducing the whole coronial process of reviewing these decisions.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. I understand that guidance from the Chief Coroner explains that great weight should be given in particular to the wishes of the family. I accept, as others have said, that there are very serious delays in the coronial system. The example given by the noble Baroness sounds like a highly regrettable situation and I will ask my officials to look further into it.
I venture to say that the coronial system, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has just observed, is ripe for a fairly thorough review. This division between local authority responsibility and judicial responsibility is probably not the most efficient or sensible arrangement. That is something we should do, both from the point of view of families going through a very traumatic situation of bereavement—it is very serious when things such as those mentioned by the noble Baroness happen. The point about witnesses is also a very fair and important one. This is ongoing work to tackle the delays in the coronial system and its general efficiency.
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the draft Regulations laid before the House on 29 April be approved.
My Lords, these regulations form part of the implementing framework for the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters 2019. The purpose of the convention is to establish a set of rules about whether a civil or commercial judgment made in a court of one country may be recognised and enforced in another. Without such a uniform scheme, each country’s domestic rules determine whether a foreign judgment will be recognised and enforced. This can cause uncertainty and a range of challenges for effective cross-border recognition and enforcement.
Following unanimous support in response to the government consultation, I signed the Hague convention 2019 on behalf of the United Kingdom in the Hague on 12 January this year. Once in force, the convention will apply between the United Kingdom and the existing parties, which include not only the EU but a range of other countries including Ukraine and Uruguay. The legislation now before the House is instrumental and necessary for the UK to proceed to ratification of the convention, which will proceed in due course once these regulations have been approved. Parallel processes will be in train in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Joining Hague 2019 will provide greater clarity and confidence for businesses and individuals in their disputes, reduce costs, encourage international trade and enhance access to justice. It will also provide greater predictability as to whether a UK judgment can be enforced abroad, encourage businesses to choose the UK’s world-class courts for international litigation in line with convention provisions and further increase the attractiveness of the UK for international dispute resolution. The convention will come into force for the UK just over a year after ratification, so we will be one of the early adopters of the convention and continue to be a leader in private international law. I beg to move.
My Lords, I warmly welcome this instrument. It is a singular achievement that we have done this. To an extent, it will remedy the EU’s refusal to allow us to accede to the Lugano Convention. As the Minister said, it is extremely important in making sure that litigants who come to this country know that their judgements will now be much more easily enforceable. I add that the Arbitration Bill which was before this House would have achieved exactly the same objectives. It is extremely important to the international position of London as an arbitration and litigation centre that we keep our law up to date.
I thank all noble Lords—the Minister, in particular, as well as the Whips and the Government Chief Whip, the Leader of His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition and their Chief Whip, and others on their Front-Bench team—and others in the other place for all they did to try to get the Law Commission Bill into the wash-up. A lot of loud noise was made, but it did not succeed.
I want to look forward and say that it is critical that overseas litigants who might choose London to have their disputes arbitrated, whether in contracts now or for the future, realise that this is, I hope, but a temporary hiccup and that we will find the means, with the co-operation of the Government and the Opposition, whichever roles they may be playing, and with the welcome support of those on the Liberal Benches, to go forward without having to go through it all over again. The Bill was agreed. There is one small amendment to be made to clarify something, but I hope we can get it on to the statute book as early as possible. It is a Bill that would help this country make money, and that, I am sure everybody agrees, is an imperative.
I thank the Minister enormously for what he has done while he has been in his position. As a Minister in the Ministry of Justice, he has laboured mightily on many matters, but I thank him in particular for what he has done to ensure that London stays at the forefront in the highly competitive world of dispute resolution in court and in arbitration.
My Lords, we on our side support the statutory instrument and recognise and endorse everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, said regarding the importance of recognising the Hague convention and being one of the first adopters of the new convention and, as the noble and learned Lord explained, the ratification process and the importance of the UK maintaining its status as a world leader in its courts system.
I agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, about the Arbitration Bill. I well remember the Second Reading debate in the Moses Room, where the Back Bench was replete with retired Supreme Court judges—which, as the only non-lawyer taking part in that debate, was a very instructive process for me.
Every noble Lord who has spoken has really made the same point about the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill and the Arbitration Bill. All I can say is that, from my side, I also did what I could to try to get these Bills to be recognised, but, as the Bills started in the Lords, that was a problem. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, says about improving the wash-up procedure, because these are not politically contested Bills yet they are very important for UK plc. In the future, I will very much do what I can to make sure that my political party, whatever its position, will do everything it can to get these Bills on the statute book as quickly as possible.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and I particularly thank those who have been kind enough to express personal regards in remarks about me—to which I would respond only that no one operates individually and I have a wonderful team in my private office. I have magnificent officials in the Department of Justice. I have very strong ministerial colleagues both in this House and in the other place. We work as a team and it is that team that keeps us, as it were, in orbit and it is to them that one owes the warm thanks of this House.
The main point made by all noble Lords is to express unanimous disappointment, regret and frustration at the loss of the Arbitration Bill and the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill. I can only agree with those sentiments and express the profound hope for both those measures, particularly the Arbitration Bill, under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, where so much work was done was done by the special committee, at Second Reading and elsewhere that it would be an enormous regret and a very serious black mark on our processes if all that had to be done again.
I very much hope that, whatever Government is in power, that Bill, in particular, is brought back as soon as possible and that we are not defeated or held up in any way by inflexible and archaic procedures. The same applies with equal force to the litigation funders Bill. With those brief comments, I commend the regulations.
