King’s Speech

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome the Minister and congratulate him on a most outstanding maiden speech. I will briefly deal with two topics not mentioned in His Majesty’s gracious Speech: family justice and the efficiency of our courts.

Such is the pressure on the prisons and on our court system that family justice struggles very often to get attention. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, whom I also warmly welcome and congratulate on his appointment, is a distinguished family magistrate, but I first ask the Minister for an assurance that the family justice system will receive both the attention and the resources it needs under the new Government.

More particularly, the previous Government quietly embarked on an ambitious programme to improve family justice, including setting new objectives through the Family Justice Board; reinvigorating the local family justice boards; rolling out the pathfinder project in private family law across the country, which transforms the old adversarial system into a problem-solving system; instituting a pilot scheme for early legal advice, because in family law many litigants are unrepresented; encouraging mediation; and taking other measures. Will the Minister kindly assure the House that this programme will continue, that in particular the rollout of the pathfinder project across the country will be taken forward and that the Lord Chancellor will not take no for an answer, whatever the alleged lack of financial resources or other feeble excuses might be put forward? Our children deserve no less.

Similarly, and in the same vein, will the Minister consider closely reforming the adversarial system that exists in public family law to encourage a more conciliatory and cost-effective approach, including earlier resolution? Will the Minister particularly investigate why the cost of family law proceedings is so high and has risen so sharply, and why, in particular, some 13,000 or so cases in public family law consume about half the whole civil legal aid budget and cost almost as much as legal aid in the entire Crown Court?

I turn briefly to court administration. The general public, and indeed noble Lords, may not know or entirely appreciate that each year there is an extremely painful negotiation between the Government and judges as to how many days courts are allowed to sit, with a view to restricting the latter. Much emphasis has already been put on the appalling delays in our court system. Faced as we are with that, does the Minister agree that any system intended to restrict court sittings should be fully transparent and explained, and that the rationale for this system and the decisions made thereunder should be explained fully to Parliament and the general public?

Still on the subject of court administration, this is largely in the hands of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, HMCTS. Serious questions arise about the transparency and accountability of the present framework under which that system operates. Those questions are for another day, but the final question I would like to ask the Minister is this: is he aware that in our country which, as the Attorney-General emphasised yesterday, prides itself on the rule of law, our dedicated and hard-working court staff are the worst-paid public servants? Apart from anything else, that seriously undermines the efficiency of our entire court system. What do the Government propose to do about it?

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 103, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 103A.

103A: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as section 1 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 already provides for the National Crime Agency to have functions in relation to combating organised crime; this function encompasses organised immigration crime.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Motion X, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motion Y.

Motion X relates to the function of the National Crime Agency. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, indicated that he had brought forward his amendment to generate a debate about the role of the NCA in tackling organised immigration crime. That debate has been most useful, but on the substance of the amendment I hope that your Lordships will accept that it is not in fact needed, as the Commons has decided.

As regards proposed new Section 6A of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which is now proposed in Amendment 103B, I respectfully suggest that the NCA’s annual report and annual plan already set out the range of activities in which it is already engaged to tackle the cross-channel people-smuggling gangs. Again, this is an unnecessary addition to the 2013 Act.

Finally on this aspect, I gently say that this here is, after all, the legislature. We are not the Executive, and I would respectfully suggest that the legislature should be slow to overmanage the independent executive agencies, when there is no compelling reason to do so in this case. That is the Government’s position on Motion X.

As regards Motion Y, the Government are of course grateful to have the further opportunity to discuss Lords Amendment 104 with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Government can wholeheartedly concur with the sentiments behind this amendment. While our immediate focus is on enacting this Bill, we also need to take a longer-term view if we are to tackle refugee crises and human trafficking. That is what the Government are doing. The Government entirely accept that these challenges cannot be solved by the UK alone and that we need to work collaboratively with our international partners if we are to achieve our shared goals.

The interconnected nature of migration and the need to work collectively is why the Government are already working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international partners. Noble Lords will be aware that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has secured agreements quite recently with France, Italy, Albania and the EU to work together to address illegal migration, through a combination of operational, diplomatic and development-led interventions. The UK has every incentive to continue to develop that work at international level to address the international problems of migration.

Against that background, the Government’s position, while accepting fully the very good, worthy and wise intentions behind the amendment proposed by the most reverend Primate, is that this amendment is unnecessary. If I may, I again respectfully and humbly question whether it is a proper use of legislation to provide in law how a Government—it would be any Governments over the next 10 years—should set out their policy on working with international partners over a 10-year period. Government policies change, adapt and respond to circumstances. What those policies should be is a matter of public debate and political debate.

In the Government’s view, it would be a somewhat unusual use of legislation to set this out alone for migration. Why not do it for defence, health or education? This is particularly where the Government are expected to set out their strategy for working diplomatically with international partners in such a circumstances, unless it is really required. But in the Government’s submission, with all respect to those who support and have proposed this amendment, it is not necessary because the Government are well aware of the need to develop a strategy and co-operate with international partners, as I have just said.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, if I may I will first deal briefly with Motion X1 and the National Crime Agency. It is important to remind the House that the Government have a dedicated multi-agency task force on organised immigration crime, which includes the NCA. The task force is committed to dismantling organised immigration crime groups internationally, including the criminal networks which facilitate people smuggling. In partial response, at least, to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, the task force is active in 17 countries worldwide, working with partners to build intelligence and prosecution capability.

The Government’s position, and indeed the position of the House of Commons, is that there is no need for further legislative measures to support the effectiveness of the National Crime Agency. That is the reason why the Government cannot support Motion X1. As regards Motion Y1, no one could have listened to the speeches tonight without recognising the power and sincerity with which they were made. The Government are all for reconciliation and accountability; that is a matter, in the Government’s view, for the normal political process. The House of Commons’ view, as expressed very recently and by a substantial majority, is that Amendment Y1 is unnecessary, although I am sure the sentiment behind it is shared by all of us.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in this brief debate. I thank my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his support and one or two of the ideas he brought forward, which highlight the point I am trying to make. That I have tabled an amendment has caused my noble friend Lord Blunkett to put before your Lordships the idea of licensing the boats. That may be a good idea, there may be better ideas or there may be additional ideas, but at least that was an idea that came forward.

The Minister himself has given the House a couple of facts about 17 countries working together; that has never come up in our discussions on the Bill. We need to continue to ask questions of the Government and to keep making demands of them; through that, public policy will be improved. The very least we can do is for at least one part of the Bill to concentrate on the criminal gangs who are causing such misery, rather than on the people who suffer misery at the hands of those gangs. That is the purpose of my amendment, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his support.

I finish with reference to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. How refreshing it is to have a contribution which talks about how to deal with a common problem facing humanity, whatever our views or wherever we come from—actually looking at what we might do to come together to solve that common problem rather than seeking to divide us, as sometimes happens.

