(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. There should be only one person on their feet. If the shadow Minister does not wish to give way, the hon. Gentleman should recognise that fact.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. The hon. Member for St Ives (Andrew George) did not catch my eye—
Order. As many hon. Members want to catch my eye, I am reducing the time limit to six minutes.
May I return the hon. Lady to her point about funding? She claimed that S4C had suffered a 94% cut, but if we are to have a sensible debate about this important issue, should we not recognise the reality, which is that it will be subject to cuts of 6% per annum for the next four years? That is much better than what is happening to many other public sector departments, and should be sufficient for it to deliver its objectives. Does the hon. Lady regret the fact that over the last 13 years there has not been adequate scrutiny—
Order. I believe that the hon. Gentleman hopes to catch my eye later. He cannot make his speech now.
The hon. Gentleman could have made a much better intervention about funding. If the intervention that he made was intended merely to back up his party’s crib sheet, I do not think that that was very sensible. He could have pointed out that yesterday the Department said that it would remove the reference to S4C from schedule 4 and give it a clause of its own, but, unbelievably, no additional funds and no commitment to funding after 2015.
I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman was present when my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) mentioned the office of the chief coroner. I refer him to my right hon. Friend’s remarks.
I think we should remind ourselves of the consensus that exists. It is clear that setting about getting rid of a number of public bodies created by primary legislation raises significant challenges, and that the only way of making that achievable was to create a streamlined model. However, it is undoubtedly true that the Bill as originally presented was over-zealous. It was entirely unacceptable that the remaining bodies listed in schedule 7 could be added to other schedules by order. That is now rightly not the case, and the Bill is more suitable for the purpose for which it was intended.
I welcome the addition of clause 10, which creates a need to consult the person or office holder to which the proposal relates as well as persons
“representative of interests substantially affected by the proposal”.
That, I believe, needs to be reinforced.
In my constituency in the west of Wales, 60% of residents speak Welsh as a first language. S4C and plurality in Welsh language broadcasting is vital, and concerns remain about the model currently proposed and the impact that it would have on, in particular, S4C's governance and independence. I do not start from a “no change” position. At a time when other broadcasting bodies face significant cuts, S4C cannot—and, for that matter, does not—expect to be treated differently from other broadcasters. It has shown a willingness to discuss a new model with the DCMS and the BBC, but fundamental differences remain between the BBC and S4C.
The two basic concerns relate to long-term funding and guarantees of funding after 2015, which has been partly addressed—I will qualify that later—by yesterday's written statement, and to S4C’s remaining independent. Yesterday's written statement confirmed that an amendment would be introduced that would put in statute the level of funding for S4C that is required for it to meet its statutory remit as a Welsh language broadcaster. I await the text of the amendment, because it must pave the way for a formula set by the Government and not the BBC, providing parity with other broadcasting organisations.
It is also vital for S4C to remain financially and operationally independent, and not to be run by the BBC. The DCMS has made clear that it expects S4C to be independent, and has given a number of undertakings to guarantee that. It would be helpful if the Department also made abundantly clear that the BBC must not have its personnel in S4C's management team, and that S4C must remain in charge. Discussions are taking place to find a suitable model, but it is hard not to conclude that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has put all its eggs in one basket in an attempt to meet the time frame for this Bill, instead of addressing fundamentally the challenges of supporting S4C in an age when digital services have led to an increasingly fragmented market and at a time of reduced public expenditure. This looks rushed, and it would surely be better to carry out a full review of how S4C should be constituted, with the aim of finding a long-term solution, whether that be a model of full funding from Westminster, a partnership model along the lines proposed currently, albeit with a stronger guarantee of independence, or even a channel funded by the Welsh Government in the event of broadcasting being devolved.
All four party leaders in Wales wrote to the Culture Secretary in support of such a review. The Select Committee on Welsh Affairs report on S4C stated that this haste was “regrettable”, and the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport said that it found it
“extraordinary that the Government and the BBC, which is fiercely protective of its own independence, should find it acceptable to agree a change in the funding and governance arrangements for another statutorily independent broadcaster, S4C, without the latter having any involvement, say or even knowledge of the deal until it has been done.”
It strikes me that this is the respect agenda in reverse.
It is of great concern that very little consideration seems to have been given to an holistic way forward. On a matter as important as Welsh language broadcasting, that is obviously not good enough, and I would welcome it if the Minister provided an assessment of the current situation regarding negotiations over the future of S4C, and say whether the Government would consider removing the provisions relating to S4C until all the possible alternatives have been pursued. In the other place, a great deal of concern was expressed about Channel 4’s inclusion in the Public Bodies Bill and the uncertainty that created. Channel 4 has now been removed from it, and I believe S4C should also be removed.
Members on the Government Benches have spoken about Citizens Advice and the new functions it would assume from Consumer Focus. Again, in Wales this issue is particularly pressing because the current structure of Citizens Advice does not lend itself to Welsh governance. There is a separate structure in Scotland, which allows for Scottish matters to be looked at differently, but that is not the case in Wales, where policy work is led from London. Consumer Focus Wales wants an amendment led by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to give Assembly Ministers the power to determine the structure they want—a power not to acquire new powers, but to determine a Welsh structure.
I have focused on the concerns that still exist, but I do not want that to detract from what is a necessary measure. The Bill represents a step forward, but there are considerable—
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. I will drop the time limit to five minutes. It would be helpful if hon. Members shaved a little off their speeches—there is a load of Members to get in.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hope that, in a few weeks, the House will be able to rejoice that Gaddafi has gone. Few dictators have committed so many acts of psychopathic wickedness over such a long period of time. Many hon. Members will know of his atrocity at Abu Salim prison in Tripoli, where he marched 1,270 prisoners into a compound, locked the gate and instructed his soldiers to open fire from the courtyard rooftops. The gunfire and grenades rained down for more than two hours until all 1,270 people were dead. But that was in the dying days of John Major’s Government in June 1996, and Britain took no action.
I welcome resolution 1973. To take action now is right, but it would be disingenuous to claim that action was not possible without Britain’s military participation, involving just three planes. The question is not whether action against Gaddafi is right but whether it is we who have the primary duty and responsibility to take it. It is the families of many of those slain 15 years ago at Abu Salim who began this revolution in Libya, inspired by others across the region who had dared to rise up and demand justice and dignity from their leaders. I praise their courage, but I recognise that this is a civil war in Libya. In that respect, it is categorically different from other conflicts involving ethnic cleansing and religious domination by one faith over another. This is neither Bosnia nor Rwanda. UN resolution 1973 has authorised international interference in a civil war in which there has been no genocide and no ethnic cleansing: no Halabja there.
The resolution purports to allow no more than the humanitarian protection of civilians, but all acknowledge that the Libyan population will not be secure from harm until the country is rid of Gaddafi. Coalition leaders, when asked whether Gaddafi was a legitimate target, have been equivocal in their response. In such circumstances, the rose of humanitarian protection begins to smell of regime change, and by that name it is not so sweet. This became apparent to Amr Moussa over the weekend when he said:
“What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians”.