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberOffence | Data subject |
1. An offence under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (offence of harassment: England and Wales) | A person mentioned in section 1(1)(a) or 1(1A)(a) of that Act |
2. An offence under section 2A, 4 or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (other harassment and stalking offences: England and Wales) | The person against whom the offence is committed |
3. An offence under section 8 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 (offence of breaching stalking protection order etc) | A person who the stalking protection order was made to protect from a risk associated with stalking (see section 2(1)(c) of that Act) |
4. An offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an offence specified in entry 1, 2 or 3 of this table | A person specified in column 2 of the entry in which the corresponding offence is specified |
5. An offence under section 70 of the Army Act 1955 or Air Force Act 1955 as respects which the corresponding civil offence (within the meaning of that Act) is an offence specified in entry 1 or 2 of this table | A person specified in column 2 of the entry in which the corresponding civil offence is specified |
6. An offence under section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 as respects which the civil offence (within the meaning of that section) is an offence specified in entry 1 or 2 of this table | A person specified in column 2 of the entry in which the civil offence is specified |
7. An offence under section 39 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 13) (stalking offences: Scotland) | The person against whom the offence is committed |
8. An offence under section 1 of the Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)) (stalking offences: Northern Ireland) | The person against whom the offence is committed |
9. An offence under section 13 of the Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)) (offence of breaching order: Northern Ireland) | A person who the stalking protection order was made to protect from a risk associated with stalking (see section 8(2)(c) of that Act) |
10. An offence under Article 4 or 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/1180 (N.I. 9)) (harassment offences: Northern Ireland) | The person against whom the offence is committed” |
My Lords, I have two matters to address. The first matter is the position on devolution. The majority of the measures in Part 1 of the Bill apply to England and Wales. Clause 18, which relates to the issuing of guidance about victim support services, engages the legislative consent process. The Senedd did not grant legislative consent for this measure. Accordingly, the Government will table in the other place an amendment so that this clause applies to England and reserved matters in Wales only, and consequently removes the requirement to consult Welsh Ministers before issuing guidance.
Part 3 of the Bill applies UK-wide, and I can confirm consent has been granted by the Senedd and the Scottish Parliament. However, the process has not yet concluded in Northern Ireland. In the interest of ensuring the legislation is passed and these vital measures come into force across the UK, we will need to proceed to legislate for all, including Northern Ireland.
Part 2 of the Bill applies to England and Wales, and engages the legislative consent process for the appointment of the independent public advocate. The Bill contains a measure which requires the Secretary of State to consult Welsh Ministers before declaring a major incident in Wales and appointing an advocate. The Senedd did not grant consent for this part of the Bill. We continue to believe that this is an appropriate level of involvement for the Welsh Government and that it respects the legislative competence of the Senedd. Having considered the Senedd’s position, the United Kingdom Government have decided that, in this instance and given the context of major incidents, we will proceed without the Senedd’s consent. It would not be acceptable for the independent advocate provisions not to apply in Wales. It is vital that these measures apply to—
Can the Minister explain why the Senedd is refusing to sign up to this agreement? It might be of interest to the House to know why.
I am afraid I am not in a position to say why the Senedd has refused consent; only the Senedd can say. The original issue was whether it should have some kind of veto over the appointment of the independent public advocate, or whether it should simply be consulted. One could infer that it was not satisfied with the requirement to be consulted and wanted a stronger role. That is an inference I draw as I have no inside information on the point. In any event, it is vital, in the Government’s view, that these measures apply to England and Wales to bring the benefit to all victims within England and Wales. So that is the devolution position.
I do not know whether, in this procedure, it is permissible for me to answer the question which the Minister was not in a position to. If I might explain, it was hoped that in the spirit of the United Kingdom you might be able to agree on a lawyer. There are an awful lot of lawyers and normally parties can agree, but, as the Welsh Assembly sees it, for some extraordinary reason the Government refused to do what normal litigants do, which is to agree on a lawyer. It stuck on that point because it thought it showed how unworkable the union is becoming if you cannot even agree on a lawyer.
Quite frankly, there are lots of lawyers in here. I do not know whether, if we put forward everyone’s name, perhaps the Senedd could agree to someone who is already in the House of Lords.
I think this is not a very useful debate to pursue at this stage of the proceedings. Without going any further, I am under the impression that it is not only the question of agreeing on a lawyer, but whether a standing public advocate should be appointed in the first place. I suggest that is something we should leave aside for today’s purposes.
My second duty is to speak to Amendment 1 in my name on the Marshalled List. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and Stella Creasy, a Member of Parliament in the other place, for the amendments they have tabled on this issue, and their engagement with myself and officials in this area. The amendment concerns what to do when there is a malicious complaint to social services and the procedure for removing that complaint, following the conviction of the complainant and the finding that the complaint was malicious.
Amendment 1 will insert into Article 17(1) of the GDPR—in fact, it inserts it into the relevant European directive so we have an unusual example of the UK Government directly amending European legislation—a new Part 2 ground which creates the right for certain victims who are data subjects to request deletion of personal data when the following two circumstances occur: first, when an allegation has been made by a person who has been convicted of relevant criminal offence against the data subject, or the person is subject to a stalking protection order made to protect the data subject from a risk associated with stalking; secondly, following an investigation by the data controller, it has been decided that no further action has to be taken in relation to the allegation.
