(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Grand Committee
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
The draft remedial order was laid to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of SW v the United Kingdom. It amends Section 9(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to make damages available in relation to judicial acts done in good faith, where the judicial act breaches the requirements of procedural fairness under Article 8—the right to respect for private and family life—of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government consider that amending Section 9(3) in this way is the appropriate approach to ensure that we meet our international obligations, while respecting the important principle of judicial immunity.
The applicant was a social worker who acted as a professional witness in childcare proceedings in the family court. The family court judge made adverse findings in his judgment on the professional conduct of SW, without giving the applicant adequate opportunity to respond, and directed that the judgment be sent to the local authority to which the applicant was then assigned. The applicant’s assignment with the local authority was subsequently terminated.
In 2016, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s Article 8 rights had been infringed and set aside the findings. However, the applicant was unable to obtain damages due to Section 9(3) of the Human Rights Act, which prevents the payment of damages for judicial acts done in good faith except in very limited circumstances. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights subsequently found that there had been a breach of Article 13 of the convention—the right to an effective remedy—read together with Article 8. The breach arose because the applicant did not have access to an effective remedy at the national level capable of addressing the substance of her Article 8 complaint and by which she could obtain appropriate relief. The European Court of Human Rights awarded a sum in damages, which has been paid.
We are obliged, as a matter of international law, to implement this judgment which, in this case, requires legislative change to ensure that similar violations will not arise in the future. The Human Rights Act contains powers in Section 10 and Schedule 2 to make amendments to legislation via a remedial order to address the findings of the European Court of Human Rights. On 17 July 2025, the Government laid a proposal for a draft remedial order to make the necessary amendment to the Human Rights Act. The Government considered that this addressed the specific findings of the court.
In November 2025, the Joint Committee on Human Rights reported on the draft remedial order. We are grateful for the committee’s scrutiny and for accepting that this is a valid use of the power to make a remedial order, which addresses the specific breach of Article 13 identified by the court in SW. The Joint Committee on Human Rights was of the view that the proposed amendment was too narrowly drafted to prevent future breaches of Article 13 where judicial acts infringe upon convention rights. It recommended amending the order either by introducing principled exceptions to Section 9(3) or considering removing the provision entirely, alongside a number of recommendations to amend the drafting.
While we recognise the committee’s recommendation to go further, having examined these concerns carefully, the Government have decided to continue with the current approach for the order, and have implemented small drafting changes in response. The implementation of this judgment should not be delayed any further as it has been five years since the judgment became final. We have taken care to ensure that the draft remedial order appropriately addresses the incompatibility identified by the court in SW v UK while respecting the principle of judicial immunity.
Although the remedial order has not been amended as recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, we have committed to undertaking a review of the operation of Section 9(3) separately to the implementation of this judgment, in consultation with the judiciary, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and other relevant parties. I am grateful to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its scrutiny of the proposal and its careful consideration of the more recent draft order that has been laid. We welcome the Joint Committee’s recommendation that both Houses approve the order.
Noble Lords will have heard me mention the need to protect the principle of judicial immunity, which is a long-established common law principle. An independent and impartial judiciary is one of the cornerstones of a democracy, and judicial immunity is an important safeguard of that independence. Officials have had continued engagement with the judiciary during the drafting of the remedial order to ensure that it was fully sighted on our plans.
Finally, given that the Human Rights Act applies to the whole of the United Kingdom, this order would apply UK-wide. Officials have been in contact with the devolved Governments during the process of drafting this amendment.
This draft order ensures that damages may be awarded under the Human Rights Act in respect of a judicial act done in good faith where the judicial act is incompatible with Article 8, on the grounds that it was done in such a procedurally defective way as to amount to a breach of the requirements of procedural fairness under that article. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction and, more importantly, place on record that I was the Minister in the previous Government who held the posts that the noble Lord now holds. This proposed statutory instrument—or an instrument along these lines—came before me at the time and I declined to allow the department to proceed with a statutory instrument, not on the basis that we should do nothing to implement the relevant judgment of the Court of Human Rights but on the basis that it should be done by primary legislation and that the statutory instrument rule is quite wrong for this kind of instrument.