I finish with this: we either try to solve this problem as one country—where one country believes that it can solve the problem by tightening up its borders and pulling up the drawbridge—or we recognise that across the continent and the globe countless millions of people are moving and the number who are going move in the future is probably going to increase. Some of the poorest countries in the world take in more refugees than many of the richer countries. All that needs to be discussed, debated and looked at—not just in a debate in Parliament but over a period of time in which people can contribute. That should include not just people in the legislature but members of the public, organisations and people from different parts of the globe.

I thought that the most reverend Primate’s contribution was refreshing and is to be welcomed. I hope that as well as supporting my own Motion your Lordships see fit to support the Motion in his name. It deserves support. It allows us to look forward, up and out, rather than inward. For that, we are in his debt. I look forward to all of us supporting his Motion. I wish to test the opinion of the House on Motion X1.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 104 and 107, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 107A.

107A: Because the Amendments are unnecessary as the Government already works in collaboration with the UN High Commission for Refugees and others in response to refugee crises and in tackling human trafficking.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoke to Motion Y. I beg to move.

Motion Y1 (as an amendment to Motion Y)

Moved by

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the House and to all noble Lords who have spoken in today’s debate and in earlier debates. If I may say so, I think we have collectively changed our minds, or developed our thoughts, in various respects as a result of a collective effort, for which the Government are grateful. I am particularly grateful to those noble Lords who have engaged outside the Chamber: the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Cromwell, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and others, have all contributed most constructively to the debate. There is clearly a great deal of strength of feeling on the issue of SLAPPs. It is therefore with some optimism that I hope the amendments I am about to move formally will be accepted: Amendments 102, 103, 137, 141, 142 and 143.

I will first make a general remark. In civil litigation generally, parties are not necessarily evenly matched. One may have more private resources than the other; one may be legally aided while the other is not. That is a fact of life, but one relies on the rules of procedure and the good sense of the judge to see fair play, bearing also in mind the inherent power of the court to strike out a claim for abuse of process. But when we come to SLAPPS—short for strategic litigation against public participation, a rather unwieldy phrase—two additional factors come into play. This is probably common ground in this House. In addition to the possible imbalance of power between the parties, the two additional factors are, first, the right to free speech, which is essentially what this legislation protects, and secondly the public interest in full and frank disclosure of wrongdoing.

Effectively, to use the courts or the threat of litigation as a means of preventing free speech and possibly covering up wrongdoing is a particular kind of abuse of process. It may well be that the power to control such behaviour already exists under the inherent direct jurisdiction of the courts—as I think my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier may have observed earlier—but the Government wish to put that issue beyond doubt and to put a stop to SLAPP-type tactics. We cannot allow the misuse of our legal system to suppress public interest investigations and reports. On the other hand, we have to safeguard access to justice in the measures that we take, so there is a balance to be struck here. The Government respectfully suggest that this Bill finds that balance.

I will first take the definition of SLAPPs. What is a SLAPP claim? It has a number of components. First, it will be one where the complainant has acted, or intended to act, to restrain the defendant’s exercise of their right to freedom of speech. The defendant will typically be a journalist. Secondly, the exercise of that right is a matter relating to economic crime—this is necessarily limited at the moment to economic crime because of the scope of the Bill—and for a purpose related to the pursuit of the public interest in combating such economic crime. Lastly, the claimant will have misused the litigation to cause harm to the defendant, in the circumstances defined in the clause.

For such SLAPP claims there will be several protections. First, there is the early dismissal test. The claimant will have to establish that they are more likely than not to succeed at trial. Normally, if you try to strike something out, it is you who has to establish that, but if it is a SLAPP claim, the burden is reversed and the claimant must establish that they are more likely than not to succeed at trial. That is an important change in the onus.

Secondly, there is the costs protection of the defendant, who will not have to pay the costs, even if there is eventually an adverse outcome at trial. On pre-litigation tactics, raised on a number of occasions by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and others—it is a very fair point—in the Government’s view the costs protection and the reversal of the burden of proof very largely draw the sting of those threats. The journalist can sit back and say, “Well, do your worst. I’m protected on costs and by the change of the onus”, so the teeth are drawn from the attempt to suppress the publication of wrongdoing.

In addition—I will come to this in a moment—there are the powers of the Solicitors Regulation Authority to pursue the solicitors through its disciplinary procedures. With those protections, there is a very substantial assault by this legislation on SLAPPs. The Government’s view is that the courts will have the necessary tools and guidance from Parliament to deal with SLAPP lawsuits aimed at stifling freedom of speech and preventing journalists exposing economic crime.

As to the points rightly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that we should have gone further and so forth, the Government’s view is that we can always improve the shining hour—of course we can—but here we have, to use the words of the noble Lord, a good chunk of what is necessary. The Government’s view is that, at the moment, these provisions go far enough. As far as Scotland is concerned, discussions are continuing with our Scottish counterparts—it is a separate legal jurisdiction—and the same is true in Northern Ireland, so those matters will be pursued in due course. But the Government ask the House to accept that the provisions of this Bill as framed cut the mustard, if I may use the expression.

Of course, SLAPPs are broader than just economic crime. In answer to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, and others, the Government will come forward with completing the jigsaw as soon as a suitable legislative vehicle appears. At the moment, we are engaged in what, in another context, is called horizon scanning, to see when we can find a legislative vehicle that will do the job. This is not something the Government are going to forget about, and nor would this House allow us to do so. As soon as we can do it, we will get on to it.

It is entirely true that we now need the Civil Procedure Rules to back this up. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee will no doubt proceed as fast as it can; it is well-versed in ensuring that there are appropriate rules to make sure that legislation can have its proper effect in the courts. I have no control over the timetable of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, but the message from this House is to get on with this as fast as we can. Indeed, if I may quickly refer to the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, of course we need, as he suggests, quick, cheap and flexible procedures. One would hope that those will be developed judicially by senior judges, and that this legislation will have the desired effect. The Government have every confidence in the ability of the courts to put into effect what is the clear will of Parliament.

I turn to Amendment 94, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. With regret, the Government, although sympathetic to the amendment’s objectives, do not feel that it would be right to criminalise access to justice in the way proposed. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, pointed out, we have got rid of criminal libel. We have a balance to strike here. It would be very strong to say that it is, or is potentially, a criminal offence to commence proceedings in the courts. The courts have to be open. In the Government’s view, the balance to be struck here is civil, not criminal. Creating a criminal offence with such a broad application to tackle what is, in essence, a civil matter would be inappropriate. We do not have the evidence to support such a development. It would be entirely inappropriate to create a criminal offence that would not be very clearly defined and would potentially prevent access to justice—apart from, of course, establishing the criminal instead of the civil standard, which we are essentially dealing with here.