The relevant criminal offences listed in the amendment are the offences of stalking and harassment against a victim. A power is also taken to update this list by regulations made using the affirmative procedure, should further offences be required to be included in the future. This amendment will provide a specific new ground for victims of stalking and harassment for the deletion of false allegations made about them, and support them to prevent the further distress that retaining this information may cause.
To ensure that the data controller has an important reason to retain the data, the exemptions under Article 17(3) of the UK GDPR will apply. This allows the data controller to refuse the re quest for a limited list of reasons, including whether processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation or the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, which could capture refusal for safeguarding reasons. However, data controllers must provide reasons for any refusal and inform data subjects of their right to complain to the Information Commissioner’s Office. We will ensure that guidance, including on child safeguarding, is updated so data controllers understand how the new ground is intended to work. We will also update the victims’ code so that victims are aware of their rights around data erasure.
I therefore commend this amendment to the House, and I hope that what I have said will permit the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, not to press her Amendment 2 on the marshalled list.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak on this very important Bill. I am delighted that it covers so many vital issues and will proceed, we hope, to Royal Assent before Parliament is prorogued.
I shall speak to Amendments 1 and 2. I thank my noble friends the Minister and Lady Barran, and their officials, for their engagement on this matter at some speed. I am delighted that Stella Creasy is here to listen to the debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, my noble friend Lady Finn and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for their support, as well as the Opposition Front Bench.
Politics is the “art of the possible”, as the important quote goes. The Government have now accepted, after resisting for many months, the principle behind Amendment 2, which we repeatedly tabled in this House at various stages of the Bill. As we have heard, the law should be updated to recognise that, in cases of stalking and harassment, one of the things that the stalker or harasser can do to prolong their victim’s agony is to make a false and malicious allegation which stays on the record, and data controllers hide behind their rights in not deleting it even when the allegation has been found to be both false and malicious.
I recognise the progress that has been made in the tabling of Amendment 1. As ever, of course, the devil is in the detail. As my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy has said, there are still grounds under Article 17(3) of the GDPR on which a data controller could refuse to delete the data. I really welcome his clear commitment that there needs to be strong guidance to the ICO and data controllers in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, and also provisions in the victims’ code. The danger with all this is that we still leave the burden on victims to argue for the data to be erased, and the power remains with the data controller. That is what worries me about those exemptions in Article 17(3).
In that guidance, the data controller must be told that they need to set out substantive grounds for refusing any request for erasure of the data. We also hope that the Government will set out scenarios in which those exemptions in Article 17(3), provided for in law, cannot be used in cases where data records have been created as a result of malicious conduct.
Having said all that, I recognise where we are at this time in this Parliament. I will be interested to hear what other noble Lords might say in this short debate and what the Minister might say in summing up. I recognise and thank my noble and learned friend for the progress that he has made on this issue.
My Lords, there is little I can add. In preparing the guidance, the Government will take into account all the points, particularly those made by my noble friend Lady Morgan. The word “automatic” may be a slightly difficult word in the guidance, but I anticipate that it will be made extremely clear that in these circumstances the data controller would have to provide very clear reasons for not deleting the complaint concerned. I hope that will be covered comprehensively in government guidance, whichever Government are in power.
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights as far as is possible. Clauses 49 to 52 would disapply Section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. It is disappointing to see this Government wasting parliamentary time and public money to remove human rights from prisoners.
There is no evidence of the Human Rights Act 1998 limiting the Parole Board from making decisions about prisoners. These clauses appear to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, while the Government ignore the many critical problems across our criminal justice system. We in the Labour Party are proud that it was a Labour Government who brought about the Human Rights Act in 1998, and a future Labour Government will continue to be a bastion of justice and hope, unlike this current Government, who cannot bring themselves to focus on the real issues affecting the public.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lady Lister spoke about the lack of support from the Labour Party if he were to press this matter to a vote. He said—I wrote it down—that he thought this was “a sad portent for the future”. That is a harsh interpretation of our stance. I have just reiterated our commitment to the Human Rights Act. We would not have chosen to support him if he had pressed the matter, but the statement I have read out reaffirms the Labour Party’s commitment to the Human Rights Act. Having said that, I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has put his finger on the central question. If the Government see no diminution of the Human Rights Act, why are they disapplying Section 3 within this Bill? Do they believe that it would breach the Human Rights Act if they failed to disapply the Act in this case?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his amendments, which seek to remove Clauses 49 to 52. I am extremely sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and others, but the Government laid out their position in Committee and nothing the Government have heard since or this evening alters that position.
As I think I have said previously, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is a procedural, not a substantive, provision. Clauses 49 to 51 effectively disapply Section 3 in relation to prisoner release legislation. Let me start by reiterating that nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. If I was asked, as I think I was, to confirm that the full range of substantive rights under the ECHR remain: yes, of course they do. Nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. A breach of human rights may still be pleaded before any domestic court or in Strasbourg in the usual way, and we would not want to prevent such action by prisoners where it is warranted.
I respectfully respond to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, by saying that this provision does not represent either an invitation or still less an instruction to the courts to disapply the Human Rights Act; nor does it imply, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and perhaps by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the Government believe there is any breach of the European convention in relation to this legislation. That is not the case. The Government do not accept that there is any breach whatever in this legislation. It is the Government’s position that a matter as important as the public protection test should be for Parliament and that it should not be open to the so-called writing-in or reading-down provisions of Section 3, which is an interpretive position which means that the courts may be required to go further than usual in interpreting legislation that would otherwise be compatible with convention rights. Although this has happened less often in recent years, it can require courts to stray from Parliament’s original intention, and the Government do not think that that is appropriate in this context. The real issue is the balance between the courts and Parliament from a procedural point of view.