I relied particularly on two things. In 2021, as noble Lords will recall, the then Government commissioned a review of the working of the Human Rights Act 1998, chaired by Sir Peter Gross, who had a distinguished panel in support and came out with an impressive report. A major recommendation of that report was that, although one can have remedial orders to amend various Acts of Parliament, that should never be done in relation to the Human Rights Act itself, because that is the foundation stone of the whole system and a foundational Act by Parliament, so amendments to the Human Rights Act itself should be done only by primary legislation. I was not, as the Minister, prepared to go against that very important recommendation and constitutional safeguard. That was the first reason.
The second reason was that this instrument has profound constitutional implications anyway. As the Minister has just said, the principle of judicial independence is a foundational principle of our constitution. In order to protect judicial independence, we have for centuries held that judicial acts made in good faith are immune from damages. That is also a foundational principle of the constitution, and again I took the view that if one was going to modify or weaken that principle, that should be done by Parliament and by primary legislation.
From the point of view of judicial independence, once one allows people to sue a judge or the court for acts done in a judicial capacity, there are two fundamental problems. One is that you are undermining the independence of the judiciary fairly self-evidently. The second is that you are opening up a second route of appeal from the decision in question, and that is a serious matter. I took the view, rightly or wrongly, that this should be done only with the full consent of both Houses of Parliament, properly and fully debated on the Floor of both Houses, following normal procedure for primary legislation.
I regret to say that by proceeding by this route, the Government have taken the wrong course. They have shown profound disrespect to Sir Peter Gross and his distinguished panel in this regard and have managed simultaneously to weaken both the foundational principles of our constitution: namely, the supremacy of Parliament and judicial independence.
I therefore respectfully ask the Minister, even at this late stage, to reflect on whether this really is the route that the Government should proceed with to make the necessary amendment to the Human Rights Act 1998, and I invite him to withdraw this order and to proceed by way of a one-line Act of Parliament which we can debate fully to explore these very important and difficult issues about judicial independence, the way courts operate, and whether in any circumstances parties or witnesses in court have rights against the judges or against courts for what is done in good faith judicially.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, who raises matters that, if you are not a lawyer, give you thought and give you interesting contributions that need to be addressed. I do not make a judgment on what he said, save that the Joint Committee—our Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I will come on to in a moment—reported, both the first time and the second time, on the singular point that, at some stage, this matter should be dealt with by primary legislation. Of course, the Government’s response at the time—and it continues to be the response; I am sure that the Minister opposite me now is going to have to defend this position—was that there was no time for such a small piece of primary legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s answer on that.
First, however, I absolutely agree that these pieces of legislation are foundation stones throughout our continent. For those of us who have spent, and are spending, a considerable amount of time working on the European Convention on Human Rights and the body that was set up to protect it—the Council of Europe—it is quite clear that all the legislatures in Europe bear this one thing and would say that all this is built on that foundation stone.
I carry that foundation stone with me, because it is not a huge document. I have it here: that is it. When people complain about the European Convention on Human Rights, I ought to have a selection and give them a copy. If you read the actual decision of the European court, you will see that it concerned Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. I will read this into the record because it is only one sentence. It says:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”.
You can see that, if you want to talk about foundations, that that is the foundation on which our Human Rights Act, which is being changed, was made.
My questions are related to the fact that we are justifiably proud of our Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is precisely its work that has been able to look at all these issues in great detail through taking evidence over a two-stage process, which has now taken nearly two years—and that is on top of the three years before that, when the case was first heard. This is very serious legislation and we need to be proud of the fact that we have a body of both Houses that lays out that the conditions that are being put before us today must be approved by both Houses; that is what we are here to do today.
I know that a solution has been put forward and the committee has agreed it—but not without a caveat. The committee’s primary caveat was that the amendment that has been brought forward is very tight and not broad. In the document that the Joint Committee on Human Rights produced, it sought to ask the Government to explain the rationale for being tight. This touches on one of the points made just now by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, on judicial independence.
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, and to say at once that I largely agree with everything she said. Clearly, something must be done about the unacceptable backlog in the Crown Courts, but what? As she just said, what is the answer? Does this Bill get the balance right?
I will address only one point: the removal of the right to elect jury trial in “either way” offences. That is the removal of a right that currently exists. It leaves the mode of trial to the discretion of the magistrates without, as far as one can see, any appeal as to how that discretion is to be exercised in a particular case. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, we need to know a lot more about how this is supposed to work and what the impact will be. I understand, and the Minister will put me right if I have it wrong, that this proposal goes together with the increase of sentencing powers of magistrates to 18 months. The general idea is that the magistrates will follow the allocation guidelines of the Sentencing Council. In other words, they will decide allocation according to the expected length of the possible sentence; if it is under 18 months, the case will stay in the magistrates’ court.