The creation of a criminal offence would go far beyond the Government’s measures and, I think, would mark a departure from other jurisdictions, to which some reference has been made. I might be wrong, but I do not know of one that has made this kind of activity a criminal offence. In the light of those comments, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Amendments 125H and 125J were tabled by my noble friend Lady Stowell. I thank her again for her constructive engagement on the Bill. These amendments seek to allow the Solicitors Regulation Authority to set its own fining limit for cases of professional misconduct relating to abusive litigation brought forward to suppress reporting on economic crime.

Clause 195 removes the statutory limit on the level of financial penalty that the Law Society, which delegates the matter to the SRA, may impose, and a similar provision applies to the Scottish Solicitors’ Discipline Tribunal. The intention that my noble friend expresses is shared by the Bill, but the Government’s view is that the current drafting of these clauses, which already captures disciplinary matters relating to economic crime, covers the matters to which my noble friend referred. If the SRA can demonstrate that an abusive litigation case breached a rule specifically for economic crime or

“purposes relating to the prevention or detection of economic crime”,

that should permit it to use its new fining powers, so my noble friend’s amendments are, in the Government’s view, unnecessary.

I assure my noble friend that the Government’s intention is that this measure allows the SRA to impose fines above £25,000 against solicitors and law firms that fail to comply with the rule by taking part in or facilitating abusive litigation, whether or not such cases reach court or are struck out, provided that the SRA can establish a link between this type of misconduct and the prevention or detection of economic crime. This legislation is directed not just to cases that come to court but to pre-action threats and actions to deal with attempts to intimidate.

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I tabled all the amendments in this group. I am very grateful to those who have added their names to them: the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I am also very grateful to the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for meeting me and senior representatives of the Law Society and of the Bar Council to discuss what is now Clause 197.

All these amendments relate to the new regulatory objective in Clause 197 that amends the Legal Services Act 2007 by inserting for the Legal Services Board a new objective:

“promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime”.

As I said in Committee, this proposed new regulatory objective is extraordinarily wide and imprecise. The meaning of the word “promoting” lacks any clarity or certainty. It raises legitimate concerns about a potential lack of proportionality and overregulation by regulators, and about a lack of evidential risk as to those sectors most likely to come into contact with economic crime—for example, advisers rather than advocates. And even in the area of advisers, it is hardly likely to involve experts in the environment or town planning.

As the MoJ’s impact assessment of the new regulatory objective makes clear, the front-line regulators of the legal profession are already implicitly under a duty to ensure that lawyers are not breaching economic crime rules. The provisions in Clause 197 are merely to make explicit what is already implicit, and it is important that the Legal Services Board and the front-line regulators understand that this is the case.

The definition of economic crime for the purposes of Clause 197 is provided in Clause 187(1) by mean of cross-reference to Schedule 10, which contains a long list of statutes. This provides no focus on what is really at issue and should be the concern of regulators. That is spelled out clearly in my Amendment 95—namely,

“the offences of fraud, false accounting, money laundering or offences under any binding sanctions regime, whether at common law or in primary or secondary legislation”.

This lack of focus could well promote overregulation and a lack of proportionality.

What is needed is a clear statement from the Minister, which I would very much welcome today, on the following. First, regulators must understand that this is not a new regulatory duty but one that states explicitly what is already implicit. Secondly, there should be a focus on the particular criminal activity which is relevant: fraud, false accounting, money laundering and offences under any binding sanctions regime. Thirdly, there is a need for evidence-based regulation according to evidence of risk in particular areas of work and practice, as I described, such as transactional work rather than contentious and court-based work, and areas of advisory work which might be relevant in which economic crime might well occur. Fourthly, there will also be a need for proportionality by regulators. Fifthly, the regulators must understand, as the Minister said before, that there is to be no interference with the principle of legal professional privilege. Finally, there is a need for consultation with the profession to ensure that the new objective successfully tackles economic crime in the proportionate and evidence-based way I have described.

I hope the Minister will be able to make those points clear to the profession to enable a proper regulatory framework to work. I beg to move.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his engagement on this topic throughout the Bill and for his remarks today. I briefly reiterate that the definition of economic crime is deliberately widely drawn. It applies not only to the regulatory objective but to several other clauses of the Bill, including the information-sharing measures between various financial institutions at Clauses 182 and 183. The Government do not believe that restricting that definition would be right.

It is true that there is a long list of offences in Schedule 10, including the reference to theft. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between fraud and theft, but I am happy to acknowledge that typical forms of theft, including low-level theft such as shoplifting or street crime or similar activities, are most unlikely to be relevant to anything in the Bill. Therefore, the Government do not feel able to change the definition of economic crime specifically for the legal sector, and the regulators must be able to respond to circumstances as they develop.

I shall address in a little more detail some of the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, this afternoon. I hope to cover all those points one way or another. First, in relation to legal professional privilege, the regulatory objective already requires adherence to professional principles under the Legal Services Act. In the Government’s view, there is no need for a specific reference to legal professional privilege, but I can make it absolutely clear that the Government do not consider that the Bill makes any difference to the principle of legal professional privilege. It is in no way an assault or attack on that fundamental principle of English law. The protection of legal professional privilege, as developed in the courts, will continue to apply in this area, as in many other areas. That is the Government’s position, and I hope that it is clear

As to how the regulatory objective and the provisions of the Bill will operate in practice, and in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who made various entirely fair points, the intention and purpose of the regulatory objective is to put the onus on legal services regulators to be active in promoting and upholding adherence to the economic crime regime. The new objective will put beyond doubt and clarify that securing compliance is explicitly part of the regulatory role. We expect regulators to use all the tools available to them, but their activity should be appropriately targeted and not in any sense just a box-ticking exercise. The objective does not directly place new duties on lawyers. It is directed to the legal services regulators, and existing safeguards remain.

All those regulators will still be bound by public law principles, which will ensure that any regulation of legal services is proportionate and fair. Proportionality is particularly important. Section 3 of the Legal Services Act already requires the Legal Services Board to have regard to the principle that regulatory activity should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only for cases where action is required. The new regulatory objective on economic crime fits within this framework and existing objectives, such as supporting the rule of law, promoting the public interest and improving access to justice.