I am puzzled by this because it is an unusual thing in legislation to say that Section 3 is disapplied. Is it not the inevitable inference from the inclusion of that provision disapplying Section 3 in this legislation that the Government are seriously concerned, at the very least, that the substantive provisions would breach the substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act?
My Lords, that is not by any means the Government’s position; nor can that inference be drawn. The Government’s position on this clause is, as I understand it, in effect, that which the noble Lord himself is reported as expressing to the independent review on human rights because Section 3 requires the judge to perform a remedial function which legislation does not on its proper construction conform to convention rights. Such a role is inappropriate under our constitution and unnecessary because Section 4 provides an effective means by which Ministers and Parliament can amend the legislation. That is the Government’s position on this provision.
So, totally hypothetically, if anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied was found to be incompatible, it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. It would then be up to Parliament to decide how to rectify it, rather than the intermediate rewriting process of the courts. It does not remove or limit convention rights. It is simply saying that in this case that is the right balance between Parliament and the courts. That is the Government’s position on that.
This group of amendments also seeks to remove Clause 52, which sets out that, when considering a challenge, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. Of course, the courts already consider risk to the public. This clause does not mean that public protection will be the exclusive or only factor to be considered. The matter will be up to the judges, who are very capable of doing their independent part in construing the legislation. What the clause does is to ensure that due weight is given to the important consideration of public protection.
So, on behalf of the Government, I beg to move that Clauses 49 to 52 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 150.
My Lords, for convenience, I will start, if I may, with Amendments 154B to 154D, which relate to the role of the chair of the Parole Board. The Government have taken note of the debate in Committee regarding the original proposals affecting the Parole Board chair and the power of the Secretary of State to dismiss the Parole Board chair.
Strong leadership of the Parole Board is essential. It appears that a mechanism already exists, in the unlikely event that it is needed, for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about their ability to do the job effectively. On balance, the Government have decided that this existing mechanism is sufficient, so we will not be proceeding with the original proposals in the original Bill.
We have also listened to feedback that the judicial functions of the chair, including deciding whether a hearing can be held in public, would most appropriately continue to be held by the chair. It has become clear that, to lead the board effectively, the chair should retain these functions, including their ability to take part in individual cases. For these reasons, I have tabled these amendments to remove all provisions relating to the chair of the board from the Bill.
I turn next to my Amendments 153A and 154A, which seek to amend Section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. These amendments enable the Secretary of State to create procedural rules via secondary legislation which the Parole Board must follow when carrying out its statutory duties.
These amendments will allow the Secretary of State to create new rules that will allow the Parole Board chair to delegate certain functions, including some judicial functions, from board members to staff in its secretariat. The Government intend for this provision to be commenced immediately on Royal Assent. This is the subject of Amendments 162A and 162B, to which I shall refer briefly in a moment.
Other courts and tribunals typically have provisions in primary legislation to allow for rules permitting the delegation of certain functions but, to date, we have not had comparable provisions for the Parole Board.
The Parole Board has approximately 320 members and 200 staff in its secretariat. Its members are public appointees, including judicial members, specialist members and independent members, the specialist members typically being psychologists or psychiatrists.
The purpose of the amendment is to give the Parole Board greater flexibility in how it manages its workload. I have to say that delays in the Parole Board process are currently serious and must be tackled. Each review that the Parole Board carries out will include a range of case management decisions, such as varying or revoking certain directions, agreeing deadlines or timelines, adding or removing witnesses, or adjourning or deferring cases that are not ready to be heard. At present, these decisions are taken by Parole Board members, but that is not always necessary. There are efficiency savings to be made if some case management decisions could be delegated to appropriate staff, and the Parole Board supports this amendment, which is dedicated to improving the overall efficiency of the board and reducing delays in the system. That is particularly important in relation to IPP prisoners, whom we discussed earlier, since we can anticipate an increasing flow of IPP decisions to the Parole Board and an increasing workload accordingly.
My Lords, that is my understanding. I am in a slight panic at the moment—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, having raised this matter—and I hope I have not proceeded in the wrong order. I think this is group 6, according to my instructions.
I am simply referring to today’s list, which is what I am working from. If the Minister looks at today’s list, he will see that this group includes, for example, government Amendment 156ZB, which is an amendment to Clause 55, and government Amendments 156ZC, 156ZD, 156ZE and 156ZF. I do not mind at all whether my amendments are in another group, but I do not want to be told later that I have missed my opportunity.
I have to say that I decided to ignore those and will discuss them in the next group, because they were in the wrong place.
It is also the Government’s wish and position that we discuss that in the next group.
Would it be possible to say something about what I think is common ground in this group—namely, the amendments dealing with the composition and functions of the Parole Board? This is dealt with in government Amendment 153A and Amendments 154, 155 and 156, in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett.
I thank the Government for what they have done. I entirely associate myself with that, and thank the Minister and the Lord Chancellor, and anyone else from the Government who accepted all of this. I am very grateful.
However, I now want to be slightly churlish about the new chair of the Parole Board—a very important position. A new chair is to be appointed, and looking at the website I see that the deadline for the applications was 24 February, sifting was 31 March, and interviews are expected to end on 31 May. I assume that the competition is largely done but current. Maybe the Minister cannot answer this now, but the provisions in relation to the Parole Board have been significantly changed as a result of this amendment.