Perhaps the Arab League was too optimistic, because that is precisely what is likely to happen, if not by British and coalition missiles then by the rebels. It is naive to think that we can stop one side fighting in a civil war and not expect the other to take advantage. In a civil war, the tragedy is precisely that civilians are killed, if not by one side, then by the other. I do not believe that the international coalition will be even-handed in stopping rebel forces advancing in the same way.
The Prime Minister said in his statement on Friday that if we will the ends, we must also will the means. To will the means, however, does not entail the proposition that we must be the means. Many people in the UK are asking, “Why does Britain always have to get involved?” In two days, we will hear the Budget and the Chancellor will explain to the country why it is necessary to cut thousands of jobs to tackle the deficit. Those men and women who have been made redundant will no doubt sympathise with the Libyan people, but they will ask, “What has this got to do with Britain?” North Africa is not on our borders. It is not in our direct sphere of influence. Libya poses no direct threat to the UK, and we have no historical responsibility as the former colonial power, so why are we spending millions of pounds on cruise missiles, and endangering the lives of British soldiers to implement the resolution? It is ironic that many people asking these questions will be among the 17,000 military personnel who were judged to be surplus to requirements in last October’s defence review, when the Government cut £4 billion from the defence budget.
There is no contradiction in welcoming the enabling authority given by UN resolution 1973, which allows those who have a direct interest or who have historical responsibilities as the former colonial power to act in Libya and, at the same time, to insist that we have no such direct interest or responsibility. Today, we are debating this after the event—we have taken that responsibility before a vote in the House, yet no one in government has sought to explain the policy of the rebels, on whose side we now find ourselves. We know that they are against Gaddafi, and that is a good start, but we certainly have no knowledge that they intend to replace him with an open, tolerant, liberal democracy. The whole of north Africa and the middle east are changing more rapidly than at any time since Suez. Shi’a minorities in Yemen and Bahrain have been shot or silenced by an invasion from Saudi Arabia. Iran is known to be eager to get involved. Egypt and Tunisia have effected home-grown revolutions and even Syria is experiencing serious internal tension.
In that extraordinary context, the Government have judged it right and in Britain’s interest to involve our forces in military action. I pray that in a week’s time Gaddafi is gone, and I pay tribute to the valour of our armed forces, but I believe that the Government were wrong to ask this—
I congratulate the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and everyone who, with patience and painstaking fortitude, has brought the UN resolution to fruition. I pay tribute, as other hon. Members have, to our armed forces who are implementing that resolution. That type of work is what protecting British national interests is all about. As other hon. Members have said, every generation needs to define what is in Britain’s national interest. In the modern world, our national interest encompasses security, humanitarian issues and commercial interests. It demands that, as a nation, we are prepared to build alliances, to contemplate military co-operation with other nations, and to deploy our unique soft and hard power assets. We are doing so in relation to Libya. We were right to act, but we were right not to act alone.
It was right to agree a resolution with clear parameters for engagement and with broad-based support, which means that, in this context, the international community can act without the United States necessarily taking the lead. It is an example, too, of Anglo-French co-operation, with Britain and France being seen to be in the lead. It confirms that we do not live in a unipolar world. Britain, in the modern world, with a new definition of our national interests, must be as flexible and co-operative as possible to protect its national interest.
As other hon. Members have pointed out, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have given the British people good grounds for caution about our country taking military action and being involved in foreign intervention. When I speak to my constituents in Halesowen and Rowley Regis, they are concerned about our commitments in the world. They have become weary in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan because they saw no clarity about the missions or their end point. We must not make the same mistake again with Libya.
It is vital that we avoid the tendency that has characterised some of our military interventions in the recent past to use over-optimistic language and to engender inflated expectations about what we can achieve and, in some contexts, a downright delusion about the lengthy effort required to achieve a successful outcome when we make the grave decision to intervene in the affairs of other countries. That mindset and language characterised our initial involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our new modern national interest demands that we are pragmatic, realistic and straight with the British people about what we are trying to achieve through the resolution. We must see the debate tonight, and the United Nations resolution, in the context of Britain adopting a broader strategy towards the middle east, a region which in recent times has been subject to turbulence and unpredictability, forcing on Britain a posture of ambiguity in foreign affairs, and obliging us to live with that ambiguity and make decisions within that context.
Although we are taking military action under the UN resolution, we must also be determined to use our influence through alliances and through our soft power assets to help build functioning civil societies and democracy in the countries of the middle east. It is in our national interest to utilise those soft power assets simultaneously with making a focused decision to take the action that we are taking in Libya.
The resolution that we are debating tonight is clear and pragmatic. It has broad-based support and I believe it is in Britain’s national interest to take action against Gaddafi now, but at the same time to be mindful that in doing so, we are making a grave decision that must be combined with Britain using its soft power assets throughout the middle east to promote democracy and build civic society.
Order. Before I call the next speaker, I inform the House that I will take one more six-minute speech, then I will drop the time limit to four minutes to try and get in as many speakers as possible.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberJust before I call the next speaker, may I say that 15 Members still wish to catch my eye and that their speeches are going to have to finish just before 9.35 pm?
Order. I have eight speakers to get in and there are 34 minutes.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberA message has been received from the Lords on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. Under the Order of the House of 15 February, any message from the Lords relating to the Bill may be considered forthwith, without any Question put. The text of the Lords insistence on amendments 1 and 8, and reasons, is available in the Vote Office as Bill 152. A paper is also available in the Vote Office setting out the motion, which I now call on the Minister to move.
Lords message considered forthwith (Programme Order, 15 February).
Clause 1
Referendum on the alternative vote system
Order. Mr Brennan, the Minister has given way once and he has said that he is not going to give way again.
I am grateful to you, Mr Deputy Speaker.
A related point made in the other place was the argument that Lord Rooker’s threshold was appropriate because the question being decided in the referendum was constitutionally significant. My argument is that we are having the referendum because this is an important issue—it is about how we are elected. It is not right that we make that decision, because the people should decide how Members are elected to this House.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith this it will be convenient to consider amendment (a) and Lords amendment 8.
The first amendment to be moved on Report in the other place by the noble Lord Rooker and agreed to by a majority of just one vote provides that:
“If less than 40% of the electorate vote in the referendum, the result shall not be binding.”
The Government oppose the inclusion of this amendment in the Bill on two key grounds. First, it goes against our view that people should get what they vote for, and, secondly, it introduces the perverse consequences associated with thresholds.
Before going into those arguments, however, I should remind colleagues that we have debated the question of whether to impose a 40% turnout threshold before, when an amendment to this effect was tabled on Report by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). I note that he has tabled an amendment today that seeks to reintroduce his proposal from Report, turning Lord Rooker’s proposal into a straightforward turnout threshold by mandating the Minister to repeal the AV provisions in the event that turnout is less than 40%. It is worth recording that, when this House voted on that proposal the first time round, it was resoundingly rejected by 549 votes to 31. On that occasion, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), speaking for the Opposition, said that he did not think it appropriate to bring in a threshold.