It is understood and expected that the Legal Services Board will work closely with the professions in developing guidance to support the new objective. This will include a public consultation on any necessary policy statement or guidance to ensure that the regulatory objective is implemented in a targeted and proportionate way. This will allow the LSB to capture and analyse any concerns that professional bodies or others may have, or continue to have, in relation to the new objective.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

102: After Clause 187, insert the following new Clause—
“Power to strike out certain claimsStrategic litigation against public participation: requirement to make rules of court
(1) The power to make Civil Procedure Rules must be exercised so as to secure that Civil Procedure Rules include provision for ensuring that a claim may be struck out before trial where the court determines—(a) that the claim is a SLAPP claim (see section (Meaning of “SLAPP claim”), and (b) that the claimant has failed to show that it is more likely than not that the claim would succeed at trial.(2) Rules made in compliance with subsection (1) may include rules about how a determination under that subsection is to be made, including (in particular)—(a) rules for determining the nature and extent of the evidence that may or must be considered;(b) rules about the extent to which evidence may or must be tested;(c) rules permitting or requiring the court to determine matters of fact by way of presumptions.(3) Rules made in compliance with subsection (1) must include rules under which the court may make a determination under that subsection of its own motion.(4) The power to make Civil Procedure Rules must be exercised so as to secure that Civil Procedure Rules include provision for securing that, in respect of a SLAPP claim, a court may not order a defendant to pay the claimant’s costs except where, in the court’s view, misconduct of the defendant in relation to the claim justifies such an order.(5) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations provide for subsections (1) to (4) to apply in relation to any rules of court that may be specified in the regulations as those subsections apply in relation to Civil Procedure Rules.(6) In this section—“court” includes a tribunal;“rules of court” means rules relating to the practice and procedure of a court or tribunal.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause, new clause (Meaning of “SLAPP claim”) and my amendments at page 191, line 37, page 192 at line 33 and 192, line 38 provide for the making of rules of court with a view to preventing claimants from improperly using civil proceedings to restrain certain disclosures of information relating to economic crime.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord chooses to move to a vote, we will support him. This amendment would build on last year’s Bill, which introduced similar changes to unexplained wealth orders. It is a welcome development, and I hope that the noble Lord presses his amendment to a vote.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, unfortunately, the Government are not able to accept this amendment, although we are sympathetic to the points made by my noble friend Lord Agnew. The amendment is designed to protect public authorities from having costs awarded against them if they fail to recover the proceeds of economic crime under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

First, the Government are not persuaded that public authorities that lose their case should be protected in this way. Secondly, this is a major breach of the general principle applied in civil litigation in the High Court that the loser pays.

Thirdly, it is a major interference with the discretion of the court on the question of costs. Fourthly, if such a change were to be contemplated, it should be a matter for the Civil Procedure Rules and not something inserted without detailed reflection on Report in your Lordships’ House. Fifthly, it would produce even more inconsistency than allegedly we have already. I do not accept that there is material inconsistency, but you would have one rule for some POCA cases and another rule for other POCA cases, because not all POCA cases are economic crime cases.

However, the Government are prepared actively to consider a consultation to properly consider this matter and the evidence with a view to ensuring that there is a correct balance of justice and the proper consideration of the pros and cons. That, very briefly, is the Government’s position.

I will briefly deal with one or two points. This is not like unexplained wealth orders, which have been mentioned. Those are an investigative procedure and not determinative of civil rights and obligations. In some respects, the UWO procedure is closer to a search warrant than to a recovery of money in civil litigation. It does not provide an analogy to the present case.

It is true that there are various costs regimes in various cases. It is probably not useful to weary your Lordships with particular decisions, but it is not without interest that in the case of Pfizer and Flynn, which involved the Competition and Markets Authority, the authority lost at first instance and was ordered to pay some of the costs. The Court of Appeal overturned that on the basis that it did not want to have the “chilling effect” of public authorities having to pay the costs when they lose litigation. However, the Supreme Court restored the original judgment and said, “This so-called chilling effect is only one factor”. In other words, it is not decisive. You must consider in that jurisdiction all the factors. The Government draw from that case that the so-called chilling effect is not necessarily decisive, and that one must have a regime that enables the court to balance all the relevant effects.

With all respect for the motives behind it and the concerns that have been expressed, this amendment is too blunt an instrument to be a proper exercise of primary legislation in an area which very much calls for balanced consideration under the Civil Procedure Rules. As I said at the outset, the Government are perfectly prepared actively to consider reform of the Civil Procedure Rules with that aim in mind.

I hope that I have persuaded your Lordships that this is not an occasion to make an exception to the well-established rule that has stood for hundreds of years, whether it applies to HMRC, the National Crime Agency or the FCA. If they make a complete Horlicks of a case, there is no reason to let them off the costs. That is the Government’s position.

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

I thank my noble and learned friend the Minister for his answer. He has always been entirely consistent, and I respect that. We have a genuine difference of views. English law has plenty of exceptions to the landscape which my noble and learned friend has set out—for example, when local authorities bring cases following the Booth case, law enforcement bodies when they bring cases in the magistrates’ court, the Law Society when it brings disciplinary action, its prosecutions that fail following the Baxendale-Walker case, and the Competition and Markets Authority, where the Competition Appeal Tribunal can rule in its favour when it is unsuccessful in bringing a case.

There are plenty of examples. I am not seeking to make the perfect the enemy of the good. We can bring this in with this Bill. It would send a very powerful signal. I seek to test the opinion of the House.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, it is always a rewarding experience to find oneself largely in agreement with some of the sentiments that have been expressed. On the issue of legal aid, Clause 54 ensures that individuals who receive a removal notice under the Bill have access to free legal advice before removal and, in so providing, it is one of the keystones of the Act. It is absolutely essential that free legal advice is available to persons before removal. That is important for the reasons that have just been given. It is important that people understand the process and that it is a fair and efficient process. No one would disagree with any of those sentiments expressed in the Chamber today.

It is important to emphasise that, unlike most civil legal aid, legal aid in the context of the Bill is being made available without a merits test, nor a means test—as a matter of statutory instrument, that will be provided in due course.

To answer the first question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, we are in close discussions with the authorities in Northern Ireland and Scotland, where I anticipate the position will be exactly the same as it is in England but, obviously, that has to be covered. As has been rightly said, legal aid is, in the context, essential for speedy but fair decision-making. Those basic points are essentially common ground.

I will now deal briefly with the amendments. Government Amendment 119A in this group simply corrects the references to the clauses in the Bill under which advocacy in the Upper Tribunal can take place, and adds a reference to the tribunal procedure rules, since the clause as tabled in the other place at a late stage needs to be corrected in those technical aspects. That is all that Amendment 119A is.

I turn now to Amendment 92A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, which seeks to make provision for legal aid for potential victims of modern slavery subject to removal for possible referral to the NRM. In the Government’s view, this amendment is not required, as Clause 54 already provides free legal advice for anyone issued with a removal notice under the Bill, and that legal aid is available irrespective of the merits or means.