There is, as I have just said, no appeal from the magistrates’ decision as far as one can see. Many will have reservations about this increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers. But among the questions are whether the right to a jury should be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than set by Parliament on the basis of a very clear classification of particular offences or criteria set out in statute. Should the length of sentence be the only consideration? Should a discretion based on guidelines set by a third party, however respected—here, the Sentencing Council—be a substitute for rules clearly defined by Parliament?
The impact statement says that this measure and changes in the sentencing powers would remove about 25,000 cases a year from the Crown Court—that is about 30% of annual receipts—and save 5,500 jury trials. But that is about the number of jury trials that take place each year, so a very substantial reduction in jury trials is envisaged. Can the Minister explain the basis of these figures in the impact statement and, following observations by other noble Lords, what work has been done to establish that the magistrates’ courts can deal with this substantial increase in their caseload? I shall come back to that point in a moment.
More generally, and in common with other noble Lords who have spoken, some of us greatly value public participation in the justice system—the idea that it is citizens themselves who are administering justice and that justice is not something that comes down from higher beings to the lower echelons. Any diminution of that is to be regretted and requires justification, for the reasons given by, among others, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
As has been particularly mentioned, there is the situation of the ethnic minorities, and the view—very correctly expressed by David Lammy himself in his famous Lammy Review—that the jury system is the only part of the criminal justice system that is fully trusted by the ethnic minorities. I welcome, of course, the Minister’s suggestion of some sort of review of this aspect, but if one is going to risk a diminution of ethnic minorities’ confidence in our justice system, one is very much playing with fire.
More generally—and these are points that have already been made—I have not heard it suggested that the jury system itself has been a significant contributor to delays in the Crown Court. Rather, as the reports of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, emphasise, the Crown Court is and has been, for reasons that have been explained—including underinvestment, however regrettable that may have been—highly inefficient. Even today, we are given to understand that 25% of all criminal trials are ineffective: the prison van does not turn up; the papers have been served too late; the counsel is unavailable; the interpreter missed the train; the witness is missing; and so forth. One is left with the impression that trial by jury is being emasculated because of efficiency failures elsewhere in the system, and that is a cause of great concern.
By contrast, as has already been said by several noble Lords, the backlog in the magistrates’ court is rising; the shortage of legal advisers is acute; legal aid is less available in the magistrates’ court and the legal aid rates are much lower, risking more unrepresented defendants. The magistrates, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, emphasised, have great difficulty in trying any cases that are of a more complex kind, particularly cases that go over beyond the day or will last for a few hours longer than the average. That is going to place the magistrates’ courts in great difficulty. I pay tribute to our lay magistracy, but I share the fears of other noble Lords that we are in danger of overwhelming them by this approach that we are adopting.
So what is to be done? I suggest a twin track: let us implement as rapidly as possible the extensive reforms proposed in detail by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, including the national listing framework, the unlimited sitting days, which are already having an impact, and the various other suggestions made by, among others, the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, so as to make the whole system much more efficient and joined-up, including the police and the CPS.
At the same time, perhaps we should consider a proposal to move a block of lesser offences, to be defined by Parliament, into the magistrates’ court, as also originally proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson. In my view, constitutionally it falls to Parliament to decide who does or does not qualify for jury trial. In principle, on an issue as fundamental as jury trial, that decision should be taken by Parliament and not left to the discretion of the magistrates, however conscientious and hard-working they may be.
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I also express my appreciation for the outstanding speech of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and thank him for introducing this debate.
I propose to address only one point, already raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath: the question of recalls to custody. Let us concentrate on that for a moment. In the past four years, recalls to custody of prisoners released under licence have more than doubled. As has already been pointed out, in the last year there were 51,000 recalls to prison; that exceeds the number of persons sentenced by the courts to prison, which was 47,000. For the first time, recalls now are greater than persons going to prison in the first place. A recall rate of 50,000 represents a rate of about one in five of those under supervision. As the charity Nacro points out, in 2017 the rate was about one in 13. Have we seen an increase in risk in the last 10 years? What is going on here? There is no evidence of increase in risk, but now, according to Nacro, for every 10 beds freed up by the release of a prisoner, nine are refilled by recalls to custody. This highly regrettable situation threatens seriously to undermine the Government’s early-release scheme. As has already been pointed out by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, what is the point of early release if it is followed by a recall?