This whole argument is against a motion that was not passed in the other place. It is against one that was defeated where there was a threshold that amounted to a veto on the result if the turnout were below that threshold. Does the Minister not accept that this Lords amendment is completely different in character? All it does—although it is a very important “all”—is to ensure that if there is a turnout of less than 40% in total, the matter will come back to this House. To pick up the Minister’s example, if, say, there were a 39% turnout and 75% of that 39% had voted in favour of a change in the voting system, I cannot conceive that this House would fail to endorse it. On the other hand, if there were a 25% turnout and if it were approved by only—
In fairness, many Members want to contribute to the debate. Can we please come to the end of the question?
I echo the point made by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) that the amendment only requires the House of Commons to think about a poor turnout and how to respond to the result under such circumstances rather than automatically triggering a small yes vote with a low turnout and a new voting system. Does the Minister not recognise the irony of his position? Here we are looking at a referendum that might introduce a new voting system under which a Member elected to this House will be required to get 50% of the votes cast, yet we cannot even put in a threshold to require a 40% turnout to give credibility to the result of a referendum. What serious constitution around the world does not have some form of threshold and why should we not introduce one in this case?
Let me be quite honest: a number of Members are still seeking to catch my eye, so we need shorter interventions.
I will take your injunction as implicitly indicating that I should give way to fewer of them.
On the effect of AV, it is not, of course, the case under our system of optional preferential voting that it is necessarily 50% of the votes cast that counts; rather it is 50% of the vote remaining in the count. If lots of people choose not to accept a preference, AV does not imply that a Member of Parliament must get more than 50% of the vote. I simply disagree with my hon. Friend. He will know that I am as unenthusiastic about the alternative vote as he is, but I think the right thing to do, which is the Government’s policy, is to have the referendum so that he and I can go out and argue for a no vote, while other colleagues wanting a yes vote will make that case. We can then both seek to get as many people as possible to vote on our behalf. The Government’s view is that if there is a turnout threshold, it will provide an incentive for those who favour a no result to stay at home. I do not think that we should be encouraging that.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. You will be aware that over the past few weeks we have had to ask questions of the Government in relation to Home Office statements not being made to this House. We have strong indications this evening that tomorrow the Home Office is to make announcements on immigration policy that affect the immigration cap. We believe that the press lobby have been informed; indeed, the Minister responsible has offered an off-camera briefing to the press on the issues involved. How can we take this issue forward when it seems that the Home Office has now become a serial offender?
I am grateful for having been given notice of that point of order. There is no information about a Government statement tonight. Those on the Treasury Bench will have heard what the hon. Gentleman has said. Advice could be taken from the Table Office, and I suggest that he seek it there.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The hon. Gentleman seems to be claiming that the Prime Minister is using Downing street for commercial purposes. Is it appropriate for the hon. Gentleman to make such a serious allegation against his own Prime Minister?
I think we all know that that is not a point of order.
I do not want to stray from the subject of the new clauses and the amendments, but I should point out something that seems permanently to escape Opposition Members, which is that we live in a time of austerity, and our Prime Minister is doing everything he can to maximise revenue to the Exchequer and minimise expense, hence the reasonably priced wine being served and the—
Order. We are straying from the subject of new clause 4. The price of drinks in Downing street has nothing to do with the topic under discussion.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I was in danger of being wholly distracted from my point, which is that my love for the British constitution, such as it is, is greater even than my love for a glass of reasonably priced white wine served at No. 10 Downing street, and there is no part of the British constitution for which I have a greater passion than that nebulous concept of Prorogation. It is the subject of the stories that my parents read to me by my bedside when I was a child. I agree that it sounds like a sad childhood, but such it was.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) made an ingenious argument about the dangers of this power remaining with the sovereign. He suggested that a Prime Minister presiding without a secure majority and having lost a vote of no confidence in this House might advise the sovereign to prorogue Parliament to avoid the possibility of Parliament passing a vote of confidence in an alternative Government and thereby bringing about an election, rather than the installation of a new Government. I am second to none in my passion for the nebulous concept of Prorogation, but I am no lawyer, unlike the hon. Gentleman.
The question that has been asked does not relate to the clause or the amendments and I defer always to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, as to whether my comments would be relevant, although of course I want to be courteous to my hon. Friend.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. My understanding of the procedures of the House is that Members need to refer directly to the proposals on the amendment paper, not rehash or rehearse a debate that took place previously, and at some length.
First, it is for me to decide whether a Member is straying out of line. I would say to Mr Byles that he has to keep in order on new clause 4. He has drifted a little, but he keeps coming back to the matter of four years or five. I am sure that he has taken those remarks on board, and that we can continue.
I am grateful to you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I have almost come to the end of my scene-setting remarks and will get into considerably more detail on the amendments very shortly. Before I do, I want to refer to confidence votes and thresholds, which have already been mentioned this afternoon, including by Labour Members.
Although we are moving to a system of fixed-term Parliaments, it would clearly be unusual and wrong to put in place a system that did not allow for early elections, in one of two scenarios: if the confidence of the House could not be held by a party leader, or if there were an emergency of some sort, or another exceptional circumstance that required an early election in the national interest. I believe that the Bill as it stands, unamended—
Order. The hon. Gentleman should be relating his remarks to new clause 4 and the amendments grouped with it. We do not need to drift back to other subjects; we have gone beyond them. I remind him that we need to stick to the subject in hand.
Order. I say to those on the two Front Benches, can we please continue?
Thank you very much, Mr Deputy Speaker.
I shall move on to new clause 4, which sets out new rules for the Prorogation—I have as much trouble as the hon. Member for Rhondda with that word—of Parliament. It would repeal the Prorogation Act 1867, which provides the power for Her Majesty to issue a proclamation for the Prorogation of Parliament. I think I got that right.
As the House is aware, Prorogation marks the end of a parliamentary Session and is the formal name given to the period between the end of one Session of Parliament and the state opening of Parliament, which begins the next Session. The parliamentary Session may also be prorogued before Parliament is dissolved and a general election called.
It is worth reminding ourselves that the term “prorogation” is derived from the Roman concept of prorogatio. In the constitution of ancient Rome, prorogatio was the extension of a commander’s imperium beyond the one-year term of his magistracy. Prorogatio developed as a legal procedure in response to Roman expansionism and militarisation.
In the context of the Westminster system, Prorogation or Dissolution of Parliament on the final day of the Session originally, according to the House of Lords Library, comprised four principal elements. First, the Speaker made a speech mainly concerned with the Subsidy Bill, which he had brought up from the Commons. This was followed by a speech from the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper replying to the points made by the Speaker and expressing thanks for the Subsidy Bill. Royal Assent was then given to the Bills passed by both Houses. Finally, the Lord Chancellor, in obedience to the sovereign’s instructions, either prorogued or dissolved Parliament. The sovereign was customarily present on those occasions, and from the 17th century onwards, usually made the speech before Prorogation or Dissolution.