There are two things. I imagine there are a number of people who would never contemplate taking on a quasi-judicial position; they would not touch it with a bargepole on the basis that you could make a decision that the Secretary of State thought affected public confidence in the board. No one would become a judge if you could be removed on the whim of a government Minister; it seems equally clear that no self-respecting person could agree to be chairman of the Parole Board if they could be removed on the whim of a Minister, as was in the Bill when this competition was run.
More seriously, the role of the Parole Board chair was crafted to remove the chair from the core work of the board—that is to say, deciding cases. Everyone knows that if you sit as a judge it is critical that you are not an administrator—you cannot lead and you are not respected. It seems to me very clear that the position of the chairman of the Parole Board has to be looked at in the light of the amendments that we are about to make.
I find it somewhat disappointing that this competition has been rushed ahead with without the position of the chairman being clear. I very much hope that the Minister can give some reassurance that more time will be taken to consider this in the light of the changes to the Bill, and that the competition will not go ahead without a further opportunity for people to apply and a proper assessment made of whether the persons who are in line are competent to deal with sitting on cases.
I do not know how this has happened. I am sure it has absolutely nothing to do with the Minister, but it is very disturbing that an appointment should be made on the basis of something in the Bill which has now been radically changed. I feel very churlish to be raising this point in the light of the Government’s acceptance of these amendments, but it seems to me that, as the chairmanship of the Parole Board is so critical, as the Minister and all of us accept, we must get the right person to do it. I am not certain that it is possible to have the right person without taking into account the new qualifications. I apologise for being churlish and for asking this question, but it is rather important. Otherwise, I warmly welcome this and thank the Government for what they have done.
My Lords, I am very glad that we have managed to sort out which are the right amendments in the right place through a collective effort across your Lordships’ House.
Noble Lords will recall a discussion on this matter in Committee, which is presumably what has led to these government amendments. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I welcome them, but his questions about the appointments process are absolutely legitimate and feed into what we said in Committee—that the Government need to recognise the independence of the Parole Board and understand the risks of politicisation. The original Bill seemed to be government proposals in search of an actual problem to solve. The decision on the composition of the board should be a decision for the board.
The 2019 Ministry of Justice review of the Parole Board Rules stated:
“Restrictions on which panel members can hear particular types of case have gradually been lifted over time … to allow greater flexibility and timeliness in listing the right cases for the right panel members and we do not wish to undo the improvements this has achieved”.
That was echoed by Martin Jones, the chief executive of the Parole Board, when he gave evidence to the Commons committee.
So we are in a better place than we were at the beginning of this Bill, but the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are very legitimate and require the Government’s attention and an answer. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, raised some very interesting points about how the board operates and its accessibility. That is a difficult issue, because it sometimes deals with sensitive and controversial matters. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that, because its decisions by their nature are sensitive and controversial and the Government should keep the new additional power in sub-paragraph (2C) inserted by Clause 54 under review. Removing the chair because a decision in an individual case is unpopular, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, would influence the panel’s decisions and I think is not the way the committee and the House wish to see this go.
My Lords, I begin with the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. It was not in the least bit churlish to raise this point about the process for the appointment of the new chair of the Parole Board. I have no reason to believe that this is not a fully effective appointments process, but I am not informed of the detail at this moment, and I will write to all noble Lords to set out what the position is.
I take it that the amendments proposed by the Government remove the need for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to move his Amendments 155 and 156. I was not entirely clear on whether the noble and learned Lord is still moving Amendment 154, which relates to the law enforcement members of the Parole Board. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, I simply emphasise that nothing in the government amendments decides which individual members sit on which panel in individual cases. That remains the responsibility of the board, and that is right and proper. So I will not say anything further about that group of amendments.
I then come to Amendment 156ZA, proposed by my noble friend Lord Jackson. I thank him for the amendment because, as has been pointed out, it does raise some interesting and important issues. Once again, it is effectively a question of balance between all the various interests: victims, prisoners, confidentiality, details of health, et cetera. To recap, the provision for public parole hearings was introduced in 2022, allowing any hearing to be conducted in public if the chair of the Parole Board decides that it is in the interests of justice to do so. That changed the previous position, where all hearings were held in private. The amendment proposed by my noble friend would change that position so that all hearings would be in public by default, and a private hearing would take place only in exceptional circumstances.
The Government’s position on this amendment has not changed since it was explained in Committee and, if I may put it colloquially, the Government feel that we are still in the relatively early stage of developing and gaining experience from how the Parole Board manages public hearings. We are not yet ready to go as far as my noble friend would like us to go at this point. That is the essential answer to his point—but I do not close off the question at all. As has also been pointed out, it is part of a consideration of the continuous process of updating and reviewing the workings of the Parole Board as circumstances evolve.
To respond to the specific 8,000 hearings point raised by my noble friend, the Parole Board holds more than 8,000 hearings a year. This amendment would require the Secretary of State and the Parole Board to consider the merits of having a public hearing in every case. Victims would need to be contacted in every case, which would potentially add to their trauma. It is more complex and takes longer to have public hearings, and that may well delay proceedings further. To date, the Parole Board has published decisions for just 32 public hearing applications since 2022, eight of which have been granted. That suggests to the Government that the demand for public hearings is not, in fact, especially high, but I again emphasise that the situation is still evolving and that we need to continue to learn from the practice of the day. I very much understand the desire to create more openness, transparency and trust in the parole system, but I would not wish to create new administrative burdens on the system, potentially slowing it down. On the other hand, I do not feel that this amendment can be pursued at this point in time. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Amendment 156ZAA, tabled again by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, concerns the interval between hearings and seeks to allow the Parole Board to direct the period of time. It aims to deal with the problem, as he would put it, of repeated applications. The Government are not able to change their position from that set out in Committee. The current system already provides for flexibility in the time set for the prisoner’s next parole review, and it is HMPPS—not the board—that currently sets that interval. HMPPS considers a range of factors in deciding when to refer the prisoner to the Parole Board on behalf of the Secretary of State. Reasons must be given for the length of the interval between reviews, including the Parole Board’s reasons for declining to direct the prisoner’s release at the conclusion of the last review and the interventions required to allow them to progress. The closer the interval length is to the two-year limit, the greater the justification required for the time between reviews.