Clearly, the present situation also greatly complicates the management of prisoners within the prison system. As already mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Foster, it is costing the prison service around £750 million a year—surely money better spent on supporting prisoners on licence in the community. But the most devastating effect recall can have is on the prisoner concerned, including perhaps the loss of employment, loss of accommodation and, most importantly, destruction of any progress there may have been towards rehabilitation. This total interruption of the process of rehabilitation was rightly emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and by all noble Lords who have so far spoken.
Those of us who have been around for a while will remember that 20 or 30 years ago, in admittedly very different circumstances, the culture of the Probation Service was that recall was a last resort. Indeed, it could be regarded as a sign of professional failure to have to recall someone who was under one’s own supervision. Today, for whatever reason, the culture seems to have swung 180 degrees in the other direction: recall has become the first resort, not the last.
I fully accept that the problem is very difficult, but there are only three possibilities. The first is that the prisoner was not properly prepared for release, was not properly looked after once released, or that post-release support was inadequate. An important case in point is if the prisoner is recalled because of homelessness, a point already raised by noble Lords. That seems to be a major factor. According to Nacro, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, last year 15,000 released prisoners were homeless on the day of release. What hope have we got? What hope do they have of remaining out of the prison sphere? So, lack of preparation or lack of support for prisoners in the community is the first thing.
The second possibility is that the licence conditions are too tough, inappropriate or not tailored to the needs of the prisoner concerned. Are we holding prisoners to licence conditions they are not capable of achieving—that are too heavy, that are not properly designed—given the lack of support, the mental health problems and the drug problems? These were emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke. In all these circumstances, the Chief Inspector of Probation has criticised “excessive licence conditions”, imposing on people obligations they cannot meet. Both those points amount to setting prisoners up to fail. What chance have they got if they are not properly prepared and the licence conditions are too onerous?
The third possibility, however, is risk aversion in the Probation Service. It is right to bear in mind that the service has, over the years, lost many experienced staff, is understaffed and is managing huge caseloads in very difficult conditions. Some 73% of recalls are for breach of licence conditions. There is widespread concern that those recalls are often triggered by minor or trivial breaches of licence conditions. Recalls should be primarily for reasons of public safety and not for minor breaches of licence conditions. There should be stronger rules and clearer guidance on this point. I ask the Minister: is the dramatic increase in recalls in recent years a matter of concern for the Government? What are the reasons for that increase, and what are the Government doing to tackle those underlying causes?
Finally, I add my own welcome to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson of Liverpool, to whose maiden speech we are much looking forward.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too warmly welcome the Bill and pay tribute to all those who fought so hard to achieve it. If I may immediately pick up the point just made so forcefully by the noble Baroness, Lady Hughes of Stretford: how are we going to make the change envisaged by the Bill effective? It is undoubtedly necessary, but not yet in itself sufficient. Although this is indeed a milestone, we are not yet at the destination that everybody wishes to see of deep cultural change. How are we going to get there? I would like to confine myself to just two aspects of this challenge: one is public inquiries and the other is how to make the duty of candour effective.
Astonishingly, we have no fewer than 26 public inquiries currently going on in this country. But as the Institute for Government report of December 2025 pointed out, that system of public inquiries is itself suffering from “systemic problems”, including cost, delay and failure to deliver change. As your Lordships’ own Statutory Inquiries Committee reported in 2024, in particular there is a failure to follow up on public inquiry recommendations, and that means that avoidable mistakes are constantly repeated. Therefore, I agree with the Institute for Government, which suggests that this Bill is a first step in the reform of our public inquiry system. There should be a clear system of consistently following up on inquiry recommendations, including by a committee of both Houses—or, failing that, a committee of this House—so that everyone is clear what steps are being taken to avert future tragedy. In particular, if recommendations are not implemented, why not?
I turn to the second aspect: how do we make the duty of candour effective? It is all very well to pass a Bill and to threaten a criminal prosecution, but how are we actually going to change the culture? In the debate in the other House, the right honourable Sir Jeremy Hunt lamented that he himself introduced into the NHS a duty of candour more than 10 years ago. He pointed out that that change in itself has had very little effect: we have still seen a series of national health scandals, with the Nottingham maternity scandal being only one of a number of examples. Similarly, there is already a statutory duty of candour on the police, but incidents such as the recent Maccabi incident in Birmingham do not suggest that that duty of candour is yet particularly effective. As the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, pointed out, just having codes is not enough; we already have plenty of codes. What are we going to do about this?