Hon. Members will, I am sure, be fascinated to learn from the Library’s excellent note that
“In the early nineteenth century the prorogation was still accompanied with considerable ceremony. Thus in 1815 the Prince Regent rode in the State Coach with a cavalry escort through St James’s Park to the Palace of Westminster, and on his arrival was announced with a salute of cannon.”
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this we may take Lords amendments 2, 3 and 7.
When I opened the debate on Second Reading in September, I set out—at some length, I regret to say—the history and background of compensation in the civil service since 1859. I do not propose to do the same this afternoon. However, it is timely to bring the story up to date as regards what has happened since the Bill left this House on 13 October to go to the other place.
I reiterate that from the day I first announced that the Government intended to reform the civil service compensation scheme on 6 July, extensive discussions have taken place between my officials—and myself on a number of occasions—and the civil service trade unions. Proposals were put to the Council of Civil Service Unions on 24 September. In the event, the council did not accept those proposals, but five of the unions—Prospect, the First Division Association, the Prison Officers Association, the GMB and Unite—approached the Government directly and asked to continue discussions on those terms. There followed an intensive period of meetings between the five unions and officials, which on 5 October resulted in an agreement between the negotiators on terms that might form the basis of a new compensation scheme. Later that day, the five unions wrote to confirm that they had accurately recorded an agreement that all their negotiating teams were able to recommend positively to their executives as being the best that might be achieved in negotiation.
Soon after 5 October, agreement was reached between the Government and the trade union negotiating teams. The POA’s executive committee voted to distance itself from that agreement and to request further discussion. The sixth union, the Public and Commercial Services Union, withdrew from the talks at the point when the five other unions had agreed to negotiate separately with the Government. While the Bill was in the other place, the Government agreed a number of changes to it, and this House now has the opportunity to consider those. The group of amendments that we are dealing with responds to a commitment that I made when we discussed this on Report—that is, to reinforce the requirement for meaningful consultation on any changes to civil service consultation schemes.
The new clause includes a clear requirement that future consultation on any changes that would reduce the value of the civil service compensation scheme must be undertaken
“with a view to reaching agreement”,
and it requires a report to be made to Parliament setting out the details of the consultation that had been carried out with the unions. My noble Friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire accepted an Opposition amendment in the other place to delete wording that would have limited the content of that report to such information as the Minister considered appropriate. Lord Wallace also agreed that we would table written ministerial statements in both Houses when the imminent new scheme is laid before Parliament to draw attention to it and to the steps that have been taken to consult the unions. Furthermore, we agreed to limit to three years—this is the subject of the next group of amendments—the power to revive the caps in the Bill by order, and to drop our proposals that would have allowed that time limit to have been extended by a further six months at a time.
During the Bill’s passage through the other place, the Government remained committed to trying to reach an agreement with the Council of Civil Service Unions. I made a number of personal approaches, both orally and in writing, to the PCS general secretary and to the POA inviting the CCSU to put forward alternative proposals for a reformed civil service compensation scheme and seeking to engage further. I reiterated the Government’s continuing aim of reaching an agreement with all the unions. I have offered every opportunity to those unions that wish to engage constructively in negotiations. As I said, five of them did so, and their proposals formed the basis of the agreement on which the new proposed scheme is based. If the Bill goes through its processes and achieves Royal Assent, I would intend to lay that scheme before Parliament before Christmas.
On 9 November, the Council of Civil Service Unions wrote to me with suggestions for areas that could be considered in further talks, and I responded on 15 November. I have to say that the suggestions made in the council’s letter would have had the effect of reducing the level of compensation paid to many lower-paid civil servants, and so it could not form the basis of further discussions. Having a new scheme that provides genuinely better protection for the lowest-paid civil service workers, many of whom are members of the PCS, has been crucial in all the discussions we have had. As I have made clear throughout the process, including when I made the announcement of our intention to reform and on Second Reading, that is crucial to the aims of the coalition Government.
I explained to the Council of Civil Service Unions that, in the absence of detailed proposals from the PCS, work would have to proceed on drafting the rules for a new scheme. Last week, my officials sent the draft rules for the new compensation scheme to the Council of Civil Service Unions to seek its views. Those rules will form the basis of the new compensation scheme, which as I said I intend to lay before Parliament as soon as possible, assuming that the Bill completes its passage and achieves Royal Assent.
The Lords amendments are intended to reassure the House, the unions and all stakeholders that the Government will consult fully with the unions should there be future proposals to change the compensation scheme that would reduce the benefits for civil servants. They merely put into statute what has always been our intention. Arguably, that requirement is already contained in the Superannuation Act 1972, but the amendments will put it beyond peradventure or doubt.
The amendments reflect the lengthy consultation process that I have just described. They are Government amendments that were made in the other place to respond to commitments that I made on Report and Third Reading. I am grateful for the constructive involvement of the unions and those on the Opposition Front Bench throughout the process of refining the amendments to achieve the maximum consensus.
Lords amendment 1, which is the lead amendment, inserts a new clause after clause 1. As I said, it makes it clear that consultation should be undertaken
“with a view to reaching agreement”,
and it requires that a report of that consultation be laid before Parliament. The new provisions will apply when there is a change to the compensation scheme that will result in reduced benefits. The report would have to include details of
“the consultation that took place”,
the steps that were taken
“with a view to reaching agreement”
with the unions or other persons consulted, and
“whether such agreement has been reached.”
I repeat that the Government are committed to consultation with the unions. Like the previous Administration, we will always seek to reach agreement with all unions on changes to the compensation scheme. We know from experience that that may not always be possible, and in such cases, the report will explain why.
The effect of Lords amendments 2 and 3 is that the consultation provisions will come into force two months after Royal Assent. That is the standard interval before the commencement of new legislation. However, because of the need for certainty, the other provisions of the Bill will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. As a consequence, the requirement to publish and lay before Parliament a report on the consultation will apply to future changes to the compensation scheme, and not to those currently being developed for implementation when the Bill is enacted.
A requirement for a report on the current consultation would be nugatory, because no one can claim that there has been anything other than long and extensive consultation, carried out not just by myself and my officials, but by my predecessor in this process, the right hon. Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Tessa Jowell), and the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr Byrne), who is now on the Opposition Front Bench. This process goes back a long time; there have been three years of drawn out extensive consultation and negotiation. Parliament is well aware, and nobody can have any doubt, that the process has been extensive and thorough; it has been described by the right hon. Gentleman, the right hon. Lady and myself. Equally, it would be wrong to risk a further delay, while a report was prepared and laid before Parliament, before the proposed scheme could be introduced. I have agreed, as Lord Wallace said in the other place, to table written ministerial statements to set out what consultation there has been.
I hope the House will recognise that the Government are seeking to provide the additional reassurance that was sought by the Opposition, and that the changes to the Bill meet my earlier commitments.