For the convenience of the House, as we have just agreed to de-group the amendments, it would be helpful if the Minister could introduce this group.
We are now on what was group 6. In any event, the Government are bringing forward Amendments 156ZB to 156ZD and 156ZE to 156ZH. These are technical amendments and do not change the policy, which remains as set out on previous stages of the Bill. The amendments make minor revisions to the drafting of Clauses 55 and 56. Importantly, they ensure that registrars have all the information they need at the point they consider an application to marry or to enter into a civil partnership. The information needed is whether an applicant or their intended spouse or civil partner is a whole-life prisoner and, if so, whether they have been granted an exemption from the Secretary of State. They also make some minor changes to clarify the procedure and to update related legislation in line with the reforms. For the reasons that I have just given, I ask that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill and invite noble Lords to support these government amendments.
My Lords, I have tabled my opposition to Clauses 55 and 56, which noble Lords know will prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or a civil partnership with another person without the written permission of the Secretary of State, with that permission to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. I am very pleased to be joined in my opposition to these clauses by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord German—the latter of whom unfortunately cannot be in his place tonight—both of whom spoke very powerfully on this topic in Committee.
I am also very pleased to be joined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whom I first met when he was a legal adviser at the Home Office from 1989 to 2006. We used to travel together to Strasbourg to defend the United Kingdom against allegations that it had breached the European Convention on Human Rights. Our record in court was mediocre at best, but the lunches were excellent, and I have great admiration for his expertise and judgment. I very much look forward to what he has to say on this subject.
Why have we brought this matter back on Report? It is not because I have any expectation of changing the Government’s mind, and it is not because I intend to divide the House, particularly at this late hour. My motive is simply to ensure that we record why this is an objectionable measure which has no conceivable justification. There are three reasons why I express such a critical view of these clauses. First, the Government’s reason for conferring this power on the Secretary of State and imposing this disability is so weak. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, suggested that these measures will
“drive up public confidence in the justice system”.—[Official Report, 25/3/24; col. 491.]
I can think of many reasons why confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined: the unacceptable delays in hearing trials in which defendants are accused of serious offences; the fact that so many courtrooms cannot be used because of their poor state of repair; the low rates of pay for prosecutors; and the low rates of legal aid renumeration for criminal barristers and solicitors, which has substantially reduced the number of lawyers available in criminal cases. What I have never heard anyone say is, “My confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined because whole life prisoners are able to marry”. It is preposterous.
My second reason for objecting to these provisions is that they are wrong in principle. We all know, and the Minister emphasised in Committee, that whole life orders are reserved for those who have committed the most serious crimes—awful crimes of serial or child murders involving premeditation or sexual or sadistic violence. However, this does not mean that we deny such prisoners basic rights. However repellent their crimes, whole life prisoners are allowed to eat more than a crust of bread; they are allowed to exercise; they are allowed to read books, to watch television and to send and receive letters. The right to marry another consenting adult is also a basic right. National law may limit the exercise of that right—you cannot marry your brother, a 12 year-old or your dog—but what the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test repeatedly stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Minister in Committee suggested that the Government consider that Article 12 of the European convention allows for a restriction on the right to marry to be in the public interest. However, that does not assist the Government because there is a judgment of the Strasbourg court in a case concerned with prisoners. It is Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court recognised at paragraph 91:
“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and… some civil rights and privileges. This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
The court added, at paragraph 93, that the state cannot prevent a prisoner exercising the right to marry because of the view of the authorities as to what
“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.
That is precisely the basis on which this Government purport to justify Clauses 55 and 56 of the Bill—public opinion, public confidence. I ask the Minister, how can the Government maintain the statement, made by the Secretary of State for Justice on the front of the Bill, that Clauses 55 and 56, like the rest of the Bill, are compatible with Convention rights?
My Lords, from these Benches I express irritation that we have these in the Bill at all. We have spent the last two or three months working across the House, improving and building a new framework for victims. It is, let us just say, very puzzling that these are in the Bill.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling his amendments, and of course I thank the noble Lords, Lord Carter, Lord Meston, Lord Bach and others for their eloquence. I can well understand the feelings expressed. I of course recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, together with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spent many hours in Strasbourg defending the United Kingdom, and in that context, although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was modest enough—probably inaccurately—to say that his results had been mediocre, in fact the United Kingdom has, if not the best, at least one of the best records in Strasbourg of respecting human rights.
The question of the compatibility of this particular provision with Article 12 of the ECHR has been very carefully considered—otherwise the Secretary of State would never have given the certificate in the first place.
The Government’s arguments were set out in Committee and I am not sure it is particularly useful at this late hour—especially as it is 10.01 pm—to repeat them. In the Government’s view, the measures are proportionate and apply to a very small cohort of the most serious offenders who have committed the most serious crimes. As of last December, there were 67 whole-life prisoners in England. Because they will never be released, their ability to enjoy anything resembling normal married life is already lawfully and legitimately restricted in a very significant way.