I suggest that changing the culture will be a matter of leadership, as many of your Lordships have pointed out, but it will not be easy, in particular—as the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, reminded us—as we are dealing with the complexities of human nature. Loyalty to one’s institution, hope, fear of losing one’s job, and the inability to accept that one is oneself at fault are all factors that play into the problem we are addressing.
I have no immediate answer, just one or two questions. Should we build into the system not only the threat of a criminal prosecution but some better reward and recognition that integrity, truthfulness and honesty are very much the right thing to do, so people start to think that they will get the pat on the back, as it were, and public approbation? As well as a duty of candour, a duty of praise, if you like, is the other side of the coin. Does our own system discourage candour? Has our culture of blame gone too far? Is our system too adversarial? Are we trying to pillory people when we should be trying to learn lessons for the future? All these are very important questions.
I fear that a criminal prosecution, or some criminal prosecutions, may indeed be necessary in order to make the point. Just passing the Bill, in itself, while very necessary, will not quite get us there; a great deal of thought needs to go into how we manage the psychology of this situation. I suggest that, to ensure that the Bill actually brings about change, and to monitor progress, a committee of this House should undertake post-legislative scrutiny not more than three years after Royal Assent, so that we get a good view of what is going on and we continue to chase and pursue the very important change that is necessary. This is a very good Bill, but whether it turns out to be a great Bill depends on the follow-through in which the Government and Parliament, and in particular this House, have a crucial role to play.
(4 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the matters we debate today are both sombre and urgent. They are sombre because, as the committee’s report highlights, the challenges faced by the rule of law in contemporary society are very grave. To give only one example, the then Lord Chancellor said in evidence to us that the justice system
“is not worthy of the name ‘justice’”—
surely a breathtaking condemnation of the present state of affairs. They are urgent not least because the evidence to the committee suggested widespread public disillusion with the surely basic idea that the laws that protect us all will actually be enforced and evenly applied.
Today I will highlight the rule of law as experienced by the ordinary citizen in daily life. As the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to whose chairmanship I pay my personal tribute, has indicated, the “rule of law” as a phrase does not just mean protection against the arbitrary power of the state, vital though that is; it is essential to the everyday functioning of a peaceful and orderly society. Every citizen is expected to obey the law, and the counterpart—the compact, the bargain, that underpins the whole of society—is that those who do not obey the law must be held to account. But, as others have said, if that does not happen and laws can be broken with impunity, public confidence in the very idea of a society governed by the rule of law is weakened, leading ultimately to the anarchy referred to in the title of the committee’s report.
As the committee highlighted, the widespread public perception that laws against, for example, shop theft, car theft, phone theft, house burglary and fare dodging are broken with impunity is a major, insidious and, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, gradual threat to the rule of law. One could add, for example, fly-tipping, the pollution of the rivers, dodgy vape shops, online fraud, and so on, not to mention the daily spectacle of people smugglers operating with apparent impunity, as the noble Lord, Lord Waldegrave, rightly emphasised.
Even more important is the principle that the law must be enforced equally and fairly. If the law is perceived to be enforced unequally, that compounds the problem. In particular, as the committee points out, perceptions of bias and discrimination within the police, even if unfounded in fact, corrode public confidence in the rule of law. If we add to these matters the delays in the criminal courts, the delays in the civil justice system and the numerous difficulties of access to justice summarised in chapter 6 of the committee’s report, one can understand the current disillusion of the general public with law enforcement and the effectiveness of our legal system.
I am reminded of those opening scenes in “Measure for Measure”, when, in ancient Vienna, law and order has broken down and, in Shakespeare’s words,
“liberty plucks justice by the nose”.
Angelo is sent by the Duke to restore order, and he cries:
“We must not make a scarecrow of the law”.
It is a vivid image of a legal system that is allowed to become tattered, lopsided and ineffective.