Those are not concerns that have just arisen; they have been there throughout. I have been forthright in ventilating them with the leadership of the PCS and POA, and they know that. We have been clear about the envelope within which it would be possible to make changes because increasing protection for one group can be done only at the expense of other groups. There is no way around that. That is the basis on which we have formulated the new scheme, which I hope to lay before Parliament before the Christmas recess. That is the basis of my case.
All the Lords amendments to the Bill engage the financial privilege of the House. If they are agreed to, the appropriate record will be made in the Journal of the House.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to, with Commons financial privileges waived.
Lords amendments 2 and 3 agreed to, with Commons financial privileges waived.
Clause 3
Final provisions
With this we may take Lords amendments 5 and 6 and amendment (a) thereto.
The amendments respond to concerns raised by Opposition Members on Second Reading in the other place about the potential for the caps in what is now clause 2 to be revived after being put into abeyance, which is what I propose to do next week before the House rises and before the new scheme is laid. The Government also proposed the amendments to respond to the comments about the unusual use of a sunrise provision in clause 3(4)(c) that were made in the third report of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, published on 28 October. My noble Friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire provided a full response to the Committee in his letter of 1 December. We are grateful to the Committee for its report.
The Committee also commented on the other provisions in clause 3 which would enable, by order, the caps included in clause 2 to be repealed and also to be extended by six months at a time. That would override the so-called sunset provision in clause 3(3), which would otherwise mean that the caps on civil service compensation provided in clause 2 would expire automatically after 12 months. The Committee said that “these arrangements are complex”, but added that the two delegated powers
“do not appear to the Committee to be inappropriate”.
However, the Committee was not so persuaded of the need for the power in clause 3 to revive the caps in clause 2, that being an unlimited power that would have been available to any future Government in circumstances that we cannot predict today. The amendments respond to that point. The Government accept that there should not be an unlimited power to revive clause 2. Lords amendment 6 therefore provides for subsection 3(4)(c) itself to expire three years after Royal Assent, which is in effect a sunset of the sunrise provision. I can see why some people might say that that was a bit complex, but I think that, when fully parsed, it makes perfectly good sense.
The sunset of the power to revive clause 2 would mean that it would be there, as the Government intend, as a fallback to revive the caps in clause 2, just in case they were needed because of future problems in implementing the new civil service compensation scheme. However, the introduction of the three-year time limit should provide a reassurance that the power to revive clause 2 would not be available indefinitely to future Governments.
The caps are there as a potential fall-back so that we can be certain—as both the last Government and we have wanted to be—that we can reform the civil service compensation scheme. We have an absolute obligation, in the public interest, to address the unfair and unaffordable nature of the current scheme, and we need to ensure that if a legal challenge is mounted to our revised scheme—and it has been suggested that that may well happen—there is a fall-back option, albeit one that we have absolutely no desire to use. We do not expect or intend to use the powers to impose the caps in clause 2; what we want is to see in operation as quickly as possible is the reformed civil service compensation scheme. We are determined that, if all else fails, there will be a fall-back position so that we are not left high and dry—as the last Government were—because of a legal challenge to the details of the new scheme.
Before the new scheme is laid before Parliament, I intend an order to be made under clause 3(4)(a) to repeal the caps in clause 2 in relation to any new scheme. We intend the order to include a saving provision so that the caps could be applied if, and only if, the old unreformed scheme had to be reintroduced. The saving provision would allow that to happen automatically, without the need to use the revival power by order under clause 3(4)(c). I should make it clear that this saving provision would apply only if there were an attempt to revert to the old scheme. An order under clause 3(4)(c) would be required, subject to the affirmative procedure, if it were ever proposed to revive the caps in clause 2 and to impose them over the new civil service compensation scheme that will be put in place following the completion of this Bill’s passage.
Finally, unless further extended by order under clause 3(4)(b), clause 2 in its entirety—including the saving provision—will expire 12 months after Royal Assent. From that point on, any revival of the caps would have to use the order-making power in clause 3(4)(c), which, because of these Lords amendments, will be available only within three years of Royal Assent. I very much hope that by then the new civil service compensation scheme will be in place and be operating satisfactorily for all concerned—civil servants, departmental employers and the civil service trade unions—and that the taxpayers’ interests and the proper interests of civil servants will be being met. Amendments 4 and 5 are consequential on amendment 6.
The House needs to be aware of what this measure actually means, and I make it clear that I will press my amendment to a Division.
The hon. Gentleman will be able to move his amendment formally later.
Thank you very much for that advice, Mr Deputy Speaker. I get confused when we are talking about sunset and sunrise clauses.
Let me explain what this measure means. Despite all we have heard today from the Government about their willingness to achieve a negotiated settlement on a new compensation scheme and their wish to ensure that all the trade unions are signed up to it and that it is acceptable both to members of those unions and to people not in those unions, the fact is that they will retain the power, over a three-year period, to impose the caps set out in the Bill.
We should remind ourselves of what those caps are: for a compulsory redundancy, an amount equal to a person’s earnings for 12 months, and that amount for 15 months for a voluntary severance. We heard in evidence in Committee—this has been repeated in the Chamber time and again—that that will mean a cut of up to two thirds in the redundancy payments of many civil servants; 60% to 70% was the figure cited by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Any Government will have the power to impose those caps at a later date, and to impose that level of penalty on civil servants who are made redundant.
If the Government are confident of being able to negotiate an agreed solution under the new scheme in this coming period, why do they need the right, over a three-year period, to impose these caps unilaterally? I still think that if they sought to do that, it would be subject to a legal challenge, but why would a Government seek to retain that power if they were entering into negotiations with good will, genuinely seeking an agreement, and taking every reasonable step to secure one?
My amendment simply seeks to reduce the period to 12 months, as an act of good will on behalf of this House in respect of its employees in the civil service. I believe the Government have set the period at three years because they want to maintain their original purpose for the Bill, as previously described: to use it as a blunt instrument to bludgeon the unions into submission so they agree to the Government’s proposals. That is unacceptable. I also think this will be another factor that leads to people rejecting the overall scheme in the ballots that are currently taking place, and instead moving on to take action to stop the scheme being imposed upon themselves and their fellow trade union members.
I urge the Government to think again, as 12 months should give them sufficient time to negotiate and introduce a new scheme, and to introduce any reforms or amendments that might be needed to hone it to make it more workable if there were any problems with its implementation. It is unacceptable for the Government to have the threat of this blunt instrument to hold over civil servants for three years. Introducing this measure would be another contributory factor to the deterioration in the relationship between the Government and their staff, who are meant to implement, with high morale, the policies they introduce.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI should like initially to make it absolutely clear that the dog has claimed no allowances whatever!
The hon. Gentleman knows, because I have communicated this point to him, that we need to reflect on the public’s reaction a year ago. Indeed, I contributed to the discussion in January and was in favour of a much simpler administrative scheme than the current one. Is the review at the beginning of January not an opportunity to try to get the system right, in a non-adversarial way; to take the public or, at least, the opinion-formers with us, rather than back a year; to make the job of IPSA staff, whom he rightly praises for trying to operate a difficult system, much easier; and to ensure, therefore, that MPs benefit from a simpler process, the public benefit from a cheaper process and the world outside believes that we have not once again lost our marbles?