The Committee has just accepted that Clause 21 stand part of the Bill, so I respectfully say that it does not seem correct for me to reopen or rediscuss the various arguments which have been debated at length this afternoon in relation to modern slavery. In practice, if Clause 21 stands part of the Bill, as the Committee has just agreed, the basis for this amendment, in the Government’s submission, largely falls away and it is not at all clear that there is any remaining practical purpose in pursuing the amendment. That is the Government’s position on Amendment 92A.

As far as Amendment 120 is concerned, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, which seeks to ensure the availability of civil legal aid services for various claims, challenges and legal proceedings covered by the Bill, the Government’s position is that Clause 54 already effectively provides for that. The Lord Chancellor already has a statutory duty to ensure that legal aid is made available to individuals where it is required under LASPO. By virtue of Clause 54, legal aid will therefore have to be made available to individuals in receipt of a removal notice, in relation to that removal notice, to take advice in making a suspensive claim either on factual grounds or on grounds of serious irreversible harm. This is, as I said a moment ago, an essential feature of the Bill to ensure fairness to those facing potential removal under the powers in the Bill. There are other existing provisions in LASPO that make legal aid available in relation to protection claims, human rights claims, modern slavery, detention and habeas corpus. But the key need here in this Bill is for legal advice before removal takes place and legal advice in relation to making a suspensive harm claim or a suspensive factual claim.

Finally, Amendment 120A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who I know follows these matters with great interest and great integrity and has over the years been very concerned indeed about the provision of legal aid, highlights the practical importance of making sure legal aid actually is available. The same point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and others. That is a very important aspect that the Government and the Ministry of Justice in particular are fully seized of at the moment. As noble Lords can imagine, it provides a considerable logistical challenge, because it depends on a number of factors: where the potential removees or detainees are; how they can be accessed; who is going to provide the advice; whether there are enough people to do it; whether they are trained up enough; whether it can all be done in the short time limits provided by the Bill. Those are all matters with which the ministry is currently seized. We are working extremely closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office to ensure that legal aid is really made available to those who need it. I venture to hope, most sincerely, that we are not in a position where any significant proportion of the persons concerned fail to get legal aid. It would not be acceptable, in the Government’s view, for very large numbers of people to be removed without the benefit of legal advice. It is a problem that the Government have to solve and are working to solve.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to take us back to the impact assessment issue, but it would certainly be helpful to know before Report where the Minister’s department is going in relation to the work he referred to. We should have a much clearer idea, by the start of Report, as to the extent to which his department is able to give guarantees that a proper legal aid system would be in place, effective and able to operate.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord says. It is an entirely reasonable question. I will take it back to the department and do my best to see how far we can satisfy that completely understandable request. The Government accept that legal advice should be available in practice and quickly, and they are working on that with intense attention at the moment but, in relation specifically to Amendment 120A, do not feel it is appropriate or feasible to provide for a statutory obligation to deliver within 48 hours, which is what the amendment calls for.

However, there should be a system that enables people effectively to take advice within the strict periods of time set out in the Bill, which are subject to extension—we do not yet know how that will work, but they can be extended by the Secretary of State and the Upper Tribunal. I hope your Lordships will accept that the general position on legal aid in Clause 54 is a positive provision in the Bill and that removing the means test and merits tests is correct in the circumstances. Properly administered and operated, this will be a very important safeguard for those affected by the provisions in the Bill. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw the relevant amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. I welcome Clause 54 being put into the Bill—it is better than it not being there—but several problems arise. First, Clause 54 says in terms of LASPO only that:

“Sub-paragraph (5) does not exclude services provided to an individual who is subject to removal”.


It does not do anything to make sure that that legal aid for advice and representation will appear, which is the reason for the importance of the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Hunt of Kings Hunt, about a duty to provide legal aid, as there is no guarantee. There is also no guarantee that Clause 54 will deliver any legal aid before this Bill comes into force as an Act. What will the Government do in practice to deliver that legal aid?

Secondly, Clause 54 benefits only people who are subject to removal and have, presumably, already had a removal notice. The concern that motivated Amendment 92A was that it should be available not only to individuals who are subject to removal under this Act but to those who might reasonably expect that they would be. They ought to be able to get advice so that they can give informed consent to a trafficking referral; they need to know what the implications and consequences could be. With respect, I do not think the Minister covered either of those points.

Finally, we do not appear to be getting the message across that the better informed and supported people are, the greater the benefit to the Government will be in being able to have faster processes. Clearly, those processes are not working at the moment—we would not have this incredible, appalling backlog if everything was going swimmingly with processing efficiency. I cannot speak for the noble Lord, Lord Bach, but I think we are inspired by the idea that you could streamline the system and try to avoid delays in highways and byways if people were properly legally informed of their rights. The Minister is a lawyer, so I am sure he gets that point, although unfortunately I have not heard him express it. All that said, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 92A.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for explaining this really quite complex area. The only thing I was going to ask the Minister was whether he could explain the timeframes within which the appeal must be lodged: seven days for the Upper Tribunal and then 23 days for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session. Are those timeframes standard in these types of cases? How have they arrived at them?

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expressed the case very fully and I thought the way the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summarised it was a fair comment about the accessibility of these processes to people taking part in them.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, Clauses 43 to 51 are an essential part of the scheme of the Bill, just like Clause 54 on legal aid, which we discussed earlier. I think by now your Lordships are very familiar with the scheme of the Bill but, just briefly, for the record, I will try to outline these clauses and answer the questions that have arisen as we go through.

The first thing the Bill does is to render certain claims —protection of human rights and modern slavery claims—non-suspensive so that making them does not delay the removal of an illegal migrant to a safe third country. However, the Bill then provides safeguards for removal in two cases: where there is a serious harm suspensive claim and where there is a factual suspensive claim—there has been a mistake as to whether the conditions are met.

Then the Bill goes on to provide that if the Secretary of State refuses those claims there is then an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In general, the Government’s position is that that provides proper safeguards. It does not dismiss safeguards—if I may use the phrase just used by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—it strikes a fair balance between expedition and fairness to the migrant. It does not in any way destroy justice because the ultimate decision in relation to the suspensive claims is in the hands of a very respected and senior judicial body and legal aid is available in order to bring those claims.

The basic timetable, to answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that there are seven working days from receipt of the notice of removal to bring the claim, subject to the possibility of an extension if that is necessary to secure justice in a particular case. The 23-day period—I think I am right although I will correct myself in writing if I am wrong—is for the Upper Tribunal to take its decision. Those time limits for appeals are specific to this Bill. This is an expedited procedure that provides strict time limits, but in the Government’s view they are fair time limits.