In the Government’s view, the measures are justified on the basis of public interest, as already set out in Committee. The public’s confidence in, and respect for, the justice system is a matter for which any elected Government must have regard—and that of course includes the feelings of victims. The one cause célèbre that has been mentioned did have an important impact in that regard.
I would add only that the measures do not prevent whole-life prisoners benefiting from supportive relationships while in custody, in the same way as other prisoners. We are simply talking about being married or in a civil partnership, and not being able to do that does not have any practical impact on an individual’s ability to maintain a relationship with a prisoner, and does not provide any additional rights or detriments in terms of visits or communications.
I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Carter, in particular. I do not have any authority to simply drop these clauses, nor am I able to indicate in any way what my personal views may or may not be. I hope I have provided at least some reassurance and I respectfully suggest that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.
I thank the Minister. I also ask him to give a very modest undertaking this evening that, before Third Reading, he will ask the Secretary of State to consider the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, as a way of solving the perceived problem, without including in the Bill a clause that so many of us regard as objectionable. I ask him to kindly give that undertaking—with of course no commitment whatever.
I can and will and do give that undertaking.
Amendment 156ZB agreed.
Amendments 156ZC and 156ZD
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as noble Lords will recall, there is a power created in Clauses 44 and 45 of the Bill that will allow the Secretary of State to refer release decisions made by the Parole Board to the Upper Tribunal. When we debated this issue in Committee, I said that we were satisfied at that time that the Upper Tribunal has the necessary skills and powers to deal with these referral cases, having consulted the Judicial Office on that matter last summer.
However, the Government have listened carefully to the arguments put forward for this amendment by noble Peers in Committee, including by two former Lord Justices, and, in the light of that debate, I asked the judiciary to reconsider this matter. The unanimous view put forward was that, given how the intervention power in the Bill has evolved over the time, the High Court is the most appropriate venue to hear referred parole cases. I therefore tabled amendments that will make that change.
I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks to the members of the Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber for their work with my officials on the measures in the Bill and to make it clear that this decision does not, in any way, reflect on the important work of that chamber; it is simply a matter of deciding where this power should best reside within the upper judiciary system.
There are two other technical amendments related to the referral power—my Amendments 122E and 122F —which will ensure that there is clear, lawful authority to detain a prisoner while the Secretary of State decides whether to refer their case to the High Court. As the decision-making process cannot be fully undertaken until the board has directed the Secretary of State to release the prisoner, it is essential to have these interim protections, so that there is a proper authority to detain the prisoner in the meantime. I beg to move.
I am very grateful to the Minister for what he said and the amendments he has put forward. For reasons that would be boring to explain, they achieve exactly the same result in practice as the amendments put forward by myself and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon. I am delighted that the Government have accepted this and I concede that their amendments are simpler.
My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for the government amendments in this group. The Government have listened carefully to the two previous Lord Chief Justices and decided that the High Court is the most appropriate place to hear parole referrals. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said that the Government’s amendments in this group were better than his, which has circumscribed the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised an interesting point about how the courts should deal expeditiously with parole-type matters, and I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say on that.
My Lords, on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, once referred to the court, the timetable and listing will be a matter for the court, but I am sure that it will take account of the need for expedition and the remarks made in the Chamber just now.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in Committee to these matters affecting IPP prisoners and to all those who have continued to engage in constructive debate with us in preparation for Report. I fully share the desire to use this opportunity to do all that we reasonably can to help offenders serving the IPP sentence to progress towards release, where that is safe to do so. To that end, we have brought forward four substantive government amendments and are taking other important measures as well. Indeed, progressing IPP licence termination and swiftly considering cases for release remain one of the top priorities for HMPPS and this Government, and I emphasise that.
The first amendment, Amendment 139A, applies where the Parole Board directs the re-release of an IPP prisoner. The amendment grants the Secretary of State the power to decide that the recall should have no effect for the purpose of the two-year automatic period, which is the period before the licence automatically terminates. Under the current measures in the Bill, the two-year clock will be reset when an offender recalled during the automatic period is subsequently re-released by the Parole Board. This would mean they would be required to serve a further two years in the community before the licence would be terminated automatically.
However, the Government’s amendment would enable the Secretary of State to decide that the recall should have no effect on the automatic period if he considers it to be in the interests of justice, much as the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, has proposed in his amendments to introduce a power of executive re-release, which I will come on to shortly. In these circumstances, if the recall is disregarded for the purposes of the automatic period, the clock will not reset on their release from prison and the offender would then be required only to remain on licence for whatever time remained of the two-year automatic period. I must stress, however, that this discretionary power would not apply to all IPP recalls in the qualifying period; it would be a matter for the decision of the Secretary of State in the light of all the circumstances.
The Government’s second amendment concerns the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Carter—Amendments 137 and 146—to grant the Secretary of State the power to re-release a recalled IPP offender without the need to go through the Parole Board process at all and for the offender to benefit from the automatic period as if the recall had not occurred. Our Amendment 139B will permit the Secretary of State to re-release recalled IPP prisoners and mirrors a power that the Secretary of State currently has to re-release offenders serving determinate sentences—now referred to as risk-assessed recall review, known colloquially as RARR. This is an executive power, and it will be for the Secretary of State to decide if and when to use it. We have also included an amendment to enable the Secretary of State to impose licence conditions in a recalled IPP offender’s licence if the Secretary of State uses this power to re-release them on licence.