Order. Can we have shorter interventions? A lot of Members wish to speak in this very important debate.
I welcome the intervention and the correspondence between me and the right hon. Gentleman, although we have a slightly different view about the purpose of today’s motion. We know that there will never be a win on this subject with the media and the public, whatever the scheme’s initial form. That is just never going to happen. Anybody who has been around the media, business or politics for long enough knows that that will never happen, so the question for us is: what type of scheme would be most beneficial to constituents and the taxpayer?
I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s input during the initial set-up, and I recognise his hard work in looking for a simple scheme, but I suspect that IPSA has not fully taken on board the power that we have given it to simplify things and make our jobs easier. My greatest hope today is that the terms of the motion never need to be used, and that IPSA comes forward with a scheme that works, thereby enabling us to do our job.
With regard to the intervention of the hon. Member for Walsall North, it is notoriously difficult to get information out of IPSA, and I understand why. Among other practices, it might not reflect well on IPSA if its senior salaries were compared with the salaries of Members of Parliament. I believe that there is also concern over the cost of the buildings that it has hired and the contracts into which it has entered. I do not want to go into the minutiae of how IPSA operates; I want to focus on the purpose of the motion and the consequences of its being passed this afternoon.
The motion presents an opportunity for the Government and our political party leaders to stand aside from this issue. The moment a party leader speaks on this subject, it is ignited and becomes a party political matter, with the parties wrangling with each other. The moment a Government get involved, it is a headline media issue—why are the Government trying to change IPSA and get rid of its independence? It is untenable for Governments and political party leaders to handle this issue, and they cannot do so in the way that is needed. I put it to the House that it is right for Parliament to handle this issue and to create the opportunity for the Government and party leaders to stand aside and allow measures to be brought forward. If it looks like those measures will cost the taxpayer more, of course the Government should have a right of veto. However, we need to deliver to the Government and party leaders the opportunity to step aside and allow this place time for calm contemplation and to bring forward measures. It is then up to the Government to make a judgment. We would be doing our party leaders a service, and it would be the first time in 100 years that they would have been given such an opportunity on the issue of MPs’ conditions and remuneration.
Order. As hon. Members are aware, Mr Speaker has decided not to select the amendment. Many Members wish to speak, so brevity is essential.
(13 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. May I illustrate the point that he and I have made in answer to the Minister’s perfectly reasonable point? At first blush, it appears that the provisions of clause 2(1)(c) strengthen the role of the House against the Prime Minister. However, I remember what happened in 1979. I was a candidate at the 1979 election, so I was no longer working for the Government, but I was in very close touch with people for whom I had worked for three and a half years and knew a lot about what was happening. There was a crisis over the outcome of the Scottish Assembly referendum, and the Commons needed an occasion on which it could give vent to that feeling, because the various smaller parties had to have their positions put on the record. Had there been a provision in legislation for an early Dissolution by two-thirds majority, the Government of the day—
Order. Interventions must be shorter. I understand that the point has to be made, but I would be grateful if we could get to it quickly.
In that situation, the Government of the day would have worked with the smaller parties and said, “You can have your shout on the two-thirds majority, and in return, we’ll give a bit of extra cash to Northern Ireland,” and so on. That would have happened. Therefore, the motion of no confidence would probably never have been tabled, and even if it had been, it probably would have been lost.
Frankly, the point of order that the hon. Gentleman raised last week was nonsense. He did not give me notice of it, so I was unable to respond. I listened carefully to last week’s debate and responded to it. I then made an announcement of Government policy in this House at the Dispatch Box, which I thought was the usual way of conducting business.
The following day, I wrote to the leaders of parties in each of the devolved Assemblies, as I said I would. I did not put anything in those letters that I had not announced in the debate. I also wrote to the shadow Justice Secretary, who leads on political and constitutional reform for the Opposition, to keep him properly informed. I placed copies of all those letters in the Library.
Order. We should not be rehashing previous points of order. We should be dealing with the amendment. I am sure that Mr Bryant wishes to do so.
Yes, indeed. This is just about the process and the fact that it has been the convention in every Committee stage in which I have been involved for Ministers to write to all members of the Committee, and, when the Committee is sitting on the Floor of the House, to all those who have taken part in the debate.
My point is that clause 2 has no electoral mandate. Clause 1 has some degree of mandate, in that we had proposed in our manifesto that there should be fixed-term Parliaments, and the Liberal Democrats had made a similar proposal. I do not believe that there is a mandate for a five-year fixed-term Parliament, as both political parties had previously said that they were in favour of four-year fixed-term Parliaments. Clause 2 has absolutely no mandate from the electorate. Indeed, the proposals in it run directly counter to those in the Conservative manifesto, and to what the Prime Minister said as Leader of the Opposition in relation to the reform of the power of Dissolution. He said that he would introduce legislation to ensure that, should there be a change of Prime Minister as a result of the party in power changing its leader, there would be a general election within six months, but that is not the proposal that we have before us today.
The Deputy Leader of the House is chuntering away. I think he is trying to talk to you, Mr Hoyle, because he keeps on saying that I am out of order and that I am not speaking to the right part of the clause. Perhaps he could have his conversation with you privately.
The hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil) is absolutely right in one sense. We have to achieve a balancing act. This House needs to exert its power through its majority to hold the Government to account and, if necessary, to sack the Government. In most circumstances, that has happened when a political party has splintered or when a leader of a party has proved unable to control his or her troops—his, in most cases—through the Division Lobbies. We have seen that happen with the Irish Home Rule Bill and with the Budget at different times, leading to a collapse of confidence in the Government on the Government side and the subsequent fall of that Government. I think that we should still stick with that process.
In case hon. Members feel that in recent times motions of no confidence—and particularly successful motions of no confidence—have been pretty rare, it is worth pointing out that we should look at a longer period of history than just the last few years if we are to set out constitutional change that will stand the test of time. We have no way of knowing what will happen to the political parties, as presently constituted, in five, 10, 15 or 20 years’ time.
Looking back over the last 150 or so years, we find that no confidence motions have been used quite regularly and have frequently led to the collapse of Governments. Lord North’s Government, for example, fell in 1782. There was also a sustained period in which no confidence motions were common from 1885 onwards; indeed, there were two such motions in 1886, when first Lord Salisbury’s Government and then Gladstone’s Government fell again on the issue of Irish home rule, which divided the Liberal party—
Order. I am sure that the Committee, like me, welcomes the history lesson, but we must stick to the amendments, from which we are drifting away. The hon. Gentleman may feel that he is in order, but he is not. I would like him to come back to order, and it would also be helpful if he faced the Chair.
I am grateful, Mr Hoyle. I will address myself to you more directly. The point I am trying to make is that clause 2 deals with motions of no confidence and early elections and these have been a sustained part of what we have put up with. I am not sure whether you are going to allow a clause 2 stand part debate later. I note that you are saying no, but I hope it will be possible to allow a degree of latitude so that we can consider all the elements of the clause.