One should make it clear that we have two situations. The first is where the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded. In that circumstance, the person concerned has to apply for permission to appeal. That is the current approach, as I and the Government understand it, in the asylum and human rights system. It is effectively to weed out unmeritorious appeals as those designed to do no more than frustrate removal. Those cases are decided by the tribunal on the papers. Similarly, if you make a late suspensive claim—a claim out of time—it will be considered only if there are compelling reasons. That is at the level of the Secretary of State but if they consider that there are no compelling reasons, you can go to the tribunal and say, “There are compelling reasons why I was out of time”. Again, that is for the tribunal to decide on the papers.

These provisions are designed to ensure that claims are made at the earliest opportunity and prevent late claims being used to frustrate removal, undermining the overall effectiveness of the claims process. Once a claim has been made to the Secretary of State but not refused, and then to the Upper Tribunal as well, the whole process is suspended until the tribunal has taken a decision, so there is protection during that period.

Clause 47 also deals with another problem that constantly arises in this kind of case, where somebody tries to raise something new at a late stage. Again, there is a procedure for dealing with that: effectively, that the new matter can be considered by the Upper Tribunal only if there have been compelling reasons for it not to have been raised earlier. In relation to late claims, claims out of time and new matters, there are those checks to prevent the system being abused.

Clause 48 then requires the various timeframes to be respected. It places a requirement on the tribunal procedure rules to secure that those timeframes are respected. As I have just said, there are seven working days for the submission of a substantive appeal—I think that is in Clause 48(1)(a)—and a 23 working-day period for the tribunal to decide that substantive appeal. Those timeframes may, as I say, be extended. What we have here is a process that, in the Government’s view, is essentially a fast-track process but none the less a fair and balanced one.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

These very short timescales are no doubt part of the deterrent effect which the Government are seeking to put in place through the Bill. What estimate have the Government made about the workload on the tribunal process? Is it really sustainable to have such short timescales?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have been working closely with the senior judiciary to ensure that we have the relevant judicial manpower and resources to deal with the workload. I am not, as of this moment, in a position to give specific details but one of the reasons for allowing the judges of the First-tier Tribunal to sit in the Upper Tribunal, which gives us a pretty wide pool to draw upon, is that it enables us to draw upon recorders, retired judges and others. The Government are at the moment satisfied from the discussions they have had that there will be sufficient judicial capacity to meet any reasonably foreseeable workload, but that is a perfectly good question and I thank the noble Lord for raising it.

I will come in a moment to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about judges in general, but I will first deal with government Amendment 115A, which provides for the first set of tribunal rules effectively to be made by the Lord Chancellor rather than, as would normally be the case, by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. That committee normally takes quite a long time to make new rules—maybe 12 months or more—so, since we are working to implement the Bill as soon as practicable, government Amendment 115A provides for the first set of tribunal procedure rules, including these time limits, to be made by the Lord Chancellor so that we have the relevant tribunal procedure rules in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his responses. I am not really persuaded by his answer on Clause 49: that these are just some little minor issues that cannot be JRed from the Upper Tribunal. Subsection (3) states that

“the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision”.

So the fact that it has made an error is apparently not subject to judicial review, which seems to me not particularly minor. An application for judicial review can be made if the tribunal

“has acted … in bad faith or … in such a procedurally defective way as amounts to a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice”.

I do not suppose those crop up very often, and I would imagine that bad faith would be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish, so I do not think there is much wiggle room in Clause 49—but those who know more about how these things work might have other thoughts, and if they do I would be grateful if they would share them with me in due course.

I do not think the Minister covered the point about First-tier Tribunal judges being appointed to act as Upper Tribunal judges. If he did not—I will check what he said—perhaps he could write to me with any answers.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I will happily write to the noble Baroness. I thought I had covered it when I said that it was creating a pool. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, nods. It is creating a pool of judges so we have enough judges of relevant standing and experience to decide what are essentially factual questions. These are relatively limited factual questions.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise. I was clearly inattentive as I was trying to look at the other groups that are coming up. Even so, I think concerns remain about promoting, and possibly overpromoting, people before they are ready. What the Government are proposing to do seems a little odd.

On the tribunal rules, I note the Minister’s citation of a precedent, but at one point he said that the problem is that the committee works too slowly. I would have thought that if processes do not work very well or do not work in a reasonable timeframe, the way to resolve that is to work with the relevant bodies to speed them up rather than to grab power from them. However, I find that this Government seem to have an appetite for grabbing powers from everybody else, whether it is the courts, other agencies or indeed Parliament. I worry that the Government are getting rather too big for their boots. Perhaps one day they will even come a cropper. That said, I think I have probably taken these issues as far as they can go.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

16: Clause 3, page 4, line 40, leave out “or citizen”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can be relatively brief in introducing a small group of technical amendments to the Bill and perhaps, if I may say so, allow the House to take a short break from the understandably strong feelings generated by the discussion.

The amendments essentially address three issues. The first is to define the term “national” as including a citizen of the relevant country. Thus Amendment 19 inserts a Bill-wide definition of the term “national”. The effect is that any reference to a country of which a person is a national includes a country of which a person is a citizen. In not all countries are citizenship and nationality exactly the same. Similarly, a reference to a person not being a national of a country is to be read as also referring to a person not being a citizen of that country. Amendment 19 ensures that the Bill is consistent in this regard. Amendments 16, 24, 28, 99 and 141 are simply consequential amendments. Amendment 128 makes a similar change to Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The second group of technical amendments ensures that the word “court”, where it appears in the Bill, includes a tribunal. That is in relation specifically to Amendment 25A, which refers to the definition of an application for judicial review. The definition of the application for a judicial review in Clause 4(6) is extended so that it covers an application to a tribunal. That will specifically be the judicial review jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

The substantive issues about the scope of judicial reviews—whether they are non-suspensive or not, and the related provisions of Clause 52 and 55—will, I am sure, be debated in due course. The effect of Amendment 25A, and the associated Amendments 115C, 116A, 117A, 123A and 123B, is to make it clear that the relevant provisions in each case apply to tribunal proceedings, especially proceedings in the Upper Tribunal, as they do to proceedings in the High Court or the Court of Session.

Finally, the third group of amendments includes Amendments 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 38, which relate to the country to which certain persons who satisfy the conditions in Clause 2 may be removed to. Effectively, they treat persons who hold a passport or an identity document from the country in question as if they were nationals or citizens of that country. If, for example, an Indian national had a French identity document, they could be returned to France, assuming that there were no exceptional circumstances preventing their removal there. In other words, it is simply to treat persons who have obtained an identity document in the same way as they would be treated were they a national or citizen of that country.

I am happy of course to deal with any points that arise, but I do hope that these relatively technical amendments find favour with the Committee, and I beg to move Amendment 16.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will just ask the Minister for clarification with regard to countries that we do not recognise or areas where there are territorial disputes. Two of the main areas people are coming to the UK from, which the Government wish to stop, are conflict-afflicted areas because of territorial disputes, where the UN has a particular mechanism of providing humanitarian identification.