We are not yet, thankfully, at that point. I certainly agree with the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Waldegrave, and others, that our system is not broken. But one cannot thrust under the carpet or ignore some of the matters and threats which I have mentioned. In these circumstances, all those in politics and public life should treat the threats to the rule of law that are the subject of this debate with the utmost seriousness. Politically, justice and the rule of law have all too often been an afterthought, coming behind health, welfare, education and so on. But, in truth, the rule of law is the keystone on which everything else depends. Nurturing and protecting that keystone is a matter of the highest importance, not only morally but politically.
Earlier today, as others have already said most movingly, we paid tribute to the life of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who embodied in his office of Lord Chancellor and in his person the authority and dignity of the rule of law. Let us try to live up to the example of Lord Mackay and once again place the rule of law, a healthy justice system, fair and effective law enforcement and access to justice at the core and centre of our public life, with all the resources and attention to excellence that is required. Let us never make a scarecrow of the law.
(5 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when we think about the justice system, let us not forget Cinderella—the family courts. It is not entirely bad news; there is some good news on this front. Exceptionally in this debate, I congratulate, if I may, the Minister, and indeed her predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, on the Government’s recent commitment to complete the rollout of what is now called the child-focused model in private law disputes concerning children. Previously known as the pathfinder scheme, and initiated by the previous Government, this new approach introduces a problem-solving, multi-agency approach in private family law cases concerning children in place of the traditional adversarial model. Recently described by the retiring President of the Family Division as one of the most important developments in family law over the past 30 years, this new approach has been shown to reduce backlogs, shorten proceedings, save costs, reduce stress and, most importantly, enhance the voice of the child in these often-traumatic cases.
But there is, as always, a “but”. I appreciate that the most difficult thing in government is to extract from the machine a commitment to achieve a certain policy aim by a certain date—in other words, to set a deadline. Has anybody ever succeeded in getting the Government to set a definite deadline by which a commitment will be delivered? None the less, my plea today to the Minister—and through her to the Lord Chancellor and the Government—is to set a deadline for the completion of the rollout of the child-focused model in the family courts. Please give the children, stuck through no fault of their own for months and sometimes years on end in the family courts, the priority they so plainly deserve.
This is a success story. It is a partial answer to those who believe that nothing works. Good public sector reform can be achieved, but the drive has to come from Ministers. I respectfully suggest that the end of 2027 for the complete introduction of child-focused family courts across the country, including London, would be a proper deadline. We are not yet even half way there. We have made good progress—and great credit to everyone concerned—but let us press on with this most important project.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I warmly congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Longfield, on an outstanding maiden speech and welcome her again to this House. Indeed, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for leading this debate. In response to his invitation, I briefly say that in my view we have two fundamental problems with the court system. First, there are not enough criminal lawyers to go around—whether it is CPS, prosecution or defence. Secondly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, also said, there are many inefficiencies in the court system. If we can tackle those, we may not need radical reform.
I will take four points very briefly. Despite the recent increase in sitting days, I understand that in 2025, Snaresbrook Crown Court will still be unable to use more than 15 out of 20 courts: in other words, 25% below capacity. Isleworth Crown Court reportedly closed five courts last month, and, according to today’s Times, last Friday, only eight out of 20 courts at the Old Bailey were working. At present, the court backlog is an emergency. There is no justification in such an emergency for allowing outdated accounting rules to restrict court sittings.
On the question of costs, the court system has high fixed costs—buildings, permanent judges, staff, and so forth. But the marginal costs are relatively low: a part-time recorder’s fee is £800 a day. So, 10 recorders, sitting remotely, could do at least 50 extra court cases or directions hearings a day for less than £10,000. It is basic economics that, with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, the correct economic response is to maximise throughput—to reduce unit costs. But the present restrictions lead absurdly to the opposite result: higher unit costs per court disposal. That is not an efficient system.
More fundamentally, under the Courts Act 2003 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the Lord Chancellor has a statutory duty to ensure an “efficient and effective system” of courts and tribunals. Under Section 17 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the Lord Chancellor takes a formal oath,
“to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and effective support of the courts”.
That is an absolute obligation, not subject to Treasury whim or political change in the wind. So, would the Minister accept that, by virtue of those statutes, resources must be ring-fenced from spending cuts and funded properly?
Lastly, given the astonishing figure from the NAO that 27% of court trials are ineffective, as already mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, does the Minister agree that although listing is traditionally regarded as “a judicial function”, the general efficiency of listing practices, as distinct from decisions on individual cases, is a legitimate subject of public debate and scrutiny by Parliament?