The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) observed that Governments had fallen by virtue of their Budgets’ being opposed. One of my arguments is that the whole concept of a no confidence motion is excluded from the Bill. It is not clear what counts as a no confidence motion; nor is it clear, in the part of the Bill that we are currently considering, what counts as a motion calling for an early general election.
I am not sure that that is true. It depended on the Crown—that is, the Government or Executive—retaining the power to dissolve Parliament. I do not think that a measure that was considered to be a motion of no confidence in 1866—namely,
“to leave out the words ‘clear yearly’ and put ‘rateable’ instead thereof”—
would be considered to be one today, and I therefore think that it would be inappropriate for that power to remain.
Order. The next set of amendments deals with no confidence motions. I think that the hon. Gentleman is in danger of jumping ahead, and I am sure that he does not want to do that.
I am concerned less about hon. Members’ definition of a confidence issue than about whether that definition would be acceptable to the court if a certificate were challenged. However, I accept that that is the subject of a later clause.
In case there were any doubt about it, I shall join the hon. Gentleman in the Division Lobby unless the Whips manage to get to him, which is very unlikely. They rarely manage to get to him—he is an undiscovered country beyond whose bourn no Whip has ever returned, since we are doing “Hamlet” this afternoon.
Order. It may help the hon. Gentleman to know that the Chair will decide on which amendments the Committee may vote.
Mr Hoyle, I have a point of inquiry following your response to the Opposition’s Front-Bench spokesman, which is about the stand part debate. As the amendments are theories in concatenation, it is difficult to address an amendment in isolation without reference to a wider context.
It is unlikely, not ruled out. The other point is that I am not sure that we will even get there. At the rate at which we are going, we have quite a while to go yet.
Thank you, Mr Hoyle. I shall start with my first observation, which is that the test of each clause in both of the constitutional Bills is to ask in what way it enhances the role of the people in relation to Parliament. The answer, again, is that this does not. The measures are meant to be an internal reorganisation of the rules and regulations of the House of Commons effected through statute. We have had advice from the Clerk of the House that, if challenged, it will be open to judicial interest and the views of the courts. Historically, this matter has always been determined within these precincts and so the question of what we call parliamentary privilege is particularly germane to the Bill. I am very concerned about that. I make the perhaps minor observation that in a struggle between a new Government without a mandate and the House of Commons authorities, who are appointed by the House, I would back the advice of the House rather than that of the politically motivated and interested Government of the day. I do not dismiss the Clerk’s memorandum or accept the response to it, which is effectively like that television sketch “Computer says no.” That is an extraordinary and very undignified response to the Clerk’s advice on something that is of the greatest importance to Members of the House, and through them, citizens’ rights, activities and freedoms.
My next point concerns the accumulation in clause 2 and the proposed amendments to it of purposes, or distinctions between ways of dissolving Parliament. These measures have shifted my position from benign acceptance of the concept of a fixed Parliament to one of questioning whether there was not greater wisdom in the proceedings and processes that we had before. These measures worry me enormously. My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) generously moved an amendment in which she has no confidence in order to test a proposition, and she did test it—to destruction. On examination, the amendment is too threadbare and offends the very conscience of why we are here. It suggests that some Members’ views on whether a Parliament should stand or not should be disregarded because they do not have a party leader who represents a certain number of votes. I do not know how such an amendment got through the Select Committee but I think it was to form the basis of some sort of standing order that could be cooked up to meet the point about judicial inquiry into the purposes or nature of the Bill.
Let me make another point about motions for an early election or of no confidence. We have tickled, argued and considered across the Chamber the way in which Mr Callaghan accepted that there had to be a general election, but that was nearly at the end of a five-year Parliament. There was very little scope beyond going the few months left, but he stood up immediately and said, “There will have to be a general election.” I remember the perfervid moments of the Maastricht debates and the subsequent consequences of a Government who had a very small majority wanting to increase the rate of VAT on domestic fuel. The motion was to be vehemently opposed by people such as myself, who had lost the Whip, but not just because of that—it was an opposed measure. It could not have fallen but for the support of Conservative Members who took a broader view on it, and it did fall.
The argument that was put by the bastion of the 1922 Committee and the Whips, of course, for they have an argument for all seasons, was that if it fell, the Government would fall, and that the solemnest duty of any Conservative Member was to support the measure because the confidence of the House stood in the Budget. I shall always have a soft spot for the Justice Secretary—then the Chancellor—because when he lost the vote, he said, with that famous giggle, “Oh, we’ll have to have a corrigendum Budget.” We duly had one on the following Thursday. I am really talking about the pressure that was put on Back Benchers, because we were told that the Government would fall.
If I had stood in front of my constituents at the general election and said, “I’ve got two little measures. The short title of one of them is the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but the long title seems to contradict that concept,” they would have been bemused. If I had then started talking to them about the nature of confidence votes and motions for an early election, they would have been struggling. We were entering an election and they knew what it was about; there was a crisis. There was a huge public deficit and anxiety about jobs, yet here was Shepherd of Aldridge-Brownhills troubling them with the notion that
“each member of the House of Commons who at the time of the motion being made is the registered leader of a registered party”
and so on. If I had done that, my constituents would have thought, “Well, he’s been with us a long time,” and they might have made a different judgment in the election.
The measure has no mandate. I have opposed other constitutional measures, but however wrong I thought the balance of the argument was for the detail of the Scotland Bill proposed by Labour, no one could say that there had not been a national convention on it. There was no political party in Scotland that had not long resourced such a measure. I recall John Smith’s role and that of a whole series of people. They were alert and alive to the issue. No one could claim that there was no mandate for the reforms and changes that took place under the sovereignty of this Parliament to create a Scottish legislative structure and to pass powers to Scotland. The constitutional developments in Wales and Northern Ireland were similar.
Those measures could claim a mandate. The 19th century is often cited, but these are long struggles. I was a little riled by the Labour spokesman because he referred to the 18th century. It is proclaimed that the glory of the House is reflected in our coming to the democratic age—it is rather like dividing up what happened in a great empire—but the democratic age is fairly fresh and young and new. It did not really start until the 1860s. That was when political parties were formed and there was a more regimented approach to the management of the House—not easy to do. There was a glorious extract from the London Illustrated News next to the office of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash)—I now know where Pericles found the stones to get over his lack of confidence. The extract was from the Queen’s Speech—then Her Majesty Queen Victoria. The burden of it was to say, “This parliamentary Session”—well, this particular parliamentary Session will last for ever, but apart from that—“Her Majesty’s Government will concentrate on foreign affairs. It will leave domestic legislation to the House.” Just like that. That is a world away from where we are now—where the Government have to fiddle and twiddle, and do everything at the behest of a very informed—
Order. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) also gave us a history lesson and had to be reminded to come back to the amendment. I am sure that the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) would prefer to stick to the amendment. I realise that we can broaden things out, but we are going a little bit too far from the measure.