This amendment also, again, includes a parallel power for the Secretary of State to decide that the recall of an IPP offender should have no effect for the purposes of the two-year automatic period, again where it is considered in the interests of justice. This will ensure that the Secretary of State has the same discretionary power regardless of whether the decision to release a recalled IPP offender is taken by the Parole Board or by the Secretary of State using the RARR power. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, made a compelling case for his amendments in Committee. I hope that he will agree that the amendment introduced by the Government achieves the objectives of his amendments and that he will not press Amendments 137 and 146.
The Government’s third amendment concerns the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—Amendment 141—to put the IPP action plan on a statutory basis and require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament. I fully recognise the noble Lord’s intention and I am particularly grateful for his significant engagement on this and other matters relating to this part of the Bill. We have therefore tabled Amendment 139C to require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament about the steps taken by the Secretary of State in the reporting period to support the rehabilitation of IPP and DPP prisoners and their progress towards release from prison on licence termination.
The Bill includes a non-exhaustive list of the issues that it should address, including support for female offenders, those sentenced to detention for public protection and the engagement undertaken in the reporting period. The Government are committed to ensuring that the IPP action plan delivers tangible change by safely reducing over time the IPP population in custody and in the community, while still prioritising public protection. Through the IPP action plan, HMPPS is putting in place further measures to boost the support of those serving IPP sentences in custody and in the community, including a new policy to deliver multi-disciplinary progression panels to oversee cases at critical points, such as that early period following release or the period following a recall to custody. Delivery of the action plan is overseen by a senior IPP progression board chaired at a senior level which meets quarterly. I have asked that quarterly reports be supplied to Ministers, to ensure that the action plan is effective.
My Lords, I first thank noble Lords for their contributions. To those who were kind enough to refer to me personally, I respectfully say that I simply speak on behalf of the Government, not on my own behalf. This Bill, these amendments and the matters we are discussing are government-sponsored matters. It is the Lord Chancellor and my right honourable friend Mr Argar in the other place, and the Government as a whole, who have put forward this Bill and these amendments for your Lordships’ consideration.
I gathered from the most eloquent speeches we heard today that a number of amendments are not going to be moved. For the record only, I will therefore touch only briefly on those amendments and then turn in more detail to those that remain in contention.
Amendments 134 to 136, proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, would permit offenders to apply to the Parole Board for licence termination after at least a year had elapsed. The Government’s view can be briefly stated: the relevant offenders have to complete only two years on licence, so we are talking about only one possible application to the Parole Board during that two-year period. By the time the Parole Board has determined the application, one would be very close to the end of the two-year period anyway. In the Government’s view, it is not unreasonable to expect an offender to fulfil the required two-year period; that is a clear and certain test. We should not overburden the Parole Board—even more than it is burdened already—with these further applications. That is the brief answer to that point; I will not elaborate further.
On the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 138, which addresses what are described as inappropriate recalls, I simply point out that, in his recent report of December 2023 on the Probation Service and the power of recall, the chief inspector found that the power was being used in a necessary and proportionate way. I associate myself with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, bringing to bear his experience as a magistrate, about the importance of recall and the circumstances in which it happens. It is very important that the Probation Service is not criticised for the way in which it makes recalls. Be that as it may, in the Government’s view, these amendments, including Amendment 138, are now overtaken by government Amendments 139A and 139B, which provide, in effect, for re-release and for the release not to count if that is in the interests of justice.
I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, whether I can give any examples of what might be in the interests of justice in that instance. My official advice is that I cannot, because that would pre-judge particular circumstances. I can say in my personal capacity, however, that one could imagine, theoretically and hypothetically, that a recall made rather close to the expiry of the licence term, when the effect might be to restart the two-year clock—or a recall made in circumstances where there had been an arrest but subsequently there were no charges, or nothing was done to pursue the matter that led to recall—might be instances where this kind of power could be useful. I think that is as far as I can go on that matter.
Amendment 139 concerns the power in delegated legislation to change the qualifying period, which at the moment could be either reduced or released. That is a standard provision. The Government cannot imagine the circumstances in which anyone would ever want to increase the qualifying period, but one never knows. Therefore, we are not in favour of changing the statutory power to change the qualifying period.
In a debate on public bodies, protests and funding, we wanted to use the word “reasonableness”, and the Government still stuck to proportionality—in government circles, on that particular Bill, they knew what proportionality meant. Moreover, I was in the debates on the Human Rights Act; it was very clear that part of the human right is whether the decisions that have been taken are really proportionate. The Act spells this out, so I do not understand why, in this particular case, the Minister is relying on case law, particularly on the Human Rights Act. I do not see why that cannot be applied in this particular instance.
My Lords, I cannot do better than simply refer to what I have already said: the Government think that there should be a very clear, simple test of public protection, and that the way to get these prisoners out is to work in a way that enables them to meet that test, so that they and the wider community are safe. My respectful submission to this House is that that is a reasonable and responsible approach, because otherwise we run terrible risks in relation to releasing this cohort, who have already been found several times not to be safe to release. That is the Government’s position.
I turn briefly to Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, which relates to other support for IPP prisoners through the use of independent monitors, and in addition to the support I indicated on the last occasion. The Government will look at additional support, as the noble Baroness asked me to do, and consider whether that would be a further element that we can build into the action plan. I respectfully say to the noble Baroness and to other noble Lords who have made this point that, for prisoners who have lost hope, the Government’s actions should be the start of restoring hope. We are in the business of restoring hope for this cohort of prisoners.