(2 years ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Hacking (Lab)
I am sorry if I am taking a little time; I hear the Deputy Chief Whip. But it is important that we should look to the future and realise that this Bill is unfinished business.
My Lords, I simply associate myself, on behalf of these Benches and as the previous sponsor of this Bill in the previous Government, with the thanks that have been given to the entire team, not only to the special committee and its chair but to the civil servants who have supported the work. I thank the Government and the Minister himself, who worked very hard in the special committee, collaborated very closely with the previous Government and myself and has, as has been said, managed to bring the Bill forward again with remarkable speed. As the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said, of course there is always unfinished business and we must look to the future, but we now have an extremely good base on which to do so.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I continue to be glad that this Bill has the support of so many noble, and noble and learned, Lords. As I said in my opening remarks, the Bill has now enjoyed robust review and precise revision and I hope it will have swift passage through the House of Commons.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for noting that we are the only two noble Lords without direct experience who took part in both this Bill and the previous Bill; he was right in saying that. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and I was remiss in not thanking Joey Topping for clerking the previous Committee stage. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for his best wishes for the Bill.
I will address the substance of what my noble friend Lord Hacking said on arbitral corruption. Of course, we take this very seriously. We believe that it would not be appropriate to use the Bill to address these matters. However, the arbitral sector is reviewing how corruption can be better identified and dealt with. The Government will continue to support this work and push for the adoption of best practices as they are developed. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in relation to the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, your Lordships will recall that on 27 March this year, when I was then the Minister in charge of the Bill, I said that I had written to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the ICC, the LCIA, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, GAFTA, the Law Society and the Bar Council to ask them
“what measures they have in place to mitigate the risk of corruption in arbitration, whether more should be done in the sector to mitigate corruption in arbitration”,
and any suggestions they had as to
“the best way to proceed and how the Ministry … could support the sector’s efforts”.—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. 12.]
Before I had a chance to review or indeed see any of those replies, Parliament was dissolved, so I still do not know what the replies were. I understand from the Minister in a call this morning that there is some glitch in relation to the convention about what documents an incoming Government could see if those documents arose under the previous Government. I would have thought that this was an area where continuity between the Governments, transparency and a common approach were essential and necessary. I very much hope that in the meantime, any technical glitch about the change of Government should not interfere with the tackling of this problem.
As has been pointed out, the Minister in his letter of 15 August summarised the responses in some detail, but the question remains, as has been raised by two noble Lords—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith—as to whether those responses should be made public, with the co-operation, of course, of the institutions concerned, from the point of view of establishing and reinforcing the reputation of the City of London and, in particular, reassuring those who wish to arbitrate in this country that the question of corruption is being addressed.
It is true that the ICC is conducting an international review of the approach to arbitration in this sector, but that review is not due to report until the end of 2025. It seems to me that there is an argument for the present Government—the Minister—to go back to the persons to whom I wrote and ask them whether they would be prepared to make public their responses, with a view to reassuring and continuing to protect the reputation of the City of London.
That said, although I think we are all with the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, in spirit, amendment to the Bill is probably not the best way to proceed at this stage. As I indicated when I was myself the Minister, I would not support an amendment to the Bill to deal with this particular matter, but I invite the Minister to give us an assurance that the Government will continue to monitor the issue, to keep in touch with the relevant arbitral institutions in London, and take such steps as the Government think fit to ensure that the arbitration scene in London is as free from corruption as can conceivably be achieved. Nothing less will do. At the same time, I also invite him to perhaps revisit the question of publishing the responses, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, have just invited him to do.
My Lords, I associate myself with the wonderful words of the three noble and learned Lords and I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, but when I was reading theology, my then—wonderful—professor of theology said that the only way you know whether you have resolved a theological conundrum is to try to find some practical solution to your particular difficulty.
My greatest concern with the amendment is this. It talks about safeguarding the arbitration proceedings against fraud and corruption. Probably Queen Elizabeth I would have said to such a suggestion what she said to the troops at Tilbury:
“I have no desire to make windows into men’s souls”.
How do you safeguard proceedings against corruption? Corruption is in the hearts and minds of people. How do you do it? I cannot find a real, practical solution. Therefore, on those grounds, although the amendment is well intentioned, I think the burden it would put on the proceedings of arbitration is far too great, so please may we not have a desire to make windows in people’s hearts.