Is it the government position that all those people will have to come from a state that we recognise? By definition, many of the asylum seekers are seeking asylum because they are being persecuted because they are on one side of a territorial dispute—some of these geographical areas I have visited. The Government in this Bill now seem to be indicating that they will come to a side with regard to which identification documents, either national or citizenship, they will recognise. Why is this the case?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the proposed amendments are to cover the technical situation where somebody who is not necessarily a citizen or a national happens to hold an identity document of that country, and therefore—almost by definition, but certainly by strong presumption—is clearly someone who has a close relationship with that country. Assuming it is a safe country and that there are no other circumstances that might create an exception, that is a place to which they should normally be returned. If, as I think the question is posing, there are real risks in sending that person back to a particular country, the procedures in the Bill kick in. That would be a question of fact in each case.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his explanation of the government amendments. I have two questions. First, what would be the status of people who have no passport: stateless people? Of course, there are stateless people in refugee camps. There are, perhaps preponderantly in refugee camps but also elsewhere, people who have no recognised state.

Secondly, it so happens that I was in the West Bank in Palestine last week. Palestinians who live in the West Bank are entitled to a Jordanian passport. They are not entitled to an Israeli passport, but they have an identity document as Palestinians in the West Bank. That is a different category from the category of people who are completely stateless. I am wondering whether the Minister could explain how these two particular examples might be accommodated within these government amendments.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I will, if I may, look into the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and give a more precise answer. I think, just as an initial answer, we are essentially dealing with nationals of a country listed in proposed new Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which is to be added by this Bill. They are EU and EEA countries, together with Albania and Switzerland. It is to those countries that this applies. The provisions I referred to relate to EU countries, EEA countries, Albania and Switzerland, and I do not think that they touch at all on the situation of stateless persons in particular, or those who hold a Jordanian but not an Israeli passport, et cetera.

Amendment 16 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

19: Clause 3, page 5, line 38, at end insert—
““national” includes citizen;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a Bill-wide definition of “national”. The effect is that references to a country of which a person is a national include a country of which the person is a citizen and references to a person who is (or is not) a national of a country include a person who is (or is not) a citizen of that country. This is for consistency across the Bill.

National Security Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to some of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I echo his thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for their constructive engagement with us on the damages clauses. I too am satisfied that Amendment 169, in particular, and the assurance that the noble and learned Lord gave in writing—which I hope he will repeat on the Floor of the House—address the main concern. I am impressed also by the eloquent point he made in Committee, that these clauses simply confer a power, or discretion, on the court, and I am confident that the courts will exercise those powers fairly and sensibly.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments. I hope the House will agree that the Government have been in listening mode throughout this Bill, and that we have in this particular instance moved quite considerably to deal with what the Government consider to be justified observations by your Lordships.

On the general point, the reforms are designed to protect the public, to deter those who seek to exploit our security services for compensation and to reduce the risk that court awards or damages may be used to fund terrorism—perhaps the most serious harm that can be perpetrated against society, going to its very fabric. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked me to restate the purpose of the clause and I think I have endeavoured to do so in those words.

On whether the Government can give any assurance that these provisions will not be invoked on the basis of

“unproven allegations … from a foreign state”,

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the fact that this is a power in the court; it is entirely in its discretion. No court is going to act on anything other than proper evidence, so in the Government’s view there is no risk of the danger to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred, because this is a court process with rules of evidence and proper and fair procedures.

With those two preliminary observations, I come to the central point that was at issue when we discussed this clause in Committee. We have listened to the concerns expressed by noble Lords that the legislation needed to ensure that no national security case fell into scope where there was no connection between the Crown’s conduct and the terrorist conduct of the claimant. I can repeat before this House the assurance in the letter I sent noble Lords today, to which we have already been referred, saying that there needs to be a causal connection between the conduct of the terrorist and the reduction in damages.

As to what criteria the courts should apply when considering these issues, I know that noble Members felt the courts would require further guidance. In the Government’s view, the courts do not require further guidance; they are well able to interpret and apply this legislation, especially in light of the amendments we have proposed. The Government have every confidence in the court being able to discharge its functions under these provisions.

Our courts are well versed in taking a wide range of relevant factors into account in determining liability and assessing the level of damages. There are a number of common-law considerations to which noble Lords referred in Committee which may indeed provide some guidance. We do not seek to exonerate the Crown in respect of its own culpability; we aim simply to ensure that the terrorist conduct is properly taken into account when calculating quantum.

I turn to what I think are the only live amendments on this part, Amendments 174 and 175. Those amendments would apply to the Bill’s provisions whereby a court would consider the context in which the Crown had acted to reduce a risk of terrorism, but their underlying intention seems to the Government to be to markedly restrict those provisions. As I understand it, the amendments seek to limit the consideration of the court to where the Crown’s actions had been commenced —the provisions use the word “instigated”—and the conduct was required to have taken place overseas at the instigation of a foreign state.

While the Government accept that there are difficulties in preventing terrorism when the action concerned needs to be taken overseas, there are so many different facts and circumstances flowing from the claimant’s own actions that the proposed amendments would significantly limit the effect of these clauses. In the Government’s view, the courts ought to have complete discretion to apply the clauses as they stand; a very tight restriction both as to instigation and to the requirement that the instigated conduct took place overseas would limit them inappropriately and improperly restrict the discretion courts should have under the provisions.

The Government further feel that there is scope in these amendments for some confusion. The two aspects, an overseas element and instigation, seem to be couched in language reminiscent of an exclusive list, quite apart from the difficulty of deciding exactly what one means by “instigation”. In practice, the Government feel that the courts should be left to exercise their discretion, as they surely will, without the limitation proposed by these amendments. That is the Government’s position on the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I hope that in the light of what I have said, he will consider not pressing them.

There is one amendment by the Government—Amendment 181—which is proposed to ensure family proceedings in Scotland and Northern Ireland are excluded from the freezing and forfeiture provisions that are also part of this part, as with those in England and Wales. That simply corrects an oversight in the original drafting.

Having set out the Government’s amendments and why we are unable to accept the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, I commend Government’s amendments and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have heard the Minister’s explanation. It is right that the amendments that were between us were Amendments 174 and 175. Having considered his point on the court’s discretion, I am not sure that the difference between us is so wide as to justify my testing the opinion of the House on this occasion. I shall not move those two amendments and beg leave to withdraw the stand part amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

169: Clause 85, page 57, line 18, leave out from “wrongdoing” to “and” on line 21 and insert “that—
(i) involves the commission of a terrorism offence or other involvement in terrorism-related activity, and (ii) has a connection with the conduct of the Crown complained of in the proceedings,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with the other Government amendments to this Clause, would mean that the court may consider the matters in Clause 85(3)(b) only if there was a connection between the terrorist wrongdoing and the conduct of the Crown complained of in the proceedings.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

177: Clause 86, page 58, line 19, leave out from “out” to “to” and insert “how the Crown considers the national security factors”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Government amendments to Clause 85.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It is perfectly within the rules of the Companion for noble Lords to seek points of clarification or elucidation from those who are speaking.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am again extremely grateful to noble Lords for their interventions and, in particular, for the support for the principle behind Clause 89 expressed by the Official Opposition, subject to the point about minor offences, which I will come to in a moment.