Of course, I joyously do that. Implicit in every line of the measure is the management of the House. That is the only reason why I diverted slightly to recall the London Illustrated News.
Order. Such an experienced Member will know that the referendum is not quite part of this group of amendments. I am sure that he would like to get back to the amendment.
Absolutely, Mr Hoyle. I am sorry, but the right hon. Member for Blackburn, who is a former Home Secretary and holder of many other important national offices, drew me down that road of speculation.
To sum up, the Government have a motive to cover either outcome of the AV referendum. It suits both parties in the coalition to prevent an early general election, which is why they want a fixed-term Parliament—they want to assure themselves of a longer period in office. I say only this: good luck to them, but they should not expect me to vote for the Bill tonight.
My hon. Friend is right, and I shall come in a moment to the Hunting Act 2004, which is another piece of legislation that was open to judicial review. In the courts at the moment, there is the extraordinary situation of an election court judging my—I not sure of the correct parliamentary terminology—previous hon. Friend the Member for Oldham—
Order. We will not stray down that path, as the matter is before the courts. We must return to the amendment.
Thank you, Mr Hoyle. That proves my point—the areas where we cannot go because they are before judges are increasing.
In his written statement, the Minister simply cites article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, and leaves it at that. It provides that
“proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court”,
and he said he could see
“no reason why the courts would not continue to defer to them”.
The comity between Parliament and the courts has relied on the fact that the internal proceedings were entirely matters for the House’s jurisdiction. Its procedures arising from Standing Orders or resolutions cannot be legally challenged, but statute law can. That is the extraordinary development in the Bill.
Order. We are in danger of straying into amendment 6, and I would like hon. Members to come back. I am sure that that is what the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) was about to do.
I was about to come straight back to amendment 33; I will not be led too far astray.
Reference has been made to the new Supreme Court on the other side of Parliament square, which gives the capacity for amendments relating to the self-governing of this place, such as amendment 33, to be overturned by the actions of judges. The Clerk of the House has further warned us of the not infrequent need in recent years for interventions by the Speaker of the House of Commons to protect parliamentary privilege in the courts. As the hon. Member for Stone knows far better than we do, these matters can go from here across Parliament square and even to Europe.
All we want from the Minister is some clarity on this issue, and evidence of some slightly more rigorous thinking than the rushed elements that we have had so far. Rather than being slightly dismissive of the fears expressed by the Clerk of the House, will he provide us with some certainty and a clear answer to the question on statutory instruments and the certificate?
Order. After such a long debate, may I inform the Committee that I do not propose to allow a debate on clause stand part?
There are several other groups of amendments, and we can expand on these matters further in due course. I shall go only as far as I need to in discussing this group, rather than trying to accelerate the debate. I want to deal briefly with the timetable. I do not think that the Bill has been rushed in any way. It was published in July, it had its Second Reading in September, and the first day of its Committee stage did not start until November. We have another day in Committee today, and the House passed a programme motion earlier that gives us an extra day in Committee on Thursday. I do not think that we are rushing ahead with this. No knives were included in the programme motion, and we are taking the debate at the proper pace that the Committee requires.
I would not want the Minister inadvertently to mislead the Committee. He said that extra time has been provided, but he has not allowed any extra time; he has merely allowed the injury time for the three statements that interfered with the debate. [Interruption.] If the Deputy Leader of the House wants to make a speech, I am sure he will be able to catch your eye, Mr Hoyle. [Interruption.]
Order. I would like to stop this bickering between the Front Benchers. Let us move on.
My hon. Friend moved amendment 33, although many members of the Select Committee pretended that they wanted nothing to do with it; to be fair, so did my hon. Friend. She explained why the amendment was tabled—to enable this Committee to debate and test the concerns raised by the Clerk. I shall touch on them briefly. I will not overdo them, as we may have an opportunity to debate them further in a later group of amendments on the Speaker’s certificate. However, I shall deal with the amendment. I know my hon. Friend said that she does not want to press it to a Division, but it is the lead amendment.
The amendment would remove two central provisions—the two mechanisms that provide for an early general election to take place: the vote through which the House can choose to have an early election and the mechanism for having one following the loss of a vote of confidence. Instead, the amendment provides that the early election could take place only on the House’s address to the monarch, which can be made only
“by the Prime Minister acting with the agreement of…the Leader of the Opposition; and…the…leader of a registered party that received more than 20 per cent. of the total votes cast at the previous…general election.”
I have a number of serious issues with the amendment. First, it would prevent the Prime Minister from calling a general election only if he did so for political advantage. It ignores and does not address the circumstances where there is a loss of confidence. It also focuses greatly on Front Benchers, as our debate has made clear. I exempt my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest from this criticism, as she said she did not agree with the amendment, but given their views about the role of Front Benchers, I am surprised that the other signatories to the amendment thought that that was a good idea. The hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) is not in his place, but I do not think he would mind my saying that he is somewhat sceptical about the power of Front Benchers and the usual channels. I am surprised that he supported an amendment that suggests they should have a lot of power. As the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) pointed out, not every registered leader of a party is necessarily a Member of this House.
The amendment also fails to deal with what would happen to a party such as the Liberal Democrats, our coalition partners, part-way through a Parliament. How would we take account of the vote it had received at the previous general election? Indeed, the 20% threshold would leave Northern Ireland parties out of the picture completely. If this measure had been in place following the 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections, only two people would have been required to table the motion—the leader of the Labour party and the leader of the Conservative party. In view of what has been said about the need to remove the power of the Executive and Front Benchers, that does not seem a sensible step forward.
It would thus be fair to say that amendment 33 is not well drafted. From what I heard, it does not sound as if it had enormous support across the Committee, including even from my hon. Friend. Despite the fact that she did not agree with the amendment, she moved it in a way that was very becoming to her parliamentary experience and the Committee enjoyed the opportunity with which it was presented.
In a moment; let me first address the question I have just been asked.
Earlier in the debate, we had a conversation about motions that were not specifically in these terms, and several Members on the Government Benches referred to certain votes. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) referred to some votes on Europe and my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) talked about a vote on VAT on fuel. How the Government behaved after the debates on those motions was determined by Ministers, not the House.
Motions of no confidence are an issue to be debated later. Members ought to be speaking to amendment 33.
Order. I am sorry, but I am making a ruling from the Chair. I feel that this is a debate that we are going to have and I am concerned that we are getting drawn into it now. The Minister may answer quickly, if he wishes, but I do not want to let this go any further after that.
Mr Hoyle, you are pointing out that we can discuss this at length when we get on to a later group of amendments. My view on the hon. Gentleman’s example is very clear: if the Prime Minister so wishes, he can cease being Prime Minister whenever he feels like it. The House could then see whether an alternative Government under a different leader could be formed—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda says not under this provision, but this provision is for an early election. The Prime Minister can cease being Prime Minister whenever the Prime Minister chooses and Her Majesty will then be able to send for an alternative person to form a new Government. That is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about fixed-term Parliaments, not fixed-term Governments.