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, again I take this opportunity to welcome and congratulate the Minister on his appointment, since this is the first time that we have faced each other across the Chamber at the Dispatch Box, and our roles are now reversed. I thank him particularly for his courtesy and common sense in the previous Parliament and I am sure that that those qualities will serve the ministry and this country in very good stead in the years ahead. It is a marvellous appointment and I congratulate him.
His Majesty’s loyal Opposition support the Bill and I thank the Government for bringing it forward so quickly and expeditiously when it was so unfortunately lost as a result of the Dissolution of the last Parliament. I also take this opportunity to thank everyone who has contributed to the result we have achieved, particularly the Law Commission team and all those who gave evidence to our Special Public Bill Committee. It has been a notable example of co-operation in achieving the result that we now have.
As the Minister has indicated, although this is formally the Second Reading, it is in effect the Third Reading or perhaps even the fourth reading, since many of these issues have been much gone over and the Bill is in effect in exactly the same form that I would have had the honour to present to this House at Third Reading had the election not intervened, in particular in relation to the insertion of new Section 6A(3), which affects investor protection-type arbitrations. I would have moved that wording at Third Reading as a government amendment—it was consulted on and I approved the wording—so I am delighted to be able to support not only that clause but the Bill as a whole. Indeed, I could do no other, since the previous Government worked very hard—in close collaboration with the then Opposition and with all stakeholders—to arrive at the result that we have now arrived at.
On the Bill itself, I will ask the Minister one question about the background that I have just mentioned. I think our procedures looked somewhat absurd in the eyes of the world when we lost the Bill when we did. Can the Minister say whether the Government in due course would be prepared to co-operate with all parties across both Houses to consider the procedures and rules for carryover between Parliaments, so that we avoid similar situations arising in the future, at least in relation to Bills that are uncontentious and apolitical? I am sure the Minister would be prepared to take that under advisement, but I look forward to his reply on that issue.
On the Bill itself, this is a very technical area, and there will always be certain what ifs, or questions that the Bill does not address. The Minister has indeed mentioned one such area in relation to the situation that may arise if there is in fact no choice of seat in the relevant arbitration agreement. The position of His Majesty’s Opposition is that one cannot cover everything in a Bill of this kind, and we should have absolute confidence in our excellent judges, who are well equipped to deal with any remaining lacunae there may be. As at present advised, we support the Government’s view that has just been expressed on that particular issue—there may be others—that we would welcome possibly a further comment in the Explanatory Notes but are entirely content to rely on the Commercial Court to sort out any questions that may remain. That is indeed what judges are for.
In our view, the Bill has, for one reason or another, been delayed long enough, and should now reach the statute book as early as possible. However, there is one point that has been drawn to my attention. It was drawn to my attention only today and relates to Clause 13, which relates to the situation where one needs the “leave of the court” to appeal on a certain issue. It apparently relates or could relate to a case called Inco Europe v First Choice. As I understand it, the issue is related to the question of whether the “leave of the court” means the court of first instance and/or includes or should refer to leave from the Court of Appeal. The normal situation is that you apply for leave from the court trying the case; if you do not get it there, you ask the Court of Appeal for leave. The question is whether the Inco Europe decision—a decision of this House sitting in its judicial capacity some years ago—is fully reflected in Clause 13. I simply leave that question with the Minister; I have no idea myself what the answer is, but that is a point that has been raised with me.
In relation to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, on corruption, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his contribution today, his continuing interest in the issue of corruption and indeed his contribution to our Special Public Bill Committee. It was a great pleasure to have the opportunity to work with him, and he is by far the most experienced Member of this House on a number of these issues. At this stage, to take the point raised by the noble Lord himself, the position of the Opposition would be that it is now important that the Bill reaches the statute book. We would therefore hesitate to support further delay or dealing with the issues of corruption in this particular Bill. There are a number of important, albeit fairly technical, improvements made by the Bill, and it is quite important that those reach the statute book as soon as may be.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has already said, the issue of corruption was raised before. I believe the ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR has commissioned a task force to explore the issues of corruption, and in my previous capacity, I also wrote to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the ICC, the LCIA, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association and GAFTA, asking for their views on the issue of corruption and the Government should take this forward. I ask the Minister what replies he has had to those letters I authorised and personally wrote, and if and when the Government are able to come to a view on how we should take forward this important issue of corruption. As the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has rightly emphasised, we cannot leave things where they are.