As a quick reminder, Clause 89 narrows the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specific terrorism offences can automatically receive civil legal aid services. This includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more as well as other offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection. It is important to note that this clause modifies but does not exclude legal aid, because there is still the route of exceptional case funding, particularly if convention rights are in issue. One of the fundamental convention rights— I think this at least partially answers the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—is the necessity for a fair trial, in Article 6. The exceptional case funding route is still available in that regard. Phrases such as “excludes”, “denies”, “debars” and “no legal aid support” are not an accurate summary of what this clause achieves.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but is it not the case that no one gets exceptional case funding simply because they otherwise would not get legal aid? The point made by the noble and learned Baroness was that it is unfair, so you will not get a fair trial. However, that does not ground exceptional case funding —unless the noble and learned Lord has a different view of exceptional case funding from the rest of us.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, there might well be found applications for exceptional case funding; approximately 75% of such applications are successful each year. In any event, exceptional case funding is still available.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

On the question of numbers and definition, what is the essential definition of exceptional case funding and how many cases have given rise to such a relief?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I do not have the exact definition in front of me. It is a matter for the director of the Legal Aid Agency to decide. There is guidance on this, which applies in particular to cases of inquest and other areas where convention rights are at issue. I can supply my noble friend with further details in due course.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The number of cases would be very helpful.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I do not have that information with me, but about three-quarters of applications succeed.

At the risk of disturbing the atmosphere of good will that has, to an extent, prevailed this afternoon, your Lordships would have expected me to explore with the Government whether there can be any further movement on this clause and I am sorry to say that, subject to the important exception for victims of domestic abuse in relation to family and housing matters, they adhere to the clause and respectfully present it to the House.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to remove these clauses from the Bill altogether. The Government’s position is that the measures are necessary to ensure that our limited resources for legal aid funding are not directed towards individuals who attack society and democracy and, through their actions, commit acts of terrorism that seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions which provide the benefit of legal aid. It is right that access to legal aid should therefore be subject to the provisions of this clause. Again, I understand that the Labour Party, in principle, accepts that approach.

It is certainly possible to argue, as the noble Baroness did, that if this applies to terrorism, why does it not apply to murder, the abuse of women, drug trafficking and other offences? Certainly, one can always advance an argument about where you draw the line. The line is drawn here at terrorism because of its particular threat to our society and democracy; that is the Government’s reasoning. As I have just said, it is not a blanket ban on civil legal aid because the exceptional case funding route ensures—in compliance with our obligations under the convention—that legal aid remains available when it is most needed to ensure access to justice.

Amendment 188, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would limit the restriction to where an offender has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years or more. I acknowledge of course the noble Lord’s concerns, but the Government oppose this amendment on the following grounds. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, introduced following the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham Hill terrorist attacks, expanded the sentencing powers of courts in relation to terrorist offenders and created more restrictive provisions for terrorist offenders whose offences carry a maximum sentence of more than two years. So, the two-year benchmark is already baked into legislation, and the Government feel that it is the appropriate benchmark in this instance.

The noble Lord’s seven-year sentence proposal would mean that a number of quite serious terrorism offences would escape: for example, the breach of a TPIM notice. It would also—by reference to sentencing, as distinct from the statutory definition of an offence—create quite a subjective difference between offenders when one has got more than the other: one is a bit above and one is a bit below, perhaps because one has had more previous convictions than the other, or for whatever reason. So, the Government think that the two-year benchmark in existing legislation is logical, defendable and clear and that it should remain. So, with regret, the Government are unable to accept Amendment 188 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Amendment 187, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make the restriction not apply if the terrorism offence of which the individual had been convicted had no relevant factual connection with their application for legal aid. We quite understand the noble Lord’s intention behind that amendment, but, again, the Government cannot accept it. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, this is a point of principle. The Government have considered with great care the proposal put forward and consider that the fact of a conviction for a terrorist offence carrying a sentence of more than two years is a ground for restricting the route by which legal aid is granted, so we are unable to accept this amendment.

However, we have tabled government Amendments 182, 183, 184 and 186 to create an exception so that the restriction will not apply where a terrorist offender is a victim of domestic abuse and is applying for legal aid related to family and housing matters within a relevant time period. That would include such matters as pursuing protective injunctions in child custody cases, as well as the loss of a home or homelessness. Again, the question arises: if you have extended it there, why do you not extend it somewhere else? The answer, I think, is that one has to draw a line somewhere. Those are particularly serious issues in society as it stands, and that seems to the Government to be a sound basis for making an exception. It is not our position that it is relevant or wise to create any further exceptions.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a point from his earlier comments on exceptional case funding. The guidance on this on GOV.UK says:

“You could get legal aid for cases that would not usually be eligible if your human rights are at risk. This is known as exceptional case funding”.


Can the Minister clarify: under the Bill, will anybody who receives any sentence for any terrorism offence now automatically be eligible for exceptional case funding?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

No, that is not the Government’s position. There is a mechanism by way of exceptional case funding to ensure access to justice in an appropriate case.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Then the point that the Minister referred to about the Bill is irrelevant, because the eligibility for exceptional case funding is regardless of whether the Bill is in place.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is not entirely irrelevant that exceptional case funding is always available for access to justice. That fact changes some of the comments that have been made about the restrictive nature of the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, there is a sharp division of opinion on the general principles here. I share the disappointment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, at the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the Labour Front Bench, particularly in view of the way the Labour Front Bench spoke in favour of the principles we enunciated in Committee. I do not propose to press Amendment 180, but when the time comes, I will seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 185.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

181: Schedule 16, page 188, line 21, leave out from “proceedings”” to end of line 26 and insert—
“(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003; (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 12(5) of the Family Law (Northern Ireland) Order 1993 (S.I. 1993/1576 (N.I. 6));(c) in relation to Scotland, has the meaning given by section 135 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and includes proceedings under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (asp 1).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides a definition of “family proceedings” in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

182: Clause 89, page 60, line 11, after “Schedule 1” insert “other than those in paragraph 12 of Schedule 1”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the limitation on the availability of civil legal aid to an offender where the services are provided to them as victims of domestic violence in relation to a matter arising out of a family relationship in which there has been, or is a risk of, domestic violence.